

CHAPTER 4

SECURITY ISSUES

4.1 Despite the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and successful elections in Namibia, Mozambique and Angola, political and social peace remains fragile throughout the region. This chapter examines both the internal security issues facing the SADC countries as well as some of the issues that cross national borders and have the potential to disrupt the stability of the region.

Internal threats

Transition to democracy

4.2 The most serious challenge to any country's security comes from an unstable political situation. Africa as a whole has a poor record of tolerance of political diversity, and the peaceful transition of power between opposing groups within many of its nations. As one observer noted:

Africa had 150 heads of state between 1957 and 1990, but only six relinquished power voluntarily.¹

Political conflicts inflamed by ethnic or religious tensions have slowed efforts to build stable democracies in most of Africa. The situation in Southern Africa at present, in comparison, is more positive.

4.3 Much of the evidence indicates that the sources of current threats to political stability across southern Africa arise from domestic problems and economic inequalities rather than from military domination and aggression. The Southern Africa Legal Education Assistance Foundation (SALEAF) argued, in its submission, that these threats include:

...racial and economic inequalities; processes such as the allocation of housing, education, health, and social welfare resources; and the distribution of essentials such as water and electricity. These pressures are likely to rise as the region's population continues to grow.²

4.4 The Committee agrees that domestic problems across Southern Africa are contributing to the struggle for stability and self-sufficiency among SADC countries. The issues identified in relation to human and natural resources are discussed separately in Chapter 9.

4.5 The SADC countries have moved towards democratic and multi-party systems of government at different paces in the post-colonial period. Botswana, although occupied in the past with resisting the South African apartheid regime's destabilisation, has had a

1 *Democracy in Africa*, in CQ Researcher, Vol 5, No. 11, p. 255.

2 SALEAF, Submission, p. S681.

relatively stable multi-party democratic government since independence in 1966. Similarly, Namibia has made a successful transition to a multi-party government since gaining independence from South Africa in 1989. This transition was made in the face of early charges of government corruption, interference from Angola and considerable resistance from South Africa. However, changes occurring in South Africa at that time gave Namibia the opportunity to resolve many of its internal problems.

4.6 Other countries have been less fortunate. Political violence and social unrest have accompanied Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Malawi, to varying degrees, in their quests for multi-party democracy. Almost without exception, the failure of neophyte democratic governments to provide quick solutions to endemic social problems such as housing, health and employment have been at the root of much of the discontent. South Africa is in a particularly vulnerable situation at the present time because of the apparent slow progress of the Reconstruction and Development Program (see paragraphs 6.22 to 6.33).

4.7 Constitutional changes in Zambia, which appear aimed at former President Kaunda and his party, have led to concerns about continuing stability in that country. Zambia has been viewed by many as a model of democratic reform since the holding of the first democratic elections in 1991. The charging of eight members of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) with treason; the expulsion of an elected MP by the Speaker following receipt of a letter from the member questioning the constitutional amendments; the imprisonment of two journalists critical of the Speaker's ruling on matters relating to the constitutional amendments; and serious questions about the independence of the Electoral Commission and apparent discrepancies in the voters roll all add to the growing concern about the political situation in Zambia.

Kingdoms

4.8 Other forms of government exist in the region. The two smallest countries, Swaziland and Lesotho, are hereditary monarchies. In the Kingdom of Lesotho, the King is the head of State but holds no executive or legislative powers. The government otherwise is a multi-party democratic one with the Prime Minister as the head of government.³ The Kingdom of Swaziland remains under the aegis of the King who has executive powers. A cabinet of ministers, all appointed by the monarch, exercises executive power. Political parties were banned in 1973. Parliament is elected by an electoral college consisting of 30 members of the Senate (20 of which are royal appointees) and 55 elected members to the House of Assembly plus 10 nominated by the monarchy.⁴

Mauritius

4.9 After twenty-four years of constitutional monarchy, Mauritius became a republic in 1992 with a president as head of state. It is now a multi-party democracy; its parliament consisting of the National Assembly normally serving a five year term. The President is elected by a simple majority of all members of the National Assembly (some seventy in number). The Prime Minister, who is a member of the National Assembly, is appointed by the President. Apart from the National Assembly, there is a Council of Ministers that

3 Griffin, A. 'Lesotho', *The World of Information. Africa Review 1995, 18th Edition*, The Economic and Business Report, CNN International, London: Kogan Page and Walden Publishing, p. 95.

4 Murray, R. 'Swaziland', *The World of Information. Africa Review 1995*, op. cit., pp. 188-190.

consists of the Prime Minister and not more than twenty-four other ministers. The President also appoints ministers to the Council.⁵

Lusophone countries

4.10 Angola and Mozambique were once Portuguese colonies. Their paths to independence are littered with oppressive rulers and bitter civil wars. For the Republic of Mozambique, a peace accord was reached in Rome in 1992. The country did not achieve a substantial level of peace and stability until late in 1994 when it held its first official multi-party elections.⁶ Similarly, peace did not come to Angola until the signing of an accord in early 1995.⁷ With United Nations intervention, the Lusaka agreement for peace was signed in May 1995 between the President elect, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, leader of the *Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) and the leader of UNITA, Dr Jonas Savimbi. The Angolan peace, however, remains very fragile as differences between the MPLA and UNITA continue. The future of Angola's rich diamond provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sol, presently controlled by UNITA, are the subject of ongoing discussions between the government and UNITA.⁸ The UN Security Council has threatened to impose sanctions on UNITA if it continues to delay implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Accord.

4.11 The ravages of civil war leave these countries in dire need of assistance. With an estimated two million landmines, Mozambique, along with Angola, has the highest number of amputees in the world.⁹ Both countries are extremely reliant on foreign aid.

The Republic of South Africa

4.12 The parliament of the Republic of South Africa is a bicameral one consisting of a 400-member National Assembly and a 90-member Senate. Both houses sit for five years. Half of the National Assembly's seats are elected on a national basis and half on a provincial basis from a list of candidates selected by competing parties.¹⁰ The Senate has been elected on a provincial basis, with ten members from each of the nine provinces established by the constitution. A constitutional court was established in 1995 and has the power to change national law and to interpret the constitution. Under the draft revised Constitution, the second chamber will be a Council of Provinces. Each province will have 10 representatives, one of whom will be the Provincial Premier; six will be permanent and 4 'floaters', ie people expert on specific pieces of legislation.¹¹

4.13 Civil unrest and political violence have marred South Africa's move towards a peaceful transition to democracy. In the four years before the 1994 elections, constitutional negotiations were undertaken against a backdrop of provincial and racial conflict. Multi-party negotiations in 1993 led to an Interim Constitution, which provided for the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) following an election result.¹² Consequently, all

5 Hill, H. 'Mauritius', *The World of Information. Africa Review 1995*, op. cit., p. 119.

6 DFAT, Submission, p. S332.

7 DFAT, Submission, pp. S280-S282.

8 Wroughton, L., 'Angolans Discuss Future of Diamond Provinces', Reuters, 13 June 1996.

9 Poole, A. 'Mozambique' in *The World of Information: Africa Review 1995*, op. cit., p. 129.

10 Somerville, K. 'South Africa' in *The World of Information. Africa Review 1995*, op. cit., p.175.

11 Exhibit No. 69, p. 6.

12 DFAT, Submission, p. S353.

parties that received more than five per cent of the national vote in the 1994 elections were represented in the new government.

4.14 The GNU began its period in office in a spirit of consensus, cooperation and compromise. The National Party, led by Mr F. W. de Klerk and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) whose leader is Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi pose the main opposition to the ANC, which received 62.6 per cent of the vote in the 1994 elections. In the period since those elections, internecine fighting has occurred between ANC and Inkatha supporters in KwaZulu/Natal province, as well as between various groupings within the Zulu. Indeed, black versus black violence is of greater concern than tensions between the black and white communities at present. Close to 20,000 people have died since 1985 in KwaZulu/Natal in fighting between the ANC and IFP supporters, and 1800 alone died in the first six months of 1996.¹³ This resurgence in violence in early 1996 led the GNU to postpone local government elections in the province from the end of May to 26 June 1996. While Inkatha argued for the elections to go ahead as scheduled, they accepted the postponement decision and in early June Chief Buthelezi suggested a joint peace call between the two groups.

4.15 Following the eleventh-hour adoption of a draft of the new Constitution, Deputy President de Klerk announced he was withdrawing the National Party from the GNU, effective from 30 June 1996. In so doing, he observed:

We believe that the development of a strong and vigilant opposition is essential for the maintenance and promotion of a genuine multi-party democracy...We feel that the stage has now been reached where we will be able to serve the national interest more effectively by concentrating fully on a responsible opposition role untrammelled by co-responsibility within the government of national unity... The three years that now lie ahead will give us...and the ANC...the opportunity to develop clear identities and platforms before the election.¹⁴

There is the possibility that Inkatha, which boycotted the constitutional drafting process but remains within the government of national unity, may also withdraw from the GNU sometime before the election.

4.16 The Constitutional Court sent the draft text of the Constitution back to the Constitutional Assembly in May 1996 for further work on eight issues, including the authority of provincial and local governments. The Constitutional Assembly, which has representation from all six political parties except for the IFP, has prepared a revised text for consideration of the Constitutional Court. Inkatha briefly ended its 18-month boycott of the constitution-writing process in October 1996, but less than a week later pulled out again.¹⁵

4.17 The new constitution will be phased in following its eventual ratification by the Constitutional Court. The next national elections will be held in April 1999 and the ANC faces the prospect of selecting a new presidential candidate as President Mandela has confirmed his intention not to stand. South Africa's peace process is likely to be at its most vulnerable in the lead up to these 1999 elections.

13 'Buthelezi Agrees to Joint Peace Bid with Mandela', AAP, 11 June 1996; 'Another 54 killed in Troubled KwaZulu-Natal Province', AAP, 10 June 1996.

14 'Text of Key Comments by South Africa's de Klerk', AAP, 10 May 1996.

15 Boyle, B., 'Inkatha pulls out of South African Constitution Talks', Reuters, 7 October 1996.

4.18 A central platform of the GNU is the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). The country's infrastructure deteriorated quite markedly because of prolonged sanctions and civil strife and the Government faces vast and potentially destabilising socio-economic problems. Implementation of the RDP has not been as fast as had been hoped, and ultimately the fate of the government will depend on its ability to meet the raised expectations of the population. The risk of unrealised expectations will be more pressing in the medium to long term; in the short term the majority of the population have welcomed the advent of majority rule and hope for a better economic future for their children. Should this not be realised, tensions will increase within the society. (The RDP is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6).

4.19 In 1995 the GNU announced the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with Archbishop Desmond Tutu as its head. The Commission was formed as one mechanism for achieving reconciliation and reconstruction of the divided South African society. The Commission has been charged to investigate all politically motivated crimes committed by members and allies of the former regime in defence of apartheid, as well as crimes committed by members of the liberation movement. The Commission has the power to grant amnesty and indemnity from prosecution to perpetrators in exchange for full disclosure of their crimes, and to provide reparation to the victims and families of those killed.¹⁶ The Commission began public hearings in early 1996 and representatives of both the ANC and the National Party have appeared before it. While both sides acknowledge past excesses, both claim the abuses committed were unintentional and not a matter of public policy.¹⁷

4.20 A challenge to the Supreme Court by families of killed anti-apartheid activists regarding the Commission's amnesty powers has been dismissed, and an appeal has now been lodged with the Constitutional Court, the top legal authority in South Africa. An estimated 1800 people have applied for amnesty.¹⁸ In late August 1996 the Commission's five member amnesty committee voted unanimously to grant amnesty to two men serving prison terms for the murder of a sympathiser of a Bophuthatswana homeland leader.¹⁹

4.21 An additional problem confronting the new government in South Africa is the intransigence within the existing culture of the old bureaucracy. Mr Colin Butler, President of the WA Chapter of the Australia-Southern Africa Business Council, described comments made to him by the Premier of the Gauteng Province, Mr Tokyo Sexwale. He stated that Mr Sexwale felt that he was in charge of 'everything at the top but nothing down the bottom'.²⁰ Mr Butler stated that new policy statements 'can be slowly lost in the weight of bureaucracy as it filters down to the people below'.²¹ He claimed that the process of change would occur very slowly in the old bureaucracy. Professor McPherson stated that the government's policy of fast-tracking non-Europeans into positions of power or authority may be one way of addressing this problem.²²

Australia's role in electoral and constitutional assistance

16 'Archbishop Tutu Named Chairman of Truth Commission', AAP, 30 November 1995.

17 'ANC admits to "Excesses" in fight for freedom', AAP, 28 August 1996.

18 Saunders, J., 'South Africa Apartheid Hit Man to go on trial', Reuters, 14 August 1996.

19 'Two convicted murderers first to get Commission amnesty', AAP, 30 August 1996.

20 Butler, Transcript, 4 October 1995, p. 319.

21 *ibid.*

22 McPherson, Transcript, 4 October 1995, p. 275.

4.22 Australia, as an active member of the United Nations lends its support to peacekeeping, humanitarian and developmental assistance in southern Africa. Australia has established a track record in successfully assisting Southern African countries in their electoral process and requests for assistance are increasing.

4.23 There was consensus among submissions that Australia has an important role to play in the promotion of stable and democratic governments in Southern Africa. According to Community Aid Abroad (CAA):

For peace to be maintained Australia must have an active ongoing relations (sic) which involves the whole spectrum of activities including aid, trade, investment, diplomatic representation, participating in UN and other peace keeping and reconciliation initiatives and being an active participant in regional dialogue on security and economic cooperation.²³

4.24 In evidence, Dr Bell, Deputy Electoral Commissioner, commented on the number of requests for assistance Australia receives, and stated that:

The pressure for advice and activity has continued since we made that submission and, briefly, we have been asked this year to provide a technical adviser to Malawi for a month...We have been approached by a number of organisations to provide observers and trainers in Tanzania for elections next month. We have had a number of advisers in South Africa all year and next week we are receiving a visit from South African officials who want to study Australian electoral processes and related constitutional matters. We were approached by both the Commonwealth and the UN to provide a technical adviser for Sierra Leone for six months...we recently provided an expert to participate in a training-conference exercise in Namibia, so there has been a lot of continuing activity.²⁴

4.25 An important element in providing electoral assistance is to be sure that sufficient training and experience is left behind so that countries can look after their own processes in future.²⁵ Dr Bell saw the electoral process as part of wider constitutional assistance that Australia could offer transitional democracies. He warned however that, '...we have to be a bit careful that we do not try to do things we are not qualified to do...'²⁶

4.26 Australia's assistance in electoral aid is changing. The focus is moving from provision of electoral observers, to that of providing post-election advice on what the country learned from its experience and what electoral law might be developed for the future.²⁷ In South Africa for example, the Australian Electoral Commission noted that there was a lack of forward planning in terms of the law, in particular, on the basis of electoral law.

23 Community Aid Abroad, Submission, p. S623.

24 AEC, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 241.

25 *ibid.*

26 AEC, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 242.

27 AEC, Transcript, 29 September 1995, pp. 243-244.

4.27 Strategic planning for elections and the electoral process is a long term one involving experienced electoral administrators lending assistance and guidance to South Africa in its early democratic electoral experience.²⁸ Voter education is of equal importance if elections are to be truly democratic and representative of the people's choice. The AEC believes that it is important to take a flexible approach and gear the education process to meet the special needs of the assisted country. Radio, it was suggested, was an excellent means of communicating information about the electoral process in South Africa for example.²⁹

4.28 As a means of promoting sound governance, the Committee supports continued Australian assistance in the electoral development of South Africa and other newly democratic states and notes that funding may be able to be provided under Category B of the new aid framework for Africa (see Chapter 8).

4.29 The Committee recommends that:

- 6. Australia offer increased expert assistance to the fledgling democracies in the Southern African region in such fields as constitutional drafting and electoral law.**
- 7. the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AusAID and the Australian Electoral Commission develop an ongoing program of assistance in the area of electoral reform and development.**

Secession movements

4.30 Although the SADC countries are moving towards greater regional integration, secession claims in a number of these countries hold the potential for future political instability. Secession claims have arisen in many countries across Africa, and are a legacy of the colonial era when very different social and ethnic groups were combined under one administrative power. Post-colonial borders in Africa are based more on the geo-political status quo that existed at independence than on any concept of commonality of culture or interest.

4.31 In Zambia, one of the 4 largest ethnic groups, Lozis from the Western Province, want to break away and establish Barotseland under a traditional system of government headed by the Litunga (tribal King). The Zambian government has made it clear that it will not tolerate secession claims. President Chiluba in 1993 was quoted as saying:

This nation is an indivisible unitary state. Our borders are unalterable and our fundamental law gives this nation perpetual existence in its present form...the Western Province ..(is)...an integral part of Zambia and government would use all its resources at its disposal to defend, protect and safeguard the integrity of the nation.³⁰

4.32 In Tanzania, the problem is somewhat different. The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which on 26 April 1964 led to the creation of the United Republic of Tanzania, is under considerable stress. The islands maintain a separate president (who is also vice-

28 AEC, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 244.

29 AEC, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 245.

30 Quoted in *Southern Africa News Features*, 28 July 1994, p. 2.

president of Tanzania) and parliament which only has jurisdiction for Zanzibar on designated matters. Tanzania has a unicameral national assembly, with representatives from both the mainland and Zanzibar. The 1995 elections in Zanzibar for their own assembly and president turned into a *de facto* referendum on ties with the mainland. The incumbent Zanzibari President (CCM party) was in favour of continuing close links; the opposition (CUF party) wanted as much autonomy as possible. The ruling party was declared the winner by the narrowest of margins, and there were numerous complaints of electoral irregularities against both sides.³¹ The narrowness of the win (50.2 per cent for CCM against 49.8 per cent for CUF) underlines the deep political division in Zanzibar and the question of relations between the islands and the mainland will continue to be a major issue of contention within the country.

4.33 In Angola, separatist sentiment is widespread in the coastal province of Cabinda which is physically separated from the rest of the country by the oceanic outlet of Zaire and the River Congo. With a population of some 200,000 they have had a separatist guerilla movement in existence (the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda or FLEC) for some 30 years.³²

4.34 South Africa faces two challenges to its political integrity, the first from white right-wingers who have demanded the creation of a *volkstaat*, an independent homeland for the Afrikaner minority. While President Mandela has ruled out the creation of a *volkstaat*, the race war that was threatened by right-wing groups prior to the election has not materialised, and proposals for a *volkstaat* have become increasingly modest. Recently, the leader of the right wing Freedom Front, General Constand Viljoen, was reported to have announced plans to secure an Afrikaner homeland in Northern Cape within 50 years.³³

4.35 Of more concern are demands by the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which is seeking virtual autonomy in the South African federation for the province of KwaZulu Natal. The relationship between the provinces and the central government was examined as part of the constitution-writing process, but Inkatha boycotted the process, and violence in the province of KwaZulu Natal remains a continuing problem. The new South African constitution provides for a degree of autonomy for the provinces, giving them exclusive rights to legislate on some issues, but the central government has the power to override measures 'that violate national norms or conflict with the national interest.'³⁴

Internal violence

4.36 With the end of the apartheid era, the expectation of black Southern Africans is that racial and economic inequality will be addressed. While the fledgling governments have depended upon the tolerance of the people who look to them for change, these governments cannot expect to maintain the people's support without demonstrating results. Evidence of growing violence across South Africa, for example, may be a sign that the tolerance and patience of the majority of the population is diminishing. Nonetheless, violent crime is increasing across certain provinces undermining what growth and development can be accomplished. Escalating internal violence is also acting as a deterrent to foreign trade and

31 AFP reports 25-30 October 1995.

32 Kapembeza, V, 'Succession Claims: An Obstacle to Unity', in *Southern African News Features*, 28 July 1994.

33 'South Africa's Right-wingers identify white homeland', AAP, 1 September 1996.

34 'South African Constitution Guarantees Democracy', AAP, 8 May 1996.

investment in South Africa. The South African Tourism Board (SATOUR) has identified a link between declining tourism numbers and perceptions about personal safety and the negative publicity of the crime problems.³⁵

4.37 Violence and crime in South Africa are generally now more criminal in nature than political, and are more prevalent in some areas than others. The Gauteng region encompassing Johannesburg, for example, has a very high rate of crime and violence. The Australia-Southern Africa Business Council cited crime statistics in Johannesburg and Durban as 4500 crimes on average per 100,000 population.³⁶ According to South Africa Police figures, 1.98 million serious crimes were reported in South Africa last year, only half of which were solved.³⁷ A year-long study commissioned by the Nedcor banking group, called a Project on Crime, Violence and Investment, observed that 45.6 per cent of all South Africans perceived crime as South Africa's most serious problem, greater than unemployment, education and housing. The study showed that crime cost South Africa more than 31.3 billion Rand (\$A9.08 billion) during 1995, or more than 18 per cent of the 1996 national budget and 5.6 per cent of the projected 1996-97 Gross Domestic Product.³⁸

4.38 The emergence of a Cape Town-based Muslim vigilante movement fighting organised crime and drugs is a reflection of the level of community concern within South African communities. President Mandela has publicly acknowledged the extent of the problem, and the ANC has stated it is prepared to rethink its policy against the death penalty.³⁹

4.39 The crime problem has also been a factor in the increase in numbers of well-educated white South Africans seeking to migrate. In the first six months of 1996, 5627 South Africans, almost all well-educated whites, left the country, a 23.6 per cent increase on the same period in the previous year.⁴⁰

4.40 According to the Human Rights Committee (HRC), a non-governmental monitoring group in South Africa, KwaZulu Natal has a very high level of overtly political violence as well as other criminal violence and 'faction fighting' between Zulu clans and communities.⁴¹ The HRC indicated that, in this province, the overall murder rate averages 80 to 90 murders per week.⁴²

Other countries affected by escalating crime

4.41 Mozambique is experiencing rising crime, particularly in coastal and southern regions. Transport routes in the south are particularly vulnerable to armed gangs. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reported that ten drivers have been shot since January 1995.⁴³ Similarly, a rise in violent crime in Malawi resulted in the dismissal of the Inspector-

35 Hirschler, B., 'Violent crime scares tourists away from South Africa', Reuters, 15 August 1996.

36 ASABC, Transcript, 6 September 1995, p. 81.

37 'South African police have 10,000 criminals in sights', AAP, 14 June 1996.

38 'South Africa slipping into 'culture of crime' - Study', AAP, 12 June 1996.

39 'Mandela admits crime out of control; death penalty mooted', AAP, 2 September 1996.

40 Harris, P., 'South Africans flee crime in ever-increasing numbers', Reuters, 15 October 1996.

41 O'Loughlin, E. 'Prayer killings an exception in calmer times: Lives can depend on the amount of political tension between the INKATHA Freedom Party and the African National Congress in the troubled KwaZulu/Natal province.' *The Guardian*, 30 September 1995, Johannesburg, p.10.

42 *ibid.*

43 The Economist Intelligence Unit. 'Mozambique, Malawi.' *Country Report*, 4th Quarter, 1995, p. 8.

General of the police force by the President in that country's attempt to take a hard line on crime.⁴⁴ Widespread violent crime in Tanzania is said to be followed by 'horrific acts of summary justice meted out by impromptu vigilante groups, which form wherever a crime is witnessed.'⁴⁵ The eastern seaboard of the region appears to be the worst affected by violence and crime.

Australia's role

4.42 In their submission, Dorward and Geddes argued there were 'severe limits' to what Australia could contribute to regional security in Southern Africa.⁴⁶ In their opinion, Australia's most significant contribution toward regional stability could be in the provision of 'increased but well targeted and small-scale local development assistance through Australian non-government agencies'.⁴⁷

4.43 One such program was for Australian assistance to the South African Police Service (SAPS). Dr Joan Wardrop stated that Australia could assist the SAPS at the management as well as operational level. As a possible model Dr Wardrop referred to an exchange program between the SAPS and the Western Australian Police (WAP) to promote a 'country-style' proactive policing program adopted by the WAP. She argued that major transitions that are under way in the SAPS 'are likely to be more successful if international input can be achieved at the operational unit level'.⁴⁸

4.44 Another suggestion for assistance came from the Southern Africa Legal Education Assistance Foundation (SALEAF) who drew attention to the small percentage of legal students receiving training aid in Australia. At June 1994, only 2.1 per cent (about 7 students) of the total number of assisted students in Australia were undertaking legal education. The total number of sponsored students studying in Australia from Southern Africa in 1994 was 309, fifty of which were from South Africa.⁴⁹ They suggested that Australian overseas development assistance (ODA) be directed towards the provision of legal education and training in Southern Africa in the form of support for under-resourced universities and training programs for practicing legal professionals. They also suggested that help should be provided 'to establish legal resource centres in southern Africa that are widely accessible to all peoples in the countries of the region'.⁵⁰

4.45 The Committee recommends that:

- 8. AusAID, in conjunction with Southern African authorities, consider including provision of some legal education and training, and assistance to establish legal resource centres, as part of the official development assistance program.**

4.46 In giving evidence to the Committee, the President of the Australia-Southern Africa Business Council indicated that the violence came about through high unemployment

44 *ibid.*, p. 22.

45 The Economist Intelligence Unit. 'Tanzania.' *Country Report*, 2nd Quarter, 1995, p. 9.

46 Dorward & Geddes, Submission, p. S48.

47 *ibid.*

48 Wardrop, Submission, p. S1016.

49 SALEAF, Submission, p. S688.

50 SALEAF, Submission, p. S680.

and lack of training and education.⁵¹ The Committee supports the premise that education and training are vital to obtaining and maintaining peace in the region. Further discussion of Australia's role in assisting Southern Africa in education and training is contained in Chapter 9.

External threats

Relations between SADC members

4.47 Before SADC was established at Windhoek in Namibia in 1992, the Front Line States (FLS) handled sub-regional political solidarity and security cooperation.⁵² These states were countries of the Southern African region surrounding South Africa and were united in their struggle against apartheid.

4.48 With the signing of the treaty, however, a new era of determined cooperation emerged among the SADC countries. While SADC is concerned primarily with developing trade and investment among its members and internationally, a key objective is to promote and defend peace and security. To achieve its objective, SADC aims to:

- promote the coordination and harmonisation of the international relations of member States; and
- secure international understanding, cooperation and support, mobilise the inflow of public and private resources into the region.⁵³

4.49 The increased cooperation between SADC countries has had some quite unexpected consequences. South Africa and Mozambique, for example, have signed an accord under which white South African farmers will settle in an underpopulated but fertile part of Mozambique. They will have land concessions for 50 years, renewable on the expiry date. Mozambique, which has 6 times the arable land of South Africa, benefits from increased agricultural production and employment. The agreement also establishes a transport corridor between the two countries.⁵⁴

4.50 The experience of apartheid destabilisation in Southern Africa has stimulated the countries of SADC to take a more active role in the internal security of its members and its neighbours. For example, during the constitutional crisis in Lesotho in 1994, SADC requested the opportunity for external mediation to end the conflict. The Presidents of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, together with Nelson Mandela (then the president of the ANC), met in Maseru and agreed to establish a regional task force to monitor a cease-fire. This initiative succeeded in containing the crisis and resulted in a truce.⁵⁵

4.51 SADC has signalled its desire to seek peaceful solutions to issues of regional security. More recently, President Mandela indicated a willingness for South Africa to start contributing to international peacekeeping.⁵⁶ As an active supporter of UN global

51 ASABC, Transcript, 6 September 1995, p. 82.

52 DFAT, Submission, p. S438.

53 Exhibit No. 68.

54 'Mandela Signs Deal for White 'Trek' to Mozambique', AAP, 7 May 1996.

55 DFAT, Submission, pp. S308-S309.

56 Wheatley, A. 'South Africa ready for UN peacekeeping - Mandela', Reuters, 22 October, 1995.

peacekeeping operations, particularly in Southern Africa, Australia should applaud the efforts of SADC in seeking peace and stability among its members.

4.52 The need to strengthen regional dialogue was well supported among submissions. The Committee agreed that dialogue can be enhanced through organisations such as SADC, which promotes political stability and preventative diplomacy.

4.53 The Committee recommends that:

- 9. Australia encourage an increased regional dialogue through support in the institutional strengthening of organisations such as SADC.**

ASAS

4.54 As noted earlier, the Front Line States (FLS) were formed by countries bordering on South Africa and who were most affected by its previous regime. In March 1995, SADC Foreign Ministers met in Harare. They recommended that the former FLS be reformed as the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) with the membership of all SADC countries. The DFAT submission described the association as:

...a political appendage of SADC with a specific focus on sub-regional unity, peace and security. ASAS effectively replaces the stillborn SADC sector on sub-regional security.⁵⁷

4.55 Little is known about this association as yet, but the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade submission supports its formation and suggests that:

...there may be scope to feed into ASAS processes some of Australia's thinking on the workings of preventive diplomacy centres.⁵⁸

4.56 The Committee supports SADC's efforts to promote stability that will lead to lasting peace in the region.

4.57 The Committee recommends that:

- 10. the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade monitor the development of ASAS and offer assistance as appropriate.**

Migration

4.58 Illegal migration is a problem across the region but particularly so for South Africa given its comparative economic wealth and opportunities. In the past, many people from neighbouring countries came to South Africa to work in the mines, and their remittances made a significant contribution to the economy of their home country. Labour was imported from Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique, and was part of a deliberate policy of keeping industrial disputes down in the mines.⁵⁹ Since South Africa's transition to a democratic government, given the high levels of unemployment in South Africa (estimated to be up to

57 DFAT, Submission, p. S440.

58 DFAT, Submission, p. S440.

59 Sibraa, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 181.

45 per cent) the importation of labour is now facing strong opposition.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, South Africa is still a major draw for illegal migrants seeking a better life from across the region.

4.59 The former South African High Commissioner to Australia estimated that there are some 3 million illegal Africans living in South Africa.⁶¹ At any one time there are approximately 2 million economic refugees from Mozambique in South Africa. Many are detained and sent back to Mozambique but they return:

South Africa and certainly Mozambique...have border guards there all the time. It is a bit like the situation between Mexico and America. If they are caught, they are taken back. There is a town just across from the Mozambique/South African border which is just a big transit camp, a holding camp...They come back again the next day. It is a very hard thing for them to deal with.⁶²

4.60 Refugees from Rwanda and Burundi are moving towards South Africa and are risking their lives by walking through minefields and wildlife parks such as Kruger National Park to reach the border.⁶³ The Committee heard anecdotal information indicating that Africans were migrating to South Africa from as far away as Lagos in Nigeria.⁶⁴

Repatriation

4.61 For the period 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1994, South Africa involuntarily repatriated 90,692 illegal immigrants. Of these, 71,279 were Mozambicans.⁶⁵ In addition, 12,931 illegal immigrants were repatriated to Zimbabwe and 4,073 to Lesotho.⁶⁶ The large number of Mozambicans crossing the border to South Africa has increased border tension between the two countries. For the first time since 1990, officers in the South African army called unsuccessfully for the electric border to be turned up to a lethal level in the hope of deterring the flood of Mozambican refugees.⁶⁷

Refugees

4.62 Significant numbers of refugees fled into adjacent countries during the bitter civil wars in Mozambique and Angola and as a result of ethnic clashes in Burundi and Rwanda. Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) estimated that approximately one million refugees have been repatriated to their homelands in Mozambique since peace was restored.⁶⁸ This has created a problem for the Mozambican government in that people have returned to their homes to find themselves dispossessed of land. An attendant problem for the government is the expected drop in national income that will occur as South Africa enforces

60 ASABC ,Transcript, 6 September 1995, p. 77.

61 Community Aid Abroad, Exhibit No. 62, p. 27.

62 DFAT, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 181.

63 Sibraa, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 181.

64 Lea, Transcript, 6 September 1995, p. 85.

65 US Department of State, *South Africa Human Rights Practices*, 1994, February 1995, p. 11.

66 *ibid.*

67 *ibid.*

68 ACFOA, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 234.

its migration policy. Mozambique's second largest export earner is its labour and the withdrawal of labour from South Africa will affect the national economy.⁶⁹

4.63 Over a million refugees from Rwanda and Burundi remain in Tanzania, placing an enormous economic, social and environmental burden on that country. While repatriation is the long-term goal, the process is proving to be very slow. The Committee notes with extreme concern the recent breakdown in relations between Zaire and Rwanda, fuelled in part by the presence of significant numbers of Rwandan refugees in Zaire. The recent outbreak of violence illustrates the potential for ethnic tensions to affect surrounding countries, and create massive humanitarian crises. It also illustrates the importance of governments maintaining a commitment to aid through the UN and support NGOs working in the area of humanitarian relief.

Border tensions

4.64 According to DFAT, tension exists on the borders between Angola and Namibia and among Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi because of the refugee situation. Tensions between Angola and Namibia have abated since the fragile peace settlement in Angola but the Cabinda area on the Zaire border remains contentious.⁷⁰ Similarly, an influx of Rwandan and Burundi refugees into the Kigoma and Kagera regions of northern Tanzania have caused an escalation in tensions along the northern Tanzanian borders.⁷¹ After the Tanzanian government closed the northern borders in March 1995, an estimated 685,000 refugees were counted. This number was made up of 590,000 Rwandans and 87,000 Burundi nationals.⁷²

4.65 Zimbabwe is also subject to illegal immigrants and refugees as they move through the country on the way to find work in South Africa.⁷³ Anecdotal information suggests that up to 20 million people are displaced across Africa.⁷⁴

Illegal arms trading

4.66 Because of civil conflict in the Sub-Saharan region over the past 25 years, some countries within SADC have developed a culture of small arms trading. Liberation movements took up arms against their oppressive regimes. However, in the post-apartheid era in southern Africa, political violence is being overtaken by criminal violence and in some areas, gang warfare. The culture of small arms now crosses generations, and escalating poverty with unemployment are perpetuating their use.

4.67 This is particularly evident in Angola, a country undergoing careful disarmament under the watchful eye of the United Nations. After 20 years of civil war, the first rebel fighters are beginning to disarm.⁷⁵ Many of the 60,000 Angolan troops have known no life other than war. Rehabilitation into a civilian society, particularly one where civil unrest remains, will be a challenging task for the Angolan government.

69 Community Aid Abroad, Submission, p. S639.

70 DFAT, Transcript, 29 September 1995, pp. 180-181.

71 DFAT, Submission, p. S389.

72 The Economist Intelligence Unit. 'Tanzania.' *Country Report*, 2nd Quarter, 1995, p. 9.

73 DFAT, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 180-181.

74 Community Aid Abroad, Exhibit No. 62, p. 27.

75 Siona, Casimiro. 'First UNITA soldiers abandon arms under UN's watchful eye', AAP, 21 November 1995.

4.68 The Committee heard evidence that, since the end of the war in Mozambique, there was a concern that arms would move across the border into Zimbabwe.⁷⁶ The Zimbabwe government took what steps it could to ensure that this did not happen; anecdotal information indicates that these weapons are on their way through to South Africa.⁷⁷ Joint operations carried out between Mozambican authorities and South African police in 1995 yielded a cargo of illegally held arms including grenade launchers, anti-personnel mines and more than 200 AK-47 rifles.⁷⁸

4.69 Through Committee members' visits and wider discussions, the Committee noted that the arms trade was particularly problematic in South Africa where violent crime works as a disincentive to trade and investment and saps confidence in the country's ability to meet long-term goals. It felt also that the violence impacted significantly on the country's human resource capacity because of the loss of experienced business people and entrepreneurs who are increasingly likely to emigrate.

4.70 The Committee notes that the problem of illegal arms will continue to be a major factor in Southern Africa. While it is primarily a matter for the SADC countries to tackle both on an individual and regional basis, the Committee encourages the Australian Government to raise this problem in discussions and provide assistance if requested.

Legal arms trading

4.71 At its height the South African state-owned company, ARMSCOR was the tenth major supplier of arms internationally. As part of the reductions in the South African defence industry the government restructured ARMSCOR into two organisations in April 1992. The first, DENEL Pty Ltd, a public company with 100 per cent of the company's equity owned by the state, has taken control of ARMSCOR's manufacturing capabilities and facilities. ARMSCOR remains part of the Ministry of Defence and 'is responsible for the acquisition of armaments, and related products, arms trade control and market facilitation.'⁷⁹ At present, it is estimated that South Africa has less than 0.5 per cent of the international arms market, although ARMSCOR believes it can increase this share.⁸⁰

4.72 In September 1995, the South African Cabinet announced its approval of an Interim Arms Control Policy. The primary goal of the new arms trade and transfer policy is to establish South Africa as a responsible producer, possessor and trader of defence-related products and advanced technology.⁸¹ The organisational structure established by the Cabinet comprises four accountable levels of responsibility:

- An initial permit application technical processing level.
- A multi-departmental review and recommendation process on permit application.

76 Sibraa, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 180.

77 *ibid.*

78 The Economist Intelligence Unit. 'Mozambique, Malawi.' *op. cit.*

79 Institute for Defence Policy, Submission, p. S797-798.

80 Institute for Defence Policy, Submission, p. S798.

81 High Commission for South Africa. 'New arms control policy for South Africa.' in *Focus on South Africa*, 8/1995, pp. 1-2.

- A scrutiny and recommendation process by Directors-General [of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs; Safety and Security; Defence; Transport; Intelligence Services; Trade and Industry; and Arts, Culture, Science and Technology].
- A control, policy and decision-making authority, which is a Cabinet-approved Committee of Ministers, the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC).⁸²

4.73 The Committee applauds the efforts of the South African government in seeking a policy of arms control and disarmament. The Committee was concerned, however, that more active law enforcement may need to occur before South Africa could begin to witness a resolution to this problem.

82 *ibid.*

Nuclear issues

4.74 Of the SADC countries, only South Africa has a nuclear history. In 1993 South Africa disclosed that it had previously developed a 'limited nuclear deterrent capability'⁸³ and that it had now been dismantled. South Africa was an active participant in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in early 1995 and worked closely with Australia in that process.⁸⁴ South Africa remains a major producer of uranium.

4.75 The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (Pelindaba) Treaty was signed in April 1996. Pelindaba refers to the site of the previous South African Government's covert nuclear weapons program, the site of what is now South Africa's peaceful nuclear program, and the site at which the negotiations on the Treaty were conducted.⁸⁵ The Zone covers the continent of Africa, island states that are members of the OAU and all islands considered by the OAU to be part of Africa, and fifty-four countries are eligible to sign the treaty. This treaty creates the world's fourth nuclear-weapon-free zone.⁸⁶

Drug trafficking

4.76 Drug smuggling appears to be problematic along the eastern seaboard of southern Africa. The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that drug-smuggling is a growing problem in Mozambique with this country gaining a reputation as an 'entrepôt' for international illegal drug trade. Similarly, Tanzania has become a 'busy conduit' for international drug trading as has Zambia.⁸⁷

4.77 The Committee heard little direct evidence on this problem except for comments concerning the drug problem in the community of the Gauteng region in South Africa. Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad (APHEDA) representative, Mr Davis indicated that:

...the texture of crime is rapidly changing with the importation of new drugs, opiates and cocaine based drugs which have not been present so much previously.⁸⁸

4.78 The Committee noted these concerns and suggests that the Australian Government continue to monitor the situation to see if it has any implications for the delivery of Australian development assistance programs to the region.

Australia's regional security interests

4.79 In his submission, Professor McPherson gave several reasons why regional security should be a priority for Australia. He stated that:

83 Stumpf, W., 'South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement', in *Arms Control Today*, v. 25(10); Dec 1995/Jan 1996.

84 DFAT, Submission, p. S491.

85 Press Release, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 12 April 1996.

86 Fischer, D, 'The Pelindaba Treaty: Africa Joins the Nuclear-Free World', in *Arms Control Today*, v. 25 (10), Dec 1995/Jan. 1996.

87 The Economist Intelligence Unit, 'Tanzania', op. cit.

88 ACTU, Transcript, 15 September 1995, p. 157.

Australia has a very immediate interest in promoting security in the Indian Ocean region given our physical exposure to the region, as well as given the challenges the region offers in terms of future economic opportunities. In the post Cold War era indications are that the USA will withdraw increasingly from many of its previous security commitments leaving countries like Australia to seek their own regional security solutions. Given this situation, and the increasing tendency for international dialogues to take place at a multilateral rather than a bilateral level, there are obvious advantages for Australia to encourage a regional dialogue based on the Indian Ocean rather as it has done with respect to ASEAN and APEC.⁸⁹

Australia's defence relations with Southern Africa

4.80 Several submissions indicated that political instability, resource and environmental security and endemic and pandemic diseases are more of a concern for regional security than are the more traditional military deployment issues.⁹⁰ Military spending, although some 15 per cent of public expenditure in Africa, appears to be decreasing across the Southern African region.⁹¹ In particular, South Africa is looking to reduce its defence spending. In its submission, the Department of Defence made the following comments about our defence relations with Southern Africa:

Africa is well outside Australia's region of strategic interest and does not attract a priority for developing strategic or operational links. The Defence Organisation's limited contact with African countries is principally in support of peace building or humanitarian missions in the pursuit of broader national goals.⁹²

4.81 The Department of Defence, however, acknowledged the growing potential for economic development particularly in South Africa, and in light of South Africa being the 'dominant economic and military power in sub-Saharan Africa...with an important role to play in any regional dialogue process on economic development and security'⁹³ has begun to renew military contacts. The Department's aim is to 'establish a friendly, low-key relationship with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and to exchange views on areas of common interest such as peacekeeping, technology and operating environments'.⁹⁴

4.82 While neither Australia or South Africa has formal defence representation in each other's country, there have been a range of contacts with the various arms of the SANDF, particularly in the area of training and technology. The Chief of Staff Operations of the SANDF visited Australia in August 1996 and there have been reciprocal visits by Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel. In the area of equipment, Project Bushranger, a project to increase the mobility of Army brigades through the introduction of purpose-built infantry mobility vehicles, has shortlisted two Australian tenderers who are teamed with South

89 McPherson, Submission, p. S3.

90 McPherson, Submission, p. S2.

91 World Vision Australia, Submission, p. S657.

92 Department of Defence, Submission, p. S719.

93 Department of Defence, Submission, p. S1232.

94 *ibid.*

African companies. Other contacts in the defence industry and logistics field have also occurred, and were detailed in the Department's supplementary submission.⁹⁵

4.83 Beyond South Africa, the other two countries that have had contact with the ADF are Mozambique and Namibia. Defence classifies its interest in Mozambique as 'solely humanitarian' with ADF demining instructors deployed, firstly under UN auspices, and then extended following the end of the UN mandate in Mozambique. The Australian Government has extended the provision of two ADF personnel involved in demining until January 1998. ADF involvement in Namibia was as part of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) for a one year deployment that commenced in April 1989. The Australian contingent of construction and field engineers supported by a workshop element were involved in mine clearance and construction support tasks.⁹⁶

South Africa's defence policy

4.84 In its draft White Paper on Defence, South Africa acknowledged that 'security policy is no longer a predominantly military problem but has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters...'⁹⁷ The White Paper went on to observe that:

South Africa is not confronted by an immediate conventional military threat. It has no aggressive intentions towards any state and does not anticipate external military aggression in the short term...(and)...defence cooperation with other Southern African states is a priority. South Africa will accordingly seek to strengthen the security and defence forums of SADC and the Association of Southern African States...⁹⁸

4.85 The GNU has indicated a strong commitment to ensuring that the SANDF 'is representative of the South African population'.⁹⁹ The SANDF was established after an integration of the existing South African Defence Force (SADF) and the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC's military arm and other smaller paramilitary groups. This was achieved by the Joint Military Coordinating Council set up after negotiations between the South African government and the ANC in 1993. The integration process also involves a downsizing plan which reduces the new SANDF from around 130,000 to 90,000 personnel over a three year period.

4.86 The integration has been less contentious than many would have believed possible. The new Defence Force is concentrating on training for 'non-traditional' roles of peacekeeping, nation-building tasks and other secondary missions. President Mandela has managed to retain the confidence of the armed forces by demonstrating respect for the role they played in the pre-election and post-election periods.¹⁰⁰

95 Department of Defence, Submission, pp. S1232-35.

96 Department of Defence, Submission, pp. S1236-37.

97 Exhibit No. 28, p. 4.

98 Exhibit No. 28, pp 19-20.

99 Exhibit No. 28, p. 33.

100 Williams, R.W. (Col) 'South Africa's New Defence Force: Progress and Prospects', *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 170, March 1995, p. 6.

4.87 The SANDF is continuing to provide assistance to the South African Police Service (SAPS) and in 1995-96 its assistance amounted to R1.2 billion. This level of assistance is expected to continue, given the law and order problems facing South Africa, despite several public statements by the government that it would like to withdraw the SANDF from police tasks in the long-term. As of August 1996, a total of 62 full-time companies of the SANDF (approximately 9,000 troops) were deployed internally, on a daily basis, on border and area protection tasks. Since the start of 1996 they have recovered 1000 illegal weapons, and arrested 24 000 illegal border-crossers.¹⁰¹

4.88 The Southern African region is less certain about the role of South Africa's armed forces. South Africa is attempting to balance regional perceptions that it has the infrastructure and resources to provide the basis for any regional security arrangement, with regional concerns about developing military dominance.¹⁰² South Africa is firmly engaged in resolving its domestic problems and views its military infrastructure, from a regional perspective, as providing an opportunity to offer regional military training for other SADC defence personnel.¹⁰³

4.89 South Africa's expenditure on defence, as a percentage of GDP has decreased from 4.3 per cent in 1989, 2.6 per cent in 1993, 2.2 per cent in 1995-96, and has fallen just below 2 per cent for 1996-97. This decrease in expenditure has been achieved by a combination of reductions in military personnel, the postponement or cancellation of projects and capital spending and the closure of bases.¹⁰⁴

Indian Ocean Region

4.90 Australia's attempts to establish an ongoing regional dialogue through the International Forum on the Indian Ocean Rim (IFIOR) received mixed responses from submissions, particularly in regard to Australia's push to discuss regional security issues. Professor McPherson disagreed with news reports claiming the discussions about regional security were a 'total disaster.'¹⁰⁵ He stated that:

..the security question was not just a question of security in a traditional sense. It was comprehensive security, including environmental security and human rights.¹⁰⁶

4.91 In giving evidence, Dr Yasmeen from the Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies (IOCPS) stated that, although Australia and South Africa have been improving their relationship, Australia may be undermining its own Indian Ocean Strategy through lack of sensitivity. She stated that:

...unless and until we have that sensitivity within the Australian system as to how our policies would be perceived in the region, either South Africa or even for that matter India, we do have this possibility where any perception of Australia hijacking the agenda would be

101 Institute for Defence Policy, Submission, p. S1107-1112.

102 Williams, R. W., op. cit, p. 8.

103 ibid., pp. 7-9.

104 Institute for Defence Policy, Submission, p. S797.

105 McPherson, Transcript, 4 October 1995, p. 263.

106 McPherson, Transcript, 4 October 1995, p. 264.

counterproductive and our whole idea of an Indian Ocean community - whether based on interests in the health field, economics or other areas - would really not continue because there would be this feeling constantly of 'What are the Australians up to?'¹⁰⁷

4.92 In giving evidence, representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated that the department was aware of the sensitivity needed in discussing regional security issues. They noted however that:

There has been reluctance from the subcontinent to have security issues on the agenda, whether it be in the intergovernment process in Mauritius or in the second track process at IFIOR.¹⁰⁸

4.93 They argued, however, that security was a very important consideration in the whole regional dialogue process. While economic issues are the main concern of the region at the present time, the department claimed that:

...we may be able to build trust and confidence within ourselves, learn how to dialogue, and we will probably be able to move on to more contentious issues later on.¹⁰⁹

4.94 A seminar was held in Perth in September 1996 at the Indian Ocean Centre to address prospects for peace and security across the Indian Ocean rim, focusing on maritime issues. That seminar built on the IFIOR of the previous year and covered such issues as the spread of narcotics, small arms, and transnational crime as well as shipping and protection of the marine environment. The Committee notes the success of this meeting, and its role in improving dialogue between officials, academics and researchers. The Committee also agrees that Australia should develop an understanding of the diverse cultures within the Indian Ocean Region so as to reduce the likelihood of any difficulties arising through inadvertent errors of cultural judgment. Overcoming such barriers could best be achieved by exposure to, and working with, the cultures of the region.

4.95 The Committee recommends that:

11. Australia explore through the International Forum on the Indian Ocean Rim greater cultural exchanges and trade links.

107 Yasmeen, Transcript, 4 October 1995, p. 307.

108 DFAT, Transcript, 25 August 1995, p. 21.

109 DFAT, Transcript, 25 August 1995, p. 22.

United Nations

4.96 With the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of apartheid and the peaceful settlement of civil conflict in Angola and Mozambique, conventional threats, that is, external ones ceased to be the significant security concern for Southern Africa. The need for NATO-type alliances is no longer necessary because the main form of security threat in the region now is internal and derived from social rather than military instability.¹¹⁰

4.97 Nonetheless, the United Nations remains active in Africa particularly in providing refugee assistance arising from civil unrest in Somalia and Rwanda. The UN is also actively involved in peacekeeping and preventative diplomacy, a recent example being the gradual and peaceful disarming of Angolan troops. In recent years it has carried out peace-keeping operations in Mozambique and Angola and given mine clearance support in northern Namibia and Mozambique.¹¹¹ It has also provided skilled support in terms of technical assistance and electoral observers to South Africa and other SADC countries during their democratic elections.

4.98 South Africa was reinstated to the UN in June 1994 after an absence of 20 years. The relative peace in the region since has meant that the UN involvement in Southern Africa is one of economic and subsistence relief rather than peace-keeping. The UN's involvement through UNESCO, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) is discussed in later chapters.

110 Breytenbach, W. 'Conflict in Southern Africa: Whither collective security?', in *Africa Insight*, vol. 24, no. 1, 1994, pp. 26-37.

111 DFAT, Submission, p. S493.