

## **Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)**

**(Also known as: Al-Qa'ida in Yemen (AQY) prior to January 2009)**

The following information is based on publicly available details about Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). To the Australian Government's knowledge, these details are accurate and reliable and have been corroborated by classified information.

### **Basis for listing a terrorist organisation**

Division 102 of the *Criminal Code* provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:

- (a) is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
- (b) advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

### **Details of the organisation**

#### *Objectives*

Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is the recognised affiliate of al-Qa'ida operating in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It is led by Nasir al-Wahishi, a Yemeni extremist who was once a close aide and bodyguard to Usama bin Laden (UBL). Al-Wahishi, whose appointment as AQAP leader was confirmed by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the deputy al-Qa'ida leader, is featured on Saudi Arabia's most wanted terrorist list.

Yemen has become the third-largest haven for al-Qa'ida in the world with the group there experiencing greater stability and freedom of movement than counterparts located in Iraq, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan. AQAP claimed responsibility for the attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253 on 25 December 2009. In a statement issued by the AQAP following the attempted attack, the group's leaders said: 'we tell the American people that since you support the leaders who kill our women and children ... we have come to slaughter you [and] will strike you with no previous [warning], our vengeance is near.' The statement continued: 'we call on all Muslims ... to throw out all unbelievers from the Arabian Peninsula by killing crusaders who work in embassies or elsewhere ... [in] a total war on all crusaders in the Peninsula of [Prophet] Muhammad.'

AQAP was known previously as al-Qa'ida in Yemen (AQY). The group was founded after the escape of 23 extremist detainees from a high-security government correctional facility in Sana'a in February 2006.

In a statement in January 2009, al-Qa'ida in Yemen announced a change of name to al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP, the name of the previous al-Qa'ida network in Saudi Arabia which was dismantled by Saudi authorities in 2006. In the same statement, AQAP announced two Saudi former Guantanamo Bay detainees had joined the group as senior members. One of those has since surrendered to Saudi authorities.

The aim of AQAP is to remove all Western influences and interests from the Arabian Peninsula. On 15 May 2008, AQAP released an online statement threatening attacks in the

Arabian Peninsula against non-Muslim foreigners. The group warned that they 'stand absolved from [the rights] of any infidel who has entered the Arabian Peninsula.'

#### *Leadership*

AQAP's leader, or emir, is Nasir al-Wahishi (aka Abu Basir) – a Yemeni national who was amongst the group of 23 veteran extremist leaders who escaped from a Yemeni government correctional facility in February 2006. This group went on to form the leadership elements of the current AQAP organisation. Al-Wahishi is reported to have served as an aide and a bodyguard to Usama bin Ladin in Afghanistan.

Public statements by Ayman al-Zawahiri in late 2008 and early 2009 praised AQAP's activities and referred to Nasir al-Wahishi as the emir of the group.

AQAP's deputy leader is Sa'id al-Shihri (aka Abu Sayyaf, aka Abu Sufyan) – a Saudi national and former Guantanamo detainee. Al-Shihri was returned to Saudi Arabia in 2007 and underwent a rehabilitation program but fled to Yemen upon his release. AQAP's operational commander is Qasim al-Rimi (aka Abu-Hurayrah al-San'ani).

#### *Membership*

AQAP comprises several hundred fighters and has found sanctuary among a number of Yemeni tribes, particularly in the eastern provinces.

#### **Terrorist activity of the organisation**

AQAP has been involved in a number of terrorist attacks, continues to plan and conduct attacks in Yemen and has claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks outside Yemen. The group employs suicide attacks, person and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, targeting Yemeni and foreign government, as well as foreign officials and tourists.

#### *Directly or indirectly engaged in the doing of terrorist acts*

AQY, as it was then known, first emerged when it claimed responsibility for the 15 September 2006 suicide vehicle bomb attacks against oil facilities in the provinces of Marib and Hadramawt.

#### *Directly or indirectly preparing, planning or assisting in the doing of terrorist acts*

Recent terrorist attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by, or reliably attributed to, AQAP have included:

- 2 July 2007 – AQY again used a suicide vehicle bomb in Marib Province. This attack was at the Queen of Sheba temple and killed eight people, mostly Spanish tourists.
- 6 April 2008 – AQY was responsible for a mortar attack against the Haddah apartment complex in Sana'a which housed a number of US embassy employees.
- 18 January 2008 – AQY members were involved in the attack on a tourist convoy in Hadramawt, which killed two Belgian tourists and two Yemeni drivers.
- 17 September 2008 – AQAP attacked the US Embassy in Sana'a, killing at least 18, including one American. Reporting indicates vehicles, explosives, small arms, and suicide bombers were used in the attack and the suicide bombers were disguised in local Yemeni security force uniforms.

- 15 March 2009 – four South Korean tourists were killed and four wounded by an explosion in the historic city of Shibam in southeast Yemen. On 26 March 2009 AQAP issued a statement claiming responsibility for the 15 March suicide bombing in Shibam.
- 18 March 2009 – a suicide bomber targeted a delegation of South Korean officials en route to the airport in Sana'a to investigate the Shibam terrorist attack. The bomber walked between the two vehicles and detonated his vest but caused no injury to the officials. AQAP claimed responsibility for the attack.
- 27 August 2009 – a suicide bomber attempted to assassinate Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Muhammad bin Nayif in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. AQAP claimed responsibility for the attack.
- 25 December 2009 – Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate an IED aboard Northwest flight 253 en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. On 28 December AQAP released a statement on a jihadist Internet forum claiming responsibility for the attack.

*Directly or indirectly fostering the doing of terrorist acts or advocating the doing of terrorist acts*

AQAP actively fosters and advocates the doing of terrorist acts. In January 2008 the group launched its online magazine *Sada al-Malahim* ('Echoes of the Epics'). The 11th issue of *Sada al-Malahim*, published on 29 October 2009, contained an editorial urging Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ruling family.

The 11th issue was 73-pages in length and focused primarily on the assassination attempt on Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayef. Several of the 31 articles in the magazine provided information about the bomber, Abdullah Hassan Taleh al-'Asiri (AKA Abu al-Kheir), and gave justification for the attack. Some articles were reprints of speeches and texts from Usama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam and Yusuf al-'Ayiri, and the AQAP communiqué on the Marib clash with Yemeni forces that occurred on July 30. Three articles were featured from AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahishi, including a piece that praises Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, a piece describing the deception of Nayef by al-'Asiri, and a brief eulogy for slain Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement commander, Saleh al Nabhani.

On 19 February 2009, AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahishi issued an audio statement urging the people of Yemen to rise up against their government. Al-Wahishi portrayed Yemen as being exploited by the Western powers, which he described as "crusaders".

## **Conclusion**

On the basis of the above information, ASIO assesses that Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula is directly and indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in, fostering and advocating the doing of terrorist acts. It is submitted that the acts attributable to Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula are terrorist acts as they:

- (i) are done with the intention of advancing a political cause, namely, removing western influences and interests from the Arabian Peninsula;
- (ii) are intended to coerce or influence by intimidation, the governments of foreign countries, namely Yemen and Saudi Arabia; and
- (iii) constitute acts which cause serious physical harm to persons, including death, as well as serious damage to property.

**Other relevant information**

*Proscription by the UN and other countries*

In January 2010, the United States designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

## Al-Qa'ida (AQ)

(Also known as: Al-Jihad Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaida, The Base, Egyptian al-Jihad, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites, International Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders, Islamic Army, The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Sites, Islamic Salvation Foundation, The Jihad Group, New Jihad, Usama Bin Laden Network, Usama Bin Laden Organisation, The World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders)

The following information is based on publicly available details about al-Qa'ida. To the Australian Government's knowledge, these details are accurate and reliable and have been corroborated by classified information.

### **Basis for listing a terrorist organisation**

Division 102 of the *Criminal Code* provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:

- (a) is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
- (b) advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

### **Details of the organisation**

#### *Objectives*

In 1988, al-Qa'ida emerged from the Maktab al-Khidamat, a recruitment and fundraising network for the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan. The impetus for establishing al-Qa'ida was to retain a common purpose for Islamic extremists following the end of the conflict with the Soviets. During the late 1990s, al-Qa'ida was transformed from providing a unifying function for extremist elements into a global network of cells and affiliated groups.

Al-Qa'ida seeks to remove governments in Muslim countries that it deems are "un-Islamic" in order to establish an Islamic Caliphate. The United States and its allies are believed by al-Qa'ida to represent the greatest obstacle to this objective, given their perceived support for these governments.

#### *Leadership*

Al-Qa'ida is a Sunni Islamic extremist organisation whose core leadership is located in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Usama bin Laden co-founded al-Qa'ida with Dr Abdullah Azzam and gained full control after the assassination of Azzam in 1989. Usama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri continue to lead al-Qa'ida.

Al-Qa'ida maintains core support networks and operations in the Afghanistan and Pakistan border region. This region has served as a sanctuary for the leadership since the loss of the group's facilities in Afghanistan in late 2001, and where it continues to be well protected by local tribes and other sympathisers.

However, due to counter-terrorism measures against it, the al-Qa'ida core has become increasingly isolated, short of funds and is having more trouble recruiting and equipping fighters. While bin Laden and al-Zawahiri remain at large, unmanned drone attacks continue to kill other senior al-Qa'ida leaders, making it more difficult to raise funds, recruit and plan operations.

### *Membership*

The exact size of the organisation is unknown, although some estimates have suggested a strength of approximately several thousand fighters. Originally, al-Qa'ida recruited veterans of the Soviet-Afghan conflict of 1979-89 and from campaigns in places such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kashmir, Mindanao, Chechnya, Lebanon, Algeria and Egypt.

More recent recruits include fighters who have gained experience in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. While al-Qa'ida has inspired a new generation of extremists, not all of those who travel to Afghanistan/Pakistan actually join al-Qa'ida. For some it is easier to join a local extremist group.

### *Recruitment and funding*

Funding is often obtained through donations from Muslim charities and individuals. The US 9/11 Commission report attributed much of al-Qa'ida's funding to money diverted from charities. In addition, funds are also probably raised through criminal means, such as credit card fraud and the use of assumed identities. It is believed al-Qa'ida stopped using legitimate banking institutions for moving funds by mid-2002, turning instead to alternative systems such as the hawala system, couriers and precious stones.

Arabs dominate al-Qa'ida's senior leadership. Less is known about the group's recruitment methods since the loss of its training camp infrastructure in Afghanistan in late 2001. It is likely a similar system has been established in the tribal areas of Pakistan, but on a smaller scale, using covert training camps and safe houses.

However, US drone attacks have made it more difficult for al-Qa'ida's efforts in fundraising and recruiting. Reports suggest al-Qa'ida is struggling to raise funds and is having more trouble recruiting and equipping fighters.

## **Terrorist activity of the organisation**

### *Directly or indirectly engaged in the doing of terrorist acts*

Al-Qa'ida has directly or indirectly engaged in a number of terrorist attacks, including assassinations, suicide bombings, aircraft hijackings and attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including vehicle-borne and vessel-borne. Significant attacks which al-Qa'ida has claimed responsibility for, or that can be reliably attributed to individuals affiliated with al-Qa'ida, include:

- 7 August 1998: the bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people;
- 12 October 2000: the bombing of the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors;

- 9 September 2001: the assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masood in Afghanistan;
- 11 September 2001: the hijacking of four US passenger planes and crashing them into the World Trade Center buildings in New York, the Pentagon in Washington, and a field in Pennsylvania, killing approximately 3,000 people, including ten Australians;
- 11 April 2002: the bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba, killing 20 people;
- 14 June 2002: the car bombing outside the US Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, killing 12 people;
- 6 October 2002: the bombing of the French oil tanker MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen, killing one sailor;
- 28 November 2002: in Mombasa, Kenya, the car bombing of a hotel, killing 15 people, and the firing of two surface-to-air-missiles that missed an Israeli passenger plane after takeoff from Mombasa airport;
- 24 February 2006: the attack on the Abqaiq oil refinery in Saudi Arabia, killing two security guards;
- 2 June 2008: the bombing of the Danish Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing 6 people; and
- 20 September 2008: the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing 60 people.

*Directly or indirectly preparing and/or planning the doing of terrorist acts*

Al-Qa'ida lost its primary base for training, planning and preparing for terrorist operations following the US intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001. Since then, al-Qa'ida has sought alternative locations in which to train and regroup, and members continue to gain combat experience in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Despite sanctions against al-Qa'ida's extensive financial networks, al-Qa'ida continues to find means of raising and transferring money for terrorist attacks, including through donations, criminal activity and via couriers.

*Directly or indirectly assisting in the doing of terrorist acts*

Reporting indicates al-Qa'ida has encouraged, inspired and assisted like-minded individuals, as seen in the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London transport system. While there has been no confirmation of al-Qa'ida command and control over these attacks, there have been indications of al-Qa'ida involvement in training and influencing those involved. Two of the perpetrators of the London attacks, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, had travelled to Pakistan and, according to a statement by al-Zawahiri, had been trained by al-Qa'ida operatives.

Al-Qa'ida has also provided financial and material assistance in support of terrorist acts by other groups. These include:

- 12 October 2002: assisting in funding attacks on night clubs and the US Consulate in Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 people, including 88 Australians;

- 15 November 2003: assisting in planning and preparing car bomb attacks on two synagogues in Istanbul, killing 20 people;
- 20 November 2003: assisting in planning and preparing car bomb attacks on the HSBC Bank headquarters and the British Consulate in Istanbul, killing 30 people;
- 7 July 2005: assisting in training those involved in IED attacks on London's transport system, killing 56 people, including one Australian; and
- 2 March 2006: assisting in bombing a diplomatic vehicle outside the US Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, killing three people.

*Directly or indirectly fostering the doing of terrorist acts or advocating the doing of terrorist acts*

Senior members of al-Qa'ida have made numerous statements advocating the conduct of terrorist attacks against the US and countries perceived to have allied themselves with the US and Israel. The February 1998 statement issued under the banner of the "World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders" decreed that civilians in these countries were legitimate targets for terrorist attack.

Al-Qa'ida continues to provide inspiration, encouragement and influence to other Sunni extremist groups around the world. Moreover, al-Qa'ida leadership relies on its franchise organisations to plan and execute attacks. This relationship is best demonstrated by the decisions of the Salafist Group for Call and Combat in Algeria and the Jamaat Tawhid wa'al-Jihad group in Iraq to merge with al-Qa'ida. Now known as al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb and al-Qa'ida in Iraq respectively, both groups accept strategic direction and at times receive funding from al-Qa'ida.

Al-Qa'ida has recently expressed support for Uighur separatists in China. In an October 2009 statement, senior al-Qa'ida member Abu Yahya al-Libi declared "It is the duty of Muslims today to stand by the side of their wounded and wronged brothers in East Turkestan ... there is no way to lift oppression and injustice but with truthful return to their faith and ... to seriously prepare for jihad."

Al-Qa'ida also encouraged extremism in Somalia in 2009. A statement by al-Zawahiri in February and another one by bin Laden in March called on the mujahideen of Somalia to reject the government and fight for an Islamic state.

Senior al-Qa'ida leaders continue to make public statements promoting al-Qa'ida's ideology, supporting attacks undertaken by other groups and advocating violent jihad against the West. According to the UN Monitoring Team on al-Qa'ida and the Taliban, "the main way the (al-Qa'ida) leadership imposes some control and uniformity of purpose is through its broadcasts and web postings. These have attained increasing sophistication and follow a clear pattern, promoting recruitment, keeping local groups motivated, suggesting targets, and providing overall direction."

As-Sahab, al-Qa'ida's media wing, has continued to produce high-quality videos that reinforce al-Qa'ida's ideology, defend its actions, recruit new members and inspire others to conduct terrorist attacks. From 2002 to 2009, as-Sahab produced 250 videos, peaking at 97 in 2008. The drop in production in 2009 may be attributed to a lack of funding and/or increased counter-terrorism measures against al-Qa'ida. However, there is no indication the decline in the numbers of productions has degraded the effectiveness of al-Qa'ida's message to like-minded individuals.



Al-Qa'ida also exploits the terrorist attacks conducted by individuals and groups not linked with it to further spread its message. Following the suicide bombing on the CIA base at Khost, Afghanistan, on 30 December 2009, the chief of al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan released a statement on 6 January 2010 in which he praised the bomber, stating "Your brothers will continue the march on your path and they will not rest and their populace will not part with the populace of the Americans till they inflict upon them the greatest and most astonishing deaths and wounds..."

In a 29 January 2010 statement attributed to bin Laden, the people of the world are urged to wage economic terrorism on the US by boycotting American products and disposing of the US dollar. Bin Laden also called on the "mujahideen" to "continue their fight against the unjust in Iraq and Afghanistan."

### **Conclusion**

ASIO assesses al-Qa'ida is continuing to directly and indirectly engage in, preparing, planning, assisting in and fostering the doing of acts involving threats to human life and serious damage to property. ASIO also assesses that al-Qa'ida advocates the doing of terrorist acts. This assessment is corroborated by information provided by reliable and credible intelligence sources, as well as by the terrorist acts conducted by al-Qa'ida in the past.

In the course of pursuing its objective of creating an Islamic Caliphate, al-Qa'ida is known to have committed or threatened action:

- with the intention of advancing al-Qa'ida's political, religious or ideological causes;
- that causes, or could cause, serious damage to property, the death of persons or endangers a person's life; and
- with the intention of creating a serious risk to the safety of sections of the public globally.

In view of the above information, al-Qa'ida is assessed to be directly and indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in and fostering the doing of terrorist acts and advocating the doing of terrorist acts. Such acts include actions which have been done or threatened with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause and with the intention of coercing, or influencing by intimidation, governments and individuals globally. The actions or threatened actions which al-Qa'ida is assessed to be involved in would, if successfully completed, cause serious physical harm and death to persons and serious damage to property.

### **Other relevant information**

#### *Links to other terrorist groups or networks*

In 1998, key figures of five terrorist groups, including Usama bin Laden, issued a declaration under the banner of the "World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders," announcing a jihad and stating the US and its allies should be expelled from the Middle East.

In addition to the groups al-Qa'ida has incorporated "officially" under its banner, al-Qa'ida also has provided encouragement and inspiration to other Islamic terrorist groups. Among such groups are: Al-Shabaab, Abu Sayyaf Group, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic

Army of Aden, Asbat al-Ansar, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamiat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Ansar al-Islam.

*Threats to Australian interests*

Since 2004, a number of statements have been made by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri calling for attacks against the US and its allies, including Australia. The most recent al-Qa'ida reference to Australia was on 2 April 2008, when as-Sahab posted to extremist internet forums an audio file of al-Zawahiri responding to questions from forum participants. Al-Zawahiri referred to Australia when responding to a question criticising al-Qa'ida for killing Muslims in Muslim lands and not conducting attacks in Israel. Al-Zawahiri responded by citing attacks against the US and its allies, including Australia, in various locations and that these countries supported Israel.

*Proscription by the UN and other countries*

Al-Qa'ida is listed in the United Nation's 1267 Committee's consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the governments of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Al-Qa'ida also is listed by the European Union for the purposes of its anti-terrorism measures.

## **Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)**

**(Also known as: Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah, Jamaah Islamiyah, Jama'ah Islamiyah, Jemaa Islamiya, Jema'a Islamiya, Jemaa Islamiyah, Jema'a Islamiyya, Jemaa Islamiyya, Jemaa Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiah, Jemaah Islamiya, Jeemah Islamiyah, Jema'ah Islamiyah, Jemaah Islamiyyah, Jema'ah Islamiyyah)**

The following information is based on publicly available details about Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). To the Australian Government's knowledge, these details are accurate and reliable and have been corroborated by reliable and credible classified information.

### **Basis for listing a terrorist organisation**

Division 102 of the *Criminal Code* provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:

- (a) is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
- (b) advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

### **Details of the organisation**

#### *Objectives*

Jemaah Islamiyah is a Salafi jihadist group, inspired by the same ideology as al-Qa'ida (AQ), which regards the Indonesian government, along with other nations in the region, to be illegitimate. JI seeks to revive a pure form of Islam and establish a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia, governed by the tenets of *Sharia* (Islamic law).

Founded in Malaysia on 1 January 1993 by Indonesian Islamic clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, JI represents an evolutionary development of the Indonesian Islamic movement, Darul Islam (DI), which fought a violent insurgency to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s. JI's goals are essentially those of DI, but with a regional perspective.

JI's charter and operating manual, the "*General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah*" (PUPJI), outlines the religious principles and administrative aspects underlining JI's primary objectives. These entail establishing a solid support base of followers and then through armed struggle – first creating an Islamic state in Indonesia followed by a pan-Islamic Caliphate incorporating Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and southern Philippines and ultimately creating a global theocratic Islamic state.

#### *Leadership*

The current JI leadership remains anti-Western in orientation, refusing to denounce violent jihad as a means of achieving its desired objectives and willing to conduct attacks against local sectarian targets. JI has no publicly acknowledged leader, but has a well-ordered succession plan, in the event of the arrest of the incumbent Emir. Since the arrest of JI Emir Zarkasih in June 2007, no new Emir has been identified publicly. However, two possible candidates have emerged: Para Wijayanto and Hadi Surya.

JI remains operationally and organisationally distinct from other regional extremist groups. Despite counter terrorism efforts by regional authorities, JI remains a functional paramilitary organisation, supportive of the use of violence whenever strategically opportune.

JI currently embodies two opposing factions – a group which advocates fast tracking the Islamic Caliphate through sustained violence and a ‘traditionalist’ faction that temporarily eschews attacks, preferring to focus on the long term grass roots consolidation and rebuilding of its support networks.

#### *Membership*

JI’s membership is not known publicly and is estimated to range between 900 and several thousand members, mostly concentrated in Java but spread throughout Indonesia and neighbouring Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar.

#### *Recruitment and funding*

Recent JI activity has an emphasis on *Dakwah* (Islamic outreach) and publishing – in order to prepare a *mujahidin* support base for future extremist activity. JI’s 35 or so schools continue to produce a new generation of potential mujahideen who will intermarry, set up businesses together and be indoctrinated in ideology sympathetic to JI’s long-term Islamist goals.

Most of JI’s funding is derived from member contributions, Islamic publishing, affiliated charity and legitimate business activities, robbery and direct transfers from Middle-East based terrorist financiers in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

### **Terrorist activity of the organisation**

#### *Directly or indirectly engaged in the doing of terrorist acts*

Elements of JI have conducted numerous attacks targeting sectarian and foreign interests in Indonesia, particularly anti-Christian violence in Sulawesi, Maluku and Sumatra. JI targeted the Philippines Ambassador in Jakarta in 2000 and also conducted sectarian attacks across Indonesia over the 2000/2001 Christmas and New Year period. JI’s first successful anti-Western attack was the Bali bombings of October 2002 which killed 202 people, including 88 Australians. This was followed by the 2003 JW Marriot Hotel bombing and the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. The second Bali bombing, which took place in 2005, killed four Australians.

#### *Directly or indirectly preparing, planning or assisting in the doing of terrorist acts*

JI has been responsible for preparing, planning or assisting in the doing of terrorist attacks against a range of targets, but particularly Christian, Western and Indonesian government interests. Those previously subjected to JI attacks include hotels, bars, diplomatic premises, transport and military facilities and churches.

Since its re-listing by the Australia Government as a terrorist organisation on 9 August 2008, networks with familial and social links to JI have conducted attacks specifically targeting Western interests. Information and materiel seized in operations against JI linked individuals

since 2008 demonstrate JI retains the capability and intent to use violence to achieve its goals - and networks linked to JI continue to plan to conduct terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia.

- 17 July 2009: The Noordin Top network – involved in previous anti-Western attacks attributed to JI – conducted bombings against two hotels in Jakarta, the Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton. Seven civilians were killed including three Australians. Funding for the hotel bombings likely came from overseas, via links between JI associates and foreign extremists.
- 1 April 2009: JI fugitive, Mas Selamat Kastari, former head of the Singapore branch of JI, was arrested by Malaysian authorities in Johor while plotting further attacks against Singapore.
- 28 June 2008 – 1 July 2008: a JI-linked cell in Palembang, Sumatra, was arrested for plotting to bomb a tourist café. Al-Furqon, a JI-linked pesantren, provided the venue for the radicalisation of the cell members; Fajar Taslim, a member of JI's 'Afghan Alumni' provided the group leadership and ideology to undertake acts of violence; and another member of the Afghan alumni, Saifuddin Zuhri, provided weapons and bomb making materiel and expertise to the Palembang cell.
- JI operatives continue to provide terrorist training to local extremist groups in the Philippines, such as the MILF and the ASG – these JI elements were co-located with the groups in southern Philippines, and contributed to the surge of violence against domestic Philippines and foreign interests in the Sulu Archipelago since 2008.
- Intelligence from the arrest of senior JI operatives, Abu Husna and Agus Purwantoro in Malaysia in 2008 detailed JI's links and desire to renew its international terrorist links.

*Directly or indirectly fostering the doing of terrorist acts or advocating the doing of terrorist acts*

JI remains focussed on Dakwah (Islamic outreach) and its publishing operations to promote an extreme interpretation of Islam. JI's network of 35 or so religious schools continually works to inculcate future generations of Indonesian youths in this extreme form of Islam designed to develop a support base in Indonesia for an Islamic State under Islamic Law, and legitimatise the use of violence to achieve their objectives.

## **Conclusion**

On the basis of the above information, ASIO assesses that JI is continuing to directly and indirectly engage in, preparing, planning, assisting in, fostering and advocating the doing of terrorist acts involving threats to human life and serious damage to property.

In the course of pursuing its objective of creating an Islamic state under *Sharia* (Islamic law) in Indonesia and a pan-Islamic Caliphate in South East Asia, JI is known to have engaged in acts that:

- are done with the intention of advancing JI's political, and religious and ideological causes;
- cause serious damage to property, the death of persons or endanger a person's life; and
- create a serious risk to the safety of sections of the public of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Australia and other persons visiting areas in which it operates.

The above acts include actions which have been done or threatened with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause and with the intention of coercing or influencing by intimidation, the Government and people of Indonesia which they consider apostate. The actions or threatened actions which JI are assessed to be involved in would, if successfully completed, cause serious physical harm and death to persons and serious damage to property.

### **Other relevant information**

#### *Links to other terrorist groups or networks*

Having a common heritage in DI has facilitated close links between JI and other violent extremist groups in Indonesia. These groups, including DI remnants, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), KOMPAK (Crisis Action Committee), and Laskar Jundullah, provide recruits and support networks for JI activity. JI continues to recruit covertly from its network of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), religious study groups and through personal contacts.

JI's domestic and regional extremist links were reinforced by the simultaneous presence of JI and non-JI Southeast Asian militants in al-Qa'ida training camps in the late 1980s and early 1990s. JI's 'Afghan Alumni' cultivated organisational and personal relationships with foreign extremist groups, such as al-Qaida, while training and fighting in Afghanistan. Links were also forged with Southeast Asian extremist groups, laying the foundation for the current JI collaboration with militant groups in the Philippines. JI has linkages to the Abu Sayyaf Group – particularly through fugitive JI operative Umar Patek and Dulmatin, who was recently killed by Indonesian Security forces – and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), who still provide refuge to JI personnel despite ongoing MILF/Philippines Government peace negotiations.

#### *Proscription by the UN and other countries*

JI is listed in the United Nation's 1267 Committee's consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the governments of Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US.

## **Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**

**Also known as: Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM); Le Groupe Salafiste Pour La Predication et le Combat; Salafist Group for Call and Combat; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC); Tanzim al-Qa'ida fi bilad al-Maghreb al-Islamiya**

The following information is based on publicly available details about al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb. To the Australian Government's knowledge, these details are accurate and reliable and have been corroborated by classified information.

### **Basis for listing a terrorist organisation**

Division 102 of the *Criminal Code* provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:

- (a) is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
- (b) advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

### **Details of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb**

#### *Objectives*

Formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a Sunni Islamic extremist group with its headquarters in northern Algeria. The group operates mainly in Algeria and the Sahel region of northern Mali. From its bases in northern Mali, AQIM also conducts regular attacks in Mauritania with some forays into Niger. AQIM does not appear to have established a strong foothold in the Maghreb countries of Morocco, Tunisia or Libya at this stage but aspires to expand its influence throughout North Africa and the Sahel/Sahara region and to conduct attacks in Europe.

As the GSPC, the group's main goal was to overthrow the Algerian Government and replace it with an Islamic government to rule Algeria under Sharia law. This remains one of AQIM's key aims. However, following the GSPC's merger with al-Qa'ida in late 2006 and name change to AQIM in early 2007, the group increasingly has adhered to al-Qa'ida's extremist ideology and has declared war against foreigners and foreign interests.

AQIM has called for the freeing of the Maghreb countries of North Africa from Spanish and French influences and for the regaining of the lost Islamic regions of southern Spain, known as al-Andalus. AQIM also has stated its support for the Palestinians and called on Muslims across North Africa to target Jewish and Christian interests. Since 2000, Algerians believed to be GSPC/AQIM members have been arrested in France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK and Pakistan. Security forces also have dismantled AQIM support cells in several European countries. While an AQIM attack in Europe is possible; the threat appears to have receded in the past few years.

Concerted counter-terrorism campaigns by Algerian security forces have put AQIM on the defensive in northern Algeria. Algerian authorities reportedly neutralised hundreds of AQIM

militants in 2009 and believe that the group's national emir, Abdelmalek Droukdal, is losing control of the organisation. As a result of these pressures, the group's focus appears to be moving southwards into the Sahel region, boosting the relevance of the group's Mali-based battalions for training and recruitment and fundraising operations. These battalions are currently able to operate in relative safety in the vast, ungoverned north of the country and AQIM is launching an increasing number of attacks in Mali and Mauritania, including against Westerners, with some forays into Niger. As a result, international and regional calls for the Malian Government to drive AQIM out of Mali are becoming louder.

The GSPC was formed in 1998 as a splinter group of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to protest against the GIA's indiscriminate killing of civilians. The GSPC quickly became Algeria's largest and most dangerous terrorist group and by 2000, the external networks of the GIA across Europe and North Africa had been absorbed by the GSPC.

In June 2004, the GSPC released statements claiming that its jihad in Algeria was part of the international jihad led by Usama bin Laden and declaring war on all foreigners and foreign interests in Algeria. The culmination of this increasingly pro-al-Qa'ida stance was the GSPC's official merger with al-Qa'ida and its subsequent name change.

- On 11 September 2006, al-Qa'ida announced a merger between the GSPC and al-Qa'ida.
- On 26 January 2007, the GSPC announced it had changed its name to Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Following the 2006 merger, AQIM media statements took an increasingly anti-Western position and the group conducted its first attacks specifically targeting Western interests.

### *Leadership*

Since 2004, the group has been led by Abdelmalek Droukdal (aka Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud). Other central figures include the leaders of two semi-autonomous and increasingly active AQIM battalions based in Northern Mali - Abdal Hamid Abu Zayd aka Abid Hamadou (Tariq Ibn Ziyad Battalion) and Mokhtar Belmokhtar (Al Moulathamine Battalion). The group's 2006 merger with al-Qa'ida has proved to be largely ideological and AQIM appears to operate autonomously with limited contact and direction from its parent organisation.

### *Membership*

AQIM's membership currently is estimated at between 500 and 800 members, about a third of whom operate in the Sahel regions of northern Mali and Mauritania. AQIM members are recruited from the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), the Sahel region (extending across northern Mali, southern Mauritania, northern Senegal, southern and central Niger, central Chad, central Sudan and Eritrea) and from other West African countries.

### *Recruitment and funding*

Following substantial losses in its northern Algerian strongholds in the past two years, AQIM has stepped up its efforts to recruit new members. The group released a video entitled 'Join the Caravan' on 1 January 2010, maintains web-based propaganda and issues on-line updates of its activities under the title 'Series of the Swords' Shadows', disseminated by the Al-Fajr Media Centre website. In October 2009, the website announced that AQIM had formed a new



media outlet called 'Al Andalus Media Productions', in reference to an area of Spain regarded by AQIM as occupied Islamic territory.

AQIM funds itself primarily through criminal activities, including the kidnapping of Westerners for ransom payments. Kidnapping operations in the Sahel/Sahara region of North Africa have been a key source of funding in the past two years and have netted the group millions of Euros in ransoms since February 2008. Other funding sources include protection rackets, people and arms trafficking, money laundering and muggings and increasingly, the facilitation of drug trafficking from South America into Europe.

### **Terrorist activity of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb**

#### *Directly or indirectly engaged in the doing of terrorist acts*

AQIM conducts attacks against Western interests in northern Algeria and increasingly in Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Its methods include suicide bomb attacks, remotely detonated roadside bombings, small arms attacks, kidnappings for ransoms and assassinations.

- AQIM's most significant attack on Western interests in Algeria was the 11 December 2007 suicide bombing attack on the UN Office in Algiers which killed 17 people.
- AQIM's most significant attack on Western interests in Mali was the assassination of a British tourist in northern Mali on 31 May 2009 following the UK Government's failure to meet AQIM's political demands.
- In Mauritania, AQIM was behind the kidnap of four Westerners in November and December 2009, the killing of a US citizen in the capital Nouakchott on 23 June 2009 and a suicide attack on the French Embassy in Nouakchott on 8 August 2009.
- In Niger, AQIM associates kidnapped two Canadian diplomats in December 2008 and held them in northern Mali until April 2009 when they were freed following the release of four AQIM prisoners held in Mali. Four European tourists were also taken hostage in Niger in January 2009 and held in northern Mali. Three were released after ransom payment while the fourth was killed.
- A further seven Westerners were kidnapped in four separate incidents in Mauritania, Mali and Niger between November 2009 and April 2010.
- As of May 2010, AQIM was holding three Western nationals hostage in northern Mali.

In addition to targeting Western interests, AQIM routinely attacks Algerian military, police and government interests. Common tactics include ambushes, attacks at false roadblocks, raids on military, police and government convoys, armed assaults and vehicle-borne suicide bombings.

#### *List of attacks*

AQIM can also be reliably attributed to, or has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks including:

- 10 December 2006 – AQIM claimed responsibility for a roadside bomb attack on a bus carrying Western oil workers near Algiers. One Algerian died and nine others were injured in the attack, including four Britons, one American, one Canadian and one Algerian.

- 3 March 2007- AQIM claimed responsibility for a roadside bomb attack on a bus carrying Russian gas workers, south-west of Algiers. Three Algerians and one Russian died in the attack.
- 29 August 2007 – AQIM placed a homemade bomb between two railway tracks, derailing a freight train near Algiers and injuring three people
- 6 September 2007 – an AQIM suicide bomber blew himself up shortly before a scheduled visit by the Algerian President in the town of Batna, killing 11 people
- 13 September 2007 – authorities defused a bomb placed by AQIM in a market in the city of Chemora (440km southeast of Algiers). The bomb was intended to explode in the midst of the crowd on the first day of Ramadan 2007.
- 14 September 2007 - Three people were killed and five wounded when a homemade bomb exploded outside a police residence east of Algiers. AQIM later claimed responsibility for the attack.
- 24 September 2007 - three municipal guards were the target of a lethal ambush perpetrated by an armed group of AQIM militants in Stah, 360km east of Algiers.
- 25 September 2007 – AQIM militants killed two police officers in a roadside bomb attack on a police patrol in Les Issers.
- 27 September 2007 - AQIM was responsible for the deaths of two soldiers in a bomb attack in Sidi Ali Bounab, in the Bourmedes Province, 135km east of Algiers.
- 9 October 2007 – three Algerian military personnel died when two roadside bombs place by AQIM targeted an army convoy in Boumerdes.
- 8 November 2007 – AQIM claimed responsibility for an attack on an aircraft, possibly an Algerian Air Force cargo or transport jet, which was the target of an RPG attack at Djanet airport in the south of Algeria.
- 11 December 2007 - two car bombs exploded in Algiers, killing at least 62 people. The attacks targeted the Constitutional Court building and a UN office. AQIM later claimed responsibility for the attacks.
- 3 January 2008 – an AQIM militant carried out a suicide truck bomb attack in Naciria, 70km east of Algiers, killing four people and injuring 20.
- 1 February 2008 – AQIM associates launched a firearm and grenade attack on the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania.

**Attacks in the past two years include:**

- 29 January 2008 – a lorry laden with 635 kg of explosives and driven by an AQIM supporter was detonated outside a police barracks in the town of Thenia, east of Algiers, killing four people and injuring 23 others.
- 10 March 2008 – AQIM issued a statement claiming responsibility for the abduction of two Austrian tourists in Tunisia.
- 6 August 2008 – AQIM claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Tizi Ouzou province, east of Algiers, on 3 August that reportedly injured 24 people.
- 9 August 2008 – an AQIM suicide bomber driving a vehicle laden with up to 300 kg of explosives attacked the Coast Guard barracks and the gendarmerie in Zemmouri el-Bahri in Boumerdes province, east of Algiers, reportedly killing six and injuring 18.

- 17 August 2008 – AQIM militants ambushed a military convoy between the provinces of Skikda and Jijel, east of Algiers, killing 11 soldiers with roadside bombs and small arms fire.
- 19 August 2008 – AQIM claimed responsibility for a large car bomb explosion outside a police training school in Issers near Boumerdes province, east of Algiers, killing 48 and injuring 45.
- 20 August 2008 – AQIM militants carried out attacks against a hotel and a police barracks in Bouira, south-east of Algiers, killing 11 and injuring 38.
- 17 February 2009 – AQIM claimed responsibility for the 14 December 2008 kidnappings of Canadian UN envoy Robert Fowler and his aide in Niger as well as the 23 January 2009 kidnappings of four European tourists – two Swiss, one German and one British – in Mali.
- 26 May 2009 – 10 Algerian soldiers were killed and six other injured when their patrol was ambushed by AQIM militants in Biskra province south-east of Algiers.
- 3 June 2009 – AQIM released an internet statement claiming to have killed British hostage Edwin Dyer, one of four European tourists kidnapped by the group in late January 2009. It was later confirmed that Dyer had been beheaded by the group in May 2009.
- 17 June 2009 – 20 police officers and a civilian were killed by AQIM militants during an attack on a security convoy in the Mansourah area of northern Algeria's Bordj Bou Arreridj province.
- 23 June 2009 – AQIM militants shot dead a US national in the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott.
- 29 July 2009 – 20 Algerian soldiers were killed when AQIM militants ambushed their convoy with IEDs and small arms in Tipaza province west of Algiers.
- 8 August 2009 – two security guards were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated himself outside the French embassy in the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott. Local authorities attributed the attack to AQIM.
- 9 November 2009 – a senior army officer was killed and two soldiers were wounded when AQIM militants detonated an IED in the Cap Djenet area of Boumerdes province, east of Algiers.
- 18 December 2009 - kidnapping of two Italian citizens by suspected AQIM militants in the Mneyssiratt area of Mauritania.
- 25 November 2009 – AQIM associates kidnapped a French civilian from the town of Menaka in Mali, near the border with Niger.
- 29 November 2009 – AQIM associates kidnapped three Spanish aid workers 170km north of Nouakchott in Mauritania.
- 20 April 2010 – AQIM members kidnapped a French tourist and his Algerian driver in northern Niger.

*Advocating the doing of terrorist acts*

AQIM leaders and senior al-Qa'ida members including Ayman al-Zawahiri, have stated publicly that AQIM should target US, French and other Western interests in Algeria, across North Africa and into Western Europe.

## **Conclusion**

On the basis of the above information, ASIO assesses that AQIM is directly and indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in and fostering the doing of terrorist acts and advocating the doing of terrorist acts. It is submitted the acts attributable to the AQIM are terrorist acts as they:

- (i) are done with the intention of advancing a political cause, namely the overthrow of the Algerian Government and the establishment of an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law; and advancement of al-Qa'ida's political and religious causes.
- (ii) are intended to coerce or influence by intimidation, the governments of foreign countries including Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.
- (iii) constitute acts which cause serious physical harm to persons, including death, as well as serious damage to property.

## **Other relevant information**

### *Proscription by the UN and other countries*

AQIM is listed on the United Nations 1267 Committee's consolidated list as an entity associated with al-Qa'ida. AQIM has been also listed as a terrorist organisation by the US. Canada and the UK still list the group as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC).