



Department of Primary Industries

Submission No. 01.4

(Quarantine Facility)

Date: 27/03/13

OUT13/7013

Dr Colin Grant
First Assistant Secretary
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
18 Marcus Clarke Street, Canberra ACT 2600

Monday 25 March 2013

Dear Dr Grant

As requested I am writing in support of the DAFF position that quarantine containment risk best practice is to concentrate high containment multipurpose infrastructure into a condensed building envelope. This is fundamental to biosecurity facility design and construction globally and has been executed across Australia during the multi-million dollar upgrade of facilities including at the Elizabeth Macarthur Agricultural Institute (EMAI). Last year EMAI completed a \$56.7M upgrade including the construction of new multi-purpose QC2 and QC3 facilities. These are general microbial laboratories and multi-purpose holding rooms including 2300m² of animal and plant QC2 spaces in one building and 800m² of animal and plant spaces in an interconnected building. These facilities include QC2 and QC3 laboratories and animal holding facilities. There are additional QC2 laboratories and animal houses as well as effluent and trade waste management infrastructure that were also refurbished.

All QC2/QC3 facilities at EMAI are designed to be utilised as multi-user or multi-disease or multi-species facilities within the same building envelope. This includes animal holding facilities. Utilization of advanced negative air handling engineering, pass throughs and dunk tanks, and the construction of multiple self contained spaces allow a flexible and safe high containment facility to function optimally. EMAI routinely holds multiple animal, plant and aquatic species in adjacent spaces within the same building. This includes receiving over 30,000 biosecurity samples per month for processing as well as significant live animal and plant biosecurity research. The facility is a critical part of the biosecurity emergency response capability for NSW and Australia and routinely handles diseases with serious biosecurity implications. These include Hendra, anthrax, avian influenza, swine flu, equine influenza and Australian bat Lyssavirus to name a few of zoonotic biosecurity concern.

Condensing high containment biosecurity activity into purpose built QC2/QC3 facilities is critical to mitigating the risk including waste emissions of air, liquid or solid waste. Limiting movement of people, materials or waste outside the bio-secure building envelope is key including plant and equipment that manages waste. It also ensures physical security of the facility as access points are limited and only suitably trained and authorised individuals can gain entry.

I trust this assists DAFF with the process of establishing a new PEQ facility. Please do not hesitate to call me if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely

Jonathon Gregory
Director, Centre for Animal and Plant Biosecurity EMAI