

Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee
QUESTIONS ON NOTICE—SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET ESTIMATES, 21 OCTOBER 2015
Department of Defence

Q No.	Senator	Broad topic	Question	Proof Hansard, page & hearing date or Written Q	Date rec'd	Date Tabled
1.	Ronaldson	Jobs creation in Bendigo from Hawkei build	<p>Senator RONALDSON: If I can provide a bit of commentary before I go on to my next question. Clearly, for regional and rural Victoria, these types of investment are absolutely pivotal not only for skill retention but clearly there is the opportunity for those who live in these areas to remain and to upgrade their skills and invest back into their community. So this is a very important project. I understand also that not only will there be retention of jobs, and additional jobs, at Thales in Bendigo, but are there any downstream supplier job opportunities, particularly, in Geelong?</p> <p>Major Gen. McLachlan: I will have to take that on notice to talk about Geelong. I am aware that there is a very comprehensive supply chain. I know Thales have worked particularly hard to maintain the above-50-per-cent manufactured and supported in Australia requirement, which is a fundamental aspect of the contract. I know, for instance, that the subcontractors that are making the steel subassemblies are Australian. I know that Thales is using BlueScope Steel for that. So, once again, we are committed within the contract, and we have contractual arrangements that mean that absolutely no less than 50 per cent of the contract price has to be manufactured and supported in Australia.</p>	13/14	01/12/15	04/02/16

2.	Lambie	Australian coroner's investigation into green on blue attack	<p>Senator LAMBIE: We found out through an Australian coroner's investigation that vital information was withheld from troops on the ground about green on blue attacks. Are you ashamed of that and what have you done to ensure the risk of green on blue attack is reduced?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: You need to give me the context.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: The green on blue attack where we lost three soldiers.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: Yes.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: What actions have you taken to prevent that in the future?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I can get you the detailed information and I can take that on notice. We did an initial response to that and an investigation, and included all the findings of that in our lessons learned, as we normally do, to look to improve the systems that we have in place. I will dig in and get the details, but the Queensland coroner has just looked at this and made a number of recommendations as well. I have formally given that to the service chiefs and commander joint operations to assess what we have done and then also what the coroner had recommended. I do not believe there is a large disparity in that, by the way. You may remember early on that there was mention that we did not act on intelligence. There had been no intelligence that Hekmatullah was a specific threat in that patrol base. There were some issues with the flow-down of some of the force protection measures that the coroner brought out, but I believe that that had all been taken into account after that through our own investigation into it. But that is all on open record from the coroner.</p>	17	04/02/16	25/02/16
3.	Conroy	Task Force 50	<p>Senator CONROY: Is Task Force 50 directly engaged in the conflict in Syria, or is its role restricted to the collective self-defence of Iraq?</p> <p>Mr Richardson : I am not sure what Task Force 50—</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: Task Force 50 would be under another UN mandate. We would have to take all that on notice.</p>	18	03/12/15	04/02/16
4.	Lambie	Cost of operations in Middle East since 2000	<p>Senator LAMBIE: So do have a cost figure for that, Minister? And what it has cost us so far to do this?</p> <p>Senator Payne: We will see if we can give you the operations cost.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I can give you the cost of the operation so far. Operation OKRA, for fiscal year 2014-15, for all the people, the aircraft and operations is \$159.4 million. That estimate for the next year is \$390 million.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Is there any way I would be able to get an estimate from 2001 on how much it has cost so far in the Middle East in the last 15 years? Would I be able to get that please, Minister?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: We can take that on notice.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: That would be great, thank you.</p>	19	24/11/15	04/02/16

5.	Lambie	Average number of tours for Special Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001	<p>Senator LAMBIE: With the Special Forces, what is the average amount of tours they have completed since 2001?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: Individually, Special Forces, I would have to check for you. I can give you the numbers on numbers of rotations.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: I understand the rotations. I want to know separately the personnel and how many rotations those personnel have done on average and what is the highest amount?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: Not just Special Forces but I can give you the figure across the board.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: No, I actually want the Special Forces figure.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: If I give you the whole figure, it will help you understand where the Special Forces sit. Are you after the cumulative time in warlike operations? Would that be the figure?</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Yes.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: People who have spent one year or less is 41,233—that is, 81.7 per cent; people who have spent between one and two years is down to 8,424—that is 16.7 per cent; between two and three years, 755 people—1.5 per cent; and more than three years, 59—0.1 per cent. That is the total force. I will have a look at the Special Forces particularly and take that on notice. But that just gives you the general idea that they are very small numbers once you start talking over two years cumulative.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: I understand that. I am quite concerned that the Special Forces have done their fair share in the Middle East and they are exhausted. That is what they are telling me so I am just trying to bring to the government's attention that if we need to up the manning in that area for the future then we need to start looking at that.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: If I look at the Special Forces in Afghanistan, the majority of the Special Forces have been out of there now for some time. We are looking at a small group of, as I said, about 80, who are currently in Iraq doing the AA mission and that is a sustainable force.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: But since 2001, the SAS have done a substantial amount of time in that war zone.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: They have done a fantastic job.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: They have done a fantastic job but they have also done a substantial amount of time.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: So any consideration we have for the forces going in, one of the major considerations is the sustainability and the pressure it puts on our people and our families.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Will I be able to see the figures on that?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: We will get those to you.</p>	20	03/12/15	04/02/16
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6.	Lambie	Copy of section of Defence Act	<p>Senator LAMBIE: I want to follow up Senator Xenophon's question about the port. I would like to know why it says in a previous defence white paper that the Chinese are a threat to Australia, yet we are now leasing or considering leasing and in future selling our ports to them. I do not understand how this is comfortable.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: The question about China's broader strategic posture in the region and what they might own or lease in Australia and the security implications of that are really quite separate.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Is that really the best answer you have for me, Mr Richardson? In the white paper it says that they are a threat, but now we are leasing ports out to them.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I do not think the white paper used the word 'threat', Senator. You are referring to the 2009 white paper, which had particular wording in it which was not repeated in the 2013 white paper. In neither white paper was the word 'threat' used. It talked about the strategic posture in respect of China.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: If the Chinese, once they take over the lease of the port, wanted to close that port down and let nobody in, what—</p> <p>Mr Richardson: It would be illegal. Quite apart from that, we have some overriding powers under the Defence Act. So that is not a possibility.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: So the Defence Act comes into play there. Could you provide that information to me, please? I would be very grateful to look at that.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: Sure. In extremis, The Defence Act can come into play, but also the owner of the lease does not have the authority to simply close down a port for any reason at all. Obviously they could close a port in respect of certain specified circumstances, but they do not have the right to close down a port simply because they feel like it.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Can you provide that information on the specifics of how they can do that? Thank you.</p>	27	03/12/15	04/02/16
7.	Lambie	Financial contributions to war	<p>Senator LAMBIE: Thank you. I have a question for the minister, which I believe I asked in the last estimates and still have not received an answer to, as to why in 2012 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates made a surplus of over \$300 billion yet we have not approached them to pay for our participation in this war.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: They make other financial contributions to countries in the region which are in greater financial need than us.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Could you provide me with those facts and figures, please, Mr Richardson.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: Yes, to the extent we can.</p>	31	03/12/15	04/02/16

8.	Lambie	Refugees taken by Saudi Arabit	<p>Senator LAMBIE: Could you also inform me how many refugees they are taking, especially Saudi Arabia—the refugees that are now being displaced all over Europe.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I am not aware of Saudi Arabia taking any refugees. However—</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Why not? Do you know why they are not taking any refugees?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I cannot speak for the Saudi government. I said I am not aware of any. There are, of course, a number of countries in the region that have enormous numbers of displaced people. For instance, Jordan has up to a million displaced people. Turkey has well over a million displaced people. So countries in the region carry an enormous burden in that respect.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: But, to your knowledge, Saudi Arabia are not taking any of these displaced people.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I am not aware, but I would need to take that on notice to give you an accurate answer.</p>	31	01/12/15	04/02/16
9.	Lambie	Alleged allegations of sexual abuse	<p>Senator LAMBIE: That would be good. In the meantime, our pensioners are actually paying for our deployment overseas, pretty much. I want to touch on Defence abuse. First of all, I would like to talk to somebody about the dental nurse who planned to blow up HMAS <i>Cairns</i>, and I want to ask questions as to why she claims that she was raped and that she had actually reported this to the Australian Defence Force and the New South Wales police—not that you can speak for the New South Wales police. If there was a recorded police report while she was in the Australian Defence Force, what has been done about that police report?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I will just get Personnel.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I do not think we are aware. I do not know whether we are aware of the case.</p> <p>Ms Skinner: Sorry, I am not aware of that case. I will need to take that on notice and have a look for details around that.</p>	31	03/12/15	04/02/16

10.	Lambie	Access to police and ADFIS reports	<p>Senator LAMBIE: The 22 men accused of rape that are still serving. I was wondering if I would be able to obtain the ADFIS and police reports that were done on those men, because surely they would have been interviewed.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I do not believe you can get them, because of a privacy issue, but leave it with me.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: So all those 22 men have been interviewed through ADFIS?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: Again, you need to give me the context of your question, please.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: The 22 men accused from the DART that are still serving.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: It is actually 23.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Twenty-three. Have all of those been questioned through ADFIS?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I can take you through those 23 if you like—where we are at with that. If I start with the starting point of those 23, the first point is that I take the allegations against them very seriously, because they are serious allegations. But the starting point is that the DART had those referred to them. They looked at it and found that there was not evidence to be able to present them to the civil police. So, based on the lack of evidence to put them into civil criminal prosecution, they forwarded those 23 cases back to us. The second part of the context—and it was in the last DART report—was that they acknowledged that the difficulties facing us in taking action are the same difficulties that the civil police have in taking action with that, and they also acknowledged the fact that some of these are quite old cases.</p> <p>With that context, of those 23 alleged abusers, we have four cases currently subject to formal administrative inquiry processes with the chiefs. There are seven cases currently under consideration by ADFIS. One was referred to civilian police at the time who determined there was insufficient evidence to proceed, and administrative action was taken at the time. One case is awaiting civilian police advice—i.e. that has come to us, ADFIS have looked at it and they have gone to the civil police for advice on that. One was actioned at the time of the initial assault. It resulted in a conviction for indecent assault, not rape, and a subsequent administrative action was taken against that person. In one case, the alleged perpetrator was misidentified of those 23—hence, you are probably right that there are 22—where the person whom Defence thinks may be implicated is no longer serving. We talk about the 23 simply to stay standard with the DART report. Three cases determined no further action in accordance with the complainant's wishes—the complainant did not want to take it any further. Without their consent, there is insufficient evidence to be able to take action against them. In one case, there was no further action because the complainant did not want to be identified to Defence.</p>	31/32	03/12/15	04/02/16
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11.	Conroy	Security threat of the Taliban in Uruzgan	<p>Senator CONROY: Let me unhook the UN from our discussion: what is Defence's assessment of the likelihood that Uruzgan might fall in its entirety to the Taliban?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I would need to seek some advice on that.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Would that advice be available during the course of the day?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: In respect of that broader question, I think we should be able to help you.</p>	36	02/12/15	04/02/16
12.	Lambie	Tactical payments – Iraq and Afghanistan	<p>Senator LAMBIE: Are we still giving cash payments to Afghani and Iraqi nationals as part of tactical payments, and if so how much? What guarantee can be given that we are not funding the enemy—that that money is going where it is supposed to be going and that it is well targeted.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: We are not funding the enemy with tactical payments. The scheme is still in place for our operations, but I do not believe that we have had any tactical payments in the last period. I will take that on notice and I will let you know.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Can you give me an answer as to why you believe it does not get through to enemy hands, because I would really like that too please.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: The way that it is negotiated and the way it works is that it is not given to a group. It is given to a particular family in the way it is done. No, I do not believe that it goes through to funding terrorism.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: But you have hundreds of thousands of dollars here that you give to one person, so how can you guarantee where that is going?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I am not going to talk about the exact value, but I think you might be inflating by a couple of zeros.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: If we can just get a statement about exactly where that money is channelling through to, I would be really—</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I can get that for you, yes.</p> <p>Senator LAMBIE: Thank you.</p>	37/38	01/12/15	04/02/16

13.	Fawcett	Unfunded Liabilities	<p>Senator FAWCETT: I accept the fact that this is the first white paper in many years that has detailed funding attached to it—and that that is still under wraps. What I do not accept is that parliament should not have some visibility of the pressures that Defence is under with respect to what I think are pretty basic, ongoing, through-life support for bases and ICT. I think we still need to have—Minister, I would invite you to perhaps come back to the committee on this, on notice if necessary—a standard process to give us that visibility. If the Department of Defence are asked—quite often for valid reasons; sometimes admittedly not—to absorb a measure and they have to reprioritise so that some work they had planned to do, perhaps to get rid of asbestos in a building or to upgrade an ICT system, is then deferred, the parliament should have an understanding of how great that growing pressure is on the department. To date we have not had that. We have had figures for outstanding works in defence infrastructure of up to \$15.7 and we still, after a year and a half of asking, cannot get a more defined list of what that \$15.7 billion of unfunded works looks like. I do not find that to be an acceptable level of transparency. I certainly invite the minister to come back to the committee with a way forward on that. Whilst the executive is free to do what they need to do, I think this committee, in its oversight role, should have some visibility of what the impacts are for Defence that we, collectively, will have to manage in another parliament with another government perhaps five years down the track.</p> <p>Senator Payne: I will have a look at what you have said and what you have asked for.</p>	43	03/12/15	04/02/16
14.	Xenophon	Forward Estimates for Offshore Combatant Vessel and Future Frigate	<p>Senator XENOPHON: On notice, if you cannot do it now, can the current forward estimates for both the Offshore Combatant Vessel program and the Future Frigate program be provided? Is that something that can be provided?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We can certainly provide you with the spend we anticipate over the forward estimates.</p>	47	04/12/15	04/02/16

15.	Conroy	First Principles Review – Consultants	<p>Senator CONROY: Is there an implementation team or is that the implementation committee's role?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: The implementation of First Principles is broken up into five work streams. There are groups of people working on the implementation in the five work streams and that is driven by the secretariat reporting to the committee on a weekly basis, and we can inject ourselves whenever we so wish.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Has the One Defence implementation committee, team or anyone at Defence hired any consultants to provide advice on the implementation?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: Yes—</p> <p>Senator CONROY: What sort of consultants have been hired?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We have a particular consultancy group working with the secretariat, and I think one or two of the work streams have or are going to bring in some consultants in particular areas for advice in specialised areas.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: What sort of specialised areas? Help me out.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: One area might be in behaviours. Capability Acquisition and Sustainment will probably bring in, if they have not already brought in, someone to assist in terms of the implementation of the models they have developed in terms of their new work structures and the like. Those are two areas; and, as I said, we have got a consultancy firm working with the secretariat.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Who has been hired?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: In terms of the secretariat, someone will have it. I just forget the name of the firm itself.</p> <p>Mr Baxter: There is a company called Partners in Performance who are working with the implementation committee, monitoring the progress across the whole organisation for the different recommendations.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I should say: this particular company has an interesting relationship with Defence. We engaged this company a few years back, in about 2010-11, with respect to the implementation of the Strategic Reform Program. The company walked away after a few months on the grounds that we were not serious about the implementation. So they are quite independently minded.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: I am very familiar with them.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: So far they have not walked away from us.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Are they the only consultants?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: Involved with the secretariat, yes, but I believe there are other consultancy groups—</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Can you take me through a list of who else you brought in for the specialist niche things that you were describing before?</p>	51/52	03/12/15	04/02/16
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	Conroy	First Principles Review – Consultants	<p>Mr Baxter: Different areas that are responsible for different aspects of the implementation have started to work with some outside partners. In my own case I am responsible for putting together the contestability element of the capability life cycle. We are doing some work with Rand at the moment to identify possible models for the contestability process.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: So we have Rand, PiP—are there any others across the department working on this?</p> <p>Mr Gillis: The Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group is working with a company called Bechtel to assist us in the 'smart buyer' process. They have done some work, almost identical work, in the UK recently, and so we are working with them—</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Bechtel—could you spell that please?</p> <p>Mr Gillis: B-e-c-h-t-e-l.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I think they are American in origin.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Any other volunteers? I see Vice Admiral Griggs is leaning forward.</p> <p>Vice Adm. Griggs: In the capability stream, I have a single KPMG consultant to assist me in a sort of a red-teaming capacity, really focusing on lean business process.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Anyone else want to volunteer?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We can take that on notice. If there are others, we will—</p> <p>Senator CONROY: If I could get who they are, what they are doing, and what they are costing.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: Sure, no problem.</p>			
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16.	Wang	Budget for research and innovation	<p>Senator WANG: First of all, what budget does the department have for research and innovation?</p> <p>Dr Zelinsky: The Defence Science and Technology Group has a budget of \$408 million per annum.</p> <p>Senator WANG: How much of that budget goes to private defence technology researchers or innovators?</p> <p>Dr Zelinsky: The budget is actually expended within the group. We do expend money with universities—about \$16 million per year—and some of that money goes to contractors and partners in programs. That amount would be a relatively small amount. I would have to take that question on notice.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I think Mr Baxter might add a point here.</p> <p>Mr Baxter: Defence also has a range of collaborative programs with industry funding innovation. We spend somewhere between \$50 million and \$70 million a year working with companies identifying defence technologies that could lead to a capability gain for the Australian defence forces. As part of the white paper process, the government is considering a new defence industry policy statement, which will cover defence collaboration with industry on innovation.</p> <p>Senator WANG: Perhaps someone could give me a comparison between our spending on defence research and, say, US or China?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We would need to take that on notice. In respect of China, we would not be able to help you because they are not quite as transparent as some other countries.</p>	60	03/12/15	04/02/16
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17.	Gallacher	Fuel card fraud	<p>Senator GALLACHER: Let's go to the \$585,000 of Defence card fraud on fuel. I think you can run a B-double for 225 days doing 1,000 kilometres a day at two kilometres to the litre and that would be the equivalent of \$585,000 worth of fuel. How is it possible that people can actually purchase that amount of fuel? I have tried to follow this through the media and I cannot really see that anybody has paid any money back or been convicted of it.</p> <p>Mr Brown: I can answer a part of that. I think the head of joint logistics might be able to give you more detail on what the process and procedures were but we have actually recovered \$12,000 of that. As I mentioned at the last hearing, the individuals concerned have a capacity to pay. The court has awarded that they can pay the amounts and we are progressively getting money back from them.</p> <p>Senator GALLACHER: But they could not have used the fuel so they must have sold it.</p> <p>Mr Brown: They were charged and we are recovering funds from them.</p> <p>Senator GALLACHER: What was their penalty?</p> <p>Mr Brown: I will take that on notice. I do not have that in front of me.</p> <p>Senator GALLACHER: So they did not get a custodial sentence?</p> <p>Mr Brown: Again, I will take it on notice.</p> <p>Senator GALLACHER: And we recovered \$12,000 out of the \$585,000?</p> <p>Mr Brown: Yes.</p> <p>Senator GALLACHER: Refresh my memory, we sold a bus with a couple of fuel cards in it?</p> <p>Mr Brown: That is correct. The bus was sold. It was moved to an auction, it was sold and the fuel card was left in it.</p> <p>Senator GALLACHER: Was it one fuel card or two?</p> <p>Mr Brown: The head of the fuel services branch would be able to give you that information.</p>	62	01/12/15	04/02/16
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18.	Xenophon	Lobbyist – Post Defence engagement	<p>Senator XENOPHON: until the chair brutally cuts me off again. Mr Richardson, you may have seen reports that Mr Warren King, the former head of the DMO, may be taking a position with CMAX Advisory, a very reputable, well-known lobbying firm that works in, among other things, the defence space. I note that currently under the Lobbying Code of Conduct:</p> <p>... Agency Heads or persons employed under the Public Service Act 1999 in the Senior Executive Service (or equivalent), shall not, for a period of 12 months after they cease their employment, engage in lobbying activities relating to any matter that they had official dealings with in their last 12 months of employment.</p> <p>I also note that US White House executive order 13490, 'Ethics commitments by executive branch personnel', has a two-year time frame before someone who has work in a senior position can become a lobbyist. Does—and I will be guided by you, Minister—the government have a position on whether the 12-month period is adequate or whether there is any consideration of moving to what the United States—the White House—is doing by having a two-year ban? And this is not a criticism of Mr King, but he does have an enormous wealth of information and enormous expertise, and I wonder whether the minister or Mr Richardson have any views as to whether the time frame ought to be 12 months or two years.</p> <p>Senator Payne: Let me just say: I am not aware of any change to that approach but I am happy to take the question on notice and come back to you.</p>	71	03/12/15	04/02/16
19.	Xenophon	Costs to Defence for Queensland Coronial Inquiry	<p>Senator XENOPHON: I do have some questions in relation to the future combat submarine combat system. I will try and get through those as quickly as possible. But before I get to that line of questioning I would like to know the cost to Defence of the green-on-blue Queensland coronial inquiry, as to what the costs involved were—</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We would need to take that on notice, I think, unless—</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: We will take that on notice to get you those details. Needless to say, it will involve the legal support for the families, the positioning of all the people and all that, so we will give you the whole answer.</p> <p>Senator XENOPHON: Of course. I am not begrudging that cost, so just—</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: We will do that for you.</p> <p>Senator XENOPHON: And a breakdown of the various—</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: The components?</p> <p>Senator XENOPHON: Yes, that is fine.</p>	73	03/12/15	04/02/16

20.	Xenophon	AN/BYG-1 industry plan	<p>Senator XENOPHON: If we can go back to the history: in May 2012, Defence advised Senator Johnston—question on notice 202 which said, 'The target is for Australian companies to be able to compete for inclusion in the joint development process on the same basis as US based companies.' Senator Johnston provided a question on notice in writing. He got a response about the target to this. Five months later in response to Senator Fawcett's question on notice 14, Defence stated inter alia, 'A plan to increase Australian industry competitiveness in the AN/BYG-1 development program is expected to be completed by early 2013.' Can you provide a copy of this plan that was referred to in question on notice 14 to Senator Fawcett?</p> <p>Rear Adm. Dalton: I will have to take that on notice. I do know that we did change the process. In the middle of last year, we did an ideation process that involved Navy submariners and industry getting together to look at what would be a good idea to work on, and that process has actually generated the two bids that are now—</p> <p>Senator XENOPHON: My direction question was—and this relates to question on notice 14 of October 2012 estimates in terms of the forensic questions that Senator Fawcett asked—could I please have a copy of that plan? Could you take that on notice.</p> <p>Rear Adm. Dalton: We will take that on notice.</p>	74	05/02/16	25/02/16
21.	Fawcett	Shipbuilding – Intellectual property	<p>Senator FAWCETT: But planning to do more of them in the future is a bit like shipbuilding before the Rand report and continuous shipbuilding. Telling somebody that we are probably going to build another frigate in 10 years time does not help them keep a workforce or that intellectual property between now and 10 years time. As part of the Chief of Navy now being responsible under the First Principle Reforms for looking at the fundamental inputs to capability, and if we view that this kind of software development is a fundamental input to capability—and traditionally it is normally featured somewhere in one our PICs or SICs—what are we doing to make sure that that company has the cashflow to continue developing their people and their intellectual property so that they can contribute to that process down the track?</p> <p>Rear Adm. Dalton: I think I probably have to take that on notice.</p>	75	04/12/15	04/02/16

22.	Rhiannon	Amount of soil being examined at RAAF Base Williamstown	<p>Senator RHIANNON: Thank you. Are you saying you cannot do anything about it at all or are there some areas that you could deal with and some areas that you could not deal with? Have you rated these in any way?</p> <p>Ms Clifton: Yes. It is possible to do some decontamination and removal. For example, it is possible to remediate soil. So soil is remediated through a process called the thermal desorption, where it is heated and the chemicals are removed. We can do that and we are currently looking at doing that for works that are underway on-base at the moment.</p> <p>Senator RHIANNON: Sorry?</p> <p>Ms Clifton: We are currently looking at options for that.</p> <p>Senator RHIANNON: To do it over the whole base?</p> <p>Ms Clifton: Where we are removing soil.</p> <p>Senator RHIANNON: I see. How big an area? In terms of the amount of contamination, are you talking about dealing with 50 per cent, 10 per cent—what are you talking about?</p> <p>Ms Clifton: I would have to get to you on that.</p>	77	18/12/15	04/02/16
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23.	Conroy	Submarines - additional purchase options	<p>Senator CONROY: So, on the issue of the option of an extra four submarines to be exercised at a later date, I just want to better understand the role of such options in previous defence acquisitions. Was there an option for additional submarines to be acquired under the initial Collins class acquisition program?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: That was before me.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We will take it on notice.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: I am sure there is somebody with grey enough hair in the room to help us.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: Or no hair.</p> <p>Vice Adm. Barrett: I do not have that answer.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We will take it on notice.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: My understanding is yes. With regard to the Oberon class submarine and was it exercised—</p> <p>Senator Payne: Now you are really stretching.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: the answer, I believe, is no.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: Again, I think you are heading down the hypothetical path—</p> <p>Senator CONROY: I am just talking about past experience. The past is not hypothetical.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: No, but you are relating that to the future, which is.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: I will get to that. You have anticipated possibly my next few questions. So Collins had an option to be exercised that wasn't. With the Oberon class submarines, the government-of-the-day's initial commitment was to acquire eight submarines. How many did we actually acquire?</p> <p>Vice Adm. Barrett: Oberons: we operated six.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: But, initially, we were going to have eight, and we took six.</p> <p>Vice Adm. Barrett: I would like to clarify all of those points as to what the original government decision was around the numbers of the operating. I do not have that off the top of my head, and we would need to confirm that.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: I am happy for you to come back to us. I even understand that originally when we bought the very first one way, way, way back we talked about buying two at the time. So there is a consistent pattern of saying, 'I'm going to buy X number of submarines,' but never actually getting round to doing it. That is the only point I am making.</p> <p>Vice Adm. Barrett: Okay. I can't confirm that that was the case for the Oberon.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Are there any other Australian defence acquisition programs that have included options for additional units which were never exercised or had their initial acquisition numbers revised down?</p>	81/82	29/01/16	04/02/16
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	Conroy	Submarines - additional purchase options	Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I can give you ones where they were exercised. Wedgetail was one: we did four, with an option for two. With the C17 we did four, and we did not even have any options but we ended up with another four because we saw the capability. We will take that on notice for where we have had options and exercised them or not.			
24.	Conroy	Offshore patrol vessels and frigate – acquisition costss	<p>Senator CONROY: Senator Xenophon will come back, so I can't guarantee everybody. I refer you to the announcement by former Prime Minister, Mr Abbott, and Defence Minister, Mr Andrews, on 4 August regarding their plan for Australia's naval shipbuilding industry. Could you provide us with a breakdown of the \$89 billion figure, including the specific classes or types of vessels whose build make up the figure.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: Peter Baxter will take it.</p> <p>Mr Baxter: The announcement that the government has made will cover \$89 billion in acquisition costs for the new submarines, the new frigates and the offshore patrol vessels. The offshore patrol vessels and the frigates will be a bit over \$30 billion of those acquisition costs.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: So \$30 billion is offshore?</p> <p>Mr Baxter: For offshore patrol vessels and frigates.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Do we have a breakdown between the two.</p> <p>Mr Baxter: I would have to take that on notice.</p>	83	03/12/15	04/02/16
25.	Whish-Wilson	F35 program partners	<p>Senator WHISH-WILSON: I will start the list: the US, Australia, Canada, Norway, UK, Turkey, Italy, Netherlands, Japan, there are a couple of FMS customers they do not talk about, Republic of Korea.</p> <p>Senator Payne: And Israel.</p> <p>Senator WHISH-WILSON: I can take them on notice.</p> <p>Air Marshal Davies: My understanding is there are nine partners in the F35 program: USA, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Canada, Turkey and Australia. There are three foreign military sale nations: Japan, South Korea and Israel. My notes here say Canada and Denmark are expected to make down-select decisions in the next 12 to 18 months.</p> <p>Senator WHISH-WILSON: Could I ask if possible for an updated estimate on the total cost of acquiring 72 Joint Strike Fighters that we are aware of.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: We can provide that for you, Senator</p>	88	01/12/15	04/02/16

26.	Conroy	Land 400 – Phase 2 extension	<p>Senator CONROY: Was the July extension to the phase 2 tender process formally recommended by Defence to the government?</p> <p>Major Gen. McLachlan: We provided advice to the government on that.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Did you formally recommend it?</p> <p>Major Gen. McLachlan: It was certainly our position that it was a universal request from all of the tenderers involved.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Was that written or verbal advice that you provided?</p> <p>Major Gen. McLachlan: At that particular point in time—I will have to take that on notice.</p>	94	01/12/15	04/02/16
27.	Conroy	Land 400 – delinking Phase 2 and 3	<p>Senator CONROY: Okay. In June at budget estimates I also discussed the relationship between phases 2 and 3 of LAND 400 with officials. At the time, General Caligari confirmed that they had been linked in 2012 but were recently delinked. Would you please inform the committee of when the decision to delink those phases was made.</p> <p>Major Gen. McLachlan: I cannot remember off the top of my head. I will take that one on notice.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: What is the benefit to taxpayers from delinking phases 2 and 3? You have come to the table. I am assuming you are going to add to the evidence.</p> <p>Air Vice Marshal Hupfeld: I will have to take that question on notice on the actual dates. That was the decision made by government previously, but I will have to come back to you with the dates themselves.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Could you tell us what the benefit to the taxpayers from delinking the phases is.</p> <p>Air Vice Marshal Hupfeld: No, I am not able to comment on that now. I would have to take that on notice as well.</p>	94	01/12/15	04/02/16

28.	Ludlum	Kunduz hospital attack	<p>Senator LUDLAM: When was the department first notified that the hospital in Kunduz was being attacked?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: 'Was being' attacked or 'had been' attacked?</p> <p>Senator LUDLAM: Either.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I was not personally aware at the time. Our headquarters personnel in Afghanistan may have known. We may have had some embeds who knew at the time, but I would have to take it on notice to be able to tell you when we became aware of it. I was definitely aware the very next day, as I get my CINC brief, that it had occurred.</p> <p>Senator LUDLAM: In what role would Australia have had embeds in that area? Presumably, if we had people in that area, you would be well and truly—</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: No, we are not talking about embeds; I am talking about in the headquarters in Kabul and we are talking about that higher level ISAF headquarters, not down at that level.</p> <p>Senator LUDLAM: It probably goes without saying that Australia did not have personnel in that area at the time that the hospital was bombed.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: No, we did not have people there conducting that operation in the area at Kunduz.</p> <p>Senator LUDLAM: Have we had people engaged in that part of Afghanistan since the Taliban have started taking territory back off the ANSF?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: Not taking it back but contesting. I do not believe we have had anyone. I would have to check. And, again, we would have to have a look at whether or not we had embeds at some stage up there, but I am not aware of any.</p> <p>Senator LUDLAM: I might come back to this later. You have offered to take some of that material on notice, so I will leave that there for the moment.</p>	96	03/12/15	04/02/16
29.	Conroy	Plans for the M113	<p>Senator CONROY: How long is Defence planning to keep the M113 for?</p> <p>Major Gen. McLachlan: I will have to take it on notice for the specific date. It is in the order of 2030.</p>	98	01/12/15	04/02/16

30.	Xenophon	Future submarine combat system	<p>Senator XENOPHON: I want to go to the issue of the future submarine combat system. In relation to the questions asked previously, I just want to check whether or not it is correct that a US official travelled to Australia at the commencement of the program in 2003 and talked up Australian industry involvement in the program. I understand that what was said in a September 2003 briefing to industry by US Navy personnel was:</p> <p>We value our partnership with the Commonwealth of Australia and look forward to the full participation of Australian Industry and the Royal Australian Navy in the Combat System Modernization Process</p> <p>My question is: how was that commitment honoured, because it was a very clear commitment made back in 2003? Was it reasonable to expect that the commitments made by US officials would be honoured? It was a pretty unequivocal commitment saying that they looked forward to the 'full participation of Australian Industry and the Royal Australian Navy in the Combat System Modernization Process'. Did the Navy, at the time, take that the senior US official on his word?</p> <p>Rear Adm. Dalton: I think I have actually seen the presentation that you might be referring to, but I cannot confirm it. So I will have to take that one on notice. My recollection is that that presentation said there were opportunities for industry but it did not guarantee industry.</p>	100	03/12/15	04/02/16
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31.	Xenophon	AN/BYG-1 costs	<p>Senator XENOPHON: The total project and sustainment cost, including payments to the US government, for the AN/BYG-1 to date, according to an answer, was \$528.6 million. The more recent answer—and I thank the minister for facilitating that—is \$260 million to date and \$400 million forecast for 2002 to 2019. I am told that this is very expensive, that it is about 2½ times more expensive than the original Rockwell TDHS system that was on the Collins submarine, which was \$150 million in today's dollars, according to a 1998 ANAO report, and several times more than the cost of the ISUS-90 system that was selected in 2001 to replace the TDHS, before the selection was overridden in favour of the AN/BYG-1, for so-called strategic reasons. Is there any comment that the department, the minister or Rear Admiral Sammut can make on that?</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: I could say there are different views about the costs of combat systems and so forth. What we have undertaken in AN/BYG-1 and the cooperative program that we have with the US is not just a one-off buy of a combat system; we have bought into a process which is continuing to update the combat system for obsolescence issues but also for emerging threats. What I am saying there is that we have not just bought one combat system and installed it on the submarine—and I did not quite catch the periods that you mentioned there over which we—</p> <p>Senator XENOPHON: Sorry; that is probably my fault. This is according to the very recent answers to questions on notice: \$260 million to date and \$400 million forecast from 2002 to 2019.</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: It is \$322 million, as I understand, between the start of the ACP in 2004 and 2019. Additional to that would have been be A\$79 million that we paid for development of the combat system in the first instance. What I want to say is that, by 2019, we would have effectively installed about nine combat systems across the fleet in terms of—no; I am sorry; that is incorrect. It is about refreshing the combat system in each of those submarines—in one case, up to three times—</p> <p>Senator XENOPHON: Could you take that on notice?</p>	101	03/12/15	04/02/16
32.	Xenophon	AN/BYG1- Question on Notice 2482	<p>Senator XENOPHON: I respect that. In a tabled question, I asked the department whether they agree that the future combat system is a federated system and they agreed. I also asked whether the decision to go with the BYG meant the Commonwealth was taking on responsibility for integrating the entire system, and again they agreed. I also asked what the cost of that approach might be and got no answer. Noting that we are talking about a program in the billions of dollars—and I note that Ian McPhedran of News Limited reported a \$4 billion number last year, although that number seems quite extraordinary—surely it is reasonable for parliament to receive an answer about what the cost estimate is?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I will have a look at that.</p>	102	03/12/15	04/02/16

33.	McEwen	Personnel 2013/14 and 2014/15	<p>Senator McEWEN: Perhaps you could take on notice the actual number of bodies for those categories of employees and for those financial years, as I asked. For the people who have left the organisation in those categories of employment, could you take on notice the distribution of the length of service at a time of their separation.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We can give you that.</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: Would you say that, as a general impression, those leaving the organisation tend to be older with a longer period of service?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I would need to see the figures on that.</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: Could you take that on notice?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: Yes.</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: If you have the information, could you also take on notice whether those separating are evenly spread across the disciplines, such as mathematics and physics—I am talking about people with postgraduate qualifications—and whether you are losing more in one category than another?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We will have the information and we can provide it.</p>	107	02/12/15	04/02/16
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34.	McEwen	Macroeconomics report 2012	<p>Senator McEWEN: I want to go to Macroeconomics's report that was commissioned by the former Labor government in 2012 about the economics of local build in shipbuilding. Are you aware of it?</p> <p>Mr Richardson: I am sure we will have someone here who is.</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: It was a question on notice from Senator Xenophon and a question answered in the Senate by Senator Brandis in August with advice that the report was not finished.</p> <p>Mr Richardson: We will have someone here who can answer that.</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: As I understand, that is the report on economics concerning submarines?</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: Correct.</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: A report was being developed by the then industry division of the DMO. That report looked at the work—and it still needs to be finalised—that—</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: We will just make sure that we are talking about the same report. This is the one that Macroeconomics, which is the name of a company, was commissioned to undertake on behalf of DMO.</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: I was under the impression that there was some assistance that they initially provided but that work was then taken over by DMO to be completed.</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: There was a contract that was close to half a million dollars that went to Macroeconomics to prepare this information—this 'study', as it was called.</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: I would need to take that on notice as to the amount that was spent and the full extent of the involvement of Macroeconomics, but there was other work that was being done to look at the factors that would need to be considered around assessing the economic benefits of building the submarines in Australia.</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: This study was supposed to be delivered in 2014. In August this year, Senator Brandis said: 'It is not yet complete.' When is it going to be complete?</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: Again, I will need to take that on notice and raise it with the people who are writing that report.</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: Is there any documentation arising from this study—like a draft report or draft information—available?</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: The report is being developed as a document. Again, I will need to take it on notice as to—</p>	111	03/12/15	04/02/16
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35.	Conroy	Coalition Intelligence Sharing with Iraq	<p>Senator CONROY: In late September there were widespread media reports that Iraq had reached a deal to share intelligence with Russia, Iran and Syria. Was Defence aware of Iraq's intentions to share intelligence with Russia, Iran and Syria prior to that announcement?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I do not believe that we had full information on that, but they are not sharing coalition intelligence; they are sharing their own intelligence, as I understand it.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: How do you ensure that they are able to separate out information that they receive from the coalition?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I do not believe they are receiving any intelligence direct. It will be through the command and control centres that are set up with the coalition in Baghdad.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: You have got no concerns then about the intelligence-sharing arrangement with Russia?</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I do not believe that any intelligence that we do not want to have shared would be shared.</p> <p>Senator CONROY: Could you just explain the process—I think you briefly mentioned it then—whereby the coalition shares intelligence with Iraq.</p> <p>Air Chief Marshal Binskin: As I understand it—and I will take this on notice for the specifics—the joint coalition headquarters in Baghdad are set up and cooperating closely not just with the coalition but with the Iraqi security forces, so they will use our generated intelligence to help shape the Iraqi operations. I would not believe that sensitive raw product would be passed across those lines. It would be used to help coordinate their activities and what our responses might be in support of their operations.</p>	17	01/12/15	04/02/16
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36.	Parry	HMAS TOBRUK & gifting of de-commissioned naval vessels to States	<p>(1) Who, or which Department can gift a de-commissioned ship to a state for non-military use.</p> <p>(2) What de-commissioned ships have been gifted to states in the past and for what purpose.</p> <p>(a) Was there any other Commonwealth funding provided in addition to the ship?</p> <p>(b) If so, what was the amount and for what purpose?</p> <p>(c) What was the cost of each of these projects to the Commonwealth?</p> <p>(d) What was the cost to the State?</p> <p>(3) Does any other Commonwealth Department have involvement with the sale or disposal of de-commissioned naval vessels?</p> <p>(a) If so, what is their involvement?</p> <p>(4) Is it true that the cost of berthing the HMAS TOBRUK in Sydney is \$5,000.00 per day, whereas it could be berthed at Bell Bay for \$1.55 per metre per day; that is less than \$200 per day?</p> <p>(5) What steps are required to obtain the HMAS TOBRUK for recreational use by State or Territory Government?</p> <p>(6) Which Department or Agency can assist a State or Territory Government with the process for acquiring the HMAS TOBRUK for recreational purposes?</p>	Written	04/02/16	25/02/16
37.	Gallacher	Unapproved Expenditure of Boots	<p>(1) How is it possible that the purchase exceeded the \$40,000 authority by \$330,000?</p> <p>(2) Who checks the authorisations of the purchases?</p> <p>(3) What is the process of purchase?</p> <p>(4) What is the process acquitting a purchase?</p> <p>(5) Is it peer reviewed?</p> <p>(6) Wouldn't the purchase of boots be demand driven?</p> <p>(7) Who establishes the need for additional boots to be purchased?</p> <p>(8) I understand that 1,433 parade boots were purchased at \$235 a pair – Can you confirm that these are Australian made boots?</p> <p>(9) How are the sizes of boots determined?</p> <p>(10) What were the sizes that were bought?</p> <p>(11) How many of the boots are remaining in inventory?</p> <p>(12) Are defence continuing to buy additional pairs of boots, while there is this excess?</p> <p>(13) Can you confirm that these boots were purchased for personnel in Duntroon?</p> <p>(14) How many personnel go through Duntroon that require boots every year?</p> <p>(15) How long do issued boots last?</p> <p>(15) Are non-Duntroon personnel issued with the same Australian made pairs of boots?</p> <p>(17) What is the cost of boots to Army Personnel who do not go to Duntroon?</p> <p>(18) How much do these boots cost and where are these made?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16

38.	Gallacher	Possible identification of unrecovered Australian remains from the Battle of Krithia	<p>(1) I understand the Unrecovered War Casualties Unit – Army (UWC-A) has been investigating claims, made by Mr Lambis Englazos and Mr John Basarin, that they have identified the location of unrecovered Australian remains from the Battle of Krithia, is that correct?</p> <p>(2) When did this investigation begin?</p> <p>(3) What steps have been taken to investigate this claim?</p> <p>(4) What records have been examined as part of this investigation?</p> <p>(5) I understand that a visual inspection of the Krithia site was due to take place in June 2015, did that inspection go ahead?</p> <p>(a) Can you confirm that the area inspected was the site identified by Mr Lambis Englazos and Mr John Basarin?</p> <p>(b) Were any other possible burial sites inspected as part of this investigation?</p> <p>(c) What does a visual site inspection involve?</p> <p>(d) What is the purpose of a visual site inspection?</p> <p>(e) Are these visual site inspection processors sufficient to definitively identify whether a mass grave is present at that location?</p> <p>(f) Can you please provide details as to the outcome/findings of that visual site inspection?</p> <p>(6) What is the next step(s) in this investigation following the visual site inspection?</p> <p>(7) Is there a defined set of criteria as to the level of evidence that is sufficient to support obtaining permission to conduct more invasive reconnaissance and possible recovery.</p> <p>(8) When can we expect the investigation to be completed?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
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39.	Ludwig	Departmental Rebranding	<p>(1) Has the department/Agency undergone a name change or any other form of rebranding since the leadership change in September, 2015? If so:</p> <p>(a) Please detail why this name change / rebrand were considered necessary and a justified use of departmental funds?</p> <p>(i) Please provide a copy of any reports that were commissioned to study the benefits and costs associated with the rebranding.</p> <p>(b) Please provide the total cost associated with this rebrand and then break down by amount spent replacing:</p> <p>(i) Signage.</p> <p>(ii) Stationery (please include details of existing stationery and how it was disposed of).</p> <p>(iii) Logos</p> <p>(iv) Consultancy</p> <p>(v) Any relevant IT changes.</p> <p>(vi) Office reconfiguration.</p> <p>(c) How was the decision reached to rename and/or rebrand the department?</p> <p>(i) Who was involved in reaching this decision?</p> <p>(ii) Please provide a copy of any communication (including but not limited to emails, letters, memos, notes etc) from within the department, or between the department and the government regarding the rename/rebranding.</p> <p>(2) Following the changes does the department share any goods/services/accommodation with other departments?</p> <p>(3) What resources/services does the department share with other departments; are there plans to cease sharing the sharing of these resources/services?</p> <p>(4) What were the costs to the department prior to the Machinery of Government changes for these shared resources? What are the estimated costs after the ceasing of shared resource arrangements?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
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40.	Ludwig	Staffing - employment of non-Australian citizens	<p>I refer you to section 22 (8) of the Public Service Act 1999 which says: "An Agency Head must not engage, as an APS employee, a person who is not an Australian citizen, unless the Agency Head considers it appropriate to do so."</p> <p>(1) Does the department have guidelines or similar to assist Agency Heads to assess when it is appropriate to hire non-Australian citizens? If no, do individual agencies have their own guidelines? If yes to either: (a) Please provide a copy. (b) When did they come into effect? (c) Can Agency Heads decide to go against the advice? If yes, under what circumstances?</p> <p>(2) Are Agency Heads required to provide a reason to anyone for hiring non-Australian citizens? If yes: (a) Who are they required to report the reason to? (b) Does this reporting happen before or after the hire has been made? (c) Is this reason provided in writing? If no, how is it provided? (d) Can you please provide a list of reasons that have been used since the Federal election in September, 2013.</p> <p>(3) Are there any provisions to over-rule a Head of Agency's decision to hire a non-Australian citizen? If yes: (a) Who can over-rule this decision? (b) Under what circumstances can it be over-ruled? (c) How many times has this occurred since the Federal election in September, 2013.</p>	Written	04/12/15	04/02/16
41.	Ludwig	Ministerial Personalised Stationery	<p>Since the leadership change in September, 2015, how much has been spent by the Ministerial office on personalised stationery for the Minister and the Minister's staff? Please provide a cost breakdown by type of stationery purchased and the quantity of each and whether it was for the Minister or for staff.</p>	Written	04/12/15	04/02/16

42.	Xenophon	Operations - Overseas Postings	<p>I refer to comments made by Duncan Lewis, ASIO director-general in a recent news article from the Australian regarding two common misperceptions about the organisation's role.</p> <p>Mr Lewis is quoted as saying: "ASIO is often incorrectly seen as a purely domestic security intelligence agency when in fact it is responsible for the security of Australians wherever they are, which obviously includes overseas"</p> <p>The article states that as more and more Australians travel and live overseas (more than one million) – ASIO's international footprint has increased correspondingly with officer's posted throughout Asia, North America, the Middle East and Europe.</p> <p>(1) Does the Department of Defence also view their role changing as more and more Australians travel and live overseas?</p> <p>(2) What roles and responsibilities does Defence and its officers hold when operating overseas?</p> <p>(3) When did ASIO initially start posting officers overseas?</p> <p>(4) Can you advise the current number of defence officers posted overseas?</p> <p>(5) How much has the Defence international footprint increased? (a) Can you provide a breakdown of these numbers over the last decade? (b) Can you advise of locations officers are posted?</p> <p>(6) Is the Defence still expanding its offshore role?</p> <p>(7) What training (operational and otherwise) do Defence staff receive prior to and during overseas postings?</p> <p>(8) What authorisations exist overseas for weapons carrying by officers?</p> <p>(9) How does Defence monitor weapon handling by overseas officers and what policies exist to ensure safety to officers and others?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
43.	Xenophon	Overseas Incident	<p>I refer to the IGIS inquiry into an incident overseas in which a Special Forces soldier allegedly pulled a gun on a female ASIS agent during a drinking session.</p> <p>(1) What policies does Defence have in place with regards to ensuring Defence has controls in place to ensure that officers are not carrying weapons under the influence of alcohol?</p> <p>(2) How does Defence cooperate and interact with other Australian agencies operating overseas (ie. ASIS, ASIO)?</p> <p>(3) What procedures does Defence have in place for officers that may commit a crime during operations?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16

44.	Xenophon	Defence abuse - Pathway to Change Strategy	<p>It is now over three years since Defence launched the Pathway to Change strategy. Former Defence Minister Smith committed to reporting to Parliament on an annual basis on progress with Pathway to Change and responses to abuse in Defence.</p> <p>(1) What processes does Defence have in place for assessing progress with the Pathway to Change Strategy?</p> <p>(2) What processes and timetable are in place for reporting to the Minister for Defence on Pathway to Change strategy?</p> <p>Former Minister Smith had committed to reporting to Parliament on an annual basis on these matters.</p> <p>(3) Will the new Minister for Defence be reporting to Parliament on these matters on a regular basis?</p> <p>(a) If yes – when is the Minister’s first report expected to be presented to Parliament?</p>	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16
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45.	Xenophon	Defence abuse	<p>In October 2014 the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee tabled its report - Processes to support victims of abuse in Defence. The Government response to this Report was tabled on 16 June 2015. A number of recommendations relate to the Department of Veterans' Affairs.</p> <p>Some of the Government responses indicated that the recommendations would be further considered by Government in budgetary contexts and/or that there would be further consideration and consultation before Government decisions were made.</p> <p>Shortly before the change in Ministers I met with the then Minister for Defence Kevin Andrews and I expressed to him my concerns that these matters not be left to drift while people damaged by abuse in the Defence Force and their families are continuing to suffer without assistance they could be getting.</p> <p>I was particularly concerned that we not get to the next Budget process without sufficient work having been done to enable the Government to make substantive decisions.</p> <p>Minister Andrews agreed to take up these concerns with the then Minister for Veterans' Affairs and I wrote to Minister Andrews on 4 September 2015 to confirm my concerns.</p> <p>I have written to the new Minister for Defence Senator Payne and provided her with a copy of my letter to Minister Newman.</p> <p>(1) Has the Department of Defence briefed the Minister on these issues?</p> <p>(2) Has the Department of Defence commenced discussions with the Department on these issues?</p> <p>(3) For each calendar year from and including 2011 to date how many incidents of alleged sexual assault on ADF members where the alleged or suspected perpetrator is another member of the ADF member have been reported to:</p> <p>(a) ADF Investigative Service</p> <p>(b) the Values Behaviours and Resolutions Branch (or its predecessor)</p> <p>(c) other entities within Defence</p> <p>(4) For each calendar year 2011 to date – how many incidents have there been where Defence is aware that a member of the ADF has reported an alleged sexual assault by another member of the ADF to State or Territory Police?</p>	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16
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46.	Xenophon	Defence abuse	<p>Taking into account that: Vice-Admiral Griggs (then Acting Chief of the Defence Force) informed the Senate FADT Committee in hearings in September 2014 that the ADF leadership would not commit to pursuing zero incidence of sexual assault of ADF members by ADF members because the ADF leadership considered that zero incidence of sexual assault was not achievable.</p> <p>Experts in the field generally consider that the rate of reporting of sexual assault in the general community is less than 20%. Many reports on aspects of abuse in the ADF have concluded that there have been strong cultural factors in the ADF environment discouraging reporting of abuse.</p> <p>It seems likely that many incidents of sexual abuse in the ADF are not reported.</p> <p>(1) Does Defence accept that many incidents of sexual abuse in the ADF are probably not reported? (2) If Defence does not accept that – why not? (3) If Defence does accept that, then what is the ADF doing: (a) to identify where unreported abuse may be occurring; and (b) to address possible areas of unreported abuse?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
47.	Xenophon	Defence action on DART referrals	<p>(1) Has Defence taken any: (a) administrative action (b) commenced a prosecution under the Defence Force Discipline Act?</p> <p>(2) In relation to any current members of the ADF for allegations of sexual assault or other abuse of other members of the ADF which was referred to Defence by the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce? (a) If yes – in how many cases? (b) If yes - what was the nature of the action or charges and what was the outcome of the action or prosecution?</p> <p>(3) Has Defence taken into account any allegations referred by the DART in risk management to protect other ADF personnel whether or not formal action is taken against the suspected perpetrator?</p> <p>(4) In particular has Defence taken into account any allegations referred by the DART in deciding on postings or allocation of duties to members of the ADF who are alleged perpetrators? (a) If yes how have such allegations been taken into account?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16

48.	Xenophon	SeMPRO	<p>(1) Has there been a review of SeMPRO's resourcing levels? (a) If yes, what was the outcome of that review? (b) If not, when will the review take place?</p> <p>I understand SeMPRO as initially established was not given resources to have a presence on Defence bases, establishments and ships but was limited to an office in Canberra with a telephone number for victims to call.</p> <p>(2) If the 'uptake' of victims of sexual abuse who have made a telephone call to SeMPRO 'to date' has been low, will that be regarded as a factor indicating that SeMPRO's level of resourcing is adequate or inadequate? (a) That is – if the 'uptake' is low will that be taken as indicating that SeMPRO needs more resources as the Committee recommended '...to facilitate further outreach activities and personal support to victims of sexual assault in Defence? (b) Or will that be taken as indicating that there is no need for SeMPRO to be available for victims of recent sexual assault?</p> <p>Defence stated in writing to the FADT Committee last year that in its first year of operation, SeMPRO did not receive any reports of sexual assault within 72 hours of an incident – 72 hours being the relevant period for possible collection of forensic evidence.</p> <p>(3) In the second year of SeMPRO operation – from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015: (a) how many reports of sexual assault did SeMPRO receive within 72 hours of an incident? (b) on how many occasions has SeMPRO assisted a victim of sexual assault with the collection of forensic evidence within 72 hours of an incident?</p> <p>In evidence given to the Senate FADT Committee last year Defence said that most of the victims of sexual abuse who came to SeMPRO wanted to discuss 'historical' incidents. That is not surprising given that SeMPRO cannot take reports on a confidential basis if there is any current 'risk'.</p> <p>(4) Since it commenced operations on 1 July 2013 how many reports has SeMPRO received: (a) within 7 days of the incident (i) of sexual assault? (ii) of other sexual abuse? (b) within one month of the incident? (i)-of sexual assault? (ii)-of other sexual abuse?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
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49.	Xenophon	Report of the Review of allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence	<p>It is now four years since the Report of the Review of allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence identified that a Royal Commission could be appropriate to address the legacy issues arising from Defence's failure to call to account male Cadets who sexually assaulting other Cadets at ADFA and Cadets who acquiesced in those assaults.</p> <p>It took Mr Roberts-Smith two years from November 2012 until November 2014 to consider whether or not to recommend that there be such a Royal Commission. For over three months the Government has been sitting on Sex Discrimination Commissioner Broderick's report on whether to accept Mr Roberts-Smith November 2014 recommendation for a Royal Commission into abuse at ADFA.</p> <p>The issue of whether or not to accept Mr Roberts Smith's recommendation for a Royal Commission in respect of allegations of abuse and the management of abuse at ADFA is a very important national issue.</p> <p>(1) Will Defence or the Minister make Ms Broderick's report available for Parliamentary and general community consideration before it makes a decision on whether or not to accept Mr Roberts-Smith's recommendation? (a) If not why not? (b) If yes, when will that occur?</p>	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16
50.	Xenophon	Fraud	<p>It was reported in 1990 by Senator Ray that 'Defence fraud could hit \$800m, says Senator.</p> <p>(1) Can the Department provide details of the reported fraud that were investigated by the Australian Federal Police at the time? (a) If not, why not? (2) Can Defence give reason as to why such levels of reported fraud have not been reported since then? (a) If not, why not?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16

51.	Xenophon	Fraud – 'Re-thinking Systems of Inquiry, Investigation, Review and Audit' Report	<p>In 2015, Defence has released the 'Re-Thinking Systems of Inquiry, Investigation, Review and Audit'.</p> <p>Can Defence provide the “Heading of Figure 3, Page 19 of Report on Stage B (possible models for an optimal system of audit) 10 May 2013 > RSR audit - First report.”</p> <p>(1) Can Defence give a succinct Departmental understanding of the categories highlighting the 'Common Themes Emerging From Audit Reviews of Major Capital Acquisition Projects.'? If not, why not?</p> <p>(a) Gaps / delays in briefing senior decision-makers and Ministers</p> <p>(b) Leadership failure at a senior level</p> <p>(c) Failure to appreciate complex interdependencies</p> <p>(d) Underestimated project complexity and cost</p> <p>(e) Changes to project scope and objectives</p> <p>(f) Project management deficiencies</p> <p>(g) Insufficient skilled personnel</p> <p>(h) Project record-keeping deficiencies</p> <p>(i) Controls not effective</p> <p>(j) Failure in project accounting</p> <p>(2) Can Defence provide the final overall budget for each of the projects mentioned (redacted) in this Figure? If not, why not?</p>	Written	02/12/15	04/02/16
52.	Xenophon	Fraud – Australian Defence Force Investigation Course	<p>In understand that the 2011 ADFIS audit team advised that the DPSMS is not an approved records management recording system under the Archives Act and may fail to reach the requirements of AGIS.</p> <p>I understand that the audit team identified the Australian Defence Force Investigative Course (ADFIC) no longer complies as a qualification under Australian Government Investigation Standards (AGIS).</p> <p>Can the Department tell me what has been done about this?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
53.	Xenophon	Fraud – Report on AFP not reported in Defence Annual Reports	<p>Given that INV-FIR-FIR-32-2003 was reported to the AFP on the 7th July 2003 for corruption to the amount of \$4,100,000.00</p> <p>Can Defence explain why it was not reported in either the Defence Annual Reports for 2002-03 or the next year, 2003-04? If not, why not?</p>	Written	02/12/15	04/02/16

54.	Xenophon	Fraud – FOI referrals to AFP	In the recent FOI document # R22150450, Defence identified that 110 cases using the key word fraud, contract and corruption were identified and referred to the AFP. Only 33 cases had a dollar value attributed to them. Can Defence please supply the remaining values?	Written	28/01/16	04/02/16
55.	Xenophon	Fraud – Naval Board Investigation	I refer to my written Question on Notice No.63 - Defence Fraud / ANAO Audit Implementation? I refer you to part (2) of the question. I also refer you to part (4) of the question where, unless raised in-camera, the oversight committee has never been informed or advised of the size and quantity of the financial loss (including fraud) from this armaments depot, RANAD Newington. The then Minister (1997) was quoted in the Bulletin Magazine as saying she will, "take appropriate action" after being briefed by the department. Can Defence explain for what reason a most serious investigation by a Naval Board of Inquiry has never, from your records, been brought to the attention of the responsible Defence Minister?	Written	01/12/15	04/02/16
56.	Xenophon	Submarine Commanding Officers	(1) How many RAN officers have passed the submarine “perisher” Command Qualification course: (a) in the past 10 years? (b) in the past 5 years? (c) in the past 2 years? (2) How many RAN submarines are presently assigned a “perisher” Command Qualification officer as Commanding Officer? (3) Of those presently assigned submarine Commanding Officers: (a) In what year did each pass the submarine “perisher” Command Qualification course? (b) In which Navy did each pass the submarine “perisher” Command Qualification course?	Written	04/12/15	04/02/16
57.	Xenophon	Tenders for Combat System	Have any tenders (including limited) tenders been released with respect to combat system (e.g. sonar, ESM, electro-optical, weapons) training service in the past 6 months? If so, what is the nature and scope of these services?	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
58.	Xenophon	B1 Bombers Placement	What discussions have occurred re: placement of B1 bombers in Australia?	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16

59.	Xenophon	UAVs on Cocos Keeling Islands	What discussions have occurred re placement of UAVs on Cocos Keeling Islands? (Former Coalition Defence Spokesman and Defence Minister David Johnston had been a supporter of this idea)	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
60.	Xenophon	Defence Cooperation Programs	What Defence Cooperation programs, exercises or other forms of engagement did Australia enter into with Indonesia from 1997-2000?	Written	01/12/15	04/02/16
61.	Xenophon	Future Submarine	(1) After the Competitive Evaluation Process is concluded and the design partner selected, how does Defence intend to maintain “competitive tension” with respect to price during the period up to finalisation of the design of and contract for the submarine? (2) With respect to the Microeconomics study contract (DMOCIP/RFT0315/2012) to conduct work on the potential economic input of the SEA 1000 project on the Australian economy, please provide the Committee with the “raw” reports or studies that were delivered to the Commonwealth.	Written	04/12/15	04/02/16

62.	Xenophon	AN/BYG-1 Transition from "reference system" to "preferred system" for Future Submarine	<p>With regard to the exchange that took place between Senator Xenophon and Mr Richardson/Rear Admiral Sammut over a lack of transparency with respect to the decision to have the BYG Command and Control (C2) System go from a "reference system" to "preferred system", please provide a summary of the business case used to justify this decision, including details with respect to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) How a value for money assessment was carried out (2) The merits of the BYG C2 solution with respect to value for money, including details as to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) The projected total acquisition cost of the BYG C2 for the future submarine fleet (based on a fleet of 12 submarines) (b) A comparison cost of a ISUS-90 C2 or SUBTICs C2 in percentage terms (c) The projected total acquisition cost of a complete BYG based federated combat system, including initial integration cost, for the future submarine fleet (based on a fleet of 12 submarines) (d) A comparison cost of a complete ISUS-90 fully integrated combat system or SUBTICs based fully integrated combat system in percentage terms (3) How a capability assessment was carried out (4) The merits of the BYG C2 system with respect to capability (5) How Defence has assessed the indigenous industrial involvement package associated with acquisition of the BYG vs a ISUS-90 combat system or SUBTICs based combat system <p>With respect to the selection of the BYG combat system for the future submarine:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (6) All things being equal (i.e. isolating other changes to the future submarine), does Defence concede that the use of the BYG system, as opposed to other conventional submarine C2 systems, will have an adverse impact on the submarine's indiscretion ratio. (7) Noting the number of submarines is set to increase, and therefore the number of total BYG combat system are set to increase, what impact will that increase have on the annual amount paid to the US government for joint program updates? (8) What are the projected annual costs for the Australian integrator of the BYG system? <p>With respect to answers to Q2564 tabled on 02 September 2015 where Defence advises that the Japanese, SUBTICS and ISUS 90 combat system are not under consideration for the future submarine:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (9) Does Defence concede that the Competitive Evaluation Process was the perfect opportunity for Defence to establish cost, risk and platform impacts of the various combat system choices for the future submarine? (10) Why was the comparison opportunity not taken? (11) Who made the decision to not take this opportunity, and why? 	Written	05/02/16	25/02/16
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63.	Xenophon	Australian C2 System	<p>(1) Has Defence given consideration as to the possibility of developing, as countries such as Singapore has, an indigenous C2 system? Noting factors such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) industry capability (b) that submarines combat systems is a priority industry capability (c) project time frames to get the first submarine in the water (d) risk and (d) cost <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) If so, please provide a brief analysis of merits or difficulties with an indigenous C2 system? (ii) If not, why not? <p>(2) With respect to common functionality (e.g. data fusion, automatic track motion analysis and tactical picture compilation) that exist between Acacia Research's TDMS system and the BYG C2 system:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Has a capability comparison ever been carried out between the two system? (b) If so, in broad and unclassified terms, what was the result of this comparison? <p>(3) How many Collins class submarines were fitted with Acacia's TDMS system as part of the Combat System Augmentation program?</p> <p>(4) How much money was spent on the fit of Acacia's TDMS system to Collins as part of the Combat System Augmentation program?</p> <p>(5) In broad figures (e.g. <\$10M, \$10-20M, \$20-50M) what would be the acquisition cost of a fleet fit of Acacia's TDMS system for the future submarine?</p>	Written	05/02/16	25/02/16
64.	Xenophon	Collins AN/BYG-1 Cost	<p>(1) Please explain the substantial difference as to the cost of the BYG as supplied to Senator Johnston in Q206 of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee Estimates in May 2012 and as supplied to Senator Xenophon in question 2487 tabled on 20 July 2015</p> <p>(2) Noting the cost of the BYG as supplied to Senator Xenophon in question 2487 tabled on 20 July 2015, and for rough comparison purposes since 2001, what is the total amount that has been spent of the:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Collins Class sonars? (b) Collins Class ESM Suite? (c) Collins Class periscopes? (d) Collins Class communications fit? 	Written	05/02/16	25/02/16

65.	Xenophon	Advanced Processor Build Program	<p>(1) With respect to comments made by Rear Admiral Dalton in relation to “the system integrator” of the two Australia companies products into the BYG:</p> <p>(a) Can Defence confirm who the main system systems integrator referred to is?</p> <p>(b) Noting Defence is a financial contributor to the joint program and therefore would have an interest expenditure in the broad program, can Defence please advise what the annual (or other fixed period) value is for that integrator.</p> <p>(c) Can Defence confirm that the work in the Steps 2-4 of the APB process is not done entirely by the “system integrator” drawing on its internal resources, but by other US companies as well?</p> <p>(d) Noting that (and subject to Defence’s confirmation of c above) US companies other than the system integrator are working on Steps 2-4 of the APB process, can Defence explain why that integration work is available to US companies but not available to the Australian companies that originated the products ?</p> <p>(2) Noting the following statement from Rear Admiral Sammut, “If I might just add: the companies were actually contracted for amounts of around \$230,000 each for the development of the technology, along with another \$155,000 for further work if it was required, and there was an additional amount in each of those contracts for travel and international travel”.</p> <p>(a) Can Defence please confirm that each company was contracted for \$230,000?</p> <p>(b) Was the money allocated to “further work” spent, and if so, was any of this additional expenditure for the integration phase work in APB steps 2-4 and the associated international travel?</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(i) additional money was provided for additional work and for international travel,</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(ii) there is a need for additional work in the integration phase, and</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(iii) that work takes place in the US, why has Defence not spent money on the Australian companies to travel to the US and do that additional work?</p> <p>(3) Noting Defence is a financial contributor to the joint program and therefore would have an interest expenditure in the broad program:</p> <p>(a) For each of the products that have been originated by Australian industry, what is the total value of the work, presumably allocated to US industry, to undertake the steps 2 through 4 of the APB process?</p> <p>(b) For each of the products that have been originated by Australian industry, what is the total value of the work across all 4 steps of the APB process?</p> <p>(4) Noting the following statement from Rear Admiral Sammut, “The next step is the integration step that Rear Admiral Dalton was talking about, which is actually being able to now put their software into the wide combat system that is used in American submarines and Australian submarines, to ensure that it does not upset the stability of the entire suite, and do laboratory testing before it goes to sea.</p>	Written	05/02/16	25/02/16
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	Xenophon	Advanced Processor Build Program	<p>That has to be done in an environment where the software can be tested in the context of all of the AN/BYG software, not just in isolation”</p> <p>(a) Can Defence confirm that for each of the products originated by Australian industry and funded by the Australian taxpayer, during the integration by US companies of those products into the BYG, the US companies undertaking the integration would, as a matter of course gain a level of familiarity with the product’s software ?</p> <p>(b) Can Defence confirm that during integration work of this nature, as a matter of course changes would be made to the products’ software to ensure that the products do work in the context of all the BYG software ?</p> <p>(c) For each of the products originated by Australian industry and funded by the Australian taxpayer, can Defence confirm whether, as an outcome of the 4 step APB process, the most recent “as integrated” version of the product software will be available to an organisation in US industry but not to the Australian originator of the product?</p> <p>(d) For each of the products originated by Australian industry and funded by the Australian taxpayer, can Defence confirm that where further functions need to be added to these products to meet evolving future capability requirements, the Australian originators would not be in a position to offer changes, noting that they will not have access to the most current product revisions resulting from the integration process ?</p> <p>(e) For each of the products originated by Australian industry and funded by the Australian taxpayer, can Defence confirm that should further functions need to be added to these products to meet evolving future capability requirements, the US companies that were handed the Australian products, and have access to the most current product revisions resulting from the integration process will be in a position to offer future modifications to those products to meet new requirements?</p> <p>(f) Upon whose Intellectual Property register will the products originated by Australian Industry and funded by the Australian taxpayer sit?</p> <p>(5) With reference to Defence’s answer to Q202 of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee Estimates in May 2012 where Defence stated “The target is for Australian companies to be able to compete for inclusion in the joint development process on the same basis as US based companies, can Defence clarify that response and confirm, whether Australian industry – even where it has the technologies and/or capabilities that address Navy requirements and even where the underlying algorithms are confirmed in Step 1 testing – is only able to compete for inclusion in Step 1 of the APB process, and that the work associated with the integration effort in Steps 2 through 4 of the APB process is only available to US companies, and that future work associated with further evolving Australian originated products is only available to US companies?</p>			
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			(6) What, if anything, is being done differently with the current APB round, to enhance Australian industry participation?			
66.	Bilyk	Ministerial Functions	(1) In relation to any functions or official receptions hosted by the Defence Minister or Assistant Minister for Defence in 2015, can the following please be provided: (a) List of functions; (b) List of attendees including departmental officials and members of the Minister's family or personal staff; (c) Function venue; (d) Itemised list of costs; (e) Details of any food served; (f) Details of any wines or champagnes served including brand and vintage; and (g) Details of any entertainment provided.	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
67.	Bilyk	Secretary's Speeches to staff	(1) Can a copy of any speeches delivered by the Secretary of the Department at any staff meetings in 2015 please be provided?	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
68.	Bilyk	Secretary's office upgrade	(1) Have the furniture, fixtures or fittings of the Secretary's office been upgraded in 2015? If so, can an itemised list of costs please be provided?	Written	01/12/15	04/02/16

69.	Conroy	Defence White Paper	<p>In his final press appearance as Defence Minister on 20 September 2015, Kevin Andrews said: “The Defence White Paper is finalised and ready for release.” (http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/09/20/minister-for-defence-doorstop-interview-melbourne-commonwealth-parliamentary-offices/) During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, the following exchange occurred: Senator CONROY: So you have received it? It is not being reworked? You have received a final copy that you are ready to release? Senator Payne: I said that the white paper in its then form—as it was after my appointment—has been received and is being considered. Senator CONROY: You received the finalised version? Mr Richardson: Just as a statement of fact—I do not want to get drawn into other matters—the white paper was not 'finalised' then. Senator CONROY: The then defence minister, on 20 September, said that, 'The Defence white paper is finalised and ready for release.' So either he is wrong or you are wrong. Mr Richardson: As of that date it was neither finalised nor ready for release and that is a statement of fact. Senator CONROY: It was not finalised and it was not ready for release? Mr Richardson: No.</p> <p>(1) Did Defence provide then-Minister Andrews with a final draft of the 2015 Defence White Paper for consideration prior to 20 September 2015? (a) If so, on what date was this provided? (b) Did Minister Andrews provide feedback requiring any redrafting? (c) Have any changes been made to this final draft since 20 September 2015? If so, what are these changes and who directed that they be made?</p> <p>(2) Did Defence provide advice to then-Minister Andrews’ office suggesting that the 2015 Defence White Paper was either ‘finalised’ or ‘ready for release’ on or before 20 September 2015?</p> <p>(3) Did Defence advise then-Minister Andrews that his statement of 20 September 2015 claiming the “...Defence White Paper is finalised and ready for release...” was incorrect?</p> <p>(4) What criterion must be met for Defence to consider a document such as the 2015 Defence White Paper to be ‘finalised’?</p> <p>(5) What criterion must be met for Defence to consider a document such as the 2015 Defence White Paper to be ‘ready for release’?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
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	Conroy	Defence White Paper	<p>(6) Does Defence consider then-Minister Andrews' 20 September 2015 statement to have been misleading?</p> <p>(7) As of 21 October 2015, had Defence Minister Payne been provided with a final draft of the 2015 Defence White Paper to consider?</p> <p>(a) If so, on what date was this provided?</p> <p>(b) Has Minister Payne provided feedback requiring any redrafting? (c) Have any changes been made to this final draft since 21 October 2015? If so, what are these changes and who directed that they be made?</p> <p>(8) Has Prime Minister Turnbull's National Security Council considered the 2015 Defence White Paper draft ?</p>			
70.	Conroy	Defence Budget	<p>In relation to the Government's commitment to lift Defence expenditure to 2 percent of GDP by 2023/24:</p> <p>(1) Has Defence prepared proposals to achieve the 2 percent expenditure target by 2023/24?</p> <p>(a) Are these proposals in accordance with a normal and advisable acquisition and absorption processes?</p> <p>(2) Has Defence prepared proposals to achieve the 2 percent expenditure target over a longer timeframe than 2023/24?</p> <p>(3) What are the year-on-year real budget growth figures that will be needed to reach the Government's target of 2 percent by 2023/24?</p> <p>(a) How will each year-on-year spending target be achieved?</p> <p>(4) How will Defence manage the acquisition of platforms at the accelerated rate required by the Government's target?</p> <p>(5) Is the expenditure target realistic from the point of view of the ability of Defence and industry to manage this level and rate of increased spending?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
71.	Conroy	Submarines - Competitive Evaluation	<p>(1) Did Defence provide the Government with advice recommending that the Competitive Evaluation Process result in down-selection to a single bidder?</p> <p>(a) If so, when was this advice provided and in what format (written or verbal)?</p> <p>(2) Has Defence provided advice to Government proposing that the Competitive Evaluation Process result in down-selection to more than one bidder?</p> <p>(a) If so, when was this advice provided and in what format (written or verbal)?</p> <p>(3) Has Defence provided any advice to Government on the potential implications of down-selecting to one bidder including, but not limited to, any potential impact on competitive tension, price and/or schedule?</p>	Written	05/02/16	25/02/16

72.	Conroy	Submarines - Local Build	<p>During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, Rear Admiral Sammut said:</p> <p>“Of course, the impact of the various build options on our ability to sustain will also be considered, as well as the level of Australian industry involvement that each of the participants are proposing as well. All of those factors play into that core factor—our ability to sustain the submarine with sovereignty.”</p> <p>Does Defence agree that build options other than a local Australian build – particularly, but not limited to, a full overseas build – may increase risk with respect to Australia’s ability to sustain the Future Submarines?</p>	Written	04/12/15	04/02/16
73.	Conroy	Submarines - FAQ from SEA1000 Website	<p>The ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ section of the Department of Defence’s SEA1000 website (http://sea1000.gov.au/submarine-essentials/faqs/) states:</p> <p>“Effective submarine operations depend on technological expertise and costly support, so used to be restricted to a few developed nations. Now, the rising wealth of Indo-Pacific nations is expanding the number of submarine operating nations – by 2030 50% of the world’s submarines will be in Australia’s broader strategic region.”</p> <p>During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, Vice Admiral Barrett said:</p> <p>“It is not Defence’s assessment, per se.”</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Where did Defence source this information? (2) Does Defence agree with this assessment? (3) What is Defence’s own assessment of the projected density of submarines in Australia’s broader strategic region in coming years? (4) Does Defence agree that the increasing density of submarines in our broader strategic region means that Australia’s submarine fleet will be an increasingly important element of our defence force? 	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16

74.	Conroy	Submarines - Life Extension Collins Class	<p>During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, Secretary Richardson said that: “So some life extension of some of the Collins—it might only be one; it may be two; don't know—is highly likely. We cannot be dogmatic about that at the moment, but it is certainly highly likely.”</p> <p>(1) Has Defence conducted, or is Defence in the process of conducting, an analysis of how many Collins class submarines may require life extension and for what period of time they may need to be extended? (a) If this analysis has been completed, when was it completed? (b) If this analysis is underway, when does Defence expect to complete this analysis?</p> <p>(2) Has Defence conducted any estimates since September 2013 of the costs associated with extending the life of the Collins class? (a) If so, when was this conducted and is Defence able to comment (in broad terms, if necessary) on the likely cost to extend the life of Collins?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
75.	Conroy	Submarines - Collins Class	<p>(1) Does Defence intend to use Collins as a testbed for any new technologies and/or systems that will be part of the baseline specification for the Future Submarine?</p> <p>(2) Does Defence consider that using Collins as a testbed for new technologies and/or systems that will be part of the Future Submarine could be a beneficial means of reducing schedule, design and cost risk for the Future Submarine project?</p>	Written	04/12/15	04/02/16

76.	Conroy	Submarines - CEP Process	<p>Under the former Labor Government, a tender was released in relation to the effect on the economy of building submarines in Australia. The tender (DMOCIP/RFT0315/2012) was won by macroeconomics.com.au, which was paid around \$459,000 to deliver a report by 30 June 2014.</p> <p>When Senator Xenophon asked about this at Supplementary Budget Estimates on 22 October 2014, Defence's response under Question on Notice 30 stated in part: "The modelling work was completed in August 2014. Informed by the modelling, a report is being compiled by the DMO. The report is well advanced but not yet complete."</p> <p>When Senator Xenophon followed up on this in the Senate on 25 August 2015, Senator Brandis' response in Senate Question on Notice 2552 was: "The report to which Senator Xenophon refers is not yet complete."</p> <p>During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, the following exchange took place:</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: Is this report going to be completed before the conclusion of the CEP process?</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: It will be completed in conjunction with the CEP so that we have an understanding of some of the economic factors that would apply to considerations that arise from the CEP which would form the advice that would go to government to inform its decision on the international partner.</p> <p>Senator McEWEN: So when will it be completed then?</p> <p>Rear Adm. Sammut: I do not have a precise date for you; again I will have to take that on notice. It is being led by another area where there are specialists in these fields, not by my particular project. But it will be conducted in conjunction with our program.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) What is the current status of this report? (2) When will the report be finalised? (3) Why has the finalisation of this report been delayed? (4) Was the Defence Minister or Defence Minister's Office consulted and/or advised as part of any decision-making process to delay the report? If so, when did this occur and what if any guidance was provided by the Defence Minister or Defence Minister's Office? (5) Will the report, or an unclassified version of the report, be made public? (6) Which area of Defence has responsibility for this report? Has this changed at any time since the report's inception? (7) How many Defence staff are currently working on this report and what percentage of their time is spent on this report? (8) Has the number of Defence staff, or the amount of time spent on this report by those staff, changed since the report was first commissioned? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) If so, why and when did a change occur? 	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
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77.	Conroy	Submarines - Expert Advisory Panel	<p>In Question on Notice No. 82 from Budget Estimates in June 2015, Defence was asked if it had recommended the appointments of all four members of the Expert Advisory Panel to oversee the Future Submarine Competitive Evaluation Process. Defence responded that:</p> <p>“Defence recommended the appointment of Professor Don Winter, the Hon Julie Anne Dodds-Streeton, and Mr Ron Finlay to the Expert Advisory Panel.”</p> <p>(1) Did Defence provide advice to the Government regarding the number of members that should comprise the Expert Advisory Panel? If so:</p> <p>(a) What was the number advised by Defence?</p> <p>(b) When was that advice provided?</p> <p>(c) In what form was that advice provided?</p> <p>(d) Who specifically was the advice provided by and to?</p> <p>Defence’s response under Question on Notice No. 82 from Budget Estimates in June 2015 goes on to state that:</p> <p>“With a view to recommending Mr Jim McDowell for other Defence-related roles, he was not included among those originally recommended for appointment to the Expert Advisory Panel for the competitive evaluation process. All candidates were evaluated by Defence on the basis of their experience and expertise in complex military acquisition programs, legal and probity matters, and the delivery of major projects. A number of candidates were considered in the evaluation; however, only those appointed to the panel were recommended.”</p> <p>(2) Who conducted the evaluation of potential appointees to the Expert Advisory Panel?</p> <p>(3) Over what period did this evaluation occur?</p> <p>(4) What was the evaluation framework that was employed to assess potential candidates?</p> <p>(5) Were potential candidates required to submit documentation attesting to their experience and expertise in relation to the selection criteria?</p> <p>(6) Were potential candidates interviewed in order to establish their levels of experience and expertise in relation to the selection criteria?</p> <p>(7) Was Mr Jim McDowell formally considered as part of the evaluation that Defence conducted for the Expert Advisory Panel?</p> <p>IF YES:</p> <p>(a) Why was he ultimately deemed inappropriate to recommend to the Government for the role?</p> <p>(b) Did Defence consider him to have met the key selection criteria?</p> <p>(c) Was the Government consulted on the exclusion of Mr McDowell from Defence’s evaluation process?</p>	Written	04/12/15	04/02/16
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	Conroy	Submarines - Expert Advisory Panel	<p>(d) If Mr McDowell met the criteria of the evaluation process, how does Defence justify the exclusion of him from the formal Ministerial Submission on the basis of wanting to ‘reserve’ him for another role?</p> <p>IF NO:</p> <p>(e) Why was Mr McDowell excluded from the evaluation process?</p> <p>(f) Did Defence consider that Mr McDowell did not meet the criteria for appointment to the Expert Advisory Panel?</p> <p>(g) Is it Defence’s prerogative to exclude individuals from appointment advice to the Government on the basis of ‘reserving’ them for other positions?</p> <p>(8) Which other Defence-related roles were Defence intending to recommend Mr McDowell for?</p> <p>In an article by Mr David Wroe in The Sydney Morning Herald on 8 October 2015 entitled “Defence Minister rejects expert concerns of ‘rushed’ submarine bidding process”, Defence Minister Payne is quoted as saying: “Once an international partner is selected, there will be about three years of further development work before we finalise the Future Submarine’s capability and cost.”</p> <p>(9) Will the Expert Advisory Panel or any of its members have any role in relation to the Future Submarine project once an international partner has been selected?</p> <p>(10) Is there any intention to continue the Expert Advisory Panel, or to establish another oversight body, to provide independent advice during the ‘three years of further development work’ that Minister Payne is anticipating will occur once the current Competitive Evaluation Process concludes?</p> <p>(11) Given the Government’s intention to down-select to one bidder at the end of the short Competitive Evaluation Process – thus removing all competitive tension thereafter – and to then spend around three years working with the successful bidder on issues such as cost, what mechanisms, processes and independent oversight will be put in place to ensure that the cost, schedule and design developed with the sole successful bidder are realistic, represent value for money for the taxpayer, and offer the best balance between capability, cost, schedule and risk for the ADF?</p>			
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78.	Conroy	Future Frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels	<p>In their joint media release on 4 August 2015, then Prime Minister Abbott and then Defence Minister Andrews stated that: “The Future Frigates will be built in South Australia based on a Competitive Evaluation Process, which will begin in October 2015.” They also stated that the Government was: “Bringing forward construction of Offshore Patrol Vessels (SEA 1180) to replace the Armidale class patrol boats by two years, with a continuous onshore build commencing in 2018 following a Competitive Evaluation Process.” (http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/08/04/joint-media-release-prime-minister-and-minister-for-defence-the-governments-plan-for-a-strong-and-sustainable-naval-shipbuilding-industry/) During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, Deputy Secretary Baxter said: “The government is going to consider the process to acquire those two classes of ships in the coming months.”</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Will Defence utilise a Competitive Evaluation Process for the acquisition of both the Future Frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels? (2) Have the criteria for the Competitive Evaluation Process for the Future Frigates been finalised – or is the process still subject to consideration? (3) Have the criteria for the Competitive Evaluation Process for the Offshore Patrol Vessels been finalised – or is the process still subject to consideration? (4) Has the process for either the Future Frigates or Offshore Patrol Vessels – including, but not limited to, timelines, milestones, and/or criteria for participants – changed since the Government’s announcement on 4 August 2015? If so, how? (5) Has the Competitive Evaluation Process for the Future Frigates or the Offshore Patrol Vessels commenced? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) If not, why not and when will the process(es) now commence? (b) If so, on what date(s) did the process(es) commence and what are the expected milestones, including receipt of bids and final determination of successful bidder(s)? (c) Is the intention to down-select to one bidder, or more than one bidder, at the conclusion of each of these Competitive Evaluation Processes? 	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
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79.	Conroy	Future Frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels Sustainment Costs	<p>During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, the following exchange occurred: Senator CONROY: Fifty billion dollars for the acquisition of submarines? Mr Baxter: The acquisition and some of the sustainment costs as well.</p> <p>(1) Please outline and quantify what sustainment costs are included within the estimated \$50 billion apportioned for the Future Submarine project. (2) Please provide a breakdown of the projected costs for each element of these sustainment costs as well as an explanation of the projected spending schedule associated with those costs. (a) Please provide figures on both an out-turn cost basis and a 2015 dollar basis. (3) Of the \$39 billion apportioned for the Future Frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels, does this \$39 billion figure also include some sustainment costs? (a) If so, please provide a breakdown of the projected costs for each element of these sustainment costs as well as an explanation of the projected spending schedule associated with those costs. (i) Please provide figures on both an out-turn cost basis and a 2015 dollar basis.</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
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80.	Conroy	Future Frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels Out-turned Costs	<p>During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, the following exchange occurred: Senator CONROY: Fifty billion dollars for acquisition of submarines sounds a little high. Mr Richardson: It is an out-turn cost. Mr Baxter: It is on an out-turn cost basis. Mr Richardson: It is inflation into the 2040s et cetera. Mr Baxter: The last of the submarines is likely to be built into the 2040s. Mr Richardson: For the last of the submarines—if they were built, say, in the early 2040s—it is the out-turn cost of what the submarines would cost in 2040 dollars.</p> <p>(1) What assumptions did Defence utilise when calculating the out-turned cost of \$50 billion including, but not limited to, inflation, indexation, and spending schedule? (2) Is the projected \$39 billion for the Future Frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels also calculated on an out-turn basis? (a) If so, please outline what assumptions Defence utilised when calculating the out-turned cost including, but not limited to, inflation, indexation, and spending schedule. (3) Utilising the same assumptions as those used to calculate the \$50 billion out-turned cost for the Future Submarines and the \$39 billion out-turned cost for the Future Frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels, please provide cost estimates for both in 2015 dollars.</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
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81.	Conroy	Shipbuilding in South Australia	<p>During a press conference on 4 August 2015, then Prime Minister Abbott said: “What we are announcing today is basically a fleet build here in Australia, centred on South Australia, because we have confidence that a restructured domestic surface naval shipbuilding industry can be competitive, can give us the best possible ships, at the best possible price, maximising the local build.”</p> <p>During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, Deputy Secretary Baxter said: “As I said, on the shipbuilding side the government was clear at the time, in August, and said that the future frigate build would be centred on Adelaide and that the site for the construction of the offshore patrol vessels would be determined, but it would be in Australia.”</p> <p>(1) Is Mr Baxter correct that the site for construction of the Offshore Patrol Vessels is yet to be determined?</p> <p>(2) Is there, or will there be, any requirement or preference for construction of the Offshore Patrol Vessels in South Australia as part of the Competitive Evaluation Process?</p> <p>(3) If the location is yet to be determined, how does this accord with then Prime Minister Abbott’s statement that construction of the Navy’s surface fleet would be centred in South Australia?</p>	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16
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82.	Conroy	Shipbuilding - Continuous Build	<p>During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, the following exchange took place: Senator CONROY: So it is not a continuous build of frigates; it is a continuous build of surface vessels—even though the surface vessels could be substantively different? Air Chief Marshal Binskin: With the skill set, it could be frigates, it could be air warfare destroyer replacements down track—they would all come together to ensure that we have a continuous build capability in the country. Senator Payne: And including the offshore patrol vessels? Air Chief Marshal Binskin: No, the offshore patrol vessels are separate. This issue was then revisited in the following exchange: Senator CONROY: But the argument around frigates a few moments ago was that the continuous build is not just about frigates—in other words, the frigates cannot sustain the continuous build by itself, but the patrol boats will be there as well that creates the continuous build. Air Chief Marshal Binskin: No, no, no— Senator CONROY: Did I misunderstand? Air Chief Marshal Binskin: You did. It will be the major fleet units in the sense of the frigates and the air warfare destroyer replacements down track.</p> <p>(1) Does the Chief of the Defence Force stand by his statement that the Offshore Patrol Vessels will not be part of a continuous build process of surface vessels? (a) If so, when was this decision made and on what basis? (b) What explains the discrepancy between the Chief of the Defence Force’s statement and the announcement by the then Prime Minister on 4 August 2015 that the Offshore Patrol Vessels would utilise “ a continuous onshore build commencing in 2018 following a Competitive Evaluation Process”?</p> <p>(2) Is it Australian Government policy that the replacement for the Air Warfare Destroyer will be part of the continuous build centred in Adelaide? (a) If so, when was this decision made? (b) Was this decision made on the basis of advice from Defence? (i) If so, on what date was that advice provided and in what form (written or verbal)?</p> <p>During Supplementary Budget Estimates on 21 October 2015, the following exchange took place: Senator CONROY: The continuous build program is in Adelaide, right? Mr Baxter: Yes, it will be based around the Future Frigates program.</p> <p>(3) Is Adelaide the only location at which a continuous build of naval vessels will occur?</p>	Written	04/02/16	25/02/16
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83.	Conroy	Shipbuilding - Navantia Designed Hull	<p>On 28 July 2015, IHS Jane's reported that Defence had abandoned the idea of using the Navantia designed hull of the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers as the basis for the proposed Future Frigate (http://www.janes.com/article/53246/australia-drops-plans-to-use-awd-hulls-for-future-frigates). It was suggested that this decision was motivated by an assessment that the Navantia designed hull was ill-suited to anti-submarine warfare.</p> <p>(1) Is the report correct? (a) If so, on what basis was the decision made that the hull was unsuitable for anti-submarine warfare?</p> <p>(2) What is the operational concept that drives the requirement that a Frigate have a quiet hull?</p> <p>(3) In what context is it imagined that a Frigate would 'creep up' on an adversary submarine?</p> <p>(4) Was the Navantia designed hull deemed too large for Future Frigate?</p> <p>(5) What is the limit on the displacement of the Future Frigate that has been established by Defence? (a) On what basis has this limit been set?</p>	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16
84.	Conroy	Offshore Patrol Vessel Construction Location	<p>The Government announced that it would acquire Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) from 2018 as a part of the \$89 billion shipbuilding plan. Former Prime Minister Abbott indicated that the OPVs could be built in Adelaide until the commencement of the SEA 5000 program, at which point the OPVs might be built in Western Australia or Victoria.</p> <p>(1) What are the implications of beginning the construction of the OPV fleet in Adelaide prior to moving it to Western Australia or some other location? (a) Does Defence agree that this could increase the complexity of the build and, in turn, could increase the potential risk to cost and schedule?</p> <p>(2) What are the requirements matrix of the OPV?</p> <p>(3) Is it envisaged that the OPV would replace the Navy's fleet of Armidale Class Patrol Boats, Hydrography Ships and Huon Class Mine-hunting vessels?</p> <p>(4) Is the OPV intended to be a single multi-role ship that can be used across the spectrum of operations such as border protection, long-range counter-terrorism, and counter-piracy operations and in war fighting roles?</p> <p>(5) Will the OPV requirement include it having a flight deck for helicopter operations?</p> <p>(6) What does Defence imagine that the displacement of the OPV will be?</p>	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16

85.	Conroy	Air Warfare Destroyer	<p>(1) What is the current status of the Air Warfare Destroyer project?</p> <p>(2) What are the current projected initial operating capability and full operating capability dates for the Air Warfare Destroyers?</p> <p>(3) What is the projected life of type for the Air Warfare Destroyers?</p>	Written	01/12/15	04/02/16
86.	Conroy	Land 121 Ph 4 (Hawkei)	<p>With respect to the Government's announcement on 5 October 2015 regarding the acquisition of 1,100 Hawkei protected vehicles:</p> <p>(1) What is the schedule for their delivery?</p> <p>(2) What force elements are to receive the Hawkei and in what order of priority?</p> <p>(3) What are the sustainment plans for the Hawkei?</p> <p>(4) The Government's media release of 5 October said that the cost of the contract would be \$1.3 billion. Over what period will this be paid?</p> <p>(5) The Government's media release stated that: "the vehicles will be manufactured at Thales Australia's production line in Bendigo, creating 170 jobs there and another 60 jobs in Victoria." Are these 'new' jobs or do they constitute the continuation of the existing workforce currently engaged in the production of Bushmaster?</p> <p>(6) In terms of the production of Hawkei, to what extent is the vehicle to be manufactured in Australia?</p> <p>(7) What is the Australian Industry Content stipulated in the contract?</p> <p>(8) Which components are made by Australian businesses that are currently part of the Thales Australia Bendigo supply chain?</p> <p>(9) What is the export potential of the Hawkei?</p>	Written	01/12/15	04/02/16

87.	Conroy	Tiger Helicopters	<p>(1) What progress has been made in achieving initial operating capability for the Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter?</p> <p>(2) In a slide-deck provided by Defence to support a briefing to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on 23 June 2015, Defence states that the Financial Year 2013-14 sustainment cost was \$43,000 per Tiger flying hour.</p> <p>(a) Does that remain the case and how does that per-hour flying cost compare to other helicopters and aircraft in the ADF's inventory?</p> <p>(b) What accounts for this very high cost and what is being done to bring the cost down?</p> <p>(3) The Defence Portfolio Budget Statements for 2015-16 (Budget Related Paper No. 1.4A, page 43) state that rate of effort in terms of flying hours for Tiger are as follows: 2014-15 Estimated Actual: 3,250 hours 2015-16 Budget Estimate: 5,846 hours Across the 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19 Forward Years, the Tiger's rate of effort is then projected to be 6,227 hours.</p> <p>(a) What was the final rate of effort achieved by Tiger in Financial Year 2014-15?</p> <p>(b) How does the cost and flying hour numbers for Tiger compare with the planned targets originally set out in the contract requirements?</p> <p>(c) What gives Defence confidence that it will be able to increase the rate of effort by such a large amount between 2014-15 and 2015-16?</p> <p>(d) What is the strategy for Army to remediate this poor performance?</p> <p>(4) Has the Tiger been operated from the flight deck of the Canberra class Landing Helicopter Dock ships? If not, when is this scheduled to occur?</p> <p>(a) In the context of the preparation for the ADF to stand up a full Amphibious Ready Group in 2017, does Defence expect that the Tiger will be able to operate from the Landing Helicopter Dock ships at that time?</p> <p>(b) Is the Tiger able to operate in a maritime environment without compromising its sustainment or capabilities?</p> <p>(c) Are the material and components of the Tiger able to work at sea without being damaged by the maritime environment?</p> <p>(d) Does the Tiger have the balance and characteristics required to work from the flight deck of a Landing Helicopter Dock ship? Has this been confirmed and, if so, when?</p> <p>(e) In the event that the Tiger is deemed unsuitable for operations conducted from the flight deck of the Landing Helicopter Dock ships, what implications does this have for Force Structure and the current concept of the Amphibious Ready Group?</p>	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16
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88.	Conroy	MRH-90 Helicopters	<p>(1) Is the MRH-90 currently operating at sea with the Royal Australian Navy?</p> <p>(a) Have there been any challenges encountered by the helicopter as it operates in a maritime environment?</p> <p>(2) Is the MRH-90 able to operate in a maritime environment without compromising its sustainment or capabilities?</p> <p>(a) Are the material and components of the MRH-90 able to work at sea without being damaged by the maritime environment?</p> <p>(3) With respect to both the Tiger and the MRH-90 helicopters, what has been the operational impact of the failure by Australia to procure helicopters with motorised folding rotor blades?</p> <p>(a) What impact does the requirement to manually fold rotor blades (assuming this is possible on both airframes) have in terms of space on a Landing Helicopter Dock ship and other Navy assets?</p> <p>(b) What is involved in the manual folding procedure – can Defence please outline the process step-by-step? For example, how many people are involved, what do they have to do to manually fold the blades, and how long does it take?</p> <p>(c) What are the implications in terms of having to manually fold the blades for flight deck operations (time and tempo of operations)?</p>	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
89.	Conroy	Defence Capability Plan	Is it still the intention of the Government to publish a Public Defence Capability Guide to address projects scheduled for approval in the six years beyond the forward estimates and to assist Australian defence industry?	Written	03/12/15	04/02/16
90.	Conroy	Defence Industry	<p>(1) For each of the following funds, initiatives and programs – the Priority Industry Capability Development Fund, the Defence Innovation Realisation Fund, the Australian Military Sales Office and the Skilling Australia’s Defence Industry program – could Defence please advise the following:</p> <p>(a) How much money is assigned annually?</p> <p>(b) Who administers the grants?</p> <p>(c) Who have been the recipients of grants under these programs?</p> <p>(d) What is the public policy intent of these programs?</p> <p>(e) What is the duration of each of these grants or programs?</p> <p>(f) How are these grants audited?</p>	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16

91.	Conroy	Defence Reserves - Planned Workforce Allocation	<p>With regard to Table 10: Planned Workforce Allocation – Reserve for both the PBS 2014-15 and the PBS 2015-16, on pages 24 and 26 respectively: These appear to show that the number of members in the Active Reserve Force has declined from 2013-14 to 2014-15 (using estimated actual figures), in all by 525 or 2.6 per cent, and over the two year period 2013-14 to 2015-16 a forecast fall of 1060 or 5.4 per cent over two years. Given the recognition of the importance of the continuing integration of the ADF Reserves into the Total Force, exemplified through Plan Suakin and Plan Beersheba, this is of concern.</p> <p>2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 forecast: Navy 2100 1760 1760 Army 14750 14500 14000 Air Force 2800 2765 2830 Total 19650 19025 18590</p> <p>(1) What are the reasons for this decline? (2) What do the figures so far in 2015-16 look like? (a) How many separations from the reserves and how many recruitments into them? (b) What are the main reasons given by those who separate from the reserves? (c) What actions is the Department taking to remedy any issues identified in this feedback, particularly for Army which relies more on ab initio recruitment (i.e. those joining the reserve with no previous military experience)? (d) What is Defence’s assessment of the main drivers for recruitment? (3) With regard to recruitment, what are the figures for ab initio recruitment and for former permanent ADF personnel who come into the reserves? (a) What are the figures for each service, and for 2013 14, 2014-15, and for this financial year to date. (4) There is a change in the 2015-16 PBS to reporting days of activity: the total number of days service rendered, with a headcount of members rendering paid service in brackets. (a) Will the headcount continue to be made available to make sure we have a full picture?</p>	Written	02/12/15	04/02/16
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92.	Conroy	Defence Reserves	<p>(1) What are the training modalities for reserves?</p> <p>(a) Is account taken of the possibility that lengthy periods of training may have some disadvantages for reservists in the sense that they would prefer to be providing service rather than using a lot of the time they have available on training, which is not what they signed up for?</p> <p>(2) What is the thinking behind the training regimes Defence uses?</p> <p>It is understood that the Government has changed the authority of the Chief of the Defence Force with respect to determining the number of Reservists to be deployed on any operations in that agreement from the Department of Finance now has to be obtained before the Reservists can be deployed.</p> <p>(3) Is this correct? If so, why has the Government implemented this change?</p> <p>(a) Why does the Government not consider that the Chief of the Defence Force should be the sole decision maker on the deployment of Reservists, short of call up of Reservists, on any operations?</p>	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16
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93.	Conroy	Contamination at Defence Bases	<p>With regard to the issue of contamination at RAAF Base Williamtown and other Defence facilities:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) What are PFOS and PFOA, and what are they used for? (2) How was the foam used? (3) Who, typically, used these foams? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Was it only ADF personnel, or did contractors, working with the ADF, use the foam? (4) When were these chemicals used? (5) Which facilities were they used in? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Was it all Defence facilities, ADF air fields or all facilities that have a fire fighting unit? (6) What is the extent of the contamination within ADF facilities and the areas surrounding them? (7) What are the health issues associated with PFOS and PFOA? (8) Who do the health issues affect? (9) When did Defence first become aware of the health issues associated with the use of PFOS and PFOA? (10) What actions did Defence undertake to address the situation when it became aware of the contamination? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) When did Defence stop using material containing PFOS and PFOA? (b) Who did Defence inform and when? (11) Can Defence please outline the process by which the extent of the contamination both within the ADF facilities, and outside of them, became known? (12) Can Defence please outline the timeline of events that have taken place since the discovery of contamination? (13) Does Defence still have any firefighting foams that contain PFOS and/or PFOA in stock at any of its facilities? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) If so, for what purpose? (b) If firefighting foam containing PFOS and PFOA is no longer used: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (i) What foams are used for firefighting purposes now? (ii) Is Defence aware of any concerns about the current firefighting foams being used? 	Written	18/12/15	04/02/16
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94.	Conroy	Contamination at Defence Bases - Remediation	<p>With regard to potential further contamination and remediation:</p> <p>(1) What has Defence done to contain the contamination and to prevent any further contamination of groundwater, surface water and soil?</p> <p>(2) Does Defence intend to do any remediation of the sites, either on base or in the surrounding area?</p> <p>(3) Is Defence aware of any other sites affected by PFOS and PFOA contamination that have been successfully remediated?</p> <p>(4) Does Defence have any estimates of how long remediation could take at each facility?</p> <p>(5) RAAF Base Williamtown is undergoing significant redevelopment. Has the soil and water contamination been considered in planning of works and work already commenced for extension of the runway?</p> <p>(6) How about at Oakey – has there been any redevelopment work there of late?</p> <p>(7) Are workers on these building sites safe from exposure to these chemicals?</p> <p>(8) Have any other sites that used these foams been redeveloped recently or plan to be in the future?</p>	Written	18/12/15	04/02/16
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95.	Conroy	Contamination at Defence Bases - Health of personnel	<p>With regard to the health of residents in surrounding areas and those who might have been affected, including serving and retired ADF personnel who served at these facilities in the past:</p> <p>(1) How many current and former ADF personnel were exposed to the foam? (2) How many contractors were exposed to the foam? (3) How were these people exposed to the foam? (4) There have been media articles in the Toowoomba Chronicle reporting that military medics were drenched in the foam during training exercises (http://www.thechronicle.com.au/news/a-retired-army-medic-is-angry-he-wasnt-told-of-hea/2556072/).</p> <p>(a) Are these articles accurate? (b) Is this practice still continuing, but with different foams? (c) Has medical testing been made available to these personnel? (d) What is the process for them to have tests carried out – do they need to contact the ADF or is the ADF seeking them out? (e) Is compensation being offered to people with health issues caused by this product?</p> <p>According to a report in the Newcastle Herald of 26 October 2015, the NSW EPA has overruled the Department of Defence: “After a harrowing wait, they, along with 13 other property owners, received letters from Defence last week advising them there was nothing detected in their water to be concerned about. But it has emerged this seemingly rare good news comes with a caveat. The Environment Protection Authority reissued on Friday [23 October] its precautionary advice to residents in the contamination zone not to drink their bore water or prepare food with it, or eat eggs from backyard chickens.” (http://www.theherald.com.au/story/3448752/toxic-truth-water-warning-repeated/?cs=305)</p> <p>(5) Why is such radically different advice being issued? (6) Have Defence and the EPA now agreed on a common approach?</p> <p>With regard to the issues of public safety and the health and wellbeing of ADF personnel, their families and residents living in close proximity to the affected facilities:</p>	Written	18/12/15	04/02/16
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	Conroy	Contamination at Defence Bases - Health of personnel	<p>(7) Is Defence aware that in 2004, US company DuPont reached a settlement with residents who claimed they became ill after PFOA from a plant at Parkersburg West Virginia contaminated their drinking water supply? (http://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-02/us-lawsuit-may-impact-australian-communities-with-contamination/6821674?pfm=sm&site=newcastle)</p> <p>(a) Is Defence aware that DuPont also agreed to set up an independent panel to study the effect of PFOA on people?</p> <p>(b) It is reported that the panel found six possible health issues linked to the chemical including kidney and testicular cancer and thyroid disease. What is Defence's view on this finding?</p> <p>(8) Is Defence aware that on 7 October a US jury awarded a plaintiff \$1.6 million, ruling that PFOA from a DuPont plant contaminated drinking water and contributed to her development of kidney cancer? (http://www.theherald.com.au/story/3420585/payout-for-cancer-victim-exposed-to-leaked-chemicals/?cs=305)</p> <p>(a) Has Defence assessed the bearing this case has on Australian Defence facilities?</p>			
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96.	Conroy	Contamination at Defence Bases - Testing of Contamination	<p>With respect to testing for contamination in the areas surrounding affected facilities:</p> <p>(1) Is the Defence helping communities test their properties?</p> <p>(2) In the case of Oakey, Defence has advised residents in the contaminated area to not drink water – Defence’s website states (http://www.defence.gov.au/id/oakey/): “As a precaution, Defence recommends not drinking water from any underground sources (i.e. bore water) within the investigation area, until further notice. This includes boiled groundwater.”</p> <p>(a) How long does Defence expect this advice to be in place for?</p> <p>(b) Has Defence provided this advice to the residents near any other ADF facilities?</p> <p>(3) What current processes does Defence have in place to determine what the health risks are, and how are these being communicated to those who may have been affected?</p> <p>(a) Is there a systematic procedure involving health experts looking into this, with the aim of providing some greater certainty?</p> <p>(b) Are there procedures for regular medical checks?</p> <p>(c) What medical advice is being given to people who may have been affected by the contamination?</p> <p>(d) Will any human testing be undertaken – either of ADF personnel or of residents in the surrounds of the Base?</p> <p>(e) What processes are in place for advising those who have now left the ADF but were exposed to the contaminants – including families of children who previously attended the on-base child care centre?</p> <p>(4) Reports indicate that some testing has been carried out at areas surrounding ADF facilities to determine the extent of the contamination. With respect to this testing, could Defence please outline:</p> <p>(a) What methodology is being used to define which properties are being tested within the defined ‘Red Zone’ of the contamination – and has the ‘Red Zone’ been enlarged?</p> <p>(b) In regard to the situation at Williamtown, reports indicate that concurrent testing is being undertaken by both the NSW EPA and Defence, on different established ‘Red Zones’ – why are Defence and the NSW EPA undertaking different testing in different zones?</p> <p>(c) What is being tested – for example, does it include bore water, ground water, soil, surface water and animals (both stock and domestic)?</p> <p>(d) Will Defence agree to community demands for all bore water, surface water and soil to be tested on the properties in the defined ‘Red Zone’?</p> <p>(e) Can Defence confirm that it will meet the cost of all testing undertaken by both its contractors as well as any testing assessed as necessary by the New South Wales EPA?</p>	Written	21/12/15	04/02/16
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97.	Conroy	Contamination at Defence Bases - Economic Loss by Business Owners	<p>There is expected to be economic loss suffered by business owners as a result of the forced closure of industry surrounding the base, ongoing reputational issues and potentially a negative effect on property values.</p> <p>(1) With regard to the announcement by the NSW Government of the extension of the closure of local fishing in Williamstown by a further eight months, what steps are being taken by the Federal Government to provide adequate compensation to those fisheries?</p> <p>(2) With regard to the public declaration by the Commander of RAAF Williamstown, Air Commodore Steve Roberton, as reported in the Newcastle Herald on 30 September, that Defence accepted that it would be paying compensation (http://www.theherald.com.au/story/3394545/defence-to-blame-so-it-should-pay-base-boss/):</p> <p>(a) Is this Defence's formal position?</p> <p>(b) What are the procedures Defence has for the seeking and granting of compensation?</p> <p>(c) Given that commercial fishing licenses have already been suspended for two months, what plan does Defence have to compensate these people who have suffered economic loss and reputational damage due to the contamination?</p> <p>(d) What is the extent to which compensation is being considered for other stakeholders affected by the contamination? (E.g. Business, property value, reputation)</p> <p>(e) Do compensation plans extend to those who have suffered economic loss through not being able to use bore water on their properties, and instead having to purchase town water?</p> <p>(f) What is the timeframe around granting compensation?</p> <p>(g) Formal compensation procedures can be time consuming and complex – is Defence considering in other types of financial assistance, such as ex gratia payments?</p> <p>(h) Has Defence considered meeting the expense of connecting residents not already on town water to the available supply?</p> <p>(i) As with concerns about health effects, it is important that communication is clear and effective – how is Defence making sure that those potentially affected are being proactively advised of what their options are?</p>	Written	21/12/15	04/02/16
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98.	Conroy	Contamination at Defence Bases - Consultative and Expert Groups	<p>(1) There are a number of consultative and expert groups that have been set up to manage the contamination situation.</p> <p>(a) Please provide a full description of each of the groups, including their membership and community representation.</p> <p>(b) How are community representatives selected or made known?</p> <p>(c) Was there consideration of including local MPs, either State or Federal, on the advisory group established to respond to the situation?</p> <p>(2) Members of Parliament have been receiving large amounts of community contact regarding the situation. What mechanisms are in place for Members of Parliament to feedback community concern and take part in addressing the situation?</p>	Written	18/12/15	04/02/16
99.	Peris	RAAF Base Darwin Housing	<p>With regard to the reported promise made prior to the last Federal election by the Federal Member for Solomon, Ms Natasha Griggs MP, that hundreds of RAAF Base Houses, sitting on Defence land at the RAAF Base Darwin would be excised to create a stand-alone suburb known as “Saving Eaton” (http://www.territorystories.nt.gov.au/bitstream/10070/247522/4/ntn31aug13004x.pdf):</p> <p>(1) What is the status of the commitment to excise the land as far as Defence is concerned?</p> <p>(2) Will the land on which the empty RAAF Base houses are sitting be excised from the Commonwealth for civilian residential use as promised?</p> <p>(3) How many of the empty RAAF houses have been sold to the company Northern Transportables?</p> <p>(4) How many of these houses have been removed from the RAAF Base by Northern Transportables?</p> <p>(5) How many empty former RAAF Base houses still remain on the Darwin RAAF Base?</p> <p>(6) When will Northern Transportables remove the remaining houses from the RAAF Base?</p> <p>(7) Why have no new houses been built on the Darwin RAAF Base?</p> <p>(8) How many new Defence Houses will be built on the Darwin RAAF Base?</p>	Written	09/02/16	25/02/16

100.	Bilyk	Visit to Torres Strait	<p>(1) Did any of the former or current Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries/Assistant Ministers in the portfolio, their personal staff or the Department participate in the former Prime Minister's trip to the Torres Strait?</p> <p>(a) If so:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) What was the duration of the visit to Torres Strait? (ii) Which locations did the Minister/his Department travel to? (iii) Which communities did the Minister/his Department engage with? (iv) What type of activities did they undertake? (v) What were the outcomes of the trip? (vi) Was an official report or communique or similar published in relation to the trip? (vii) Are you able to please provide an itinerary for the A Minister and his Department's trip? (viii) Which hotel or hotels did the Minister and his Department stay in? (ix) Could you please provide an itemised cost breakdown in relation to the Minister and his Department's involvement in this trip - accommodation, ground transport, meals, incidentals etc. (x) How many members of the Minister's staff participated in the trip? (xi) Could you please advise the number of staff, their title and staffing classification under the MOPS Enterprise Agreement? (xii) In terms of departmental officials from the Department, could you please advise the names and roles of each departmental official in attendance? (xiii) Could you also please provide an itemised list of costs for departmental officials in terms of flights, accommodation, ground transport, meals and other incidentals? This should specify the officials which travelled in business class and those that travelled in economy, the hotels they stayed in and which businesses supplied ground transport. 	Written	29/01/16	04/02/16
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101.	Conroy	Uruzgan Province	<p>Senator CONROY: At budget estimates—back in June, I think it was—I asked about the situation in Uruzgan province and reports that three districts in the province had fallen to the Taliban. At the time Mr Richardson said:</p> <p>The advice I have is Uruzgan province is one of a number of remote areas of Afghanistan that is continually contested by the Taliban-led insurgency. However, Afghan security forces continue to respond effectively by taking back ground lost temporarily to the Taliban. Defence does not assess that any districts in Uruzgan province have fallen to the Taliban. Outlying districts within Uruzgan province traditionally come under pressure from the Taliban during the fighting season due to their distance from the key population centres.</p> <p>I draw your attention to an article in The New York Times by Rod Nordland and Joseph Goldstein on 11 October entitled 'Afghan Taliban's reach its widest since 2001, UN says'. The article states:</p> <p>The Taliban insurgency has spread through more of Afghanistan than at any point since 2001, according to data compiled by the United Nations as well as interviews with numerous local officials in areas under threat.</p> <p>The article goes on to note:</p> <p>In all, 27 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces had some districts where the threat level was rated high or extreme.</p> <p>In Oruzgan Province, in southern Afghanistan, four of its five districts were rated under extreme or high threat, with only the capital, Tarinkot, classified as under "substantial" threat. Many local officials predicted that the province might soon become the first to entirely fall to the Taliban.</p> <p>A lot has happened in three months, Mr Richardson.</p> <p>...</p> <p>Mr Richardson: Your question in the middle of the year was specifically about a report that three districts had fallen to the Taliban. What you are quoting out of the New York Times is reported threat levels and also reports of Taliban activity. There is no question that Taliban activity does exist across quite a number of provinces in Afghanistan. I am not aware of actual threat levels as assessed by the UN. But if you want us to give some comment on it I am very happy to take it on notice.</p>	Spoken 34/35	02/12/15	04/02/16
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102.	Xenophon	Combat Systems	<p>Senator XENOPHON: Minister, earlier today—I was not in the room but it has been reported back to me—you made a very welcome statement about the need for innovation, creativity, agility and flexibility in terms of Defence and industry participation, as I understand it. It seems from the figures provided to me now that \$380,000 has been spent in terms of local firms in the context of a \$350 million spend for these combat systems. Do you consider that to be fairly deficient, in the scheme of things, or is that something you may want to reflect on at a later time?</p> <p>Senator Payne: I think I would like to reflect on it further. But the point I was making was in response to a question from Senator Back earlier today which was indicating that one of the areas in which the US Secretary of Defence, Ash Carter, and I had had discussions, predominantly in the bilateral but also slightly in the AUSMIN space, was around our ability to do that together, and my view and intention to develop that further. I will take what you have just been discussing with those here at the table and reflect on that and come back to you on notice.</p>	Spoken 75	05/02/16	25/02/16
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