


709/87 Yarranabbe Road
Darling Point, N.S.W.
Tel: 02 9363 4707; Fax: 02 9327 6761

4 June 2005

To The Secretary
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
Parliament House
Canberra A.C.T. 2600

Attention Dr Sarah Miskin, Inquiry Secretary



SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSION

Further to my letter of 7 May 2005 and in response to your advice that detailed evidence of **OPPORTUNITIES** for fraudulent voting at the 9 October 2004 election, in terms of names and addresses set out in our submission dated 28 February 2005, may not be made available to the public via the AEC's website, we submit the attached revised statement of findings of a partial street walk and door knock review in the subdivision of Parramatta in the electoral Division of Parramatta.

As stated in the letter of 28 February 2005, Parramatta was selected because it was a marginal electorate which had hundreds of invalid addresses on the roll prior to the 2001 election.

Similar discrepancies have been found in other electorates which are sufficient to put a dent in the authenticity of the results of the 9 October 2004 election in some of the marginal electorates.

Yours sincerely,

W. Bruce Kirkpatrick for Peter Brun and Vic Batten

(Members of the H.S. Chapman Society) who signed the original submission.

FROM : Peter E.C. Brun, Victor Batten, W. Bruce Kirkpatrick

709/87 Yarranabbe Road Darling Point

Tel: 02 9363 4707; Fax: 02 9327 6761

6 JUNE 2005

**The Secretary
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
Parliament House
Canberra**

**PARRAMATTA ROLL SURVEY - SUBMISSION TO THE JSCEM -
21/02/05 - Revised 6 June 2005
PARRAMATTA - 19 Subdivisions, 47 Polling places**

SUMMARY

- A partial street-walk and door knock review in the Division of Parramatta based on the Electoral Roll of 7 September/9 October 2004, using the Liberal Party's "Feedback" roll data and comparing the names and addresses entered with those on the the AEC's computerised roll, revealed that, in one subdivision, errors and omissions existed in both the "Feedback" roll and in the AEC's computerised roll.
- If these streets comprising 2.2% of the Subdivision are representative, there would be over 2400 voters still on the roll in the Parramatta electorate who were no longer living at their enrolled addresses at the time of the election.
- It was evident from asking householders that some voters had not lived at the enrolled addresses for months or even years and that others had never lived at the enrolled address or did not exist as real persons.
- Calls were made in 15% of the streets in the subdivision. The large number of vacant addresses and enrollable addresses not inhabited by enrollable voters suggests that a habitation review needs to be carried out, as these represent opportunities for padding the roll with bogus enrolments.

1. PRE ELECTION

The discrepancies in the AEC's roll of voters when checked against some actual residences following the 2001 election, led to a move to recheck the electoral roll in Parramatta after the 2004 election. It had been intended to carry out this check before the election to minimise the retention on the roll after 7 September 2004 of names of voters which would not be eligible to be used on polling day as a qualification for obtaining voting papers. The change from hard copies of the roll being available to the public, to the situation of access being restricted to persons now covered under Section 90B of the now amended Act with the only available source of reference for the general public being the AEC's computer record, has severely restricted the ability of members of the public to check on electoral fraud.

2. POST ELECTION

After the sitting member Ross Cameron (Lib) had conceded defeat to Julie Owens (ALP), access was granted to part of a hard copy of the Liberal Party's "Feedback" roll, in street order. The objective was to assess the accuracy of the Australian Electoral Commission's CRU (Continuous Roll Update) roll, alleged by the AEC to be the most accurate register of voters assembled. On 22 October 2004 our team of three was given a copy of the 120 pages of the "FeedBack" roll for the PARRAMATTA SUBDIVISION having 50 names per page.

3. FINDINGS

The PARRAMATTA SUBDIVISION pages were divided into 3 bundles. Checks were made to obtain samples of possibly questionable entries, e.g.

- multiple occupancy of residences with 4 or more residents.
- resident's names having apparent ethnic and cultural differences - e.g. Chinese living with Arabs.
- missing sequence numbers in a street or apartment indicating an opportunity for a false name to be added to the roll at that address.
- inconsistencies between the roll and the actual residents at specific addresses, (Provisional and Postal voters).

A small selection of 37 addresses in 9 streets was identified from 14 of the 120 pages supplied, with 50 names per page, covering 3105 residences in 59 streets.

The names and addresses of electors on the Feedback roll were checked and confirmed as being on the AEC computerised roll at the Campbell Street Sydney office. Residences visited which were without occupants or were occupied, but names given of the "enrolled voter/owner" by the occupants which were not on the AEC roll, were noted (for detail see the initial report dated 21.02.05).

Both the Feedback roll and the AEC computerised CRU roll had omitted some residences visited but which had occupants who, in some cases, commented that they had not voted. Not all registered voters voted. The Feedback roll omitted the names and addresses of some voters who had voted and were enrolled on the AEC computerised roll.

- Number of voters on registered roll not living at enrolled address: 15
This included names of voters at residences not having lived there for months, years and never (i.e. Non existent - names only).
- Number of those and other voters still on roll at 22 October 2004 25
- Number of residences/vacant blocks visited which were opportunities for registering false names as had no occupants or were occupied by persons who were unable to name the owners or agent - 30

There are other empty residences and residences missing from the street sequence of addresses which provide further opportunities for false registration.

The evidence in past Inquiries of votes being lodged by persons in names not entitled to vote in the relevant election and using addresses different to where the person voting resides, whether in Federal, State, Union, preselection or other elections, has been widely publicised (examples can be supplied - - e.g.

- Mundingburra July-December 1995, Judge Ambrose in ruling for a by-election said "Unknown people had voted using Mundingburra electors' names (and addresses) while others had voted twice."

Of approximately 114,000 residents (of whom around 6000 lived in the Parramatta subdivision), including ineligible in the Parramatta electorate, 82,005 voted of which 6996 votes were informal.

In 14 pages each of 50 names, there were found to be 15 who were on the roll who should not have been and 30 residences where there was no registered voter resident, providing opportunities for false registration.

An extrapolation applied to the whole of Parramatta's 19 subdivisions implies that, if there were an average of 1 non legitimate voter per page ($15/14=1.07$), and 1.5 missing residences per page ($25/14=1.78$) there would be 5700 opportunities for manipulation of the roll.

That can be concluded without having to call on more addresses.

Names on the roll not at addresses listed: 1 per page x 120 = 120; 120 x 19 = 2280 for Parramatta electorate.

Empty Houses: 1.5 per page x 120 = 180 per subdivision; 180 x 19 = 3420 for Parramatta electorate

Some possible opportunities in Parramatta electorate: 2280 + 3420 = 5700

A similar but more extensive sample habitation review was carried out in Wentworth with similar discrepancies having been uncovered.

A proper and complete habitation check would show just how inadequate is the AEC's CRU procedure.

CONCLUSION

1. Neither the AEC's CRU nor the Liberal Party's "Feedback" rolls were up to date at 8 September or 9 October 2004.

2. The opportunities for fraudulent voting seem to be far in excess of the margin of votes by which the seat changed elected representatives on 9 October 2004.

3. The lack of a properly and efficiently maintained Habitation Review underlines the fact that the AEC's CRU is a poor substitute for serving the Australian democracy.

4. The change from making hard copies of the computerised rolls available to the public, to limiting availability of roll information to restricted computer access, has exacerbated the difficulty for members of the public of being able to check the accuracy of the rolls. **Empty residences are not identifiable from accessing the AEC's computerised roll.** The exercise described above could not have been attempted without access to the hard copy to which we were eventually given access after the election and after, in effect, "the horse had bolted".

One could wonder if that change was a deliberate move by some influential Parliamentarians to stop interested community 'watchdogs' uncovering these opportunities for fraudulent voting.

However, even with the means being restored to enable members of the public to check the accuracy of the rolls in their subdivisional areas, as long as there is no system for identifying which are the false votes in the ballot boxes, some, but less, fraud will continue.

The last JSCEM Report on the 2001 election and now the amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 in Section 91B(3), report that the change was due to a desire to stop the rolls being used for commercial purposes. When one considers the availability of Trade information sources, the telephone directories and the use of scanners, computers and other aids to obtaining the same information, the movers of this change must be seen to have had some ulterior motives, other than protecting the public from commercial exploitation.

It is recommended that legislation be introduced to make hard copies of the rolls available to the public as was previously the practice, both before and after the rolls close for elections and have been updated. A comparison of the rolls exposes a lot of the questionable changes which have been made months/years ago and at the last minute and the names and addresses of voters who should have been removed from the rolls but are still at an incorrect address.


It is also recommended that Parliament no longer accept the excuses

for delay in ensuring electoral roll validity put forward in the responses to Recommendations 1 and 2 of the Report on *The Integrity of the Electoral Roll*, ANOA Report No. 42 2001-02. It is now 2005.



Bruce Kirkpatrick for Peter Brun and Vic Batten

(Members of the H.S. Chapman Society) who signed the original submission as below:



Bruce Kirkpatrick Peter Brun Vic Batten
(Members of the H.S. Chapman Society)

