



## **Submission No 13**

### **Inquiry into Australia's Defence Relations with the United States**

**Name:** Dr Robyn Lim  
Professor of International Relations

**Address:** Nanzan University  
27 Sei-rei cho  
Seto-shi Aichi  
JAPAN 489-0863

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**AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES**

**Submission by Dr. Robyn Lim, Professor of International Relations,  
Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan.**

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**Address: Nanzan University, 27 Sei-rei cho, Seto-shi Aichi, Japan 489-0863.**

I address myself to this Inquiry as a former Australian academic and intelligence official living in Japan, now looking at the security debate in Australia with the detachment that distance can provide.

From my perspective, Australia has been far too slow in comprehending the pace of change — both in the global and regional strategic environment and in the technology apposite to warfare (“network centric warfare”). To put it bluntly, we seem to be having some trouble getting our heads out of the sand.

And we still seem to think we can get defence on the cheap. Most democratic governments find it hard to think strategically before the enemy appears on the horizon. In early 1939, Neville Chamberlain famously said that Great Britain could not afford a war, so there would not be one.

ANZUS is an alliance that we ardently sought and were lucky to get. But will we be able to keep it?

For us, the main benefit of alliance has always been that anyone contemplating an attack on us, *or on our vital interests anywhere in the world*, would have to calculate the likely response of the United States. Deterrence consists of creating uncertainty in the minds of would-be aggressors. Since winning the Cold War, America has had the kind of uncontested military power unseen since the Roman Empire.

Would we really want to give this up?

If we do not continue to enjoy American protection, where would we find security, including nuclear security?

Some say we should rely on the “international community”.

I suggest to the Joint Committee that any Australian government proposing to entrust the nuclear security of the Australian people to the good will of the so-called “international community” would do so at its electoral peril.

Without American nuclear protection, it is most likely that we would soon feel it necessary to develop nuclear weapons ourselves.

### ***The risks of overplaying our hand***

The notion that we can increasingly set the terms of engagement in this alliance is a delusion. True, we have some leverage. For example, we host Pine Gap, which remains as critical to American nuclear security as it was during the Cold War, and will have a vital role in missile defence.

In addition, we continue to play an important part in the Anglo-Saxon intelligence sharing arrangements arising from the second world war which help give the United States global intelligence vision. Recently we were also on a very short list of countries willing to send combat forces to Iraq in the absence of a clear UN mandate.

Moreover, the northern parts of Australia abut the vital straits that link the Indian and Pacific Oceans. That is bound to catch America's interests, not only because it is the dominant maritime power, but because of America's commitment to Japan's resource security (which continues to meet the interests of both parties).

In addition, as Japan slowly becomes a "normal country", increased security ties between Australia and Japan will contribute to American security as well. Current co-operation between Australia and Japan in the Proliferation Security Initiative, for example, is seen by America as a valuable adjunct to its own counterproliferation efforts pointed at North Korea in particular.

We also bring to the table our longstanding defence links in Southeast Asia, for example in the Five Power Defence Arrangements. That is important for the United States because the Pacific Ocean is the widest of the world's oceans, larger than the Indian and Atlantic Oceans combined. Even as the U.S. army seeks to become more mobile in the Asia-Pacific region, and able to operate at long distances from its bases, the distances remain daunting. Our longstanding regional defence links are especially important for the United States now that it is engaged on such a broad anti-terrorism front. *Al Queda*, for example, has exploited the weaknesses of many Southeast Asian states, including post-Suharto Indonesia.

For all these reasons, we can present ourselves as contributors to American security, not mere consumers.

Still, we would be unwise to overplay our hand. The Filipinos did so in 1991 because they never really believed the United States would leave. The South Koreans could be on the way to making the same mistake. Countries pursue their interests, but they do not always follow their best interests. Indeed, strategic history is the story of calculation and miscalculation.

### *We have choices*

If we really came to believe that this alliance either endangered our security (by dragging us into "other peoples' wars")<sup>1</sup> or was no longer relevant, we would be free to abrogate it after giving a year's notice. Then we would be "free" to look after our own security. I strongly doubt we would find it by spending less than two per cent of GDP on defence — or by eschewing nuclear weapons.

But if we choose to remain in this alliance, are we willing to pay the price, both in increased defence spending and in willingness to share risk? The days of relatively easy choices are over.

For all US allies, the price of alliance is going up. That is because the United States has greater strategic latitude as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, and because of the possibilities inherent in the new technologies apposite to warfare. Both are likely to fuel tendencies to unilateralism.

Unilateralism is not the same as isolationism. Isolationism means that the United States would retreat to its own hemisphere, behind the ocean moat, and pursue missile defence from there. Unilateralism means the United States would stay engaged in our region, but increasingly on its own terms, relying less on fixed bases and alliances. America now has much more scope to do so now that it is not restrained by countervailing Soviet power and because the 'transformation' of its military is making it much more possible to fight wars from a distance.

The interest that the United States has pursued in East Asia ever since it took the Philippines as a prize of the naval war with Spain in 1898 is the maintenance of a balance of power in ways that suit its interests. For the last fifty years, America has chosen to pursue this objective largely by means of alliance with Japan. But this was not always the case and may not always be so in future. All American alliances are now under increased scrutiny.

In global terms, the new U.S. doctrine of pre-emption is a natural response to the current threat from international terrorism linked to rogue states in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Because *Al Qaeda* is a non-state actor, the whole notion of "international law" based on state sovereignty, dating from 1648, is no longer relevant.

Deterrence, as we have understood it for centuries, will not work against terrorists who do not have political objectives, and who are willing to commit suicide.

### ***How alliances work***

We need to see ANZUS in the contexts of alliances in general. All treaties have escape clauses. As General de Gaulle once said, accurately if not politically correctly, "alliances are like girls and roses. They last while they last." And they last only as long as the congruence of interest that underpins them.

Those Australians sympathetic to China's interests often begin their complaints against ANZUS by observing that our interests and those of the United States are not identical. Of course, undermining the U.S.-Australia alliance has been a major objective of Beijing since 1996, when we made strong complaint about

China's attempts to intimidate now-democratic Taiwan by means of missile launches bracketing Taiwan's major ports. It's true that no two countries have identical interests. How could they? It's also irrelevant. What matters is whether their interests remain congruent.

We are not obliged to agree with all American policies. For example, we have ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) while the United States has not. And in a triumph of hope over experience, we normalized our diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000.

Moreover, for us and other U.S. allies, the benefits of alliance come with costs and risks attached. The lubricant of alliances is blood. And the practical manifestation of what lubricates alliances, especially in the more difficult kinds of crises, is "boots on the ground". We need to be able to contribute capable ground forces and hence risk casualties — not just send frigates, aircraft and logistics/humanitarian force elements.

While the RAN and RAAF can operate relatively easily alongside U.S. and U.K. forces, Army is lagging far behind, especially when it comes to be able to operate with American land forces in the context of "network centric warfare". That is a consequence of the neo-isolationist thinking that overtook us in our exaggerated response to the 1969 Nixon Doctrine.<sup>2</sup>

Yet in the two world wars and the Cold War, we allied ourselves with more powerful countries and sent forces overseas. We did so not simply because we wanted protection from direct threat, but because we understood what was at stake in terms of our interests and values. By adding our weight to our side, we helped it to win — as Machiavelli recommends. It is vastly in our interests to see conflicts resolved, and power balances struck, as far from our shores as possible.

Currently, the risks we face are global as much as regional. For example, the "proliferation axis" connects rogue states and terrorists all around the world. China, although not a rogue state, has been one of the worst proliferators, not just to North Korea, but to Pakistan and the Middle East. (There is some reason to hope that China, given its growing stake in Middle Eastern oil and hence stability, is beginning to see the folly of this.<sup>3</sup> Neither has China been able to control North Korea, or prevent it from ways that injure China's own interests, not least in relation to Japan.)

Australians can be quick to complain if we think the United States is giving insufficient attention to our region.<sup>4</sup> But the United States will see East Asia through the lens of its global interests. We are much more likely to have influence in Washington if we are less parochial, and see how ANZUS fits into global, not just regional, security.

Moreover, alliances are two-way streets. Along with security benefits come costs and risks, *for both parties* — not just the weaker party. The United States runs risks when it maintains key facilities on the soil of allies who might prove unreliable in a crunch.

That's what happened in the recent Iraq war, when Turkey, a long-standing NATO ally, refused to permit passage for the US Fourth Infantry Division. The United States, by having the "joint facilities" in Australia — facilities vital for its own nuclear security — runs the risk that one day we might pull the plug, possibly at a critical moment.

And if we wish to restrain U.S. inclinations towards unilateralism, the way to do it is for us (and other reliable allies such as Britain) is to support the United States when it is forced to act when the "international community" proves that is not up to the job.

Currently, contrary to what some Australians seem to think, the United States is driven not by hubris, but fear. After the terrorist attacks on America, *any* U.S. President will be driven by the fear of a nuclear weapon going off in a major city on his watch. And that fear derives from the connections between the rogue states and terrorist organizations.

Moreover, we live in a region that is far from stable and faces threats of a hitherto-known extent. The winning of the Cold War did not end great power strategic tensions in East Asia, as they did in Europe. When the Cold War ended, the strategic problems of this region had not been resolved — the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea.

This region is not as dangerous and volatile as the Middle East. But much visceral instinct lies not far beneath the surface, notably between China and Japan. These two great powers of East Asia have never hitherto been strong at the same time. And whereas China has strategic ambition, Japan has strategic anxieties. Both could have consequences for Australian security.

In addition, the "transformation" of the U.S. military, especially "network-centric warfare" is transforming the nature of alliances. Allies will much more closely integrated into U.S. global strategy because of the increased tempo of warfare. Thus US allies will have reduced ability to pick and choose about what they are willing to contribute, and when.

### *A patch of history we seem to forget*

ANZUS is the "southern anchor" of a US alliance structure in East Asia which was a product of the Korean War. As a consequence of our timely (albeit limited) contribution to the Korean War, Australia reaped the strategic dividend

of protection from the United States.<sup>5</sup> That was an alliance we had sought since 1905, when Admiral Togo sank the Russian Combined Fleet in the Tsushima Strait. We worried that one day the British Navy would be too overextended in the North Sea and the Mediterranean to be able protect us. And with our small population and limited resources, we could not defend ourselves against a major strategic threat. And from 1905, we had Japan in mind. Those fears, of course, came true in February 1942, with the fall of Singapore. That event has continued to drive Australian thinking about security and defense.

This patch of history is important because few in Australia seem to remember that ANZUS was an alliance that we ardently sought, and the United States was reluctant to grant. Just because small countries clamour for protection is no reason for the United States to grant it. Indeed, Congress had to be persuaded that we would not be mere “consumers” of U.S. security. For many Americans, Australia was simply “too far south”.

Moreover, few in Australia seem to remember that “entangling alliances” are not the American tradition. To the contrary, the United States throughout its history has avoided such alliances. Indeed, for several years after the end of the Second World War, the United States was unmoved by West Europeans. Including the British Labor government, clamoring for protection.

It took the Truman administration in fact quite a long time to accept that Soviet near-hegemony over Eurasia threatened America’s vital interests — because a USSR in control of all the resources of Eurasia would sooner or later develop enough maritime and air power to threaten the United States in its own hemisphere. Currently, there are influential Americans arguing that the United States should revert to its long-standing tradition of eschewing entangling alliances.<sup>6</sup>

Alliances are not automatic guarantees of support in all circumstances. No alliance, not even NATO, makes that kind of commitment. The United States will not support its allies if they do dumb things. For example, our support of the Dutch in West Irian, which played into the hands of the USSR. This incident still rankles with the “Old Guard” of DFAT, who like to cite it as an example of America’s being an unreliable ally. Yet when Moscow started to provide Sukarno’s Indonesia with the beginnings of a modern navy and air force, we clamored for American protection. A good example of an ally wanting to have its cake and eat it, though few Australians seem to read it this way.

We did the same thing in relation to East Timor in 1999. The Prime Minister turned two decades’ worth of supposed defence self reliance on its ear, and demanded U.S. “muddy boots on the ground”. Those Australians normally most hostile to the United States were the ones howling loudest for US intervention. The *Melbourne Age* was shouting in its editorial “We’re on our Own”.<sup>7</sup> The



then Opposition Leader was demanding that we unilaterally intervene in a territory that we had recognized as part of Indonesia since 1978 (something the U.N. had never done.) In other words, we should invade Indonesia!

The way the Indonesian-backed militias behaved of course cannot be excused. And it turned out all right in the end, not least because we have a highly capable ADF. But it also showed a volatility in Australian politics that came as an unwelcome surprise in Washington and elsewhere.

And without U.S. diplomatic support — pressing Indonesia to “invite” a U.N. authorized intervention — we would not have been able to intervene anyway. The presence of the U.S. Navy helicopter carrier *Belleau Woods*, carrying 900 Marines, as well as the cruiser *Mobile Bay*, provided military back up for America’s diplomatic intervention. CNN pictures of a huge U.S. Marine standing beside General Peter Cosgrave (no runt himself) spoke volumes about the value to us in a crisis of being a U.S. ally. Still, it was not our finest hour.

As to recent costs and risks, the Howard government took a significant risk in sending forces to Iraq in the absence of an unambiguous UN mandate and in the face of considerable public opposition. (The precedent had in fact been set by the Hawke Labor government when it committed forces to the first Iraq war before the UN mandate had been obtained.) But last year Mr. Howard correctly calculated that this would pay off. After all, only the most myopic thought that the US could lose this war! (Though many did worry, rightly as it turned out, about the aftermath.)

Thus the Prime Minister seized the chance to enhance our leverage in the alliance. That’s what the Menzies government did in 1962, when it agreed to the establishment of the U.S. naval communications station at North West Cape. (The purpose of the Cape was to communicate with the new *Polaris* ballistic missile submarines, which were able to target the “soft underbelly” of the USSR from firing positions in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean.) I doubt that Menzies understood the finer points of global nuclear strategy at the time. But sensibly, he seized the opportunity to make Australia more valuable to the United States, and thus reduce the risk that we would be seen as a mere way station to the Gulf.

### ***“Defence of Australia” versus “Muddy Boots on the Ground”***

But one wonders how long we will be able to get away with the current policy of not being prepared to have too many “muddy boots on the ground”. That is all a consequence of outmoded thinking three decades old. The 1976 Defence White Paper written under the Fraser government was a neo - isolationist document reflecting the post Vietnam view that alliances were entangling, a source of danger rather than security.

Then the 1986 Dobb report sought to present the Cold War as irrelevant for Australian security, and talked about “defence self-reliance”. This caused alarm in Washington because it could be read as wishing to take us out of the alliance.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, it would have suited Soviet objectives if Australia, an important U.S. ally, had gone the way of New Zealand, thinking that it could run and hide.<sup>9</sup>

The Hawke Labor government — alive to the danger of a crisis in the alliance that would not go down well with the electorate — prudently repackaged “Defence of Australia” (DOA) as “self-reliance within a framework of alliances”. Deliberate ambiguity has its uses. But it did mean that we developed a force structure unlikely to be able to contribute much to “expeditionary forces”. Thus we reduced the risk of being embroiled in “other peoples’ wars”.

The risks inherent in this approach were not so obvious as long as the United States itself remained in a state of strategic paralysis induced by the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal that destroyed the Nixon presidency. (Few seem now to remember that during the Carter presidency, the Soviet Union started to think that it could win the Cold War.) But the risks inherent in DOA became more apparent after President Reagan came to power and started to reverse these dangerous trends for American security. Then the onus was back on America’s allies to show what they were willing to contribute. We were slow to respond.

Thus an ADF trained and equipped for continental defence was not able to make more than a “niche” contribution to the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. And we are batting on a sticky wicket here because we demanded U.S. “muddy boots on the ground” in East Timor, when we were hard pressed to move even limited forces a short distance from our own shores. Let’s not delude ourselves that all this flies under the radar screen in Washington.

### *Confusing proximity with importance*

One of the deficiencies of the DOA approach is that it confuses the near with the important. For those advocating this approach, the 2002 Bali bombing is held out as evidence that forces should be committed closest to home because that’s where the threat is. The most important task at hand, they say, is to tackle the terrorist networks in Southeast Asia. Conversely, committing forces to Iraq is said to be for US benefit — our paying the insurance premium on ANZUS.

This approach represents a failure to grasp the significance of Nicholas Spykman’s observation that “distance does not protect; there can be security only in balanced power”. Our own history should tell us that. The Japanese did not suddenly appear on the doorstep in 1942 as a consequence of anything happening in the “arc of islands” to our north and north-east.

To the contrary, the fall of Singapore was a consequence of distant events. First came the collapse of the balance of power in Europe, when Stalin gave Hitler a free hand to invade Western Europe. That created glittering prizes for Japan in the resource-rich Southeast Asian colonies of the European powers. And with Anglo-Saxon maritime power between Alexandria and Hawaii — a distance of more than half the globe — reduced to one small British aircraft carrier, the Japanese were willing to risk everything on one throw of the dice.

Distance did not protect us then, and it will not protect us now. And while the United States has reason to expect us to look after our own back yard, in what some have come to call “Pax Australiana”, that will not be enough to maintain our standing as a reliable ally.

***Proliferation risks are global and not in the ‘air-sea gap’***

Those who confuse proximity with importance also fail to understand that nuclear proliferation, and the success or failure of regimes like Iraq’s, affect Australia’s security as much as they do America’s.

Moreover, nuclear proliferation regimes have demonstrably failed. Many Australians remain wedded to arms control. But they need to think realistically about what is likely to happen when it does not work.

Currently, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime is collapsing under the challenges laid down by North Korea and Iran.<sup>10</sup> And it cannot be “fixed”. That’s because the Treaty’s origins lie in the shared interest of the Cold War superpowers to retard the spread of nuclear weapons.

The real enforcement provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty were the willingness and ability of the superpowers to enforce discipline within their blocs.<sup>11</sup> Now that discipline is gone. India’s nuclear test in May 1998 heralded the beginning of the end for the NPT, even though India had never signed the Treaty. That was because it meant that a major country had decided that it would enhance its security by testing nuclear weapons.<sup>12</sup>

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, that will have immense consequences for our security. Yet North Korea has flaunted its obligations to the “international community” and the Security Council has not even met. We should ask China why. And where North Korea has led, Iran is following.

The collapse of the NPT has important implications for Japan, which has always described the Treaty as one of the pillars of its own nuclear policies.

## *The US-Japan alliance: implications for our security*

We need to look north of the equator. The health or otherwise of the U.S. – Japan alliance is what is really critical for our security.

Those who advocate “regional engagement” usually envisage a soft multilateralism that pays too much attention to ASEAN and neglects the power balance in North Asia. What held ASEAN together was the regular “four-eyes” discussions between Lee Kuan Yew and Suharto, not the endless ASEAN meetings. We also need to appreciate that ASEAN has become a vehicle for accommodating China. What we need from it, and from APEC, in terms of our own security, is simply not available.

The “dual function” of the U.S. – Japan alliance has always been of great importance for us. That alliance has provided Japan with nuclear and long-range maritime security in ways that do not disturb Japan's neighbours. It has also cocooned Japanese power.

But because of the peculiar circumstances of the Cold War, many Japanese have come to think that they can ignore their security problems, or expect America to resolve them. Japan had a near-free ride during the Cold War, and during the first Gulf war, the alliance came close to rupture when Japan thought it could just throw money at the problem. The alliance came close to breaking point again in 1994 during the Korean nuclear crisis, when Japan sought to run away. Since then, both parties have moved to shore up the alliance.

But if the United States ever felt inclined to give up on Japan, that would have enormous implications for our own security. Would it reduce the credibility to us of American strategic protection, or would it incline the United States to take out more insurance by moving to strengthen its alliance with us? Who can say? But it is something we should be thinking about.

There is indeed some reason to worry that the North Korean nuclear and missile threat could rattle the U.S.-Japan alliance. That's partly because North Korea's missiles can reach all parts of Japan, but cannot yet reach the continental United States. Differences among the Japanese conservatives, papered over since the end of the last war, are beginning to resurface. (The socialists and communists have been discredited, in large part because of the winning of the Cold War.) It is no longer taboo in Japan to talk about nuclear weapons or pre-emptive strike capabilities.<sup>13</sup>

So will Japan be content to rely for its nuclear security on what it has now — the US nuclear umbrella, the promise of missile defence and its own ‘virtual’ arsenal? Let us fervently hope so.

Missile defence meets Japan's strategic needs because it is non-nuclear and defensive. Moreover, it's hard to see how Japan would enhance its security by acquiring nuclear weapons.

But for the United States and Japan, missile defence raises issues so difficult that they will define the future of the alliance. An alliance that remained essentially a paper one for the duration of the Cold War will have to be transformed because of the demands of "network centric warfare". This is a real challenge to Japan's appalling decision-making processes. Moreover, if Japan insists on an "independent" command and control architecture, that might in some circumstances prove to be an alliance-buster.<sup>14</sup>

In the context of thinking about missile defence, we also need to remember that China's howls about against it are entirely self-serving. China's missiles, and those of its quasi ally North Korea, are threatening to destabilize this region. In fact, China's complaints about missile defence have made more Japanese aware that Chinese missiles target Japan, a country which lacks either nuclear weapons or missiles.

### *Arms control and the U.S. alliance*

The notions of "destabilizing arms races" and "security dilemmas" touted in Beijing are close to the hearts of the arms control fraternity in Australia and elsewhere. But these are protean fallacies that come out of a misreading of the role of arms control during the Cold War — a misreading that has its origins in the appalling casualties of the first world war.<sup>15</sup>

Major strategic tensions do not arise out of the blue, as the arms control fraternity seems to think. Wars are not caused by weapons, but by collisions of strategic interest.

It's not that arms control never works. To the contrary, this region has a history of one of the more successful naval arms control arrangements, the Washington system of 1921-22. But this arrangement was not proof against the rise of Japanese militarism after the *Kwantung* army slipped its leash. Arms control works only if all sides genuinely want peace, and can agree on what constitutes sufficiency. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. And all too often, arms control lulls Western publics into complacency.

Currently, with the NPT regime collapsing, we need to think through the implications for our own security in the context of the issues raised in this Inquiry. Nuclear weapons, because of their vast destructive power, touch on the most fundamental question of national survival. The Canberra Commission had its uses for the Howard government, when it was able to outflank Labor from the left. But political expediency risks creating hostage to fortune.

Nuclear disarmament is a pipedream. What weapon, once used, has ever been “disinvented”? And how long can we continue to rely on nuclear protection from the United States while at the same time undermining it in international forums by promoting the chimera of nuclear disarmament?

I believe that if we were no longer U.S. allies, we would have to think seriously about acquiring these weapons ourselves, as Bill Hayden was honest enough to admit — after he retired.<sup>16</sup>

### *U.S “bases” in Australia?*

Obvious interest exists in the United States for greater access to northern Australia.<sup>17</sup> Even though this will raise some complex issues, we should encourage this interest, for the same reasons that Mr. Menzies seized the opportunities presented to him in relation to North West Cape in 1962.

That’s because we do not have nearly as much leverage on this alliance as many Australians, misreading our history, seem to think.

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<sup>1</sup> According to this version of history, now widely accepted in our universities, the only “politically correct” war was the one on our doorstep in 1942. This interpretation of history dates of course from the casualties of the first world war. Yet what would have happened to Australia if Germany had won that war, as it very nearly did? We would have been part of the division of spoils of the British Empire, and I doubt we would have enjoyed it much. Male members of my family have fought in all Australia’s wars since 1914, including in the Middle East and in Europe (Bomber Command). I resent the implication of those who peddle this notion of “other peoples’ wars” - that only those who fought in the Pacific War made a contribution to Australia’s security.

<sup>2</sup> The Nixon Doctrine was a blue water doctrine. That is, the United States was pulling out of Southeast Asia because the drain of the Vietnam war was playing into the hands of the USSR. It was not pulling out of East Asia as a whole. How could it, when it needed forward deployments in East Asia in order to present a credible threat to the vulnerable “backside” of the USSR. In that respect, the opening to China helped greatly because it presented a huge strategic distraction for Moscow.

<sup>3</sup> See Michael Richardson, “A change of heart decades too late”, *South China Morning Post* 12 March 2004.

<sup>4</sup> See for example Peter Jennings, “America must be focused on Asia”, *Financial Times* 20 November 2003. Mr. Jennings says that “Iraq is an important test for American strategic policy but what happens there will not change the global balance of power. By contrast, the shifting balances of power in the Asia-Pacific region will shape the balance of power for the next generation and beyond”. I think the lesser weighting given to Iraq is not correct. The outcome of events in the Middle East and East Asia will both be momentous, though they differ in character. Terrorism rates high in the Middle East, whereas East Asia is much more classic balance of power.

<sup>5</sup> Thanks mostly to Percy Spender. Menzies, not much interested at the time, was happy to take credit later.

<sup>6</sup> See for example, Rajan Menon, “End of Alliances”, *World Policy Journal*, Vol. XX, No.2, Summer 2003.

<sup>7</sup> 11 September 1999.

<sup>8</sup> In order to justify defence spending and force structure, the Review also seemed to point the finger at Indonesia. But Indonesia has never represented a threat of invasion. Rather, Indonesia has been a threat to our security when it has been weak, as now, but not when it has been strong – as it was under Suharto.

<sup>9</sup> The Whitlam government sought to do this by taking a supine attitude to Moscow. Few in Australia now wish to recall that we shamefully recognized the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states, which was a consequence of the 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact. We were the only Western government to do this. Moscow responded with a book entitled “Australia: Between Two Oceans”. Message: you can run, but you can’t hide.

<sup>10</sup> See Robyn Lim, “Nuclear proliferation treaty under threat”, *Defender*, Summer 2003, pp.25-29.

<sup>11</sup> This was a shared interest, but it was not identical. The United States had to rely on nuclear weapons in order to contain the USSR. The Soviets would have preferred complete nuclear disarmament so as to maximize their strategic advantage – the near-hegemony over Eurasia they acquired as a consequence of the way the second world war ended. In the early stages of the Cold War, the Soviets continued to believe that superior political organization (the party system) would see them through, as it had in world war two. But the ever-increasing destructive power of nuclear weapons meant that Soviet leaders came to see that these weapons if used would

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destroy their political system. Thus superpower nuclear condominium was for the Soviets a second best option. Of course, they never gave up their propaganda campaign about nuclear weapons, which were designed to convince Western and Japanese publics that American nuclear weapons, not Soviet hegemonial designs, threatened their security. This had considerable resonance in our region, not least in New Zealand.

<sup>12</sup> India had a so-called "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974. It chose to "take its nuclear pants off" in 1998 for a number of reasons – status, power, security. Of these, security was the most important. With the end of the Cold War, India lost its alliance with Moscow and was faced with a "rising" China that was also arming its arch-rival, Pakistan, with missile and nuclear technology.

<sup>13</sup> Japan is developing its own pre-emptive doctrine. See "LDP draft calls for capability to attack foreign bases", *Kyodo News* 19 March 2004. While it's too early to say what this will mean for Japan's "strategic trajectory", it is obviously something that all regional governments will be closely watching.

<sup>14</sup> See Robyn Lim, "Japan faces tough choices over U.S. alliance", *International Herald Tribune* 11 February 2004.

<sup>15</sup> See Patrick Glynn, *Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control and the History of the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, 1992.)

<sup>16</sup> Bill Hayden, *An Autobiography* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1996) p.404.

<sup>17</sup> See for example, Roger Cliff and Jeremy Shapiro, "The Shift to Asia: Implications for U.S. Land Power", in *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003).