# Supplementary submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters – Informal Voting

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AEC
Australian Electoral Commission

**Australian Electoral Commission**

# Contents

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# 1. Introduction

This submission focuses on informal voting in the House of Representatives and covers:

- the AEC's Analysis of Informal Voting – House of Representatives, 2010 Federal Election (discussed briefly below with a copy of the full report at Attachment A);
- the conduct of formality workshops as a pilot project in the lead–up to the 2010 Federal Election; and
- the impact on informality of different voting systems (including the 'progressive informality' proposal put forward by Mr Antony Green and the provisions in the South Australian *Electoral Act 1985* in relation to informal voting. (See separate paper at Attachment B.)

## 1.1 AEC's Analysis of Informal Voting – House of Representatives – 2010 Federal Election

1.1.1    After each federal election the AEC conducts an analysis of informal voting in the House of Representatives (HoR) and publishes a report on its findings. The report, Analysis of Informal Voting – House of Representatives, 2010 Federal Election, was published on the AEC website on 31 March 2011. A copy of the report is at Attachment A.

1.1.2    The AEC's analysis of informal voting at the 2010 HoR election shows that the level of informal voting increased nationally at the 2010 federal election, across all states and territories.

1.1.3    At the 2010 federal election, the national informal vote for the HoR was 5.55 per cent (or 729,304 informal votes). This is a significant increase from 3.95 per cent (or 510,822 informal votes) in 2007, and a small increase on the 2004 result (5.18 per cent).

1.1.4    The national decline in informality that occurred at the 2007 federal election was the first such decline since 1993.

1.1.5    The ten divisions with the highest rates of informal voting at the 2010 House of Representatives election were all located in Sydney. These divisions (and their respective informality rates) were:

- Blaxland (14.06 per cent);
- Fowler (12.83 per cent);
- Watson (12.80 per cent);
- Chifley (11.16 per cent);
- McMahon (10.84 per cent);

- Werriwa (10.35 per cent);
- Greenway (10.27 per cent);
- Barton (9.82 per cent);
- Reid (8.80 per cent); and
- Parramatta (8.65 per cent).

1.1.6    Many of these divisions were also in the top ten divisions with the highest levels of informality following the 2007 federal election.

1.1.7    More than half of all informal ballots in 2010 had incomplete numbering (including number '1' only ballots and other ballots with incomplete numbering) or were totally blank.  This was also the first federal election since AEC informal ballot paper surveys began where the proportion of blank ballots was higher than the proportion of number '1' only ballots.

1.1.8    Just over half (51.4 per cent) of all informal votes were assumed to be unintentionally informal, while the remaining 48.6 per cent were assumed to be intentionally informal.

1.1.9    While it appears that most informal voting continues to be unintentional, there was a substantial increase in assumed intentional informal voting (in particular, blank ballots) at the 2010 HoR election.  The informality rate for blank ballots increased from 0.79 per cent of votes cast (or 20.0% of all informal votes) at the 2007 election to 1.60 per cent of votes cast (or 28.9% of all informal votes) at the 2010 election.

1.1.10   There are many factors that could influence a voter to intentionally or unintentionally cast an informal vote and it is not possible, in many cases, to accurately quantify or even separately identify the impact these factors might have.  Of those factors identified as significant influences on (unintentional) informal voting at previous HoR elections, English language proficiency and the number of candidates appear to be the strongest predictors of informality rates (or changes in informality rates) in 2010.  Analysis relating to differences between state and territory electoral systems and the federal system provided mixed results, suggesting that other factors were more significant influences on informality in 2010.

1.1.11   There was some media interest following statements made by Mr Mark Latham in August 2010 that voters should lodge an informal vote at the 2010 federal election by depositing a blank ballot paper into the ballot box.  Lodging a blank ballot is the simplest way of casting an informal vote.  It is not possible to determine whether the increase in blank ballots is related to Mr Latham's

comments or indeed to any other public commentary. It is possible that the level of blank ballots was simply a reflection of the mood of the electorate.

1.1.12    Strategies employed by the AEC aimed at minimising the informal vote in 2010 included:

- translating a range of information (including the *Official Guide to the 2010 Federal Election* - a leaflet that was distributed to all households) into 22 different languages for use in the polling place. Additionally, all translated election communication materials were available on the AEC website in an "information in your language" section. This information was also accessible through an AEC telephone translation service which provided assistance in 16 languages.

- the election advertising and public awareness campaign, including:
  - national television, press and online advertising campaign during the voting period for the election including translated material in a range of languages. Backed up by information available from the AEC's website (including a how to vote practice tool), national call centre, and the *Official Guide to the 2010 Federal Election* leaflet delivered to all households.
  - media coverage achieved through press releases and public relations.
  - final reminders at the time of voting from polling officials, posters and translated information available at polling places.

- conducting 90 formality workshops, in the weeks prior to the election, in the divisions with the highest informality levels at the 2007 election (this is discussed further below).

- employing multi-lingual staff in divisions with a high percentage of people with culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds; an interactive "How to vote practice tool" was available on the AEC website to enable electors to practise filling in their ballot papers; this was promoted through the advertising and public relations materials.

## 1.2 Pilot project - conduct of formality workshops in western Sydney

1.2.1    In the lead up to the federal election the AEC conducted a pilot project targeted at informal voting in an area with traditionally high informality rates where it was considered that the majority of the informal votes may be cast unintentionally.

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The primary objective of the pilot project was to increase voter knowledge in relation to casting a formal vote. The secondary objectives were to engage and build sustainable community connections, and to evaluate the content and methodology used in delivering community education.

1.2.2 The divisions that were chosen to participate in the pilot were those with a high informality rate in previous federal elections, where this informality rate was linked to the division having a significant number of CALD voters. The participating divisions, which were all located in the western Sydney area, were: Blaxland, Watson, Chifley, McMahon, Fowler, Reid, Parramatta, Werriwa, Banks and Bennelong.

1.2.3 The AEC engaged consultants to manage the pilot program, working closely with the AEC. The consultants engaged bilingual educators who were proficient in the identified target language groups. Preference was given to educators with extensive networks in the community. AEC staff developed program content and resource material and provide training to the educators in content and methodology. Educators were equipped with a toolkit comprising a translated PowerPoint slide presentation, translated fact sheets, mock ballot papers, ballot box, teaching tools, evaluation forms, presenter notes. The consultants managed the logistics of promoting and arranging the workshops. Each workshop was attended by an AEC staff member who provided 'technical expertise' support for the bilingual educator.

1.2.4 In total, 90 workshops were conducted with 1772 participants across 13 language groups in the three week period leading up to the 2010 federal election.

**Table 1**: Number of formality workshop sessions and participants

| Language Group | Number of Sessions | Total Participants |
|---|---|---|
| Arabic | 15 | 300 |
| Italian | 3 | 60 |
| Greek | 10 | 224 |
| Chinese - Cantonese | 5 | 170 |
| Chinese - Mandarin | 7 | 180 |
| Khmer | 8 | 126 |
| Serbian | 4 | 122 |
| Spanish | 5 | 80 |
| Vietnamese | 13 | 254 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Turkish | 4 | 42 |
| Korean | 5 | 69 |
| Dinka | 2 | 20 |
| Arabic/Other | 4 | 58 |
| English/Other | 5 | 67 |
| **TOTAL** | **90** | **1772** |

1.2.5    While it was only possible to obtain a limited amount of written feedback, analysis of this indicates that by the end of the session there was a significant shift in both attitudes to voting and level of knowledge about voting between the 'pre' and 'post' workshop questionnaire.

1.2.6    Educators confirmed an increase in knowledge and understanding during the workshop as evidenced by the number of correctly completed ballot papers in the mock election, and level of engagement of participants through the workshops.

1.2.7    The workshops did not directly result in a reduction in informality in the targeted division during the 2010 federal election.  However, they were perceived by attendees as useful.  Given an average of 170-180 workshop participants in each of the target divisions consisting of around 100,000 voters, an immediate impact in informality statistics could not be expected.  However, the adoption of the program on a continual basis with opportunity for repeat visits and broader topic coverage could be expected to have an impact on informality figures over time.

1.2.8    While a high number of workshops were held, there was also considerable unmet demand, in part due to the timing of the election announcement.  This indicates there is interest in the electorate for learning about voting.  The pilot also demonstrated the successful use of strong community networks to identify target groups and deliver electoral education.  The format of the workshops and the logistics of their delivery were considered generally appropriate for the target audiences and the venues in which they were delivered.

1.2.9    The total cost of delivering the workshops was just under $210,000.

1.2.10   As part of its 2010 election voter survey, the AEC conducted around 480 face-to-face interviews at seven locations in western Sydney on polling day.  The majority of these interviews were carried out in language, specifically Arabic, Vietnamese and Greek.  Of those interviewed, around 45 had attended a workshop and found it useful.  However, those people were no less likely than

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other western Sydney respondents who speak languages other than English to vote informally, nor were they more confident about voting than those who had not attended a workshop.

1.2.11    Informal voting decreases as voter confidence increases, and as such the AEC recognises that in-language support needs to focus on this outcome.

1.2.12    The AEC is currently reviewing its informality strategy and considering next steps.

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Attachments

Attachment A     Analysis of Informal Voting - House of Representatives, 2010 Federal
Election

Attachment B     Paper – Impact on informality of different voting systems

SECRETARIAT NOTE

Attachment A, *Analysis of Informal Voting - House of Representatives, 2010 Federal
Election*, is available on the AEC website at:

http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/Strategy_Research_Analysis/index.htm

## IMPACT ON INFORMALITY OF DIFFERENT VOTING SYSTEMS

### 1.     Introduction

1.1     On 4 March 2011, during a public hearing held by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) as part of its inquiry into the *Conduct of the 2010 federal election and matters related thereto*, the Chair of the Committee, Mr Daryl Melham MP, put the following request for information and advice to the AEC:

> "We heard from Antony Green on Wednesday in relation to some options as far as lowering the [in]formal vote is concerned. He put three options to us: one was optional preferential, which I do not think is on anyone's radar; the second was what is called 'progressive informality'; and the third was in relation to the South Australian system of voting, which is registered preference tickets. I understand that you are doing an analysis of the informal voting and that that will be part of a supplementary submission. I would like from you an analysis of, if the South Australian position had applied to the Commonwealth, how many votes would have been captured by that in terms of the count. I am also interested, so that the committee can compare, in your doing that also for progressive informality.".

1.2     This Submission has been prepared in response to that request.  The balance of the Submission is organised under the following headings:

(i)     **Part 2**     The "progressive informality" system

(ii)     **Part 3**     The ticket voting system used for South Australian House of Assembly elections

(iii)     **Part 4**     Hypothetical impact of the systems at the 2010 federal election

(iv)     **Part 5**     Policy issues.

### 2.     The "progressive informality" system

2.1     <u>Overview of the system</u>

2.1.1     In his Submission (No. 88) to the JSCEM's current inquiry, Mr Antony Green put forward the option of a "progressive informality" system, as follows:

> **"Option 2: Progressive Informality**
>
> My second option retains compulsory preferential voting, but relaxes the strict formality criteria currently applied before a vote is admitted to the count.  Progressive Formality [sic] would admit to the count any vote with a valid first preference, <u>and only exclude ballot papers with incomplete preferences at the point where those preferences were required to be counted</u>.

My procedures for counting would be

    (1)    Initial count admits any vote with a valid first preference

    (2)    If one candidate has a majority of first preference votes, no further checks for formality are required on ballot papers admitted to the count under Step (1)

    (3)    If preferences require to be counted to determine a winning candidate, the ballot papers of a candidate are re-examined for formality before they are distributed. Any ballot papers that do not have a valid next preference are excluded from the count.

    (4)    Having excluded some first preferences as informal, a check is made to determine that the leading candidate has not now reached 50% of the new formal total. If preferences are still required to determine the winner, proceed to step (5)

    (5)    Distribute preferences. Return to step (3) and determine if further distributions need to be undertaken.".

2.1.2 In practice, the counting process for this system is equivalent to that for optional preferential voting, in that for a given set of marked ballot papers:

(i)    the two systems will always elect the same candidate; and

(ii)    at the end of the first preference count, and at the end of each exclusion, the progressive totals of all continuing candidates will be the same under the progressive informality system and optional preferential voting.

Under progressive informality, votes which at an optional preferential count would be set aside as "exhausted" are instead added to the total of informal votes.

2.1.3 One difference between the systems, implied rather than stated explicitly in Mr Green's Submission, but clarified in his testimony at the JSCEM public hearing on 2 March 2011, is that under progressive informality, the directions on the ballot paper would still instruct the voter to show a full preference ordering for all candidates.


2.2    <u>Advantages and disadvantages of the progressive informality system</u>

2.2.1 In his Submission, Mr Antony Green summarised the advantages and disadvantages of the system as follows:

"**Advantages**

- Does not undermine compulsory preferential voting, as advocating a vote with incomplete preferences is still advocating a vote that would be informal, if the vote was for a candidate who would be excluded at some point to distribute preferences.

- Gives effect to the intent of more voters than the current rules

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**Disadvantages**

- Candidates who finish first or second in a count are less likely to have their votes declared informal. This disadvantages minor parties and independents compared to the major parties.

- Votes would be admitted to the count on election night that may be excluded later in the count. In close elections, this may make the result less clear on election night. In particular, indicative preference counts may be less reliable.

- The counts currently conducted for information purposes would have to take account of these rules, resulting in complete 2-candidate and 2-party preferred counts for some electorates finishing with a different total of formal votes to the initial count of first preferences.".

2.2.2 In relation to those observations, the AEC would make the following comments.

(i) Advocating an informal vote through the marking of an incomplete preference ordering is not currently an offence under the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (the "Electoral Act"). If it be thought desirable to prohibit the advocacy of the marking of votes in a way which did not express a full preference ordering, an amendment to the Act would be needed. That, however, would immediately give rise to a number of complex issues of the type which arose under earlier formality rules in the Act; the history of those issues is summarised at **Annex 1**.

(ii) The impact of the system on the clarity of election night results would be likely to be only marginal, and much less than the impact of uncounted declaration votes. At the 2010 election, there were over two million declaration votes uncounted on election night, a number vastly exceeding the number of votes which under progressive informality might have been counted as formal on election night, but later set aside as informal.

(iii) The possible difference between the number of formal votes at the beginning and the end of a distribution of preferences is an issue of appearance rather than substance, and should not be seen as an obstacle to the adoption of the system.

2.2.3 As the counting processes for the progressive informality system and optional preferential voting are in practice equivalent, the two systems share many of the same strengths assessed against the test of minimising unintentional informality. In particular, the progressive informality system would be more effective than the current full preferential system in giving effect to the expressed first preferences of voters. Under the current system, significant numbers of ballot papers are excluded from the count even where the voter has clearly indicated a first preference, and in some cases later preferences as well (though not a full preference ordering). In many of those cases - where the first preference has been indicated for a major party, or the vote has been cast in a "safe" seat, or both - the required later preferences the absence or defectiveness of which cause the vote to be classed as

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informal are ones which would never have impacted on the result in the seat if they had been marked correctly, and if the vote had as a consequence been accepted as formal.  The analysis at paragraphs 4.4 to 4.9 below suggests that the progressive informality system would "save" many of those votes.

2.2.4   In that context, it is instructive to note that the task faced by the average voter is now clearly more complex than when full preferential voting was introduced in 1918.  Up until then, there had been seven general elections, at which a total of 525 vacancies were filled, and for which a total of 1060 nominations were received.  Over those seven elections, the overall average number of candidates per vacancy was 2.02.  Over the last eight general elections, from and including that of 1990, 1,191 vacancies have been filled, for which a total of 7,775 nominations have been received, at an average of 6.53 candidates per vacancy.  This trend came to a climax at the 2009 Bradfield by-election, contested by 22 candidates, at which the informal vote reached 9%, by a substantial margin the highest ever recorded in the division, and more than double the rate for that division at the 2007 election.

2.2.5   An argument sometimes raised in relation to optional preferential voting, and which might be taken to apply also to the progressive informality system, is that it runs the risk of becoming a plurality ("first-past-the-post") system.  This position was taken by the JSCEM in its June 2000 report entitled *The 1998 Federal Election - Report of the Inquiry into the conduct of the 1998 Federal Election and matters related thereto* (the "1998 Election Report"):

> "4.55   The Committee notes these arguments for optional preferential voting and particularly acknowledges Mr [Antony] Green's argument regarding the consistency of introducing both voluntary voting and optional preferential voting at the same time.  The Committee, however, believes that there is a strong chance that an optional preferential system will eventually lead to voters casting only one preference as the realisation sinks in to voters that, to indicate second and subsequent preferences, will decrease the possibility that their most preferred candidate will win. The Committee, therefore, is unconvinced that the introduction of optional preferential voting will not result in a de facto first past the post system where candidates can be elected with significantly less than half the vote.".

2.2.6   In its June 2009 *Report on the conduct of the 2007 federal election and matters related thereto*, the Committee stated (at paragraph 8.36) that it did not support "a change to adopting optional preferential voting for House of Representatives elections" and (at paragraph 8.65) that it supported "the retention of full preferential voting for House of Representatives elections", but did not further elaborate its reasoning.  These conclusions were touched upon in a dissenting report lodged by the Opposition members of the Committee.

2.2.7   Three points need to be made in relation to the arguments raised in the 1998 Election Report.  First, the proposition that under optional preferential voting (or the progressive informality system), the indication of second and subsequent preferences by a voter can decrease the possibility that his or her most preferred candidate will win is not correct: second and subsequent preferences on a ballot paper only come into play once the voter's most preferred candidate has already been excluded.

2.2.8 Secondly, while it is possible under optional preferential voting or progressive informality for a candidate to be elected with less than 50% of the total formal vote, others might argue that that would be preferable to a situation in which a candidate came to be pushed over the 50% threshold by the receipt of insincere preferences expressed by voters who did not genuinely prefer him or her to the alternatives on offer.

2.2.9 Thirdly, the risk that optional preferential voting or progressive informality will "result in a de facto first past the post system where candidates can be elected with significantly less than half the vote" can be tested empirically by reference to experience at State elections where the optional preferential system has been in use for some time. For example, the following table classifies the Electoral District results from Queensland State elections from 2001 to 2009 according to the winning candidate's final vote, expressed as a percentage of the original total first preference vote for all candidates in the District.

| Winning candidate's total vote after distribution of preferences, expressed as a percentage of the original total of first preference votes of all candidates | Number of Electoral Districts in category (2001) | Number of Electoral Districts in category (2004) | Number of Electoral Districts in category (2006) | Number of Electoral Districts in category (2009) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Greater than 50% | 58 | 73 | 80 | 72 |
| Between 49% and 50% | 4 | 6 | 4 | 10 |
| Between 48% and 49% | 3 | 6 | 2 | 1 |
| Between 47% and 48% | 5 | 2 | | 3 |
| Between 46% and 47% | 5 | | 1 | |
| Between 45% and 46% | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Between 44% and 45% | 3 | | | |
| Between 43% and 44% | 2 | 1 | | 1 |
| Between 42% and 43% | 4 | | 1 | |
| Between 41% and 42% | 2 | | | |
| Between 39% and 40% | 1 | | | |
| Between 35% and 36% | 1 | | | |
| **Percentage of total Districts where the winning candidate's vote after distribution of preferences was greater than 50% of the total of first preference votes of all candidates** | **65.17%** | **82.02%** | **89.89%** | **80.90%** |

2.2.10 These figures do not appear to evince any pronounced trend over time towards candidates being elected at Queensland State elections with substantially diminished popular mandates.

2.2.11 At the 2007 State election in New South Wales, the comparable figures were as follows.

| Winning candidate's total vote after distribution of preferences, expressed as a percentage of the original total of first preference votes of all candidates | Number of Electoral Districts in category (2007) |
|---|---|
| Greater than 50% | 72 |
| Between 49% and 50% | 6 |
| Between 48% and 49% | 2 |
| Between 47% and 48% | 6 |
| Between 46% and 47% | 2 |
| Between 45% and 46% | |
| Between 44% and 45% | 1 |
| Between 43% and 44% | 2 |
| Between 42% and 43% | 1 |
| Between 41% and 42% | |
| Between 39% and 40% | |
| Between 38% and 39% | 1 |
| **Percentage of total Districts where the winning candidate's vote after distribution of preferences was greater than 50% of the total of first preference votes of all candidates** | **77.42%** |

2.2.12 In taking stock of these figures it is important to note that it is made clear to voters at State elections in Queensland and New South Wales, via the instructions on the ballot papers, that they are only obliged to indicate a first preference, and that whether they choose to indicate additional preferences is up to them.  Furthermore, parties and candidates can, and sometimes do, advise voters to indicate only a first preference; which advice has in the past been reinforced by widely publicised slogans such as "Just Vote 1".  That being the case, it might be thought reasonable to infer that a progressive informality model would be less likely to "result in a de facto first past the post system" than the adoption of optional preferential voting.

3. **The ticket voting system used for South Australian House of Assembly elections**

3.1 Overview of the system

3.1.1 Provision for House of Assembly ticket voting has existed since the original enactment of the South Australian *Electoral Act 1985* ("the SA Act").

3.1.2 In broad terms, the system operates as follows:

(i)     A House of Assembly candidate who wishes to do so and who complies with specific procedural requirements set out in the SA Act is entitled to lodge either one or two voting tickets (SA Act, ss. 63(1)-(3a)).

(ii)    Such a ticket or such tickets must show a first preference for the candidate lodging it or them, and must specify a full preference ordering of all candidates on the ballot paper (SA Act, ss. 63(4)).

(iii)   In general, a House of Assembly ballot paper will be informal if the voter does not show a preference ordering of all candidates (SA Act, para. 94(1)(b)). Where a voter places a tick or a cross on a ballot paper, the tick or cross is taken to be equivalent to the number 1 (SA Act, ss. 76(3)).

(iv)    However, ballot papers where the voter has not shown such a preference ordering of all candidates may still be rendered formal by making reference to voting tickets, in the following circumstances.

   (a)   If a voter indicates a first preference for a particular candidate and indicates no further preference, and that candidate has lodged a single voting ticket, the ballot paper will be formal, and will be taken to have been marked in accordance with that voting ticket (SA Act, ss. 93(2), 94(4)).

   (b)   If a voter indicates a first preference for a particular candidate and indicates no further preference, and that candidate has lodged two voting tickets, the ballot paper will be formal. If the number of ballot papers so marked is even, half the ballot papers so marked will be deemed to have been marked in accordance with the first ticket, and the other half in accordance with the second. If the number of ballot papers so marked is odd, one of the ballot papers will be deemed to have been marked in accordance with whichever of the two tickets is determined by lot by the returning officer; and half the remainder (if any) will be taken to have been marked in accordance with one ticket and half in accordance with the other (SA Act, ss. 93(3)).

   (c)   If a voter indicates a first preference for a particular candidate and also indicates further preferences, if the candidate has lodged a single voting ticket, and if the preferences indicated by the voter are consistent with that voting ticket, the ballot paper will be formal, and will

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be taken to have been marked in accordance with that voting ticket (SA Act, ss. 93(4)).

(d)     If a voter indicates a first preference for a particular candidate and also indicates further preferences, and the candidate for whom the voter indicated a first preference has lodged two voting tickets, then:

(I)     if the preferences indicated by the voter are consistent with only one of the two tickets, the ballot paper will be formal, and will be taken to have been marked in accordance with that ticket; but

(II)    if the preferences indicated by the voter are consistent with both tickets, that ballot paper will be formal, and will be treated as if it had been marked only with the number 1 (and therefore will be included with those dealt with in the manner described in subparagraph (iv)(b) above) (SA Act, ss. 93(5)).

3.1.3   The following requirements are also significant for the operation of the ticket voting system.

(i)     It is an offence at South Australian elections to distribute a House of Assembly how-to-vote card that does not recommend a full allocation of preferences, or to advocate publicly that a voter should mark a House of Assembly ballot paper so as to show an incomplete preference ordering (SA Act, s. 126).

(ii)    How-to-vote cards submitted by candidates to the Electoral Commission are displayed in a poster in each voting compartment (SA Act, s. 66).  Voting tickets lodged by candidates are <u>not</u> so displayed, nor is there any legal requirement that the preferences advocated by a candidate in a how-to-vote card must be the same as, or consistent with, those contained in a ticket or tickets so lodged.

(iii)   Each ballot paper is required to be printed with the following statement at or near the top of the ballot paper and in clearly legible print: "You are not legally obliged to mark the ballot paper" (SA Act, ss. 61(2)).

3.1.4   The relevant provisions of the SA Act are at **Annex 2**.

3.2.    <u>Impact on informality at South Australian elections</u>

3.2.1   There were 37,897 House of Assembly votes state-wide rendered formal by the operation of ticket voting in 2002; 43,553 votes so rendered formal in 2006; and 32,638 votes so rendered formal in 2010.  The relevant statistics from the last three State elections, as shown on the website of the Electoral Commission of South Australia, are at **Annex 3**.

3.2.2  At South Australian State elections, the rules described at paragraph 3.1.2(iv) above are not applied during the polling place count, but subsequently, by the Returning Officers.

## 3.3    Comments on the system in the Second Green Paper

3.3.1  The following comments were made on the system at paragraphs 5.56 and 5.57 of the Government's *Electoral Reform Green Paper – Strengthening Australia's Democracy*, published in September 2009:

> "5.56    Ticket voting in this form is said to have two distinct advantages – it assists voters in numbering preferences and provides a safety net for informal votes.  To assist voters in numbering preferences, how-to-vote cards are able to be displayed in each voting compartment for voters who did not have the benefit of receiving a how-to-vote card for their preferred candidate.  To act as a safety net, the ticket vote also serves as a template for the distribution of preferences for those voters who simply place a '1' in the square opposite the … [candidate] they wish to support.  Such votes, which would otherwise be informal, retain formality through operation of the ticket vote, which acts as a type of savings clause.
>
> 5.57    Whilst the ticket voting system does provide a means by which the number of informal votes can be reduced, it has been argued that the system encourages political parties to engage in back-room preference deals to attempt to engineer an election result in their favour.  The ticket voting system for the South Australian lower house is not heavily publicised, and it might be argued that there is a question over the extent to which voters who show incomplete preference numbering would be aware that further preferences will, in effect, be deemed to have been recorded by them.  In this regard, the system may be contrasted with that used at Senate elections, where the voter is given a clear choice between expressing his or her own preferences or adopting in full those recommended by a group or party. …".

## 3.4    The JSCEM Report on the 2007 election

3.4.1  The South Australian provisions were addressed in the JSCEM's *Report on the conduct of the 2007 federal election and matters related thereto*, as follows.

> "…
>
> 8.47    The approach adopted for South Australian House of Assembly elections ensures that votes marked with a single preference, which can include a single number '1' as well as a tick or a cross, are included in the count, with preferences beyond those preference expressed directed according to the registered tickets.
>
> 8.48    The impact of this savings provision on the rate of informality for South Australian House of Assembly elections is to markedly reduce the informality rate, which would, at a minimum, be twice as high without the savings provision (table 8.7).

**Table 8.7 South Australian House of Assembly informal and ticket voting, 1985 to 2006 state elections (per cent)**

|                      | 1985 | 1989 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2006 |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Total informal votes | 3.5  | 2.8  | 3.1  | 4.0  | 3.1  | 3.6  |
| Accepted ticket votes| 4.1  | 6.0  | 5.9  | 4.9  | 4.0  | 4.6  |

*Source Green A, submission 62.1, p 14.*

8.49    The effect of the savings provision at the 2006 South Australian state election was noted by Mr Antony Green, who told the committee that:

> At the 2006 South Australian election, a total of 35,029 informal votes were recorded, a rate of 3.6 per cent, compared to 5.2 per cent in the Legislative Council. Compared to Victoria, Western Australia, and Commonwealth elections in every state, South Australia is the only state using compulsory preferential voting where lower house informal voting is less than upper house informal voting.

> In total, 43,553 votes were admitted to the count after being 'saved' by the use of registered ticket votes. All of these votes would have been informal under the Commonwealth Electoral Act. Under Commonwealth formality rules, the South Australian lower house informal vote would have been 8.1 per cent, not 3.6 per cent.

…

8.66 The savings provision used for South Australian House of Assembly elections significantly reduces informality and would have potentially 'saved' almost 154,000 votes at the 2007 federal election, had such a provision been included in the Commonwealth Electoral Act. However, the committee considers that the South Australian model which also saves votes where only a single preference is expressed (including a '1', a tick or a cross), is a step too far, in that it may actively encourage optional preferential voting rather than operating as a genuine savings provision.".

### 3.5    Advantages and disadvantages of the ticket voting system used for South Australian House of Assembly elections

3.5.1  In his Submission to the current inquiry, Mr Antony Green summarised the advantages and disadvantages of the system as follows:

> *"***Advantages**
>
> - Same as for progressive informality, except that the ability of any candidate to lodge preference tickets means minor parties and independents are not disadvantaged compared to major parties.
>
> **Disadvantages**
>
> - There is a greater load created for the Electoral Commission in validating and registering preference tickets
>
> - As with progressive informality, votes are admitted to the count on election night that may be subsequently excluded.

- Indicative preference counts are less reliable on election night as polling place staff are not in a position to use registered preference tickets to determine the eventual preference destination of a ballot paper with incomplete preferences".

3.5.2  A much more critical view of the South Australian system has been expressed by Emeritus Professor Dean Jaensch, in an article entitled "'Ticket voting' endangers democracy" published in *The Advertiser* on 7 April 2011:

> "The SA method, called "ticket voting", makes too many assumptions.  It is designed by Labor and the Liberals to favour themselves, not the voters.  It forces the Electoral Act to contain a nonsense.  It works on the assumption that many voters do not know what is best for them, or even what they are doing.
>
> The "ticket vote" is applied, for example, when an elector has put only the number one on the ballot paper.  If the party that has been chosen has registered a preference distribution with the Electoral Commission, then these preferences are added to the ballot paper.
>
> The voter has no say in the matter.
>
> On what grounds can such a law be accepted?  The law decides on behalf of the voter.  Where is the democracy in that?
>
> A careful reading of the SA Electoral Act leads to only one conclusion. (Keep in mind that the Act is written by the party or parties, not by the Electoral Commission).
>
> The "ticket vote" turns an informal ballot into a formal one, without asking the permission of the voter concerned.
>
> As such, it should be removed from the statute book as simply unacceptable.
>
> The Act states that the only way to cast a formal ballot is to fill in all squares with sequential numbers.  But it then allows for missing sequential numbers to be put onto the paper.  Surely this denies the first prescription?  Even worse, the Act contains a savage fine for anyone who advocates voting in any way other than the required full sequential numbers.
>
> The political party or parties warn you not to vote with only one number.  But if you do, the party will make sure your vote is not only formal, but its preferences go the way the party wants them to.  Get rid of such nonsense!
>
> Instead, allow optional preferential voting.  Parties oppose that.  But almost three quarters of a million voters seem to want it. Which opinion should win the argument?".

3.5.3  The South Australian system would be effective in saving many votes at federal elections which are informal under the full preferential system: details are set out at paragraphs 4.10 to 4.14 below.

3.5.4  It might be argued that it is undesirable in principle that a vote marked (for example) with a figure 1 alone may be formal if cast for a candidate who has lodged a voting ticket, but informal if the candidate has not so lodged a ticket, especially

where the fact that a ticket has or has not been lodged may not be readily apparent to the voter. Against this, however, it may be noted that candidates have a significant incentive to lodge tickets, so in practice any discriminatory effect may not be too great. The following table sets out, for the last five South Australian House of Assembly elections, the number of candidates who respectively lodged no voting ticket, a single voting ticket, or two voting tickets.

| Year | Number who lodged no voting ticket | Number who lodged a single voting ticket | Number who lodged two voting tickets |
|------|------|------|------|
| 1993 | 6 | 148 | 73 |
| 1997 | 2 | 94 | 101 |
| 2002 | 2 | 244 | 56 |
| 2006 | 1 | 157 | 111 |
| 2010 | 40 | 206 | 7 |

3.5.5 At the 2010 election, the candidates who did not lodge a ticket comprised 28 from the Greens, 9 from the Fair Land Tax – Tax Party, and three independents.

## 4. Hypothetical impact of the systems at the 2010 federal election

4.1 The following table seeks to analyse the impact which the introduction of the progressive informality system, or the South Australian House of Assembly ticket voting system, could have had on the extent of informality in each category of informal vote analysed in the AEC's *Analysis of Informal Voting - House of Representatives, 2010 Federal Election*. Detailed descriptions of the various categories are set out in Appendix B to that *Analysis*. The numbers shown against each category are nationwide totals.

| Category of informality | Number of ballot papers | Treatment under "progressive informality" | Treatment under the South Australian House of Assembly ticket voting model |
|------|------|------|------|
| A: Totally blank | 210,587 | Informal | Informal |
| B: Incomplete numbering | 221,432 | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal at the first preference count; formality by the end of the distribution of preferences (if any) will depend on the later preferences shown, and the order of exclusions | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal if the candidate for whom the first preference is shown has lodged a voting ticket or tickets, and the preferences (if any) shown by the voter beyond the first preference are consistent with at least one ticket so lodged by the candidate |

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| Category of informality | Number of ballot papers | Treatment under "progressive informality" | Treatment under the South Australian House of Assembly ticket voting model |
|---|---|---|---|
| *B-1: Number '1' only* | *202,411* | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal at the first preference count; formality by the end of the distribution of preferences (if any) will depend on the later preferences shown, and the order of exclusions | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal if the candidate for whom the first preference is shown has lodged a voting ticket or tickets |
| *B-2: Number '1, 2' only* | *9,817* | Same as B-1 | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal if the candidate for whom the first preference is shown has lodged a voting ticket or tickets, and the second preference shown by the voter is consistent with at least one ticket so lodged by the candidate |
| *B-3: Number '1, 2, 3' only* | *4,913* | Same as B-1 | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal if the candidate for whom the first preference is shown has lodged a voting ticket or tickets, and the preferences shown by the voter beyond the first preference are consistent with at least one ticket so lodged by the candidate |
| *B-4: Number '1, 2, 3, 4' only* | *1,746* | Same as B-1 | Same as B-3 |
| *B-5: Number '1, 2, 3, 4, 5' only* | *1,039* | Same as B-1 | Same as B-3 |
| *B-6: Number '1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6' only* | *627* | Same as B-1 | Same as B-3 |
| *B-7: Number '1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7' only* | *550* | Same as B-1 | Same as B-3 |
| *B-8: Number '1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8' only* | *186* | Same as B-1 | Same as B-3 |
| *B-9: Number '1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9' only* | *143* | Same as B-1 | Same as B-3 |
| C: Ticks and crosses | 85,724 | Provided the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal if (i) a tick or | Provided the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal if the voter has shown a |

| Category of informality | Number of ballot papers | Treatment under "progressive informality" | Treatment under the South Australian House of Assembly ticket voting model |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | cross is deemed by the law to be equivalent to a figure 1; and (ii) the voter has shown a unique first preference | unique first preference, the candidate for whom the first preference is shown has lodged a voting ticket or tickets, and the preferences (if any) shown by the voter beyond the first preference are consistent with at least one ticket so lodged by the candidate |
| D: Other symbols (e.g. alphabetic characters, zeros etc | 4,816 | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, if the voter has used alphabetic characters and has shown a unique first preference ("one"), formal at the first preference count; formality by the end of the distribution of preferences (if any) will depend on the later preferences shown, and the order of exclusions | Provided the ballot paper does not identify the voter, if the voter has used alphabetic characters and has shown a unique first preference ("one"), formal if the candidate for whom the first preference is shown has lodged a voting ticket or tickets, and the preferences (if any) shown by the voter beyond the first preference are consistent with at least one ticket so lodged by the candidate |
| E: Non-sequential numbering | 67,335 | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, and that the voter has shown a unique first preference, formal at the first preference count; formality by the end of the distribution of preferences (if any) will depend on the later preferences shown, and the order of exclusions | Informal |
| *E-1: Unique first preference but repeated numbers within sequence, all squares completed* | *14,094* | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal at the first preference count; formality by the end of the distribution of preferences (if any) will depend on the later preferences | Informal |

| Category of informality | Number of ballot papers | Treatment under "progressive informality" | Treatment under the South Australian House of Assembly ticket voting model |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | shown, and the order of exclusions | |
| *E-2: Unique first preference but repeated numbers within sequence, not all squares completed* | *1,867* | Same as E-1 | Informal |
| *E-3: Repeated number '1's.* | *13,984* | Informal | Informal |
| *E-4: Missing numbers within sequence, number '1' missing and no repeated numbers* | *4,062* | Informal | Informal |
| *E-5: Unique first preference but missing numbers within sequence, no repeated numbers* | *17,089* | Same as E-1 | Informal |
| *E-6: Other non-sequential numbering* | *16,239* | Same as E-1 | Informal |
| F: Scribbles, slogans or other protest vote marks | 123,102 | Informal | Informal |
| *F-1: Scribbles/slogans* | *50,900* | Informal | Informal |
| *F-2: Candidate names changed* | *10,071* | Informal | Informal |
| *F-3: Other protest vote marks* | *62,131* | Informal | Informal |
| G: Illegible numbers | 3,703 | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, and that the voter has shown a unique first preference, formal at the first preference count; formality by the end of the distribution of preferences (if any) will depend on the later preferences shown, and the order of exclusions | Informal |
| *G-1: Illegible numbers, first preference clear, second preference not clear* | *1,271* | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal at the first preference count; formality by the end of the distribution of preferences (if any) will depend on the order of exclusions | Informal |
| *G-2: Illegible numbers, first and second preferences clear* | *1,043* | Provided that the ballot paper does not identify the voter, formal at the first | Informal |

| Category of informality | Number of ballot papers | Treatment under "progressive informality" | Treatment under the South Australian House of Assembly ticket voting model |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | preference count; formality by the end of the distribution of preferences (if any) will depend on the later preferences shown, and the order of exclusions | |
| *G-3: Illegible numbers, first preference not clear* | *1,389* | Informal | Informal |
| H: Voter identified | 318 | Informal | Informal |
| I: Other informal ballot papers | 12,287 | Informal | Informal |
| **Total** | **729,304** | | |

4.2    The potential impact on informality implied by the figures in the table at paragraph 4.1 can be summarised as follows.

Progressive informality

4.3    It is assumed, in the following analysis, that none of the ballot papers (other than those in category H) identified the elector.

4.4    Under the progressive informality system, all 221,432 ballot papers in category B ("Incomplete numbering") would have been formal at the first preference count, but some might subsequently have been rendered informal in a distribution of preferences (if required), depending on the later preferences shown by the voters, and the order of exclusions.

4.5    The 85,724 ballot papers in category C would have been formal at the first preference count provided that (i) a tick or cross had been deemed by the law to be equivalent to a figure 1; and (ii) the voter had shown a unique first preference. Again, some might subsequently have been rendered informal in a distribution of preferences (if required), depending on the later preferences shown by the voters, and the order of exclusions.

4.6    Some of the 4,816 ballot papers in category D would have been formal at the first preference count.  That would have been the case if the voter had used alphabetic characters and had shown a unique first preference ("one").  Some might subsequently have been rendered informal in a distribution of preferences (if required), depending on the later preferences shown by the voters, and the order of exclusions.

4.7    Of the 67,335 ballot papers in category E ("Non-sequential numbering"), 18,046 (those in categories E-3 and E-4) would have been informal because they

lacked a first preference.  The remaining 49,289 ballot papers in category E would have been formal at the first preference count, but some might subsequently have been rendered informal in a distribution of preferences (if required), depending on the later preferences shown by the voters, and the order of exclusions.

4.8     Of the 3,703 ballot papers in category G ("Illegible numbers"), 1,389 (those in category G-3) would have been informal because they lacked a first preference.  The remaining 2,314 ballot papers in category G would have been formal at the first preference count, but some might subsequently have been rendered informal in a distribution of preferences (if required), depending on the later preferences shown by the voters, and the order of exclusions.

4.9     Therefore, under the progressive informality system at least 273,035 more ballot papers - those in categories B, E-1, E-2, E-5, E-6, G-1 and G-2 - would have been formal at the first preference count.  If ticks and crosses were deemed by the law to be equivalent to a figure 1, it could be anticipated that some of the 85,724 ballot papers in category C would also have been formal at the first preference count.  (The precise number so rendered formal cannot be determine from the survey figures, since category C includes not only ballot papers where a unique first preference was shown, but also those where there was no first preference discernable, because of the use of multiple 1s, ticks and crosses, or a mixture of those symbols.)   It could be anticipated that some of the 4,816 ballot papers in category D would also have been formal.

The South Australian system

4.10    Under the South Australian system, a ballot paper which but for the voting ticket system would be informal cannot be "saved" unless the candidate for whom it expresses a first preference has lodged at least one voting ticket.  It is assumed, in the following analysis, that (i) all candidates at the 2010 federal election would have chosen to lodge at least one such ticket; and (ii) that none of the ballot papers (other than those in category H) identified the elector.

4.11    All 202,411 ballot papers in category B-1 would have been rendered formal.  The remaining 19,021 ballot papers in category B would have been rendered formal if any preferences shown by the voter beyond the first preference were consistent with at least one ticket lodged by the recipient of that first preference.

4.12    The 85,724 ballot papers in category C would have been formal if (i) the voter had shown a unique first preference; and (ii) any preferences shown by the voter beyond the first preference were consistent with at least one ticket lodged by the recipient of that first preference.

4.13    Some of the 4,816 ballot papers in category D would have been formal.  That would have been the case if the voter had used alphabetic characters and had shown a unique first preference ("one"); the candidate for whom the first preference was shown had lodged a voting ticket or tickets; and the preferences (if any) shown by the voter beyond the first preference were consistent with at least one ticket so lodged by the candidate

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4.14    Therefore, under the South Australian system, at least 202,411 ballot papers - those in category B-1 - would have been formal.  It could be anticipated that some of the remaining 19,021 ballot papers in category B, some of the 85,724 ballot papers in category C, and some of the 4,816 ballot papers in category D, would also have been formal.


**5.      Policy issues**

5.1     The adoption at federal elections of either the progressive informality model or the South Australian model would affect only those ballot papers on which the voter had provided an incomplete preference ordering.   Fundamentally, such a ballot paper can be included in the count in one of two ways.

(i)      It can be counted in accordance with the preferences shown by the voter, but set aside as informal (or, in the parlance of optional preferential voting, "exhausted") if a point is reached in the count at which it needs to be transferred but shows no next available preference for any continuing candidate.   This was also the approach which applied at federal elections from 1984 to 1998, under which, as discussed at **Annex 1**, a "savings clause" rendered formal certain ballot papers marked with incomplete preference orderings.

(ii)     A registered voting ticket or tickets may be used to attribute additional preferences to the voter if the preference ordering shown on the ballot paper is incomplete.

5.2     The advantage of the first approach is that it faithfully reflects the views actually expressed by the voters, counting the ballot papers in accordance with what they have marked, but making no further assumptions about their preferences.

5.3     While the second approach is similar in some ways to the ticket voting system used at Senate elections, the Senate system provides voters with an explicit choice of two different voting methods.  An "above-the-line" Senate voter, by the act of so voting, makes a clear choice not to determine his or her own preference ordering, but to adopt that recommended by a group.  Such a choice is not explicitly provided to voters at South Australian House of Assembly elections.

5.4     While the second approach might be questioned, as in the *Green Paper*, on the basis that it arguably may cause preferences to be attributed to some voters which they do not actually hold, in practice the impact of this will be mitigated by the fact that the second and later preferences on many ballot papers never need to be revisited after the formality check.  In particular, many voters in seats where a preference distribution is not needed to determine the result, and many voters in other seats who cast first preference votes for candidates not excluded during the count (e.g., most major party candidates), would be significantly advantaged by the adoption at the federal level of the South Australian system, since in many cases their first preference votes would be counted, and the later preferences attributed to them due to the operation of the voting ticket system either would not be counted, or

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would not change the result in the seat.  On that, Mr Antony Green, in a blog item published on 28 February 2011 and entitled *Informal Voting - Two Ways of Allowing More Votes to Count*[1]*,* observed, in relation to the 2010 South Australian election, that:

> "Of the 32,638 ticket votes admitted to the South Australian count, only 2,020 or 6.2% would have been required to have their preferences examined to determine the winning candidate in a contest.".

5.5     One issue which would need close attention in the federal context would be the extent to which the South Australian model would comply with the requirement in section 24 of the Constitution that the House of Representatives shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth.  When ticket voting for the Senate was first introduced, its validity was challenged on constitutional grounds.  The High Court, in *McKenzie v Commonwealth* [1984] HCA 75, upheld the challenged provisions, and made the following observations:

> "The plaintiff submitted, first, that electors who use the simplified system of voting will be voting for parties and not for candidates and that this will contravene s.16 of the Constitution which provides for the qualifications of a senator: it is right to say that the electors voting at a Senate election must vote for the individual candidates whom they wish to choose as senators but it is not right to say that the Constitution forbids the use of a system which enables the elector to vote for the individual candidates by reference to a group or ticket. Members of Parliament were organized in political parties long before the Constitution was adopted and there is no reason to imply an inhibition on the use of a method of voting which recognizes political realities provided that the Constitution itself does not contain any indication that such a method is forbidden. No such indication, relevant to the present case, appears in the Constitution.".

5.6     While it is clear from the Court's ruling that a system which permits a person "to vote for the individual candidates <u>by reference</u> [emphasis added] to a group or ticket" is valid, it is for a number of reasons less clear that the South Australian model would be held to constitute such a system because:

(i)      As noted at paragraph 5.3 above, the ballot paper does not explicitly offer the voter two alternative methods of voting in the way that a Senate ballot paper does.

(ii)     The posters in voting compartments show how-to-vote cards, not voting tickets.  Significantly, they therefore do not alert the voter to cases in which the candidate may have lodged more than one voting ticket.  (As can be seen from the table at paragraph 3.5.4 above, significant numbers of candidates in 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2006 chose to lodge two tickets; in 1997, they outnumbered those candidates who lodged a single ticket.)

(iii)    There is no requirement for copies of voting tickets to be made readily available to voters at polling places (in contrast to the requirement in relation

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1 http://blogs.abc.net.au/antonygreen/2011/02/informal-voting-two-ways-of-allowing-more-votes-to-count.html

to Senate elections set out in s. 216 of the Electoral Act ("Group voting tickets to be displayed")).

In fact, it is not clear that a voter at a polling place at a South Australian election who wished to "refer" to a voting ticket on the spot before casting his or her vote would have a ready way of doing so.

5.7     Options for the adoption of the South Australian model federally could include:

(i)     a direct copy of the model, without any substantive changes;

(ii)    an implementation which only permitted candidates to lodge a single voting ticket; or

(iii)   an implementation, based on either (i) or (ii), under which the implications of marking incomplete preferences would be clearly spelt out to voters, putting them in a position of making an informed choice to vote by reference to a ticket, rather than having tickets invoked effectively by accident.

5.8     Options (i) and (ii) would require careful consideration in the light of the potential constitutional issues flagged at paragraphs 5.5 and 5.6 above.  Whether option (iii) would suffice to mitigate any constitutional risks might only be resolved if the issue were to be taken before the Court.  Option (iii) also represents a major rather than minor variation of the South Australian model: arguably one of the intrinsic features of that model is that voters are <u>not</u> given an explicit ticket voting option, and that the obligation to number all candidates is still *prima face* preserved. If option (iii) were seen as appealing, some might argue that it would in practice be so similar to the ticket voting system used at Senate elections that it would be better simply to use a Senate style ticket voting system for the House of Representatives as well - an approach which would have the virtue of minimising any potential constitutional issues.

5.9     In considering a model for dealing with informal votes, consideration also needs to be given to the related issue of the handling of ballot papers marked with ticks and crosses.  The SA model provides that a single tick or cross can be taken as the equivalent of a single figure 1. The arguments in favour of permitting the use of ticks and crosses in lieu of a figure 1 on House of Representatives ballot papers may be shortly stated as follows.

(i)     For most voters, a ballot paper is but one of many forms which they complete in the course their daily lives. It is a general principle applied almost everywhere else that forms will be acted upon provided they make clear the intention of those who completed them.  An election process should be a mechanism by which voters exercise one of their most fundamental political rights, not an obstacle course in which counter-intuitive rules are applied so as to deny them their rights.

(ii)    The approach of treating a single tick or a single cross as equivalent to a single figure 1 has proven to be workable at State elections in New South

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Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia, and in the implementation of "above-the-line" voting for the Senate.

(iii)  It is likely that acceptance of ticks and crosses will also serve to render formal at least some votes which are currently informal.

5.10  The implementation of either the progressive informality model or some version of the South Australian model would have practical implications for the AEC.

(i)  Revisions would at the minimum be required to procedures manuals, polling place procedures, polling official training packages, Candidates and Scrutineers Handbooks, and the computer systems used for vote tabulation on election night and the aftermath of election day.

(ii)  It is by no means clear that a process of displaying how-to-vote cards (or alternatively voting tickets) in each voting compartment would be practicable at a federal election.  To take a worst case scenario, such a stipulation at the Bradfield by-election in 2009 could have required the display of 22 how-to-vote cards, or up to 44 tickets, each showing preferences for all 22 candidates.

5.11  Broadly speaking, progressive informality would be simpler to implement than the South Australian system; the disparity in ease of implementation would depend on the precise details of the system to be used.

**Annex 1**

**Issues which have arisen under previous formality rules**

1.      From 1918 to 1984, the Electoral Act stipulated that for a House of Representatives vote to be formal, and therefore able to be included in the count, it had to indicate the voter's preference for all of the candidates.[2]   In 1984, the Electoral Act was amended to insert a "savings" provision, under which certain ballot papers which did not show preferences for all candidates could nevertheless be regarded as formal, and included in the count.   The following subsections were inserted in what is now section 270 of the Act:

"(2)      Where a ballot-paper in a House of Representatives election in which there are 3 or more candidates-

(a)      has the number 1 in the square opposite to the name of a candidate;

**(b)      has other numbers in all the other squares opposite to the names of candidates or in all those other squares except one square that is left blank; and** [emphasis added]

(c)      but for this subsection, would be informal by virtue of paragraph 133 (1) (c),

then-

(d)      the ballot-paper shall not be informal by virtue of that paragraph;

(e)      the number 1 shall be taken to express the voter's first preference;

(f)      where numbers in squares opposite to the names of candidates are in a sequence of consecutive numbers commencing with the number 1- the voter shall be taken to have expressed a preference by the other number, or to have expressed preferences by the other numbers, in that sequence; and

(g)      the voter shall not be taken to have expressed any other preference.

(3)      In considering, for the purposes of subsection (1) or (2), whether numbers are in a sequence of consecutive numbers, any number that is repeated shall be disregarded.".

2.      Notwithstanding this amendment, the instructions on the ballot paper, which commanded voters to indicate preferences for all candidates, were left unchanged, and in addition, the following new subsection relating to "how-to-vote" cards was inserted in what is now section 329 of the Electoral Act:

"(3)      A person shall not, during the relevant period in relation to an election under this Act, print, publish or distribute, or cause, permit or authorize to be printed, published or distributed, an advertisement, handbill, pamphlet or notice that contains a representation or purported representation of a ballot-paper for use in that election

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2 Where the voter had consecutively numbered the squares opposite all but one of the candidates, and had left the last square blank, he or she was taken to have shown preferences for all the candidates, with the blank square being taken to indicate a last preference.

that is likely to induce an elector to mark his vote otherwise than in accordance with the directions on the ballot-paper.".

3.    The apparent intention of the legislation appears to have been to enable some votes bearing incomplete numbering of preferences to be counted, without adopting or legitimising optional preferential voting.  This, however, created an immediate anomaly, introducing a manner of marking the ballot paper which, though formal, could not be legally advocated on a how-to-vote card.  This became a matter of increasingly acrimonious dispute during the 1980s and 1990s.

(i)     At the 1987 election, a campaign was run in Victoria advising electors not to vote at all, or to cast an "optional preferential vote" under then section 270(2) of the Electoral Act, or to vote informally.  The AEC sought injunctions against the campaigners on the basis of these three campaign objectives.  The Court awarded injunctions to prevent the campaigners from advocating not voting at all, and to prevent them from inducing electors to vote otherwise than in accordance with the instructions on the ballot paper.  However, the Court decided that as it was not unlawful to vote informally, it could not be illegal to advocate informal voting.

(ii)    At the 1990 election, the campaigners did not proceed with their planned advocacy, so there was no need for the AEC to initiate court proceedings. However, as a consequence of an indication that such campaigns might be run in the future, the JSCEM recommended to Parliament a further tightening of the penalties.  Section 329A was enacted in 1992, as follows:

> "(1)    A person must not, during the relevant period in relation to a House of Representatives election under this Act, print, publish or distribute, or cause, permit or authorise to be printed, published or distributed, any matter or thing with the intention of encouraging persons voting at the election to fill in a ballot paper otherwise than in accordance with section 240.
>
> (2)    In this section: 'publish' includes publish by radio or television.".

(iii)   At the 1993 election, one of the earlier campaigners indicated that he was intending to run a campaign advocating informal voting and optional preferential voting.  After receiving warnings from the AEC, on 5 March 1993 he applied to the High Court for an injunction to prevent the AEC from intimidating him, and a declaration that section 329A was unconstitutional. The High Court dismissed his injunction application, but referred the constitutionality of section 329A to the Full Bench.  On 7 February 1996 (8 days after the issue of the writs for the 1996 election) the High Court decided that section 329A was a valid enactment of Parliament.

(iv)   At the 1996 election, the same campaigner again indicated that he was intending to run a campaign advocating informal voting and optional preferential voting, and after he published an advertisement which was clearly in breach of section 329A, the AEC obtained an injunction against him from the Victorian Supreme Court.   The campaigner immediately defied that injunction, and was sent to jail for contempt of court.  He then appealed the

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injunction to the Federal Court and lost. He then appealed the contempt order and was given early release from jail.

4. Following the 1996 election, the JSCEM examined the operation of the savings clause and the impact of subsections 329(3) and section 329A on the electoral process. The Committee found that in its view, the "affair has clearly shown that section 329A is an ineffective and heavy-handed provision"[3] and recommended that section 329A and related provisions should be repealed, while the wording of section 240 should be clarified.[4]

5. In 1998, the former sections 270(2), 329(3) and 329A of the Act were repealed, and section 240(2) was introduced, so that section 240 now reads:

"(1) In a House of Representatives election a person shall mark his or her vote on the ballot paper by:

(a) writing the number 1 in the square opposite the name of the candidate for whom the person votes as his or her first preference; and

(b) writing the numbers 2, 3, 4 (and so on, as the case requires) in the squares opposite the names of all the remaining candidates so as to indicate the order of the person's preference for them.

(2) The numbers referred to in paragraph (1)(b) are to be consecutive numbers, without the repetition of any number.".

This provision remains in force: the Electoral Act now clearly prescribes full preferential voting, and both the savings provision and the specific sanctions for advocating other than full preferential voting have been removed.

6. The AEC has previously highlighted a range of issues associated with the possible reintroduction of the 1984 savings clause. The following observations were made in the AEC's *Second Submission to the Inquiry by the Joint Standing Committee On Electoral Matters into the 2007 Federal Election*, 15 September 2008, Annex 9:

"19. In its submission to the 1996 JSCEM inquiry, the AEC outlined that in its view there was a basic policy conflict in the CEA at that time in relation to preferential voting for the House of Representatives. The problem was presented as follows:

- The [Electoral Act] required full preferential voting;

- The [Electoral Act] prohibited inducing optional preferential voting;

- The [Electoral Act] prohibited the advocacy of optional preferential voting; but

- The [Electoral Act] allowed certain optional preferential votes as formal.

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3 JSCEM, *Report of the Inquiry into the 1996 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto*, June 1997, paragraph 3.34.
4 JSCEM, *Report of the Inquiry into the 1996 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto*, June 1997, paragraph 3.41 (Recommendation 13) and 3.43 (Recommendation 14).

20.     The AEC is firmly of the view that these contradictions would occur again if a savings provision, with or without the sanctions discussed below, was reintroduced. Such contradictions do not enhance the public perception of our electoral system as a coherent method for choosing representatives and governments.

21.     While various courts had consistently upheld the Parliament's intentions in enacting the above provisions of the [Electoral Act], there was a perception that there was a 'loophole' in the [Electoral Act] that allowed for the avoidance of the requirement for full preferential voting. This perception may have been exacerbated by the increased availability of optional preferential voting at state elections; it remains possible that some electors are confused by the different ballot paper marking requirements across Commonwealth and state elections.

22.     It is also clear that the reintroduction of a savings provision alone would see an increase in the number of House of Representatives ballot papers that were not fully preferenced. Not only could non-aligned campaigns re-emerge to advocate less than full preferential voting, but experience in those states and territories with optional preferential voting shows that political campaigns themselves move towards advocating exhausting a ballot paper to limit preference flows to other groups and parties.

**Reintroducing a savings provision for non-sequential ballot papers**

23.     In 1998, the Parliament chose to emphasise that House of Representative elections were to be conducted using full preferential voting. It did so by repealing the then section 270(2) and by clarifying section 240 with the insertion of a requirement that "the numbers referred to in paragraph (1)(b) are to be consecutive numbers, without the repetition of any number." These changes meant the prohibitions on advocacy of optional preferential voting were also repealed, as they were no longer required.

24.     Parliament could choose to reintroduce the savings rules that were repealed by the *Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act 1998*, by reenacting section 270(2) and repealing section 240(2). However, before such steps are contemplated consideration needs to be given as to whether such a move is to be a genuine savings arrangement - to prevent electors from inadvertently disenfranchising themselves through error - or is to be a move towards optional preferential voting.

25.     When considering the constitutionality of section 329A of the [Electoral Act], the High Court had reason to consider if the savings provisions then in force were in fact offering electors more than one method of using their vote. Brennan CJ found that "the saving provisions do not prescribe an alternative method; they merely save from invalidity some ballot papers which are not filled in in accordance with the method which the Act prescribes", which is a useful construction when considering the limits of savings provisions.

26.     Currently the prescribed form of the ballot paper includes the instruction "number the boxes from 1 to [here insert number of candidates] in the order of your choice", and so each ballot paper includes this clear instruction. The AEC underlines this message through signage in polling places (including in voting screens), in public information messages and in the training of polling staff, who provide guidance to each elector. This message remained in place during the operation of the former

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section 270(2) and was an important mechanism in reinforcing the requirement of full preferential voting.

27.     A further step in ensuring that full preferential voting remained the requirement for House of Representatives ballot papers was the introduction of the prohibitions, firstly in the former section 329(3), which made it an offence to distribute how-to-vote cards that might induce electors to vote otherwise than in accordance with the instructions on the ballot paper and later in section 329A, prohibiting advocating that persons voting at an election should complete their ballot paper otherwise than in accordance with section 240.

28.     While some JSCEM members and other commentators raised concerns over the years at the political liberty concerns of section 329A, in 1996 the High Court found in *Langer v Commonwealth* that section 329A was a valid enactment because Parliament has prescribed a primary method of choosing members of the House of Representatives.

29.     The AEC expressed in 1996 a view that section 329A was likely to remain problematic if citizens continued to seek to defy the law, leaving the AEC no choice but to enforce it. Any reintroduction of sanctions would also need to be enforced to be a deterrent.  If an offence exists in law, and it is being publicly and wilfully breached, the AEC is not in a position to fall back on some imaginary discretion not to uphold that law.

30.     Despite these potential problems, if the savings provisions were introduced without sanctions provisions, the effect would be to allow for open and possibly widespread advocacy of optional preferential voting at federal elections.  This would send a clear signal that Parliament was accepting in principle that optional preferential voting should exist as an alternative to full preferential voting for federal elections, although the [Electoral Act] may not clearly state as much.  The question would then arise as to why Parliament does not expressly provide for optional preferential voting in the [Electoral Act], rather than allowing it to exist only as a "loophole".

31.     Of more concern is the possibility that if Parliament were to introduce savings provisions without prohibiting advocacy in relation to those provisions, public confusion about the real intentions of the legislators on the method of voting required under the [Electoral Act] can be expected to increase under the pressure of well-organised public campaigns in support of optional preferential voting.  The AEC does not believe that this potential confusion can be properly and appropriately addressed by AEC education campaigns alone.


**Conclusion**

32.     The reintroduction of the savings provisions alone, while appearing to be relatively simple, would instead reinstate policy conflicts in the [Electoral Act] remedied by the 1998 amendments.  Such conflict places the electoral administration in an invidious position, introduces a potentially confusing hybrid voting system not based on clear and understandable principles and could be seen as an introduction of optional preferential voting by stealth.".

**Annex 2**

**Provisions of the South Australian *Electoral Act 1985* relating to ticket voting for the House of Assembly**

## 4—Interpretation

(1)　In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—

　　…

　　***how-to-vote card*** means a card, in the form of a ballot paper, indicating the manner in which a particular candidate or group of candidates suggests that a vote should be recorded by a voter;

　　…

　　***registered voting ticket*** means a voting ticket lodged under section 63;

　　…

　　***voting ticket*** means a written statement of a particular order in which a voter might allocate preferences in an election, being a statement for use under this Act in interpreting the votes of voters who—

　　　(a)　in relation to a Legislative Council election—choose to vote in accordance with the voting ticket;

　　　(b)　in relation to a House of Assembly election—do not indicate an order of preference covering all candidates;

　　*…*


## 61—Form of ballot papers

(1)　Subject to this Act, ballot papers must be in a form prescribed by regulation.

(2)　The following statement must be included on each ballot paper at or near the top of the ballot paper and in clearly legible print—

　　　"You are not legally obliged to mark the ballot paper."


## 63—Voting tickets

(1)　One voting ticket, or two separate voting tickets, may be lodged with the Electoral Commissioner or the returning officer in relation to a candidate or a group of candidates (but where a candidate is a member of a group, a voting ticket must relate to the group as a whole and not to an individual member of it).

(2)　A voting ticket will not be regarded as validly lodged under subsection (1) unless—

　　　(a)　written notice of intention to lodge a voting ticket or voting tickets is given to the Electoral Commissioner or the returning officer at or before the hour of nomination by or on behalf of the candidate or candidates; and

　　　(b)　the voting ticket is lodged within 72 hours after the close of nominations.

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(3)  A voting ticket may be lodged under this section by—

   (a)  the candidate or candidates to whom it relates; or

   (b)  a person authorised in writing by the candidate or candidates to act on their behalf.

(3a)  An authorisation under subsection (3)(b) may only be given to—

   (a)  a registered officer of a registered political party of which the candidate or candidates are members; or

   (b)  a member of a group who is, in terms of the authorisation, to act on behalf of all members of the group.

(4)  A voting ticket lodged under subsection (1) must—

   (a)  indicate by consecutive numbers commencing with the number 1 an order of preference for all candidates in the election; and

   (b)  —

      (i)  in the case of a voting ticket lodged by or on behalf of an individual candidate—indicate a preference for that candidate over all other candidates in the election;

      (ii)  in the case of a voting ticket lodged by or on behalf of a group of candidates—indicate preferences for the candidates comprising the group—

         (A)  in the order in which the names of those candidates are to appear in the ballot paper; and

         (B)  over all candidates in the election who are not included in that group.

(5)  If—

   (a)  notice of intention to lodge a voting ticket for a Legislative Council election is given under subsection (2)(a); but

   (b)  a voting ticket is not then lodged in accordance with the requirements of subsection (2)(b),

the Electoral Commissioner must take reasonable steps to inform the candidate or candidates to whom the voting ticket was to relate of the failure to lodge the voting ticket in accordance with the requirements of this section (but the Electoral Commissioner need not take any other action in relation to the matter).

## 66—Preparation of certain electoral material

(1)  The Electoral Commissioner must have the following electoral material prepared for use in polling booths on polling day:

   (a)  posters formed from how-to-vote cards submitted by the candidates in the election; and

   (b)  in relation to a Legislative Council election—posters or booklets, or posters and booklets containing the voting tickets registered for the purposes of the election.

(2) Material submitted for inclusion under subsection (1)—

    (a) must list candidates in the same order as their names will appear on the relevant ballot paper; and

    (b) must comply with any other requirement prescribed by the regulations; and

    (c) must be submitted in a quantity determined by the Electoral Commissioner; and

    (d) in the case of how-to-vote cards, must be received by the Electoral Commissioner not later than 4 days after the day for nomination; and

    (e) if 2 or more candidates form a group for the purposes of a Legislative Council election—must be jointly submitted by or on behalf of all candidates in the group; and

    (f) must not identify a candidate—

        (i) by reference to the registered name of a registered political party or a composite name consisting of the registered names of 2 registered political parties; or

        (ii) by the use of a word or set of words that could not be, or may not be able to be, registered as the name, or as part of the name, of a political party under Part 6 because of the operation of section 42(2)(e) or (3)(b),

    unless the candidate provides the Electoral Commissioner with a declaration (in the form determined by the Electoral Commissioner) that is signed by a person authorised by the relevant parliamentary party or registered political party (as the case may require) and states that—

        (iii) the candidate is endorsed by the party; or

        (iv) the party has consented to the use of the relevant name or names or word or words; and

    (g) in the case of how-to-vote cards—must, in relation to how-to-vote cards submitted by or on behalf of the same candidate or group of candidates, be in identical form.

(3) The form of a poster or booklet prepared under this section will, subject to this section, be as determined by the Electoral Commissioner.

(4) The order in which the electoral material referred to in subsection (1) is arranged will correspond to the order in which the names of candidates will appear on the relevant ballot paper.

(5) The presiding officer at each polling booth must—

    (a) ensure that, in relation to a House of Assembly election, posters prepared under subsection (1)(a) are displayed in each voting compartment; and

    (b) ensure that all other posters and booklets prepared under subsection (1) are displayed or made available (as the case may be) in a prominent position in the polling booth and in accordance with any direction issued by the Electoral Commissioner.

## 76—Marking of votes on ballot papers

(1)   In a Legislative Council election a voter must mark his or her vote on the ballot paper as follows:

    (a)   by placing the number 1 in the square opposite the name of the candidate for whom he or she votes as his or her first preference, and consecutive numbers in the squares opposite the names of the remaining candidates so as to indicate the order of preference for all candidates; or

    (b)   if the ballot paper contains a voting ticket square—by placing the number 1 in that square.

(2)   In a House of Assembly election, a voter must mark his or her vote on the ballot paper by placing the number 1 in the square opposite the name of the candidate for whom he or she votes as his or her first preference, and consecutive numbers in the squares opposite the names of the remaining candidates so as to indicate the order of preference for all candidates.

(3)   For the purposes of this Act, where a voter places a tick or a cross on a ballot paper, the tick or cross will be taken to be equivalent to the number 1.

## 93—Interpretation of ballot papers in House of Assembly elections

(1)   This section applies only in relation to a House of Assembly election.

(2)   Where—

    (a)   a voter marks a ballot paper by placing the number 1 in the square opposite the name of a particular candidate and indicates no further preference; and

    (b)   there is 1 voting ticket registered for the purposes of the election in relation to that candidate,

the ballot paper will be taken to have been marked in accordance with that voting ticket.

(3)   Where—

    (a)   a voter marks a ballot paper by placing the number 1 in the square opposite the name of a particular candidate and indicates no further preference; and

    (b)   there are 2 voting tickets registered for the purposes of the election in relation to that candidate,

then the ballot paper is to be grouped with other ballot papers marked in the same manner and—

    (c)   if the number of those ballot papers is an even number—half of them will be taken to have been marked in accordance with one ticket and half in accordance with the other; or

    (d)   if the number of those ballot papers is not an even number—

        (i)   one of the ballot papers will be taken to have been marked in accordance with whichever of the 2 tickets is determined by lot by the returning officer; and

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(ii)   half the remainder (if any) will be taken to have been marked in accordance with one ticket and half in accordance with the other.

(4)   Where—

(a)   a voter marks a ballot paper by placing the number 1 in the square opposite the name of a particular candidate and proceeds to indicate further preferences by consecutive numbers; and

(b)   there is 1 voting ticket registered for the purposes of the election in relation to that candidate; and

(c)   the preferences indicated by the voter are consistent with that voting ticket; and

(d)   the ballot paper would, apart from this subsection, be informal,

the ballot paper will be taken to have been marked in accordance with that voting ticket.

(5)   Where—

(a)   a voter marks a ballot paper by placing the number 1 in the square opposite the name of a particular candidate and proceeds to indicate further preferences by consecutive numbers; and

(b)   there are 2 voting tickets registered for the purposes of the election in relation to the candidate; and

(c)   the preferences indicated by the voter are consistent with one or both of those voting tickets; and

(d)   the ballot paper would, apart from this subsection, be informal,

the ballot paper, if consistent with both voting tickets, will be treated as if it had been marked only with the number 1 and dealt with in accordance with subsection (3), but if it is consistent with one only of the voting tickets, it will be taken to have been marked in accordance with that voting ticket.

## 94—Informal ballot papers

(1)   Subject to this section, a ballot paper is informal if—

(a)   it is not authenticated by the initials of the officer by whom it was issued, or by an official mark as prescribed; or

(b)   it has no vote indicated on it, or it does not indicate, in the manner required by this Act, the order of the voter's preference for all candidates in the election; or

(c)   it has on it any mark or writing (not authorised by this Act or the regulations) by which the voter can be identified; or

(d)   in the case of a ballot paper required by this Act to be deposited in a ballot box or other secured facility—it is not so deposited.

(2)   A ballot paper that is not duly authenticated by initials or an official mark is not informal by reason of subsection (1)(a) if the officer responsible for considering whether the ballot paper should be admitted is satisfied that it is an authentic ballot paper on which a voter has marked his or her vote.

(3)  Where a voter indicates by consecutive numbers commencing with the number 1 the order of his or her preference for all candidates on a ballot paper except one—

    (a)  the ballot paper is not informal; and

    (b)  it will be presumed that the candidate for whom no preference is expressed is the one least preferred by the voter and that the voter has accordingly indicated the order of his or her preference for all candidates.

(4)  A ballot paper to which effect can be given under the provisions of this Division relating to registered voting tickets is not informal by reason of subsection (1)(b).

(4a)  If—

    (a)  notice of intention to lodge a voting ticket for a Legislative Council election was given under section 63(2)(a) but a voting ticket was not then lodged in accordance with the requirements of section 63(2)(b); and

    (b)  the ballot papers for the election contain a voting ticket square on the basis that the voting ticket was to be lodged; and

    (c)  a voter uses that voting ticket square,

then the ballot paper is informal unless—

    (d)  subsection (4) of section 92 applies; or

    (e)  subsection (6) of this section applies.

(5)  Where a candidate in a Legislative Council election dies between the date of nomination and polling day—

    (a)  a ballot paper is not informal by reason only—

        (i)  of the inclusion on the ballot paper of the name of the deceased candidate; or

        (ii)  of the marking of any consecutive number opposite that name; or

        (iii)  of the omission to place any number opposite that name, or of any resultant failure to indicate in consecutive order the voter's preferences; and

    (b)  a preference indicated on the ballot paper for that candidate must be ignored and subsequent preferences renumbered accordingly.

(6)  Where—

    (a)  a ballot paper has not been marked by a voter in the manner required by this Act; but

    (b)  despite that fact, the voter's intention is clear,

the ballot paper is not informal and will be counted as if the voter's intention had been properly expressed in the manner required by this Act.

(7)  A ballot paper is not informal except for a reason specified in this section.

## 126—Prohibition of advocacy of forms of voting inconsistent with Act

    (1)    A person must not publicly advocate that a voter should mark a ballot paper otherwise than in the manner set out in section 76(1) or (2).

        Maximum penalty: $2 500.

    (2)    A person must not distribute how-to-vote cards in relation to an election unless each card is marked so as to indicate a valid vote in the manner prescribed in section 76(1) or (2).

        Maximum penalty: $2 500.

**Annex 3**

**Ticket voting at South Australian House of Assembly elections, 2002, 2006 and 2010**

**2010**

| DISTRICT | FORMAL VOTES (a) No. | (b) % voting formally | ORDINARY VOTES (c) Non-ticket | (d) Ticket | (e) Total | ORDINARY VOTES (as %age of formal votes) (f) Non-ticket | (g) Ticket | (h) Total | DECLARATION VOTES (i) Non-ticket | (j) Ticket | (k) Total | DECLARATION VOTES (as %age of formal votes) (l) Non-ticket | (m) Ticket | (n) Total | TOTAL TICKET (o) No. | (p) (as %age of formal) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adelaide | 20120 | 96.2 | 14609 | 382 | 14991 | 72.6 | 1.9 | 74.5 | 4977 | 152 | 5129 | 24.7 | 0.8 | 25.5 | 534 | 2.7 |
| Ashford | 21213 | 97.0 | 15812 | 545 | 16357 | 74.5 | 2.6 | 77.1 | 4701 | 155 | 4856 | 22.2 | 0.7 | 22.9 | 700 | 3.3 |
| Bragg | 21445 | 98.1 | 16633 | 377 | 17010 | 77.6 | 1.8 | 79.3 | 4346 | 89 | 4435 | 20.3 | 0.4 | 20.7 | 466 | 2.2 |
| Bright | 21387 | 97.1 | 15802 | 410 | 16212 | 73.9 | 1.9 | 75.8 | 5020 | 155 | 5175 | 23.5 | 0.7 | 24.2 | 565 | 2.6 |
| Chaffey | 20035 | 96.9 | 15694 | 475 | 16169 | 78.3 | 2.4 | 80.7 | 3777 | 89 | 3866 | 18.9 | 0.4 | 19.3 | 564 | 2.8 |
| Cheltenham | 20161 | 95.7 | 15261 | 733 | 15994 | 75.7 | 3.6 | 79.3 | 3984 | 183 | 4167 | 19.8 | 0.9 | 20.7 | 916 | 4.5 |
| Colton | 21188 | 96.3 | 16406 | 741 | 17147 | 77.4 | 3.5 | 80.9 | 3907 | 134 | 4041 | 18.4 | 0.6 | 19.1 | 875 | 4.1 |
| Croydon | 19808 | 95.2 | 14980 | 888 | 15868 | 75.6 | 4.5 | 80.1 | 3776 | 164 | 3940 | 19.1 | 0.8 | 19.9 | 1052 | 5.3 |
| Davenport | 20458 | 97.4 | 15884 | 333 | 16217 | 77.6 | 1.6 | 79.3 | 4121 | 120 | 4241 | 20.1 | 0.6 | 20.7 | 453 | 2.2 |
| Elder | 20344 | 96.3 | 15082 | 559 | 15641 | 74.1 | 2.7 | 76.9 | 4529 | 174 | 4703 | 22.3 | 0.9 | 23.1 | 733 | 3.6 |
| Enfield | 19975 | 95.8 | 14589 | 875 | 15464 | 73.0 | 4.4 | 77.4 | 4344 | 167 | 4511 | 21.7 | 0.8 | 22.6 | 1042 | 5.2 |
| Finniss | 20299 | 97.7 | 13656 | 389 | 14045 | 67.3 | 1.9 | 69.2 | 6095 | 159 | 6254 | 30.0 | 0.8 | 30.8 | 548 | 2.7 |
| Fisher | 22262 | 97.5 | 17569 | 355 | 17924 | 78.9 | 1.6 | 80.5 | 4231 | 107 | 4338 | 19.0 | 0.5 | 19.5 | 462 | 2.1 |
| Flinders | 20160 | 97.3 | 15867 | 511 | 16378 | 78.7 | 2.5 | 81.2 | 3688 | 94 | 3782 | 18.3 | 0.5 | 18.8 | 605 | 3.0 |
| Florey | 20782 | 96.5 | 15728 | 611 | 16339 | 75.7 | 2.9 | 78.6 | 4313 | 130 | 4443 | 20.8 | 0.6 | 21.4 | 741 | 3.6 |
| Frome | 21111 | 97.3 | 15593 | 380 | 15973 | 73.9 | 1.8 | 75.7 | 5036 | 102 | 5138 | 23.9 | 0.5 | 24.3 | 482 | 2.3 |
| Giles | 18900 | 96.5 | 14389 | 551 | 14940 | 76.1 | 2.9 | 79.0 | 3825 | 135 | 3960 | 20.2 | 0.7 | 21.0 | 686 | 3.6 |
| Goyder | 20798 | 96.0 | 16343 | 600 | 16943 | 78.6 | 2.9 | 81.5 | 3738 | 117 | 3855 | 18.0 | 0.6 | 18.5 | 717 | 3.4 |
| Hammond | 21584 | 96.7 | 16220 | 527 | 16747 | 75.1 | 2.4 | 77.6 | 4705 | 132 | 4837 | 21.8 | 0.6 | 22.4 | 659 | 3.1 |
| Hartley | 19750 | 96.1 | 14423 | 566 | 14989 | 73.0 | 2.9 | 75.9 | 4618 | 143 | 4761 | 23.4 | 0.7 | 24.1 | 709 | 3.6 |
| Heysen | 21603 | 97.4 | 17042 | 258 | 17300 | 78.9 | 1.2 | 80.1 | 4222 | 81 | 4303 | 19.5 | 0.4 | 19.9 | 339 | 1.6 |
| Kaurna | 20955 | 96.5 | 15924 | 610 | 16534 | 76.0 | 2.9 | 78.9 | 4260 | 161 | 4421 | 20.3 | 0.8 | 21.1 | 771 | 3.7 |
| Kavel | 20493 | 97.1 | 15767 | 337 | 16104 | 76.9 | 1.6 | 78.6 | 4312 | 77 | 4389 | 21.0 | 0.4 | 21.4 | 414 | 2.0 |
| Lee | 21038 | 95.3 | 16173 | 608 | 16781 | 76.9 | 2.9 | 79.8 | 4126 | 131 | 4257 | 19.6 | 0.6 | 20.2 | 739 | 3.5 |
| Light | 20793 | 96.5 | 15749 | 460 | 16209 | 75.7 | 2.2 | 78.0 | 4445 | 139 | 4584 | 21.4 | 0.7 | 22.0 | 599 | 2.9 |
| Little Para | 21808 | 96.5 | 16346 | 712 | 17058 | 75.0 | 3.3 | 78.2 | 4568 | 182 | 4750 | 20.9 | 0.8 | 21.8 | 894 | 4.1 |
| MacKillop | 20144 | 97.2 | 15995 | 447 | 16442 | 79.4 | 2.2 | 81.6 | 3613 | 89 | 3702 | 17.9 | 0.4 | 18.4 | 536 | 2.7 |
| Mawson | 21443 | 95.8 | 16119 | 558 | 16677 | 75.2 | 2.6 | 77.8 | 4634 | 132 | 4766 | 21.6 | 0.6 | 22.2 | 690 | 3.2 |
| Mitchell | 22244 | 97.0 | 17069 | 475 | 17544 | 76.7 | 2.1 | 78.9 | 4532 | 168 | 4700 | 20.4 | 0.8 | 21.1 | 643 | 2.9 |
| Morialta | 20933 | 97.1 | 15876 | 703 | 16579 | 75.8 | 3.4 | 79.2 | 4177 | 177 | 4354 | 20.0 | 0.8 | 20.8 | 880 | 4.2 |
| Morphett | 21055 | 97.8 | 15241 | 560 | 15801 | 72.4 | 2.7 | 75.0 | 5063 | 191 | 5254 | 24.0 | 0.9 | 25.0 | 751 | 3.6 |
| Mount Gambier | 21781 | 96.4 | 17095 | 390 | 17485 | 78.5 | 1.8 | 80.3 | 4205 | 91 | 4296 | 19.3 | 0.4 | 19.7 | 481 | 2.2 |
| Napier | 20753 | 95.8 | 15924 | 712 | 16636 | 76.7 | 3.4 | 80.2 | 3938 | 179 | 4117 | 19.0 | 0.9 | 19.8 | 891 | 4.3 |
| Newland | 20783 | 96.5 | 16118 | 424 | 16542 | 77.6 | 2.0 | 79.6 | 4133 | 108 | 4241 | 19.9 | 0.5 | 20.4 | 532 | 2.6 |
| Norwood | 21255 | 96.6 | 15973 | 472 | 16445 | 75.1 | 2.2 | 77.4 | 4690 | 120 | 4810 | 22.1 | 0.6 | 22.6 | 592 | 2.8 |
| Playford | 20730 | 95.8 | 15859 | 763 | 16622 | 76.5 | 3.7 | 80.2 | 3950 | 158 | 4108 | 19.1 | 0.8 | 19.8 | 921 | 4.4 |
| Port Adelaide | 21732 | 96.6 | 16216 | 788 | 17004 | 74.6 | 3.6 | 78.2 | 4542 | 186 | 4728 | 20.9 | 0.9 | 21.8 | 974 | 4.5 |
| Ramsay | 19763 | 95.6 | 15034 | 944 | 15978 | 76.1 | 4.8 | 80.8 | 3611 | 174 | 3785 | 18.3 | 0.9 | 19.2 | 1118 | 5.7 |
| Reynell | 20191 | 96.1 | 15639 | 622 | 16261 | 77.5 | 3.1 | 80.5 | 3724 | 206 | 3930 | 18.4 | 1.0 | 19.5 | 828 | 4.1 |
| Schubert | 20827 | 96.6 | 16757 | 429 | 17186 | 80.5 | 2.1 | 82.5 | 3563 | 78 | 3641 | 17.1 | 0.4 | 17.5 | 507 | 2.4 |
| Stuart | 20851 | 97.1 | 14674 | 430 | 15104 | 70.4 | 2.1 | 72.4 | 5591 | 156 | 5747 | 26.8 | 0.7 | 27.6 | 586 | 2.8 |
| Taylor | 21985 | 95.8 | 17138 | 952 | 18090 | 78.0 | 4.3 | 82.3 | 3706 | 189 | 3895 | 16.9 | 0.9 | 17.7 | 1141 | 5.2 |
| Torrens | 20789 | 96.7 | 15710 | 624 | 16334 | 75.6 | 3.0 | 78.6 | 4286 | 169 | 4455 | 20.6 | 0.8 | 21.4 | 793 | 3.8 |
| Unley | 20572 | 98.4 | 15209 | 397 | 15606 | 73.9 | 1.9 | 75.9 | 4826 | 140 | 4966 | 23.5 | 0.7 | 24.1 | 537 | 2.6 |
| Waite | 21693 | 97.9 | 16736 | 393 | 17129 | 77.1 | 1.8 | 79.0 | 4440 | 124 | 4564 | 20.5 | 0.6 | 21.0 | 517 | 2.4 |
| West Torrens | 20477 | 96.6 | 15312 | 566 | 15878 | 74.8 | 2.8 | 77.5 | 4438 | 161 | 4599 | 21.7 | 0.8 | 22.5 | 727 | 3.6 |
| Wright | 22198 | 96.9 | 16983 | 574 | 17557 | 76.5 | 2.6 | 79.1 | 4487 | 154 | 4641 | 20.2 | 0.7 | 20.9 | 728 | 3.3 |
| **Totals** | 980669 | 96.7 | 744218 | 26,016 | 770234 | 75.9 | 2.7 | 78.5 | 203813 | 6,622 | 210435 | 20.8 | 0.7 | 21.5 | 32638 | 3.3 |

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**2006**

| District | Formal Votes (a) No. | (b) % voting formally | Ordinary Votes (c) Non-ticket | (d) Ticket | (e) Total | Ordinary Votes (as % of formal votes) (f) Non-ticket | (g) Ticket | (h) Total | Declaration Votes (i) Non-ticket | (j) Ticket | (k) Total | Declaration Votes (as % of formal votes) (l) Non-ticket | (m) Ticket | (n) Total | Total Ticket (o) No. | (p) (as % of formal) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adelaide | 19337 | 96.3 | 14733 | 535 | 15268 | 76.2 | 2.8 | 79.0 | 3935 | 134 | 4069 | 20.3 | 0.7 | 21.0 | 669 | 3.5 |
| Ashford | 20026 | 96.0 | 15471 | 671 | 16142 | 77.3 | 3.4 | 80.6 | 3728 | 156 | 3884 | 18.6 | 0.8 | 19.4 | 827 | 4.1 |
| Bragg | 19940 | 97.7 | 15877 | 540 | 16417 | 79.6 | 2.7 | 82.3 | 3397 | 126 | 3523 | 17.0 | 0.6 | 17.7 | 666 | 3.3 |
| Bright | 20182 | 97.1 | 15414 | 580 | 15994 | 76.4 | 2.9 | 79.2 | 4029 | 159 | 4188 | 20.0 | 0.8 | 20.8 | 739 | 3.7 |
| Chaffey | 19486 | 96.5 | 15816 | 910 | 16726 | 81.2 | 4.7 | 85.8 | 2644 | 116 | 2760 | 13.6 | 0.6 | 14.2 | 1026 | 5.3 |
| Cheltenham | 19156 | 95.7 | 14442 | 999 | 15441 | 75.4 | 5.2 | 80.6 | 3495 | 220 | 3715 | 18.2 | 1.1 | 19.4 | 1219 | 6.4 |
| Colton | 20389 | 96.6 | 16471 | 760 | 17231 | 80.8 | 3.7 | 84.5 | 3037 | 121 | 3158 | 14.9 | 0.6 | 15.5 | 881 | 4.3 |
| Croydon | 19486 | 96.4 | 15092 | 1077 | 16169 | 77.5 | 5.5 | 83.0 | 3130 | 187 | 3317 | 16.1 | 1.0 | 17.0 | 1264 | 6.5 |
| Davenport | 19764 | 97.7 | 15676 | 531 | 16207 | 79.3 | 2.7 | 82.0 | 3400 | 157 | 3557 | 17.2 | 0.8 | 18.0 | 688 | 3.5 |
| Elder | 19223 | 95.9 | 14406 | 801 | 15207 | 74.9 | 4.2 | 79.1 | 3829 | 187 | 4016 | 19.9 | 1.0 | 20.9 | 988 | 5.1 |
| Enfield | 19213 | 96.0 | 14622 | 995 | 15617 | 76.1 | 5.2 | 81.3 | 3417 | 179 | 3596 | 17.8 | 0.9 | 18.7 | 1174 | 6.1 |
| Finniss | 20700 | 96.8 | 16202 | 835 | 17037 | 78.3 | 4.0 | 82.3 | 3544 | 119 | 3663 | 17.1 | 0.6 | 17.7 | 954 | 4.6 |
| Fisher | 20386 | 97.0 | 16557 | 556 | 17113 | 81.2 | 2.7 | 83.9 | 3149 | 124 | 3273 | 15.4 | 0.6 | 16.1 | 680 | 3.3 |
| Flinders | 18902 | 97.6 | 15382 | 776 | 16158 | 81.4 | 4.1 | 85.5 | 2664 | 80 | 2744 | 14.1 | 0.4 | 14.5 | 856 | 4.5 |
| Florey | 18982 | 96.3 | 14654 | 742 | 15396 | 77.2 | 3.9 | 81.1 | 3444 | 142 | 3586 | 18.1 | 0.7 | 18.9 | 884 | 4.7 |
| Frome | 20073 | 96.9 | 15810 | 853 | 16663 | 78.8 | 4.2 | 83.0 | 3273 | 137 | 3410 | 16.3 | 0.7 | 17.0 | 990 | 4.9 |
| Giles | 19113 | 96.6 | 14905 | 771 | 15676 | 78.0 | 4.0 | 82.0 | 3301 | 136 | 3437 | 17.3 | 0.7 | 18.0 | 907 | 4.7 |
| Goyder | 20580 | 95.8 | 16699 | 886 | 17585 | 81.1 | 4.3 | 85.4 | 2868 | 127 | 2995 | 13.9 | 0.6 | 14.6 | 1013 | 4.9 |
| Hammond | 20506 | 96.0 | 15749 | 901 | 16650 | 76.8 | 4.4 | 81.2 | 3702 | 154 | 3856 | 18.1 | 0.8 | 18.8 | 1055 | 5.1 |
| Hartley | 19355 | 96.3 | 14492 | 767 | 15259 | 74.9 | 4.0 | 78.8 | 3944 | 152 | 4096 | 20.4 | 0.8 | 21.2 | 919 | 4.7 |
| Heysen | 19784 | 97.3 | 15873 | 569 | 16442 | 80.2 | 2.9 | 83.1 | 3238 | 104 | 3342 | 16.4 | 0.5 | 16.9 | 673 | 3.4 |
| Kaurna | 19648 | 95.7 | 15474 | 780 | 16254 | 78.8 | 4.0 | 82.7 | 3244 | 150 | 3394 | 16.5 | 0.8 | 17.3 | 930 | 4.7 |
| Kavel | 19572 | 96.8 | 15647 | 586 | 16233 | 79.9 | 3.0 | 82.9 | 3217 | 122 | 3339 | 16.4 | 0.6 | 17.1 | 708 | 3.6 |
| Lee | 20114 | 96.6 | 15652 | 886 | 16538 | 77.8 | 4.4 | 82.2 | 3384 | 192 | 3576 | 16.8 | 1.0 | 17.8 | 1078 | 5.4 |
| Light | 20679 | 96.1 | 16606 | 828 | 17434 | 80.3 | 4.0 | 84.3 | 3085 | 160 | 3245 | 14.9 | 0.8 | 15.7 | 988 | 4.8 |
| Little Para | 19907 | 95.8 | 15240 | 876 | 16116 | 76.6 | 4.4 | 81.0 | 3554 | 237 | 3791 | 17.9 | 1.2 | 19.0 | 1113 | 5.6 |
| MacKillop | 20159 | 97.0 | 16449 | 799 | 17248 | 81.6 | 4.0 | 85.6 | 2830 | 81 | 2911 | 14.0 | 0.4 | 14.4 | 880 | 4.4 |
| Mawson | 20267 | 96.2 | 15819 | 616 | 16435 | 78.1 | 3.0 | 81.1 | 3660 | 172 | 3832 | 18.1 | 0.8 | 18.9 | 788 | 3.9 |
| Mitchell | 19766 | 95.4 | 15252 | 661 | 15913 | 77.2 | 3.3 | 80.5 | 3710 | 144 | 3853 | 18.8 | 0.7 | 19.5 | 805 | 4.1 |
| Morialta | 20467 | 96.4 | 16038 | 906 | 16944 | 78.4 | 4.4 | 82.8 | 3322 | 201 | 3523 | 16.2 | 1.0 | 17.2 | 1107 | 5.4 |
| Morphett | 21100 | 97.4 | 16428 | 717 | 17145 | 77.9 | 3.4 | 81.3 | 3822 | 133 | 3955 | 18.1 | 0.6 | 18.7 | 850 | 4.0 |
| Mount Gambier | 20675 | 95.7 | 16867 | 630 | 17497 | 81.6 | 3.0 | 84.6 | 3128 | 50 | 3178 | 15.1 | 0.2 | 15.4 | 680 | 3.3 |
| Napier | 19756 | 95.6 | 15450 | 1038 | 16488 | 78.2 | 5.3 | 83.5 | 3060 | 208 | 3268 | 15.5 | 1.1 | 16.5 | 1246 | 6.3 |
| Newland | 20492 | 95.6 | 16250 | 732 | 16982 | 79.3 | 3.6 | 82.9 | 3383 | 127 | 3510 | 16.5 | 0.6 | 17.1 | 859 | 4.2 |
| Norwood | 19785 | 96.6 | 15344 | 730 | 16074 | 77.6 | 3.7 | 81.2 | 3606 | 105 | 3711 | 18.2 | 0.5 | 18.8 | 835 | 4.2 |
| Playford | 20644 | 96.0 | 16472 | 927 | 17399 | 79.8 | 4.5 | 84.3 | 3059 | 186 | 3245 | 14.8 | 0.9 | 15.7 | 1113 | 5.4 |
| Port Adelaide | 19592 | 95.0 | 14691 | 810 | 15501 | 75.0 | 4.1 | 79.1 | 3881 | 210 | 4091 | 19.8 | 1.1 | 20.9 | 1020 | 5.2 |
| Ramsay | 19227 | 95.4 | 15291 | 1071 | 16362 | 79.5 | 5.6 | 85.1 | 2695 | 170 | 2865 | 14.0 | 0.9 | 14.9 | 1241 | 6.5 |
| Reynell | 20075 | 96.1 | 15798 | 772 | 16570 | 78.7 | 3.8 | 82.5 | 3345 | 160 | 3505 | 16.7 | 0.8 | 17.5 | 932 | 4.6 |
| Schubert | 20759 | 96.8 | 17096 | 825 | 17921 | 82.4 | 4.0 | 86.3 | 2732 | 106 | 2838 | 13.2 | 0.5 | 13.7 | 931 | 4.5 |
| Stuart | 20637 | 96.9 | 15514 | 824 | 16338 | 75.2 | 4.0 | 79.2 | 4134 | 165 | 4299 | 20.0 | 0.8 | 20.8 | 989 | 4.8 |
| Taylor | 20019 | 95.4 | 15557 | 1156 | 16713 | 77.7 | 5.8 | 83.5 | 3096 | 210 | 3306 | 15.5 | 1.0 | 16.5 | 1366 | 6.8 |
| Torrens | 19710 | 96.6 | 15374 | 736 | 16110 | 78.0 | 3.7 | 81.7 | 3460 | 140 | 3600 | 17.6 | 0.7 | 18.3 | 876 | 4.4 |
| Unley | 19691 | 97.4 | 15219 | 541 | 15760 | 77.3 | 2.7 | 80.0 | 3713 | 218 | 3931 | 18.9 | 1.1 | 20.0 | 759 | 3.9 |
| Waite | 21028 | 97.5 | 16885 | 493 | 17378 | 80.3 | 2.3 | 82.6 | 3547 | 103 | 3650 | 16.9 | 0.5 | 17.4 | 596 | 2.8 |
| West Torrens | 19832 | 96.6 | 15283 | 763 | 16046 | 77.1 | 3.8 | 80.9 | 3614 | 172 | 3786 | 18.2 | 0.9 | 19.1 | 935 | 4.7 |
| Wright | 20977 | 96.1 | 16451 | 648 | 17099 | 78.4 | 3.1 | 81.5 | 3670 | 208 | 3878 | 17.5 | 1.0 | 18.5 | 856 | 4.1 |
| Totals | 939161 | 96.4 | 736490 | 36406 | 772896 | 78.4 | 3.9 | 82.3 | 159119 | 7147 | 166265 | 16.9 | 0.8 | 17.7 | 43553 | 4.6 |

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**2002**

| District | FORMAL VOTES (a) No. | FORMAL VOTES (b) % voting formally | ORDINARY VOTES (c) Non-ticket | ORDINARY VOTES (d) Ticket | ORDINARY VOTES (e) Total | ORDINARY VOTES (as %age of formal votes) (f) Non-ticket | ORDINARY VOTES (as %age of formal votes) (g) Ticket | ORDINARY VOTES (as %age of formal votes) (h) Total | DECLARATION VOTES (i) Non-ticket | DECLARATION VOTES (j) Ticket | DECLARATION VOTES (k) Total | DECLARATION VOTES (as %age of formal votes) (l) Non-ticket | DECLARATION VOTES (as %age of formal votes) (m) Ticket | DECLARATION VOTES (as %age of formal votes) (n) Total | TOTAL TICKET (o) No. | TOTAL TICKET (p) (as %age of formal) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adelaide | 20333 | 96.3 | 15842 | 612 | 16454 | 77.9 | 3.0 | 80.9 | 3784 | 95 | 3879 | 18.6 | 0.5 | 19.1 | 707 | 3.5 |
| Ashford | 20722 | 96.5 | 16486 | 727 | 17213 | 79.6 | 3.5 | 83.1 | 3396 | 113 | 3509 | 16.4 | 0.5 | 16.9 | 840 | 4.1 |
| Bragg | 20319 | 97.9 | 16270 | 533 | 16803 | 80.1 | 2.6 | 82.7 | 3415 | 101 | 3516 | 16.8 | 0.5 | 17.3 | 634 | 3.1 |
| Bright | 20365 | 96.9 | 16200 | 641 | 16841 | 79.5 | 3.1 | 82.7 | 3416 | 108 | 3524 | 16.8 | 0.5 | 17.3 | 749 | 3.7 |
| Chaffey | 20161 | 97.5 | 16897 | 720 | 17617 | 83.8 | 3.6 | 87.4 | 2451 | 93 | 2544 | 12.2 | 0.5 | 12.6 | 813 | 4.0 |
| Cheltenham | 19473 | 94.1 | 15249 | 1041 | 16290 | 78.3 | 5.3 | 83.7 | 3019 | 164 | 3183 | 15.5 | 0.8 | 16.3 | 1205 | 6.2 |
| Colton | 19733 | 95.5 | 16318 | 813 | 17131 | 82.7 | 4.1 | 86.8 | 2504 | 98 | 2602 | 12.7 | 0.5 | 13.2 | 911 | 4.6 |
| Croydon | 19935 | 96.2 | 16331 | 753 | 17084 | 81.9 | 3.8 | 85.7 | 2711 | 140 | 2851 | 13.6 | 0.7 | 14.3 | 893 | 4.5 |
| Davenport | 19970 | 97.7 | 16427 | 494 | 16921 | 82.3 | 2.5 | 84.7 | 2965 | 84 | 3049 | 14.8 | 0.4 | 15.3 | 578 | 2.9 |
| Elder | 19875 | 95.8 | 15768 | 673 | 16441 | 79.3 | 3.4 | 82.7 | 3333 | 101 | 3434 | 16.8 | 0.5 | 17.3 | 774 | 3.9 |
| Elizabeth | 20375 | 96.7 | 16305 | 819 | 17124 | 80.0 | 4.0 | 84.0 | 3076 | 175 | 3251 | 15.1 | 0.9 | 16.0 | 994 | 4.9 |
| Enfield | 19835 | 96.0 | 15737 | 837 | 16574 | 79.3 | 4.2 | 83.6 | 3118 | 143 | 3261 | 15.7 | 0.7 | 16.4 | 980 | 4.9 |
| Finniss | 20797 | 97.2 | 17183 | 888 | 18071 | 82.6 | 4.3 | 86.9 | 2635 | 91 | 2726 | 12.7 | 0.4 | 13.1 | 979 | 4.7 |
| Fisher | 20042 | 97.1 | 16719 | 540 | 17259 | 83.4 | 2.7 | 86.1 | 2707 | 76 | 2783 | 13.5 | 0.4 | 13.9 | 616 | 3.1 |
| Flinders | 20476 | 98.2 | 17191 | 689 | 17880 | 84.0 | 3.4 | 87.3 | 2535 | 61 | 2596 | 12.4 | 0.3 | 12.7 | 750 | 3.7 |
| Florey | 19476 | 97.2 | 15692 | 732 | 16424 | 80.6 | 3.8 | 84.3 | 2953 | 99 | 3052 | 15.2 | 0.5 | 15.7 | 831 | 4.3 |
| Frome | 20652 | 98.3 | 16850 | 514 | 17364 | 81.6 | 2.5 | 84.1 | 3287 | 1 | 3288 | 15.9 | 0.0 | 15.9 | 515 | 2.5 |
| Giles | 17620 | 97.3 | 13990 | 603 | 14593 | 79.4 | 3.4 | 82.8 | 2899 | 128 | 3027 | 16.5 | 0.7 | 17.2 | 731 | 4.1 |
| Goyder | 20380 | 96.9 | 16989 | 843 | 17832 | 83.4 | 4.1 | 87.5 | 2465 | 83 | 2548 | 12.1 | 0.4 | 12.5 | 926 | 4.5 |
| Hammond | 19588 | 97.6 | 16010 | 588 | 16598 | 81.7 | 3.0 | 84.7 | 2906 | 84 | 2990 | 14.8 | 0.4 | 15.3 | 672 | 3.4 |
| Hartley | 20127 | 96.3 | 15821 | 842 | 16663 | 78.6 | 4.2 | 82.8 | 3344 | 120 | 3464 | 16.6 | 0.6 | 17.2 | 962 | 4.8 |
| Heysen | 20053 | 97.4 | 16983 | 451 | 17434 | 84.7 | 2.2 | 86.9 | 2550 | 69 | 2619 | 12.7 | 0.3 | 13.1 | 520 | 2.6 |
| Kaurna | 19356 | 96.4 | 15667 | 787 | 16454 | 80.9 | 4.1 | 85.0 | 2809 | 93 | 2902 | 14.5 | 0.5 | 15.0 | 880 | 4.5 |
| Kavel | 20682 | 96.9 | 17514 | 624 | 18138 | 84.7 | 3.0 | 87.7 | 2485 | 61 | 2544 | 12.0 | 0.3 | 12.3 | 685 | 3.3 |
| Lee | 19930 | 96.7 | 15948 | 693 | 16641 | 80.0 | 3.5 | 83.5 | 3142 | 147 | 3289 | 15.8 | 0.7 | 16.5 | 840 | 4.2 |
| Light | 20539 | 96.6 | 17055 | 743 | 17798 | 83.0 | 3.6 | 86.7 | 2637 | 104 | 2741 | 12.8 | 0.5 | 13.3 | 847 | 4.1 |
| MacKillop | 20747 | 97.5 | 17454 | 606 | 18060 | 84.1 | 2.9 | 87.0 | 2632 | 55 | 2687 | 12.7 | 0.3 | 13.0 | 661 | 3.2 |
| Mawson | 21048 | 96.9 | 17069 | 609 | 17678 | 81.1 | 2.9 | 84.0 | 3267 | 103 | 3370 | 15.5 | 0.5 | 16.0 | 712 | 3.4 |
| Mitchell | 19745 | 96.6 | 16007 | 561 | 16568 | 81.1 | 2.8 | 83.9 | 3077 | 100 | 3177 | 15.6 | 0.5 | 16.1 | 661 | 3.3 |
| Morialta | 19935 | 95.5 | 16158 | 947 | 17105 | 81.1 | 4.8 | 85.8 | 2748 | 82 | 2830 | 13.8 | 0.4 | 14.2 | 1029 | 5.2 |
| Morphett | 21467 | 98.0 | 17163 | 687 | 17850 | 80.0 | 3.2 | 83.2 | 3610 | 107 | 3617 | 16.8 | 0.5 | 16.8 | 794 | 3.7 |
| Mount Gambier | 20985 | 97.3 | 17942 | 517 | 18459 | 85.5 | 2.5 | 88.0 | 2479 | 47 | 2526 | 11.8 | 0.2 | 12.0 | 564 | 2.7 |
| Napier | 19894 | 96.4 | 16314 | 887 | 17201 | 82.0 | 4.5 | 86.5 | 2565 | 128 | 2693 | 12.9 | 0.6 | 13.5 | 1015 | 5.1 |
| Newland | 19542 | 97.6 | 15997 | 591 | 16588 | 81.9 | 3.0 | 84.9 | 2851 | 103 | 2954 | 14.6 | 0.5 | 15.1 | 694 | 3.6 |
| Norwood | 20595 | 97.0 | 16210 | 706 | 16916 | 78.7 | 3.4 | 82.1 | 3576 | 103 | 3679 | 17.4 | 0.5 | 17.9 | 809 | 3.9 |
| Playford | 20254 | 96.3 | 16761 | 802 | 17563 | 82.8 | 4.0 | 86.7 | 2552 | 139 | 2691 | 12.6 | 0.7 | 13.3 | 941 | 4.6 |
| Port Adelaide | 20184 | 96.5 | 16032 | 842 | 16874 | 79.4 | 4.2 | 83.6 | 3187 | 123 | 3310 | 15.8 | 0.6 | 16.4 | 965 | 4.8 |
| Ramsay | 20424 | 96.6 | 16758 | 995 | 17753 | 82.1 | 4.9 | 86.9 | 2541 | 130 | 2671 | 12.4 | 0.6 | 13.1 | 1125 | 5.5 |
| Reynell | 19583 | 96.4 | 15751 | 702 | 16453 | 80.4 | 3.6 | 84.0 | 3017 | 113 | 3130 | 15.4 | 0.6 | 16.0 | 815 | 4.2 |
| Schubert | 19404 | 96.7 | 16114 | 595 | 16709 | 83.0 | 3.1 | 86.1 | 2619 | 76 | 2695 | 13.5 | 0.4 | 13.9 | 671 | 3.5 |
| Stuart | 19694 | 97.7 | 15410 | 490 | 15900 | 78.2 | 2.5 | 80.7 | 3586 | 208 | 3794 | 18.2 | 1.1 | 19.3 | 698 | 3.5 |
| Taylor | 19628 | 96.8 | 15630 | 1006 | 16636 | 79.6 | 5.1 | 84.8 | 2818 | 174 | 2992 | 14.4 | 0.9 | 15.2 | 1180 | 6.0 |
| Torrens | 20912 | 96.6 | 17078 | 692 | 17770 | 81.7 | 3.3 | 85.0 | 3024 | 118 | 3142 | 14.5 | 0.6 | 15.0 | 810 | 3.9 |
| Unley | 20220 | 98.0 | 16029 | 546 | 16575 | 79.3 | 2.7 | 82.0 | 3562 | 83 | 3645 | 17.6 | 0.4 | 18.0 | 629 | 3.1 |
| Waite | 20804 | 97.5 | 16933 | 455 | 17388 | 81.4 | 2.2 | 83.6 | 3346 | 70 | 3416 | 16.1 | 0.3 | 16.4 | 525 | 2.5 |
| West Torrens | 20639 | 96.6 | 16273 | 767 | 17040 | 78.8 | 3.7 | 82.6 | 3415 | 184 | 3599 | 16.5 | 0.9 | 17.4 | 951 | 4.6 |
| Wright | 21514 | 97.8 | 17366 | 665 | 18031 | 80.7 | 3.1 | 83.8 | 3332 | 151 | 3483 | 15.5 | 0.7 | 16.2 | 816 | 3.8 |
| TOTALS | 948032 | 96.9 | 769891 | 32868 | 802759 | 81.2 | 3.5 | 84.7 | 140346 | 5029 | 145273 | 14.8 | 0.5 | 15.3 | 37897 | 4.0 |

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