

Submission No. 01



(Defence BSIP)

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Submission No 1



**Australian Government**

**Department of Defence**

Defence Support Group

**BASE INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS (BIW) PROJECT  
Under The Base Security Improvement Program (BSIP)**

**NORTHERN NEW SOUTH WALES, SYDNEY CENTRAL,  
SYDNEY WEST, AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY,  
VICTORIA & QUEENSLAND**

**Statement of Evidence  
to the  
Parliamentary Standing Committee  
on Public Works**

Department of Defence  
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory

July 2012

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## **NEED FOR THE WORKS**

### **Identified Need**

1. The Base Infrastructure Works (BIW) Project, to be delivered as part of the wider Base Security Improvement Program (BSIP) by the Department of Defence, was established to design and deliver a range of infrastructure improvements at a number of Defence sites. The works will provide improved security measures at each Defence site and reduce the risk to Defence personnel from specific types of terrorist attack.
2. The BIW Project will deliver infrastructure works on 16 Defence sites deemed to be at the highest risk of these types of terrorist attack.

### **Options Considered to fulfil the Identified Need**

3. For each of the 16 sites, three sets of BSIP security risk treatments were developed for consideration (incorporating physical, technology, policy & procedure, and people based treatments). These were:
  - a. Option 1 - a set of mandatory measures for each site (which are largely procedural in nature);
  - b. Option 2 - a value-for-money option to achieve an acceptable residual security risk profile for each site; and
  - c. Option 3 - a full cost solution designed to fully mitigate identified security risks.
4. The value-for-money option for each site was chosen by Defence as the preferred option as it presented a cost effective means of achieving acceptable residual security risk profiles at the 16 sites. This option comprises of a number of protective treatments to improve existing infrastructure, harden site boundaries and provide improved technology for site monitoring and identity verification.

### **Options Considered for Works**

5. At each of the 16 priority sites (shown at attachment 1), Defence undertook to identify a range of options for each of the infrastructure improvements deemed necessary to reduce the security risk levels. Where possible and where it was available, existing infrastructure has been utilised and improved, however in some circumstances this was not possible resulting in new works being designed.

6. An example is vehicle access points on to sites. If there was an existing vehicle access point that could be improved upon to achieve the required security effect, then this was utilised.

However, at some sites new infrastructure, and in some circumstances a new location had to be selected to achieve the required security effect. In some instances, there were limited or no alternate options for required works.

7. Other examples of the use of existing infrastructure include housing of Base Command Posts and Command and Monitoring Facilities in existing infrastructure and the improvement of existing vehicle and pedestrian access points to provide for an increased security effect.

### **Historical Background**

8. On 4 August 2009, the Prime Minister the Hon Kevin Rudd MP, directed Defence to review its protective security arrangements as a result of a Commonwealth and state multi agency operation against a terrorist group. The *Review of Defence Protective Security Arrangements* (the review) identified 33 recommendations. A program of works under the BSIP was then initiated to implement these recommendations.

9. A security risk assessment activity was conducted by Defence in 2009, reviewing 88 Defence sites. This assessment identified 16 sites that required priority treatment.

10. In 2010 the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force approved a broad set of treatment options to be applied at the 16 priority sites in order to achieve acceptable residual security risk profiles. This approval was sited on a set of value-for-money treatments in addition to a number of mandatory treatments.

### **Environmental and Heritage Impact**

11. As part of the project development process, Defence engaged a specialist environmental consultant and a heritage sub consultant to prepare an Initial Environmental Review of the BIW elements at all 16 sites.

12. The Initial Environmental Review noted that the 16 priority sites which are proposed to receive works under the BIW Project include a number with nationally significant heritage values. Specific attention was given in the design phase to avoid or minimise any heritage impacts on site, with this process being informed by engagement with Defence and local government heritage planners.

13. Site selection boards were convened at each of the 16 sites with the aim of ensuring that the placement of BIW elements on sites will not impose on heritage or environmental values as identified by the Project's reviews or as defined by the various heritage and environmental plans maintained by several of the sites.

#### Heritage Considerations

14. A number of the BSIP sites are included on the Commonwealth Heritage List for their historic heritage values. These historic heritage values are associated with specific buildings and precincts, landscape elements, vistas and view lines. Where proposed BIW Project elements have the potential to impact on these Commonwealth values, under Section 341ZC of the EPBC Act a Historic Heritage Impact Assessment has been conducted. The Historic Heritage Impact Assessment provides clear direction on avoidance, mitigation and management measures that will be undertaken by the BIW project team.

15. Key heritage considerations for the BIW works include:

a. Garden Island Defence Precinct, Potts Point NSW:

- i. This site will see construction of a new access control point comprising pass office, guard house, roadway and car park, vehicle inspection area, rejection turnaround lane and vehicle barriers/traffic calming. The site is included on the Commonwealth Heritage List for its historic heritage values. This area has been heavily built up, contains large areas of hardstand and contemporary buildings, and does not interact with identified heritage assets;
- ii. This site will also see enhanced entry and access control/surveillance at a number of key buildings. These buildings are located within the Old Foreshore Heritage Precinct where the tolerance for change is identified as 'moderate', but the facilities are not individually recognised for their heritage significance. Works will not impact on any heritage elements; and
- iii. A number of multi-purpose poles will be installed throughout the site to house Surveillance Systems. A number of the poles are located adjacent to identified buildings ranging from 'moderate' to 'high' significance. Micro - Siting of all poles is in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment.

- b. Victoria Barracks Sydney, Paddington NSW:
- i. Works include reconfiguration of the existing rear access control point comprising a new pass office, roadway and car park, rejection turnaround lane and vehicle barriers/traffic calming measures. The works also involve the reopening of a pedestrian entry within the Perimeter Wall. These works neighbour the Perimeter Wall which is of 'exceptional' historic heritage significance and the Army Band building which is of 'moderate' historic heritage significance. All works have been designed to have no impact on the Perimeter Wall and will be according to the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment;
  - ii. The existing guard house is to be developed as a pedestrian only entry, including the installation of removable bollards, glass barrier and a speed gate. The proposed works neighbours the Perimeter Wall which is of 'exceptional' historic heritage significance, the Guard House which is of 'high' historic heritage significance and is located within Heritage Precinct 1 – South African Square. All works have been designed to have no impact on the Perimeter Wall and will be according to the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment;
  - iii. The proposed works include enhanced entry and access control/surveillance and security film and blinds to windows in a number of buildings. Full height turnstiles will be installed at the Perimeter Wall pedestrian gates and removable bollards at Greens Road vehicle gates. The pedestrian turnstiles (and associated fencing) and removable bollards are proposed adjacent to the Perimeter Wall which is of 'exceptional' historic heritage. All works have been designed to have no impact on the Perimeter Wall and will be according to the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment; and
  - iv. Surveillance Systems are being installed on multi-purpose poles throughout the site. A number of the multi-purpose poles and associated trenching are located adjacent to assets of identified historic heritage significance. Micro-siting of all poles is in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment.



c. Russell Offices, Russell ACT

- i. The proposed works at the R2 café includes external glazed barrier to some ground floor areas, which may impact the vista which is on the Commonwealth Heritage List. All works have been designed in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment, in consultation with the National Capital Authority and in preparation for consultation with the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities. This may include referral to the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999*;

d. Duntroon Garrison, Campbell ACT:

- i. The proposed works on the Morshead Drive West/Staff Cadet Avenue entry include heavy duty sliding gates and landscaping. The gates will be concealed from view except when the road closure has been temporarily implemented due to a heightened level of security. The intersection of Morshead Drive West and Staff Cadet Avenue is within the broad Precinct Boundary of the Royal Military College Duntroon Cultural Landscape which is of 'exceptional' significance. All works have been designed in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment, in consultation with the National Capital Authority and in preparation for consultation with the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities;
- ii. The proposed works on the Morshead Drive East/Plant Road include vehicle barriers, extended driveway and landscaping. The proposed vehicle barriers will act as a speed control device until they are activated to facilitate road closure at heightened levels of security. The intersection of Morshead Drive East and Plant Road is within the broad Precinct Boundary of the Royal Military College Duntroon Cultural Landscape which is of 'exceptional' significance. All works have been designed in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment, in consultation with the National Capital Authority;

- iii. The proposed Robert Campbell Road and Fairbairn Avenue Entry Plan works are within the broad Precinct Boundary of the Royal Military College Duntroon Cultural Landscape which is of 'exceptional' significance. All works have been designed in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment, in consultation with the National Capital Authority;
- iv. The proposed Protective Measures include enhanced entry and access control/surveillance, vehicle control mechanisms and strategic landscaping to a number of assets. These assets are located within the broad Precinct Boundary of the Royal Military College Duntroon Cultural Landscape which is of 'exceptional' significance. All works have been designed in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment, in consultation with the National Capital Authority;
- v. A Surveillance System will be installed on multi-purpose poles throughout the site. The proposed multi-purpose poles are located within the broad Precinct Boundary of the RMC Duntroon Cultural Landscape which is of 'exceptional' significance. A number of the multi-purpose poles are also located adjacent to individually recognised heritage assets and landscape features. All works have been designed in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment, in consultation with the National Capital Authority; and
- vi. A new Base Security Post will be constructed to provide an overt security presence on the site. The preferred site for this Base Security Post is located within a listed heritage precinct, and while the existing building on the site is not heritage listed, the building either side of it are listed. Defence is in the process of consulting with the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities on the necessary approvals. Defence will designed to all heritage constraints and will ensure that all impacts are minimal and in accordance with the relevant Heritage Management Plan, National Capital Authority requirements and Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities approvals. This may include referral to the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water,

Population and Communities under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999*;

- e. Victoria Barracks Melbourne, Southbank VIC:
- i. The proposed new access control point on Miles Street will consist of a pass office, guard house, roadway and car park, vehicle inspection lane, rejection turnaround area and vehicle barriers/traffic calming. Victoria Barracks Melbourne is on the Commonwealth Heritage List for its historic heritage values. The proposed works are in an area that has been heavily built up, contains large areas of hardstand and does not interact with identified heritage assets;
  - ii. The Miles Street access control point also has historical archaeological considerations. Victoria Barracks Melbourne has been part of the Defence estate since the mid 19th Century, and the potential for historical archaeology has been documented at the site. All construction work will be done in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment, and Construction Environmental Management Plan to ensure that if any finds are uncovered during construction that they are managed in accordance with state and federal legislation;
  - iii. The existing guard house on St Kilda Road will be developed as pedestrian entry only, and will include construction of new pass office, security gate, vehicle barriers and landscaping. The proposed works is adjacent to buildings of 'exceptional' and 'high' heritage value. The proposed location of the works is in an area where an important historic viewline has been noted within the perimeter wall. The design has been developed in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment and will not impact on the perimeter wall or the view line;
  - iv. The proposed protective measures include enhanced entry and access control/surveillance, security window film and/or the installation of vehicle control mechanisms to a number of buildings on the site. Protective measures are proposed to one building of 'exceptional' historic heritage significance. The design has been developed in accordance with the Historic Heritage

Impact Assessment and will not impact on the exceptional historic heritage building; and

- v. A Surveillance System will be installed on multi-purpose poles throughout the site. A number of the multi-purpose poles and associated trenching are located adjacent to assets of identified historic heritage significance. Surveillance System units are proposed to be attached directly to buildings of ‘moderate’ heritage significance. Micro-siting of all poles is in accordance with the Historic Heritage Impact Assessment.

### Environmental Impacts

16. The environment and heritage issues identified at the BIW managed through the preparation and implementation of a robust Construction Environmental Management Plan. Sites with further issues will be subject to further investigations where required. Defence will ensure that all internal Defence Environmental approvals process will be followed, including an Environmental Clearance Certificate.

17. The key environmental considerations for the BIW works have been:

- a. At Holsworthy Barracks the installation of a Surveillance System on multi-purpose poles throughout the site have been sited to ensure that there is no impact on a number of sensitive vegetation communities, including endangered vegetation communities (under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999*). A number of the multi-purpose poles and associated trenching are located within or adjacent to Cumberland Plain Woodland (Shale Plains Woodland), an endangered vegetation community. These works have been assessed as not having a significant impact on this community and will be constructed in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;
- b. At RAAF Base Richmond the installation of a Surveillance System on multi-purpose poles throughout the site will occur within areas of identified ‘medium’ contamination. There is the potential that contaminants may be present and may be disturbed during ground disturbance. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;

- c. At Steele Barracks a number of the multi-purpose poles and associated trenching are located within areas of identified contamination ranging from 'high' to 'low' risk. - Therefore, there is the potential that contaminants may be present and may be disturbed during ground disturbance. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;
- d. At the Garden Island Defence Precinct:
  - i. The new access control point is within an area of previously documented 'very high' contamination (SYD0002) Marine Sediments. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan; and
  - ii. A number of the multi-purpose poles (associated with the Surveillance System) will be installed in areas of identified contamination ranging from 'very high' to 'low' risk. There is the potential that contaminants may be present and may be disturbed during ground disturbance. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;
- e. At Victoria Barracks Sydney the reconfiguration of the existing rear access control point is occurring in an area of known 'high' contamination. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;
- f. At Duntroon Garrison:
  - i. Installation of multi-purpose poles (associated with the Surveillance System) will require the removal of native remnant vegetation and one of the poles is located in close proximity to critically endangered Box-Gum Grassy Woodland. These works have been assessed as not having a significant impact on this community and will be constructed in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan; and

- ii It is also noted that a number of the multi-purpose poles and associated trenching are located within areas of identified 'medium' and 'low' contamination. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;
- g. At Simpson Barracks:
  - i The Crew Street entry will see construction of a new access control point comprising pass office, guard house, roadway and car park, vehicle inspection area, rejection turnaround lane and vehicle barriers/traffic calming measures. The works are located in close proximity to endangered plains grassy woodlands. These works have been assessed as not having a significant impact on this community and will be constructed in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan; and
  - ii The Yallambie Road entry will see construction of a new access control point comprising pass office, guard house, roadway and car park, vehicle inspection area, rejection turnaround lane and vehicle barriers/traffic calming measures. The works are located in close proximity to Yellow Box Woodland and endangered Studley Park Gum. These works have been assessed as not having a significant impact on this community and will be constructed in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;
- h. At HMAS CERBERUS:
  - i The South Service Road entry will see the existing gates replaced with heavy duty gates. The South Service Road access point is located adjacent to an area of known 'high' contamination. Any works in this area could disturb contaminated soils. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan; and
  - ii Installation of multi-purpose poles (associated with the Surveillance System) is occurring within areas of identified 'high' and 'low' contamination. There is the potential that contaminants may be present and may be disturbed

during ground disturbance. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;

i. At RAAF Base Williamtown:

- i Installation of multi-purpose poles (associated with the Surveillance System) is occurring within areas of ‘moderate’ ecological value and include identified ecological communities (Smooth-barked Apple, Swamp Oak Forest and Tall Open Shrubland). These works have been assessed as not having a significant impact on this community and will be constructed in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan; and
- ii A number of the multi-purpose poles and associated trenching are located within areas of identified ‘medium’ contamination. There is the potential that contaminants may be present and may be disturbed during ground disturbance. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;

j. At RAAF Base Amberley:

- i The South Amberley Road entry will see construction of a new access control point comprising pass office, guard house, roadway and car park, vehicle inspection lane, rejection turnaround area and vehicle barriers/traffic calming measures. A number of sensitive vegetation communities are known to occur within RAAF Base Amberley including EPBC and State listed endangered communities. The works are located within an area that has been set aside as a Wildlife Corridor, proposed Revegetation Area and Wildlife Crossing Zone;
- ii The works are neighbouring an area of previously documented ‘high’ contamination. There is the potential that contaminants may be present and may be disturbed during ground disturbance. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will undertake

construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan;

- iii The Rosewood Road will be widened to accommodate a truck rejection area and a vehicle inspection bay, installation of vehicle barriers and calming devices, relocation of guard house and removal of pavement and provision of car parking. The road footprint is adjacent to an area declared *Eucalyptus crebra* woodland open forest and an area that has been defined as 'core habitat' within sensitive fauna habit mapping. The adjoining area is also set aside as a Proposed Conservation Area and includes fauna permeable fencing. These works have been assessed as not having a significant impact on this community and will be constructed in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan which will include fauna permeable fencing where required;
- iv The Behms Road entry involves widening of the pavement to accommodate a truck rejection area, installation of vehicle barriers and traffic calming devices, relocation of boom gates and removal of pavement and provision of car parking. The road footprint is located adjacent to a Wildlife Corridor and proposed Revegetation Area. All works will be in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan and will not have a significant impact on the Wildlife Corridor;
- v Installation of multi-purpose poles (associated with the Surveillance System) is occurring in proximity to significant stands of eucalypts which contain koala habitat. The flowering eucalypts provide a food source for Grey-headed Flying Foxes, *Pteropus poliocephalus* which are listed as Vulnerable under the EPBC Act. These works have been assessed as not having a significant impact on this vulnerable species and will be constructed in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan; and
- vi One of the multi-purpose pole locations is located in close proximity to an area of previously documented 'medium' contamination. Defence will continue to investigate to determine the level of contamination and will



undertake construction in accordance with the project Construction Environmental Management Plan.

### **Key Legislation**

18. The key legislation applicable to this project is:
  - a. *Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999;*
  - b. *Australian Capital Territory (Planning and Land Management) Act, 1988;*
  - c. *Native Title Act, 1993;*
  - d. *Defence Act, 1903;* and
  - e. *Workplace Health and Safety (WHS) Act 2012.*
19. The design will comply with all relevant and current Defence Standards, Australian Standards, Codes and Guidelines including, but not limited to, the following:
  - a. Building Code of Australia (BCA) 2011;
  - b. Defence Manual of Infrastructure Engineering – Electrical (MIEE);
  - c. Defence Manual of Fire Protection Engineering (MFPE); and
  - d. Defence Infrastructure Management policies and processes.

### **Impact on Local Communities**

20. The local community impacts are related to increased employment opportunities during the construction and the operational phases, as well as potential local traffic and acoustic impacts for areas adjacent to sites during both these phases. Any adverse traffic and acoustic impacts, both during and post construction, are expected to be minor and are being specifically addressed to be minimised through the ongoing design development process.

21. Community engagement and consultation will be conducted over the period April to June 2012 via briefings and media releases.

### **Employment Impacts**

22. It is expected that the works will be delivered by one or more Head Contractors. The project will generate a significant amount of short-term employment during the construction phase through

on-site labour and construction materials fabrication and supply. Defence anticipates that local building sub-contractors will be employed on a large proportion of the construction works.

23. The Project does not increase the number of Defence personnel at each of the 16 sites, although there will be a comparatively small increase in the numbers of security guards once the new facilities are in operation. As a result Defence does not foresee any change in the current traffic patterns or overall vehicle numbers accessing the sites.

### **Consultation with Stakeholders**

24. Consultation will be conducted over the period April to June 2012 with the following stakeholders:

- a. Mr Adam Bandt MP, Federal Member for Melbourne;
- b. Mr Michael Danby MP, Federal Member for Melbourne Ports;
- c. The Hon Peter Garrett AM MP, Federal Member for Kingsford Smith;
- d. Ms Sharon Grierson MP, Federal Member for Newcastle;
- e. The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Federal Member for Flinders;
- f. Mr Craig Kelly MP, Federal Member for Hughes;
- g. Dr Andrew Leigh MP, Federal Member for Fraser;
- h. The Hon Jenny Macklin MP, Federal Member for Jagajaga;
- i. Mrs Lousie Markus MP, Federal Member for Macquarie;
- j. Mr Shayne Neumann MP, Federal Member for Blair;
- k. The Hon Tanya Plibersek MP, Federal Member for Sydney;
- l. The Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, Federal Member for Wentworth;
- m. Mr Andrew Barr, MLA, Member Legislative Assembly for Molonglo;
- n. Mr Bart Edward Bassett MP, State Member for Londonderry;
- o. Mr Craig Baumann MP, State Member for Port Stephens;
- p. Mr Colin Brooks MP, State Member for Bundoora;
- q. Mr Neale Burgess MP, State Member for Hastings;

- r. Mr Martin Foley MP, State Member for Albert Park;
- s. Ms Melanie Gibbons MP, State Member for Menai;
- t. Ms Clover Moore MP, State Member for Sydney;
- u. The Hon Bronwyn Pike MP, State Member for Melbourne;
- v. The Hon Carmel Tebbutt MP, State Member for Maroubra;
- w. Mr Wayne Wendt MP, State Member for Ipswich West;
- x. Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities;
- y. National Capital Authority (NCA);
- z. ACT Roads;
- aa. Road and Traffic Authority (RTA) of NSW;
- bb. VicRoads;
- cc. Randwick City Council;
- dd. Banyule Council;
- ee. City of Sydney;
- ff. City of Melbourne; and
- gg. Australian Federal Police.

## **PURPOSE OF WORKS**

### **Project Objective**

25. The objective of this project is to deliver tailored infrastructure works at 16 priority sites, in order to reduce the risk of specific types of terrorist attack upon Defence personnel. These works are to complement other non-infrastructure BSIP elements to achieve acceptable residual security risk profiles for the identified BSIP terrorist risk events.

26. To meet this objective, the BIW Project will deliver infrastructure treatments tailored to each site's specific security risk profile, function and other environmental factors.

### **Details and Reasons for Site Selection**

27. The infrastructure works are limited to on-site, apart from some minor impacts on local road networks immediately adjacent to upgraded site entry points. The locations of the 19 sites are shown at Attachment 1.

28. The Project does not require acquisition of additional land or involve land disposal aspects. There will be no change to any existing land use conditions.

### **Detailed Description of the Proposed Scope of Works**

#### Site Locations

29. The 16 priority sites to receive the BIW works are:
- a. Holsworthy Barracks, Holsworthy New South Wales (NSW);
  - b. RAAF Base Richmond, Richmond NSW;
  - c. Steele Barracks, Moorebank NSW;
  - d. Garden Island Defence Precinct, Potts Point NSW;
  - e. Victoria Barracks Sydney, Paddington NSW;
  - f. Randwick Barracks, Randwick NSW;
  - g. Defence Plaza Sydney, Sydney NSW;
  - h. Duntroon Garrison, Campbell Australian Capital Territory (ACT);
  - i. Russell Offices, Russell ACT;
  - j. Brindabella Park, Majura ACT;
  - k. Victoria Barracks Melbourne, Southbank Victoria (VIC);
  - l. Defence Plaza Melbourne, Melbourne VIC;
  - m. Simpson Barracks, Yallambie VIC;
  - n. HMAS CERBERUS, Crib Point VIC;
  - o. RAAF Base Amberley, Amberley Queensland; and
  - p. RAAF Base Williamtown, Williamtown NSW.

## Scope Elements

30. The focus of security treatments being delivered at the 16 priority sites revolve around enhancing entry zones to increase access control capability. This will be achieved by implementing a range of measures aimed at enhancing the security arrangements that apply to pedestrian and vehicle access. These measures, which will consist of physical, technological and procedural solutions, will be applied at specified locations across a site, and will depend on the site's operating profile. Such measures will support the establishment of personnel bona fides and access privileges. In addition, a number of treatments will be utilised to provide some protection from a number of security risks with particular focus on highly populated and other venerable areas. A series of treatments will also be combined to enhance the site's security operating capability, including through the use of CCTV systems at selected points of interests. Additionally, security patrolling arrangements will be modified and enhanced to increase the site's daily protective security arrangements.

31. The BIW treatments to be implemented broadly fall into the following functional groups:
- a. Alert Systems. The intention of the Alert System is to provide the site with a capability that allows site resident personnel to be notified of a Serious Security Incident by various means, including loudspeakers on site;
  - b. Command and Monitoring Facilities. The intention of the Command and Monitoring Facility is to provide an on-site capability (either a purpose built facility or an adapted existing facility) from which site management staff can support day-to-day security function management and/or respond to and manage an Serious Security Incident;
  - c. Detection Systems and Policy. The intention of the Detection Systems and Policy is to provide a detection capability for the site that allows an appropriate local response, and when threat activity is identified, allows for the efficient passage of information to Defence as well as to civilian authorities for subsequent investigation and analysis. This element includes deployment of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) supporting various detection technologies;
  - d. Electronic Access Systems. The intention of an Electronic Access System to provide an electronic access control capability in locations that require users to have a card coded in accordance with access privilege procedures and that records all access

activity in a central searchable data base. This element includes deployment of Defence Common Access Card electronic access systems;

- e. Physical Access Systems. The intention of a Physical Access System is to enhance the access control arrangements for personnel to identified areas through the delivery of physical control measures such as appropriate locks, hardened door and entries. It is designed to complement the electronic access systems noted above; and
- f. Enhanced Reception Facilities. The intention of an Enhanced Reception Facility is to provide a capability that enables security access staff to establish and record the security credentials of persons (and possibly their vehicles) prior to being granted site entry as well as to ensure items that could present a security risk do not enter the Site. There is a high degree of site specificity in the application of this functional group. Works include permanent and retractable bollards, speed reduction humps, gates (vehicular and pedestrian), vehicle turnaround points and Site pass issue offices.

#### Public Transport

32. All the sites are serviced by public bus services. However the public bus routes to some sites such as Holsworthy Barracks, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base Richmond, RAAF Base Amberley, RAAF Base Williamtown, HMAS CERBERUS and Duntroon Garrison are limited resulting in a high dependency on private motor vehicles.

#### Local Road and Traffic Concerns

33. As part of the project, new or enhanced Access Control Points are being designed for every site (with the exception of RAAF Base Williamtown). Where required, new Access Control Point will provide changed conditions for traffic entering and leaving the sites. The design of the Access Control Point has taken into account impacts on local roads and current traffic movements into and out of the sites together with anticipated traffic movements from known future projects.

#### Holsworthy Barracks, Holsworthy NSW

34. The project scope for Holsworthy Barracks involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include;

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities at the existing front gate on Macarthur Drive and to the Moorebank Ave entry zone to improve the access control capability. This will be achieved by applying treatments around the pass issue point and Access Control Point;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events;
- d. Provision of Australian Federal Police facilities to improve security capability on the Base; and
- e. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

35. Attachment 2 shows the access control works at Holsworthy Barracks.

#### RAAF Base Richmond, Richmond NSW

36. The project scope for RAAF Base Richmond involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities at the new Dight Street entry zone to improve the access control capability. This will be achieved by applying treatments around the pass issue point and by the provision of a new Access Control Point;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events;
- d. Provision of security measures at perimeter access gates for vehicles and pedestrians; and
- e. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

37. Attachment 3 shows the access control point works at RAAF Base Richmond.

#### Steele Barracks, Moorebank NSW

38. The project scope for Steele Barracks involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancing the current Access Control Point on Chatham Avenue. No pass facilities are provided at the Chatham Avenue Access Control Point for Steele Barracks, as all visitors are required to obtain passes at the Holsworthy Barracks pass office which is located approximately 1.5 km further along Moorebank Avenue;
- b. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and
- c. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

39. It should be noted that Steele Barracks has been flagged for potential closure within a few years (pending approvals). As a result, the treatments selected will (where possible) allow for relocation or reuse elsewhere.

40. Attachment 4 shows the access control works at Steele Barracks.

#### Garden Island Defence Precinct, Potts Point NSW

41. The project scope for the Garden Island Defence Precinct involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities at the Cowper Wharf Road entry zone to improve the access control capability. This will be achieved by reconfiguring the existing Access Control Point and pass facilities and providing new security treatments to this zone;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events;



- d. Provision of security measures at perimeter access gates for vehicles and pedestrians; and
- e. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

42. Attachment 5 shows the access control works at GIDP.

#### Victoria Barracks Sydney, Paddington NSW

43. The project scope for VBS involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities at the Moore Park Road entry zone to improve the access control capability. This will be achieved by applying treatments around the pass issue point and Access Control Point;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and
- d. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

44. All works referred to at this site will be constructed within the designated boundaries of Defence land designated 'Defence Special Purposes' with the exception of road works on Moore Park Road to create the upgraded entry point to the base.

45. Attachment 6 shows the access control works at Victoria Barracks Sydney.

#### Randwick Barracks, Randwick NSW

46. The project scope for Randwick Barracks involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;

- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities in the form of a new access gate and entry zone on Avoca Street to improve the Base's access control capability. This will be achieved by applying treatments around the pass issue point and new Access Control Point;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and
- d. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

47. All works referred to at this site will be constructed within the designated boundaries of Defence land designated 'Defence Special Purposes', with the exception of the road works on Avoca Street to create the new entry point to the base.

48. Attachment 7 shows the access control works at Randwick Barracks.

#### Defence Plaza Sydney, Sydney NSW

49. The project scope for Defence Plaza Sydney involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the buildings existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities at the ground floor entry zone to improve the access control capability. This will be achieved by applying treatments around the pass issue point and Access Control Point; and
- c. Protective measures at the lift lobby of each floor reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events.
- d. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

#### Duntroon Garrison, Campbell ACT

50. The project scope for Duntroon Garrison involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Provision of new Base Security Post, incorporating a Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post, as well as accommodating the Australian Federal Police. The Command and Monitoring Facility will support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities including a new Access Control Point at the key intersection of Robert Campbell Road and Fairbairn Avenue. At present Duntroon Garrison is an open Base and this will not change under the BIW Project, however works will be delivered to facilitate road closures when required at the following three locations:
  - i. At the intersection of Staff Cadet Avenue and Morshead Drive;
  - ii. At the intersection of Plant Road and Morshead Drive; and
  - iii. At the northern entry to the Australian Defence Force Academy between Northcott Drive and Tobruk Road;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and
- d. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

51. Attachment 8 shows the access control works at Duntroon Garrison.

#### Russell Offices, Russell ACT

52. The project scope for Russell Offices involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities including at the existing Access Control Point facing Reg Saunders Way as well as to the foyers in several buildings;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and

- d. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

53. Attachment 9 shows the access control works at Russell Offices.

#### Brindabella Park, Majura ACT

54. The project scope for Brindabella Park involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to the Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities to enable all personnel entering the buildings to pass through a controlled Access Control Point; and
- c. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage, an internal public alert system and a duress alarm system.

55. All works referred to at this site will be constructed within the designated boundaries of the Defence tenanted buildings. Building permits will be sought for the works and the works will comply with the relevant Standards and Regulations as applicable.

#### Victoria Barracks Melbourne, Southbank VIC

56. The project scope for Victoria Barracks Melbourne involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Limiting vehicle access through the existing St Kilda Road North gate. A new Access Control Point facility with Pass Office and Gate House will be developed at the south-east corner of the Base on Wells Street (100m north of Coventry Street) which is known as the Miles Street gate. The existing Wells Street Entry (120m south of Wadey Street) will be closed;
- b. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;

- c. A new Base Command Post to support the monitoring, control and response to security incidents;
- d. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and
- e. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

57. Attachment 10 shows the access control works at Victoria Barracks Melbourne.

#### Defence Plaza Melbourne, Melbourne VIC

58. The project scope for Defence Plaza Melbourne involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities at the rear car park entrance on Little Collins Street, and enhancing the Access Control Point in the former Armoury Café facility and the foyer on each Defence floor; and
- c. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, an internal public alert system and a duress alarm system.

#### Simpson Barracks, Yallambie VIC

59. The project scope for Simpson Barracks involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities primarily contained at both the Crew Street and the Yallambie West gate;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and

- d. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

60. All works referred to at this site will be constructed within the designated boundaries of Defence land designated 'Defence Special Purposes' with the exception of road works on Yallambie Road to create the new entry point to the base.

61. Attachment 11 shows the access control works at Simpson Barracks.

#### HMAS CERBERUS, Crib Point VIC

62. The project scope for HMAS CERBERUS involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities at the existing Access Control Point on Wilson Avenue and Cook Road;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and
- d. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

63. Attachment 12 shows the access control works at HMAS CERBERUS.

#### RAAF Base Amberley, Amberley QLD

64. The project scope for RAAF Base Amberley involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined, will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility and Base Command Post to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhanced Reception Facilities to improve the access control capability at new entry zones on Southern Amberley Road, Rosewood Road, Behms Road and off Walloon

Road adjacent to Attached Property 2. This will be achieved by applying treatments around the pass issue point and Access Control Point;

- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and
- d. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

65. Attachment 13 shows the access control works at RAAF Base Amberley.

#### RAAF Base Williamtown, Williamtown NSW

66. The project scope for RAAF Base Williamtown involves the implementation of a series of security treatments that, when combined will provide a significant enhancement to the Base's existing security provisions. In summary these treatments include:

- a. Enhancements to Command and Monitoring Facility to support the day to day security monitoring and incident response;
- b. Enhancements the Base Command Post to support the monitoring, control and response to security incidents;
- c. Protective measures to, and around, specifically identified facilities to reduce the risks to Defence personnel from the identified BSIP terrorist risk events; and
- d. Installation of infrastructure to support increased CCTV coverage around the base, a public alert system and a duress alarm system.

#### **Zoning, Local Approvals and Land Acquisition**

67. Works referred to in this evidence are, or will be, constructed within the designated boundaries of Commonwealth land, with the exception of connection to local roads which traverse Local Government Authority landholdings in most instances.

68. The selection siting locations for all of the project elements are consistent with the zone plans for each of the BIW sites (where zone plans exist) and this has been confirmed through the Defence site selection process.

#### **Planning and Design Concepts**

69. The overall concept design for BIW Project, focuses on:

- a. meeting the security requirements of the Project;
- b. maximising operational efficiency with the functional and rational location of user groups' facilities;
- c. creating a safe work environment;
- d. maintaining and enhancing a strong integrity, image and identity for the Base;
- e. creating a strong 'Sense of Place' with respect to the interaction of the user groups;
- f. maximising 'Quality of Life' by achieving an attractive working environment;
- g. integration of landscaping creating carefully designed spaces and movement corridors to improve visual legibility of establishments;
- h. the application of environmentally sustainable design principles; and
- i. careful integration of appropriate building materials and colour, complimented with appropriate signage.

70. The design of the facilities will represent value for money and will withstand the test of public scrutiny, over the life of the project.

### **Urban Design Principles**

71. Defence sites need to maintain flexibility to respond to the changing needs and growth demands of the users over time, and this includes; both flexibility in the site layout and in the buildings themselves.

72. The proposed designs will provide improvements in Base security that represent value for money and offer good economy in construction technique, buildability and finish.

73. During the preliminary design stage, the designers have considered the implications and estimates of cost for design, materials, construction techniques, finishes, equipment and energy systems which will deliver economy on a life cycle costing basis.

74. In the selection of services and associated equipment, the capital costs have been balanced against forecast operational and maintenance costs. Operating cost comparisons have been undertaken during life cycle costing analysis in the design process prior to the selection of mechanical plant. Particular consideration has been given to energy efficient design solutions employing passive solar energy.



## **Structural Design**

75. The structural design has taken into account the soils and weather conditions encountered at the various sites. The new proposed facilities will be generally concrete or steel framed structures with concrete floor slabs. They will generally comprise masonry precast panels.

76. All new facilities provided as part of the BSIP BIW Project will be single storey facilities. The buildings will be typically of a 'robust' construction utilising simple details to expedite the construction and minimise the cost. Typically the building forms will be:

- a. Stiffened raft footing system with slab on grade;
- b. Steel columns supporting simply supported steel roof beams with cold formed purlins and metal roof sheeting;
- c. Roof and wall bracing for stability; and
- d. Lightweight cladding typically with some areas of blockwork or precast panels for durability, security and architectural requirements.

77. Several of the building will be provided a level of ballistic protection.

78. The building structures will be designed to be serviceable and durable for the intended minimum design working life expectancy of 40 to 60 years. The structural designs considered are cost-effective and take into account the availability of materials and local construction methods typical of the base's location.

## **Materials and Furnishings**

79. Materials and finishes will be selected from those readily available locally for their functionality, durability, and low maintenance and for their ecologically sustainable design properties. Designs will be contextually relevant by creating a consistent visual quality at the sites.

## **Mechanical Services**

80. The Mechanical services will consist of a split air conditioning system delivering recycled air to the various facilities. In refurbished areas the existing system will be reused accordingly. Where appropriate natural ventilation will be utilised rather than mechanical air conditioning to maintain comfortable interior working conditions.

### **Hydraulic Services**

81. Water supply, sewerage and stormwater services within each facility will be extended where necessary to suit design requirements. There will also be provision for separate internal and external reticulation of water to all toilets and urinal flushing for future connection to non-potable water supply infrastructure.

### **Electrical Services**

82. The Electrical Services will consist of low voltage services mains, to power the internal and external electrical equipment required for each of the nominated facilities. The power supply will originate from the existing sub-stations.

83. Electrical Services for site security services will originate from a low voltage switchboard within proximity of the security equipment cubicles.

### **Fire Protection**

84. Fire Protection Services are limited to the new buildings proposed which will comply with the Defence Manual of Fire Protection Engineering (MFPE) based on the critical asset register. The compliance will be achieved through a new Fire Detection System or extension of an existing system in accordance with AS 1670.

### **Landscaping**

85. The landscape architectural approach will provide environments that adhere to security principles, site conditions, local microclimate, maintenance requirements and user functionality.

86. At Base entries and around identified facilities, landscape design will improve general amenity and complement new security facilities. Any new plantings required as part of the project will utilise plant stock that is indigenous to the area.

87. Actions have been taken to minimise water demands through specifying indigenous and low-water use plant stock, utilising small size plant stock to hasten plant establishment, and minimising use of lawn.

### **Water and Energy Conservation Measures**

88. In accordance to Departmental requirements, design principles have been implemented that achieve an equitable balance for ecology, amenity and economy where possible. The initiatives that have been explored in this project include:

- a. water sensitive design initiatives such as landscaped swales for improved infiltration;
- b. designing new and refurbished facilities for longevity;
- c. designing for simple, efficient maintenance; and
- d. specifying endemic plants on all sites (provenance stock where possible), with the aim of irrigation-free planting once established. Provenance stock is to be grown where possible from seed sourced and collected directly from the site and/or surrounding areas.

89. The use of water capture and reuse technology on new buildings was examined throughout the design phase, however the size of the new buildings and the intensity of use did not support the installation of rainwater harvesting equipment or greywater reuse on a value-for-money basis.

90. The Environmentally Sustainable Design approach is consistent with the Departmental Environmental Strategic Plan (2010-2014), and related policies.

91. Defence's commitment to reducing the environmental impact of its land, buildings and infrastructure assets demonstrates environmental leadership in government operations in the use of:

- a. Energy. Typical measures used in this Project to reduce energy consumption include:
  - i. passive design solutions to maximise passive heating and cooling (including building orientation, thermal efficiency of fabric and thermal mass);
  - ii. passive ventilation (where applicable);
  - iii. external views and high acoustic qualities via double glazing;
  - iv. passive solar design for natural lighting; and
  - v. external screen devices designed to control adverse sunlight penetration;
- b. Water. Typical measures used in this Project to reduce water consumption include:
  - i. water efficient fittings and fixtures;
  - ii. water Sub-metering and monitoring;
  - iii. provision of Grey water outflow to base-wide recycling facility (if applicable); and
  - iv. waterless urinals;

- c. Waste. Typical measures used in this Project to reduce waste include:
  - i. local material selection and minimisation of transport;
  - ii. reuse of existing structures minimises construction materials;
  - iii. management of construction and demolition related waste generation; and
  - iv. material selection that provides for future adaptability and flexibility.

92. Water sensitive urban design principles have informed many outcomes of the design. It is recognised that water is a precious commodity and a valuable resource that should not be wasted or taken for granted.

### **Demolition and Disposal of Existing Structures**

93. The Project will include the demolition of a number of facilities. Materials from the demolished facilities will be separated and recycled where possible. These works will be completed in accordance with the Heritage Management Plans for each of the sites and have been addressed in the Heritage Impact Assessment.

### **Provisions for People with Disabilities**

94. Access and facilities for the disabled will be provided where necessary in accordance with the building code of Australia, Australian Standard AS1428 and Defence's policy 'Disabled Access and Other Facilities for Disabled persons'. Dispensations are not anticipated at this time.

### **Childcare Provisions**

95. No additional Childcare facilities are being provided under this project as the works are not associated with an increase in demand for childcare services.

### **Workplace Health and Safety Measures**

96. The design features of the facilities are compatible with the requirements of the *Workplace Health & Safety (WHS) Act 2012*, Defence Estate Quality Management System, the Defence Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) Manual (DOHSMAN), Defence Safety Manual (SAFETYMAN) and relevant State and Territory legislation.

97. All construction sites will be appropriately secured to prevent public access during the construction period.

## **COST EFFECTIVENESS AND PUBLIC VALUE**

### **Outline of Project Costs**

98. The estimated total out turned costs to deliver the BSIP BIW project is \$205.52 M (excluding GST). This cost estimate includes construction costs, management and design fees, furniture, fittings and equipment, contingencies and an escalation allowance.

99. An increase in net operating costs is expected due to the construction of the new facilities and the associated increases in facilities maintenance, cleaning and utilities expenses. This net increase is estimated to be \$13.338 M (on an annual basis).

### **Details of Project Delivery System**

100. A Design Services Consultant is currently engaged to complete the design package. This consultant will provide technical advice during the construction phase.

101. A Project Manager/Contract Administrator will be appointed by the Commonwealth in late 2012 for the Project's construction phase to manage the proposed works and administration of the contracts for construction.

102. One or more Head Contractors, using the Defence form of Head Contract, will be appointed by the Commonwealth in late 2012 to deliver procurement of trades and construction of the proposed works.

### **Construction Program**

103. Subject to Parliamentary clearance, construction works are planned to commence delivery of the works on the 16 sites from December 2012 and conclude by June 2015, with a defects and liability period extending for 12 months from commissioning.

### **Public value**

104. Defence has considered the viability and suitability of adaptive reuse for existing facilities to meet the needs of some of the BSIP elements to reduce the need for new construction. Some new facilities will also be constructed, where existing facilities are inappropriately sited for their alternative BSIP-related use, or are otherwise unsuited to cost effective adaptation.

105. Existing facilities being replaced by the BIW Project will be either maintained by Regional Defence Support for other uses, or listed for demolition.


106. The cost of investment, both in capital and operating terms, has been optimised in a number of ways, including the reuse of existing facilities to host Base Command Post and Command and Monitoring Facilities, joint use of facilities where appropriate to meet several requirements (such as collocation of guardhouses / pass offices), investigation and utilisation of existing underground trenching across the 16 sites and minimisation of building hardening / internal base traffic management measures required to achieve the desired risk profiles across all sites.

**Revenue**


107. There are no financial revenue streams generated by this security enhancement project.


**ATTACHMENTS**



1. Location of sites for BSIP BIW Works
2. Access Control Works at Holsworthy Barracks, Holsworthy NSW
3. Access Control Works at RAAF Base Richmond, Richmond NSW
4. Access Control Works at Steele Barracks, Moorebank NSW
5. Access Control Works at the Garden Island Defence Precinct, Potts Point, NSW
6. Access Control Works at Victoria Barracks Sydney, Paddington NSW
7. Access Control Works at Randwick Barracks, Randwick NSW
8. Access Control Works at Duntroon Garrison, Campbell ACT
9. Access Control Works at Russell Offices, Russell ACT
10. Access Control Works at Victoria Barracks Melbourne, Southbank, VIC
11. Access Control Works at Simpson Barracks, Yallambie, VIC
12. Access Control Works at HMAS CERBERUS, Crib Point VIC
13. Access Control Works at RAAF Base Amberley, Amberley QLD





























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