

The Senate

Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Legislation Committee

Civil Nuclear Transfers to India Bill 2016
[Provisions]

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Referral of inquiry

1.1 On 9 November 2016, the Civil Nuclear Transfers to India Bill 2016 (the bill) was introduced in the House of Representatives by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Julie Bishop MP. On 10 November 2016, the Senate referred the provisions of the bill to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee for inquiry and report by 24 November 2016. The Selection of Bills Committee listed the following reasons for referral:

To ensure the bill achieves the object of codifying, for the special case of India, and for the purposes of the relevant laws, the content of Australia's relevant international obligations in relation to nuclear safeguards to be applied by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] in India.¹

Conduct of inquiry

1.2 The committee advertised the inquiry on its website, calling for submissions to be lodged by 17 November 2016. The committee also wrote directly to a range of individuals and organisations likely to have an interest in the bill, drew their attention to the inquiry and invited them to make written submissions.

1.3 The committee received nine submissions to the inquiry. These submissions are listed at Appendix A and are published on the committee's website.

Background

1.4 On 5 September 2014, the *Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy* (the Agreement) was signed in New Delhi. On 28 October 2014, the Agreement was tabled in the Parliament and referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT). JSCOT made six recommendations in the report tabled on 8 September 2015, including:

- urging the Australian Government to commit significant diplomatic resources to encouraging India to become a party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty;
- that the Australian Government consider facilitating the negotiation of a nuclear arms limitation treaty for the Indian subcontinent region;
- that, should the Australia-India Agreement be ratified, uranium sales to India only commence once:
 - India has achieved the full separation of civil and military nuclear facilities, as verified by the IAEA;

1 Selection of Bills Committee, *Report No. 8 of 2016*, 10 November 2016, Appendix 1.

- India has established an independent nuclear regulatory authority under law;
 - the Indian nuclear regulator's existing policies and arrangements have been reviewed to ensure its independence;
 - the frequency, quality and comprehensiveness of onsite inspections at nuclear facilities have been verified by the IAEA as being best practice standard;
 - the lack of sufficient planning for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities has been rectified;
- that the Australian Government outline the legal advice it has received regarding the consent to enrichment provisions in Article VI of the proposed Australia-India Agreement; and
 - that the Australian Government outline the legal advice it has received concerning whether the proposed Australia-India Agreement breaches Australia's obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty).²

Government response to JSCOT report

1.5 The Australian Government tabled a response to the committee's six recommendations on 11 November 2015.

1.6 The response to recommendation one and two provided assurance that India has been a key focus of its efforts to promote entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty as well as negotiations towards a fissile material cut-off treaty.³ It noted that although only the states involved can decide to negotiate an arms limitation agreement, Australia and India have established an annual dialogue to discuss issues on nuclear disarmament and ways to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in the region.⁴

1.7 Of particular interest to this inquiry is the government's response to recommendation three, which suggested that uranium sales to India only commence once certain conditions are met. Although the response agreed with the committee on the importance of the conditions raised, it stated the government was satisfied that steps had been taken to address each condition, and did not agree that exports to India should be deferred.⁵

1.8 The response noted that the Agreement already provides adequate provisions for the separation of India's civil and military facilities, and pointed out that India is

2 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, *Report 151: Treaty tabled on 28 October 2014*, September 2015, pp xiii–xiv.

3 Australian Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties *Report 151*, p. 1.

4 Australian Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties *Report 151*, pp 1–2.

5 Australian Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties *Report 151*, p. 4.

working to enhance its regulation in nuclear safety. The response noted that the remaining conditions were similar to those made by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), which provided an in-depth review of India's performance against IAEA safety requirements, and that the IAEA and India have developed an action plan to address the IRRS recommendations.⁶

1.9 The response to recommendation four noted that no specific legal advice regarding the consent to enrichment provisions had been sought. The response to recommendation five advised that it is not the practice of the Australian Government to disclose its legal advice.⁷

Purpose of the bill

1.10 The purpose of the bill is to 'codify, for the special case of India, the content of Australia's relevant international obligations for the purposes of relevant laws'.⁸ This makes it clear that decisions approving civil nuclear transfers to India are taken not to be inconsistent with, or have been made with due regard to, Australia's obligations relating to nuclear safeguards under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, if particular conditions are met.

1.11 The bill will protect uranium mining companies in Australia from domestic legal action challenging the consistency of the safeguards applied by the IAEA in India and Australia's international non-proliferation obligations. It will also protect any future bilateral trade in other nuclear-related material or items for civil use.⁹

1.12 In 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) accepted that nuclear trade would be possible with India on the basis of its commitments and actions in support of nuclear non-proliferation, even though it is not a signatory to the NPT.¹⁰ The decision was agreed to by the 48 members of the NSG, which includes all of the major nuclear supplier countries and others that are active in non-proliferation efforts. This includes Australia which sits on the Board of Governors of the IAEA.¹¹

1.13 Under this framework and related agreements made with India, the IAEA applies a robust safeguards regime to India's civil nuclear fuel cycle, where Australian obligated nuclear material will exclusively remain. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) emphasized that the measures in place to prevent the diversion of Australian uranium from the civil part of India's fuel cycle are at least as strong as

6 Australian Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties *Report 151*, pp 2–4.

7 Australian Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties *Report 151*, p. 4.

8 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2.

9 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2.

10 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 1.

11 Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*, p. 2.

those in place for other export destinations.¹² These include explicit commitments by India in a binding bilateral agreement with Australia, and robust inspection and accounting procedures enforced by the IAEA.¹³ According to DFAT, the United States, Canada, France, Japan, Korea, Russia and Kazakhstan, among others, have established nuclear cooperation with India on the basis of the NSG's 2008 decision.¹⁴

1.14 The department highlighted that since 2008, India has met its commitments to support international non-proliferation efforts, which include: continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing, separating its civil and military nuclear activities and accepting IAEA safeguards on the former. Furthermore, India has brought its Additional Protocol with the IAEA into force and is working with Australia and others to promote negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.¹⁵

The provisions of the bill

1.15 Clauses 1 to 7 establish the short title of the Act; its commencement (the day after the Act receives Royal Assent); its object, simplified outline and definitions; as well as asserting that it extends to Australia's external territories and binds the Crown in all its capacities.

1.16 Subclause 8(1) provides that, as long as the conditions set out in subclause 8(3) are met, the exercise of powers or the performance of functions under the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987* (and any prescribed legislative instruments) regarding the export from Australia of nuclear or nuclear-related items, is considered consistent with Australia's obligations under specified international agreements relating to the safeguards to be applied in India. The subclause is drafted with reference to Section 70 of the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987*.

1.17 Subclause 8(2) provides that, as long as the conditions set out in subclause 8(3) are met, the exercise and performance of functions by a person under the *Defence Trade Controls Act 2012* or the *Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958* (and any prescribed legislative instruments) regarding the export from Australia of nuclear material or nuclear-related items are considered to have had due regard to Australia's obligations, responsibilities and commitments, under the specified international agreements in relation to the safeguards to be applied in India.

1.18 Subclause 8(3) specifies the conditions referred to in subclauses 8(1) and 8(2). The conditions state that both the Australia-India Agreement and the India-IAEA Agreement must be in force, and that person exercising a power or performing a function in connection with the export from Australia of nuclear material or nuclear-

12 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

13 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 1.

14 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

15 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

related items must be satisfied that IAEA safeguards will apply to the material or item(s) in India. This provision refers to how administrative procedures related to export from Australia or nuclear material or nuclear-related items shall be exercised.

1.19 Subclause 8(4) provides that the section applies to the exercise of a power or performance of a function before, on or after commencement of the Act. However, the Explanatory Memorandum asserts that 'the Act will not negatively affect any person as a result of the retrospectivity of this provision'.¹⁶

1.20 Clause 9 provides that, if the India-IAEA agreement is amended, the Minister must give notice of the amendment by notifiable instrument. This is to ensure that the Parliament will be notified of any amendment agreed by India and the IAEA. It is important to note, that any amendment that materially affected the operation of the India-IAEA agreement would need to be approved by the IAEA's Board of Governors, of which Australia is a member.

1.21 Clause 10 provides that the Minister may make rules prescribing certain matters. Subparagraphs 8(1)(ii) and 8(2)(ii) specify matters that may be prescribed by rules.

Chapter 2

Issues raised in evidence

Introduction

2.1 This chapter considers a range of issues raised in evidence which address whether Australia can supply nuclear material to India consistent with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty). It summarises the concerns raised by some submitters as well as the benefits of the bill. It concludes with the committee's view and recommendation.

Conflict with international obligations

2.2 Some submitters argued that Australia may be in breach of its international obligations under both the NPT and the Rarotonga Treaty. Under the NPT, Australia undertook not to in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.¹ Under the Rarotonga Treaty, Australia undertook not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any state.² Under both of these treaties, Australia has a responsibility to ensure that nuclear material transferred to India is not used for, and does not contribute to, the production of nuclear weapons.

2.3 Evidence from Mr John Carlson, Former Director General of the Australia Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and non-resident Fellow of the Lowy Institute, argued that 'this bill attempts to make lawful actions that, at the least, are questionable in international law, namely, approval of nuclear supply to India under the Australia-India nuclear cooperation agreement.'³

2.4 Likewise, Mr Ernst Willheim, Visiting Fellow, ANU College of Law, argued that the bill would have no direct effect if Australia's nuclear exports to India were in fact consistent with Australia's relevant obligations and procedures.⁴ He argued:

The only possible operation for the proposed legislation would be in circumstances where there was an actual or alleged breach of Australia's obligations or an actual or alleged failure to observe procedures. In those circumstances the proposed legislation would seemingly validate what might otherwise be invalid. The obvious inference is that the Government is contemplating action that may be inconsistent with Australia's obligations

1 *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, London, Moscow, and Washington, 1 July 1968, entry into force 23 January 1973, ATS 1973 (No. 3), Article I.

2 *South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty*, Rarotonga, 6 August 1985, entry into force 11 December 1986, ATS 1986 (No. 32), Article 3.

3 Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, p. 1.

4 Mr Ernst Willheim, *Submission 7*, pp 3–4.

or the exercise of powers or functions without regard to those obligations and that the Government wishes prospectively to validate such activities.⁵

2.5 The Australia Conservation Foundation argued that the *Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy* (the Agreement), aided by this bill, would serve to increase nuclear safety and security concerns. It stated that the Agreement fails to advance non-proliferation outcomes and is in clear conflict with Australia's international obligations under the Rarotonga Treaty.⁶ The Foundation noted that the Rarotonga Treaty also obliges signatories not to supply equipment or material to countries, including India, not under full scope safeguards.⁷

2.6 The Uniting Church in Australia expressed concern that the bill grants significant domestic legal protection to private corporations in order to grant them certainty over profits on potential uranium exports to India.⁸ It argued that uranium trade with India undermines a fundamental principle of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime: the principle that only signatories to the NPT can engage in international nuclear trade for their civilian nuclear programs.⁹

2.7 Similarly, the Medical Association for the Prevention of War argued that exporting to India 'sends a strong signal to NPT signatories that the treaty has no future value. With the proposed legislation Australia is signalling that commercial interests outweigh the international safeguards provided by the NPT.'¹⁰

2.8 Mr Ernst Willheim also argued that, although the bill would cure any invalidity arising from breaches of Australia's obligations under domestic law, the legislation would not have any effect in relation to Australia's obligations as a matter of international law.'¹¹

India-specific issues

2.9 As India is not a signatory to the NPT, submitters raised a number of concerns, including that:

- Australia cannot be certain that subsequent generations of transferred material will not be used for weapons development;¹²
- India's nuclear industry is the subject of continuing and unresolved safety problems and regulatory deficiencies;¹³

5 Mr Ernst Willheim, *Submission 7*, p. 3.

6 Australian Conservation Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 4.

7 Australian Conservation Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 4.

8 Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, *Submission 8*, p. 3.

9 Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, *Submission 8*, p. 7.

10 Medical Association for the Prevention of War, Australia, *Submission 9*, p. 2.

11 Mr Ernst Willheim, *Submission 7*, p. 4.

12 Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, p. 3.

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- India does not have clear separation between its civil and military nuclear programs;¹⁴ and
 - imported uranium frees up India's domestic reserves to be used for its nuclear weapons program.¹⁵

Principle of pursuit

2.10 Mr John Carlson expressed his concern that the India-IAEA safeguards agreement may not be fully consistent with NPT safeguards requirements, specifically, the 'principle of pursuit'.¹⁶ The principle requires that safeguards must apply not only to the nuclear material supplied, but to all subsequent generations of nuclear material produced by or through the use of that material. As Mr Carlson explained:

...the India-IAEA safeguards agreement does not fully meet this principle. Because the NCA [the Australia-India Agreement] depends on the operation of the India-IAEA agreement, deficiencies in the latter agreement impact directly on the NCA...While the India-IAEA agreement compromises the principle of pursuit with respect to plutonium production (a highly sensitive stage of the fuel cycle), the NPT allows no such compromise. Faced with an agreement such as the India-IAEA agreement that does not fully reflect NPT requirements, an NPT party must ensure that its NPT obligations are met in full.

This principle is written into the Australia-India NCA [Article III.1.(d)], but the effect of the NCA is qualified through its dependence on the terms of the India-IAEA agreement. As I pointed out in my submissions to JSCOT, this is a major weakness in the NCA. The India-IAEA agreement allows India to use safeguarded material, which could include AONM, to produce unsafeguarded plutonium.¹⁷

2.11 Mr Carlson suggested that the bill be amended to require that the person exercising the relevant power must be satisfied that not only is the exported nuclear material subject to safeguards under the India-IAEA agreement, but that all its subsequent generations of nuclear material produced or processed will be as well.¹⁸

2.12 This issue was discussed during the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) inquiry into the Agreement. Dr Robert Floyd, Director General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Authority, assured the committee that the provisions of the India-IAEA agreement would prevent such a situation occurring. Dr

13 Australian Conservation Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 1.

14 Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, p. 2.

15 Australian Conservation Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 3.

16 Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, p. 2.

17 Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, pp 2–3.

18 Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, p. 4.

Floyd made it clear that India's obligations under the agreement prohibit Australian nuclear material from being used for military purposes at all times.¹⁹

Unresolved safety and regulatory issues

2.13 A number of submitters presented their concerns that India's nuclear industry has unresolved safety and regulatory issues.²⁰ The Uniting Church in Australia noted that India had scored poorly on the 2016 nuclear security index produced by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which suggested that India's security conditions could be improved by strengthening on-site protection, controls, and accounting and noted:

India's nuclear materials security conditions remain adversely affected by its continued increase in quantities of nuclear material, high levels of corruption among public officials, and the presence of groups interested in and capable of illicitly acquiring nuclear materials.²¹

2.14 The Australian Conservation Foundation noted that the Indian Auditor-General's report in 2012 highlighted continuing safety and regulatory deficiencies, and warned of a disaster similar to Fukushima or Chernobyl if nuclear safety issues were not addressed:

The concerns highlighted in this report, including lax regulation, poor governance and a deficient safety culture, remain largely unaddressed. Given that Australian uranium directly fuelled the Fukushima nuclear crisis it is incumbent on Australia, as a potential uranium supplier to India, to take these concerns seriously and take explicit action to confirm the status of industry compliance with the Auditor-General's recommendations.²²

2.15 Likewise, the Synod referred to media reports that emphasized on-going safety concerns regarding India's nuclear reactors, and drew attention to India's lack of an independent nuclear regulatory agency.²³ The Australian Conservation Foundation's argued that:

[India] does not allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of all its nuclear plants, refuses to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities. India's continuing tension with Pakistan makes the sub-continent is one of the world's most precarious nuclear hot spots.²⁴

19 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, *Report 151: Treaty tabled on 28 October 2014*, September 2015, pp 47–48.

20 For example: Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*; Australian Conservation Foundation, *Submission 3*; Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, *Submission 8*; Medical Association for the Prevention of War, Australia, *Submission 9*.

21 Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, *Submission 8*, p. 2.

22 Australian Conservation Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 2.

23 Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, *Submission 8*, pp 3 and 10.

24 Australian Conservation Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 3.

Separation of civil and military activities

2.16 Submitters expressed their concern that India does not have clear separation between its civil and military nuclear programs.²⁵ The Synod expressed its alarm that the bill makes no mention of the recommendations of the JSCOT report, in particular recommendation three. It argued that there is no formal verification of whether facilities in the 'civilian unsafeguarded' stream are contributing nuclear material to India's nuclear weapons program.²⁶

2.17 Similarly, Mr Carlson argued that although India has excluded several major 'civilian' facilities from permanent safeguards, the India-IAEA agreement still allows India to use Australian material in those reactors.²⁷

2.18 Mr Carlson suggested that as India is not prepared to fully separate its military and civil programs, an alternative approach would be to require that Australian material be used only in a permanently safeguarded facility, and listed in an annex to the India-IAEA agreement.²⁸

Imported uranium would free up India's domestic reserves for weapons

2.19 The Australian Conservation Foundation and the Medical Association for the Prevention of War expressed concern that the provision of Australian uranium to India would indirectly facilitate the expansion of India's military nuclear sector.

2.20 Both argued that even if Australian uranium does not go directly to India's nuclear weapons program, the use of imported uranium in civilian nuclear reactors would free up domestic reserves to be used for weapons development. They cited the former head of India's global strategic development task force, who stated in 2005:

Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum credible deterrent as fast as possible, it is to India's advantage to categorise as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refuelled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapon-grade plutonium production.²⁹

Subjective wording of the bill

2.21 Mr Carlson also expressed his concern that the bill uses a subjective standard rather than an objective standard based on facts. Clause 8 of the bill states that 'the person exercising the power or the performing the function is satisfied that the nuclear

25 For example: Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, p. 2; and the Australian Conservation Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 3.

26 Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, *Submission 8*, pp 1 and 3.

27 Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, p. 3.

28 Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, p. 4.

29 Australian Conservation Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 3; and the Medical Association for the Prevention of War, Australia, *Submission 9*, p. 2.

material or nuclear-related item will be subject to safeguards under the India-IAEA agreements if supplied to a place in India'.³⁰

2.22 Mr Carlson suggested removing the subjective wording of 'satisfied' to create an objective standard. The clause would instead state that: 'the nuclear material or nuclear-related item will be subject to safeguards under the India-IAEA agreements if supplied to a place in India'.³¹

Expected benefits of the bill

2.23 The committee received evidence which demonstrated that India's plan to significantly increase its nuclear energy supply presents a range of potential economic benefits for Australia exporters over the medium and long term.³² As well as potentially increasing Australia's export revenue and regional employment opportunities, India's nuclear energy expansion is likely to make a valuable contribution to a reduction in carbon emissions. It will also help to power economic growth and poverty reduction in the world's fastest growing major economy.³³ Nuclear cooperation will also contribute to a strengthening of bilateral ties between Australia and India.³⁴

Clarification of Australia's existing obligations

2.24 As the NPT and the Rarotonga Treaty include provisions in relation to safeguards that apply to Australia's nuclear exports to India, there is potential for alternative interpretations of the relevant safeguards obligations. According to DFAT, the bill will ensure that there is no uncertainty under Australian law that could hinder uranium exports to India.³⁵ The Minerals Council of Australia agreed noting that:

[t]he bill clears away any concern and ambiguity on the legality of uranium sales to India. It was always envisaged that India's uniqueness following on from the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group decision, might require a bill of this kind to clarify Australia's relevant international obligations for the purposes of the relevant laws.³⁶

2.25 It also noted that the Australia-India Agreement was entered into with bipartisan support; negotiations were commenced by the Labor government in 2013 and completed by the Coalition government in 2014: 'the potential need for a bill such

30 Civil Nuclear Transfers to India Bill 2016, cl. 8.

31 Mr John Carlson, *Submission 2*, pp 5–6.

32 For example: Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*; and the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, *Submission 6*.

33 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

34 EM p 2

35 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

36 Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*, p. 2.

as this was understood as far back as 2011 when the ALP amended its policy on uranium sales to India.³⁷

Economic potential

2.26 According to DFAT, India represents a modest market for Australian uranium in the short term, but with huge growth potential over the long term. Timely engagement in the Indian market would maximise the opportunity for Australian uranium export companies,³⁸ with India's potential uranium demand likely to generate substantial construction and operational jobs in regional Australia.³⁹

2.27 India aims to supply 25 per cent of its energy from nuclear power by 2050 and currently has 22 operable reactors, five more under construction, 20 planned within the next eight to ten years, and a further 44 have been proposed.⁴⁰

2.28 Australia has nearly a third of the world's uranium resources and approximately 10 per cent of global production.⁴¹ Australia produces around 7 000 tonnes of uranium ore concentrates each year.⁴² The Department of Atomic Energy in India stated India's intention to buy up to 1 500 tonnes of uranium from Australia over the next five years.⁴³

2.29 According to the Minerals Council of Australia, India could be generating over 800 TWh of nuclear power by 2040, requiring around 18 000 tonnes of uranium per annum.⁴⁴ Australia could sustainably target 30 per cent of this demand, which is approximately equivalent to Australia's entire uranium exports in 2014-15 of 5 515 tonnes.⁴⁵ It noted:

Australian exporters are currently having preliminary commercial negotiations with Indian customers who are keen to secure Australian uranium. Access to Australian uranium will increase India's ability to obtain material which could in turn assist Indian reactor capacity uptake and also provide India with supply security and diversity. Australian exporters are well poised to take advantage of this growth opportunity in

37 Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*, p. 2.

38 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

39 Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*, p. 3.

40 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

41 Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*, p. 3.

42 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

43 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

44 Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*, p. 3.

45 Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*, p. 3.

India as logistically it is significantly closer to Australia than other countries Australia currently supplies.⁴⁶

2.30 However, the Uniting Church of Australia expressed scepticism at India's plans to increase its nuclear power supply, citing the International Energy Agency's assessment that, 'despite the Indian Government's stated wishes, a realistic assessment is that even under the current policy setting the nuclear share of total generation will barely double from 3 per cent currently to 7 per cent by 2040.'⁴⁷

Other countries export uranium to India

2.31 A number of submitters pointed out that India has already entered into a number of agreements with other countries to meet its demand for uranium supplies.⁴⁸ According to the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, India currently sources the majority of its uranium supply from Russia, Kazakhstan and Canada.⁴⁹

2.32 The Minerals Council of Australia agreed, noting that:

Australia already lags Canada who's first exports to India occurred in late 2015, following the conclusion of a contract for 3220 tonnes, concluded earlier in the year. In September 2016, India and the US moved closer to the planned construction of six reactors by Westinghouse with the two sides deciding to immediately commence the work on engineering and site design, and make an early conclusion of a competitive financing package. Just days ago, Japan and India concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement, opening the door for India to import Japanese nuclear technology.⁵⁰

Committee view

2.33 Submitters critical of the bill argued that it should not be passed until all the recommendations made by JSCOT have been implemented. The committee strongly disagrees with this view. The committee acknowledges the concerns raised by contributors, but believes many of the issues raised were addressed by JSCOT during its wide-ranging inquiry into the Australia-India Agreement and fall outside the more limited scope and intent of the bill.

2.34 Specifically, the committee is satisfied that the bill provides the certainty required to give effect to the Australia-India Agreement. It clarifies that decisions approving civil nuclear transfers to India are taken not to be inconsistent with, or have been made with due regard to, Australia's obligations relating to nuclear safeguards. That is its primary purpose.

46 Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*, p. 3.

47 Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, *Submission 8*, pp 8–9.

48 For example: Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*; and the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, *Submission 6*.

49 Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, *Submission 6*, p. 1.

50 Minerals Council of Australia, *Submission 4*, p. 3.

2.35 The committee is of the view that the amendments to the bill proposed by Mr John Carlson are not necessary. The committee is not convinced the bill uses a subjective rather than an objective standard. There is no reason why a person who is 'satisfied' that nuclear material will be subject to safeguards under the India-IAEA agreements if supplied to India has not reached that conclusion based on the objective facts.

2.36 The committee is satisfied that since 2008, India has met its commitments to support non-proliferation efforts, continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, separate its civil and military activities and accept IAEA safeguards. The committee notes that India is currently working with Australia to promote negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

2.37 The committee notes that submitters critical of the bill are silent on the important foreign policy backdrop to Australia's nuclear trade with India. As the DFAT submission highlighted, Australia's relationship with India has changed fundamentally over the past five years, with a deepening of defence, security and economic ties: 'It is very much in Australia's interests to encourage greater, collaborative leadership by India in Indian Ocean and broader Indo-Pacific security'.⁵¹

2.38 It is in this context that the committee recognises the economic and security benefits to be gained from Australia's relationship with India, and civil nuclear transfers consistent with Australia's international obligations will come to form an important part of that evolving bilateral relationship. At the very least, increased uranium exports to India will boost employment opportunities in regional and remote Australia while helping to reduce India's carbon emissions. The committee commends the bill to the Senate.

Recommendation 1

2.39 The committee recommends that the bill be passed.

Senator Chris Back
Chair

51 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, *Submission 5*, p. 2.

Appendix 1

Submissions

- 1 N.A.J. Taylor
- 2 Mr John Carlson
- 3 Australian Conservation Foundation
- 4 Minerals Council of Australia
- 5 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
- 6 Department of Industry, Innovation and Science
- 7 Mr Ernst Willheim
- 8 Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania
- 9 Medical Association for Prevention of War, Australia

Additional information

- 1 Correspondence from Senator the Hon Matthew Canavan, Minister for Resources and Northern Australia, in relation to the bill, dated 22 November 2016, received 22 November 2016.

