



# **Supplementary Submission No 41**

## **Inquiry into Australia's Maritime Strategy**

**Organisation:** Department of Defence

**Contact Person:** Mr Shane Carmody  
Deputy Secretary Strategic Policy

**Address:** R1-5-B001  
Russell Offices  
CANBERRA ACT 2600



Reference:

Contact: Mr Shane Carmody

E-mail: shane.carmody@defence.gov.au


Telephone: +61 (02) 6265 2848

Facsimile: +61 (02) 6265 1599

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31 July 2003

Mr Stephen Boyd  
Secretary – Defence Sub-Committee  
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade  
Parliament House  
Canberra ACT 2600



Dear Mr Boyd

Defence has completed the 12 responses to questions on notice arising from the Defence Sub-Committee hearing on 24 March 2003 into Australia's Maritime Strategy.

The responses, attached to this letter, have been approved by the Minister for Defence.

Yours Sincerely,

Shane Carmody  
Deputy Secretary Strategic Policy

## **QUESTION 1**

Member: Mr A.R. Bevis, MP

HANSARD: Page 300

What is the ADF's stockpiling policy?

### **RESPONSE**

The level of stocks held by the ADF is determined through a number of factors, including strategic guidance, available funding, risk management and supply chain factors. Reserve stock requirements are reviewed periodically against changing preparedness objectives or activity level/usage rate guidance, alterations in service operating and support concepts, or changes to industry support arrangements. Due to the dynamic nature of these variables, ADF stockholding policy does not prescribe levels of holding. The policy provides a requirements determination policy that seeks to quantify and cost the stockholding implications of ADF preparedness objectives.

## **QUESTION 2**

Member: Hon B.C. Scott

HANSARD: Page 309

How many F/A-18 pilots does the RAAF have available?

### **RESPONSE**

The number of fast-jet pilots in the RAAF is classified for operational security reasons.

## **QUESTION 3**

Member: Senator Hutchins

HANSARD: Page 312

Do you (Defence) have a view about the Shipowners Council and Maritime Union of Australia's concern about the decline in Australian merchant marine? Have you expressed a view to the government about it, particularly in relation to the taxation regime?

### **RESPONSE**

Defence has not made any specific submissions to the Government on this issue, but is consulted by other departments, when appropriate, for its views on shipping industry issues.

#### QUESTION 4

Member: Hon G.J. Edwards, MP

HANSARD: Page 313 - 314

How will the ADF maintain the capability to respond to another Bali scenario and maintain the quality of care for ADF personnel in the field on outsourcing health services?

#### RESPONSE

Defence health services in Victoria are the only ones being outsourced. Health services in the ACT and southern NSW were market tested but Defence has decided not to proceed with outsourcing in those areas. The remainder of the health services will be rationalised with a view to reducing duplication and improving efficiency, but a decision on whether they will be market tested will not be taken until the rationalisation is complete. Health services in the Sydney region were not market tested due to the complications arising from the need to maintain three major deployable health facilities at HMAS Penguin, Holsworthy Barracks and RAAF Richmond. The decision to market test a particular region will be based on assessment of that region's individual circumstances, including the capability of the civilian sector in that region to provide the required level of health care to the military population.

Currently, a significant number of uniformed health professionals are committed to providing non-operational health support on a base. Frequently, they are operating in small facilities from which it is difficult to release personnel for training. Health support for ADF operations requires health personnel with the skills to deal with significant trauma. These skills take time to develop and they degrade rapidly if not practised on a regular basis. These skills cannot be developed and maintained by providing non-operational health care on a base.

By outsourcing non-operational health support, the Defence Health Service is able to concentrate its uniformed health professionals in its major deployable health facilities. With larger numbers of health professionals in one area, it is much easier to release personnel to undertake training at major civilian hospitals which deal with trauma on a regular basis. Defence has established strategic alliances with a number of major civilian hospitals to facilitate this training. Through these alliances, personnel have the opportunity to develop and maintain their skills by regular attachments to the hospitals. As a result, the uniformed health professionals are better trained to undertake their medical duties when deployed on operations.

## QUESTION 5

Member: Hon L.R.S. Price, MP

HANSARD: Page 314

What was the difference between the medical support provided in the Bali response and the support provided for ADF operations in East Timor and Rwanda?

### RESPONSE

In East Timor and Rwanda, the requirement was to provide a level of health care to a deployed military force. This involved deploying a facility that had a surgical capability, high and medium dependency nursing care and a range of supporting health services, such as pathology, medical imaging, physiotherapy, environmental and preventive health and dental services. The contingents included a series of short rotations (two to six weeks) of Reservists who provided specialist services such as orthopaedic and general surgery, anaesthetics and trauma medicine. Self-sufficient units with clear command and administrative structures were deployed, and those units could sustain themselves for the full six months of each rotation. Significant time and effort was put into carefully preparing the forces prior to deployment.

In response to the Bali bombing, the ADF deployed a number of aeromedical evacuation teams at very short notice to prepare casualties for evacuation and to provide care for the casualties while they were being flown to Australia, where they were admitted to specialist civilian health facilities. The teams consisted of full-time aeromedical evacuation trained medical officers, nursing officers and medical assistants. Those teams were supplemented with specialist Reserve medical officers, principally anaesthetists, who provided specialist care to the more severely injured.

## QUESTION 6

Member: Mr A.R. Bevis, MP

HANSARD: Page 314

How does the ADF maintain the capacity to deploy a brigade on a long-term basis and deploy at least a battalion on another deployment?

### RESPONSE

The Army can meet the strategic direction issued in *Defence 2000 – Our Future Defence Force* to sustain a brigade deployed on operations for extended periods and, at the same time, maintain at least a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere. Army sustainability arrangements are designed to support a brigade group capable of warfighting operations up to mid-intensity on Australian territory or offshore. A separate battalion group task force is available to deploy to undertake a range of tasks at short notice while a brigade is on operations. The Army is enhancing the sustainability models that support this capability.

Army sustainability planning addresses the mobilisation, training support and resource requirements to mount two separate and sequential 12-month rotations of the brigade group. This will enable a brigade-sized commitment to be sustained over an extended period of time, allow sufficient time to mobilise the second rotation and allow for respite between re-deployments. The brigade group is not a unit with a fixed structure for a specific task. The rotations of the group will be formed, when required, from Army units across the combat force, held at the necessary preparedness levels. This arrangement offers the capabilities of a balanced brigade-size force and provides the flexibility required to assemble a deployable force for a specific operation.

## QUESTION 7

Member: Mr A.R. Bevis, MP

HANSARD: Page 314 - 315

Please provide information on the impact that the requirement to crew vessels currently deployed on operations at war levels has had on other branches of the Navy. How has that affected reserve day requirements in other branches of the Navy, particularly in the area of minehunters and patrol boats based in Darwin?

## RESPONSE

A total of 42 additional personnel were required to augment the crews in HMA Ships *Anzac*, *Darwin* and *Kanimbla*. The majority (38) served on HMAS *Kanimbla* due to the non-standard roles the ship was undertaking. While HMAS *Kanimbla* is normally crewed for amphibious operations, on this occasion the ship required additional personnel to carry out its boarding and task group command roles.

The requirement to provide additional personnel to deployed units in a period of overall personnel shortages was carefully managed to minimise the impact on Navy capability and individuals. The 42 additional personnel serving on deployed ships were sourced from across the Navy and, where possible, Reserve support was supplied to cover the losses. By applying a system of priorities and spreading the requirement across shore units, the impact on the rest of the Navy has been minimised. The requirement to provide additional personnel for deployed ships had no significant effect on the patrol boat, minehunter or minesweeper forces.

The deployment of Navy units on operations did not result in any increased requirement for Reserve day funding. Reserve personnel involvement in operations and support of operations, including the patrol boat and mine warfare groups, was managed from within existing Reserve day funding.

## QUESTION 8

Member: Mr A.R. Bevis, MP

HANSARD: Page 315

Have there been any ADF suicides in the Northern Territory in recent times, and were any ADF suicides connected to the pressures related to current operations?

### RESPONSE

There have been three ADF suicides reported from the Northern Territory since January 2000.

The Defence Health Service Branch monitors suicide rates and maintains a database of all reported ADF suicides. The database contains demographical information and the date and method of suicide. Since the beginning of 2002, this database has been expanded to include additional personal information, including operational service history.

A causative link between the suicides and operational service cannot be assumed. It is not possible to link a member's suicide directly to operational service, or any other specific life event, without a retrospective reconstruction of their lifestyle and personal circumstances. A comprehensive psychological autopsy could attempt to clarify the nature of the death and examine details of behaviours and events leading to the suicide. Psychological autopsies are not currently performed on ADF personnel who have committed suicide, but are being investigated as part of the ADF Suicide Prevention Initiative.

The ADF Suicide Prevention Initiative seeks to identify all ADF specific risk and protective factors to reduce the level of suicides. International suicide research indicates that the risk factors for suicide include a complex array of mental health, family, relationship, societal and situational factors. Operational service is one of many risk factors that will be considered.

## QUESTION 9

Member: Hon L.R.S. Price, MP

HANSARD: Page 317

What is the current status of the different Service sustainability models?

### RESPONSE

#### Navy Sustainability Modelling

The Navy has a range of capability sustainability methodologies tailored for the specific demands of its operational and support concepts. The Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) is responsible for sustainability and reporting of Navy equipment and supplies.

Within the DMO, the Director General Maritime Support reports on the sustainability of Navy equipment and supplies to the Chief of Navy Senior Advisory Committee quarterly. The quarterly report summarises the sustainability requirements of the RAN fleet, and reports any shortfalls in key enabling equipment, spare items and supplies. The sustainability requirements are derived from factors including operational tempo of the fleet, anticipated operational threat levels, maintenance routines for equipment on the ships, usage rates of spares and the prevailing reliability and lead times of commercially sourced spares and items. The DMO identifies existing sustainability shortfalls by obtaining current stock holding balances from Defence logistics information systems and conducting a gap analysis based on the estimated usage of items determined by the sustainability requirements.

The Defence Science and Technology Organisation is assisting the Navy to develop specific tools and methodologies that will improve the DMO's and the Navy's ability to predict and plan for the demand and provision of supply items. These tools will also assist the DMO and the Navy to determine reserve stockholding guidance and procurement strategies. The Maritime Systems Division in DMO is participating in a defence data warehousing initiative that will automate sustainability gap analysis for the Navy. This tool will allow adjustments to be made to the parameters of the model, which will facilitate analysis to optimise the Navy's investment in sustainability.

Personnel sustainability and workforce requirements in the Navy are managed by Navy Systems Command. These requirements are articulated in the Navy Strategic Workforce Plan, which includes analysis of the personnel requirement against rank, specialisation and category. Naval vessels require a minimum number of qualified personnel to maintain operational effectiveness, and the Commanding Officer of each vessel manages the daily state of personnel readiness. The Navy has scope for sustaining personnel numbers at sea by posting shore-based personnel to sea, when required, from permanent Navy and Australian Naval Reserve sources.



## Army Sustainability Model

The Army is introducing the Army Sustainment Model, which is supported by the Combat Force Sustainment Model (CFSM) and the Training Sustainment Model. These models support the strategic direction issued in *Defence 2000 – Our Future Defence Force* to ensure that the Army can sustain a brigade deployed on operations for extended periods and, at the same time, maintain at least a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere.

Preparedness guidance for the Army combat force is stated in the Chief of Army Capability Directive. The CFSM provides additional guidance to sustain a brigade-sized commitment over an extended period of time, allow sufficient time to mobilise the second rotation and allow for respite between re-deployments.

The CFSM is based on the following principles:

- (a) The model provides guidance to satisfy the military strategic and operational requirements required to meet government guidance.
- (b) The model reflects the Army-in-being plus the adjustments foreshadowed in the Defence Capability Plan and the revised role for the Reserves.
- (c) Force groupings in the model support current and emerging operational concepts and tasks derived from extant strategic guidance. Force requirements that may include national mobilisation to defend Australia are not addressed in the CFSM.
- (d) The CFSM only identifies the land component contribution to a joint force.
- (e) Deployable land force groupings are balanced to maximise self-sufficiency in land operations.
- (f) Force groupings are identified by their required preparedness status. The assumed period for an operational deployment for the rotatable brigade group is 12 months for both peace support and mid-intensity warfighting operations.
- (g) The CFSM reflects feasible tasking and readiness for full-time and part-time elements. Reinforcement, round-out and mobilisation solutions are included in the model.
- (h) All units in the Army combat force are allocated a deployment status against the CFSM.

The model designates differing levels of preparedness for the Army's combat force to meet strategic planning objectives.

The CFSM is designed to ensure an appropriate balance of combat, combat support and combat service support, and of full-time and part-time personnel. The model will define the mobilisation procedures, including Reserve support, workup requirements and additional resources required to prepare the brigade group for deployment within the available warning time. The Chief of Army Senior Advisory Committee endorsed the current iteration of the CFSM in December 2002.

The Training Support Model is currently under development and will ensure that all personnel are trained to the levels necessary to meet strategic direction.

## Air Force Sustainability Model

Sustainability of Air Force weapon systems is a responsibility shared between the force element groups that operate the systems and the Defence Materiel Organisation system program offices that support them. Currently, capability and sustainability reports are based on assessments at the force element groups. Air Force, with contractor assistance from Ball Aerospace, is developing a Capability Management System (CMS) to manage the assessment and reporting of capability, which includes sustainability.

The CMS project is developing a system that will model the generation and sustainment of Air Force capabilities, including modeling the complex logistics relationships that support them. A range of software tools is being developed to support the CMS by deriving capability and sustainability outcomes based on modeling of operational and logistics scenarios. The CMS will collate and report the sustainability outcomes and guidance drawn from these models.

The Air Force CMS and the models that support the system are being progressively developed and implemented throughout 2003. Useful sustainability modelling and reporting by Air Force force element groups is planned for completion in 2003. Further development will improve the comprehensiveness and responsiveness of Air Force sustainability modelling.

## QUESTION 10

Member: Hon L.R.S. Price, MP

HANSARD: Page 317

To what extent has force structure and capability changed as a result of *Defence 2000*?

### RESPONSE

The Government's goals, outlined in *Defence 2000 – Our Future Defence Force*, required the establishment of a more flexible force structure able to deploy quickly and operate effectively in the immediate neighbourhood and wider region over the next 10 years, as well as able to respond to armed attacks on Australia.

The most significant force structure enhancements emerging from the White Paper are due to enter service from 2005 – 2013. Nevertheless, there have already been some significant enhancements to the ADF's force structure as a result of White Paper guidance.

The size of the ADF has increased by 2,210 permanent ADF personnel, from 49,552 in January 2001 to 51,762 by 1 April 2003, and is progressing towards the White Paper target of 54,000 personnel by 2010.

The ADF's ability to deny an opponent the use of our maritime approaches, and allow the ADF the freedom to operate at sea, as well as providing support to coalitions and deployed land forces has been enhanced by:

- the commissioning of the Anzac Class frigate HMAS *Stuart* and the launching of the Anzac class frigates HMA Ships *Ballarat* and *Toowoomba*;
- the delivery of the final Collins class submarines;
- the completion of the mine warfare vessels HMA Ships *Norman*, *Gascoyne*, *Diamantina* and *Yarra*; and
- the ongoing upgrade of the AP-3C maritime patrol aircraft combat systems.

Since December 2001, ADF land forces have become more able to provide a professional, well-trained, well-equipped force available for operations in the immediate neighborhood at short notice. This capability has been enhanced by:

- the development of Army sustainability models to ensure the ability to sustain a brigade group deployed on operations for extended periods while maintaining a battalion ready for deployment elsewhere;
- the raising of the second Tactical Assault Group and the Incident Response Regiment to respond to the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction;
- the raising of the Special Operations Command to enhance the ability of the special forces to respond rapidly to a wide range of crises; and
- the introduction into service of the amphibious support ships, HMA Ships *Kanimbla* and *Manoora*, to significantly increase the ADF's ability to deploy and support Australian forces offshore.

The ADF's air combat capability has been enhanced through upgrades to the F/A-18 fleet. These upgrades, forecast in the White Paper, included installation of new aircraft radars and the acquisition of advanced air-to-air missiles. These enhancements have enabled the ADF to maintain an air combat capability at a level at least comparable qualitatively to any in the region, and to provide support to coalitions in support of wider interests.

The ADF's ability to protect Australia from air attack and control our air approaches has been enhanced by the completion of the Eastern Region Operations Centre at RAAF Williamtown and completion of the 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit garrison facility at RAAF Darwin.

The potential for sustained 24-hour surveillance of our northern approaches has been enhanced through the April 2003 acceptance of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) into service. This system comprises three high frequency over-the-horizon radars and the JORN co-ordination centre at RAAF Edinburgh. This capability is further enhanced by development undertaken at the Jindalee Facility Alice Springs.

There have also been significant enhancements in Defence's intelligence gathering and analysis systems as a result of the White Paper.

## QUESTION 11

Member: Hon L.R.S. Price, MP

HANSARD: Page 320

In terms of the exercise program, which ones fully exercise maritime doctrine? What percentage of exercises does that represent? Which exercises involve the three forces but may not necessarily fully exercise maritime doctrine?

### RESPONSE

All single-Service, joint and combined exercises conducted by the RAN are designed to exercise one or more facets of maritime doctrine. The Army and the Air Force also conduct exercises that develop and test capabilities in elements of maritime doctrine. All these exercises are designed to maintain and enhance the core skills of individual units and task groups, and enable participants to advance to more complex and diverse exercises or operations.

The full extent of Australian maritime doctrine can not be exercised within the time, space, resource and strategic constraints of one exercise. The ADF Program of Major Service Activities includes a schedule of single-service, joint and combined exercises. The program objectives include fully exercising Australian maritime doctrine each year through a series of exercises that cover the full spectrum of maritime doctrine collectively rather than individually. The schedule of exercises in the program includes work-up exercises, focused on specific elements of Australian maritime doctrine, that enable Australian maritime forces to participate in the larger, more complex maritime exercises in the program. These major exercises include multi national combined maritime exercises that allow Australian forces to test maritime doctrine comprehensively in demanding situations. They represent about five per cent of the total number of exercises conducted.

The following tri-Service field exercises practise specific aspects of maritime doctrine, without exercising all aspects of that doctrine:

- Exercise Crocodile (conducted biennially);
- Exercise Tandem Thrust (conducted biennially);
- Exercise Talisman Saber (to replace Exercises Tandem Thrust and Crocodile from 2005);
- Exercise Kakadu (conducted biennially);
- Exercise Croix Du Sud (conducted biennially, with all three Services being involved from 2003); and
- Exercise Stardex (conducted annually).

The ADF also conducts tri-service headquarters exercises, command post exercises and wargames that practise specific aspects of maritime doctrine. These are Exercises Northern Trilogy, Vital Prospect, Vital Launch, Tendi Walk, and the Focused Logistics Wargame.

## QUESTION 12

Member: Senator Macdonald

HANSARD: Page 327

How does Defence fund commitments such as the Multinational Interception Force?

### RESPONSE

The ongoing costs of current capabilities are incorporated within the Defence funding base. The net additional costs of operational commitments, such as the Multinational Interception Force, where the scale and duration of the new commitment cannot always be predicted with any certainty, is determined by Government on a case by case basis.

The additional funding Defence receives from the Government for operations is based on net additional cost calculations. The net additional cost approach is consistent with the approach taken by successive Governments in providing supplementation to the Defence Budget for operations including, for example, the Gulf War and peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Rwanda.

In 2001-02 and 2002-03, funding for the net additional costs of the Multinational Interception Force was included in supplementary funding provided to Defence for Australia's contribution to the War on Terror in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.