Ref No: 644:03:GDA

December 19, 2003

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Mr James Catchpole
A/g Sectional Committee Secretary
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2601

Submission No. 77

Dear Mr Catchpole,

Thank you for your letter dated December 2, 2003 and e-mail dated December 16, 2003 seeking answers to a number of questions raised by members of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit.

The responses to the questions of December 2, 2003 are:

Q1   In the last two years (December 2001 – December 2003), Qantas has carried 7334 Persons In Custody (PIC). The reasons that persons were classified as PIC include; persons overstaying their visa approval period, persons having been refused entry into Australia for a range of reasons, prisoners being escorted and persons being deported from Australia.

PIC information is currently manually retained (new electronic reporting systems are being developed for implementation in 2004) by Qantas and unavailable in electronic format. Manual records indicate that the 7,334 PICs carried fall into the following categories:

	Escorted	Unescorted
Family Court	20	1
Overstayed Visitor	215	1558
Prisoner (National)	3016	153
Prisoner (Overseas)	50	26
Refused entry	134	994
Removee	568	512
Unknown	20	67

Q1a Qantas has had, on occasions, concerns regarding the late advice of proposed PIC travel from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). On some occasions, no advice has been received regarding supervised departures. Across the range of agencies there are occasions where a lack of information has caused problems.

Qantas provides agencies with a proforma called *'Exchange of Information between an Authority booking travel for a person in Custody and Qantas Airways Limited.'* (copy attached) as well as guidelines in the form of a pamphlet titled, *'Person in Custody'*. (copy attached) to assist agencies and minimise any issues between an agency and Qantas.

Q1b Qantas has refused the carriage of fourteen (14) PICs in 2002 and 2003. In these cases, carriage has been refused following an assessment regarding the risk posed by the carriage of the PIC to other passengers and aircraft operations.

A recent example of Qantas refusing to carry a PIC occurred on November 21, 2003. The PIC has been originally assessed as a medium risk and was being escorted by two escorts between Cairns and Brisbane. Before the aircraft departed Cairns the PIC became uncontrollable and unruly and the aircraft returned to the gate. The PIC and escorts were off loaded and further carriage was refused.

Q1c Qantas was not the carrier in the example given to the Committee by the Board of Airline Representatives Australia (BARA). However, Qantas has experienced many incidents of the non notification of the carriage of a PIC.

Q1d See Q1b above.

Q2a Shortly following September 11, 2001 Qantas established an Enhanced Aircraft Security Group, comprising of management representatives from the airline's Group Security, Group Safety, Flight Technical, Engineering, Avionics, Cabin Safety and Flight Operations.

This group considers procedural and technical proposals to enhance the security of Qantas aircraft. On May 9, 2002 in addition to the installation of the new enhanced flight deck doors, a decision was also made to install video surveillance equipment outside the cockpit door of Qantas aircraft.

This group discussed the merits and otherwise of wireless threat notification devices and decided such devices were not an option for Qantas aircraft at this time on the grounds that:

- Qantas has an existing protocol for cabin crew to call the flight deck if there is a threat in the cabin;
- the use of wireless devices would inevitably induce accidental activation and the flight crew would have no choice but to land as soon as possible because there is no way to verify if the threat was real or not (crew would not leave the flight deck, but would divert to the nearest safe airport);
- unless approved by the aircraft manufacturers, there is a potential for electromagnetic interference with aircraft equipment;
- once the remote devices were known to be held by cabin crew, it would not be difficult for someone to obtain a device (or at least one that emits on the same frequency) and cause disruption to a flight;
- there is sufficient mitigation with the installation of the enhanced flight deck security door, the future installation of CCTV, and existing crew procedures; and
- the logistics of controlling the distribution, return and replacement of lost devices would be enormous.

Q2b Qantas has no knowledge of the cost of fitting these devices to company aircraft.

Q3 Qantas has not been formally involved in the trial. This is an initiative of management at Newcastle Airport. The ID check is performed by the security contractors (Chubb) employed by Newcastle Airport.

Q4 The last detailed analysis of meeters and farewellers was undertaken for Qantas in 1996 by research group ANOP. The estimated number of meeter and/or farewllers currently passing through security screening points at Qantas domestic terminals is between 2.25 million and 3 million per annum.

Qantas does not support limiting access to domestic sterile areas to travelling passengers only as:

- there is no increased risk or threat to aircraft operations by allowing screened meeters and farewellers into sterile areas at domestic airports;
- there is no enhancement of security outcomes by prohibiting non passengers into domestic sterile areas;
- not all customers have photo IDs (eg. children, elderly, non-drivers, WA has not transitioned their drivers licence to photo IDs)
- 35% of all domestic passengers travel without hold stowed luggage and proceed to check-in in lounges (Qantas Club and Chairman's lounge) and boarding gates located within the domestic sterile areas. These passengers do not possess a boarding pass at the time of passing through the screening point. Many of these passengers cannot be identified as travelling passengers at this point as the majority of Qantas domestic tickets are now e-tickets. As a consequence;

- significant delays would be anticipated at landside check-in counters to accommodate those passengers that now check-in in lounges and at boarding gates;
- there is potential for substantial infrastructure costs for additional landside check-in counters (space permitting);
- there is potential for significant under utilisation of current lounge and boarding gate check-in facilities;
- it is anticipated that additional staff would be required at screening points to check IDs (if held) and confirm validity;
- it is anticipated that queue wait times would increase at screening points (especially at capital city airports) potentially increasing incidents of air rage, reducing customer service and moving Australia closer to the unacceptable United States experience of significant delays at security points;
- additional screening units and staffing at significant capital and ongoing labour costs may be required (space permitting) to reduce anticipated delays;
- security areas within landside areas would need to be increased (space permitting) for additional wait time in queues;
- landside areas in domestic terminals may not be large enough to accommodate all existing passengers checking in landside, the additional passengers previously checking on at lounges and boarding gates plus their accompanying meeters and farewellers;
- Qantas would lose the benefit of significant recent lounge infrastructure upgrades at $millions within the sterile areas of Qantas terminals;
- the impact on concessions would be to lose up to 3 million potential customers;
- the retail revenue loss to terminal operators would be significant;
- the loss of sales to retailers would be significant.

The limiting of persons into domestic sterile areas is a complex issue with far reaching effects on the design and operating economics of terminals, the processes associated with passenger facilitation, the costs to airlines and ultimately customers for little if any increase in a security outcome.

Q5   The following are excerpts from the paper delivered by myself at the Crime Stoppers International Conference held in Melbourne on October 9, 2003.

"Intelligence/Information Sharing

There is no doubt that the timely dissemination of accurate intelligence and information is a valuable tool for all law enforcement and security practitioners.

Government intelligence agencies have never, since the cold war, enjoyed such support as is now the case. Expenditure is regularly being approved for more resources and more equipment.

Governments have also never been so keen to share previously protected information with organisations considered operators of critical infrastructure and indeed the public.

The collection, collation and assessment of information and intelligence is now an integral part of any law enforcement agency's tools of trade.

Engaging the private sector in the whole of government security planning has in the past been resisted and was more akin to reaction and response rather than prevention.

The concept of public and private sectors sharing information and intelligence in a timely manner is in its infancy and does not sit well with many experienced government, law enforcement and security officials let alone the private sector.

A terrorist or criminal only has to get it right once. The rest of us must get it right all the time!

We must ensure therefore, that we give ourselves every chance of success and that means both the public and private sectors working together, combining endeavours and resources, for an outcome that is beneficial to everyone - except those in our society who wish to gain from criminal behaviour or who aim to kill and injure fellow human beings with a passion for a cause that few of us appreciate or understand.

Let me give you three clear examples of areas for improvement.

Airports are complex communities consisting of a large number of people and a diverse range of businesses and government agencies.

There is generally a baseline threat environment with varying associated risks.

On any one day aircraft, trains, buses, taxis, cars and trucks convey thousands of people and tonnes of freight and goods to and from an airport. With each movement there is a distinct possibility that the equilibrium of the security environment will be disturbed – but who knows?

It is possible that in any given period of time; a large shipment of currency (millions of dollars) could be arriving, a foreign dignitary (VIP) could be departing, a government minister could be visiting the airport, a prisoner may be in the process of being extradited, several extremely valuable cargo shipments (including an art exhibition on loan from an

overseas national gallery, thousands of computer chips, and those unmarked containers belonging to the pharmaceutical manufacturer) could be arriving and departing, a group of refugees are being deported, the duty free store is receiving its weekly delivery of cigarettes and alcohol, a carrier is opening the new lounge and the guest list includes many well known celebrities, performers like the Rolling Stones could be arriving, customs and the police could be monitoring a suspect drug importation, an Ambassador could be farewelling a Head of State or senior minister on that countries national carrier – I'm sure by now you have the picture.

Where else is there an environment where such activities, in all reality, are a possibility in any given period of time on a single day?

Although individual organisations and agencies may be aware of one or even more of these events, who knows about them all, who knows the total picture? The answer – no-one!

There is no mechanism to capture, co-ordinate or disseminate this information to appropriate stakeholders.

In fact the general principle that is applied by government agencies as well as the private sector is that silence is itself a measure that offers security, confidence and peace of mind.

It is now time to reassess this theory. Sure such information deserves protecting, however, that protection must be balanced against the benefit of a holistic and co-operative approach to assessing all the risks in an airport environment and consequently, having the ability as a community, to employ adequate mitigation strategies and measures.

I am not for one minute advocating the indiscriminate exchange of information. What I am proposing is that a model which enables protected and sensitive information to be received, assessed and disseminated between relevant member organisations (public and private) at an airport, by appropriately cleared personnel from each of those organisations, must be possible.

The question is; have we the courage and desire to make it happen or, are we going to keep our heads in the sand and only look at and care about our piece of the pie in isolation.

Security an airport community responsibility

The second issue is that of engaging the entire airport community, residents and visitors in contributing to its safety and security outcomes.   We accept and encourage "neighbourhood watch" programs, why not "airport watch"?

There are many organisations and individuals who could play a more significant role in aviation security. It is essential that these organisations and individuals understand their roles and can identify opportunities to contribute.

Formal training and awareness programs are conducted for pilots, cabin crew, some ground staff, and government agency employees, etc, but not all. Certainly there is not a program that I am aware of for employees of concessions, taxi drivers, cleaners and similar.

Here we have a significant number of airport community members who we are not fully utilising in our security efforts.

My point is that we often say that "security is everyone's business"; now it is time to make that saying a reality.

We need to promote a level of security awareness across the board. This may be a big ask and certainly a challenging prospect, however, it is essential that the public at large be alert and know what to do when witnessing unusual or suspicious behaviour. The taxi driver must know what to do when he overhears a suspicious conversation in his cab. The cleaner must know what to do when he witnesses some odd behaviour or locates an item that is out of place. They should all know what to report and how to report it. It is essential that we get the message across to everyone that they all have a part to play in the security process.

In Australia, following the Bali bombings, the Federal Government initiated a campaign entitled "Be Alert Not Alarmed". Whilst the initiative was met with scepticism and criticism in many circles, the message was itself not only relevant but fundamental to enhance security awareness throughout the community."

Q6 There has been no response that I am aware of to the proposal to date. Qantas did, however, sponsor a presentation by Crime Stoppers to the Aviation Security Industry Consultative Group Meeting chaired by the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) in Adelaide on December 16, 2003.

The responses to the questions of December 16, 2003 are:

Q1 Qantas believes that the current legislative arrangements as detailed in the Air Navigation Act and Regulations should be enhanced to outline the extent of the power and authority of the Airport Security Committee.

Q2 Qantas has been advised that it is the intention of DOTARS that such matters will be "covered in the respective Airport Security Transport Programs and therefore do not need regulatory support".

Qantas is of the opinion that the formation, performance and objective of the airport security committee is best outlined in regulation rather than security programs.

Yours sincerely

Geoffrey D Askew
Head of Group Security