CHAPTER 2
Key issues
2.1
Those agencies affected by the measures contained in the Bill, and which
made submissions to the inquiry, expressed strong support for the proposed
legislation.[1]
For example, the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) considered:
...the new arrangements [introduced in the Bill] to be timely
and appropriate measures that are matched to current and emerging changes in
the organised crime threat picture and, accordingly, to law enforcement
corruption risk.[2]
2.2
Liberty Victoria and the Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland also
supported the Bill. In Liberty Victoria's view, the Bill 'sensibly' balances an
individual's right to privacy with appropriate limitations on undue
interference.[3]
2.3
Three submitters – Civil Liberties Australia (CLA), the Community and
Public Sector Union (CPSU) and the Australian Federal Police Association (AFPA)
– raised specific concerns in relation to the proposed measures in Part 1 of
Schedule 1 of the Bill (introduction of targeted integrity testing), and
Schedule 2 of the Bill (enhancement of the powers of the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
(Customs)).
Introduction of targeted integrity testing
2.4
ACLEI submitted that Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bill reflects and
responds to the challenges involved in investigating corrupt conduct, while
ensuring accountability, protecting the rights and reputations of individuals,
and providing appropriate legal protection for officers who conduct integrity
testing operations.[4]
Customs and the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) agreed that targeted
integrity testing would enhance and strengthen their existing integrity measures,
with both agencies emphasising that the tests will be 'intelligence‑led'.[5]
Annual reporting to Parliament
2.5
The AFPA acknowledged the importance of maintaining the integrity of the
Australian Federal Police (AFP), but noted that AFP employees are already subject
to an existing AFP integrity regime.[6]
In this context, and in view of the ACLEI's current oversight of the AFP in
relation to corruption issues, the AFPA questioned whether Part 1 of Schedule 1
of the Bill serves a legitimate objective:
[T]he Bill contributes to a regime which stretches the
boundaries of the Right to Protection Against Arbitrary and Unlawful
Interference with Privacy provided in Article 17 of the [International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights]...The AFPA recommends that a Statement of
Compatibility with Human Rights, with a structure similar to that provided in
the Explanatory Memorandum pursuant to Part 3 of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), be prepared for each ACLEI annual
report, to monitor the ongoing impact of integrity testing on targets.[7]
2.6
Mr Rogan McMahon-Hogan from the AFPA indicated that this recommendation
could provide a starting point for protecting the rights of AFP employees.[8]
However, a representative from the Attorney-General's Department (Department) informed
the committee that the annual reporting of integrity testing operations, and
their impact on individual officers, raises several other concerns:
We would have a concern that that might, firstly, disclose
methodology that is used in the integrity testing potentially. Depending on the
level of information, it might be possible to identify targeting or even
particular targets.
Also...even disclosure of things like the number of integrity
tests could potentially undermine deterrence value, if it is clear to officers
about the number of those tests that are being conducted each year—they may be
able to better gauge whether they would be subject to one, and we think the
fact that officers are not aware of that will ensure that the regime has an
overall greater deterrence value for corruption.[9]
Concurrent operation of integrity
regimes
2.7
Part V (Professional standards and AFP conduct and practice issues) of
the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) sets out a professional
standards integrity regime for AFP employees. The AFPA submitted that the Bill
does not adequately consider the concurrent operation of the existing regime and
the proposed regime:
[N]or does [the Bill] provide grounds on which a referral of [an
investigation under the existing regime] containing multiple potential elements
of corruption will be warranted. It is a realistic assumption that acts of
corruption will be combined with lesser acts which may breach professional
standards, with the result that AFP members may be subjected to concurrent
investigations with conflicting and potentially confusing requirements.[10]
2.8
The AFPA recommended that the Bill explicitly provide that any
behaviour, which is the subject of an AFP Professional Standards investigation,
cannot also be the subject of an integrity testing operation.[11]
The Department rejected this proposition on the grounds that it would not be
appropriate:
As a powerful investigative tool, it is intended that
integrity testing only be used for the most significant cases of misconduct,
where criminal behaviour is suspected. There is a wide spectrum of misconduct
which could give rise to an AFP Professional Standards investigation. At the
outset of any investigation, the extent of any suspected misconduct is likely
to be unclear. It is important that the AFP is not precluded from using
integrity testing as an investigative tool in circumstances where a
Professional Standards investigation has commenced.[12]
2.9
The Department also referred to proposed new section 15JE of the Crimes Act 1914
(Cth) (Crimes Act) (item 29 of Schedule 1 of the Bill), which allows the
Integrity Commissioner to authorise an integrity testing authority for staff members
of the AFP in relation to corruption issues:
While the Integrity Commissioner often works in collaboration
with the AFP, it is an important aspect of the role [of] the Integrity
Commissioner that he be able to conduct investigations independent from the
agencies within his jurisdiction. To limit the Integrity Commissioner's power
to investigate where an internal AFP investigation is underway would be an inappropriate
interference with the independence of the office.[13]
Role of the Integrity Commissioner
2.10
In relation to integrity testing authorities, the AFPA argued that the
Integrity Commissioner should have greater involvement in the approval of an
authority.
2.11
The AFPA submitted that the circumstances in which an application can be
made for an integrity testing authority do not appear to be transparent
(proposed new subsection 15JE(1) of the Crimes Act; item 29 of Schedule 1 of
the Bill):
As it stands[,] there is no external oversight of the
authorisation to conduct investigations. Unfortunately, this would leave the
possibility of non‑integrity, organisational factors influencing
decisions on whether or not to conduct an integrity test.[14]
2.12
In its supplementary submission, the AFPA stated that 'it is most
appropriate for the Integrity Commissioner to authorise these investigations'.[15]
Alternatively, the AFPA proposed that the Integrity Commissioner be notified of
and oversee the authorisation of integrity testing operations, a function described
in evidence as 'dual authorisation':
[The AFPA] would like to see dual authorisation with the
ACLEI commissioner to authorise an investigation whether it is or is not
corruption integrity testing...[I]t is an anticorruption measure in itself to
ensure that there is an independent person authorising the testing and that it
is not done internally...The danger with this model, as it is written at the
moment, is that a senior officer who is corrupt could organise integrity
testing on an innocent police officer.[16]
Departmental and Customs' responses
2.13
At the public hearing, a departmental officer pointed to proposed new
sections 15JI and 15JK of the Crimes Act (item 29 of Schedule 1 of the
Bill), which require the Integrity Commissioner to be notified of the grant or
variation of an integrity testing authority, and also the oversight role of the
Integrity Commissioner in relation to corruption issues under the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) (Integrity Commissioner
Act):
[T]here is already a very extensive and sufficient level of
oversight by the Integrity Commissioner of integrity testing.
In addition to that, the use of any covert or coercive powers
as part of an integrity test still need to go through all of the existing
authorisation processes—say, for controlled operations, or to a judge for a
surveillance device warrant et cetera. So there is independent oversight in
that respect of a number of the coercive powers that could be used as part of
an integrity [test].[17]
2.14
The officer added that existing integrity measures prevent senior
officers in agencies under ACLEI's jurisdiction from abusing the power granted
under proposed new subsection 15JE(1) of the Crimes Act:
[O]fficers can make complaints to agencies like the Ombudsman
or indeed an officer could complain to the Integrity Commissioner if they felt
that they were being inappropriately targeted or corruptly targeted with an
integrity test. So there is a whole surrounding set of misconduct procedures
and safeguards that would apply, as they would apply to authorising a range of
investigation techniques.[18]
2.15
In its submission, Customs addressed the issue of how it will ensure that
the measure proposed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bill is used only to enhance
integrity and combat corruption. In particular, Customs highlighted proposed
statutory safeguards within the Bill:
- the prerequisite criteria for the authorisation of an integrity
testing operation (proposed new paragraph 15JG(2)(a) of the Crimes Act; item 29
of Schedule 1 of the Bill);
- the limited number of senior officers who will be able to
authorise an integrity testing authority (proposed new section 15JE of the
Crimes Act; item 29 of Schedule 1 of the Bill);
- the criminalisation of unauthorised disclosure of information
relating to an integrity testing operation (proposed new sections 15JQ and 15JR
of the Crimes Act; item 29 of Schedule 1 of the Bill); and
- the new notification and reporting requirements (proposed new
sections 15JI and 15JS of the Crimes Act; item 29 of Schedule 1 of the
Bill).[19]
Enhancement of the powers of the Chief Executive Officer of Customs
2.16
Schedule 2 of the Bill amends the Customs Administration Act 1985
(Cth) (Customs Administration Act) to introduce a range of measures, including
enhanced powers for the CEO of Customs, and the ability for authorised officers
to require or direct drug and alcohol testing of Customs workers.
2.17
ACLEI supported enhancing Customs' integrity arrangements,[20]
and noted that the proposed provisions reflect many priority areas identified
in an internal review of Customs' integrity arrangements and anti-corruption
strategies, which was jointly conducted by ACLEI and Customs in 2012:
These measures will bring [Customs'] anti-corruption
arrangements into closer alignment with those of the Australian Crime
Commission and the Australian Federal Police, and contribute to the 'common
integrity platform' which has the [Integrity Commissioner Act at] its centre.[21]
2.18
In its submission and at the public hearing, the CPSU raised several
concerns with the proposed measure(s).
Mandatory reporting pursuant to
CEO's Orders
2.19
Proposed new section 4B of the Customs Administration Act (item 16 of
Schedule 2 of the Bill) provides the CEO of Customs with the power to issue
written orders in relation to the control of Customs (CEO's Orders), including
the mandatory reporting of certain matters set out in proposed new subsection
4B(2) of the Act.
2.20
Ms Brooke Muscat-Bentley from the CPSU told the committee:
[Our] [m]embers understand that they would need to report
criminal or corrupt activity but are concerned that misconduct is quite broad
and, because the CEO can determine that or change what misconduct is, they
might not be aware of that misconduct and therefore could be subject to a code
of conduct themselves. They are also not really clear about who they would be
reporting that misconduct to and what protections would be put in place if they
were reporting misconduct of a senior employee.[22]
2.21
The CPSU suggested that the definition of 'serious
misconduct' (item 14 of Schedule 2 of the Bill) should be limited to
corrupt and criminal behaviour.[23]
Departmental and Customs' responses
2.22
Noting that the Bill does not require mandatory reporting, the Department
submitted that, in the event an order is made under proposed new subsection
4B(2) of the Customs Administration Act:
Any such order will make clear the person or persons to whom
a [Customs] officer is required to make the disclosure, and the nature of
information that is required to be disclosed.[24]
2.23
Customs also advised its intention to establish an Integrity Support and
Referral Network, to provide advice and support to Customs staff regarding
integrity and mandatory reporting obligations:
Such a facility will be critical if mandatory reporting of
misconduct and corruption is introduced, as it provides a fair and confidential
mechanism for staff to meet their reporting obligations. A
similar program has been successfully run within the AFP for 16 years.[25]
2.24
The Department did not consider that it would be helpful for an order
under proposed new subsection 4B(2) to cover only criminal or corrupt conduct:
[S]uch a limitation would not be of assistance in enabling
Customs workers to know that misconduct should be reported as it would require
Customs workers to make an assessment of whether observed misconduct amounts to
corruption or criminal activity.[26]
Enhanced power to make a
declaration
2.25
Proposed new section 15A of the Customs Administration Act provides that
the CEO of Customs may make a declaration that he or she believes, on
reasonable grounds, that a staff member's conduct or behaviour, or any part of
it, amounts to serious misconduct by the staff member (the declaration making
power).[27]
The effect of the declaration will be to exclude the application of certain
provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (proposed new subsection
15A(3) of the Act).
2.26
ACLEI supported the proposed declaration-making power on the ground that
it will provide 'a specific legislative basis for the [CEO of Customs] to
disrupt corruption...when serious misconduct or corrupt conduct is established to
a relevant level of satisfaction'.[28]
2.27
However, the CPSU strongly objected to proposed new subsection 15A(3) of
the Customs Administration Act:
[It] will see Customs officers stripped of their right to
unfair dismissal protections where the employee is terminated for serious
misconduct and where the Customs CEO issues a certificate which has the effect
of removing that right. This is quite an extraordinary power[.][29]
CPSU's key concerns
2.28
Ms Rebecca Fawcett from the CPSU identified four key concerns with
proposed new subsection 15A(3):
[First], if a Customs employee is terminated in this way,
they will have no recourse to Fair Work Australia to challenge an incorrect
decision. That is a basic workplace right that is enjoyed by every other
Australian worker[.]
[Second], these measures would strip employees of their basic
right to procedural fairness. The employee will have no right to answer allegations
or respond before they are terminated. [CPSU considers] that to be at odds with
our international obligations, namely the [International Labour Organisation]
Termination of Employment Convention[.]
[Third], if passed, the Commonwealth will be the only
jurisdiction in the land to remove these basic rights from its law enforcement
and national security employees in this way. All of the state and territory
jurisdictions give the agency head of their police forces the right or ability
to dismiss employees for loss of confidence or serious misconduct, but all of
the other jurisdictions maintain an appeal mechanism of some kind[.]
[Fourth], [CPSU believes] this power will lead to poor
decision making and in the worst cases would be open to abuse. It will allow
the Customs CEO to terminate the employment of a Customs officer with no real
oversight.[30]
2.29
The CPSU advocated the removal of proposed new section 15A from the Bill
or, in the alternative, that the employee protections within Schedule 2 of
the Bill be enhanced by, for example:
- allowing the CEO of Customs to stand down an employee accused of
serious misconduct pending investigation into the matter;
- creating a process for external review of a declaration made
under proposed new subsection 15A(2); and
- including procedural requirements in proposed new section 15A –
such as, that the CEO of Customs can only issue a declaration on advice of a
panel that includes at least one member who is independent of Customs.[31]
Government responses
2.30
The EM to the Bill states that proposed new section 15A of the Customs
Administration Act applies only when a staff member's employment has been
terminated in accordance with section 29 of the Public Service Act 1999
(Cth).[32]
In its submission, the Department emphasised:
The power to make a declaration of serious misconduct only
applies once a person has been dismissed and is separate to the dismissal
process. The new power provided in the Bill does not alter or reduce the
obligation on [Customs] to accord the person fair process when determining
whether or not they have breached the Code of Conduct, and if they have,
whether they should be dismissed as a sanction for that breach.[33]
2.31
In correspondence to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights,
the Minister explained in some detail how the dismissal process is to be
extended to accommodate the proposed power in new subsection 15A:
It is anticipated that the agency's procedures will be
amended to provide that where a sanction delegate is considering termination of
employment as a sanction for misconduct, the delegate will also be required to
consider whether or not the matter is one for which it may be appropriate for
the CEO to consider a declaration of serious misconduct if the delegate does
terminate employment. If [so]...the procedures will require that the delegate
indicate this to the employee as part of the correspondence that goes to the
employee from the delegate asking the employee to 'show cause' as to why his or
her employment should not be terminated.
...
[T]his correspondence would outline the reasons why, in the
delegate's view, if the sanction of dismissal is imposed that dismissal would
warrant a referral to the CEO for consideration of a declaration of misconduct.
This ensures that, in responding to the 'show cause' letter, the employee
understand not only the implication of the potential sanction but also
understands that the delegate considers that the case may satisfy the criteria
for the making of a declaration of serious misconduct such that the employee
can address that issue as well as providing any mitigating information going to
why dismissal is not an appropriate sanction in the circumstances.[34]
2.32
Customs also noted that the Bill does not affect Customs' obligations
under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) to accord its employees fair
process when investigating allegations of serious misconduct. Further:
The making of a declaration of serious misconduct will not
limit other legal avenues available to a dismissed employee, such as claims
under anti‑discrimination legislation and under Part 3-1 of the [Fair
Work Act 2009 (Cth)] (adverse action). As a decision to dismiss a
[Customs] employee is a decision made under an enactment, the possibility of
review in accordance with the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act
1977 (Cth) continues.[35]
2.33
In response to the CPSU's concerns regarding procedural requirements,
Customs confirmed that, as indicated by the Minister in his second reading
speech,[36]
the agency will implement a panel independent of its CEO:
The role of the panel is to advise the CEO, on each occasion
[the use of the declaration making power is being considered], whether or not a
written declaration of serious misconduct is appropriate, given the details of
[the] particular dismissal, the legislative criteria and the connection
necessary to the agency's law enforcement functions.[37]
2.34
Two further safeguards were noted by Customs in its submission: the
scrutiny of the use of the declaration making power by way of a report to the
Minister (proposed new subsection 15A(7) of the Customs Administration Act);
and the requirement for a copy of the declaration to be provided to the staff
member (proposed new subsection 15A(6) of the Act).
2.35
In correspondence to the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of
Bills, the Minister noted further that proposed new subsection 15A(1) of the
Customs Administration Act contains more than one criterion, of which the CEO
must be satisfied in order to make a declaration of serious misconduct:
[W]hether the conduct amounts to 'serious misconduct' is only
one aspect of the criteria...The other aspect is that the employee's behaviour
must be having, or is likely to have, a damaging effect on:
(i) the professional self-respect or morale of some or all of
the members of the staff of the agency, or
(ii) the reputation of the agency with the public, or any
section of the public, or with an Australian or overseas government, or with a
person or body (however described) to whom the CEO may authorise disclosure of
information under section 16 of the [Customs Administration Act].[38]
2.36
The Minister added:
[T]he explanatory memorandum indicates that the conduct
concerned must also 'relate to [Customs'] law enforcement powers'. The need for
a nexus between the conduct and the agency's law enforcement functions is
consistent with the policy objective behind this power. This objective is to
ensure that employees of the agency who are proven to have engaged in conduct
of the necessary character, relating as it does to the agency's law enforcement
role, cannot be reinstated to employment within the agency, thereby compromising
the work of the agency, ongoing investigations and adversely impacting on the
morale of staff.[39]
2.37
The Department clarified further:
[T]he statement in the Explanatory Memorandum exists to
provide context around the situations in which it may be used. Including an
express limitation in the Bill would not be desirable as it could encourage
technical challenges to the exercise of the power based on the definition of a
law enforcement function. It is important that the power be able to be used in
all necessary circumstances.[40]
Drug and alcohol testing
2.38
Item 21 of Schedule 2 of the Bill inserts proposed new sections 16B-16G into
the Customs Administration Act, to create a new regime under which Customs
workers can be required or directed to undergo drug and alcohol testing.
2.39
ACLEI supported the proposed measure:
The use by an employee of illicit drugs (including border
controlled substances, such as steroids) would bring him or her into contact
with criminals who supply or distribute these substances. An employee who uses
unlawful or illegally-imported substances is compromised by the action and any
witnesses to it, and is therefore vulnerable to corrupt influence. Accordingly,
broad-based drug testing of employees is an important corruption deterrence and
risk-awareness measure.[41]
2.40
Customs informed the committee that, apart from testing conducted by the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (which applies to Customs staff working at
airports), the agency does not have the power to determine whether a worker is
under the influence of illicit drugs or alcohol. Customs therefore supported
the proposed drug and alcohol testing regime, emphasising that the legislative
amendments will ensure high standards of integrity, health, and safety, as well
as allow for the protection of Australia's border.[42]
2.41
In addition, Customs noted that the agency is developing a comprehensive
Drug and Alcohol Management Program, to underpin the proposed regime. Some
features of the program include:
- development of a dedicated education and awareness process;
- development of a robust sampling methodology;
-
intelligence-led, risk-based identification of employees for drug
and alcohol testing; and
- creation of a drug and alcohol response program.[43]
2.42
The Minister advised the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights that
Customs' program will implement current best practice to meet Australian
standards, and these standards will be reflected in a number of anticipated
arrangements.[44]
CPSU concerns
2.43
In principle, the CPSU did not object to the proposed drug and alcohol testing
regime; however, Ms Muscat-Bentley stated:
[Our members have] some concerns based on a series of
unknowns, primarily what safeguards will be in place to ensure [that] the
privacy of employees will be maintained, particularly around the use of
prescription medication.[45]
2.44
The CPSU argued that the circumstances in which drug and alcohol testing
will be permitted 'go beyond the stated purposes of the Bill and the
[behaviour] that the Bill is trying to combat':
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill states that the purpose
of these amendments is to 'enhance the powers of the CEO of [Customs] to deal
with suspected corrupt conduct'. However, the proposed sections 16B-16H of the
Customs [Administration] Act would permit any employee to be required to
undergo a drug or alcohol test at any time regardless of whether they were
suspected of corruption.[46]
2.45
While the CPSU considered the intention of the proposed regime to be
sound, its submission stated that the regime would be open to abuse, and wider
implementation of testing could undermine the level of trust between Customs
and its employees:
There is a risk that employees could be unfairly targeted for
tests and individuals or groups of employees could be harassed by repeated
requests for drug and alcohol tests. Furthermore, the Bill does not place
limits on how the results from the tests may be used and whether results can be
used in non-corruption related disciplinary proceedings.[47]
2.46
In this context, the CPSU particularly identified the capture of
prescription medication within the definition of 'prohibited drug' as a
concern:
Although Customs have indicated that this broad definition is
only intended to capture those employees who abuse prescription drugs, serious
incursions into an employee's privacy may be required to determine whether an
employee is abusing a prescription drug or not. This would include accessing
confidential medical records and asking employees to justify their use of
certain medications.[48]
2.47
The CPSU called for the proposed legislation to be as specific as possible
in setting out the range of situations in which alcohol and drug testing is permitted,
and how the results of that testing can be used. Its submission especially
recommended that prescription medications should be excluded from the Bill.[49]
2.48
At the public hearing, Ms Fawcett from the CPSU stated that,
alternatively, the Bill needs more safeguards, to ensure that Customs staff who
are legitimately using prescription medication, with a prescription, 'do not
suffer any kind of adverse action in their employment because they had a
medical condition'.[50]
Government responses
2.49
The Department submitted that proposed new section 16C of the Customs
Administration Act, which allows an authorised officer to direct a Customs
worker to undergo drug and/or alcohol testing at any time and without reason,
is intended to provide for mandatory random testing of Customs workers:
The ability to have a randomised approach is essential to
ensure that [Customs] remains drug and alcohol free. The powers to authorise
testing under [proposed new] sections 16B and 16D only allow for testing after
an incident or allegation has occurred. Section 16C will allow [Customs] to
proactively manage potential integrity issues, strengthening integrity in the agency.[51]
2.50
In relation to the breadth of the definition of 'prohibited drug', the
Minister has stated that 'it is not always appropriate to be overly
prescriptive in primary legislation', and in the context of the Bill:
[T]he benefits of providing a definition are outweighed by
the risks arising from [the] evolving and changing nature of the drug
environment...[N]ew drugs and their variants are continually entering the
market...[P]roviding a definition of 'prohibited drug' will confine the ability
of [Customs] to meet the challenges presented by new drugs and will undermine
the ability of the agency to maintain a drug free workplace. Defining the term
'prohibited drug' by legislative instrument will provide a lawful and flexible
mechanism to allow the CEO of [Customs] to respond quickly to this ever‑changing
environment.[52]
2.51
Responding to the CPSU's comments regarding prescription medications, the Acting
CEO of Customs, Mr Michael Pezzullo, commented:
If our officers are engaging in the abuse of illicit drugs,
the abuse of what might otherwise be prescribed medication in that they are
using it beyond clinical norms and not through prescriptions or turning up to
work boozed up, that is not in keeping with the sorts of standards that we
believe our agency should be projecting to the Australian community at large.[53]
Committee view
2.52
The committee notes the objectives of the Bill, and that most participants
in the inquiry supported the proposed measures. While certain aspects of
proposed provisions in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bill (introduction of targeted
integrity testing) and Schedule 2 of the Bill (enhancement of the powers of the
CEO of Customs) concerned some submitters and witnesses, the committee is of
the view that the response received from the Department adequately explains and
supports the measures, which are designed to prevent corruption in Commonwealth
law enforcement agencies and enhance the ability of those agency heads to
respond to cases of suspected corruption. The committee also notes the
statutory protections and level of oversight provided for throughout the Bill,
as well as in existing legislation (such as the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner
Act 2006 (Cth)).
Recommendation 1
2.53
The committee recommends that the Senate pass the Bill.
Senator Trish Crossin
Chair
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