

ADDENDUM TO SUBMISSION 2 TO JCPA HEARINGS ON REPORT 400
Brian Hannan – August 2005

Since making my submission, I have been made aware of the MSIC (Maritime Security Identification Card) situation (via industry publicity – see attached).

Security must be balanced or weaker points are open to exploitation. The UK situation indicates that as one area is strengthened (aviation security) terrorism will move to a weaker link (public transport).

No GA aircraft has been involved in terrorism. Yet we find a bureaucratic nightmare for the common GA private pilot seeking to pursue his or her hobby.

On the RPT side, major airports provide metal detection and X-Ray, bomb swabbing, and random searching. If a passenger cancels, unaccompanied baggage may be removed as a precaution. Aviation security in Australia should focus on this RPT area but somehow GA has been swept into the maelstrom. BTRE Report 100 confirms that GA is already in decline without this unnecessary security overkill. Well intentioned Government actions are aiding Bin Laden in his crusade to damage Western economies.

Conversely, trucks have been used as a terrorist bomb weapon. Yet we find a totally weaker approach to transport security. Likewise the wharves, where the abovementioned procedures are not in place and where a full audit of cargo is the exception rather than the rule. The sheer volume of FCLs entering Australia makes the risk of undetected movement or use of explosives or weapons far higher than in the aviation sector.

Issues like the duplication of the AVID and ASIC may seem unimportant to those on the JCPA. However, to many employed in GA, the knowledge exists that the approach taken to GA is not only inconsistent compared to that taken to Maritime security but may be a significant factor in further reducing the pilot population and the survivability of GA.

The Australian non-RPT GA sector does not pose a terrorist threat and deserves treatment equivalent at the least to the Maritime sector. If data are sought to substantiate this please consider the following: -

A 747 is around **340** times the weight of a Cessna.

Second, the 747 carries around **1280** times the explosive weight of fuel.

However, it becomes frightening when we calculate the impact force of a 747 versus a Cessna. Impact force is represented by the kinetic energy of the object calculated by the formula “half the mass of the object multiplied by the velocity squared”.

A 747 at cruise speed hits a building with **5920** times the force of a C172 at cruise speed.

I ask that the JCPA considers in its deliberations that the lower level of GA in Australia poses no security threat and deserves reconsideration of its economic value and security requirements.

Synopsis from “Owner/Driver – 8 July 2005 – P17

The new Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) will be required for workers on Australian ports from August 2005.

The Office of Transport Security advises that truck drivers accessing the wharves will have to apply for a MSIC.

The MSIC will include the standard AFP, ASIO, and DOI checks as needed.

Victorian Transport Association’s Neil Chambers, part of the Government Working Group looking at implementing MSIC advises: -

About 130,000 MSIC will be needed, covering wharves and Patrick and P&O container depots.

Australia Post has been selected as the shopfront for applicants. You go to the PO, present your 100 point ID check, fill in a form at the PO and they pass it to the AFP.

Patrick & P&O also conduct an induction course to meet the security plan and drivers will then be given a ‘smart card’ that will allow them to remotely access facilities.

In comparison, for GA pilots the current situation is

To hold a pilot licence, complete the forms with photos, ID check, and certification, then forward via CASA to obtain issue of an AVID after the standard AFP, ASIO, and DOI checks. The AVID is a hologram safe photo licence meeting security requirements.

To move on the “secure” area of an airport obtain an ASIC. At present this is not occurring for most non-RPT pilots as issuers for nation wide ASIC are awaited and GA pilots who do not fly from an ASIC issuing airport generally cannot obtain an ASIC.

The ASIC adds NO value to the AVID which already provides all mandatory information. The ASIC is merely an identifier authorised by DoTARS showing some right to be airside, although still subject to verification at specific locations – e.g. a GA ASIC will NOT automatically provide entrée to airside at an International airport.

DoTARS could by a stroke of the pen authorise the AVID as the GA (non-RPT) ASIC.

No option via Australia Post has been even suggested for obtaining ASIC or AVID for GA pilots. GA pilots will therefore become embroiled in a more bureaucratic and complex centralised process, to the detriment of GA which is already in decline (see BTRE Report 100). Can we assume trucks and the wharves pose less security risk?

The MSIC, compared to the AVID/ASIC which involves a far smaller risk group, is further evidence of the lack of coordination and consistency in the security process.