



Submission No 16

Inquiry into Australia's aid program in the Pacific

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Inquiry into Australian Aid in the Pacific

**Parliament of Australia Joint Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade**

Australian Federal Police Submission

June 2006

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Executive Summary

Australia's peace and prosperity is linked to that of our neighbours, and these links are becoming deeper and broader from both security and economic perspectives. Today, Australia is in a position to assist its neighbours with peace, good governance and an enhanced ability to combat crime with the objective of supporting economic growth, the proper functioning of state institutions and poverty eradication.

The situation across the Pacific is complex. Without adequately functioning police services, there is no reliable accountability mechanism in emerging states to ensure that other state institutions are not suborned by corruption and malpractice. Also unprofessional police and unaccountable or weak law and order institutions can result in the most disadvantaged individuals in the emerging state, suffering disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear.

The AFP has a capacity to flexibly support peace operations, capacity building and other international initiatives which promote values of political and economic freedom while working to sustain a humanitarian spirit amongst police of recipient nations. Within the Pacific region the AFP has deployed personnel to the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, Timor Leste and Vanuatu to deliver a range of capacity building activities designed to strengthen policing services within the law and justice sector of those countries.

Major achievements of these missions to date have been:

- **Solomon Islands** – Restoration of the rule of law along with the arrest of high profile offenders and the seizure of large numbers of firearms and ammunition. The removal of fear and insecurity from the community has also been a major objective along with the transfer of responsibility for policing to the Royal Solomon Islands Police.
- **Timor Leste** – Assistance to the United Nations in supervising the act of self-determination for the world's youngest nation, assistance in the maintenance of internal security for a period of five years and provision of a strong and supportive police response to a serious episode of state failure.
- **Papua New Guinea** – The establishment of a forthright relationship which provides a foundation for future engagement based on clear principles in relation to the fight against crime and corruption.
- **Nauru** – Successful administration of policing services including upgraded capability and marked progress towards removal of this nation's adverse United States *Patriot Act* status.
- **Vanuatu** – Establishment of a critical policing relationship designed to enhance the effectiveness of police operations and satisfaction of the community with the level and type of services being provided in a challenging environment.
- **Multilateral Relationships** – An unanticipated benefit for the Pacific, stemming from the Solomon Islands intervention, has arisen from the multilateral character of this mission which brought hundreds of police together from 14 Pacific nations.
- **Smaller Scale Initiatives** – Targeted, cost effective programs which have been established to debilitate transnational crime in the Pacific along with filling gaps in police service capabilities in a way which enhances relationships to support future cooperation with Australian policing operations.

The philosophy underpinning these activities recognises that the provision of support to local law and justice institutions forms the basis for a stable security environment for emerging nations in the Pacific and provides a platform for their long term development.

Introduction

This submission to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Australia's aid program in the Pacific provides the Committee with an overview of Australian Federal Police (AFP) involvement in this work, developments in the demand for international policing services and the nature of law and order problems in the Pacific. The situation across the Pacific is complex and a descriptive model has been included in the submission which may assist Committee members in gaining an understanding of the types of problems which may arise and the roles Australian police may be required to perform in their resolution. Lastly, the submission examines the issue of pre-conditions for success and the range of missions currently deployed in the Pacific region¹.

International Policing – An Australian Perspective

The AFP is the Commonwealth's international police organisation and primary adviser on matters relating to international policing. In carrying out this work the AFP is part of a Whole of Government response to international issues which involves partners from across Government including: AusAID; Defence; the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT); the Attorney-General's Department; Customs; Immigration; and other agencies on an as needs basis. The aid relationship is based on a strategic partnership between the AFP and AusAID which is supported by a formal agreement as well as project specific documentation.

The international role of the AFP has developed substantially over recent years with the AFP becoming directly involved in an increasing range of international policing issues and law enforcement partners. Catalysts for this increasing level of international activity have included threats from transnational criminals, international emergencies and disasters, and a burgeoning terrorist problem which has resulted in direct attacks on Australian interests.

The situation in the Pacific however, is particular to Australia's immediate sphere of influence, with the region being dominated by emerging states (most of which have only gained independence from colonial powers in the past 30 years). This Region is widely described as the 'arc of instability'.² These states face a daunting array of challenges, some of which are specific to the 21st Century, while others are common to the broad historic experience of state building. Phenomena unique to the present period in history are underpinned by previously unheralded communications and transportation technology, providing greater opportunities for transnational criminals from all parts of the world to operate in the Pacific and for corrupting influences (both from within and external to these emerging nations) to undermine the state building process.

The struggle within emerging states between self or sectional interests and public interest is a more traditional tension in the state formation process. This tension all too commonly spills over into dysfunctional government which is variously characterised as 'rogue states', 'failed states' or 'fragile states', depending on the extent of domestic and internationally problematic behaviours. The scale of this challenge has been well demonstrated in the past two months with major incidents of disruption in the Solomon Islands and state failure in Timor Leste,

¹ For the purposes of this discussion, Timor Leste has been included in the Pacific category to maintain consistency with other key publications such as the *Pacific 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for Growth* report published by AusAID, 2006

² See: Dobell, Graeme, Australian Security in the 21st Century Seminar Series: *The South Pacific – Policy Taboos, Popular Amnesia and Political Failure*, (Seminar Paper), Parliament House, Canberra, 12 February 2003; May, R.J., (ed.), *Arc of Instability? Melanesia in the early 2000s*, Canterbury NZ, 2003; and Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, *A Pacific engaged: Australia's relations with Papua New Guinea and the island states of the southwest Pacific*, Senate Printing Unit, Parliament House, Canberra, August 2003.

where Australia and other international donors have worked for a number of years on state building processes.

Research on state failure has shown a disturbing pattern in relation to costs which must be borne by neighbouring states and the long term difficulties encountered when attempting to re-establish failed states.

This research shows that failed states on average:

- require up to 50 years to become stable³;
- cost (US)\$50-\$80 billion to recover and become productive members of the international community⁴;
- will experience three episodes of internecine warfare if state failure commences with significant violence;
- cause adjacent states to lose in the order of 2% p.a. in Gross Domestic Product⁵;
- are breeding grounds for poverty, disease and lawlessness⁶; and
- are major sources of international terrorist and transnational criminal activity.⁷

Australia has an international role in the Pacific to assist emerging nations in attaining levels of responsible and accountable government which sustain sound economic growth. This is a necessary course of action from both humanitarian and national interest perspectives as it creates a strong and secure region which is not prone to the costs and adverse consequences of having to manage a failed state in immediate proximity to Australia.

The AFP and Offshore Interventions

Police services have not until recent times been viewed as critical participants in the delivery of international aid programs. The traditional role for police in this field has been restricted to peacekeeping operations which is reflected in the earlier work of the AFP with operations in Cyprus (1964 – present), the Thailand border (1989 – 1993), Cambodia (1992 – 1993), Somalia (1993 – 1994), Haiti (1994 – 1995), Mozambique (1994) and Bougainville (1997 - 2000), all clearly reflecting strong peacekeeping orientations. This role continues today in the Sudan as a legitimate application of policing skills in the international community.

Analysis of other AFP missions reveals strong shifts in the theme of their work towards capacity building activities where the role of foreign police has been to support operations by the domestic police services rather than exercise executive authorities. This shift first became evident with AFP involvement in Timor Leste (1999 – present) which commenced as a peacekeeping operation but progressively developed into a capacity building mission. Similar profiles have also been evident with the Solomon Islands (2000 – present) intervention and the suspended mission to Papua New Guinea (including Bougainville: 2004-2005). AFP missions to Jordan (2004 – present), Nauru (2005 - present) and Vanuatu (2006 - present) have been implemented from the outset as capacity building activities.

³ Collier, Paul, 'On the Economic Consequences of Civil War', *Oxford Economic Papers* 51, 1999, pp.168-83

⁴ Chauvet, Lisa and Collier, Paul, *Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds*, Oxford University, London, 2004

⁵ Chauvet, Lisa and Collier, Paul, *Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds*, Oxford University, London, 2004

⁶ AusAID, *Pacific 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for Growth*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, May 2006

⁷ Peebles, Dave, *Pacific Regional Order*, Co-published by ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2005

This work has been complemented by a large number of small, highly targeted initiatives across the Pacific which are designed to build capacity through training towards closure of identified skill gaps, the provision of vital policing equipment and the establishment of strategic relationships across the region's law enforcement community. The most important of these initiatives has been the establishment of Transnational Crime Units across the Pacific along with a Transnational Crime Coordination Centre in Suva, which collectively provides Pacific nations with a capacity to fight organised crime and resist the process of being 'picked-off one by one'.

The key issue which arises from the evolution described above is the transition from peace operations to capacity building and what this means for the future direction of police based support for aid activities in the Pacific.

The Nexus between Aid Delivery and International Policing

There is an increasing international recognition⁸ that aid delivery and its impact on economic growth and the delivery of social services and poverty eradication has, in many cases, been debilitated by a combination of lawlessness and corruption and seriously dysfunctional public institutions. This latter element of government would, in the normal course of events, be essential to the achievement of development goals. This problem has several dimensions however one of the critical points of failure is the justice system, and the police service within the justice system. Without adequately functioning police services, there is no reliable accountability mechanism in emerging states to ensure that other state institutions are not suborned by corruption and malpractice. Also, unprofessional police and unaccountable or weak law and order institutions can result in the most disadvantaged individuals, in emerging states, suffering disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear.

Unfortunately, no society is immune from transnational crime and many of our Pacific neighbours, such as the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste, face immense challenges. One of the great concerns about organised criminal groups and terrorist organisations is that they tend to target weak and vulnerable nations struggling with poor governance structures and social, political and/or economic instability. The prevalence of transnational criminals in any emerging state can compound already critical governance problems due to the power imbalance between them and the fragile institutions of state.

David Hegarty described some of the attendant issues in the Pacific in 2004 as:

“...money laundering through tax havens established in a number of PICs (Nauru, Cook Islands, Vanuatu), drug trafficking through the region (especially through Palau, Fiji, Papua New Guinea), a small trade in illegal weapons, and the (legal though dubious) sale of passports by some PICs (Tonga, Nauru) as fund-raising ventures. Of more recent concern has been the onset of illegal migration into the region (in particular from southern China to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji)... The appearance of criminal syndicates from East Asia and the accompanying pursuits of gambling, prostitution and drug trading in some Pacific capitals is also exercising regional police forces and

⁸ See Rotberg, Robert, *State failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press USA, 2004; Huang, Reyko, *Securing the Rule of Law: Assessing International Strategies for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice*, International Peace Academy, (Policy Paper), November 2005; and World Bank, *World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone*, The World Bank, Washington., 2005.

agencies. Carpet-baggers, con-men and promoters of shonky land deals and pyramid money and other such schemes, often from Pacific Rim countries, are also active.”⁹

These transnational threats remain a serious concern for Australia’s Pacific neighbours. There is a direct correlation between stability and the negative impact of the presence of corruption. The Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index*, shows a strong correlation between Transparency International's perception of corruption scores and a state's instability. Eight of the ten most stable countries also appear amongst the 10 least corrupt.¹⁰ This position aligns directly with the priority assigned to fighting corruption in the recently released white paper on Australian aid.¹¹

Recent events have shown that Australia cannot be complacent in regard to this instability. Sustainable economic growth continues to elude many of the Pacific island states.¹² We have seen a volatile Pacific with questions of another coup shadowing Fiji, rioting in the Solomon Islands following election of the Prime Minister and a breakdown of law and order in Timor Leste. Fears have been expressed, too, that other Pacific states exhibit some of the symptoms of failing states.¹³

The magnitude of these problems within the environments where Australian aid programs must deliver services has revealed a broad spectrum requirement for police involvement. This spectrum ranges from the need for re-establishment of law and order so that people (including aid workers) can go safely about their normal business, through to roles in training, mentoring and leading police services so that they are capable of supporting the operations of ethical and accountable institutions in emerging states. The ongoing fight against transnational crime alone would have seen a continuation of police involvement across the Pacific. However this imperative has become even more important in recent times with revised concepts in the aid field recognising that the rule of law impacts directly on economic growth, poverty eradication and the proper functioning of state institutions.

A Model for Police Involvement in Aid Delivery

Developments in the nexus between aid delivery and international policing have been rapid which has raised questions as to how and when police should be involved in various aid scenarios and what the balance should be from a Whole of Government perspective between police and other agencies. The answers to these questions are rarely clear due to the situational complexities associated with failed or fragile states, however, it is possible to illustratively model the problem from a policing perspective using the four most commonly encountered types of problems likely to affect police assistance to emerging nations.

These four problems are depicted in Table 1 and cover *civil war*, *lawlessness*, *corruption* and *institutional dysfunction* which can vary in effect from extreme to acceptable levels in any nation which may require Australian assistance. The debilitating effect of these problems needs little explanation as the effects of civil war in the destruction of emerging nations are well understood whilst the impact of factors such as lawlessness and endemic corruption on

⁹Hegarty, David, *Working Paper No 3, 2004, Intervention, Regionalism, Engagement: New forms of Security Management in the South Pacific*, State, Society & Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific & Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 2004

¹⁰ Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace, *The Failed States Index*, 2004, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3420&page=0

¹¹ AusAID, *Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, April 2006

¹² Asian Development Bank, *Outlook 2006, Asian Development Bank, Routes for Asia's trade*, China, 2006

¹³ Peebles, Dave, *Pacific Regional Order*, Co-published by ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2005, pp.2-3

the legitimacy of the state have been evident in crises amongst emerging nations, including those in the Pacific, over the past 30 years. The Table describes the possible extent of each problem in terms of limiting cases (extreme to acceptable), the forms of AFP operations which may be required as a result of these situations and the condition of the state requiring assistance. This type of generic model provides a broad prism through which the issues of police support to emerging nations can be considered as it is not reliant on specific experiences within individual states.

Table 1 – Problem Types Requiring Police Support in Emerging Nations

Type 1		Type 2		Type 3		Type 4	
CIVIL WAR		LAWLESSNESS		CORRUPTION		INSTITUTIONAL DYSFUNCTION	
Condition of Recipient State							
The state has ceased functioning and there is open warfare or other forms of extreme violence between social groups.		The rule of law is weak and arbitrary in its application with widespread violent and other crime.		Endemic corruption debilitates the functioning of state institutions to various degrees and prevents necessary institutions being established by the ombudsman.		All necessary state institutions exist and function to various degrees but require support.	
Limiting Cases							
Extreme	Acceptable	Extreme	Acceptable	Extreme	Acceptable	Extreme	Acceptable
Violent Conflict	Monitored Peace	Breakdown in Rule of Law	Rudimentary Rule of Law Established	Endemic Corruption	Sporadic Corruption	Institutional Dysfunction	Effective Public Institutions
Police Task							
Peacemaking - principally a military task due to active warfare with possible police support	Peacekeeping - military & police supervising peace, including investigation of crimes)	Completely external provision of police services due to no internal capacity – with possible military support	Inline police to supplement local service	Inline police performing both executive and advisory functions to corruption proof	Off line police to act as advisors only (no executive authority)	Off line police to act as advisors only (no executive authority), and highly targeted technical assistance (no executive authority)	Highly targeted technical assistance (no executive authority)

The policing implications of this model are clear in terms of the types of commitment which may be required to resolve each type of problem. More severe scenarios require significant numbers of external police to exercise various forms of *executive authority* on behalf of the state being assisted (due to a complete loss of internal capacity – note recent events in Timor Leste and earlier events in the Solomon Islands) whilst less severe scenarios may only require deployment of *advisors, trainers* or other forms of *technical support* such as infrastructure or equipment, which are designed to build the capacity of recipient police services.


It is also evident that situations involving high level violence are more appropriately managed and led by the military with police operating in support (criminal investigation and advice to military personnel dealing with other policing problems) and only limited representation from other sources. Less severe scenarios, such as those involving lawlessness, would result in police led operations with military and other agencies in support, at least in the early stages. Less severe situations such as those involving corruption and institutional dysfunction would provide scope for leadership by other agencies such as DFAT or AusAID.

In reality it is unlikely these problem types would exist in isolation from one another and it is highly likely that worse case scenarios, such as civil war or internecine violence, would be accompanied by varying degrees of less severe problems including lawlessness, corruption

and institutional dysfunction. More extreme problem types are also likely to be associated with total state failure whilst lower order problems are likely to define the differing dimensions of state fragility.

This situation is represented graphically in *Figure 1* which transposes these problem types onto a *development axis* based on the severity of each problem to be managed and its effects on state functionality (failed, fragile, functioning). The development axis represents the desired path for emerging nations from *worse* to *better* overall performance (terminating at one extreme in a failed state with the other being a robust emerging state). The overlap between problem types is important because it indicates that at certain points the distinction between problem types, for example lower level civil war and extreme lawlessness, is not clear and shows that they can easily be confused when dealing with issues of state failure and fragility.

Figure 1 – Development Axis for Emerging States



Recent set backs in Timor Leste and to a lesser extent the Solomon Islands, show that state building initiatives do not necessarily have a built in ‘ratchet effect’ that would prevent **backsliding** on the development axis. Indeed, this experience demonstrates all too clearly that it is possible for nations to backslide under the influence of destabilising factors which act against the longer term objective of creating robust and stable nation states. State building is not a simple process of progression from one positive stage to the next but one which requires patience and acceptance that set-backs may occur and that this is an inherent part of the process.

The AFP recognises that “changing deep rooted cultural perspectives takes many years – perhaps a decade or generation before the full benefits are felt”¹⁴. Capacity building in particular is likely to be a long term activity based on changing values and behaviours in ways which may be generational in nature rather than being simply measured in weeks, months or years. The AFP is committed to working with Australia’s Pacific partners in supporting sustained reform agendas and acknowledges the difficulties in defining problems and designing solutions to prevent state failure and support fragile states in achieving sound development goals.

Pre-conditions for Success of Policing Missions

A commonly asked question in relation to police support for development aid is, what are the preconditions for the success of such missions? Whilst it is tempting to try and establish a list of these factors, this exercise is extremely difficult and the definitive list seems ‘forever elusive’. The reason for this is the inherently complex nature of the development problem which identifies a myriad of factors, many of which are unique to individual missions. These may include the adequacy of program budgets, relationships between donors and recipients, the nature of aid being provided by other donors, the extent of corruption in recipient administrations, who is corrupt and why, the extent of cultural differences, language barriers, threats of open warfare and the public image of police in recipient nations, to mention but a small number of possibly relevant factors.

Three broad considerations have however, proven to be instructive when considering the success of Australian police aid missions. These are:


- the balance between deploying the AFP as a corporate entity by comparison to private contractors or consultants. This latter group often brings high level technical skills to problem solving and many of those working in the law and justice sector are former police. Private contractors however have no role in setting public policy in relation to other nations, have no Commonwealth charter to exert policy pressure on the governments of other nations and are often actively reliant on positive reporting by recipients for continuation or renewal of contracts. The scope for such entities to act as vigorous agents of change is highly restricted and the AFP is seeking to redefine key relationships with these agents in relation to Australian offshore law enforcement policy;
- the timing of interventions relative to state failure has important resource and effectiveness consequences as shown in Figure 2. Timing opportunities fall into three categories, pre-emptive intervention prior to state failure, intervention in the course of state failure, and post conflict intervention following state failure. In general terms it

¹⁴ Clegg, Ian, Hutton, Robert and Whetton, Jim., *Policy Guidance to Support Policing in Developing Countries* Swansea: University of Wales, 2000, p.77

is far more cost effective to intervene prior to state failure, with well developed capacity building initiatives to strengthen public institutions, rather than to undertake a full recovery process requiring a major peace operation intervention with lingering hostilities which must be followed by further lengthy capacity building activities, the costs of which exceed those which would have accrued at an earlier stage. It must be recognised, however, that proactive interventions are frequently not possible as they are actively resisted by parties which either stand to benefit from continuation of the status-quo or its destruction; and

- the desire by the population of recipient nations to see the rule of law established so that progression through the state reconstruction stages, outlined in *Figure 2*, can be undertaken in an effective and efficient manner. Where this desire is absent, assistance efforts may extend for several years or decades with interventions being ‘frozen’ at the peacekeeping stage (such as Cyprus) and all gains in terms of capacity building being entirely reliant on the presence of peacekeepers. Police interventions are about values and behaviours, and development must deal with this issue.

Figure 2 – Timing and Type of Police Interventions to Support Emerging States



The AFP has learned from practical experience that each type of police aid mission must be thoroughly and realistically assessed against specific objectives. The provision of support to foreign police services is a sensitive matter and care must be taken from a strategic international law enforcement perspective to ensure responses are cohesive and designed to enhance ethical and operational standards.

Current AFP Missions in the Pacific

The AFP has capacity to flexibly support peacekeeping, capacity building and other international initiatives which promote values of political and economic freedom and sustains

a humanitarian spirit amongst the police of recipient nations. The AFP recognises that post-conflict situations require a different approach to protracted crisis and stagnation. To this end, mission parameters are carefully calibrated to individual country circumstances in ways which recognise that assistance may be required.

Current AFP missions in the Pacific region are summarised in *Table 2*. The mission summaries incorporated in *Table 2* clearly show the extent of AFP engagement and variations in calibration referred to above. Not only do objectives, resourcing and duration of missions vary depending on the problem being addressed, but the method of service delivery is also ‘tailored’ to each situation. The majority of smaller missions are capacity building in orientation and exclusively by bi-lateral in character, whilst larger missions are more likely to be multilateral and involve the exercise of executive authorities.

Table 2 – AFP Missions in the Pacific¹⁵

Mission	Objective	Personnel	Bilateral or Multilateral	Type of Participation	Anticipated Program Duration
NAURU	To strengthen the capacity of the Nauru Police Force to effectively and professionally maintain law and order.	4	Bilateral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In-line police to supplement local service 	2004 to 2009
RAMSI	To assist the Royal Solomon Islands Police build its own capacity to manage with the law and order issues in a fair and effective manner.	282 (Australian) 51 (Pacific)	Multilateral (Australian lead)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In-line police to supplement local service In-line police advisors 	2000 to 2008 ¹⁶
TIMOR LESTE	United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission to support the objectives of the UN in Timor Leste	4	Multilateral (United Nations lead)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peacekeeping 	Mandate ceases August 2006
	Timor-Leste Police Development Program is designed to assist the Timor-Leste Police to promote and maintain a safe, stable environment in Timor-Leste.	4	Multilateral (United Kingdom)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training advisors 	2004 to 2008
	To assist the Government of Timor-Leste to re-establish law and order.	200	Multilateral (various countries)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External provision of police services 	2006 (not yet defined)
VANUATU	To contribute to creating a safe and secure environment for all citizens and visitors of Vanuatu through the provision of excellent policing services.	6	Bilateral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In-line police to supplement local service In-line police advisors 	2006 to 2011
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME UNITS & THE PACIFIC TRANSNATIONAL CRIME COORDINATION CENTRE	To contribute to the development of AFP strategic alliances with foreign partner law enforcement agencies, to ensure a cohesive and coordinated effort to combat transnational crime.	8 (staffed through AFP resources)	Bilateral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Short term programs 	Numerous on-going small projects (established in 1998)
	To assist Pacific nations to fight transnational crime across the entire region.	(as above)	Multilateral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Long term programs 	2003 to 2007 (to be further assessed)

¹⁵ As at 6 June 2006

¹⁶ Australia previously deployed personnel to the International Peace Monitoring Team from 2000 to 2003.

The major achievements of these missions to date have been:

- **Solomon Islands** – Restoration of the rule of law along with the arrest of high profile offenders and the seizure of large numbers of firearms and ammunition. The removal of fear and insecurity from the community has also been a major objective along with the transfer of responsibility for policing to the Royal Solomon Islands Police.
- **Timor Leste** – Assistance to the United Nations in supervising the act of self-determination for the world's youngest nation, assistance in the maintenance of internal security for a period of five years and provision of a strong and supportive police response to a serious episode of state failure.
- **Papua New Guinea** – The establishment of a forthright relationship which provides a foundation for future engagement based on clear principles in relation to the fight against crime and corruption.
- **Nauru** – Successful administration of policing services including upgraded capability and marked progress towards removal of this nation's adverse United States *Patriot Act* status.
- **Vanuatu** – Establishment of a critical policing relationship designed to enhance the effectiveness of police operations and satisfaction of the community with the level and type of services being provided in a challenging environment.
- **Multilateral Relationships** – An unanticipated benefit for the Pacific, stemming from the Solomon Islands intervention, has arisen from the multilateral character of this mission which brought hundreds of police together from 14 Pacific nations.
- **Smaller Scale Initiatives** – Targeted, cost effective programs which have been established to debilitate transnational crime in the Pacific along with filling gaps in police service capabilities in a way which enhances relationships to support future cooperation with Australian policing operations.

The AFP remains committed to the Pacific and will work with partners in the region to counter corruption, strengthen institutions and support infrastructure development. The AFP recognises that police aid programs aligned with partner government priorities are championed by local people and that the involvement of beneficiaries in design and implementation is most likely to result in sustainable long term outcomes.

Conclusion

Australia's peace and prosperity is linked to that of our neighbours and these links are becoming deeper and broader from both security and economic perspectives. Within the Pacific region, the AFP has deployed personnel to the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, Nauru and Vanuatu to deliver a range of capacity building activities designed to strengthen policing services within the law and justice sector of those countries. Special support has also been provided to a number of other Pacific nations in terms of training, equipment and infrastructure which has assisted in filling targeted gaps at the lower end of the spectrum and has provided a basis for coordinated responses to transnational and other crime at the high end of the spectrum. The philosophy underpinning these activities recognises the provision of support to local law and justice institutions providing a stable security environment for governments to deliver and sustain effective governance which will assist future economic growth, poverty eradication and service delivery.