

Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA)

(Also known as: Al-Faran, Al-Hadid, Al-Hadith, Harakat ul-Ansar, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, HuA, HuM)

The following information is based on publicly available details about Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA), formerly known as Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HuM), the name that is still commonly used for the group. To the Australian Government's knowledge, these details are accurate and reliable and have been corroborated by classified information.

Basis for listing a terrorist organisation

Division 102 of the *Criminal Code* provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:

- (a) is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
- (b) advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

Details of the organisation

Objectives

JuA wants to unite all of Kashmir with Pakistan and establish a caliphate based on Sharia law. JuA has advocated the use of Pakistan's nuclear weapons against India, and opposes efforts to normalise relations between the two countries.

JuA also has pledged support for Afghan militants fighting Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Some elements within JuA have wanted to re-focus their activities and bring them more into line with Usama bin Laden's global jihad against the US and Israel and their allies.

Leadership

The leader of JuA is Fazlur Rehman (sometimes Rahman) Khalil (also known as Maulana Farzul Ahmed Khalil and Maulana Ahmed Khalil).

In 1991, Khalil and his followers split from Harakat ul-Jihad Islami (HuJI), a group that fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and later turned its attention to Indian-administered Kashmir to form Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HuM). In 1993, HuM reunited with HuJI under the name Harakat ul-Ansar (HuA).

As a consequence of reports that link the group to al-Qa'ida, HuA was proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the United States in 1997. The group re-adopted the name HuM to escape the ramifications of proscription.

HuM was banned by both the US and Pakistan following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and adopted the name Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA). JuA also was subsequently banned by Pakistan in November 2003.

Membership

JuA has been reported to have strength of no more than a few hundred but exact membership numbers cannot be determined with accuracy. The majority of JuA's membership is drawn from Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.

JuA also has attracted recruits and provided training to Islamist militants from around the world, including Bangladesh, South-East Asia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Terrorist activity of the organisation

Directly or indirectly engaged in terrorist acts

- December 1999: an Indian airliner was hijacked en route from Nepal to India; one passenger was stabbed to death.
- 23 January 2002: US journalist Daniel Pearl was abducted and subsequently murdered on this date. Four people, including JuA member Ahmed Omar Sheikh, were convicted of Pearl's murder.
- 26 May 2004: JuA trained members were among a number of militants drawn from several Pakistani extremist groups responsible for the twin car bomb attack near the US Consulate in Karachi.
- 9 June 2004: the same terrorist cell was involved in an attack against a convoy carrying Karachi's military commander and resulted in seven deaths.
- February 2007: the kidnapping and subsequent beheading of a Hindu businessman in Pakistan's Sindh Province.
- February 2009: members of a terrorist cell with links to JuA and reportedly responsible for six attacks in Kabul, Afghanistan, were arrested.
- 23 February 2010: two JuA members were among five militants killed by Indian security forces in Sopore, Kashmir; the militants blew up two houses in the battle with security forces.

Directly or indirectly preparing and/or planning terrorist acts

- 19 June 2005: several JuA trained individuals were arrested in Afghanistan as they were preparing to carry out acts of terrorism.
- June 2005: two American citizens were arrested for suspected participation in an al-Qa'ida plot to attack the US. Both claimed to have attended a terrorist training camp run by JuA leader Khalil.
- December 2008: UK national Rangzieb Ahmed, who had confessed to membership in JuA, was convicted on terrorism charges.

Directly or indirectly assisting in the doing of terrorist acts

- JuA operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan prior to their destruction by Coalition air strikes in 2001.

- JuA camps in Pakistan have provided both religious instruction and military training and support to terrorist organisations and individuals from around the world.
- In 2004, individuals trained by JuA were arrested for their involvement in separate suicide car bomb attacks outside the US Consulate and the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi in May and June 2002, respectively.
- Also in 2004, individuals trained by JuA were arrested for a failed attempt to assassinate Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf with a remote-controlled car bomb in April 2002.
- Individuals trained at JuA facilities have engaged in terrorist operations in Tajikistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s.
- JuA reportedly helped facilitate training by members of the Pakistani diaspora in the UK in June 2003, some of whom may have intended to return home to conduct terrorism related activities.

Directly or indirectly fostering and/or advocating the doing of terrorist acts

- Following his release from Pakistani detention in 2006, JuA leader Khalil reportedly visited JuA-linked mosques and madrassas in Pakistan where he advocated jihad against Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
- On 16 December 2006, leaders of JuA and Pakistani sectarian terrorist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) called for a joint strategy and pledged to cooperate with Afghan insurgents to target Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
- On 4 February 2009, a death threat reportedly attributed to JuA was posted on the website of India's leader of the opposition and prime ministerial candidate L K Advani.

Conclusion

In view of the above information, ASIO assesses JuA is continuing to directly and indirectly engage in, prepare, plan, assist in and foster the doing of terrorist acts, and advocates the doing of, terrorist acts. This assessment is corroborated by information provided by reliable and credible intelligence sources, as well as by the terrorist acts conducted by JuA in the past.

In the course of pursuing its objective of uniting Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan under a radical interpretation of Islamic law, JuA is known to have engaged in or advocated actions that:

- are aimed at advancing JuA's political and religious causes;
- are intended to, or do, cause serious damage to property, the death of persons or endangerment of life; and
- are intended to cause, or have caused, serious risk to the safety of sections of the public globally.

Other relevant information

Links to other terrorist groups or networks

JuA has cooperated with other militant groups operating in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan.

JuA leader Khalil has strong ties to the Taliban and al-Qa'ida and in 1998 signed Usama bin Laden's fatwa calling for attacks on the US and its allies.

Proscription by the UN and other countries

JuA is listed in the United Nations 1267 Committee's consolidated list and by the governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and Pakistan.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

(Also known as: Abou Sayaf Armed Band; Abou Sayyef Group; Abu Sayaff Group; Al-Harakat Al-Aslamiya; Al-Harakat Al-Islamiyya; Al-Harakat-ul Al-Islamiyya; Al-Harakatul-Islamia and Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters)

The following information is based on publicly available details about the ASG. To the Australian Government's knowledge, these details are accurate and reliable and have been corroborated by reliable and credible classified information.

Basis for listing a terrorist organisation

Division 102 of the *Criminal Code* provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:

- (c) is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
- (d) advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

Details of the organisation

Objectives

The ASG's founding objective is to create an autonomous Islamic state encompassing the southern Philippines islands of Mindanao and surrounding islands and the Sulu Archipelago, whose main islands are Basilan, Jolo and Tawi Tawi. The ASG was founded in 1991 as a militant Islamic movement by Abdurajak Janjalani, who fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s where he was influenced by radical Wahhabi thought. Janjalani's original intent was to fuse Salafi Wahhabist ideology with a southern Philippines separatist agenda.

The ASG is a fundamentally clan-centric terrorist network with a fluid peripheral membership which includes foreign jihadists and enjoys support from a portion of the local population in Jolo and Basilan. The ASG's sub-groups also undertake criminal activities in order to sustain its leaders and membership and to provide resources for its terrorist activities, including its capacity to oppose military operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

The ASG views kidnap-for-ransom ventures as a profitable operational tactic – along with extortion and related activity – and these attacks have been a trademark of ASG since its creation and represent the main funding mechanism for the ASG and subordinate groups. Aside from the financial gains for ASG in conducting the above activities, ASG's activities – including the targets chosen for kidnapping and extortion operations – remain heavily influenced by the religious, political and ideological considerations as originally dictated by Janjalani. Westerners and other wealthy foreign nationals, as well as local politicians and business people feature among the targets.

Leadership

It is currently unclear whether a single leader of the ASG has emerged since former Emir, Khadaffy Janjalani, was killed in an AFP operation in September 2006. There are a number of key leadership figures with extensive operational experience, such as Radullan Sahiron, Gumbahli Jumdail (aka Dr Abu), Isnilon Hapilon and Yasir Igasan, all of whom maintain contact and retain the ability and personnel to conduct their own independent operations.

Membership

The ASG membership consists primarily of young Tausug Filipino Muslims from the Sulu archipelago, but the ASG attracts poverty-stricken unemployed young Muslims from across the southern Philippines. The ASG originally consisted of jihadi volunteers who had fought in Afghanistan. Janjalani was eventually able to attract hundreds of recruits who were mostly derived from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). ASG rank-and-file numbers fluctuate in response to successful terrorist operations and pressure from the Philippines military, which dictate the available resources and relative incentives for membership.

Since its inception, the ASG has consisted of loosely affiliated groups, mostly organised along traditional clan and familial lines, with as many as 26 clan groupings of security interest to the Philippines authorities. These sub-groups are based mainly in the Sulu archipelago in the southern Philippines – primarily on the Islands of Jolo and Basilan. The commanders of each sub-group are largely autonomous clan leaders. Despite its relatively small core numbers, the ASG draws its strength from a large local support base.

Current Status of the ASG

Since the expulsion of the ASG from Mindanao and the subsequent death of senior leaders, the ASG has continued to fragment, leaving the ASG clan groups largely confined to their home islands in the Sulu archipelago and under significant operational constraints compared to its first decade of existence. The AFP, with US military logistical support, has continued to mount operations against ASG groups in the Sulu archipelago and still consider the group to be a significant threat, particularly when acting in concert with other Philippines-based militant groups, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Terrorist activity of the organisation

Directly or indirectly engaged, or assisting, in the doing of terrorist acts

The ASG has been responsible for the planning and conduct of terrorist attacks against a wide range of targets, but particularly Philippine government, Christian and Western interests. ASG attacks in the past few years (2008 to 2010) have to a large degree been motivated by financial gain rather than purely political, religious or ideological purposes – but the proceeds of these attacks are used to support the ASG's operations. Funding is especially important for sustaining ASG's capacity to resist

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pressure from the AFP counter-insurgency operations – including its interaction with other terrorist groups (MILF, MNLF, Indonesia-based networks).

The history of target locations also highlight the ongoing operational interest and reach of ASG into areas frequented by tourists, including in Malaysia's Sabah State located southeast of the Sulu archipelago. Attacks attributed to the ASG have included:

- 23 April 2000: 21 people, including 10 foreign tourists, were kidnapped from the Malaysian resort island of Sipadan. This kidnapping was resolved in 2001 when the ASG received a \$15 million ransom.
- 28 August 2000: US national Jeffrey Schilling was kidnapped in Zamboanga City; the ASG reportedly believed he was a CIA spy. Schilling was rescued in April 2001.
- 27 May 2001: 20 people were kidnapped from the Philippine tourist resort of Dos Palmas on Palawan Island, in the course of which several victims were murdered – including a US citizen. Another US citizen was killed during the rescue operation.
- 2 October 2002: a karaoke bar in Zamboanga City was bombed, killing four people, including a US soldier and injuring 24 others.
- 27 February 2004: *Superferry 14* was bombed, killing over 100 people.
- 14 February 2005: a coordinated series of bombings in Philippines cities of Makati, Davao and General Santos, killed at least seven people and left approximately 150 injured.
- 10 August 2005: two bombings in Zamboanga City wounded eight people.
- 27 March 2006: a convenience store in Jolo was bombed, killing nine and wounding 24 people after extortion demands were not met.
- April 2007: ASG clansmen led by Albader Parad kidnapped seven local workers on Jolo. When ransom money was not paid by the local employer all of the hostages were beheaded.
- 10 June 2007: an Italian priest was kidnapped in Zamboanga and subsequently released on 20 July 2007.
- 11 October 2009: an Irish priest was kidnapped in Mindanao and subsequently released on 12 November 2009.
- January 2009: three ICRC representatives were kidnapped on Jolo and subsequently released.
- September 29 2009: two US servicemen were killed after an IED struck their vehicle in Jolo.
- 8 February 2010: two Chinese-Malay workers were kidnapped from a seaweed farm in Semporna, Sabah, Malaysia by suspected ASG members.
- 27 February 2010: suspected ASG gunmen attacked the village of Tubigan, Basalan, killing 11 people and wounding 10. These revenge attacks followed

the death of ASG sub-commander Parad who was killed during a Philippine military operation a week earlier; and

- 3 March 2010: three ASG members were arrested due to their involvement in a plot to launch bomb attacks in retaliation to the killing of ASG commander Albader Parad. Philippines authorities confirmed that the men arrested were ASG members and that they had been trained in bomb-making skills by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

Directly or indirectly fostering the doing of terrorist acts

The ASG has been linked to dozens of kidnappings over the past decade in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga City and other areas in Western Mindanao. According to the Philippine authorities, the ASG has links to al-Qa'ida and Indonesia-based terrorist networks including JI and they attribute bombings in key areas in Mindanao and in Manila to ASG.

ASG has a history of association with other terrorist organisations since its founding – most notably with al-Qa'ida, JI and other Indonesia-based extremist networks. The current primary association between ASG and other anti-Western terrorists is its provision of safe haven to JI-linked fugitives, which was first seen in 2003 and occurs to this day.

Indonesian extremists, under the protection of the ASG, continue to support terrorist operations by ASG and MILF in the Philippines and also provide bomb-making training to Philippines-based militant networks.

- Information from March 2009, recovered from ASG training camps, documented the collusion between MILF, ASG, and JI in effecting 'technology transfer' and the provision of safe haven in exchange for weapons.
- ASG clansmen on Jolo have harboured Indonesian JI members Umar Patek and Dulmatin (deceased), both of whom fled to the southern Philippines in 2003 to avoid arrest after their involvement in the October 2002 Bali bombings was exposed.
- As of January 2010, Jolo-based ASG groups also harboured Marwan – a JI fugitive and US-trained engineer and explosives trainer – who had been in the Philippines since mid 2007. Patek and Marwan currently have a combined total of US\$6 million in reward money posted for their capture by the United States.

ASG also maintains operational and logistical links with other Philippines-based networks that are actively engaged in terrorist activity, including MILF and MNLF, all of which benefit from the proceeds of kidnapping operations and fundraising activities.

Conclusion

The Criminal Code provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied that:

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- (a) the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
- (b) the organisation advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

On the basis of the above information, ASIO assesses the ASG is indirectly preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of terrorist acts. As well as conducting its own terrorist activity, ASG is providing assistance to terrorist fugitives, who retain the intent to conduct, and continue to plan, terrorist actions in the Philippines.

ASIO further assesses that elements of the ASG remain active, retain a capability to conduct attacks, and an enduring intent to directly prepare, plan, assist in, or foster the doing of terrorist acts. It is submitted that the acts attributable to the ASG are terrorist acts as they:

- (i) Are done with the intention of advancing a political cause, namely, the establishment of an Islamic state encompassing the southern Philippines;
- (ii) Are intended to coerce or influence by intimidation the government of a foreign country, namely the Philippines, and/or intimidate a section of the Filipino public; and
- (iii) Constitute acts which cause serious physical harm to persons, including deaths, as well as serious damage to property.

In view of the above information, the ASG is assessed to be preparing, planning, and fostering the conduct of terrorist acts. Such acts include actions which are to be done and threats of actions which are to be made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause and with the intention of coercing, or influencing by intimidation of the Government and people of the Philippines. The actions or threatened actions which ASG are assessed to be involved in would, if successfully completed, cause serious physical harm and death to persons and serious damage to property.

This assessment is corroborated by information from reliable and credible intelligence sources

Other relevant information

ASG is listed in the United Nations' 1267 Committee's Consolidated List as an entity associated with al-Qa'ida and as a proscribed organisation by the governments of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. ASG was last proscribed in Australia on 3 November 2008.

Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI)

(Also known as: **Al-Qa'ida of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; Al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; Al-Tawhid; Al-Tawhid and al-Jihad; AQI – Zarqawi; Brigades of Tawhid; Islamic State in Iraq; Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad; Kateab al-Tawhid; Mujahidin Shura Council; Qaida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; Tanzeem Qa'idat al-Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The al-Zarqawi network; The Monotheism and Jihad Group; The Organisation Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; The Organisation of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; Unity and Holy Struggle; Unity and Holy War; Unity and Jihad Group**)

The following information is based on publicly available details about al-Qa'ida in Iraq, formerly listed as Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (TQJBR). To the Australian Government's knowledge, these details are accurate and reliable and have been corroborated by classified information.

Basis for listing a terrorist organisation

Division 102 of the *Criminal Code* provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:

- (e) is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
- (f) advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

Details of the organisation

Al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) is a Sunni extremist group that operates within Iraq. The group operates mainly in central and northern Iraq but maintains a presence throughout the entire country. AQI networks are based primarily in Sunni areas and regions where other groups engaged in sectarian violence are located. Currently, AQI largely is funded and equipped through criminal activities and intimidation tactics within Iraq, as well as from neighbouring countries who buy goods extorted by AQI.

Objectives

AQI's key religious, political and ideological aims are to expel foreign forces from Iraq and to establish an Islamic caliphate under strict Sharia law in Iraq. However, the withdrawal of US troops from urban centres in mid-2009 has reduced the reasons for targeting, and opportunity to target, foreign forces and hence AQI recently has been focused more on targeting the Iraqi government in large-scale attacks with several occurring since August 2009. These attacks are aimed at undermining the government and the remaining foreign forces and Iraqi security forces (ISF) as well as disrupting democratic processes. AQI continues to lead a sectarian battle in Iraq

which has targeted the Shia majority, the Kurdish and other minority groups, as well as Sunnis who are supportive of the Iraqi Government.

Leadership

AQI was led most recently by Abu Ayub al-Masri (aka: Abu Hamza al-Mujahir, or ‘the immigrant’); however, al-Masri died in a US air strike on 18 April 2010. Al-Masri was an Egyptian who formerly was responsible for AQI’s intelligence operations and the solicitation of new recruits. Al-Masri led AQI since the death of former AQI leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in 2006.

Al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida (AQ) on 17 October 2004 via an internet posting. A statement by Usama bin Laden, broadcast on 27 December 2005, welcomed the union and exhorted mujahedeen in Iraq to obey al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi led AQI until June 2006 when he was killed by US forces. While leading AQI, al-Zarqawi maintained a campaign to establish an Islamic caliphate and expel Coalition forces from Iraq. In addition, al-Zarqawi remained focused on inciting Sunni-Shia sectarian violence. These remain AQI’s priorities.

The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) which formed in December 2006 is a Sunni umbrella group, largely comprised of AQI members and is responsible for conducting many of AQI’s large-scale attacks. The leader of the ISI was Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi – until his death on 19 April 2010. The ISI announced on 16 May 2010 that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Huayni al-Qurashi has replaced al-Baghdadi as leader of the ISI and that Abu Abdullah al-Husseini al-Qurashi will be deputy leader and Prime Minister to replace al-Masri. The deceased Al-Masri also was referred to as the ISI’s Minister of War. The ISI announced on 16 May that Al-Nasir Lidin Allah Abu-Sulayman is now the ISI’s Minister of War. Despite al-Baghdadi being named the Leader of the ISI, al-Masri is considered to have held the most power and operational leadership in AQI. It is evident from recent statements produced by the ISI that AQI continued to maintain a cabinet-structure and regional emirs within its leadership. However, in June 2010 the US announced that 42 of the 50 chiefs of AQI had been captured or killed in the preceding three months.

The death of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi will impact the effectiveness of AQI, particularly in the short to medium term; however, AQI has recovered previously from the death of a leader (al-Zarqawi) and could do so again.

Membership

The exact number of individuals associated directly with AQI is unknown. Iraqis are now the dominant group within AQI whereas previously foreign extremists comprised the majority of members. Local Iraqi Sunni support for AQI was affected adversely by earlier indiscriminate attacks and the resulting backlash from Coalition forces, Iraqi forces and the wider community.

Terrorist activity of the organisation

Directly or indirectly engaged in the doing of terrorist acts

Since AQI's proscription on 3 November 2008, it has been involved in the following large-scale terrorist attacks:

- 4 April 2010: the Iranian, German and Egyptian missions were targeted in bombings that killed around 35 people and wounded approximately 200.
- 3 March 2010: three suicide bombings in Baquba targeted two military and police buildings and a hospital, killing around 30 people. The ISI later claimed this attack.
- 26 January 2010: a suicide bomber targeted a forensic laboratory in the Interior Ministry in Baghdad, killing around 20 individuals. This attack and the attacks occurring since 19 August 2009 in Baghdad were all declared to be part of the 'Invasion of the Captive' campaign.
- 25 January 2010: 37 people were killed when co-ordinated suicide bombers struck three Baghdad hotels.
- 8 December 2009: five explosions targeting government buildings around Baghdad killed around 130 individuals and wounded 400.
- 25 October 2009: two explosions targeting Iraqi government buildings killed over 150 individuals and injured around 500. This attack was the largest attack in Iraq since 2007.
- 19 August 2009: around 100 civilians were killed and almost 600 injured when two near-simultaneous explosions detonated near government buildings in Baghdad.

AQI also continue to be engaged in several campaigns which involve smaller attacks aimed at inciting sectarian violence and more recently disrupted democratic processes during the March 2010 election period.

- The ISI has claimed a spate of attacks which occurred in the lead up and during the March 2010 elections. Attacks included IEDs, armed clashes and rocket strikes and are claimed to be part of the 'Axe of al-Khalil Campaign' which is aimed at disrupting democratic processes.
- The ISI claimed two October 2009 suicide bombings in Mosul which targeted Iraqi soldiers and a Kurdish Peshmerga convoy.

Directly or indirectly fostering and/or advocating the doing of terrorist acts

AQI has released a number of media statements which advocate terrorist acts and call for violence against numerous targets. Some of these statements are listed below:

- 14 May 2010: the new War Minister of the ISI, Abu Suleiman, announced a new campaign stating that the ISI would continue to wage violent jihad.
- 9 March 2010: al-Furqan, the media arm of the ISI, released a video of three fighters who incite Muslims to participate in violent jihad.
- 7 March 2010: al-Baghdadi said that AQI's fight against Coalition Forces continues and encouraged Muslims and Somalis to join al-Shabaab.
- 5 March 2010: the ISI declared a curfew on Election Day saying that those who defy the curfew will 'unfortunately expose himself to the anger of Allah and then to all kinds of weapons of the Mujahideen'. This follows a statement

released on 12 February 2010 in which al-Baghdadi threatened a military response to the Iraqi parliamentary elections.

- 22 February 2010: the ISI issued a video which states that there are dozens of young jihadists who await the day when they can shed the blood of American 'Crusaders' and those who support them. In the same recording a jihadist names heretics, the Peshmerga, the Americans and the 'pagan' Iraqi forces as possible targets for his 'martyrdom-seeking operation'.
- 11 January 2010: the ISI released a video that documents a suicide bomber in his quest to conduct a bombing against a Peshmerga base.
- 23 October 2008: al-Masri threatened attacks against the US, Australia and Britain when asked in an interview if he has any intention of striking Western interests.
- 22 September 2008: al-Masri and al-Baghdadi encourage the mujahedeen to kill and raid 'the enemies'.
- 28 July 2008: the ISI declares a new military campaign called 'Invasion of Revenge for the Martyr Brother, Abu Khalef', avenging deaths caused by Coalition and Iraqi forces.
- 14 April 2008: al-Baghdadi calls for Sunni unity and encourages all Sunnis (including those working for the Iraqi government to turn their guns towards the 'Crusader' enemy. Al-Baghdadi says the ISI will punish anyone who aids the 'occupying Crusaders'.
- 10 February 2008: the ISI renews their resolve to continue to fight against the 'aggressor'.

Conclusion

In view of the above information, ASIO assesses AQI is continuing to directly and indirectly engage in, preparing, planning, assisting in and fostering the doing of acts, and advocates the doing of terrorist acts. This assessment is corroborated by information provided by reliable and credible intelligence sources, as well as by the terrorist acts conducted by AQI in the past.

In the course of pursuing its objectives in Iraq, AQI is known to have committed or threatened action:

- with the intention of advancing AQI's political, religious or ideological causes;
- that causes, or could cause, serious damage to property, the death of persons or endangers a person's life; and
- with the intention of creating a serious risk to the safety of sections of the public globally.

Other relevant information

- AQI receives ideological support from, or has promoted ideological support for, several other terrorist organisations, including Al-Qa'ida (AQ), Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Salafists in Gaza and Al-Shabaab.
- On 26 March 2010, the ISI released a statement urging Muslims to support the family of Usama bin Laden, some of whom are currently imprisoned in Iran.

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- AQI is listed on the United Nations 1267 Committee's consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the governments of New Zealand and the United States.
- AQI was listed as a proscribed terrorist organisation on 2 March 2005, and relisted on 17 February 2007 and 3 November 2008.