

Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee

Additional estimates 2004-05

Answers to questions on notice from **Department of Defence**

Portfolio overview and major corporate issues

Portfolio overview

QUESTION 1

Senator Evans

Proof Hansard: pp. 43-44 (16 February 2005)

Please provide a copy of the Concept of Operations document for the Australian contingent operating within the Iraq Survey Group.

RESPONSE

A declassified copy of the document is attached.

QUESTION 2

Senator Evans

Proof Hansard: p. 69 (16 February 2005)

What were the dates of formal correspondence sent to and returned from Minister Hill, on the issue raised by an unidentified military officer on 17 June 2004?

RESPONSE

Item of Correspondence	Signed by Defence	Received by Minister	Annotated by Minister	Received by Defence
Ministerial Submission from Secretary and CDF to Minister	17 June 2004	17 June 2004	25 June 2004	28 June 2004
Ministerial Submission from Head Iraq Detainee Fact-Finding Team to Minister	2 July 2004	5 July 2004	12 July 2004	13 July 2004
Letter from Defence to US Embassy (copied to Office of the Minister for Defence).	6 July 2004	7 July 2004	Not marked.	13 July 2004

QUESTION 3

Senator Bishop

Proof Hansard: p. 122 (16 February 2005) and p. 26 (18 February 2005)

Does the Department still hold the view that the existence of an Australian mass war grave at Fromelles is unlikely?

RESPONSE

It is Defence's policy to conduct searches only where there is strong circumstantial or definite evidence that human remains are those of an Australian.

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The information provided by Senator Bishop that supports the claim of a mass war grave at Fromelles is speculative and does not provide a degree of substantiation sufficient to justify spending public funds in a search.

The Office of the Chief of Army asked the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to refer this matter to the French authorities. The advice from the French authorities, provided through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is that no mass grave of Australian soldiers has been discovered recently nor is there likely to be one on the basis of local historical knowledge.

Should further substantive evidence, or actual remains be discovered, Defence would consider the new evidence and then decide whether or not to investigate the claims.

QUESTION 4

Senator Hogg

Proof Hansard: p. 23 (18 February 2005)

What is the name of the other agency that conducted a debrief attended by Mr Rod Barton in April?

RESPONSE

The matter has been referred to the Minister responsible for the agency.

Capability Development

QUESTION 9

Senator Bishop

Proof Hansard: p. 42 (18 February 2005)

Did the Defence Capability Plan of 2001 in relation to the air-to-air refuellers have an in-service date of 2006?

RESPONSE

Yes.

Capital budget

QUESTION W4

Senator Carr

Consultancies

Please provide a table listing details of all consultancies for the 2003-04 financial year, for the department and all associated agencies including:

- a) the costs for all completed consultancies, both budgeted and actual;

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- b) the costs for ongoing consultancies, both budgeted and for the current financial year;
- c) the total costs for all consultancies, both the amount expended in the current financial year, and the total budgeted value of all consultancies running in the current financial year;
- d) the nature and purpose of the consultancy;
- e) the method by which the contract was let; and
- f) the name and details of the company and/or individual who is carrying out, or carried out, the contract.

RESPONSE

- a)-f) The information for consultancies conducted in 2003-04 can be found on pages 450-471 of the *Defence Annual Report 2003-04*. Information for consultancies conducted in the current financial year will be published in the *Defence Annual Report 2004-05*. Currently the costs of consultancies are not budgeted for as a discreet line item but are included in the estimates of Defence's supplier expenses. Defence will separately identify the costs of consultancies in the estimates commencing in 2005-06.

Major capital equipment

QUESTION 7

Senator Bishop

Proof Hansard: pp. 38-39 (18 February 2005)

- a) What is the final estimated cost of the combat system design and software for the Adelaide-class guided missile frigate?
- b) When will trials of the new combat system software on the Adelaide-class guided missile frigates be concluded?

RESPONSE

- a) Approximately \$310 million (February 1998 base date dollars).
- b) The prime contract allows for progressive delivery of the software. To mitigate technical risk, the prime contractor, ADI Limited, has elected to deliver the software in three separate baselines across the first three ships for upgrade. This will mean that planned improvements made to the software on subsequent ships will be retrospectively delivered to the earlier ships. For HMAS *Sydney*, the lead ship for upgrade, trials on the new combat system software will conclude at successful completion of contractor sea trials that are currently planned for August 2005.

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QUESTION 8

Senator Bishop

Proof Hansard: pp. 40-41 (18 February 2005)

In relation to the Seasprite Helicopters:

- a) Are reports that the helicopter is incapable of carrying both a missile and extra fuel tanks at the same time accurate?
- b) Can Defence comment on concerns that have been raised that on hot days the power margins used for operating the helicopters are too narrow?
- c) Does the Department know what power margins are used to determine the safe landing limit for the helicopters?
- d) What power margins are used for a helicopter to take off from a naval ship on a standard summer day off the coast of Brisbane?

RESPONSE

- a) No.
- b) These concerns are unfounded. The Super Seasprite employs, and has achieved in trials, the standard Navy power margins when operating from ships at sea, regardless of the combination of temperature and air pressure.
- c) Yes.
- d) The standard Navy requirements are a five per cent power margin by day and ten per cent by night for all helicopter operations conducted to or from ships with flight decks, irrespective of the air temperature or pressure.

Defence Outcomes

Outcome 1: Command of operations in defence of Australia and its interests

QUESTION W1

Senator Nettle

Australian Army Training Team – Iraq

- a) Have ADF members of the Iraqi Army Training Team accompanied members of the Iraqi military, police or other security forces on patrols or other operations? If yes, on how many occasions?
- b) On how many occasions have there been hostile contacts or combat?
- c) What is defence's assessment of the strength, character (nationalist, Islamist, foreign fighters etc.) and the numbers of insurgents in Iraq?
- d) How many Iraqi combatants or civilians have been killed or injured by the ADF security attachment based in Baghdad?

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RESPONSE

- a) No.
- b) Not applicable.
- c) The opposition to the Iraqi Transitional Government and Coalition forces in Iraq consists primarily of a number of Sunni Arab insurgent groups, concentrated in four provinces in the central and north-west parts of Iraq. The Sunni insurgents are motivated by a variety of factors: former regime elements, Islamists, nationalists and criminals. The short-term aims of Sunni insurgents – to force a withdrawal of Coalition forces and bring about the collapse of the Iraqi Government – coalesce, but their long-term aims differ. Insurgent groupings and motivations include:
- former regime elements who desire to expel the Coalition and revive the Ba'athist regime;
 - Islamists who wish to establish an Islamic regime in Iraq. Some of these are Iraqi in origin, and others are foreign fighters – such as Zarqawi. Although numerically small, the foreign fighters are responsible for many of the spectacular mass-casualty attacks; and
 - ordinary Sunni Iraqis who are motivated by nationalism, a desire for revenge, or criminal financial gain.

There are no definitive assessments of the number of insurgents in Iraq. The Iraqi insurgency is a fluid movement and numbers of fighters are constantly in flux as insurgents move into and out of areas. There is also a nexus between criminal groups and insurgents, with criminals exploiting the law and order vacuum created by the insurgency. 'Hard core' insurgents probably number in the low tens of thousands, but it is difficult to assess how many insurgents could be described as 'hard core' relative to Iraqis who occasionally engage in violence or provide support to insurgents in the form of money, food and shelter.

- d) As at 14 March 2005, five Iraqis are known to have been injured by the ADF security detachment based in Baghdad. Security detachment personnel have received unconfirmed reports that one of the injured Iraqis later died from wounds received in the incident on 24 January 2005. Security detachment personnel have been unable to gain more information on the condition of the unconfirmed fatality.

Outcome 5: Strategic policy for the defence of Australia and its interests

QUESTION W2

Senator Nettle

Indonesian Cooperation

- a) For the last five years, please provide the following details of training provided by Australia to the TNI (both in Indonesia and in Australia):
- Where has this training taken place?
 - What did this training involve?
 - How many personnel were trained?
 - Was there any in-country training?

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- v) What are the names, ranks, and identification numbers of the TNI soldiers who took part?
- b) What joint exercises have taken place in the last 5 years and are planned for the future?
- c) Were any current or former Kopassus member trained by Australia in the last 5 years? If so in what areas? If no, does the Australian Government plan to resume combat training with Kopassus in the near future?
- d) What is the projected cost for joint Australian and Indonesian training in 2005-06?
- e) What steps does the Department take to ensure Indonesian TNI personnel who participate in training have not been involved in human rights violations in Indonesia?
- f) What conditions has the Australian government placed on defence cooperation with Indonesia to encourage reform in the military?
- g) Can the government guarantee that none of the Defence related equipment supplied to Indonesia has been used to support military operations in Indonesia, particularly in West Papua and Aceh?
- h) Is the Department aware of allegations that the Nomad Surveillance Aircraft supplied to Indonesia has been used in military operations in Aceh and West Papua? Are these allegations true?
- i) Is the Department aware of allegations that a former Australian Navy boat supplied to Indonesia was used to dump bodies in the ocean of those killed, wounded, and arrested by the TNI during the Biak Massacre in 1998 in West Papua? Are these allegations true?
- j) Please supply a detailed list of the exact nature and value of all defence related goods (both military and dual-use) supplied to Indonesia by the Australian government or Australian companies in the last five years?

RESPONSE

- a)
 - i) Training was provided both in Australia and through mobile training teams to Indonesia.
 - ii) Training covered staff college placements, language enrichment and teaching, non-combat related single Service training, postgraduate study programs, information analysts' training, maritime studies, instructional technique, Army junior regimental officer training, military police training and flying officer training.
 - iii) Over the past five years (2000-01 to 2004-05) Defence has provided training to 649 TNI personnel, either in Australia or in Indonesia.
 - iv) Yes. Answered in (a)(i) and (iii) above.
 - v) Personal details of TNI members are provided to Defence in confidence. Release of this information without Indonesian Government agreement would potentially damage the Defence relationship.
- b) There have been no joint exercises over the last five years. A maritime air surveillance exercise between the Australian and Indonesian Air Forces is planned for April 2005, and the Indonesian Navy has been invited to participate in Exercise Kakadu 05, the Royal Australian Navy's regional interoperability maritime exercise, in August 2005.
- c) Yes. Three Kopassus members have attended training in Australia since 2000. Two Kopassus members attended the Australian Command and Staff Course and the Defence

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Strategic Studies Course respectively. The remaining Kopassus member attended defence information analysts' training.

- d) Defence's Defence Cooperation budget for 2005-06 is currently being finalised. The anticipated cost for training provided to TNI personnel over 2004-05 is \$2.596 million. The cost for 2005-06 is likely to be similar.
- e) Based on information available to it, Defence excludes cooperation with all foreign military personnel who are known to be involved with violent groups or who have been involved in known human rights abuses.
- f) All ADF training programs, including those provided to TNI members, reflect Australia's firm commitment to the Laws of Armed Conflict. They are predicated on armed forces showing respect for human rights, political freedom and the rule of law. Through exposing TNI personnel to the values and practices of the ADF, we seek to reinforce TNI's development as a professional defence force that respects human rights and international laws.
- g) No. Australia's export control policies reflect the Government's commitment to ensure the export of defence and related items is consistent with national interests and international obligations. Australia controls the export of defence and dual use goods under Section 112 of the *Customs Act 1901* and the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulation 13E. This legislation is administered by Defence. In assessing applications for export, the Defence Trade Control and Compliance unit takes into account the end use and the legitimacy of the stated end user of the product. Additionally, on a case-by-case basis the applications may be referred to other government agencies for consideration and advice.
- h) The Indonesian Navy mainly uses Nomad surveillance aircraft supplied by Australia for routine maritime surveillance patrols. The Department is not advised of Indonesian Navy aircraft tasks.
- i) The Department is aware that several vessels have been supplied to Indonesia and remain in active service in the Indonesian Navy. The Department is not advised of the Indonesian Navy's surface fleet tasks.
- j) A list of exports, by type and total value, to Indonesia is attached.

YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE (\$)
2000		
	Non-military firearms	15,101
	Military aircraft and/or parts	2,501,914
	Body armour	1,380
	Military ammunition	315
	Commercial detonators	300,000
	Information security	66,300
	Sodium cyanide ⁽¹⁾	1,989,220
	Other chemicals	2115
	Total	4,871,846

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YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE (\$)
2001		
	Military ammunition	3,620
	Non-military firearms	1,990
	Military firearms	4,400
	Commercial explosives	225
	Information security	10,956
	Sodium cyanide ⁽¹⁾	2,400,000
	Optical sensors	3,995
	Total	2,422,186

YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE (\$)
2002		
	Non-military firearms	19,171
	Military aircraft and/or parts	77,043
	Body armour	8,600
	Telescopic sights	7,190
	Military explosives or propellants	8,165
	Sodium cyanide ⁽¹⁾	2,275,000
	Other chemicals	185
	Total	2,395,354

YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE (\$)
2003		
	Military aircraft	190,000
	Body armour	236,010
	Military firearms	2,000
	Commercial explosives	200,000
	Telescopic sights	8,883
	Non-military firearms	650
	Sodium cyanide ⁽¹⁾	962,250
	Other chemicals	48,480
	Total	1,648,273

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YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE (\$)
2004		
	Body armour	1,200,200
	Telescopic sights	10,194
	Non-military ammunition	4,600
	Sodium cyanide ⁽¹⁾	6,437,500
	Other chemicals	58,690
	Information security	21,200
	Acoustic systems	30,000
	Total	7,762,384

Note

1. Sodium cyanide is a chemical used overseas predominantly for gold extraction, but also for metal plating and chemical applications such as dyes and pharmaceuticals.

QUESTION W3

Senator Nettle

Israel

- a) What training (in Israel, Australia or elsewhere) has the Australian Department of Defence or the Australian Defence Force provided to the Israeli Defence Force in the last five years?
- b) What training (in Israel, Australia or elsewhere) has the Israeli Defence Force provided to the Australian Department of Defence or the Australian Defence Force in the last five years?
- c) What joint training exercises have the Israeli Defence Force and the Australian Department of Defence (or the Australian Defence Force) engaged in over the last five years, with or without participation by defence forces from other nations?
- d) Can Defence guarantee that none of the Defence related equipment supplied to Israel has been used to support Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza?
- e) Please supply a detailed list of the exact nature and value of all defence related goods (both military and dual-use) ever supplied to Israel by the Australian government or Australian companies?

RESPONSE

- a-c) None, although two Israeli Defence Force personnel were among the observers for a submarine escape and rescue exercise in 2003.
- d) No. Australia's export control policies reflect the Government's commitment to ensure the export of defence and related items is consistent with national interests and international obligations. Australia controls the export of defence and dual-use goods under Section 112 of the *Customs Act* 1901 and the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulation 13E. This legislation is administered by Defence. In assessing applications for export, the Defence Trade Control and Compliance unit takes into account the end use and the legitimacy of the stated end-user of the product. Additionally, on a case-by-case

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basis, the applications may be referred to other government agencies for consideration and advice.

- e) A list of exports to Israel, by type and total value, is shown below. As exports of this nature carry a 'commercial-in-confidence' classification, it is not possible to provide a more detailed list.

ISRAEL – DEFENCE RELATED GOODS – 2000 TO 2004

Following are the goods and values of applications approved for export to Israel since 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2004. The items on this list include both military permits and dual-use permits.

TOTAL VALUE: \$20,321,600

YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE \$
2000	Military explosive devices	12,000
	Military electronic equipment	307,055
	Information security	5,579
	Total	324,634

YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE \$
2001	Military electronic equipment	4,584,506
	Armoured or protective equipment	2,946
	Non-military firearms	1,460
	Military explosives or propellants	1,080
	Fire control system	51,667
	Information security	10,956
	Total	4,652,615

YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE \$
2002	Military electronic equipment	3,594,146
	Military vehicles and/or parts	15,000
	Information security	2,468
	Total	3,611,614

YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE \$
2003	Military aircraft and/or parts	350,742
	Military electronic equipment	1,497,359
	Total	1,848,101

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YEAR	GOODS CATEGORY	VALUE \$
2004	Military aircraft and/or parts	500,801
	Armoured or protective equipment	8,260,815
	Military electronic equipment	1,123,020
	Total	9,884,636

Business processes

Corporate Services

QUESTION 5

Senator Hogg

Proof Hansard: p. 29 (18 February 2005)

Can Defence advise whether there was a long-term agreement in place for the use of the oval at Broondseinde Barracks by the local school and, if so, for what period?

RESPONSE

Yes, there was a long-term agreement in place between Defence and the college for the use of the oval at Broodseinde Barracks, Ballarat. Records indicate that arrangements have been in place since 15 May 1961 for the college to use the oval. The agreement was ended on 31 December 2004.

People

Defence Personnel

QUESTION 6

Senator Bishop

Proof Hansard: p. 34 (18 February 2005)

What annual funding has been allocated to the Defence Materiel Organisation up-skilling program?

RESPONSE

The funding allocated to corporate up-skilling programs this financial year is \$7 million. This funding was allocated principally to four key priority areas: professional education (for accountants, engineers, technical officers and lawyers), project management, leadership and management, and integrated logistics. A fifth category (other) encompasses technical training programs. These programs are delivered by external training providers.

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Funding allocated to these programs for the next three financial years is summarised below.

Skilling Areas	Funding Allocated				Total
	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	
	\$m	\$m	\$m	\$m	\$m
Professional Education	0.663	0.300	0.300	0.300	1.563
Project Management	1.801	1.745	2.345	1.085	6.976
Leadership and Management	1.440	1.500	1.500	1.500	5.940
Integrated Logistics	2.886	3.150	3.200	3.200	12.436
Other	0.170	0.480	0.290	0.310	1.250
Total	6.960	7.175	7.635	6.395	-

The Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) will expend approximately a further \$10 million this financial year on a wide range of training programs that are directly accessed by staff and also delivered by external training providers. In addition, in-house Defence courses are available to personnel on a free-of-charge basis covering a wide range of subject areas.

At least 67,500 staff training days are estimated to be expended each year on skilling and training the DMO workforce. The cost of this is additional to the above figures.



Defence Intelligence
Organisation

DIO/03/199/P1
STA /03

**OP FALCONER – CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE
IRAQ SURVEY GROUP**

References:

- A. MINSUB SEC/OUT/2003/230 – Iraq Phase IV – Options for ADF Contribution to Whole-of-Government Policy dated 10 Apr 03
- B. CDF EXECUTO 02/03 – AMP 41 of 160755Z Apr 03 (WMD Survey Team)
- C. HQAST 612-52-2 Pt 1 - COMAST ROEAUTH Serial One – MEAO Force Protection ROE – Amendment One
- D. CDF EXECUTO 02/03 - Operation FALCONER of 172345Z Mar 03
- [REDACTED]
- F. DI(G) Ops 32-1 – Appropriation and Import of Defence Related Materiel during ADF Operations (Draft)
- G. HQAST 612-60-3 Pt 1 Administration Instruction – OP Falconer dated 31 Jan 03
- H. CDF EXECUTO 02/03 – AMP 46 of 170735Z APR 03 [REDACTED]
- I. CDF EXECUTO 02/03 – AMP 49 (OPCOMD ASNHQ)
- J. HQAST OP FALCONER - FRAGO 71 TO COMAST EXECUTO 02/03 of 240319Z Apr 03

SITUATION

Background

1. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has requested Australian participation in an Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) in Iraq. The US is already conducting Discovery, Exploitation and Interrogation (DEI) activities as part of operations. It has been determined that these US/UK operations will continue in Phase IV.
 2. The GOAS had determined that the ADO will contribute a contingent of 12 personnel from DIO, Army and LEA to the ISG. The personnel will not be involved in the interrogation of Iraqi prisoners but will concentrate their efforts in the Discovery and Exploitation of WMD as part of the Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) and the full accounting and subsequent elimination of Iraq's WMD. Subsequently, GOAS has approved a Whole of Government approach and the contingent will include one member from DFAT.
 3. It is possible that Australia's contribution to the ISG will be increased in the light of additional US requests for former UN Inspectors and specialist staff
- [REDACTED]

Analysis of the Operational Environment

4. The AS Iraq Survey Contingent (ASISC) is to deploy to Iraq with US/UK forces. A secure base will be established in Baghdad for the HQ ISG with a number of secure sector sites established throughout Iraq. ASISC members will be integrated into the HQ and provide analytical effort to the locating, identification and elimination of Iraq's WMD. Individuals may be attached to Coalition Teams conducting SSE and will be escorted by US force elements for Force Protection. The environment is not considered secure and military members of the ASISC will be armed for self-protection and the protection of the civilian members of the ASISC.

Threat Assessment

5. The major threats will be from UXO and IED left with abandoned equipment, WMD storage facilities and items of high value. EOD teams are included in the ORBAT of the ISG to ensure that all items are rendered safe before SSE begins. The ASISC includes one EOD trained [REDACTED] for the provision of advice on EOD matters, however EOD clearance is not his primary task.

6. As the tasks involve the identification of WMD, the ASISC will require IPE for the duration of the deployment. Pre-deployment training at [REDACTED] will ensure that all members of the ASISC are trained in the use of IPE.

7. There may also be threats from the local populace or those still loyal to Saddam Hussein who may interfere with operations. These threats are considered small and at no stage will the ASISC operate in isolation from other coalition elements. The ISG ORBAT includes Force Protection elements.

Forces

8. The composition of the ASISC is detailed at Annex A.

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

National Interests

9. The AS National Interests in Iraq are disarming and eliminating its WMD program so that it no longer poses a threat to its neighbours or to global security.

10. This National Interest supports the AS National Strategic task of supporting wider interests. Fundamental to the AS contribution to global security is the ADF's support to the US led coalition to eliminate Iraq's threat of WMD.

National Strategic Endstate

11. [REDACTED]

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- e. [REDACTED]
- f. [REDACTED]

Military Strategic Objectives

- 12. [REDACTED]
- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]

Military Strategic Endstate

- 13. [REDACTED]
- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]

MISSION

14. The ASISC will deploy to Iraq to identify, account for and eliminate WMD, WMD weapon delivery systems and associated technology in conjunction with US and UK forces.

Area of Operations

- 15. [REDACTED]

Specified operational tasks

- 16. Specified tasks for the ASISC are as follows:
 - a. Assist in the identification of WMD, their delivery means and associated technology.

[REDACTED]

- b. Collect battlefield intelligence on captured and abandoned IZ equipment that may relate to WMD.
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. Ensure that GOAS is informed of intelligence, through coalition agreed INTREPs, that supports the Military and Strategic Endstates, particularly evidence of WMD.
- e. Arrange for the recovery of selected items of materiel to AS for further exploitation IAW Annex B.
- f. Coordinate reach-back arrangements for harnessing the support of [REDACTED]

FREEDOM OF ACTION

Constraints

17. Constraints for this operation are:
- a. Weather conditions may constrain operations in the theatre.
 - b. The ASISC is not to operate in isolation from the ISG.
 - c. The operation is to be conducted/planned within the principal equipment, costs and personnel limitations as directed by CDF.

Restrictions

18. Restrictions for this operation are:
- a. The ASISC is not to participate in the interrogation of EPW or Black List personnel.
 - b. Commitment is for a period of approximately six to eight months but this could be extended with GOAS approval if the circumstances indicate that an extension of duty is in Australia's best interests.
 - c. The ASISC is not to operate without ISG force protection measures being implemented. This includes only permissive SSE being conducted.

EXECUTION

General Outline

19. ASISC members will be embedded into teams within the ISG and share technical intelligence with the UK and US elements. Deployment from Canberra will commence on 10 May 03 via [REDACTED] with onward movement on 11 May 03 [REDACTED]. On order, the team will deploy [REDACTED] to Iraq and commence operations with the ISG. On the commencement of SSE tasks the ASISC may act as members of the ISG splinter teams. It is not intended for the ASISC to operate in isolation or as a formed body.

20. A collection plan has been developed by DIO to identify key items of interest. The plan is designed to inform coalition partners of the AS priorities. This information will be included in the planning of SSE by the ISG.

[REDACTED]

21. Planning has also commenced for the return of selected items of materiel to AS. An outline plan is at Annex B.

Scheme of Manoeuvre

22. The operation will be conducted in three Phases:

- a. Phase 1 – Preparation and deployment,
- b. Phase 2 – SSE Operations, and
- c. Phase 3 - Redeployment.

23. Phase 1. Pre-deployment training in AS including IPE training as part of force preparation training at DFSU-S has been completed during the period 22-24 Apr 03. BRIG Meekin will complete training during the period 6-8 May 03. Additional briefs on legal and administrative issues will occur in Canberra 28-30 Apr 03. Deploy to the MEAO [REDACTED] resupply flight on 11 May 03.

24. Phase 2. Carry out additional administrative tasks with ASNHQ-MEAO including issue and zeroing of weapons. On order from COMD ASNHQ deploy with the ISG and commence SSE. SSE operations may require the allocation of AS personnel to ISG Mobile Exploitation Teams (MET) or Sensitive Site Teams (SST) for exploitation of sites. Personnel will not deploy with these teams unless coalition forces provide the necessary force protection elements.

25. Phase 3. ASISC RTA at the completion of six months.

Force Protection

26. The ASISC will deploy with AS IPE and PPE. Resupply of IPE will be executed through ASNHQ-MEAO.

27. No SSE will be conducted in a situation that may require the use of force; this is a US directive.

28. The team will deploy on operations as part of the ISG and military personnel will be armed for self-protection. [REDACTED]

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

Legal

29. Australian ROE. OP FALCONER ROE are detailed at Reference C.

30. Civilian Compensation. Civilian staff are covered for compensation purposes by the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act.

31. DFDA. All civilian staff will be subject to the DFDA for the period of their deployment. They have all signed an undertaking to this end.

Communications

32. [REDACTED] The US will provide access to [REDACTED] terminals for the passage of reports [REDACTED] e-mail etc. Access to [REDACTED] will only be through the ASNHQ-MEAO.

[REDACTED]

33. Two unclassified laptops will be taken with the team to allow for remote data entry and storage of multimedia. They will not be connected to any secure servers.
34. A DIO supplied satellite phone and two tri-band mobile phones will be deployed to ensure insecure communications are maintained with HQ ASISC and any deployed members. This will enable any changes in the strategic situation to be passed on to ASISC members not in the immediate area of the HQ.
35. A [REDACTED] phone/fax will be deployed for the passage of AUSTEO reports. [REDACTED]
36. The ASISC will submit daily SITREPs and INTREPs to ASNHQ-MEAO through the quickest means available. In addition reports will be published directly on SOD's OP FALCONER website when access to [REDACTED] available.

CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

Vulnerabilities and Risk

37. The critical vulnerabilities and risks are:
- Adequate logistic support from ISG. The ISG has undertaken to provide limited logistic support to the ASISC. The logistic support will be items for life support such as rations, POL, and sleeping accommodation. [REDACTED]
 - Exposure to IED and UXO. As the ASISC may be dealing with captured and abandoned weapons, WMD sites and deployed in Baghdad the risk from IED and UXO is high. The EOD teams deployed in the ISG will mitigate this.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

38. Administration and Logistic issues beyond those covered in Reference G are detailed in Annex C.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

National and Operational Command the ADF IST Team

39. National Command, TCOMD and OPCOMD are exercised by ASNCOMD-MEAO (Reference I).
40. OPCON will be exercised by the COMD JTF ISG.
41. DDIO will exercise technical control through HQ ASISC to facilitate the passage of technical intelligence to AS.
42. [REDACTED] is appointed as the Contingent Commander of the ASISC. He will be authorised with the powers of a CO by ASNHQ-MEAO.
43. **Public Affairs.** ASNCOMD-MEAO has OP FALCONER public affairs responsibility in the MEAO. Any matters that may attract or warrant media attention are to be directed to ASNCOMD-MEAO (for information COMAST). All media visits are to be approved by COMAST and coordinated in the MEAO by ASNCOMD-MEAO. The commander of ASISC will also fulfil any PA role required for operating in the ISG LAW ASNHQ-MEAO directives.
- [REDACTED]

Reporting

44. National reporting requirements are in accordance with directives from COMAST and ASNHQ-MEAO. Coalition reporting requirements will be advised when known.

{Original signed}

S.D. Meekin

BRIG

DGSTA

30 Apr 03

Annexes:

- A. ASISC ORBAT
- B. [REDACTED]
- C. Administration and Logistics

Distribution:

DDIO

SOD

HQAST

ASNHQ-MEAO

[REDACTED]