Chapter Three
THE IMPACT OF THE SLOT MANAGEMENT SCHEME
Acceptance of the scheme by stakeholders
3.1 General acceptance of the need for the scheme was expressed in most submissions and evidence
given to the Committee by stakeholders. However, concerns where raised about some details of the Slot
Management Scheme.
3.2 The Local Government and Shires Association of NSW, who represent 177 general purpose
councils in NSW including 135 outside the Sydney metropolitan area, indicated support for the scheme
so long as it did not change with a change to a private operator:
A slot management system is important to the control of airports which have capacity
constraints as Sydney does. As long as the slot system does not change in its
administrative framework either under current management or a private operator then it
will offer over the long term a level of protection for regional airlines that would otherwise
not have been available. It is likely without the introduction of an administrative
arrangement such as this, then there would have been a wholesale shift to the use of price
controls as a sole arbiter of access. [1]
3.3 A number of airlines that provide regional services expressed similar acceptance, with some
reservations, of the Slot Management Scheme. These included:
- Kendell Airlines, as part of the Slot Management Committee:
…agrees with the other incumbent operators that it is a fair and reasonable means of
meeting the slot management needs.
- Impulse Airlines states in their submission:
Impulse has supported the introduction of the Slot Management Scheme in order to
avoid congestion and the inevitable delays which have been a feature of Sydney Airport
for a great number of years. [2].
- Hazelton Airlines, at the Public Hearing on 24 April 1998 told the Committee:
Having said all that, we are strongly in favour of the slot system. We believe that, yes, it
will impose a discipline on our business and on our passengers, but it will improve
efficiency of Sydney Airport. We think that with public education, particularly of our
passengers, this system will work well in time. [3]
3.4 The larger airlines, with domestic and international interests, also saw benefits in the Slot
Management Scheme at Sydney Airport. For example, while not in favour of permanent, arbitrary caps
and raising the issue of the scheme favouring regional airlines over other parts of the sector, Qantas
indicated its acceptance that:
..the new slot management scheme at KSA may have benefits in managing the
distribution of scarce resources (available slots) during peak demands. [4]
In giving evidence at the public hearing Mr Oldmeadow, Consultant, Qantas Airways, clarified this
position, stating:
The reason we think that the slot management scheme may be advantageous is that, by
actually allowing slots within 15 minute periods – and there are rules about how you do it
– we believe it will probably reduce delays at KSA. We believe that will probably be
one of the outcomes of the slot management scheme. [5]
3.5 Mr Kimpton, speaking for Ansett Australia at the public hearing on 24 April 1998 indicated while
Ansett was more concerned with price changes, they accepted the scheme.
But, in terms of the slot system, it is probably worth saying that is predicated upon the 80
movements per hour cap – which we accept. It is predicated on ring fencing of slots for
regionals, and we accept that.
3.6 The Board of Airline Representatives of Australia Inc (BARA), who represent the international airline
industry with a membership of over 47 scheduled international airlines, make similar comment to Qantas:
Without endorsing the permanent application of arbitrary caps, BARA accepts that the
slot management system may be beneficial in managing the allocation of scarce available
slots during peak demand periods. [6]
Specific concerns raised by stakeholders
3.7 Some specific concerns were raised through submissions and by witnesses about a range of issues
including current and continued access to slots. These are discussed further below.
Claims the scheme favours the regional airline industry
3.8 Qantas suggested that the scheme favoured regional carriers over any other part of the sector.
This protection “ring fences” KSA slots used by and available exclusively to regional
airlines. This protection includes slots in the most congested peak period (0600-0900
Mondays to Fridays) when some 26 per cent of all KSA slots on average are reserved
for small aircraft. The fact that, during these periods, small aircraft with as few as 8 seats
use up scarce, highly valued runway space which could otherwise be used by larger
interstate and international jets up to 400 seats plus, is the basis for continuing conflict
and debate within the aviation community and among other stakeholders. [7]
3.9 BARA, representing the interests of international carriers, raised the same concerns:
…BARA is concerned that the new scheme operates to protect the commercial interests
of one sector of the airline industry, the regional airlines, at the expense of other sectors.
The Slot Management Scheme guarantees or “ring fences” scarce Sydney Airport slots
for the exclusive use by regional airlines. The protection extends to slots in the highly
congested morning peak period when, on average, more than one quarter of all Sydney
Airport slots are reserved for small aircraft. [8]
3.10 In contrast, Impulse Airlines believes that the regional ring fence does not necessarily favour regional
access over other operators:
As pointed out earlier, this does not protect regional access in peak periods because of
the historic impact of peak period pricing. Nonetheless we feel the current usage of
Sydney Kingsford Smith Airport by the regionals is sufficiently protected by the
ring-fencing legislation. [9]
3.11 The FAC submission indicates that for the peak period 0700-0800 hours that:
Regional operators hold 28% of the peak capacity at Sydney Airport, domestic
operators hold 44% and the international operators hold 28%, [10]
In 1996/97 regional airlines, according to FAC statistics, represented 33% of all aircraft movements at
KSA, with domestic airlines representing 42% and international airlines 18% [11] of movements.
3.12 In terms of aircraft movements, international flights would appear to be well represented in this slot,
where they had 28% of peak movements while only accounting for 18% of all movements. Domestic
airlines peak use was within plus 2% of its overall use of the airport. Regional operators appear to be
under, rather than over, represented in the peak period by around 5% of movements.
The historical influence of the peak period surcharge on slot allocation
3.13 As suggested by Impulse and a number of regional airlines in submissions and evidence, this under
representation in peak time is potentially due to the historical influence of the peak period surcharge that
operated between 1991 and October 98. As Mr Bredereck of Tamair Airlines indicated in his evidence:
I have no slots in peak period times. My schedule was designed five years ago to
operate outside of peak periods, firstly due to cost and secondly, because the demand
for my services is on connecting flights and those connecting flights work nicely either
side of the peak periods.
3.14 The Slot Management Scheme, as the Committee understands it, through its “grandfather clause”
reinforces patterns of slot use that were in operation during 1997, including the impact of market forces
as a result of peak and shoulder surcharges. From the evidence supplied and economic discussion
available on the subject [12], it would seem that those airlines that could afford to pay the surcharge and
in the words of the Productivity Commission:
are those who will have gained peak time slots as a result of the Schemes grandfather clause.
If those who have the peak time slots operate the slot according to the rules of the Scheme, they will
maintain access to the slot regardless of the segment of the industry.
Possibility that the priorities of the scheme may discriminate against regional airlines without the ring fence
provisions.
3.15 The Committee believes that it is unlikely, given the priorities of the scheme and degree of
competition for peak slots, that a regional operator would gain access to a domestic or international slot
even if became free. This means that at least 70% of peak time slots, and 60% of all slots are unlikely
ever to “fall” into regional hands.
3.16 Clauses 21 to 23 of the Slot Management Scheme set out the rules for ranking applications for a
slot. Clause 22 covers new operators and clause 23 sets out the order of priority for incumbent
operators as follows:
(a) if each of 2 incumbent operators has historical precedence to a slot that was not
allocated to it, and each applies for another slot, the higher in priority of the 2
applications is the application from the operator that applies for the slot that is closer in
time to the slot to which it has historical precedence;
(b) an application for a slot to provide an international service takes priority over one for
a slot to provide an interstate service or a regional service;
(c) an application for a slot to provide an interstate service takes priority over one for a
slot to provide a regional service;
(d) an application for a slot series or slot group takes priority over one that is not for a
slot series or slot group, and (between 2 applications for slot series or 2 applications for
slot groups), the one that is for more slots takes priority over the other;
(e) an application for a slot to operate a larger aircraft takes priority over one to operate
a smaller aircraft; [14]
3.17 These clauses clearly favour larger carriers in the international and domestic sectors of the industry.
Without the protection of regional slots through the regional ring fence concept the scheme would
otherwise discriminate against regional carriers on the basis, if an incumbent, of not being an international
or interstate carrier and on the basis of seating capacity.
3.18 For new entrants, without a regional ring fence the Scheme discriminates against smaller aircraft,
and hence regional airlines. Clause 22 (a) and (c) have fairly generic application, but clause 22(b) states:
an application for a slot to operate a larger aircraft takes priority over one for a slot to
operate a smaller aircraft. [15]
Allocation of slots to regional airline industry not commercially unfair.
3.19 In the Committee's view, the argument that the number of regional slots allocated and their
exclusivity in peak time is somehow commercially unfair to other parts of the industry does not
automatically follow from the information at hand.
3.20 As discussed above, the occupants of peak slots gained access to them as a result of an economic
competition (ie via a peak surcharge) on an open playing field lasting from 1991 to 1997. The regional
airline industry represents 33% of Sydney Airport's air movements “business”, but uses only 28% of the
peak period, while interstate and international airlines use 70% of the peak period, but account for only
60% of movements. The Slot Management Scheme priorities for allocation of slots, outside the ring
fence, favours international and interstate airlines. Focusing for the moment on “equal rights” to run a
business, and ignoring other policy matters, safeguards have been provided for regional operators in a
scheme that has restrictions that would otherwise make it difficult for the regional airline industry to
maintain access to slots at the most desirable times of day. The Committee cannot see this as
discriminating against other parts of the industry.
3.21 On balance, the Committee believes that the regional ring fence is necessary to maintain a
level of equity of treatment within the scheme.
Possible leakage from the “ring fence”
3.22 Some concerns where raised in other submissions about possible leakage from the ring fence in the
longer term. For example, Hazelton indicated specific concerns in this area which it believed had not
been adequately addressed by the Department of Transport and Regional Development during
consultation concerning the scheme:
- First the inherent bias in the legislation in favour of interstate and international slot pool.
There is no guarantee (despite ring fencing of regional slots) that a subtle drift of slots from the
regional to the interstate and international pool would not occur. In such a scenario where the
number of hourly movements has been restricted to 80, slots will increasingly become a valuable
commodity. Through pressure on demand slots could increasingly be controlled by the major
airline duopoly in Australia especially as both majors each wholly-own a regional airline with
operations into KSA.
- Second, the loose drafting of the proposed legislation can, as has been argued, provide flexibility in
day to day operation of the scheme. It can however allow considerable latitude in interpretation by
the Minister and Slot Manager in what at times can be a highly charged political environment.
3.23 In follow up information provided by Sydney Airports Corporation it was indicated that:
There is no evidence of any significant loss of regional access to Sydney Airport since the
introduction of the slot system. The ring fence, however, is flexible enough to ensure easy
and rapid transfer of regional slots. This was evidenced by the transfer from Tamair to
Impulse Airlines of slots after the financial failure of Taimair. [16]
3.24 The Committee believes, from the evidence, that the regional ring fence provides many safeguards
against loss of slots to regional operators. However, the Committee's reading of the legislation and
scheme, combined with the evidence it has collected indicates to it that it is nonetheless possible and quite
foreseeable to lose a slot from the regional ring fence.
3.25 This view was confirmed at the public hearing on the 24 April 1998 by Ms Alroe from the FAC
who confirmed that leakage was possible:
So, yes, there can be leakage from the ring fence but it has got to be extraordinarily
gradual, and slots are usually regarded as a very precious asset of any company. [17]
3.26 The Committee acknowledges that a slot may be precious to an operator. This presumes, however,
that an operator remains in business or cannot be otherwise influenced to give up a slot. Given the
tenuous position of some regional airline businesses (illustrated by Tamair's failure in 1998), the complex
nature of operating a regional airline and external competition for a scarce resource, it is not hard to
imagine the circumstance where a slot could “leak” from the ring. It is very positive that Impulse Airlines
was able to step in and take over Tamair's slots, however there is no guarantee that this will occur on
every occasion.
3.27 Once a peak or shoulder slot is lost from the ring fence by the regional airline industry it is unlikely,
given the priorities of the scheme, that regional operators will regain access to that slot. Regaining a slot
would only occur in the unlikely event that there is no domestic or international competition for the slot.
3.28 The Committee is of the opinion that this is an area that warrants careful monitoring and,
if needs be, review and remedial action by the Minister for Transport and Regional Affairs and
the Slot Manager.
Continued rural and regional community access to peak time slots.
3.29 The Committee also notes with interest the interim report published in September 1998 by the
NSW Parliamentary Standing Committee on State Development. A number of the organisations
representing regional communities indicated concerns to the Standing Committee that not only might slots
be lost from the regional ring, but also, given the combination of the Slot Management Scheme and
changes to pricing arrangements at KSA, that communities would lose easy, affordable and convenient
access to KSA
At present a large number of rural and regional communities have access to a same-day
return service. Many are concerned that the Slot Management Scheme in its current form
may contribute to the demise of their service levels, with services shifted out of peak
period slots. [18]
3.30 A second issue raised in the Standing Committee's report is the question of what say regional
communities have in continuing access to their traditional slots. In this scenario, regional airlines could
divert peak slots to other routes, leaving a community with a less service or no service. While the
Standing Committee acknowledged the consultation of communities by Department of Transport and
Regional Development and that route specific slots had been considered but seen as making the scheme
far too complex, it went on to say:
However, the standing committee shares the concern of regional communities that, under
the current scheme, aircraft operators may move desirable slots away from smaller
communities to high density routes, a scenario highly likely if regional air service in New
South Wales are deregulated. If aircraft operators were to adopt such an approach many
smaller communities would lose same day return journey access to Sydney. This would
increase travel costs for members of these communities and also act as a deterrent for
those considering travelling to these communities. [19]
3.31 This Committee did not have the opportunity to explore this issue in depth itself due to time
constraints. However, the evidence collected by the NSW Parliamentary Standing Committee is sufficient
to convince the Committee that there is reason to monitor closely the movement of slots within the
regional ring fence and its impact on regional access to KSA, as well as any leakage from the regional
ring fence.
Recommendation
- The Commonwealth closely monitor movements of slots within and out of the pool of slots
“ring fenced” for regional airlines; including periodic examination of the reasons for
movement and any evidence that the distribution of slots is being manipulated by
operators to the detriment of services to regional communities. The Minister and Slot
Manager should take steps to address any trend toward reduction in regional access to
slots, particularly peak time and shoulder slots, at KSA.
- The Commonwealth consider rural and regional community representation on the Sydney
Airport Coordination Committee.
Safety issues raised concerning the compliance scheme
3.32 In their submission [20] and evidence given at the public hearing on 11 May 1998 Tamair Airlines
raised concerns that the penalty system and lack of information about the scheme had the potential to
compromise safety. In their submission Tamair state:
In respect to operators holding only a small number of slots the threat of fines for off slot
operations versus the conduct of daily commercial schedule creates a major problem.
They go on to say, after giving an example of a possible scenario involving a minor defect with a coffee
maker that could turn into a major fault:
Under such a scenario the commercial pressure to compromise safety is enormous, after
all the coffee maker is not a required item unless of course the fault causes a fire 30
minutes out of Sydney.
The submission gives a further example:
A further example occurred last week when one of my pilots delayed a 7:00am Sydney
departure by 25 minutes to take on board extra fuel. Even though he already had the
required fuel on board he suspected the forecast weather at Glen Innes to be inaccurate,
considering the changeability of the New England weather this was a safe and prudent
decision. Under the slot management system the company could not have expected a
revised slot for 2 hours, which would have destroyed the whole days schedule and
incurred additional off slot movements and hence penalties.
3.33 At the time of preparing their submission Tamair was also concerned that they had not received a
full copy of the Slot Management Scheme and its rules. The Company felt that:
This is an unacceptable situation, the slot management scheme should not have been
introduced until the rules published and the operators notified.
Even if draft versions were in place they are not in a format that can be used as a guide to
the flight crews who are directly responsible for daily compliance. [21]
Tamair recommended that an education program be developed for the industry to overcome this
problem.
3.34 Speaking in support of the compliance scheme, Mr Harris from the Department of Transport and
Regional Development stated:
Some operators will tell the committee that we are compromising safety or forcing them
to make harsh decisions but, quite frankly, that is rubbish. There is no need to fly with
any defunct safety-relevant piece of equipment when the draft compliance scheme
provides you with the ability to describe the incident, show the maintenance log report
you made of the item which caused the delay, and be forgiven the fine.
The department wishes to strongly register that weak compliance will ultimately mean that
results will be far more ruthlessly pulled apart by public opinion than any court case we
might bring. [22]
3.35 While the Department did acknowledge the possibility that if aircraft management had a different
view to the pilot about safety coming first, before commercial concerns, this could place pressure on
pilots. Mr Harris stated:
This is true, and we know it exists in the industry, but the whole safety apparatus is
designed in the end to make available to the pilot the information that he is the one that
chooses these things. Moreover, within the compliance system that we are developing, it
is quite clear and explicitly stated the compliance committee will not second guess a
safety judgement from a pilot. [23]
3.36 With regard to Tamair's evidence, in a follow up letter, Impulse Airlines disagreed that safety was
an issue
3.37 The Committee accepts that at this stage there is no evidence that the Slot Management Scheme
and Compliance Schemes are intrinsically unsafe. It can see the need for a compliance system to ensure
that there is incentive to comply with the Slot Management Scheme. However, it is concerned that the
scheme was introduced, it would seem, with less than perfect documentation and initially without the
systematic education of affected pilots by the bodies responsible for the piloting and implementation of
the program.
Loss of Capacity for growth at the most desirable times
3.38 Sydney Airports Corporation raised as a negative aspect of the scheme:
….the loss of capacity to grow at the most desirable times of day by airlines, especially
domestic operators. There is a slowly growing number of 60-minute periods with very
limited access to slots, especially for arrivals. This demand has been somewhat mitigated
by the Asian Currency Crisis but will continue to be a limiting factor on growth by both
new and incumbent operators. [25]
3.39 Kendell also raised this as an issue in correspondence on 22 February 1999:
We do however, like most operators, have the need to require additional slots at peak
times but are restricted by the legislated limit of 80 movements per hour. This is of
particular interest to us due to our announcement of our network expansion and the
purchase of regional jets, which we hope, will grow some of the markets into and out of
Sydney. [26]
3.40 This would appear to be a problem not just with operating a slot system, but rather resulting from
the overall framework of restrictions placed on operations at KSA through the movements cap and
curfew arrangements. Growth at KSA will inevitably be restrained by the need to balance a wide range
of stakeholder interests, including the Community surrounding the airport.
Claimed improvements as a result of the slot management scheme
3.41 In their 1997/98 annual report, Department of Transport and Regional Affairs made the following
claims:
The Slot Management Scheme is delivering for Sydney Airport:
- less clustering of flights in airline schedules;
- greater predicability for investment;
- fewer delays, and as a consequence fewer delays at other airports;
- reduced time spent by Airservices Australia rescheduling airlines, thereby increasing
resources available for core responsibilities;
- guaranteed access for NSW regional communities; and
- less fuel waste leading to savings in costs and reduced emissions.
An additional benefit may be airlines rescheduling movements to improve the balance of
arrivals and departures at certain peak times. [27]
3.42 At the initial hearings of this Committee in April/May 1998 some anecdotal evidence was available
to support the view that fewer delays where being experienced. However, no hard data was available
due to the limited time of the Scheme's operation. For example, Mr McGrane, Mayor of Dubbo City
council in his evidence provided 24 April 1998 indicated:
I am a person who flies into Sydney at least once a week, sometimes twice a week, so I
am a frequent user of the airport. I have found in the last six months, especially in the last
two months, the airlines have very much run on time. [28]
This period would appear to correspond to the “trial” period leading up to the Scheme's introduction and
the fist month of its operation. He goes on to say:
In regard to slot times, I think it has improved the service to our area. [29]
3.43 On the other hand, while improvements seemed apparent from the personal experience of several of
the witnesses, Mr Russell, General Manager, Hazelton Airlines indicated that:
At the moment we note that every weekday the slot system has been overridden by the
controlled time departure program operated by Airservices, so we really have not seen
the system operate except on weekends. The period of high demand, of course, are
during the peaks on weekdays. We have gone through a process of asking our
passengers to arrive early at the airport to be on time to ensure that the aircraft can
depart to meet its slot. However, because of the overriding by the controlled time
departure program, inevitably we are getting 20 minute delays before that aircraft can
then depart, and that is sending some confusing signals to our passengers, to say the
least. We are hopeful that in time that will work its way out of the system. [30]
3.44 This suggests to the Committee that at its public hearings in April it was too early to assess the
impact of the new scheme.
3.45 The Committee notes with interest the findings of the NSW Parliamentary Standing Committee on
State Development who reported in September 1998. They found that:
A great majority of witnesses told the Standing Committee about positive outcomes of
the slot management scheme.
One key positive outcome, both for passengers and for airline operators, was the
dramatic improvements in certainty of departure and landing time. [31]
3.46 To gain more up to date information, a request for further information concerning the impact of the
Slot Management Scheme was sent in January 1999 to airlines who gave evidence at the public hearings.
BARA, Qantas and Ansett declined to add anything to their evidence. Further information was received
from Yanda Airlines, Kendell Airlines and Sydney Airports Corporations which suggests that there is
some division on the benefits of the Scheme.
3.47 On 17 February 1999 Yanda Airlines, in the follow up letter to their submission, indicated that their
comments on the Slot Management Scheme where primarily negative, they state:
The slot management system was introduced as a political measure the cost of which has
to be born by a group who neither asked for or wanted it. The slot system approximates
an already existing Control Departure Program operated by Air Traffic Services, a
system operated at the coal face with significantly more operating flexibility and already
funded. However such a system would not have allowed the then Minister to claim he
was being tough with the airlines. [32]
3.48 Kendell Airlines in correspondence dated 22 February 1999 indicated they had no concerns with
the Slot Management Scheme as it currently stands. Sydney Airports Corporation saw benefits emerging
from the Scheme, their response to the initial two seasons of operation is outlined below.
3.49 With regard to the Departments claim that less fuel will be wasted and less emissions produced
under the new scheme, witnesses agreed that if the Slot Management Scheme worked as intended less
time would be spent in holding patterns over KSA and consequently less fuel would be consumed. As
Mr Kimpton, Manager Aviation Policy, Ansett Australia indicated in his evidence on 24 April 1998:
I think we are hoping that, as it beds down and gets into place, it will have the effect that
I think Senator Crane was referring to: namely, the reduction of costs for operators
because they no longer incur delays in the air coming into Sydney or delays on the
ground going out. But I think we are a little too soon in the life of the scheme to be able,
in so many words to call it an “outcome”. [33]
In response to a question on notice, Hazelton Airlines wrote:
Senator Crane asked me if I could provide an estimate of the savings that could be
expected as a result of the slot system at Sydney Airport reducing delays to inbound
aircraft.
It is difficult to be precise however on the basis of saving only five minutes per inbound
flight the savings to Hazelton would be in the order of $1.1m per annum. [34]
3.50 With regard to the Departments claim of guarantees of access for regional communities in NSW,
see the discussion and Committee recommendation above concerning the possibility of losses from the
regional ring fence and how slots are allocated to airlines, not communities, allowing possible loss of slots
in peak times.
Trends in the operation of the Slot Management Scheme March 98 to February 99
3.51 The Slot Management Scheme has now been in operation for two “seasons”, Summer 98 (29/2/98
to 24/10/98) and Winter 98 (25/10/98 to 27/3/99) with a third now scheduled by the ACA for the
period 28/3/99 to 30/10/99.
3.52 While there remains some criticism of the scheme for a range of reasons, Sydney Airports
Corporation in their correspondence dated 19/2/99, indicates that there are some positive results being
seen:
On the positive side the slot system at Sydney Airport has started to impact on delays by
smoothing out the cluster scheduling on departures. Aircraft departure times are now
spread more evenly through the hour at peak times and there is less queuing on the
airfield by aircraft waiting to takeoff. There is also a more even flow of arriving aircraft
with arrival numbers matched closer to the current processing ability of the Air Traffic
Control system. As a result control departure time procedures have been suspended
over the current scheduling season on most days, except where there have been extreme
weather conditions. This means that domestic airline operators are operating close to
their scheduled operations on most days. [35]
3.53 Sydney Airports Corporation's evidence supports the claim in the Department of Transport and
Regional Affairs' annual report for 1997/98 that the Slot Management Scheme was delivering less
clustering of flights.
3.54 It is difficult from the evidence to hand to estimate to what degree improvements have been made in
flights being on time, only that there has been improvement. Sydney Airports Corporation indicated that:
The early feedback from the Compliance Committee is that between 86% and 89% of
flights to/from Sydney Airport operate within the agreed slot performance margins. It is
expected that this performance will improve over the summer 99 season. [36]
3.55 The compliance system began its operations in October 98, at the beginning of the Winter 98
season. According to Sydney Airports Corporation, a review of off-slot operations by the Compliance
Committee has commenced. While no fines have been applied to-date, the review will determine if fines
should be levied. The Corporation saw this in a positive light:
The review process is focussing airline attention on on-time performance and there are
clear signs that the various companies are taking comprehensive action to improve
on-time performance. [37]
3.56 The Corporation also suggests that the analysis of the impact of other factors on the off-slot
movements will enable those involved to minimise the impact of these factors.
Conclusions on any benefits derived from the Scheme
3.57 It would seem from the evidence that the scheme is having a positive impact on the management of
aircraft landings at KSA, particularly with regard to cluster scheduling and arrival and departure times.
This would appear, as claimed by the Department of Transport and Regional Affairs, to have flow ons to
the airline industry in savings in operating costs produced simply by less time circling KSA in the air and
waiting for departure on the ground.
3.58 In the first two seasons of the scheme's operation there appears no evidence of any “significant” loss
of regional and rural access to KSA. However, as expressed in the Committee's recommendation, the
Committee believes the guarantees of protection of regional community and airline access are not all
encompassing. There is still a possibility that events could lead to the loss of access by communities with
less profitable routes. It is the Committee's belief that rural and regional community access will need
careful monitoring by the Minister to ensure there is no creep of slots toward more profitable routes, with
a consequent loss to some communities of slots, particularly at peak times.
Footnotes
[1] Submission, Local Government and Shires Association of NSW. p 3.
[2] Submission, Impulse Airlines Pty Ltd, p 2.
[3] Evidence, Hazelton Airlines, p. 37.
[4] Submission, Qantas, p3.
[5] Evidence, Qantas, p. 90.
[6] Submission, Board of Airline Representatives of Australia Inc., p. 2.
[7] Submission, Qantas, p3.
[8] Submission, Board of Airline Representatives of Australia Inc., p. 2.
[9] Submission, Impulse Airlines Pty Ltd, p 2.
[10] Submission, Federal Airports Corporation, p. 8.
[11] Submission, Federal Airports Corporation, p. 4.
[12] International Air Services Productivity Commission pp 157-159.
[13] International Air Services Productivity Commission p. 159.
[14] Slot Management Scheme 1998, p. 19.
[15] Slot Management Scheme 1998, p. 19.
[16] Correspondence (19/2/99), Sydney Airports Corporation.
[17] Evidence, Federal Airports Corporation, p. 71.
[18] Interim report on Provision and operation of rural and regional services in New South Wales,
Parliament of New South Wales, Legislative Council, Standing Committee on State Development, Vol 1,
p. 39.
[19] Interim report on Provision and operation of rural and regional services in New South Wales,
Parliament of New South Wales, Legislative Council, Standing Committee on State Development, Vol 1,
p. 40.
[20] Submission, Tamair Pty Ltd, p. 2.
[21] Submission, Tamair Pty Ltd, p. 3.
[22] Evidence, Department of Transport and Regional Development, p. 165
[23] Evidence, Department of Transport and Regional Development, p. 165
[24] Correspondence, Impulse Airlines.
[25] Correspondence (19/2/99), Sydney Airports Corporation, p.3.
[26] Correspondence, Kendell Airlines (Aust) Pty Ltd.
[27] Annual Report 1997-98, Department of Transport and Regional Development, p. 33.
[28] Evidence, Dubbo City Council, p28.
[29] Evidence, Dubbo City Council, p29.
[30] Evidence, Hazelton Airlines, p 37.
[31] Interim report on Provision and operation of rural and regional services in New South Wales,
Parliament of New South Wales, Legislative Council, Standing Committee on State Development, Vol 1,
p. 33.
[32] Correspondence, 17 February 1999, Yanda Airlines.
[33] Evidence, Ansett Australia, p. 75.
[34] Correspondence 22 May 1998, Hazelton Airlines, p. 1.
[35] Correspondence 19 February 1999, Sydney Airports Corporation, p. 2.
[36] Correspondence 19 February 1999, Sydney Airports Corporation, p. 2.
[37] Correspondence 19 February 1999, Sydney Airports Corporation, p. 2.