

SUBMISSION

on

THE REVIEW OF COASTWATCH

by

THE AUSTRALIA DEFENCE ASSOCIATION

to

**The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
of the Australian Parliament**

Melbourne
April 2000

INTRODUCTION

1. This submission to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit of the Australian Parliament on its Review of Coastwatch is made by the Board of directors of the Australia Defence Association on behalf of the Association.
2. The Australia Defence Association is a non-partisan citizens group structured as a corporation established by guarantee under the Australian Securities legislation with the object to promote, foster and encourage the best form of defence for Australia. The Board of seven directors is appointed by the guarantors who are drawn from a wide cross-section of the Australian community.
3. The Association is funded by private subscription and such other revenue as can be raised from various functions as well as consultancy work for industry and others. With the exception of some subscriptions to publications, all funds are derived from non-government and Australian sources.
4. The Association has correspondence relations with strategic studies institutes and individuals in 11 overseas countries, all in the Pacific Basin. It provides the Australian representation on the international committee which organises the Western Pacific sea lanes security conferences. The sixth conference in the series was hosted by the Association in Melbourne in October, 1988.
5. The Association publishes a quarterly journal *Defender* which enjoys a circulation of approximately 1000 in Australia and overseas. It also publishes a monthly digest entitled *Defence Brief* and a site on the Internet=s World Wide Web at www.ada.asn.au.
6. This submission is derived from work done by the Association over a 23 year period on the question of a Coastguard for Australia. Submissions on this topic have been made to government in 1977, to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in 1979, to the 1984 Beazley inquiry into coastal surveillance and as a paper to a conference on policing Australia=s offshore zones conducted in 1997 by the Australian Defence Studies Centre. In its essentials, this submission is little more than an updated version of the original 1977 submission to the Federal government.
7. This submission will deal only with the desirability of a Coastguard for Australia and will only incidentally address the other terms of reference of the Committee.

A COASTGUARD FOR AUSTRALIA

8. Official consideration of whether Australia should have a dedicated Coastguard service dates back at least to 1967 so it is hardly a new issue. That 1967 process, an inter-departmental committee, concluded that a Coastguard was the ideal option for Australia but the notion foundered on a determination by the agencies involved not to surrender any of their existing assets.
9. More recently and, given the challenge to produce this submission, it was necessary to re-examine some of the past assumptions, especially those relating to the current twin Defence Force roles of war-fighting and law enforcement. This also involves the fundamental consideration of what will, for the moment, be referred to as surveillance.

A LAW ENFORCEMENT TASK

10. The fundamental nature of the task currently assigned to Coastwatch is law enforcement. Australia asserts sovereignty over a 12 nautical mile wide territorial sea and a 200 nautical mile wide Exclusive Economic Zone. The Australian Parliament has passed a considerable amount of legislation which is applicable to activities carried out in both the territorial waters and the EEZ, altogether some thirteen million square kilometres of ocean. Apart from general legislation affecting Australia, specific laws seek to regulate such matters as safe navigation, immigration, quarantine, the exploitation of natural resources, preservation of the natural environment as well as imports and exports including contraband. These laws are applicable to Australian citizens and to non-Australians.
11. Others¹ have commented that in recent years the Australian parliament has been an enthusiastic legislator. However, while the government=s regulatory structures have in response become extensive, its enforcement capability may have fallen short of the demands made upon it. It is one thing to write masses of laws and regulations, even to provide some capacity to oversee the implementation of the regulations. **Law enforcement is a different issue because it confronts the challenge arising from those who consciously defy the law rather than those who need little more than to be guided in their more or less willing compliance.**
12. There is a significant number of Federal agencies as well as private contractors involved in the process. Without necessarily being exhaustive, it is possible to count the Australian Federal Police, Bureau of Customs and Departments of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Transport, Environment, Health, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence, and Natural Resources. The Hydra of mythology looks to be a much less complicated beast.
13. A further set of off-shore responsibilities accrue to governments. Limiting these to maritime matters, they include the need to support safe navigation by the provision of accurate charts and aids to navigation such as lights and buoys. Beyond the confines of Australia=s ports, this is largely a Federal responsibility with at least two agencies, Transport and Defence, involved.
14. The other major area of responsibility is maritime search and rescue. Generally this is a State responsibility, at least in inshore waters, with the actual work being carried out by a mixture of police and volunteer bodies. Federal involvement through the Australian Maritime Safety Agency as a co-ordinator and the ADF (principally RAN and RAAF) occurs in the more distant or complex cases.
15. At this stage, the Association offers some comment on the nature of law enforcement in our culture if only to suggest that, as far as possible, enforcement is seen as a matter for professional police personnel rather than a grab-bag of officials >authorised= under this or that piece of legislation. There are several reasons for this.
16. Police are trained not merely in the detail of the law but also in laws of evidence and in the limits to which they can go to enforce their authority. Moreover they stand apart from a department which has the responsibility of drafting the laws to be enforced. To that extent,

¹ Such as, for example, the Institute of Public Affairs in its February 2000 issue of *Facts*

they are a disinterested party. The use of a professional policing body must, in our view, lead to more effective enforcement.

NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE ADF

17. From this perspective, the Association argues that using the ADF in a law enforcement role is not only a misuse of the force itself but has adverse implications for its effectiveness as a combat force. There is a philosophical conflict implicit in the use of military forces for police work which damages both.
18. With admitted exceptions², a military force is expected to use maximum force and violence to achieve its objectives in the shortest possible time and with the minimum damage to itself. Its targets are the enemies of the nation as defined by the government of the day. Its people are trained and equipped primarily for this purpose.
19. By contrast a police body, at least in our tradition, is required to use minimal force in circumstances where time is less important. Patience is essential especially when the targets are not only our own citizens but who are presumed to be innocent until a court decides otherwise. Herein lies a clash between the two roles which may inhibit effective performance in both.
20. Furthermore, there is a strong constitutional tradition³ that the armed forces of the nation should not be used against its own citizens. While most offenders against our maritime law have in the past not been Australians, the risk to the popular standing of the armed forces in Australian society of the ADF enforcing Australian law against Australian citizens is real enough and should be avoided if possible⁴.
21. From the perspective of defence policy, the move away from a narrow defence of Australia or the air-sea gap strategy to one of developing a regional security community creates a new set of challenges for the ADF and especially the RAN and RAAF. In the future - as in the more distant past - their operational focus is much more likely to be beyond Australia's environs. Moreover, their necessary focus on the high-technology end of maritime operations will tend to concentrate equipment and training policy as well as doctrine on war-fighting rather than constabulary tasks. This tendency will be reinforced by a likely continuing shortage of funds and the need to bolster the less capable regional forces, leaving them to concentrate on sovereignty and constabulary tasks such as dealing with piracy.

² As in peacekeeping, for example.

³ Dating back to King Charles I and the English Civil War.

⁴ Readers may recall the concerns expressed when armed troops were mobilised, arguably prematurely, following the Hilton Hotel bombing during the CHOGM meeting in 1979.

22. On the other hand, the changing nature of warfare which puts a higher priority on constabulary tasks such as peacekeeping or similar crypto-law enforcement tasks may suggest an ADF concentration in these fields. In our view, that is more applicable to ground forces rather than the RAN and RAAF whose most valuable contribution to a regional security community will be their high-end war-fighting capabilities⁵.

⁵

Rear Admiral (Rtd) Sumihiko Kawamura noted at the January 1993 SLOC Conference in Bali that, in the Western Pacific, only the Japanese and Australian maritime forces had a capability for broad area surveillance and multi-threat response.

ONE AGENCY OR MANY

23. To date Australia has managed its offshore law enforcement task through a multitude of agencies including private sector contractors, each with the exception of the ADF specialising in a specific field. The ADF primarily through the RAN has operated as an agent with officers authorised to act under a number of pieces of legislation. If this Heath Robinson structure operates effectively, it is surely by accident coupled with the commitment and commonsense of the people involved. But such an amateurish approach is hardly worthy of a sophisticated and wealthy nation.
24. It is already clear that Australian law enforcement faces serious and growing challenges especially in the areas of illegal migration and narcotics trafficking. The involvement of organised crime groups will ensure that the problem grows. Dealing with it is not just a matter of having an effective surveillance and response system, even assuming that we have these at this time. Nor is it a matter of handing over the task to an existing law enforcement agency such as the Australian Federal Police or Australian Customs. The former is already too small and under-resourced as well as focussed on shore-bound operations. Customs are better placed but, with respect, inadequately equipped and trained, especially to handle what are likely to be escalated threats in the near future.
25. If nothing else, a truly effective agency will need to be a paramilitary force. The challenge which may not be far off will be to cope with offenders who will themselves be well-equipped and increasingly well-armed. Law enforcement officers will be faced with offenders using sophisticated electronic equipment and weapons of considerably more power than basic small arms.
26. The Association=s preferred solution is for a single paramilitary law enforcement agency. Whether it is called an Australian Coastguard or something else does not matter so much as getting the structure right⁶.

Overseas Practice

27. A quick look at the literature suggests that an independent coastguard service is the preferred option of a large number of maritime nations. The *Military Balance*⁷ shows 38 countries with an independent coastguard service (sometimes instead of a navy) and at least 12 more with a separate coastguard branch within the navy. Of course, for many smaller countries, the navy is a coastguard or marine police force rather than a conventional navy. Annex `A= gives more detail.

THE PROPOSAL

⁶ With the current propensity for complicated nomenclature, we can envisage a preferred name being something like **The Australian National Offshore Law Enforcement, Maritime Safety and Environmental Management Agency**.

⁷ *The Military Balance 1999/2000* 1999, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.

28. The following proposal is not intended to be definitive in any way. To some extent, it may even be regarded as an ambit claim. The primary objective, however, is to propose the formation of an organisation that can act effectively as a professional law enforcement agency in the maritime environment.

Role

29. A paramilitary force, that is not quite military but more than a lightly armed police force, is essential. Inevitably it must have the authority and the capability to use force to apprehend an offender. When dealing with ships or aircraft, that force may involve the use of weapons heavier than small arms and it follows that the users must be trained in the use of medium firepower conventional weapons as well as being disciplined to use only sufficient force.
30. The dual roles of detection and arrest as well as the range of offenders that may have to be dealt with presuppose a force equipped with surface vessels and aircraft. Obviously aircraft can detect offenders or suspects but interception, examination and apprehension can only be effected by surface forces. On the other hand surface vessels will not have the range or speed to deal adequately with all offenders and tracking by aircraft will often be necessary. A high degree of co-ordination and control will be required and this argues for a single force under disciplined control.
31. If a coastguard is established, it might usefully be assigned other non-enforcement roles to take advantage of its fundamentally peaceful task and its expertise in the maritime environment. Some that are immediately obvious are search-and-rescue, maintenance of navigation aids and hydrography/oceanography.

Equipment

32. Depending on the specific tasks assigned to an Australian Coastguard, it would require a range of patrol and other vessels as well as fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. As a basis for discussion, some 50 vessels of all types are likely to be required. These would include short and long-range patrol vessels, survey and oceanographic ships and lighthouse and buoy tenders. Some if not most of these are already available in the inventories of the RAN, Department of Transport and Australian Customs Service.
33. Most, if not all, of the patrol vessels would be armed. Armament would range from light automatic (say .50cal or 20-30mm weapons) up to, say, a 76mm weapon and a ship borne helicopter for search purposes.
34. Annex >B= lists some examples of US Coastguard equipment. The existing *Fremantle*-class patrol boats in the RAN inventory equate roughly to the USCG 110ft Patrol Boats while the RAN=s concept of an Offshore Patrol Combatant has features in common with the USCG 270ft Medium Endurance Cutter. The Customs Service *Bay*-class patrol vessels are similar but lack any armament.
35. Aircraft would include short and medium range search aircraft, both fixed and rotary wing, for surveillance, and for search and rescue. This paper will not attempt to specify the types or numbers since the range of suitable types is almost infinite.
36. It is worth commenting at this point that the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN) would have significant value for a Coastguard and it would be essential to provide an ADF/Coastguard interface to ensure that useful data from JORN was made available in

a timely way to the Coastguard. This is true even if Coastwatch continues to exercise responsibility for offshore aw enforcement.

Bases

37. A Coastguard would require base facilities but, with the exception of perhaps two or three key bases, these could be relatively unsophisticated. Most would be in the northern half of the country where the problem is likely to be most acute. The smaller bases would operate one or two patrol vessels with a similar number of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Using existing civil airfields and port facilities, little investment would be needed. Similarly with communications, the civil network would suffice for most purposes with dedicated radio and cryptographic equipment added.
38. One advantage of using local facilities would be the ability to use local contractors for basic maintenance and logistic support. This has the added advantage that the Coastguard personnel would become closely identified with the local community which would likely be a source of valuable intelligence. It is worth emphasising here that the Coastguard is a law enforcement body and, like all effective law enforcement agencies, depends upon good community relations for good intelligence.
39. In general, this submission envisages that a Coastguard would operate from a main headquarters (preferably not in Canberra⁸), perhaps two larger bases for the larger vessels and aircraft in the north⁹ and south-east with smaller operating bases at such places as for example Gove, Broome, Port Hedland, Geraldton, Albany, Port Lincoln, Portland (or Burnie) and Port Kembla. All of these fulfil the criteria for an operational base of access to port facilities, airfields, communications and logistic support.

Organisation

40. Annex >C= offers an outline organisational structure which ought to be kept as simple as possible.
41. The concept envisages an organisation of around 4000 regular personnel including those under training as well as civilian support staff. Command would be vested in a Commandant at around two star level with a deputy commandant responsible for an operations (including intelligence), personnel and logistics headquarters staff. The headquarters operations staff would incorporate the existing Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre.
42. Three intermediate operational headquarters are suggested, two with regional responsibilities and a marine services headquarters responsible for marine science (hydrography and oceanography) and navigation services such as the maintenance of navigation aids.
43. A typical small operational base would operate one to three patrol vessels and a number of aircraft, both fixed and rotary wing. The precise deployment at any base would be determined by current operational priorities. Larger vessels would normally be based at the regional headquarters although some flexibility would be required to permit temporary deployments from smaller bases.

⁸ Perth or Brisbane would be suitable.

⁹ The existing naval facilities at Cairns could be transferred to a Coastguard.

44. The Commandant would have to be responsible to a Minister and derive his authority from an Act of the Parliament. The Minister (Transport or Justice) would exercise some oversight through his department. However, because the force would be responsive to the requirements of several departments, the Commandant must have authority to deal directly with each and the freedom to determine operational priorities subject to government policy. In effect the Commandant would stand in the same relationship to government as a Commissioner of Police. Similarly, Coastguard personnel would exercise independent powers as common law constables and as authorised officers under various acts. Possibly those powers would be limited to commissioned officers or non-commissioned officers in independent commands.

Federal-State Relations

45. Under current arrangements, considerable primary responsibility for search-and-rescue is exercised by State authorities, mainly through State police forces. In practice, however, the State forces readily admit that they could not perform their tasks without the support of a vast number of volunteer organisations.
46. The volunteer groups exist in all States except Western Australia and the Northern Territory. Overall they boast some 3000 members and, in Victoria alone, respond to some 5000 incidents annually (including breakdowns). In Queensland the Volunteer Coastal Patrol and Air-Sea Rescue groups are generally well-funded and supported by the State government. They can and do exercise SAR responsibilities some 50 miles to seaward.
47. In other States, public funding is minimal and training standards vary enormously. Conflicts between different groups are not unknown but, overall, the volunteer organisations represent an enormous reservoir of expertise and commitment.
48. In the United States, such groups have been subsumed into the US Coast Guard as the USCG Auxiliary. In this way, the groups continue to provide an inshore SAR service while gaining both funding and standardised training. In an Australian context, the volunteer groups could be incorporated into a Coastguard in the same way. Moreover, there is some suspicion that at least some State police forces would be happy to hand over their existing responsibilities to a Federal body. In Victoria at least, the police search and rescue/boat squad is poorly resourced and cannot operate safely outside the confines of Port Phillip.

The Defence/Law Enforcement Interface

49. Comment has been made above about the relationship between defence and law enforcement. In the Association's view, Defence should not be responsible for coastguard operations although it needs to be said in the aftermath of the Southern Ocean yacht rescues and fisheries policing operations in recent years that the suggested Coastguard would not have the capability for distant SAR tasks to the same extent as the RAN and RAAF. Similarly there will be some overlap between Defence and Coastguard needs for surveillance information, especially from JORN.
50. On the other hand, as with the US Coast Guard, the ability of an Australian Coastguard to provide a combat capable naval reserve force in time of war represents a significant cost benefit and should not be ignored.

Costs

51. Research for this submission has not been able to quantify the net additional costs of forming an Australian Coastguard on the model suggested. While some costs for offshore law enforcement are already incurred by various departments and could be transferred to a Coastguard, inevitably additional costs will arise. These will be the greater because of the need to provide resources which are currently not available or, as in the case of the *Fremantle*-class patrol boats, will require replacement in the near future. Nevertheless, the annual gross cost of an Australian Coastguard on the suggested model would be unlikely to exceed \$500 million at current dollar values.
52. Against the dollar costs must be counted the less quantifiable costs of not enforcing Australian laws in some quite critical areas which are likely to come under increased pressure soon, or not providing a more cost-effective search and rescue capability. The US Coast Guard used to boast that the dollar value of its property rescues each year actually exceeded its annual budget.
53. Furthermore, the reduction of the bureaucratic component involved in the current administration of offshore law enforcement (especially the Defence component) coupled with the capacity of a Coastguard to acquire equipment more specifically tailored to its needs and more likely to be derived from commercial sources offers opportunities for reductions in present cost structures to be devoted to more efficient equipment, manning and training programs.

Interim Provisions

54. Initial outfits of both equipment and personnel should be drawn from the existing enforcement agencies with the proviso that only suitably trained and motivated personnel would be considered for transfer to a Coastguard. Similarly, equipment transferred may require some modification. For example, the *Bay*-class patrol vessels recently acquired by Customs should be provided with light armament, probably a 50cal machine gun.

CONCLUSION

55. For what is a sophisticated country, Australia has been oddly reluctant to provide an effective administration of the laws that it passes. Instead it has relied upon a multitude of agencies with overlapping responsibilities and powers, and generally a quite inadequate level of resources. This is not the place to speculate upon the reasons why, merely to suggest that some sense of national pride as well as a sensitivity to growing threats in Australia=s offshore zones argue strongly for a more sophisticated and effective approach. An effective offshore law enforcement agency - an Australian coastguard by whatever name - is essential.
56. The model outlined here is simply a proposal, surely capable of refinement. But such an agency ought to be primarily an independent and paramilitary law enforcement agency, not part of Defence and properly equipped to meet the looming challenges to Australian sovereignty in our territorial seas and exclusive economic zone.

World Coastguard Services

Coastguard* and Navy	Coastguard within Navy	Coastguard(1) only
Argentina	Algeria	Costa Rica
Bahrain	Cameroon	Cyprus
Canada #	Chile	Iceland
Cuba	Colombia	Mauritius
Ecuador	Egypt	Namibia
Estonia	Kuwait	Seychelles
Finland	Libya	Trinidad and Tobago
Germany	Morocco	
Greece	Nigeria	
India	Norway	
Iran	Qatar	
Italy *	Uruguay	
Japan		
Latvia		
Malaysia *		
Mexico		
Myanmar		
Oman		
Pakistan		
Peru		
Philippines		
Poland		
Romania		
Russia		
Saudi Arabia		
Singapore		
South Korea		
South Africa		
Spain		
Sweden		
Taiwan		
Thailand		
Tunisia		
Turkey		
Ukraine		
United Arab Emirates		
United States		
Venezuela		

- (1) Paramilitary marine police or similar rather than a dedicated coastguard. Note that for many smaller countries, the navy is effectively a coastguard only. Most of these are not listed.
- (2) Canadian coastguard is a civilian organisation merged with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans

Some US Coastguard Equipment¹⁰

378' High Endurance Cutter

Number in service Coast Guard-wide: 12
Length: 378 feet; Beam: 43 feet; Displacement: 3,250 tons
Power Plant: Two diesel engines/two gas turbine engines
Maximum Range: 14,000 miles
Maximum Speed: 29 knots
Armament: One Mark 75 76-mm gun (anti-air capable); Two 25-mm machine guns; One 20-mm Phalanx CIWS
Primary Missions: Law Enforcement, Defence Operations, Search & Rescue
Typical Crew: 176 Personnel (20 Officers, 156 Enlisted)

The 378-foot High Endurance Cutter class are the largest cutters, aside from the two Polar Class Icebreakers, ever built for the Coast Guard. They are powered by diesel engines and gas turbines, and have controllable-pitch propellers. Equipped with a helicopter flight deck, retractable hangar, and the facilities to support helicopter deployment, these 12 cutters were introduced to the Coast Guard inventory in the 1960s. Beginning in the 1980s and ending in 1992, the entire class was modernized through the Fleet Renovation and Modernization (FRAM) program. The first of the class was the Hamilton (WHEC-715) commissioned in 1967. Highly versatile and capable of performing a variety of missions, these cutters operate throughout the world's oceans.

270' Medium Endurance Cutter

The 270-Foot Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC) Famous Cutter Class
Number in service Coast Guard-wide: 13
Length: 270 feet; Maximum Range: 9900 miles; Maximum Speed: 19.5 knots
Primary Missions: Law Enforcement, Defence Operations, Search & Rescue
Typical Crew: 100 Personnel (14 Officers, 86 Enlisted)

210' Medium Endurance Cutter

The 210-Foot Reliance Class Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC)
Number in service Coast Guard-wide: 14
Length: 210 feet; Beam: 34 feet; Displacement: 1,000 tons;
Power plant: Two diesel engines
Maximum Speed: 18 knots; Maximum Range: 6,100 miles
Armament: One 3-inch/76 caliber gun; Two 50-caliber machine guns
Primary Missions: Law Enforcement, Defence Operations, Search & Rescue
Typical Crew: 100 Personnel (14 Officers, 86 Enlisted)

¹⁰

The following data is drawn from the US Coast Guard's official homepage on the World Wide Web.

110' Patrol Boat

110-Foot Island-Class Patrol Boat (WPB)

Number in service throughout the Coast Guard: 49

Length: 110 feet; Beam: 21 feet; Displacement: 185 tons

Maximum Range: 1,800 miles; Maximum Speed: 26+ knots; Power plant: two diesel engines

Armament: One 20-mm and two M-60 machine guns

Primary Missions: Search and Rescue/Law Enforcement, Defence Operations

Typical Crew: 16 Personnel (2 Officers, 14 Enlisted)

The 110-foot Island-class Patrol Boats are a Coast Guard modification of a highly successful British-designed patrol boat. With excellent range and sea keeping capabilities, the Island Class, all named after US islands, replaced the older 95-foot Cape-class patrol boats. These cutters concentrate on law enforcement - mainly drug and illegal alien interdiction duties. They are also involved in Port Security, Search & Rescue and Defence Readiness operations. Built in the late 1980s they are equipped with advanced electronics and navigation equipment.

82' Patrol Boat

82-foot Point Class Patrol Boat (WPB)

Length: 82 feet; Beam: 17 feet; Displacement: 67.5 tons

Power plant: Two diesel engines; Maximum Speed: 22 knots; Maximum Range: 490 miles

Crew: 10 personnel

Primary Missions: Search and Rescue/Law Enforcement, Defence

Throughout the history of the Coast Guard there has always been a need for fast, sturdy, highly manoeuvrable boats capable of operating in heavy seas. Our duties in search and rescue and the increasing requirement for maritime law enforcement and the interdiction of illegal drugs are two mission examples.

The 82-foot Point Class Patrol boats were built in the 1960s and continue to prove themselves efficient and seaworthy vessels.

The Point Class is named after coastal geographic Points in the United States and are all-purpose cutters. Operating with 10-18 crew members, these cutters' major missions are Law Enforcement, Search and Rescue and Defence Operations.

Nineteen 82-footers are commanded by LTJGs; Twenty-two 82-footers are commanded by BMCMs or QMCMs; Thirty-nine 82-footers have been re-engined to increase their service life to 30 years.

These durable cutters will be replaced by the newly designed 87 foot Coastal Patrol Boat (CPB) class.

41' Utility Boat

Length: 41 feet

Maximum Range: 280 miles; Maximum Speed: 22 knots

Primary Use: Search and Rescue/Law Enforcement

Typical Crew: 3 Enlisted Personnel (Coxswain, Engineer, Crew member)

Utility boats are designed for patrol, boat & ship boarding, crash boat service, and search & rescue missions.

21' Port and Waterways Boat

Length: 21 feet

Maximum Range: 145-170 miles (in protected waters); Maximum Speed: 26 knots

Primary Mission: Harbor Patrols

Typical Crew: 2 enlisted (1 coxswain, 1 crew)

A PROPOSED COASTGUARD ORGANISATION

