CHAPTER 5
ISUES CONSIDERED DURING THE INQUIRY
Introduction
5.1 The Committee examined a number of matters during the inquiry.
5.2 Not all of the matters raised in the Brew report were subject of
detailed submission or comment. The Committee has accordingly concentrated in its report
on matters that are of particular concern.
The Government's November 1996 rail proposals
Introduction
5.3 On 24 November 1996 the Government announced a number of proposed
changes to that part of the Australian rail network and industry under
Commonwealth control: the business of AN, its shareholding in NR, and
ownership of the major part of the interstate standard-gauge infrastructure
and network. [1]
5.4 The November 1996 rail proposals followed government consideration
of the Brew Report, and consultation with a Committee of MPs, Senators
and Ministers (known as the Rail Reform Committee) established by the
Government in August 1996 to examine the Government's current involvement
in the rail industry (it was stated in the Government's media release
that the Rail Reform Committee had consulted with `a wide range of people
involved in the rail industry, including private sector organisations,
the trade unions, AN employees, merchant bankers and potential buyers
in considering recommendations .... [2]
5.5 The general approach taken in the November 1996 rail proposals is
initially to offer for sale basic AN assets. The sale process will be
by way of invitation to having a scoping study (now completed) [3]
and for offers to buy finalised toward the end of the 1996-7 financial
year.
5.6 In announcing the process by which AN assets are to be sold, the
Minister for Transport and Regional Development announced in the 6 March Media Statement
that
buyers will have the option of bidding for the whole of AN's intrastate
operations, or for the component parts . Rolling stock and intrastate
track will be offered as part of the sale . Our intention is to maximise
private sector involvement to ensure the long-term viability of - and
growth in - the industry. [4]
5.7 The Minister also announced that
The Commonwealth will commence discussions with the Governments of
South Australia and Tasmania shortly about legislative changes necessary
to facilitate the AN sale [5]
5.8 Both the South Australian and Tasmanian Governments nominated clearly
preferred positions on sale or disposal of the AN assets in their States
and the Committee is aware that legislation will need to be passed by
the Parliament of both States to complete the sale. [6]
5.9 The South Australian Government noted general support for the
Government's sale of AN assets. Under its submission on `Sale Processes Being Conducted by
the Commonwealth' it noted several reservations
firstly, the timetable for the sale process may be too
compressed (ie, by 30 June 1997) to achieve a good result for both South Australian and
the Commonwealth. As a corollary, the proposed sale timetable has the potential to
increase the risk that the Commonwealth will be forced to incrementally extend the sal
schedule to ensure the objectives of the sale are achieved without compromising the
quality of the sale process;
secondly, there is a need to ensure that vital policy areas
(such as track and terminal access, equitable division of assets between AN and NR and
that following restructuring and sale, there are at least two viable providers of
interstate freight services to realise advantages of competitive business practices); and,
thirdly, the AN Board must maximise the opportunities available to
sell AN as a going concern with continuing contracts for the AN workshops
and long-term freight customers, making it important not to make judgments
about the ongoing viability of current contracts based on the existing
cost structure of AN as it is operating at the moment. [7]
5.10 In advice to the Committee, the Tasmanian Minister for
Transport, Mr Cleary noted that, in relation to the sale of AN Tasmanian assets, the
State's position is as follows
When examining the 1975 legislation, [ie, the Railways (Tasmania) Act
1975] there are fairly clear obligations on the Commonwealth to consult
the State on a whole range of other things...... [8]
5.11 The Committee notes that the Tasmanian Government was positive towards
the proposed sale of Tasrail, as Mr Cleary further indicated that "...I
am optimistic that in fact not only are we going to see the Tasmanian
rail service maintained but we are going to see it grow..." [9]
5.12 The Committee was also made aware in evidence that the range of
matters which require further discussion between the Commonwealth and the Tasmanian
Government may include the need to ensure proper provisions in title to right of way to
privatised lines.
Sale of Current AN Businesses
5.13 AN assets and businesses can be dealt with in four major
elements
- Interstate passenger services
- Workshops, locomotives and rail fleet
- AN South Australian intrastate freight and network
- Tasmanian intrastate freight and network (Tasrail)
Interstate passenger services
Brew Recommendation
5.14 The Brew proposal for passenger services is that
An attempt should be made to find a commercial operator
without subsidy but if this is not possible the services should be run by the organisation
which operates off the lowest subsidy payment.
As an interim measure passenger operations should be established as
a separate business with an emphasis on tourism and with the view at
the earliest opportunity to inviting private sector involvement. [10]
The proposal for a passenger service with an exclusive operating
franchise for 5-7 year was also canvassed. [11]
November 1996 rail proposals
5.15 The Government's current announced proposal is to sell or franchise
the major AN passenger services, the Indian Pacific and the Ghan trains.
[12] The Commonwealth Department of Transport
and Regional Development submission said that any sale or franchise of
the services to private operators would depend on the outcome of the scoping
study.Submissions to the Committee regarding the possible saleability
of the AN passenger services have all drawn on the concept of the Indian
Pacific and the Ghan as `tourist outback experience' type of travel and
the basic inconsistency between this type of service, and regular passenger
services.The Committee has not had the opportunity to examine alternative
means of integrating passenger rail services with other forms of travel
(excluding air travel). It has instead focussed on the views of current
users and those with some experience in the current operation of the services.Evidence
to the Committee from AN made it clear that the option of running the
Indian Pacific and the Ghan trains as tourist trains has been subject
of some active consideration.In an exchange with Senator Collins, the
Chairman of AN, Mr Smorgon confirmed advice in the AN submission
Senator BOB COLLINS,Do you expect that passenger
services would be maintained at existing levels once they are privatised, or would you
expect there would need to be some continuing form of government subsidy?
Mr Smorgon,First of all, there is a question mark about whether
the passenger business will be sold. The passenger business also is
a losing business. It does not make money. If it is not sold, then it
definitely has to continue in some form. We have two icons, in the Ghan
and the Indian Pacific, which should not be lost to Australia.......However
it happens, whether it be set up as a separate organisation and the
government continue to fund it, I believe it has to continue. As far
as the business is concerned, I think we can continue to improve it
and build on it. It can carry more people than it does today,either
as a privatised organisation or run by the government. [13]
Mr Neal of AN told the Committee
We operate those trains,very much the Indian Pacific,almost
on the same schedule as when the standard gauge line opened between Broken Hill and Port
Pirie. They are still being operated as if they are transport trains. They are patently
not the prime means of travelling between capital cities any more. If you are going to
travel to Perth, nobody in their right mind, if they want to do it in a hurry, gets on a
train. It is much quicker to fly.
We need to have a look at whether you can reposition those
trains. Certainly we are doing some preliminary planning on this. We are still planning,
in AN, as if we were an ongoing business because that is the way to maximise the value to
the individual businesses, having a look at turning them into experiential products, such
as, instead of taking 22 hours to travel to Alice Springs we would take three days to
travel to Alice Springs. We would spend some time at Port Augusta looking through the
museum, maybe take a trip on the Pichi Richi, we would take them out to the Cooper Pedy
opal mines and we would involve private sector bus operators to do some of these things.
Maybe we would have an evening at the Finke River so that people can appreciate what the
real bush is like.
That is a total repositioning of the trains away from the transport
sector into where I think they fit,the hospitality industry. Then you
are looking at a different product. We are in the preliminary process
of having a look at the design of that. One of the key things you need
to do is the proper market research and that remains to be done. [14]
5.22 In its submission, Rail 2000 noted that
Rail 2000 agrees that the Passenger service (of AN) should be operated
as a separate entity but questions the almost exclusive emphasis on
tourism. [15]
5.23 Rail 2000 also observed that proposals for the Indian Pacific
and the Ghan ignored the need of train users who used rail travel as a reasonably priced
and comfortable alternative to bus transport.
5.24 Ken Baxter of KPMG told the Committee that operation of Indian
Pacific and the Ghan as tourist services was a difficult concept to see in actual
operation. In speaking about a luxury tourist train venture - such as the Orient Express,
Mr Baxter suggested success of such services depend on a number of factors
They do depend, however, on two things: firstly, substantial
private investment; and, secondly, a declared track access regime and known track access
charges. I would suspect that, subject to somebody believing that they could make a profit
out of such a venture and that the volume of tourist business was there, then yes, it is a
possibility. But it would be dependent on those two things.
In terms of maintaining the sort of service which the Mayor of Broken
Hill may require, which I suspect is to take a number of people from
either Broken Hill to Adelaide or Broken Hill to Sydney,which meets
the requirements of what the committee has been asking in terms of CSOs,I
cannot imagine that the owners of an Orient Express are going
to be particularly happy about adding a concession fare regime to an
enterprise. So the state is then going to be left with the prospect
of having to run a service similar to what they might be running at
the moment, and it then becomes a decision of the government of the
day as to whether they are prepared to meet the community service obligation.
[16]
5.25 In discussions on the future of the Commonwealth in passenger
services, it became apparent that the cost of concession travel - ie, the discount offered
to particular groups of travellers - was a barrier to the profitability of the Indian
Pacific and the Ghan.In figures provided by AN to the Committee the level of concession
fares was put as
For the Ghan, 54% of passengers pay full fare, 24% are
pensioners, 13% are student/children, 4.5% are railway staff on vacation, and the
remainder are on sundry other concessions, such as the Rail Australia Pass, politicians,
blind persons' attendants etc.
For the Indian Pacific, 33% of passengers pay full fare, 49% are pensioners,
11%, students /children, 5% railway staff and the remainder on sundry
other concessions [17]
5.27 The Committee sees the continuation of services provided by the
Indian Pacific, the Ghan and the Overland passenger services as being a matter of critical
importance, both to retain the trains as identifiable 'icon' trains which offer a unique
view of Australia and as continuing passenger train services. (Refer to the Government
Senators' alternative position appearing at the end of the report).
5.28 In evidence given in Broken Hill, concern of the local
community at the possible loss of the service provided to the city by the Indian Pacific
was explained by the Mayor, Councillor Black
The train in the last full year that we can investigate, 1995-96, brought
some 27,000 tourists to Broken Hill. That is people that either got
off the train at Broken Hill or broke their journey in Broken Hill.
Whilst it is very difficult to say precisely what a tourist does spend,how
many bed nights they do spend in Broken Hill and so on,we estimate that
27,000 tourists are to be worth $6.8 million, which equates to 80 full-time
equivalent jobs. Another interesting factor is that since the refurbishment
of the train its popularity certainly has increased. The increase for
the year 1995-96 over the year 1994-95 was estimated to be some 17 per
cent. [18]
5.29 Councillor Black described Broken Hill's reliance on the Indian
Pacific this way
There is a considerable fear within the minds of Broken Hill people,particularly
after reading articles concerning a TNT road toll consortium taking
it over and upgrading it to Oriental Express standards and so on,that
the train, if privatised, will answer only to shareholders and not to
the people, and that a privatised owner would reroute the train through
Melbourne. Again, that is a concern for two reasons: the loss to the
economy of Broken Hill and,forgive me, I am the mayor and so I have
got to be somewhat parochial,and the loss to the citizens of Broken
Hill and its larger district, to people who utilise the train for their
access to capital cities for whatever services are not available in
Broken Hill. [19]
5.30 In addition, the availability of a train service to such an isolated
city as Broken Hill provided a valuable form of travel alternative to
air and bus. [20]
5.31 Any dramatic change to the Indian Pacific service would affect the
use of the Indian Pacific by citizens of Broken Hill for non-tourist travel.
Of particular significance in this regard is the fact that approximately
5000 passenger trips p.a. in each direction of travel - approximately
one-third of total trips in both directions - on the Indian Pacific are
by travellers from or to Broken Hill. [21]
5.32 Nevertheless, the Committee is interested in a better and
clearer picture of how AN passenger services will be disposed of. For the Committee to
gain such a picture, and to enable it to make a sensible recommendation on it, the
Committee and the Parliament will need - at least - to know what reaction there has been
to the invitation to bid for AN assets.
5.33 In relation to the current AN passenger services, the DTRD told
the Committee
First of all, rail travel by pensioners and the like is
already substantially subsidised by government. The government will have to make a
decision whether or not it wishes to continue that. The second thing is,and here I am
speculating somewhat,that properly constructed, a tourist experience should continue to
provide a very good and possibly even better passenger transport service. The issue is
currently the way AN thinks about its rail operations. It thinks about trying to get
people from the east coast to the west coast as fast as they can and not letting them off.
With a tourist experience you would actually be seeking to give people the opportunity to
get off at Broken Hill, Kalgoorlie or anywhere else,have an experience,and then get back
onto another train that is coming through at some other time. So that would require you to
have a certain continuity of trains and anyone who did wish to go straight through
probably could. So, properly constructed, you may well finish up with a much better
service.
Having said all that, there are no services constructed at this stage
and we do not know how that is going to operate. That very much depends
on how any private sector operator might see it or how the government
might wish to operate if it were to continue. Certainly, I can say that
if the government continues to operate the passenger services we, like
AN, would see it operating quite differently from how it operates now.
We would think it actually would operate better in all senses. But that
is speculation. [22]
5.34 In this regard, Mr Smorgon told the Committee that AN had
considered altering the route of the Indian Pacific to increase the attractiveness of the
service and its likely passenger load. For example,
Senator BOB COLLINS,Under those circumstances, would
you expect the Indian Pacific to continue to travel through Broken Hill or would it
go through Melbourne?
Mr Smorgon,We had considered a number of options, but it was
always considered that it would run through Broken Hill the way it does
today. We did look at an option of starting it in Melbourne, going up
to Sydney and then through Broken Hill. There was also another option
of running the Ghan from Melbourne through Adelaide and then
up to Alice Springs. But they were not things that we continued with.
They were ideas that we looked at but have not continued to take any
further. [23]
5.35 The Committee asked AN for advice on the profitability of its
passenger services. AN advised that
....in view of the sales process [of AN] the Commonwealth `s interest
is best protected by not disclosing this information on the public record,
[24] though the Brew report noted the annual
losses of `..between $15 million and $20 million.' [25]
5.36 The Committee pressed this matter with AN and was in turn advised
that AN had sought approval from the Ministers for Finance and for Transport
and Regional Development for the release of more detailed information
to the Committee. [26]
5.37 The use by Broken Hill citizens - and others - of the Indian
Pacific as a principal means of transport makes future provision of passenger services
essential. (Refer to the Government Senators' alternative position appearing at the end of
the report).
5.38 Any franchisee or buyer of the Indian Pacific must, during the
current AN sale and disposal process, be made aware of the requirement to provide a
continuing integrated passenger service through the Indian Pacific. The Committee
considers that further reduction in the service provided by the Indian Pacific and the
Ghan will in its view inevitably result in abandonment of the service on the AN-based
network. (Refer to the Government Senators' alternative position appearing at the end of
the report).
AN Workshops, locomotives and rail fleet (ie, rolling stock)
5.39 Under the Government's November 1996 rail proposals, the
current assets of AN which fall into these categories are to be offered for sale or
disposal.
AN Workshops
Brew Report
5.40 The Brew Report proposed that the rationalisation of workshops in
Port Augusta and Islington in Adelaide is essential. [27]
The Brew recommendation is for these workshops to be closed and transferred
to the South Australian Government to facilitate private sector involvement.
5.41 The history of the handling and management of the AN workshops
at Islington, Adelaide and at Port Augusta has been one of unsatisfactory management
planning and decisions.
5.42 As the Brew Report stressed, the effect has been to leave the
Port Augusta workshops with inadequate equipment, an inadequate volume of current work,
and limited future for rail-related work
5.43 The views of the major contributors to the inquiry have
confirmed the rundown of the AN facilities in South Australia. The submission from the
ACTU Rail Unions maintained that the AN workshops are
- a significant site of heavy engineering and complex fabrication
capacity for South Australia
- an important resource, as the only railway maintenance facilities
outside the Eastern states.
- a major employment and skills center for the town of Port Augusta
- an important center for innovative engineering fabrication and capacity
for the mining , maritime and other industries [28]
5.44 Rail 2000 noted that
The open market place will expand as more Government railway instrumentalities
in other states seek to make their operations more efficient by handing
over their own workshops (or their activities) to the private sector.
Nevertheless, there will be some scope, as Brew suggests, for the winning
of new contracts in the open market place and private sector involvement
may well facilitate that process much more effectively than the existing
regime . AN management has not been pragmatic enough in its pursuit
of excellence and efficiency within such institutions. [29]
5.45 Mr Brew was blunt in his evidence to the Committee
ANR workshops claimed a productivity target of $100,000 of
orders per employee, but faced 1996-97 with a work force of about 570 when the books held
orders amounting to only $33 million, meaning that there was meaningful work for only 330
people. It should be added that this is misleading too, because a competitive industry
target would be closer to $200,000 of orders per employee. The fanciful nature of
management's planning is shown by the fact that the workshops' business plan showed orders
totalling $48 million for the same year.
The root of the workshops' problem is that while they have
continued to carry out back shop or heavy maintenance work on locomotives and wagons used
on the east-west rail routes for many years, the NRC was given control of this line haul
and chose to contract to build a new fleet of rolling stock, and to have these maintained
as part of the same contract, in another state. In other words, the traditional workload
of the workshops is rapidly drying up for reasons outside its control.
It was found that some hope was being placed in the emergence of competitors
for line haul on interstate routes, but that ignores the fact that the
private sector has already set up highly successful rolling stock maintenance
facilities in New South Wales and Victoria. Considering that the ANR
workshops are not located at one end or the other of the interstate
routes, they will have to be highly competitive to win any of the remaining
railway rolling stock maintenance work in future. [30]
5.46 The SA Government did not accept the Brew analysis.
Contrary to the findings of the Brew Report, the South Australian Government
maintains there is a strong base to retain rail (and a general engineering)
workshop facility at Port Augusta - and our investigations to date have
confirmed investor interest . The expansion of the Olympic dam by WMC
has helped fuel this interest - including WMC's commitment to source
the majority of work in South Australia. [31]
5.47 This view on the Brew Report was not reinforced in evidence taken
in Port Augusta, and in Adelaide. The Committee was told that prospects
for the Port Augusta workshops were not at all optimistic (leaving aside
the question of a presence for AN in the town). [32]
5.48 The exception to these views on the future of the Port Augusta workshops
-came from the Port Augusta Council, which told the Committee it favoured
privatisation as proposed by the Brew Report and envisaged by the Government.
[33]
5.49 The views of local government, development groups and unions in
the Port Augusta was that the ability of the workshop to attract buyers would be affected
by the history of poor management decisions and strategies, coupled with an `outpost' view
of the Port Augusta facilities once the headquarters of the AN had moved to Adelaide.
5.50 Representatives of the Rail Unions in Port Augusta highlighted
to the Committee the problem for railway workers made redundant from AN
Most of the people in the ground shunting grades and the clerical grades
and the operational grades and the locomotive driver grades were trained
just for that. When they came from the street, they were 15 or 16 years
of age. They went into the workshops and did a junior trainee qualification
period before they were able to come out on the main line and work the
main line trains for the drivers. They were the only skills they had,those
of a locomotive engineman. It did not include things such as forklift
driving and light truck things and all of those other manners that you
can get in other areas of railways. These were some of the courses that
those people who were being made redundant were taking up. [34]
5.51 The possibility that the Port Augusta and Islington workshops
would be able to maintain a work program which kept them viable was raised by several of
the witnesses at the Committee's Port Augusta hearing. All stressed such work would be in
areas other than the railway fabrication and maintenance for which the workshops were
designed and the workforce trained.
The workshop in Port Augusta was originally able to cope with
all of the traffic requirements of Port Augusta and AN. There was locomotive maintenance,
locomotive overhaul and rolling stock maintenance, in the form of passenger coaches and
general freight wagons. Along the way, there has been a conscious decision by management
that, when they built the new MPC, the major locomotive overhauls would be done down
there. So they pinched the big overhead cranes and took them down there, and put this work
into a sort of back shop, where they would assist, overhauling components.
As I said, if that is the philosophy of the railways, there will always
be work for a number of people. If they were to take up the challenge
put to them by the people, to go out and get other contracts,for instance,
the barges or heavy engineering from Roxby Downs, if they were able
to capture those sort of things,then I imagine they would have to add
to the work force that is left, by bringing in people on a contractual
basis, because it is only a short time period of work. [35]
5.52 The Committee can see, on the basis of the evidence it heard in
Port Augusta, that the future of the AN workshops in South Australia will depend to a
large degree on the future workload and work distribution by NR and other operators, if
and when sale of AN assets proceeds.
5.53 However, the Committee felt it was regrettable that the
management of AN had essentially removed the decision-making process from the Port Augusta
facilities to Adelaide. The Committee was impressed by the AN Port Augusta workforce, the
standard of the facilities and the high level of commitment and dedication of the AN
workforce in Port Augusta. It believes that there is a major continuing role for those
facilities in rail, as well as other opportunities to diversify into other industries.
(Refer to the Government Senators' alternative position appearing at the end of the
report).
5.54 NR told the Committee that it will not be using the AN workshop
facilities (perhaps apart from Dry Creek)
In determining the most appropriate location for the
maintenance, we went about it as any transport operator would whether you are in the
trucking business or the airline business, and had a good hard look at the duty cycles of
the equipment that we were going to be operating.
In addition to the 120 new locomotives we have nominated 77 of
what we call the good old locomotives, that is, the best of the old locomotives. Of that
77, there are 47 nominated from Australian National, 17 from Victoria and 13 from New
South Wales.
But a major facility in Melbourne and the secondary facility in Adelaide
would work reasonably well for our business. Just as we have outsourced
the maintenance for 15 years of the new 120 locomotives, we would continue
with the policy of outsourcing the maintenance of the good old locomotives,
when they are transferred to us. So we are more than keen to work with
the future owner of the Dry Creek facilities to pursue a commercial
contract for the maintenance of our good old locomotives for the business.
[36]
5.55 The Dry Creek Motive Power Center, the newest AN facility in
South Australia, would, according to Mr Brew have a future in limited circumstances
I might add that much the same situation was found in the
rolling stocks depots at Dry Creek where light running maintenance is given. The workload
is already falling and present and future line haul operators are certain to seek the most
competitive maintenance services that they can find. Unless a transformation takes place
at Dry Creek, the present workload may well be lost to interstate.
One new business opportunity suggested in the report is the creation
of a rolling stock leasing company, such as is common in North America
and Europe. Should an entrepreneur attempt to do this, Dry Creek and
its facilities may well be useful and employment might be stabilised.
The maintenance of infrastructure track is clearly carried out at a
cost which is well in excess of what is available currently from the
private sector. It is also well above world best practice. If the Hilmer
competition reforms are to be carried through, there is little option
but to call for competitive tenders for this work. [37]
5.56 In addition, the proposal that purpose-built railway workshops
can take on work in other areas is not promising.
... you can always create extra business. I would suggest that the
business was not pursued because they were simply not competitive and
did not have the skills necessary. The sad fact,and whether it is Port
Augusta or anywhere else,is that there are too many workshops, and the
ones that will survive are the ones that are going to be efficient and
are in the right location. Port Augusta is not the central hub of the
National Rail network, Melbourne is. It is for that reason that a facility
was built, I understand by Goninan in Spotswood, and that facility will
clearly take over an amount of work that might have previously been
done. We had a similar situation in Victoria where we kept afloat two
workshops in Ballarat and Bendigo. [38]
AN Rail fleet
Brew Report Recommendation
5.57 The Brew Report recommended
that the AN Locomotive Business should be reconstituted as an owner
and maintainer of railway rolling stock for lease by the competing railway line haul
operations including NRC/TNT and SCT. The business is then to be sold.
5.58 The recommendation of the Brew report was that the locomotives
and rolling stock currently owned as AN assets was to
5.59 Rail 2000 noted that , in its view, the locomotives were being transferred
to AN as part of an attempt to boost the chances of finding a buyer for
Dry Creek, rather than as a considered decision. In relation to the wagon
fleet, Rail 2000 noted that it is unlikely that any buyer would need to
have ownership of the wagon fleet, other than specialist rolling stock
(such as grain wagons); it is more likely that an operator would prefer
a lease arrangement. [40]
5.60 The SA Government has made a general comment on the proposed transfer
of assets which reflected its view on the proposed sale of AN assets;
that a sale of the assets and maintenance facilities would allow an operator
to provide a `hire and maintain' service to operators who were rail industry
participants but did not want to invest in either rolling stock (including
locomotives) or maintenance facilities. [41]
SA Intrastate Freight
5.61 The Brew Report proposed that the principal lines in AN's South
Australian freight business be transferred to the South Australian Government. AN Freight
in South Australia has 4 main customers: ETSA (Leigh Creek line), the Australian Wheat and
Barley Boards (Eyre Peninsula and mid-North lines), Penrice Soda Products and Boral
Gypsum.
5.62 Submissions to the Committee made a number of points to make
about this proposal. Apart from some support for the `shortline operator' model suggested
by the Brew Report, there were several criticisms of the proposal.
5.63 Rail 2000 noted it was unlikely that the South Australian Government
would willingly take over the services, particularly if takeover involved
any financial outlay. Equally, Rail 2000 suggested that the South Australian
Government would not want to see a buyer/operator of the lines who is
unable or unwilling to provide a service to the principal users, it would
want a mechanism in place to ensure first right of refusal on thew on
the lines. [42]
5.64 This suggestion was supported by the submission from the SA
Government, which noted that
In terms of the sale process, the State Government preference is for
AN interest in South Australia be sold as a whole - rather than tolerate
any purchase simply “picking out the eyes” of the business
leaving South Australia to do the rest! However, this preferred position
does not preclude a constructive assessment of all the proposal, and
we reserve the right to amplify further South Australia's position on
AN's sale process. [43]
5.65 One of the principal users of the AN South Australian network,
the SA Farmers' Federation (in conjunction with the Australian Wheat and Barley Boards and
SA Bulk Handling Corporation) indicated its preferred option for transfer of the SA
regional rail network to the SA State Government
.......the South Australian Farmers' Federation, in
conjunction with the Australian Wheat Board, the Australian Barley Board and the South
Australian Cooperative Bulk Handling, recommend that, firstly, the South Australian
regional rail network infrastructure be state government owned, with a regulatory group
established to be responsible for overseeing the quality of the track maintenance and
safety. The group will also oversee track access to produce uniformity of regulations for
all operators, including state and/or private sectors.
Secondly, there is provision for competitive bidders and operators
for lines relevant for customers. Thirdly, we reinforce the present
situation that freight is to be separated from passenger services. Fourthly,
customers own or lease wagons. Fifthly, operators provide maintenance
for tracks and the operation of locomotives. Sixthly, the state government
examine the viability of creating rail operating regions which would
be tendered periodically. We reinforce the government policy that the
main line track be transferred to the federal government to assume the
debt. [44]
5.66 The SA Farmers Federation also suggested a range of options on ownership
of rolling stock aimed at a more flexible system of ownership and allocation
of rights to operate services. [45]
5.67 In evidence to the Committee, the representatives of the
Federation drew attention to their preferred model of service, which placed the
infrastructure in the control of the Federal Government and the service necessary to the
continued bulk transport of 60% of the South Australian total grain harvest carried by
rail.
TASRAIL
5.68 The Government proposed in the November 1996 rail proposals that
the rail network in Tasmania owned and operated by AN be sold. [46]
Brew Report recommendation
5.69 In relation to Tasrail the Brew report recommended that a shortline
operator should be sought for all rail activity including the profitable
Goliath coal and cement line. In addition, the Brew Report recommended
that the Tasrail rail infrastructure should be transferred back to the
Tasmanian Government for sale or lease, or alternatively sold or leased
by the Commonwealth by which it may recover some of its recurrent debt.
[47]
November 1996 Rail Proposal
5.70 The November 1996 rail proposals make specific proposals
regarding AN liabilities as they relate to Tasrail, and accumulated liabilities for
superannuation.
5.71 In general, submissions to the Committee centred on the continuing
existence and viability of the Tasrail network. There was less opposition
to a proposed sale than to the sale of Tasrail of the AN South Australian
network. [48] The Committee heard evidence in Launceston.
The general view put to the Committee centred on the likelihood that a
buyer or buyers would wish to buy Tasrail as a going concern.
5.72 The ACTU rail unions indicated strong opposition to the Brew
Report and the November 1996 rail proposals for Tasrail, on the basis that
- loss of network efficiencies for use of rolling stock, for
maintenance of track and rolling stock, for integrated train operation management and for
personnel management; costs which would have to be borne by operators and customers.
- Increased capital and maintenance costs for the road network
- Increased cost to the Tasmanian government of regulation of a multiple
users of track infrastructure and accredit and monitor operators for
safety. [49]
5.73 To the Committee, there is understandable concern that proposals
for the sale of Tasrail will result, instead, in closure of existing lines
and/or services which would - as a result - lead to higher road traffic
loads and resulting cost to local government and the State and elimination
of the Tasrail workforce. [50]
5.74 In Tasmania the Emu Bay Railway currently operates as a privately
owned and run railway. Evidence to the suggest that it is an efficient
and well run business. [51] Views to
the Committee differed on whether this indicated that, with an injection
of capital, Tasrail could be as efficient, or that it indicated that privatisation
of all Tasrail would give a similar performance result to the Emu Bay
Railway.
5.75 Mr Maclean, Assistant State Secretary of the Construction,
forestry, mining and Energy union (Forestry Division) gave the Committee an interesting
picture of how the Emu Bay Railway operates.
Mr McLean, ........If you take the Emu Bay example,
there are no designated positions within Emu Bay. Everybody does everything. You might
think to yourself that they become jacks of all trades but masters of none. But that is
not the case. For instance, everybody does train control, everybody has a go at train
driving, they unload their own trains, they load their own trains, they load their own
boats, everybody has a go at track maintenance, so everybody understands exactly what is
happening within the railway.
In respect of the maintenance of the locomotive fleet and the rolling
stock, each train is checked every day. Each locomotive is taken into
a workshop every day at the completion of each run and it is fitted
with brake blocks or whatever. Anything that needs doing to it is done
then. The problem Tasrail has is that the workshops in this local area
are unable to do anything about anything until such time as the locomotives
come back to East Tamar or Newstead, which is a suburb of Launceston.
That is also part of the trouble. There is a whole series of things
that can be done within Tasrail and the Emu Bay example is the best
one I know. [52]
In evidence, the Tasmanian Branch of the PTU conceded that it was
not necessarily against the change from public to private ownership `...If privatisation
can show that we have an operator that is prepared to put in and be aggressive, then I am
not necessarily opposed. I am not dead-set opposed...'
5.76 The ACTU Rail unions also pointed out, in their submission and during
evidence that the restructure of Tasrail, in common with other parts of
AN is currently undergoing a matter ignored by the Brew Report. [53]
5.77 In discussions with the Committee, the Tasmanian State Minister
for Transport, Mr Cleary noted the Tasmanian Government supported the proposals made in
the Brew Report, and in the subsequent the November 1996 rail proposals.
Financial Assistance Grants Scheme and Tasrail.
5.78 The Committee took evidence from the Tasmanian Minister for Transport
that argued that since 1990-1991 the Tasmanian Government had its level
of financial assistance reduced through the provision of Commonwealth
Grants by some $80.6 million due to the deficit of Tasrail operations.
The Tasmanians Governments view on this matter involved not only the issue
of equity in relation to such a reduction, but also that this should not
be linked to a Commonwealth government business enterprise over which
it had no direct control. [54]
5.79 The Commonwealth Grants Commission has considered the future
funding implications for State and Territory governments in terms of the AN sale, within
the context of financial assistance grants.
5.80 In response to the Tasmanian Government's request to provide
supplementary calculations which excluded the Tasrail deficit, the Commission constructed
three alternative calculations that demonstrated the likely impact on grant shares for
each State and Territory.
5.81 This was part of a broader recognition by the Commission that
an adjustment to the treatment of the AN deficit would be required in future grants if the
sale proceeded.
Sale of Commonwealth Equity in National Rail Corporation
Brew Report Recommendation
5.82 The Brew Report recommended that the Commonwealth review its shareholding
in NR and give consideration to deciding how and/or when to sell its equity
in NR. The Brew report also suggested that the private freight forwarding
industry or a `big foreign rail operator' may be interested in acquiring
this equity and bringing to the company expertise. [55]
The November 1996 rail proposals - NR Equity
5.83 The November 1996 rail proposals announced that the Commonwealth
will sell its 72.3 % equity in NR. [56]
5.84 The DTRD told the Committee that the sale of the Commonwealth's
equity in NR would follow
an initial scoping study to examine issues such as shareholder rights
on voting and disposal, of equity, and will also involve negotiations
with the shareholder states concerning changes to the Shareholders'
Agreement to facilitate the sale. [57]
5.85 NR told the Committee that the current state of NR's business, its
current plans and budgeting, which were the basis for critical comment
by Mr Brew were the result of the Shareholders' Agreement and the time
it has inevitably taken for NR to achieve a competitive position. [58]
5.86 Several submissions saw the proposed sale as either ill-considered
or premature, given that NR has been in existence for a short time, and
that early sale of shares under the shareholders' agreement may prove
extremely difficult, especially as the other shareholder governments may
refuse to cooperate in the process, particularly where questions of confidentiality
are involved. [59]
5.87 In addition, several submissions questioned the suggestion that
a foreign operator might be interested in NR, given foreign operators,
apparent preferences for integrated services (ie, where the owner owns
the entire rail asset.) [60]
5.88 The sale the Commonwealth equity in NR will require that the other
shareholders in the NR corporate structure agree to potential buyers making
a `due diligence' examination of NR financial information. It has been
reported that the NSW Government will not, at this time, agree to such
access until further information on moneys to be made available for track
infrastructure work. [61]
5.89 In its submission, NSW Freightcorp noted that, in selling its
equity in NR
It is essential that any NRC purchaser not be financially or commercially
advantaged by opportunities granted under the previous governing shareholder's
agreement. This is in keeping with the principle of competitive neutrality
and will allow efficient, competing operators to survive. [62]
5.90 The NR Shareholders' Agreement expires at the end of January
1998. It is the Committee's understanding from NR and from submissions that the NR plans -
to the extent that they have been successfully achieved to date - have been made on the
basis of a five year `establishment period', without change of ownership structure.
5.91 This extra period would also allow NR to properly plan for its future
in the light of the change in operating environment resulting from the
effect of the competition reform on the rail industry. [63]
Indications to the Committee are that there are potential buyers for the
Commonwealth equity in NR. [64]
5.92 The Committee considers that the Government's decision to offer
its NR stockholding for sale may be premature. It considers that, given the point NR has
reached in the current stage of development, the Commonwealth may consider delaying this
initiative until conclusion of the Shareholders' Agreement on 31 January 1998.
Diesel Fuel Excise
5.93 The Committee received several views on ways of creating a
viable railway system in Australia, within the context of an overall land transport
policy. The major factors in this issue involved the need for relative investment in both
the road and rail systems and the notion of competitive neutrality between road and rail
users.
5.94 Evidence to the Committee consistently highlighted claims of serious
imbalance in terms of investment between road and rail operators. It was
explained by the Chairman of NR to the Committee - that although both
are charged an 18 cents per litre diesel fuel levy - road receives an
allocation for national road investments but in the case of rail "...
we do not see an 18c a litre coming back in any form whatsoever."
[65]
5.95 It was estimated that this cost to rail was in the order of at least
$100 million per year, which if framed within a balanced land transport
policy could be redirected towards an overall rail infrastructure program
similar to that of the road investment fund. [66]
5.96 The DTRD advised that in 1994-1995 the fuel excise paid by rail
was approximately $160 million, but that `...None of that is either notionally
or in reality churned back into spending on track infrastructure.' [67]
5.97 In evidence to the Committee it was estimated that since the introduction
of the fuel excise for rail in 1982, revenue raised is about $1.4 billion
in 1993-1994 terms. [68]
5.98 A further issue involves the disparity between road and rail charges.
A consistent view put to the Committee was that the national set of charges
introduced in 1992 for heavy vehicles has led to the under-recovery of
road system costs and has forced down the charges for heavy long distance
vehicles. [69]
5.99 The Committee was made aware of the direct effect this was
having on competition with rail freight and that the notion of the need for competitive
neutrality between the two systems was a major issue to be addressed if rail was to remain
a viable competitor to road.
5.100 In the case of New Zealand, it was noted by Laird that the review
of road user charges was a `...necessary condition for rail freight profitability...'
[70]
5.101 It was further noted by Laird that in Australia the current charges
were `...deficient in regards to both the total revenue that is raised
from the non-fuel charges levied on heavy vehicle operations over public
roads, and, the structure of the charges. As such, the NRTC charges distort
road rail competition for long distance and bulk freight.' [71]
5.102 The Committee is aware that the differences between road and
rail funding and charges have led to restrictions on effective competition and given rise
to road gaining a higher share in the movement of the land freight.
Community and Public Service Obligations
Brew Report recommendations
5.103 The Brew Report recommended that two specific areas of
Community Service Obligation (CSO) be addressed by the Government in taking up those of
his recommendations it saw as appropriate.
5.104 The first is aimed at relieving the effect of inevitable
workforce redundancies in regional areas affected by the sale or disposal of AN assets -
especially in South Australia.
5.105 A principal Brew Report recommendation was
Consideration should be given to setting up a special employee assistance
program to meet the needs of people displaced by these recommendations.
It should provide counselling and advice on job skilling and employment
as well as prospects fro resettlement and financial planning on a confidential
basis for every employee of ANR.. It will be required for about 12 months
and it is noted that additional funds would be needed for retaining.
[72]
5.106 A second recommendation was
Additional funds may also be required to remedy any
environmental problems found as ANR businesses vacate sites.
The November 1996 rail proposals
5.107 The Government's the November 1996 rail proposals made
provision for both recommendations.
Employment and regional impacts
5.108 The proposal is contained in two announcements by the Government.
[73]
Employment and regional Assistance package
5.109 The employment package announced by the Government in the
November 1996 rail proposals provided for adherence to the previous government's agreement
on redundancy entitlements, superannuation and leave.
5.110 Attached to the media release announcing this policy was a pro
forma letter form the Minister to all AN employees, which indicated that
the proposed AN asset disposal or sale process would involve redundancies,
and that the Government would `....do its best to secure employment opportunities
for AN's workers..' [74]
5.111 Submissions to the Committee addressed this part of the package
by concentrating on the contributions which has been made both in South
Australia, and in Tasmania has made to the progressive reduction in the
AN workforce. [75] All told the Committee of a gradual reduction
in the total AN workforce from some 9200 to some 2200 between 1983-4 and
1995-6. [76]
5.112 The impression gained by the Committee from the accounts of
employee involvement in all attempts at rationalisation of the AN workforce was that
genuine attempts had been made by both AN and its workforce to achieve a maximum efficient
workforce level. It is equally clear that, given the direction of rail restructure and
reform inherent in the November 1996 rail proposals, that further redundancies in the AN
workforce will occur.
5.113 The Committee took a considerable amount of thoughtful and
helpful evidence from members of the AN workforce, particularly in Port Augusta and
Launceston which indicated a willingness to accommodate the rail reform process announced
by AN and governments during the last 10 years.
5.114 The Committee also had the benefit of comment from the Reverend
Claud Scherer, a counsellor who has been specifically commissioned by
AN to assist AN personnel in Port Augusta affected by the rail reform
and workforce reduction. [77]
5.115 The Committee discussed the details of the AN redundancy and superannuation
packages with AN [78] and with the DTRD.
[79] The agreement reached between the
relevant rail unions and the Commonwealth in the late 1970's is the basis
for redundancy packages, and superannuation rights. [80]
5.116 The Committee does not make any further comment on the AN
employee package except to note that such packages and redundancies were having a
deleterious effect on smaller regional communities such as Port Augusta. In evidence to
the Committee, Reverend Scherer put this view
In the seven years I have been a chaplain the last five years have
increasingly become traumatic in that the uncertainty of the future
has robbed people of self-esteem, belief in themselves and their abilities
...Now they are feeling down because the system is taking their future
away from them. That is their perception. [81]
5.117 Reverend Scherer went on to explain,
The redundancies have been an issue in the community...It is great
to have that extra money coming into the home, but there have been negatives
in that...Those who have broken marriages or strife in their marriages
end up wanting to get their hands on that money too...there is a lot
of friction, a lot of unhappiness...So it is not all beer and skittles
having that extra cash. There are emotional and mental issues that arise
out of that too." [82]
5.118 The Committee believes its recommendation (see Chapter 7,
recommendation...)on this issues is appropriate.
Regional Assistance package
5.119 The regional assistance package announced in the November 1996
rail proposals provides for
- a two year program
- will be in addition to existing Commonwealth DEETYA programs
- aimed at diversification and growth in local communities (especially
the railway towns of Port Augusta and Launceston
- private sector involvement in former AN facilities in regional
centres
5.120 The package places considerable emphasis on a future role for private
sector business involvement in the regional centers affected. [83]
5.121 This fund will be administered by the Parliamentary Secretary for
Transport and Regional Development, the Hon Michael Ronaldson, MP `acting
on advice form the local communities and the Tasmanian and South Australian
Governments'. [84]
5.122 The Committee heard considerable comment, particularly in Port
Augusta on the package.
5.123 The Mayor of Port Augusta, Joy Baluch indicated to the Committee
that the Port Augusta community was expecting a large proportion of the
moneys available - some $18 million of the available $20 million to be
expended in the city. [85]
5.124 A representative of the Spencer region, Mr Nettle, had some
critical comment on the regional assistance proposal
The AN adjustment money we have been advised about. Quite frankly,
it is turning into a Laurel and Hardy show out there. I am not sure
whether senators are aware of that. There is an amount of $20 million
in there which is being administered by the federal bureaucracy. It
will be administered by a committee advising the minister in relation
to those funds. The funds will be divided between Tasmania and South
Australia in proportion to the AN work force in each of those places,
but the process of distributing those funds, as I said in my submission,
has now reached absurd proportions with the Commonwealth requesting
bids from every local organisation in the regions where AN exists, and
the state governments. The approach is a complete contradiction of everything
that Australia has learned about effective regional development which
led the previous federal government to establish regional development
organisations and the regional development program in the first place.
[86]
5.125 Mr Nettle suggested, also that the process may result in the
following comment
.....we are going to end up with about 3,000 new beach
barbecue sets if they follow this process, and that is about all we are going to get
5.126 Comments to the Committee in Launceston stressed that the package
would be welcome, given likely developments following a closure or reduction
in AN involvement in the city [87] The
Northern Tasmanian Regional Development board representative, Mr Black
told the Committee that there were a number of projects the funds could
be put to in the Launceston area. [88]
5.127 This was a view repeated by several of the witnesses in Launceston.
[89]
5.128 The Committee considers that the regional development package
proposed in the November 1996 rail proposals is an appropriate concept, It has doubts,
detailed to it during the hearings, that the proposal is adequate, given the strain that
the changes that will certainly occur as a result of the government's reforms comes into
effect.
5.129 The Committee's recommendation in Chapter 7 reflects this
conclusion.
Environment Package
5.130 As part of the Government's 24 November 1996 rail proposals,
there is an allocation of $50 million to clean up a number of sites occupied by AN which
would be vacated as part of the overall rail reform package.
5.131 The main features of the proposed environmental strategy are:
- clean up and restoration of approximately 106 sites located within
the AN railway network in South Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory, Western Australia
and New South Wales.
- extensive remediation of derelict AN land (approx. 12 ha.) at Islington
in Adelaide. [90]
5.132 It was noted by the Committee that the environmental package had
arisen from an independent environmental audit conducted by the CSIRO
and commissioned by AN. [91]
5.133 Although some sites contained minor contamination Mr Andrew Neal,
Managing Director of AN advised at a recent Rural and Regional Affairs
and Transport Legislation Committee Estimates hearing that many required
only basic rehabilitation such as the removal of rubbish and scrap metal.
[92]
5.134 The need for extensive work to be undertaken at the Islington site
stemmed from asbestos and heavy metal contamination which required an
allocation of $5 million. Mr Neal noted that hydrocarbon contamination
was within acceptable limits and the ground water had not been contaminated.
[93]
National Track Authority
Brew Report Recommendation
5.135 The Brew Report noted that
This review has not examined current proposals for the setting up of
a national track access administration nor a new national passenger
rail organisation bet noted that there is considerable support for both
initiatives. [94]
November 1996 rail proposals
5.136 In the November 1996 rail proposals, the government announced
a proposal for a national track authority would be established. The proposed national
track access agency (the NTAA) will be
- a government-owned national track company to be based in South
Australia
- an authority which will be `one-stop-shop' to manage and control use
of the interstate rail track system [95]
5.137 The proposed NTAA will, apparently, control access to the
interstate network, including parts of the interstate network now controlled by State
authorities, and will be responsible for construction, maintenance and control on a
`below-the track' basis. That is, the NTA will control and regulate access to the rail
network by all users, both public and private.
5.138 The proposed NTAA is a significant fundamental change to the
Australian rail industry. The DTRD submission noted that
The objective is to create a network on which operators carry interstate
freight on a fully commercial and competitively neutral basis. While
provision has been made for initial Commonwealth involvement in upgrading
the interest track, in the long term investment in infrastructure will
be undertaken according to commercial requirements and willingness of
operators to pay for it. [96]
5.139 Submissions on the basis for a NTAA in Australia focussed on the
basic change to the Australian rail infrastructure implied by establishment
of an NTAA. Rail 2000 advised the Committee that the model is promoted
as having a number of advantages over integrated rail system, as it allows
for levelling of a competitive field with intermodal competitors, such
as road transport. [97]
5.140 Rail 2000 also noted that the Brew report, and the November
1996 rail proposals
..follows the British idea, where the emphasis has been the delivery
of service through the privet sector, funded by users and taxpayers
in a `Money-go-round'. In simple terms this works by money being paid
by operators to the to the infrastructure people (in addition to monies
paid elsewhere in the sector fro actually operating train services).
Where there is a shortfall in the money recovered from operations, the
infrastructure people seek out taxpayer subsidy to make up the difference.
Operators who cannot cover their operating costs can also seek out subsidy
for that from the office of Rail Regulation. [98]
5.141 The key element in the British model of a `below-the-track' track
operator is that moneys gained from track access - or track disposal -
is put into a fund to subsidise infrastructure development and operations
(such as new technology etc.). [99]
5.142 In evidence, the DTRD told the Committee that the proposed NTAA
is at present to have a capped allocation of $161.4 million compared to
a sum of $370 million allocated to the track authority proposed by the
previous government in 1995. [100]
5.143 Other witnesses, particularly major private users of the AN network
expressed support for the notion of NTAA, but indicated that details of
the Proposed NTAA's charging structure and powers would be essential before
any private users would enter into long-term commitments to the use of
the interstate network. [101]
5.144 In his evidence, Mr Martin van Onselen of a major private user
of interstate rail freight (Box Car Pty Ltd), told the Committee that any NTAA would need
to have the following features
Mr van Onselen - I think the point I am effectively
trying to make is that the environment needs to be created, and that starts with the issue
of access. Do not privatise anything until you make the rules with regard to the private
sector operating on the tracks perfectly clear. Who is going to maintain them; at what
level are they going to be charged; and how the hell do you get on them and what are the
rules going to be about getting on them? When that is very clearly established, people
will say, `I either have an opportunity to run a train and make it profitable or I do
not.'
Senator MURRAY,Are you including in that pricing rules
being established; for instance, an equalisation between road and rail?
Mr van Onselen,Yes, absolutely. Governments cannot do what they
did to the Rail Access Corporation in New South Wales, which put a charter
together that makes it impossible for the people who run that organisation
to sell a marketable product. [102]
5.145 Other likely users, including TNT and the Queensland railways and
NSW Freightcorp endorsed an NTAA, but stressed the need for prior detailed
knowledge of the authority's role, and access charging structure. [103]
5.146 The Committee has considered the extent of the explanation
that has to date been provide concerning the role, functions, powers and likely access
regime that an NTAA will have.
5.147 It is undesirable that such a crucial body, which on all
accounts will have a central role in future rail and transport market be established
without detailed prior explanation by government.
5.148 In addition, as the authority will - on the Committee's
understanding - be a body in which the Commonwealth will be either sole owner or
principal, the Committee believes that the legislation establishing it should be subject
of close scrutiny and review.
5.149 Accordingly, the Committee recommends that, when the bill
establishing the proposed is introduced into the Parliament that the Senate refer it to
this Committee for inquiry and report.
Footnotes
[1] Government initiatives were announced
in four media releases: `Rail back on Track', `Indian Pacific Services to be
Retained in Federal Rail Reform Agenda', `National Track Company to be Based in South
Australia', `Bidders Line up for Tasrail' - (Media Statements issued by the Minister
for Transport and Regional Development, Hon John Sharp, MP, 24 November 1996). The
process of disposal of AN assets was also dealt with in a release `Australian
National Scoping Study' issued by the Minister for Finance. (Media release issued by
the Minister for Finance, Hon John Fahey, MP, 24 November 1996)
[2] The procedure followed by the
Government in this regard is provided in the submission from the Department of Transport
& Regional Development (Submission 21), pp. 5-6.
[3] See Media Release `Next Step in Rail
Reform', Joint Media Release by the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Transport
and Regional Development, 6 March 1997
[4] Above, 4th para.
[5] Above, 9th para.
[6] The requirement for such legislation in
Tasmania is not clearly settled.
[7] South Australian Government, Submission
46,paras. 5.2-5.6.
[8] Evidence, 5 February 1997,
p.439.
[9] Evidence, 5 February 1997,
p.441.
[10] Brew Report, Executive Summary, para.
2.2.7, pp. 18-19.
[11] Ibid, pp 18-19.
[12] Commonwealth DTRD, Submission 21, p.
8.
[13] Evidence, 28 January 1997, p.25
[14] Evidence, 28 January 1997, p. 41
[15] Rail 2000, Submission 20, p. 11-12
[16] Evidence, 3 February 1997, p. 422.
[17] Letter to the Committee from AN, 11
February 1997.
[18] Evidence, 30 Janury 1997, p. 169.
[19] Evidence, 30 January 1997,, p.
170.
[20] Evidence, 30 January 1997, pp.
170-1.
[21] Evidence (Rural & Regional
Affairs & Transport Legislation Committee, 4 March), 1997, p....
[22] Evidence, 3 February 1997, p. 337
[23] Evidence, 28 January 1997, p. 25.
[24] Brew Report, Executive Summary, para.
2.2.7, p. 18.
[25] Letter dated 11 February, 1997 from
AN to the Committee.
[26] Letter dated 6 March 1997. from the
Minister to the Committee.
[27] Brew Report, Executive Summary, pp.
15-16; and Recommendations 6-8, pp. 69-70.
[28] ACTU Rail Unions, Submission 25, pp.
41-2.
[29] Rail 2000, Submission 20, p. 10.
[30] Evidence 3 February 1997, p. 396.
[31] South Australian Government,
Submission 46, para. 3.3.4
[32] See Evidence, 29 January 1997, pp.
72-74; 87-88
[33] See Evidence, 29 January 1997,
pp.87-88
[34] Evidence, 29 January 1997, pp.
132-3.
[35] Evidence, 29 January 1997,
pp.146-7.
[36] Evidence, 3 February 1997, p. 386
[37] Evidence, 3 February 1997, p. 397.
[38] Evidence, 5 February 1997, p. 467.
Mr van Onselen
[39] Brew Report, recommendation 1(d),
(see also pp. 16-17 of the Brew Report.
[40] Rail 2000, Submission 20, p. 10-11.
[41] SA Government, Submission 46, paras.
3.2.1-3.2.5.
[42] Rail 2000, Submission 20, pp. 8-9.
[43] SA Government, Submission 46, p.3.
[44] Evidence, 28 January 1997, p. 49.
[45] Ibid
[46] See media release `Bidders Line up
for Tasrail', (Media release issued by the Minister for Transport &
RegionalDevelopment), 24 November 1996
[47] Brew Report, p. 61.
[48] Rail 2000, Submission 20, p.10.
[49] ACTU Rail Unions, Submission 25, pp.
34-5.
[50] Evidence, 31 January 1997, pp.
239-24; 249-51; 255-58; 277;
[51] Evidence, 31 January 1997, pp.
270-275.
[52] Evidence, 31 January 1997,
pp. 280. See also submission by the Public Transport Union on a proposal to
amalgamate Tasrail with the Emu Bay Railway, Submission 42, paper prepared by John
Livermore `Operator Options: A Revitalised Tasrail'
[53] Evidence, 31 January 1997, pp.
289-290.
[54] Evidence, 5 February 1997
[55] See Brew Report, pp. 22-3.
[56] See Media release by the Minister for
Transport and Regional development, Rail Back on Track, 24 November 1996., p. 1.
[57] DTRD, Submission 20, p. 8.
[58] Evidence, 3 February 1997, pp.
377-80 generally.
[59] Rail 2000; Submission 20, Laird,
Submission 11, p. 8.,
[60] ACTU Rail Unions, Submission 26, pp.
31-32.
[61] See, NSW brake on rail sell-off, Aust.
Financial Review, 12 March, 1997, p. 7.
[62] NSW Freightcorp, Submission 24,p. 6.
[63] Evidence, 3 February 1997, pp.
412-416.
[64] Evidence, 5 February 1997, pp.
462-470.
[65] Evidence, 3 February 1997,
p.381.
[66] ACTU Rail Unions, Submission op.
cit., p.22.
[67] Evidence, 5 February 1997,
p.470.
[68] A/Prof. P. Laird, Submission 11,
p.12.
[69] Evidence, 5 February 1997,
p.449.
[70] A/Prof. P.Laird, supplementary
submission, p.6.
[71] Ibid, p.5.
[72] See the Brew report, Executive
Summary, p. 22.
[73] See media release by the Minister for
Transport and Regional Development, 26 November 1996, `AN Employee Package'; and,
media release by the Minister for Transport and Regional Development `$20 million
Regional Assistance Package to ease Transition to rail reform', 24 November 1996.
[74] See pro forma letter attached to
media release of 26 November, 1996, referred to above.
[75] See Evidence from Mr Morton and
McNeil in Pt, Augusta, pp.129-133; Mr Nobbs of the combined rail union of Pt Augusta, pp.
152-157. Evidence in Launceston came from Mr Jowett and Mr Osborne of the Public Transport
union, and Mr Maclean of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
[76] See DTRD Submission no 21, and Evidence,
Adelaide, 28 January 1996, Mr Neal of AN, p.38.
[77] Evidence, 29 January 1997, pp.
157-158.
[78] See Evidence, 28 January 1997, pp.
40-45.
[79] See Evidence 3 February 1997. Pp.
424; and, letter to the Committee from the DTRD dated 24 February 1997, pp. 2-4.
[80] See also, Evidence 3 February
1997, p. 362
[81] Evidence, 29 January 1997,
p.157.
[82] Evidence, 29 January 1997,
pp.157-158.
[83] See media release by the Minister for
Transport and Regional Development `$20 million Regional Assistance Package to ease
Transition to rail reform', 24 November 1996.
[84] See above., p. 3.
[85] Evidence, 29 January 1997, p. 82.
[86] Evidence, 29 January 1997, p. 106.
[87] Evidence, 31 January 1997, p.247.
Mr Lees, Launceston City Corporation.
[88] Evidence, 31 January 1997, pp.
264-5.
[89] Evidence, 31 January 1997, pp.
[90] Media Release 24 November 1996 Rail
Package
[91] Ibid
[92] RR&T Estimates, Hansard, 4
March 1997.
[93] November Rail Proposals, op. cit.
[94] See Brew Report, p. 13.
[95] See media release by the Minister for
Transport and Regional Development, ` National Track Company to be based in South
Australia', 24 November 1996.
[96] DTRD, Submission 21,p. 7.
[97] Rail 2000, Submission 20,p. 17.
[98] Rail 2000. Submission 20, p. 17-18.
[99] Ibid
[100] Evidence, 5 February 1997, pp...
.
[101] See BHP, Evidence, 3 February
2997 pp ; also National Rail pp. 378; Prof. Laird, p. 447.
[102] Evidence, 5 February 1997, p.
465.
[103] See Submission 27, TNT; submission
28, Queensland railways; and, Submission 24, NSW Freightcorp.