

**REVIEW OF AUSTRALIA'S QUARANTINE FUNCTION:**

**DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND  
FORESTRY SUBMISSION**

**TO THE**

**JOINT COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT**

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## Summary

### **REVIEW OF AUSTRALIA'S QUARANTINE FUNCTION: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY SUBMISSION TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT**

Australia's quarantine function has a long and effective history. Originally focusing on human health issues, the quarantine function is now designed to prevent the introduction, establishment or spread of human, animal or plant pests and diseases in Australia. The benefits that flow from this include the protection of public health, the promotion of Australia's primary production, trade and tourism industries, a reduced need to use chemicals to control pests and diseases and the protection of native flora and fauna.

Responsibility for quarantine rests largely with the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry - Australia (AFFA) where quarantine policy is managed by Biosecurity Australia (BA), quarantine operations are managed by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) and post border issues such as incursions and outbreaks are handled by Product Integrity Animal and Plant Health (PIAPH).

In recent years several major reviews and incidents have influenced the direction of the quarantine function. These include the 1996 Quarantine Review: *Australian Quarantine – A Shared Responsibility* (chaired by Professor Malcolm Nairn); the 2001 ANAO Report: *Managing for Quarantine Effectiveness*; and the Government's response to the outbreak in February 2001 of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom and Europe.

The 1996 Quarantine Review recommended a fresh approach to quarantine with several key themes: managed risk based on science; a continuum of quarantine (pre-border, border, post border); shared responsibility (Government, industry and the community); consultative decision making; external input to quarantine policy; and enhanced capacity in plant and fish quarantine protection and policy.

The Government committed \$76 million over four years to implement the recommendations of the review. This funding had a significant impact on the quarantine function through: the strengthening of quarantine border controls; the establishment of comprehensive consultative arrangements; the development of national awareness campaigns; the enhancement of plant and fish quarantine through formal management structures; the establishment of a more intensive and open approach to risk analysis; continuous improvement of operational management and planning of quarantine programs; and the extension and improvement of pre-border and post-border operations.

Greater emphasis has also been given to the full continuum of quarantine, focusing on all three elements of pre border, border and post border activities. In operational terms, significant examples of the application of this is through the Northern

Australia Quarantine Strategy, the quarantine response to military and peacekeeping activities in East Timor, and the successful management of quarantine issues arising from the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Sydney. These issues are covered in more detail in the submission.

In June 2001 ANAO Report 47, *Managing for Quarantine Effectiveness*, found that, as a result of actions taken on the Quarantine Review Committee report “quarantine operations were now markedly more effective across the board” but that “there remain weaknesses in management of the quarantine function, which need to be addressed to improve operational effectiveness and quarantine outcomes.” AFFA accepted the recommendations of the ANAO report and has since endeavoured to address the weaknesses identified. In particular, emphasis has been placed on: extending and improving the risk assessment process; improving border controls; establishing an integrated and systematic risk management framework; improving the use of quarantine risk profiles; strengthening pre-border cargo activities; and improving effectiveness indicators.

The outbreak of FMD in the UK and Europe in February 2001 and the Government's subsequent decision to increase quarantine intervention has significantly influenced the implementation of the ANAO report. The commitment of extra expenditure of \$596.4 million over four years from 2001-02 to increase the capacity of AFFA and the Australian Customs Service (Customs) has substantially strengthened of Australia's quarantine border controls. Over 1800 additional staff have been recruited to AQIS and Customs in the twelve months that has elapsed since the Government's decisions were announced. Areas of weakness identified by the ANAO in early 2001 as requiring further work have been able to be addressed in a comprehensive way as intervention levels approach 100 % at all border entry points to Australia.

This unprecedented program of work represents only the first twelve months of a four-year program. Further work is therefore required to improve the effectiveness of quarantine measures being put into place and to develop robust systems to measure that effectiveness.

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**Introduction**

1. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (AFFA) is pleased to provide this submission to assist the Committee in its consideration of this important Commonwealth Government responsibility.
2. This submission outlines:
  - the development of the Commonwealth quarantine function and its place in the current machinery of government, nationally and internationally;
  - actions taken as a result of recent reviews, including the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) Report 47 of 2001; and
  - issues relating to the continuum of quarantine.
3. The submission provides a broad overview of these issues in anticipation that this is where Committee might like to begin. Some detail is provided as attachments. AFFA will welcome the opportunity to provide more detailed information, in whatever form is desired, as the review develops and the Committee identifies the particular issues on which it would like to focus its attention.

**Constitutional and legislative provisions – historical perspective**

4. The importance of rigorous quarantine arrangements for a major primary producing and trading nation was recognised in discussions during the Constitutional Conventions leading to establishment of the Australian Federation. This reflected concerns about the spread of infectious diseases such as smallpox, plague and typhus fever in the second half of the nineteenth century and concerns also about outbreaks of phylloxera in grape vines, cattle tick and foot and mouth disease.
5. Section 51(ix) of the Constitution gave the Commonwealth power to make laws with respect to quarantine. Until 1908, the Commonwealth's responsibilities were met through uniform State quarantine legislation that came into effect before the Constitution was proclaimed.
6. In 1908, the Deakin Government introduced legislation to establish a Federal Quarantine Service. The *Quarantine Act 1908* (the Quarantine Act) describes the scope of quarantine as follows:

*“In this Act quarantine includes, but is not limited to, measures:*

*for, or in relation to, the examination, exclusion, detention, observation, segregation, isolation, protection, treatment and regulation of vessels, installations, human beings, animals, plants or other goods or things: and*

*having as their object the prevention or control of the introduction, establishment or spread of diseases or pests that will or could cause significant damage to human beings, animals, plants, other aspects of the environment or economic activities.”*

7. The Quarantine Act was administered by the Department of Trade and Customs until 1921 when that responsibility was transferred to a newly formed Department of Health that had been created following the worldwide influenza epidemic after the First World War.
8. In 1984, the policy and administration of animal and plant quarantine aspects of the Quarantine Act were transferred from the then Department of Health to the Department of Primary Industries (now the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry). The policy aspects of the human quarantine provisions of the Act continue to be administered by the Department of Health and Ageing, while AFFA undertakes a service delivery role for that Department under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding.
9. The Secretary of AFFA is the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine by virtue of subsection 9AA(1) of the Quarantine Act 1908. Subsection 9AA(1) provides that the person for the time being holding, or performing the duties of, the office of Secretary to the Department that deals with animal and plant quarantine shall be the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine.
10. The Minister for Health and Ageing is empowered by subsection 9(1) to appoint the Director of Human Quarantine. The Chief Medical Officer in the Department of Health and Ageing currently holds this appointment.
11. In 1995 the operational service delivery for plant, animal and human quarantine in all States and Territories except Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory was transferred to the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS). These three jurisdictions continue to deliver national border quarantine services on behalf of and funded by the Commonwealth under formal agreements with AQIS.
12. A summary of current quarantine and related legislation is at Attachment 1. This legislation confers powerful regulatory and associated investigative and prosecution capabilities. Strong powers of this kind are not as evident in other countries except New Zealand that enjoys a similar, relatively favourable agricultural pest and disease status.

### **Current administrative arrangements**

13. Groups within the Department assist the Secretary of AFFA in his role as the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine, with his legal and other obligations in relation to quarantine issues. These groups are principally Biosecurity Australia (BA), AQIS and Product Integrity, Animal and Plant Health (PIAPH).
14. BA was established by AFFA in October 2000 as a sub group within its Market Access and Biosecurity (MAB) group. It was established to distinguish biosecurity (quarantine) policy development and market access negotiations from the operational roles of AQIS which implements biosecurity border controls, issues import permits and provides export certification.
15. Within this framework, BA is responsible for:

- developing new biosecurity policies and reviewing existing policies for the safe importation of live animals and plants, and animal and plant products;
  - working with AQIS on the implementation of biosecurity policies; and
  - conducting technical negotiations with counterpart agencies in other countries, to develop new market access and maintain existing market access for Australian live animals and their genetic material, and plants and plant products.
16. AQIS is responsible for the operational/service delivery aspects of quarantine. AQIS quarantine border operations are organised into eight major programs:
- Airports;
  - Import Clearance (encompassing sea and air cargo and imported food);
  - Seaports;
  - International Mail;
  - Detector Dogs;
  - Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy including East Timor;
  - Post - entry Plant Quarantine; and
  - Post - entry Animal Quarantine.
17. A brief summary of each program is at Attachment 2 including a table showing broad indicators of demand for each program's services and the resources allocated by region/location across Australia.
18. PIAPH's role in quarantine is part of a broader role managing a range of issues relating to animal health (including aquatic animal health and animal welfare), plant health and plant protection. PIAPH incorporates the Office of the Chief Veterinary Officer of the Commonwealth and that of the Chief Plant Protection Officer.
19. PIAPH is responsible for the national coordination of the management of exotic pest and disease incursions or outbreaks of endemic pests or diseases of national significance, and management of major national pest and disease eradication and control programs. The area also leads Australia's contribution to the development of international policy and standards related to animal and plant health.
20. PIAPH also leads the Commonwealth's involvement in national policies and programs on agricultural production safety and related issues, including the National Residue Survey. It carries Commonwealth policy responsibility for agricultural and veterinary chemicals. On the international front, the area houses Australia's Codex contact point and leads the Department's contribution to the development of international policy and standards affecting food safety, residues and other contaminants, and agricultural and veterinary chemicals.
21. AFFA employed an estimated 2802 full time equivalent staff including AQIS contractors and State and Territory staff, in March 2002, in BA, AQIS and PIAPH. Many of these staff possess technical and professional qualifications. BA and PIAPH staff are generally Canberra based, but AQIS staff are spread widely across Australia to meet the demands for quarantine and export services. Ongoing staff employed under the Public Service Act are supplemented in AQIS by contract personnel



engaged to perform lower level, routine tasks under supervision. A summary of staff resources is at Attachment 3.

22. While other Commonwealth agencies have interests in ensuring the effectiveness of the nation's quarantine services, primary responsibility rests with the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and his Department. The inclusion in this portfolio of policy and overall operational responsibility for quarantine, together with the positions of Chief Plant Protection Officer and Chief Veterinary Officer and related government primary industry functions, enables the harmonisation of quarantine responsibilities and the preservation of their functional integrity, as well as their ready coordination with the related activities of other Commonwealth agencies.

### **Consultative arrangements**

23. The Quarantine and Exports Advisory Council (QEAC) provides independent advice to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry on quarantine issues. The Council was established in 1997 following Government acceptance of a recommendation in the report of the 1996 Australian Quarantine Review Committee. The terms of reference and current membership of the Council are set out at Attachment 4.
24. AQIS also has well established consultative arrangements with industry bodies. These consultative committees provide a valuable basis for establishing effective operational arrangements and cost recovery mechanisms for both quarantine and export functions. There are thirteen industry specific consultative bodies and these are detailed at Attachment 5.
25. In addition BA has in place extensive consultative arrangements for its work on import risk analyses and technical market access.

### **Relations with other Commonwealth organisations**

26. In order to satisfy whole of government interests in quarantine, AFFA consults with and coordinates its activities with other government agencies such as the Australian Customs Service (Customs), the Departments of Health and Ageing, Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS), Environment Australia (EA), Defence and Australia Post (AP).
27. As has been indicated, the Department of Health and Ageing determines policy and provides operating instructions for human quarantine, while AQIS is responsible for the operational implementation of these policies and instructions. A Memorandum of Understanding between AQIS and the Department of Health and Ageing governs the relationship between the policy and operational aspects of human quarantine. There is regular contact between relevant staff to ensure coordination.
28. Relations with Customs and DIMIA are particularly close. This provides the basis for tight integration of border control arrangements. For example, at international airports:

- passengers are first met by Customs Officers who validate the information on the Incoming Passenger Card which includes customs, immigration and quarantine declarations;
  - depending on the declaration(s) made there will be some physical intervention with the passenger by either a customs or quarantine officer with the appropriate expertise to deal with the risk presented. Due to increased quarantine measures, the vast majority of passengers receive some level of intervention from quarantine;
  - in the baggage collection areas, passengers are screened by both customs and quarantine staff and by quarantine detector dogs;
  - exit points are monitored;
  - support equipment, including x-ray machines and computers, as well as training and training facilities, are shared between Customs and AQIS.
29. Arrangements with a similar high level of integration are to be found at international mail centres and with the entry into Australia of all cargo and vessels.
30. Overall policy and management coordination between quarantine and closely related functions is fostered by regular meetings between the Secretaries of AFFA, DIMIA and the Chief Executive Officer of Customs. There is a Memorandum of Understanding between AQIS and Customs setting out governing arrangements for border quarantine operations. In addition, there are close working relations between relevant staff in all three agencies fostered by means of a network and committees at several levels and across the full range of activities and regions.
31. BA and EA have a mutual interest in ensuring that the environmental aspects of Import Risk Analysis are handled well. A Memorandum of Understanding between EA and BA is being developed to clarify the means by which the close cooperation needed through all the stages of Import Risk Analysis process will be achieved.

### **Relations with State and Territory governments**

32. The Constitution vests national quarantine powers in the Commonwealth. However, State and Territory authorities, as part of their wider plant and animal health responsibilities undertake inter and intrastate quarantine operations, important work in the detection of new pest and disease outbreaks and the collection of data on the status of animal and plant health. This information is shared with the Commonwealth and applied to the assessment of quarantine and other issues. The Commonwealth also plays a key national coordination role in managing incursions and developing the capacity to do so.
33. Attachment 6 shows how the formal structures of relations between the Commonwealth and the States are managed. These structures have evolved over the many years that Commonwealth and State Ministers and their officials have been meeting to coordinate agricultural, forestry and fishing activities including quarantine and its harmonisation across jurisdictions. In the case of emergencies, such as exotic pest or disease incursions, AFFA works closely with the relevant State(s) in the response stage to manage the international trade implications and, where more than one jurisdiction is affected, to provide a national coordinating role.

34. A key event for Australia was the entry into force in 1995 of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Under the provisions of a 1995 Memorandum of Understanding, State and Territory governments are required to consult with the Commonwealth before implementing any sanitary or phytosanitary measures that could inhibit trade or which might not conform with Australia's obligations under World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements.
35. Most recently at the May 2002 meeting of the Primary Industries Ministerial Council (PIMC), State and Commonwealth Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work co-operatively to develop effective nationally cohesive biosecurity policy. They agreed to confirm their partnership approach in an exchange of letters to supplement their continuing commitment to implementing the SPS Agreement as articulated in the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding on Animal and Plant Quarantine Measures.
36. The Council agreed that the current level of definition of Appropriate Level of Protection meets Australia's current needs. Council members from all Australian jurisdictions are committed to addressing differences in regional pest and disease status and risks through early and comprehensive cooperation as part of the import risk analysis process.

### **International arrangements**

37. It is important for Australia as a trading nation and a founding member of the GATT which preceded the WTO, to remain actively linked to the rest of the world through appropriate international fora and through bilateral contacts with our trading partners. Australia uses a variety of means to ensure active engagement with our trading partners and key international bodies on biosecurity issues.
38. AFFA has a presence with Australia's overseas missions at locations important to Australia's agricultural interests covering import and export functions. These interests include both policy and operational biosecurity matters, including information transfer and the performance of various technical and administrative functions.
39. AFFA will shortly add a sixth post in Beijing to the existing five in Paris, Brussels, Washington, Seoul and Tokyo to which it sends outposted officers. Most of these outposted staff have a technical background in plant or animal health including biosecurity. They assist senior MAB, AQIS and PIAPH staff in maintaining a very active presence in relevant international fora and in making bilateral and multilateral representations. In the case of emergencies such as pest or disease outbreaks, PIAPH staff work closely with outposted officers to manage the trade implications.
40. AFFA also provides four officers on secondment to DFAT to provide broader agricultural policy and representational services at the Australian embassies in Rome, Brussels, Tokyo, and Washington. These officers also provide assistance with biosecurity policy issues and representation.
41. PIAPH, MAB and AQIS provide international assistance to strengthen quarantine and related capacities through a variety of specific projects sponsored by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Australian Council for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). They also respond directly to training and consultancy requests relating to biosecurity policy and practice from a range of countries including trading partners in our region.

42. There are very few countries apart from Australia that operate comprehensive quarantine inspection services. Although the USA maintains an agricultural inspection service at its land borders and main international points of entry, this operates on a comparatively low sample basis and the data on quarantine risk material that enters the USA undetected appears to be limited. Similarly, the UK and countries in Europe do not have quarantine arrangements comparable to Australia although to some extent this also reflects their quite different status of pest and diseases. Benchmarking and best practice comparisons are therefore difficult to identify.
43. On the other hand New Zealand has a similar quarantine policy to Australia and a broadly similar plant and animal health status. AQIS and its New Zealand counterpart, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Quarantine Service, have therefore built a close relationship and regularly share performance information, technical information and quarantine innovations (including on risk assessments). In addition, due to their close geographical proximity, the two countries seek to harmonise quarantine activities wherever possible (eg. aircraft disinsection).
44. In 1989, as a joint initiative of the National Health and Medical Research Council and the Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council, the Communicable Diseases Network, Australia-New Zealand was established. The Network oversees the coordination of national communicable human disease outbreaks of national significance and field training of communicable disease epidemiologists. The Network also assists with the development of national policy on communicable diseases. Its members are drawn from Commonwealth, State and Territory and New Zealand health authorities and other government and non-government agencies, including AFFA and it provides a high level forum for additional coordination of human quarantine activities.

### ***World Trade Organization agreements***

45. The WTO Agreements underpin many aspects of agricultural trade. Continued operation of these agreements is strongly in Australia's interest given the significant contribution exports make to the Australian economy. If countries were to erode or circumvent the agreements there would be significant adverse effects on Australia's trade with the rest of the world.
46. The Government's quarantine policy is to a significant degree influenced by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The first prohibits the use of agriculture specific non-tariff measures to distort trade; the second prohibits the use of unjustifiable food safety and quarantine requirements to protect domestic producers from international competition.
47. The key WTO agreements of importance for AFFA portfolio industries are the Agriculture Agreement, the SPS Agreement and the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The Agreement on Agriculture sets out the rights and obligations of WTO members concerning trade in agriculture and food products.
48. A key concept for quarantine is the appropriate level of protection (ALOP). The SPS Agreement defines '*appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection*' as the level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory. In setting their ALOP, Members are to take into account the objective of minimising negative trade effects (Article 5.4).

49. Determining Australia's ALOP is an issue for Government in consultation with the community - it is not a prerogative of WTO. ALOP therefore reflects government policy that is influenced by community expectations. AFFA contributes to the development of this policy by providing technical information and advice although the SPS Agreement does not require a Member to have a scientific basis for its ALOP determination.
50. The Agriculture Agreement provides coverage for portfolio agricultural commodities, processed foods and beverages, but does not cover trade in fisheries and forestry products. The SPS Agreement sets out the rules underpinning quarantine and technical market access. The DSU provides the mechanism for enforcement of commitments under all WTO agreements.
51. In addition to these agreements that are of particular interest to AFFA, there are also a range of other agreements that impact on portfolio industries. These deal with the basic principles under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, rules of origin, trade and environment, technical barriers to trade, intellectual property rights, subsidies, anti-dumping, countervailing measures and safeguard actions.
52. In an international environment with multilateral trading rules, there are restraints on the level of protectionism a country can adopt. Smaller trading nations have limited capacity to influence the agricultural policies of larger richer economies. As an export driven nation, Australia could find itself excluded from major markets without warning, without justification, and without recourse if our trading partners were at liberty to increase tariffs and other barriers.
53. Scenarios of unrestricted protectionism would be devastating to Australian primary producers and Australian agricultural industries. The WTO provides a basic level of security against such trading practices and ensures a more equitable trading framework for all member countries. Tight rules and disciplines and binding commitments on tariffs and domestic support levels ensure some degree of fair competition. At the same time there is a long way to go to achieve a level playing field for agriculture. Most importantly, the WTO is a forum through which Australia and the Cairns Group can pursue further international agricultural reform through the mandated negotiations on agriculture. This is particularly important for Australia as the reduction of tariff barriers flowing from the Uruguay round has seen an increasing tendency on the part of some countries to use unjustified non-tariff barriers as a means of restricting trade in agricultural products.

#### International reference organisations and standards

54. The SPS Agreement has conferred additional status on three international standard setting organizations by requiring WTO members to harmonise their sanitary and phytosanitary measures with the standards, guidelines and recommendations produced by those organisations unless there is scientific justification for using a different measure. The SPS Agreement also requires members to take into account the risk assessment techniques developed by these organisations.
55. The three international organisations are referenced in Annex A of the SPS Agreement. Details can be found at Attachment 7 but in brief the requirements are:
  - for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) relating to food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice;

- for animal health and zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under the auspices of the Organisation des International Epizooties (OIE); and
- for plant health, the international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under the auspices of the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) in cooperation with regional organisations operating within the framework of the IPPC.

56. Australia has always been a very active participant in the deliberations of these bodies and also in GATT/WTO groups developing policies that impact on food standards and biosecurity issues. These international representations have most recently been a shared responsibility of MAB and PIAPH together with DFAT where appropriate. In preparation for meetings of the international bodies, Australia participates in quadrilateral meetings with ‘like-minded’ countries in quarantine matters – the United States, Canada and New Zealand.

### ***Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)***

57. The Government’s criteria laid down in 1997 state that Australia is open to concluding FTAs with significant trading partners, where these are likely to deliver gains in a shorter timeframe than achievable elsewhere, which are comprehensive, cover all major sectors and are WTO-consistent.
58. At present Australia has only one FTA - that with New Zealand, dating from 1983. The *Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations-Trade Agreement* (ANZCERTA) has a 1988 *Protocol on Harmonisation of Quarantine Administrative Procedures*. At present Australia is negotiating an FTA with Singapore, and examining the possibility of negotiating FTAs with Thailand, Japan and the United States.
59. Individual quarantine problems cannot be explicitly addressed in FTAs, as these are based on scientific risk assessment, not the exchange of mutual concessions like tariffs, for example. Further, WTO rules do not allow for discrimination between trading partners with regard to processing market access requests.
60. This is an issue that requires appropriate management in any FTA negotiations, making it clear that Australia is not able to compromise its science based, risk assessment approach to determining quarantine measures. At the same time, FTAs can provide for enhanced consultative mechanisms on SPS issues and various forms of closer cooperation.
61. Since the creation of the WTO, understandings of one kind or another between countries on trade issues commonly include an affirmation that the parties will adhere to their WTO obligations. The effect of the SPS obligations is that an FTA cannot be the vehicle for the parties to give perpetual concessions to one another in violation of either the general prohibition on discrimination or the other, specific provisions of the Agreement. An FTA cannot, in general, include any commitment that third parties may reasonably regard as implicitly an infringement of *their* rights.

### **Recent reports on quarantine**

62. There have been twelve major outside examinations and reports on Commonwealth quarantine in recent times, six of them since 1995. Two Quarantine Review Reports by a Committee chaired by Professor David Lindsay in 1987 and 1988 and the

Government's responses to these are the most important of the earlier reports regarding the policies on the management of risk and the consideration of issues relating to Northern Australia. These issues have been the subjects of later review.

63. The major recent reports have been:

- "Review of the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy" 1995, Nairn and Muirhead.
- The Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee 1996, "Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service".
- Report of the Australian Quarantine Review Committee 1996, "Australian Quarantine: A Shared Responsibility".
- ANAO Report No 10, September 2000 "AQIS Cost-Recovery Systems" and the associated JCPAA report included in the Committee Report of June 2001.
- Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee 2000, "An Appropriate Level of Protection".
- ANAO Report No 47, June 2001 "Managing for Quarantine Effectiveness".

64. The Government's responses to two of these reviews, namely the 1996 review of quarantine and the 2001 ANAO report, have had a significant impact on Australia's quarantine arrangements and resourcing. These impacts are outlined below.

### **Report of the Australian Quarantine Review Committee**

65. The report of this Committee (chaired by Professor Malcolm Nairn who, subsequent to the report and until December 2001, was chair of the QEAC) represented a comprehensive examination of the quarantine function as a whole. It made 164 recommendations (formal and informal) of which the Government accepted 149.

66. Additional funding of \$76 million over four years to 2000-01 to AFFA (recurrent elements were subsequently renewed) supported the Government's decisions on this review. This allowed for a significant increase in resources for quarantine operations and related activities. A summary of the Government's response to the formal recommendations of this review is at Attachment 8. In responding to the review, the Government articulated seven key themes. These provide the framework for the Government's continuing approach to quarantine:

- managed risk, based on science;
- a continuum of quarantine (pre-border, border, post border);
- community responsibility;
- consultative decision making;
- external input to quarantine policy;

- enhanced capacity in plant and fish quarantine protection and policy, and
- delivering quarantine objectives.

67. In summary, the Government endorsed recommendations of the Committee that encompassed:

- development of a partnership approach to quarantine policies and programs involving the whole Australian community;
- establishment of a more balanced approach to animal and plant health and quarantine by providing additional inputs for plant health and fish quarantine;
- development of a more formally structured process for conducting risk analyses to provide a scientifically based foundation for a policy of manageable risk;
- acknowledgement of the importance of quarantine to the natural environment;
- expansion of the scope of quarantine by recognising the importance of activities in all three elements of quarantine – pre-border, border and post-border – as a continuum; and
- enhancement of the focus on pre-border and post-border activities of the continuum of quarantine in the achievement of Australia’s quarantine goal.

Some of the important achievements arising from the review include:

- the establishment of the QEAC and the expansion of Industry Consultative Committees;
- a strengthening of resources and tools to enhance border controls;
- the development of national awareness campaigns to highlight the need for quarantine vigilance and promote a greater sense of community responsibility;
- the enhancement of plant and fish quarantine, including the creation of an office of Chief Plant Protection Officer in addition to strengthening the office of Chief Veterinary Officer;
- a more intensive, consultative and open approach to risk analysis and the development and operation of quarantine policy more generally;
- improved operational management and planning of quarantine programs based on improved databases and information systems;
- a strengthening of the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy (NAQS) (additional information on this program is provided later in this submission); and
- extension of offshore pre-border inspection arrangements, and better coordination of post-border pest and disease monitoring with States and Territories.



## **Review of the Import Risk Analysis (IRA) process**

68. As outlined above, Australia's IRA process was formalised as part of the Government's response to the 1996 Report of the Australian Quarantine Review Committee.
69. The objective of the IRA process is to provide a transparent science-based methodology for determining and managing biosecurity risks. This is achieved by detailed and rigorous scientific investigation into the disease and pest risks of the commodity that is proposed to be imported.
70. The policy recommendation is made, paying full heed to the science and to Australian legislation and Australia's international obligations. Stakeholders are closely involved throughout the IRA process.
71. Through improvements to the IRA process, Biosecurity Australia aims to address those aspects of the process that lie within its purview. These include:
- ensuring the quality of science is of the highest order
  - obtaining validation of the science and scientific process from independent sources
  - ensuring that the policy is consistent with Australian legislation and Government policy
  - ensuring that the policy is consistent with Australia's international obligations and agreements
  - rigorously applying the lessons learned during previous IRAs
  - ensuring that the quality of process and administration is up to the highest standards
  - placing emphasis on transparency and consultation during the entire process, from the earliest stages of an IRA
72. Aspects that relate to impacts on Australian industries which are potentially competing or involved in other ways (eg exporters to the proponent country), but do not come within Biosecurity Australia's purview include:
- the economic impact of trade in imports on competing Australian industries
  - social costs stemming from adverse competitive economic effects
  - economic or trade advantage accruing to Australia's export industries from a decision which may have consonance with the wishes of the proponent (whether a private company or government)
  - economic or trade disadvantage accruing to Australia's export industries from an IRA decision which may offend an import proponent (whether a private company or government)
  - other non-scientific policy or political considerations.
73. It is against this background and the recommendations of ANAO Report 47 (see next section of this submission) that Biosecurity Australia has subsequently further reviewed Australia's IRA process, consulting extensively with stakeholders on its approach to import risk analysis, including through face-to-face meetings, in the first half of 2001 and again upon release of the draft Framework in September 2001. The Framework builds on experience to date with the

current process and aims to improve consultation and further promote the scientific rigor of quarantine decisions (see Attachment 9).

74. Stakeholder reaction to the proposed changes has been supportive. The changes are expected to make the process more effective, but not to prolong the time frames. The most significant changes are as follows:
- BA specified to replace AQIS as undertaking IRAs to reflect changed responsibilities;
  - more regular advice to be made available to stakeholders with regard to the BA import risk analysis work program;
  - adoption of a single IRA approach (eliminating *routine* and *non-routine* approaches);
75. AFFA consultation with the Chief Executive Officers of the relevant State and Territory agencies and with Environment Australia on the IRA work program and the scope of individual IRAs;
- the right of stakeholder appeal on scope of analysis, timetable, and the membership of the IRA team to extend to all IRAs;
  - an IRA team to conduct each IRA, membership being governed by the availability of the required expertise - whether within BA or to what extent external to BA;
  - for all IRAs, an initial paper for consultation with stakeholders to be a technical issues paper, providing an opportunity for early stakeholder input into the science;
  - IRAs to be subject to formal external scientific peer review; and
  - all technical reports in final form, submissions and peer reviews to be placed on the public file.
76. To support this process, *Guidelines for Import Risk Analysis* have been developed as a technical reference document to assist staff in BA in the conduct of import risk analyses. These guidelines are based on the relevant international standards for import risk analysis developed by the OIE and IPPC, and provide terminology and methodology that meets Australia's obligations under the WTO SPS Agreement. They also provide a means for stakeholders to better understand the methodology employed for conducting import risk analyses.

#### **ANAO Report No 47 “Managing for Quarantine Effectiveness”**

77. This performance audit was initiated as a follow up to the 1996 review of quarantine outlined above, although the scope of the audit extended beyond the immediate recommendations of that review. The audit found that as a result of actions taken in response to the 1996 quarantine review, “quarantine operations were now markedly more effective across the board” but that “there remain weaknesses in management of the quarantine function, which need to be addressed to improve operational effectiveness and quarantine outcomes.”
78. The report made eight recommendations, all of which have been accepted by AFFA and are being implemented. The recommendations and the status of current action

are detailed at Attachment 10. Recommendations relating to IRA policies and processes have also been addressed in the preceding section of this submission.

79. The availability of the ANAO report in draft form early in 2001 coincided with outbreaks of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom and Europe. The Government's response to these outbreaks therefore took account of the findings of the audit and comprehensively addressed the quarantine border control, risk management, intervention and effectiveness issues identified in the audit. The Government's response to the increased threat of FMD and other quarantine risks is summarised later in this submission, and forms a very important and substantial component of the response to ANAO Report No 47.
80. The ANAO report acknowledged the initiative by AQIS to commence the development of a risk management tool to assist the assessment of the *relative* risk of items of quarantine interest approaching the border. This tool, called a quarantine risk indicator (QRI), was initially proposed for use in the Airports and International Mail programs to provide an improved basis for comparisons of risk between and within those programs.
81. Since the ANAO Report AQIS, with the assistance of BA, has expanded the scope for the proposed use of the QRI to include commercial cargo imports. Expansion of the original scope provides the possibility of an integrated risk management framework for all modes of entry of imported goods across the quarantine continuum.
82. The development of QRIs will take into consideration the likelihood of pests and diseases being associated with commodities and the likelihood and consequences of those pests or diseases establishing in Australia. A design document for QRIs has been developed and a pilot system to test the model is being implemented. The QRI project is at a preliminary stage and the eventual application of the concept is dependent on favourable outcomes from the pilot and access to the necessary data to run the model.
83. It is likely that the full completion of the project will take several years. While improved risk management tools are being developed and supporting data is acquired to refine the application of these tools, recent Government decisions have focussed quarantine operations on increasing quarantine border controls to 100% intervention for all cargo, shipping and mail entering Australia and at least 81% at international airports.

### **Increased Quarantine Intervention (IQI)**

84. In the May 2001 Budget, the Government announced an additional \$596.4m over four years principally to substantially increase the capacity of AQIS and Customs to respond to the threat of FMD and other quarantine risks. The decision required that quarantine border intervention levels be increased to at least 81% at airports (up from approximately 35% in February 2001) and 100% at other border entry points except mail by July 2002. The mail intervention level is to increase to 100% (up from less than 5%) by the end of December 2002. Intervention is defined as the application of quarantine measures to identify and manage items of quarantine interest eg screening by dogs or X-ray, visual examination of opened passenger bags. Effectiveness is the likelihood that these measures will intercept items of quarantine interest.
85. Most funding was directed towards increased border protection activities. It provided \$281.4m to AFFA for AQIS, \$238.8m for Customs and provisional amounts for infrastructure changes of \$49.4m for AP and \$19.4m to DOTARS for the airport

corporations based on preliminary estimates by AP and airports of their costings for these changes. An additional \$1.7m was also provided to AFFA to strengthen risk management and preparedness arrangements and to provide for rapid FMD testing.

86. The decision also provided for a comprehensive response to ANAO Report No 47, 'Managing for Quarantine Effectiveness', tabled in Parliament on 7 June 2001.
87. A summary of progress appears below with further details provided at Attachment 11. This has been a major undertaking within a very short period of time. AFFA considers the initiatives are on track to achieve the Government's targets.

### ***Resources***

88. Twelve months after decisions were announced in the 2001-02 Budget AQIS has recruited and trained most of the additional full time equivalent (FTE) staff envisaged (906 FTEs or more than 1200 additional actual staff, some of whom are employed part-time). AQIS has already deployed 48 of the expected 53 X-ray machines and 31 of 65 extra detector dog teams with some 14 more detector dogs in training.

### ***Airports***

89. National intervention and effectiveness levels have reached over 80% and 70% respectively compared with 35% intervention and effectiveness of around 39% early in 2001 prior to the outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom. The Government decisions set goals of at least 81% for intervention and at least 87% for effectiveness within 12 months of decisions being implemented.
90. Seizures of items of quarantine concern at Australia's international airports are currently 38,000 per month having risen by 84% since the March quarter 2001. Higher risk items seized include meat and dairy products, fruit and vegetables, insect-infested wood products, seeds, plants and cuttings. Over the same period the number of quarantine on-the-spot fines issued has increased by almost 60% and are now running at around 1100 per month.

### **International Mail**

91. Intervention levels have increased for the various classes of mail and are currently running at between 79% and 100%, depending on the class of mail. Initial tentative effectiveness data has shown an increase from approximately 11% (as identified in the ANAO report) to around 76% for higher risk material for parcels, registered and electronically monitored mail. Effectiveness levels cannot increase substantially beyond this until infrastructure changes currently being developed for international mail centres have been completed.

### **Cargo**

92. Intervention levels climbed significantly during 2001 for inspections of cargo including sea and air containers and high volume low value (HVLV) airfreight documents. Intervention levels are currently running at 100%, 98% and 82% respectively. Interventions for personal effects and non-containerised cargo have also been substantially increased consistent with Government decisions. Initial data for sea and air containers and HVLV indicate effectiveness levels of over 80%. Ongoing consultations with industry continue to refine the integration of increased quarantine intervention requirements and Australia's cargo facilitation practices.

93. The intervention level has reached 98% for ships and 100% for disembarking passengers. The ships for which there is no intervention comprise those overseas vessels only visiting Australian offshore facilities (eg oil rigs). The initial preliminary effectiveness assessment for ship inspections indicates that around 87% of vessels for which there is quarantine interest are detected and dealt with appropriately by AQIS at their first port of call.

#### Impact on Clients and Industry

94. AQIS has put significant effort into developing an understanding by industry and individual clients of the Government's decisions on quarantine intervention. Major changes to inspection methods and practices have required close consultation with industry bodies. AQIS continues to involve industry in decisions about cost recovery arrangements.
95. Major infrastructure work has been completed at Sydney and Brisbane airports to enhance quarantine intervention. Developments and consultations continue with other major international airports to also achieve essential infrastructure changes. AQIS and Customs also continue to work closely with AP on the work required to be undertaken at international mail centres.

#### ***Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy (NAQS) including East Timor***

96. The Government first established NAQS in 1989. It is the AQIS program that aims to maintain Australia's plant and animal health status by protecting it from incursions of exotic pests and diseases present in countries to our north. ANAO Report 47 found the NAQS program to be effective.

97. *The northern coast of Australia is highly susceptible to pest and disease incursions. Attributes of northern Australia that are of particular quarantine interest are:*

- relative proximity to foreign countries which have a different pest and disease profile and agricultural health status from Australia;
- recent experience with exotic pests thought to be introduced by wind currents;
- treaty arrangements with Australia's northern neighbours which allow for the free movement of traditional inhabitants into and out of the Torres Strait Protected Zone;
- unauthorised entry into northern Australia by foreign nationals and fishing vessels;
- low population density;
- difficult terrain, with populations of cattle and feral animals and very extensive land use systems; and
- attractiveness to international yachting traffic.

98. NAQS works by identifying and evaluating quarantine risks facing northern Australia and providing early detection advice and warning of new pests and diseases through a targeted program of monitoring, surveillance and public awareness. Its work

encompasses pre-border, border and post border activities. MAB also provides policy input and a level of service on risk assessments to NAQS.

99. Through its focus on surveillance of Australia's relatively unguarded northern coastline and islands, between Cairns and Broome, NAQS has developed a close relationship with the residents of northern Australia (including Torres Strait Islanders and Aboriginals) and neighbouring countries such as Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and East Timor.

100. Highlights of achievements during the last 12 months include:

- detection of red banded mango caterpillar and papaya fruit fly on Cape York Peninsula. These are both exotic pests and not found on mainland Australia. These detections are clear evidence of the value of early warning of exotic pests provided through surveillance and monitoring undertaken by NAQS.
- targeted animal health surveys of East Timor following increased concern relating to foot and mouth disease risks in that country;
- a boat survey of plant and animal health of the Treaty villages in Western Province of PNG involving counterpart scientists from PNG;
- quarantine clearances in North Queensland of 15,052 aircraft with 95,958 passengers and 2,758 vessels with 18,416 passengers during 2000-01;
- continuation of the program since 1999 which has seen the pre-clearance in East Timor of all Australian defence force equipment and personnel prior to their departure for Australia, enhanced border controls at Darwin and other Australian entry points, and comprehensive pest and disease surveys at all Australian army bases to which equipment has been returned;
- substantial progress with the East Timor agricultural quarantine and animal and plant health support project. This project is to assist East Timor develop quarantine objectives, develop policies for animal, plant and fish quarantine that enable the objectives to be met, prepare appropriate quarantine legislation for East Timor and assist capacity building and training; and
- considerable positive feedback received as a result of the screening of one part of the Australian Broadcasting Commission's documentary *Island Life* that focuses on NAQS activities in the Torres Strait. As public awareness is seen as a key strategy of the NAQS program, the documentary increases the current level of quarantine awareness and thereby further enhances the quarantine effort.

## **Public Awareness**

101. Improved community awareness of the importance of quarantine to Australia's agricultural industries and the environment is in itself a significant means of achieving better quarantine performance.

102. BA has an active communications strategy for increasing the awareness and understanding of the import risk analysis process, the context in which it operates and the progress of particular

IRAs. This includes publication of a newsletter, "*Biosecurity Australia News*" which also provides updates on technical market access negotiations.

103. For individual IRAs, communication includes regular updates by way of memoranda to all interested stakeholders, public meetings, stakeholder workshops and active engagement with domestic and international stakeholders who express particular interest in an IRA.
104. BA has over 2,700 people and organisations on its stakeholder register. It also provides access to comprehensive information about current and completed IRA's on the AFFA website.
105. AQIS operates two major quarantine awareness campaigns:
  - *Quarantine Matters!* – targeting Australian residents and travellers to Australia, including non-English speaking audiences and industry groups; and
  - *Top Watch* – targeting communities and visitors to northern Australia, covering the coastline from Broome in the west to Cairns in the east, and taking in the Torres Strait.
106. Following the 1996 Australian Quarantine Review Committee report, which recommended a 'shared responsibility' between government and the community for quarantine, the Commonwealth Government allocated an additional \$5.529 million over four years (1997-98 – 2000-01) to quarantine awareness. This funding has subsequently been renewed until 2004-05. The *Quarantine Matters!* awareness campaign was developed to improve the understanding of, and commitment to, quarantine among Australian residents and visitors to Australia.
107. The additional funds provided to AQIS in the May 2001 Budget included an allocation of \$5.2 million over three years to further develop awareness of quarantine through the *Quarantine Matters!* campaign.
108. The *Top Watch* awareness program is funded separately, as part of NAQS.
109. The first phase of the *Quarantine Matters!* campaign (1997-2001) included:
  - improved printed information materials and their more effective distribution;
  - displays at travel and industry expos;
  - a CD-ROM and web-based schools kit;
  - increased advertising in relevant magazines and newspapers;
  - an annual Quarantine Week;
  - annual National Quarantine Awards;
  - specialist communications to non-English speaking audiences;
  - a revised in-flight video for screening on in-coming flights;
  - improved information on the AFFA web site;

- targeted products for specific high-risk industry groups; and
  - increased use of news media to disseminate information about quarantine.
110. A tracking research survey at the conclusion of the first phase of the campaign, conducted in mid-2001, indicated generally favourable outcomes when compared to the results of earlier surveys in 1997 and 1999:
- 78% of residents said they had seen or heard something about quarantine in the 12 months to mid-2001, compared to 58% in 1999;
  - 56% of Australian residents felt they were well informed about quarantine regulations – up from 44% in 1999 and 37% in 1997;
  - the relative position of quarantine when ranked by Australians as an ‘issue of concern’ against a basket of other social issues (ie. drugs, unemployment) increased from eighth out of 10 in 1997 and 1999 to fourth out of 10 in 2001; and
  - the vast majority (99%) of management and staff of the international cargo community agreed that quarantine restrictions are essential to the well-being of our economy, while 70% considered quarantine regulations were always strictly enforced, up from 55% in 1997.
111. The research pointed, however, to lower than average awareness levels of quarantine among 18 to 24-year-olds and non-English speaking residents.
112. The second phase of the *Quarantine Matters!* campaign began in the second half of 2001, with the appointment of a new strategic communications consultant and the development of a communications strategy for the period to mid-2004.
113. Notwithstanding the pleasing achievements secured by the first phase of the *Quarantine Matters!* campaign, research shows that there is still opportunity to do more to raise awareness as a means of ensuring that Australia remains free from FMD and other exotic pests and diseases.
114. The phase two strategy provides for sharper targeting of key audiences and stronger recruitment of the ‘as yet non-committed’ individuals and groups to the active quarantine protection of Australia. At the same time, it is designed to maintain and reinforce the already high levels of awareness and compliance among the general community.
115. The shift in focus will allow for campaign efficiencies and create the opportunity to identify and understand the mindsets of “non-compliant” groups across program areas (ie. airports, seaports, cargo importers, international mail recipients).
116. Phase two of the campaign will see much greater emphases on the use of news media opportunities to better inform members of the public about quarantine. This will support a new range of mainly print-based advertising to travellers, youth and industry. New advertisements will begin appearing in about August 2002. Until then existing advertisements will continue to appear in a range of publications.



117. An upgrade of quarantine signage and ambient advertising spaces at key international airports has already begun, with a bolder visual presence for quarantine at both Sydney and Brisbane airports. Other airports will follow.
118. Specific sub-strategies are being developed to address the lower than desirable awareness levels among youth and non-English speaking audiences.
119. *Top Watch* is the quarantine awareness program aimed at encouraging the reporting of unusual pest and disease occurrences to quarantine officers by local communities, industry groups and visitors in northern Australia.
120. *Top Watch* as part of NAQS, has been especially designed for northern Australia. It is planned, funded and operated separately from the *Quarantine Matters!* campaign, but there is close co-operation between the two.
121. Key campaign activities include:
- visits to communities and schools and development of school projects;
  - the production of annual calendars for the Torres Strait and Cape York which feature local scenes and people, coupled with relevant quarantine information;
  - production of a quarterly NAQS newsletter to update key stakeholders;
  - airline ticket wallets and seat information sheets with maps of the Torres Strait quarantine zones and quarantine information;
  - weekly radio broadcasts in the Torres Strait and other remote areas;
  - a dedicated FM radio channel situated at strategic locations throughout Cape York Peninsula relaying quarantine information to 4WD tourists;
  - quarantine signage on all inhabited Torres Strait islands;
  - visits by high-profile sporting personalities and local sporting sponsorships;
  - talks and presentations by quarantine officers;
  - production of a videos targeted to schools and community groups;
  - distribution of a quarantine wall-planner in W.A.; and
  - NAQS displays/exhibits at agricultural and community shows.

## **Compliance**

122. Stronger border control and shared community and industry responsibilities for quarantine requires strong compliance and enforcement functions to enable AQIS to be assured of the ongoing integrity of quarantine systems and

operations. Where efforts to achieve border protection fail because of ignorance or criminal intent, a firm compliance response is required.

123. The planks of the compliance strategy include Quarantine Infringement Notices (QINs) at airports, referral of breaches for consideration of prosecution (both border and post border) across the full range of quarantine operations, a significant compliance operation within AQIS, and working closely with Customs.
124. In February 2002, QIN penalties were doubled from \$110 to \$220. In May 2002 amendments to the Quarantine Act introduced a maximum penalty of \$1.1 million and/or 10 years in gaol for commercially motivated illegal importations. Over the past 6 months, international travellers who ignored quarantine requirements have been fined almost \$130,000 by the courts for illegally importing prohibited items such as meat, sausages, pork, live bees, fresh dates, sunflower seeds, plant cuttings and tobacco leaves.
125. Between January and March 2002 the number of QINs issued to inbound air passengers and crew averaged 1100 per month, increasing by around 60% compared with the same period in 2001.
126. To support the integrity of quarantine and export services at the national and regional levels, the AQIS Compliance and Investigation Program (C&I) provides:
- a strong investigation capability;
  - a review mechanism under the “Fit and Proper” scheme for verification of integrity of participants in the export industry;
  - a systems/commodity assessment capability based on the principles of risk management and fraud control;
  - the collection and analysis of information; and
  - an evaluation capability through a risk assessment process of operations at registered export establishments and approved quarantine premises.
127. Since February 2001 referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), of quarantine detections at airports have increased and currently number about 20 per month nationally. Over the same period referrals to AQIS Compliance for action in relation to quarantine detections for mail, and cargo have increased by 40% overall. Referrals of detections at international mail centres have increased in Queensland and New South Wales by 150% and 200% respectively, and by 100% in other States and the Northern Territory.

### **Pre-border aspects of quarantine**

128. An important preventive strategy for managing quarantine risks to Australia is to recognise and reduce the incidence of pests and diseases in neighbouring countries. Australia conducts a number of projects to assist regional neighbours improve their pest and disease management capacity. Australia’s participation in international organisations contributes to common standards and reduced risks of pests and diseases from overseas. For example, PIAPH is working with Thailand on its management of Foot and Mouth Disease.

129. PIAPH is responsible for Australia's participation in international organisations such as Codex, OIE and IPPC (see above). These organisations and their regional offices develop common standards and keep member countries informed of significant pest and disease risks and their management.
130. ANAO Report No 47 acknowledged the progress made in pre-border activities and made two recommendations aimed at strengthening these activities. These recommendations were for AFFA to clearly articulate government policy directions and, where pre-border strategies are found to be unreliable, for AQIS to act promptly to ensure quarantine risks are effectively managed.
131. AQIS has subsequently prepared a policy paper on *Pre-Border Cargo Quarantine Arrangements*, a draft of which has been provided to industry for consultation. The final paper will describe offshore and pre-border cargo schemes and provide guidelines for:
- policy and scheme criteria;
  - operational targets;
  - performance indicators;
  - monitoring and reporting to stakeholders; and
  - models for sanctions policies.
132. Current offshore inspection and assessment activities fall into five distinct types:
- offshore inspections;
  - area assessments;
  - risk pathway assessments;
  - certification schemes; and
  - third party schemes.
133. The applicability of each of these types of assessment to any given situation can be determined according to the level of quarantine risk and complexity of the tasks involved. Examples of such systems currently in place include offshore AQIS inspections of used machinery, mining and earthmoving equipment; offshore AQIS inspections of military equipment and personnel; East Timor area pest and disease surveys (in the context of Australia's United Nations involvement); fertiliser port assessments ("reduced" risk classification where acceptable risk mitigation strategies are in place); imported food certification (acceptance of certification for food safety testing from recognised overseas government agencies); and the Canadian Timber Accreditation Scheme (recognition of exporting mills with acceptable quality assurance systems).
134. AQIS actively encourages industry to utilise offshore inspections as a risk mitigation and prevention strategy to keep quarantine risks offshore and as a logistical aid to importing large, high value consignments.

## **Olympics**

135. The 2000 Olympics and Paralympics in Sydney were an example of successful integrated pre border, border and post border quarantine responses. AQIS and MAB established close cooperation on planning for the Games with SOCOG and other agencies originating with the initial 1993 bid campaign where the capacity to conduct

the equestrian events while maintaining Australia's quarantine integrity was a critical issue.

136. Every National Olympic and Paralympic Committee and their athletes were made aware of Australia's quarantine requirements and how to comply with them before they arrived. International sporting bodies and businesses that had a major role at the Games were also contacted with the quarantine message. Special staffing arrangements during the Games were used to ensure that Games visitors and their luggage and cargo were facilitated promptly without impairing Australia's quarantine integrity. The international equestrian centre in Sydney has been surveyed several times since the Games to ensure that no exotic pests and diseases have established. Further detail on quarantine management of the Olympics is at Attachment 12.

### **Post-border quarantine**

137. The capacity to identify and manage pest and disease incursions is crucial to an effective quarantine strategy. Protecting Australia from pests and diseases means that those that do get through the border must be detected and controlled as effectively and efficiently as possible.

138. PIAPH contributes to the national capacity to identify, diagnose and manage pest and disease incursions. The Chief Veterinary Officer, the Chief Plant Protection Officer and their staff provide scientific and technical leadership to Australia:

139. producing professionally independent research, analysis and advice on animal and plant health, animal welfare and related issues.

140. managing projects in preparedness for and response to pest and disease emergencies including AFFAEMPLAN.

141. liaison and coordination of input into national and international animal and plant health standards.

142. Develop national capacity to manage animal and plant health issues through:

- joint industry government bodies such as Animal Health Australia, Plant Health Australia;
- cost sharing agreements with industry and the States and Territories;
- forecasting threats;
- surveillance systems;
- identification of incursions;
- diagnostic capacity; and
- national pest and disease eradication and control programs.

143. For example, PIAPH coordinates surveillance and monitoring projects for pests and diseases such as exotic fruit fly and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. It has established an Internet based Plant Pest Database. .

144. In June 2001, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed to hold a major simulation of a foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak to test Australia's whole of government framework of preparedness, response and recovery in the face of a major disease epidemic. The FMD Taskforce will conduct the simulation in September this year.

145. The simulation is part of a broader response to the threat of pests and diseases. At its June 2001 meeting, COAG noted that Australia's animal disease and emergency response plans were being reviewed to better cater for a major animal disease emergency, such as an incursion of FMD. COAG agreed to a high priority review of national government frameworks for emergency animal disease prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.
146. COAG also noted that if a significant FMD outbreak occurred in Australia the technical, logistical, social and financial responses needed to manage the situation would require a significant whole-of-government effort. To support a national whole-of-government framework a Memorandum of Understanding between Heads of Government is being developed to cover issues such as trigger points for activating national plans, roles and responsibilities of the various parties who would act in an emergency including veterinary services, emergency services, support agencies and industry.
147. A national FMD coordination framework has been developed to tackle a significant animal disease event on a national basis. The framework includes COAG (or a subset of affected jurisdictions) as the peak body for a major animal disease emergency, supported by an FMD management and recovery group. This group would comprise the chief executives of a small number of Commonwealth and State agencies directly involved in the major issues of the emergency and would be chaired by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and in this way would ensure national consistency of whole-of-government actions.
148. A number of key work activities have been undertaken to support the whole-of-government approach. These include legislative amendments, a review of all jurisdictional animal disease and emergency plans, training and extension, agreement to a government/industry cost sharing arrangement and an examination of relief and recovery options. The Australian Productivity Commission, at the direction of the Treasurer, is examining the social and economic consequences of a FMD situation to help support future decision-making processes.

**Attachment 1 - Quarantine and Related Legislation**

## **Quarantine legislation**

Quarantine Act 1908

**Administered by AQIS and MAB for AFFA and Department of Health and Ageing**

- Quarantine Proclamation 1998
- Quarantine (Cocos Islands) Regulations
- Quarantine Regulations 2000
- Instrument declaring a Special Quarantine Zone under section 5A of Quarantine Act 1908
- Quarantine Service Fees Determinations 2001 (No 1 of 2001)

**Source:** <http://www.affa.gov.au/content/output.cfm?ObjectID=D2C48F86-BA1A-11A1-A2200060A1B00706>

## **Imported food legislation**

Imported Food Control Act 1992

**Administered by AQIS for AFFA and ANZFA**

- Imported Food Control Regulations 1993
- Imported Food Control Order 2001

**Source:** <http://www.affa.gov.au/content/output.cfm?ObjectID=D2C48F86-BA1A-11A1-A2200060A1B00708>

**Attachment 2 – Summary of AQIS Programs**



## SUMMARY OF AQIS QUARANTINE PROGRAMS

AQIS quarantine operations are organised into eight major programs:

- Airports;
- Import Clearance (encompassing sea and air cargo and imported food);
- Seaports;
- International Mail;
- Detector Dogs;
- Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy including East Timor;
- Post - entry Plant Quarantine; and
- Post - entry Animal Quarantine.

Details on each are provided below.

### **Airports**

The Airports Program is primarily responsible for the quarantine clearance of incoming passengers and their baggage at international airports. Airports Program officers are trained to identify and seize items that could harm Australia's plant, animal and human health, or the environment. A significant proportion of staff time is also taken clearing incoming aircraft, monitoring for insect vectors of human disease, such as malaria and dengue fever, and auditing and surveillance of quarantine waste disposal arrangements.

These responsibilities are prescribed in Australian legislation, including the *Quarantine Act 1908* and relevant regulations, and various international treaties. Two key international obligations that the Airports Program are responsible for relate to monitoring airports for insects that may carry human diseases (World Health Organisation's International Health Regulations), and facilitating passenger flows where quarantine intervention is required to reduce delays (International Civil Aviation Organisation passenger facilitation standards). AQIS works very closely with both Customs and Immigration staff to ensure the smooth flow of passengers through the baggage halls of Australia's international airport terminals.

Over 99% of incoming international passengers arrive at the major international airports (Adelaide, Brisbane, Cairns, Darwin, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney). The Airports Program also has staff located at Hobart, Canberra, Coolangatta, Townsville, Mackay and Gladstone. Field staff from other AQIS Programs and from Customs are also used to clear aircraft and passengers arriving at non-first port locations. Low risk flights such as New Zealand charters and RAAF arrivals are sometimes cleared by Customs staff or special constables on behalf of AQIS at remote locations. AQIS provides training for these people.

Airports Program staff undertake a range of activities other than those directly associated with the clearance of aircraft and passengers. These include, for arriving aircraft, responding to reports of passenger death or illness, dealing with unauthorised animals on board, resolving issues relating to non-compliance with aircraft disinsection requirements, or responding to any other non-compliance in relation to requirements of the *Quarantine Act 1908*. Airports Program staff also act on behalf of the Department of Health and Ageing to monitor human disease vectors (i.e. mosquitos) around international airports. Monitoring is conducted in accordance with the World Health Organisation

(WHO) standards and, in some cases, a more stringent Australian specific set of monitoring standards is applied. These arrangements are intended to reduce the potential for human quarantine diseases to spread via vectors, which may be carried on aircraft arriving in, and travelling from Australia.

Other significant responsibilities, functions and activities for the Airports Program are:

- Seizure, for treatment, destruction or re-export, goods which pose a quarantine threat.
- Surveillance and profiling at airports for leakage of goods of quarantine concern.
- Auditing and surveillance of aircraft waste disposal arrangements, often carried out under co-regulation arrangements.
- Auditing and surveillance of aircraft disinsection treatments often performed under co-regulation arrangements.
- Assessment of the quarantine risk associated with international aircraft and passengers and the application of that information in quarantine clearance activities and surveillance.
- Initiation of legal action for breaches of the *Quarantine Act 1908* and relevant regulations.
- Development and delivery of quarantine awareness publicity (in conjunction with AQIS Public Relations) to increase awareness of, and cooperation with, Australia's quarantine laws by airlines and international passengers.

Table 1 provides a breakdown of Program resources and of traffic levels through airports. The Government's 2001 Budget initiative to increase quarantine intervention has committed the Airports Program to at least 81% intervention of passengers and an effectiveness level of at least 87% for capture of goods in the Higher Risk category and at least 50% for capture of goods in the Risk category. Attachment 11 provides a progress report on the implementation of this commitment.

## **Table 1 - Resources and Traffic for International Airports**

	<b>Total</b>	<b>ACT</b>	<b>NSW</b>	<b>VIC</b>	<b>QLD</b>	<b>Far Nth QLD</b>	<b>TAS</b>	<b>WA</b>	<b>NT</b>	<b>SA</b>
<b>Resources</b>										
Full Time Equivalents (Budgeted 2001-02)	602.74	14.69	252.64	112.45	92.07	32.52	0.20	70.22	13.70	14.25
Contractors (March 2002)	101.39	0.00	50.80	12.00	18.00	6.00	0.00	11.04	0.65	2.90
Detector Dogs (March 2002)	43	0	16	7	8	3	0	5	3	1
X-rays (March 2002)	39	1	22	4	6	2	0	4	0	0
Annual Budget 2001-02 (\$m)	Revenue	55.50								
	Expenditure	52.75								
<b>Traffic</b>										
Passengers (Estimated 2001-02)	9,173,729	672	4,335,763	1,814,787	1,463,791	393,923	748	902,462	132,381	129,202
Flights (Estimated 2001-02)	68,976	12	30,042	12,525	10,634	4,642	9	5,230	4,813	1,069

*Note: Traffic may include flights and passengers inspected by FTE's funded by the East Timor Program*

## Import Clearance Program

The Import Clearance Program contributes to the protection of Australia's animal, plant and human health and the environment through assessing and managing the risks associated with imported cargo as well as containers and packaging. These responsibilities are prescribed in the *Quarantine Act 1908* and *Imported Food Control Act 1992* and subordinate legislation. In doing so the program also contributes to the maintenance of the favourable pest and disease status of many of our export produce industries thereby improving their ability to compete for international market access.

Under the Import Clearance program, all commercial cargo entering Australia via sea or air is assessed and cleared for quarantine concerns. Cargo may also be subject to inspection and testing for compliance with Food Safety Standards. Guidelines and conditions are applied for the importation of most commodities and in some cases; the specific conditions are applied through the issue of import permits, eg biological material.

AQIS uses the Customs electronic entry system to target commercial cargo that may have quarantine concerns by the use of electronic profiling based on customs tariff codes.

Activities undertaken by staff include verification, sampling, inspection and treatment, as necessary, of processed foods, agricultural products, shipping and air containers, imports of biological products, live plants and animals, machinery and equipment, timber, logs and mouldings, fertiliser, stockfeed and personal effects consignments.

Under the program, approval is given for the treatment of goods and/or packaging materials; premises are approved for carrying out treatments, unpacking, processing, inspection and/or storage, testing, and sampling; and electronic systems operate to facilitate clearance operations at the border (eg AQIS Import Management System – AIMS).

Several sub-programs manage these activities, comprising:

- Import Operations, including Imported Food Inspection
- Biologicals Permit Issuing
- Imported Grain & Horticulture
- Live Animal Imports.

Each specialist area within the program and each sub-program is responsible for liaising with the key industry stakeholders relevant to their field of activity, negotiating with the Biosecurity Australia within AFFA, or the Australia New Zealand Food Authority in the case of imported food inspection, and with the field staff on issues relating to their area of specialisation.

Table 2 provides a breakdown of Program resources and of traffic levels for the Import Clearance Program. The Government's 2001 Budget initiative to increase quarantine intervention has committed the Import Clearance Program to 100% intervention and 96% effectiveness level for sea containers, air containers and high value low volume (HVLV) cargo. A commitment was also made to increase surveillance for personal effects and non-containerised (break-bulk) cargo. Attachment 11 provides a progress report on the implementation of these commitments.

## Table 2 - Resources and Traffic for Import Clearance

	Total	ACT	NSW	VIC	QLD	Far Nth QLD	TAS	WA	NT	SA
<b>Resources</b>										
Full Time Equivalents (Budgeted 2001-02)	608.61	79.32	172.33	146.72	92.25	16.08	8.99	57.17	8.85	26.90
Contractors (Current)	55.12	0.00	28.00	18.00	6.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.12
Detector Dogs (Current)	9	0	4	2	2	0	0	1	0	0
X-rays (Current)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Annual Budget 2001-02 (\$m)	Revenue	55.42								
	Expenditure	53.25								
<b>Traffic</b>										
Sea Containers (Estimated 2001-02)	1,120,365	0	355,451	410,784	165,236	6,876	7,343	125,196	0	49,479
Air Containers (Estimated 2001-02)	348,485	0	152,069	104,582	26,207	15,549	0	38,645	2,274	9,159
High Volume Low Value Bags (Estimated 2001-02)	257,349	0	192,156	33,383	16,481	980	0	14,088	0	261
Breakbulk Cargo Items (Estimated 2001-02)	620,672	0	188,418	193,368	180,627	473	375	3,198	21,455	32,758

## **International Mail**

The International Mail Program contributes to the protection of Australia's plant, animal and human health and the environment through the surveillance, screening and clearance of mail arriving from overseas. Some 194 million articles of mail enter Australia each year. The major proportion of international mail enters Australia through four primary gateways, namely Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Brisbane. International mail arriving at the major gateways addressed to recipients in smaller states is currently separated and sent under bond where AQIS officers examine it. While some international mail does enter Australia through Adelaide and Darwin directly, Australia Post policy requires an increasing amount of international mail to be channelled through the major gateways, particularly Sydney. All sea mail enters Australia through Sydney, although much is sent under bond to smaller centres for clearance.

Table 3 provides a breakdown of Program resources and of traffic levels through mail centres. The Program is currently implementing 100% screening of all mail via detector dogs, x-ray or physical inspection with an effectiveness target of at least 96% for capture of goods in the Higher Risk category and at least 50% for capture of goods in the Risk category. This has required AQIS to work closely with Australia Post and Customs on the building of new facilities in Sydney and Melbourne. Attachment 11 provides a progress report on the implementation of this commitment.

## **Table 3 - Resources and Traffic for International Mail**

	<b>Total</b>	<b>ACT</b>	<b>NSW</b>	<b>VIC</b>	<b>QLD</b>	<b>Far Nth QLD</b>	<b>TAS</b>	<b>WA</b>	<b>NT</b>	<b>SA</b>
<b>Resources</b>										
Full Time Equivalents (Budgeted 2001-02)	132.40	9.30	74.00	29.43	10.10	0.00	0.45	4.92	2.00	2.20
Contractors (March 2002)	17	0	15	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Detector Dogs (March 2002)	11	0	4	5	2	0	0	0	0	0
X-rays (March 2002)	10	0	5	2	2	0	0	1	0	0
Annual Budget 2001-02 (\$m)	Revenue	11.17								
	Expenditure	10.73								
<b>Traffic</b>										
Letter Class (Estimated 2001-02)	173,342,779	0	96,415,449	54,791,484	7,519,008	0	0	10,260,841	799,836	3,556,161
Articles Other (Estimated 2001-02)	17,916,951	0	12,116,401	4,194,062	986,010	0	0	477,797	31,121	115,060
Parcels/EMS/Registered (Estimated 2001-02)	3,773,201	0	2,274,066	1,237,749	215,623	0	0	170,479	0	69,344

*Note: Traffic for the NT includes mail pre-cleared in East Timor*

## Seaports

The primary function of the Seaports Program is to protect Australia's animal, plant and human health and the environment through ensuring that all vessels arriving in Australia from overseas comply with International Health Regulations and ensuring that any quarantine risk posed by the vessel is adequately managed. Each vessel is assessed for quarantine risk and, on that basis; the necessary steps are taken to ensure the vessel does not introduce any exotic pests and diseases. It should be noted that the Seaports Program is only concerned with vessel clearance and wharf side security and not the clearance of cargo (this issue is the responsibility of the Import Clearance Program).

Quarantine officers carry out inspections of overseas vessels on arrival at their first port of call in Australia to assess the hygiene of food preparation and storage areas and to ensure the vessel is not harbouring rodents, vermin, exotic insects or diseases. Quarantine officers also monitor ballast water management arrangements, waste disposal systems, animals on board vessels and inspect for Asian Gypsy Moth and exotic bees.

The Seaports Program also has responsibility for the management and clearance of unauthorised vessels (immigrant and fishing). The Program works closely with Customs, Immigration and Fisheries when processing these vessels.

In addition, the Seaports Program is responsible for wharf surveillance activities, quarantine signage on wharves and port environs and clearance of passengers from vessels. The Program works in co-operation with Customs in utilising electronic surveillance facilities.

Finally the Program is responsible for post-border vector monitoring around seaports for the entry of exotic mosquitoes, which could be vectors of human disease, and other insect pests such as Screw Worm Fly and bluetongue vectors (*Culicoides spp*).

Table 4 provides a breakdown of Program resources and of traffic levels through seaports. The Government's 2001 Budget initiative to increase quarantine intervention has committed the Seaports Program to 100% intervention of vessels and disembarking passengers and an effectiveness level of at least 96%. Attachment 11 provides a progress report on the implementation of this commitment.



## Table 4 - Resources and Traffic for Seaports

		Total	ACT	NSW	VIC	QLD	Far Nth QLD	TAS	WA	NT	SA
<b>Resources</b>											
Full Time Equivalents (Budgeted 2001-02)		78.06	8.05	12.15	4.05	11.10	12.61	2.30	17.40	7.50	2.90
Contractors (March 2002)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Detector Dogs (March 2002)		1.25	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.35	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
X-rays (March 2002)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Annual Budget 2001-02 (\$m)	Revenue	8.24									
	Expenditure	8.04									
<b>Traffic</b>											
Vessels (Estimated 2001-02)		11,455	0	2,076	778	1,964	1850	238	3,380	897	272

*Note: Seaports use detector dog resources from the Airports Program. Therefore detector dog teams in Seaports are not additional teams.*

*Note: Traffic may include vessels inspected by FTE's funded by the East Timor Program*

## **Detector Dogs**

The Quarantine Detector Dog Unit utilises the dogs' highly developed sense of smell to intercept items of prime quarantine concern at international airports, seaports, mail centres and private couriers. This is done in a manner that facilitates passenger movement and the flow of international mail and goods, and promotes the positive image of AQIS.

The Unit endeavours to meet the requirements of the client AQIS Programs including International Airports, International Mail, Import Clearance (air couriers), Seaports and the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy. Funding is provided directly by the client Programs.

The dogs are trained to alert to items regarded as being of prime quarantine concern including all fresh fruit and vegetables, meats (fresh and processed), plant material, eggs, birds, reptiles and bees. The teams covering international mail and air cargo are also trained to alert to dairy products, soil and seeds. In addition to their prime role of detection of quarantine items, the Detector Dog teams are a valuable public awareness tool due to the nature of the dogs used and the generally positive public reaction to them.

The dogs working amongst passengers are exclusively beagles and they are trained to alert in a passive response mode, in that they simply sit next to the item containing the target odour. The dogs covering international mail alert in an active response manner, digging at or nudging the offending parcels. The active response dogs are a variety of breeds, including many crossbreeds, and are often sourced from animal shelters. There are also now 12 Labradors recruited from the Customs breeding program working for AQIS.

Prior to the Government's initiative to increase quarantine intervention, there were 29 Detector Dog teams screening passengers at international airports and 4 active response teams screening international mail. Since that time, the Program has grown to 64 teams (43 passive and 21 active response) as at March 2002, with further training underway to reach about 90 teams.

## **Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy (NAQS) including East Timor**

NAQS consists of three coordinated activities funded and managed by AQIS to address quarantine challenges in northern Australia: NAQS-Scientific, NAQS-Operations and NAQS-Public Awareness. Attributes of northern Australia which are of particular quarantine interest are:

- relative proximity to other countries that have a different pest and disease profile and agricultural health status from Australia;
- treaty arrangements with Australia's northern neighbours which allow for the free movement of traditional inhabitants into and out of the Torres Strait Protected Zone;
- unauthorised entry into northern Australia by foreign nationals and fishing vessels;
- low population density;
- difficult terrain, with populations of cattle and feral animals and very extensive land use systems; and
- attractiveness to international yachting tourism.

Continued movement of people, animals and goods eastwards within Indonesia, and in particular, the establishment of significant cattle populations on islands of eastern Indonesia, foreshadow further changes in the quarantine status of the region. In recent years, there has been an increase in the arrival of unauthorised foreign nationals and fishing vessels, particularly in Broome and Darwin. These uncontrolled arrivals pose a risk of introducing new pests to Australia's animal, plant and human populations. The survey and monitoring of quarantine pests and diseases undertaken by NAQS also contributes to Australia's capacity to satisfy other countries of our animal and plant health status.

NAQS incorporates the following objectives:

- maintaining border integrity through delivery of effective quarantine services;
- monitoring and surveillance for exotic pests and diseases in northern Australia and, through co-operative programs, for pests and diseases in neighbouring countries;
- promotion of quarantine awareness and a cooperative attitude to quarantine restrictions within northern communities and neighbouring countries;
- identification and assessment of the quarantine risks presented to Australia by significant animal and plant pests and diseases present in countries to Australia's north; and
- program management and liaison.

The risk to quarantine integrity presented by the plethora of dinghy traffic and light aircraft movements within the Torres Strait, and to and from Papua New Guinea and the mainland, is addressed through inspection by quarantine officers at points of departure (in the Torres Strait) and arrival. Qualified quarantine officers drawn from local communities carry out this role, as they are best placed to do so.

The scientific program conducts monitoring and surveillance for target organisms determined by their quarantine status and risk of entry through northern Australia. These lists are not intended to be comprehensive due to the large number of organisms of potential concern (particularly for the plant component), but provide an indication of the types of pests, diseases and weeds of concern, and the major priorities for the program. Target lists are reviewed periodically to take into account changing geographic distribution and quarantine status of organisms.

The purpose of monitoring and surveillance is to provide early warning of exotic disease, weed or pest incursions into northern Australia and neighbouring countries; and to provide information

which assists in predicting likely behaviour of newly-introduced diseases or pests, and in identifying appropriate response measures in the event of an incursion into Australia.

A high level of quarantine awareness amongst communities in northern Australia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and East Timor is seen as crucial to the success of the program. To achieve this, NAQS delivers high quality extension and public awareness services to encourage appropriate behaviour and reporting of pest and disease threats. Extending responsibility for quarantine into the community is especially important in the geographic areas most vulnerable to incursion. If all sectors of the community in these remote and sparsely populated areas are 'quarantine aware' they serve to further enhance the quarantine effort.

The risk to quarantine integrity presented by the plethora of dinghy traffic and light aircraft movements within the Torres Strait, and to and from Papua New Guinea and the mainland, is addressed through inspection by quarantine officers at points of departure (in the Torres Strait) and arrival. Qualified quarantine officers drawn from local communities carry out this role, as they are best placed to do so.

The international military and humanitarian activities in East Timor pose a particular risk to Australia. As a consequence comprehensive arrangements have been put in place to protect Australia from the many serious pests and diseases that are known to exist in East Timor. These arrangements include AQIS staff inspecting Australian Defence Force equipment and personnel in East Timor prior to them returning to Australia, enhanced border controls in Darwin and other Australian ports and comprehensive post-border surveys at all Australian military bases where equipment has been returned.

NAQS/East Timor program staff continue to conduct regular surveys in East Timor to identify changes in the country's pest and disease status. The most recent joint plant and animal survey was undertaken during April/May 2002.

The first phase of a project to assist East Timor improve its own quarantine border services has been undertaken. This project includes the development of appropriate policies for animal, plant and fish quarantine as well as recommending approaches and specific activities to further strengthen quarantine services in East Timor. Further phases of this project will be progressed over the next few months including placing additional AQIS officers in East Timor to train local quarantine staff. This strategy offers Australia additional protection against pests and diseases which otherwise may enter East Timor.

These activities are good illustrations of a combination of pre-border, border and post-border initiatives and are the result of excellent cooperation between MAB, NAQS and the other AQIS operational programs.

Table 5 provides a breakdown of resources and traffic levels for the NAQS/East Timor Program.

**Table 5 - Resources and Traffic for NAQS/East Timor**

		Total	ACT	Far Nth	NT
<b>Resources<sup>1</sup></b>					
Full Time Equivalents (Budgeted 2001-02)		68.17	5.90	47.67	14.60
Detector Dogs (March 2002)		1		1	0
Annual Budget 2001-02 (\$m)	Revenue	9.55			
	Expenditure	9.54			
<b>Traffic</b>					
<b>East Timor</b>					
Vessels (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>2</sup>		105	0	0	105
Aircraft (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>2</sup>		2,347	0	0	2,347
Passengers (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>2</sup>		42,899	0	0	42,899
Containers (Estimated 2001-02)		5,705	0	0	5,705
Vehicles (Estimated 2001-02)		318	0	0	318
Containers (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>3</sup>		106	0	0	106
Vehicles (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>3</sup>		211	0	0	211
ADF Personnel (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>3</sup>		4,657	0	0	4,657
Military Aircraft (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>3</sup>		14	0	0	14
Misc. ADF Equipment (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>3</sup>		43	0	0	43
<b>NAQS - Far North Queensland</b>					
Passengers (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>4</sup>		92,616	0	92,616	0
Aircraft and vessel inspections (Estimated 2001-02) <sup>4</sup>		11,920	0	11,920	0

<sup>1</sup> Includes resources for East Timor and all NAQS sub-programs (i.e. Operations, Scientific and Public Awareness) administered by AQIS and \$0.6m for Asian gypsy moth and exotic fruit fly trapping administered by PIAPH.

<sup>2</sup> These items are also counted in the national total for Seaport and Airports

<sup>3</sup> Items pre-cleared in East Timor

<sup>4</sup> Items cleared by NAQS operational staff in Torres Strait and Cape York Peninsula

## **Post-Entry Plant Quarantine Program**

AQIS's Post-Entry Plant Quarantine Program helps protect Australia's plant health and the environment through the post-entry quarantine growth and disease screening of imported plant material at government plant quarantine stations. The importation of plants and propagatable material carries with it a high risk of introducing exotic plant pests and diseases. Consequently such material is subject to treatment on arrival and post-entry quarantine growth with disease screening.

AQIS operates two plant quarantine stations – at Eastern Creek (NSW) and Knoxfield (VIC). AQIS employs qualified horticulturists at these stations whose main responsibilities are to ensure that imported plants receive the best horticultural care to ensure maximum growth that will enable disease screening to be carried out with minimal delay. AQIS also employs qualified plant pathologists who are responsible for conducting disease screening of plants.

There are other government plant quarantine stations located throughout Australia that are maintained by State governments under compliance arrangements with AQIS. AQIS audits these facilities to ensure that AQIS protocols and standards are maintained.

Some examples of the type of high risk plant material commonly handled by this program includes stone fruit, pome fruit, citrus, grapevines, berry fruits, potatoes, clonal grasses, field crops and tropical fruits. The program has an important role to play to ensure the safe (i.e. free of pests and diseases) introduction of this material that will allow Australia's agricultural and horticultural industries to develop and remain competitive, while at the same time preventing the entry of exotic pests and diseases.

## **Post-Entry Animal Quarantine Program**

The Post-Entry Animal Quarantine Program (PEAQ) contributes to achieving protection of Australia's animal, human and environmental health by delivery of effective quarantine operational services. This program achieves this by housing imported animals in a secure manner consistent with import permit conditions and monitoring the health and welfare of imported animals during post arrival quarantine to detect exotic disease. The main function of PEAQ program is to isolate imported animals in accordance with import permit conditions. PEAQ protects against the inadvertent entry of animal pests and diseases that are present in the country of origin but which may not be detectable at the time of the animal's departure or on arrival in Australia.

PEAQ achieves the objectives by providing and maintaining secure housing for imported animals consistent with the import permit conditions, closely monitor the health and welfare of animals during quarantine so potential disease problems are quickly identified and referred to veterinarians in the live animal import program for technical management and employ experienced well trained staff.

All imported animals must serve a mandatory period of quarantine upon arrival in Australia with the exception of dogs, cats and horses from New Zealand. The import permit conditions specify a post-arrival quarantine (PAQ) period for imported animals. The majority of animals serve the PAQ in government quarantine stations. The government-owned and operated post-arrival animal quarantine stations are located at:

- Byford in Western Australia (dogs and cats);
- Eastern Creek in New South Wales (dogs, cats, livestock, horses and bees);
- Spotswood in Victoria (dogs, cats, livestock, horses, and live pigeons); and
- Torrens Island in South Australia (poultry hatching eggs).

Staff supervising quarantine must monitor the health and welfare of the animals in their care on a daily basis. The health and welfare of the animals must be recorded in an appropriate manner. Early reporting of potential disease problems provides the program with the opportunity for early identification and management, preventing potential costly disease outbreaks.

**Attachment 3 – Summary of Human Resources in AQIS, MAB and PIAPH**



**Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Staff - March 2002**

<b>AFFA Area</b>	<b>AQIS</b>	<b>Product Integrity</b>	<b>Market Access</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>FTEs</b>	2571*	119	112	2802

\* AQIS FTEs include contractors and employed staff in WA, NT and TAS.

**Attachment 4 – Quarantine and Exports Advisory Council (QEAC)**

## **QUARANTINE AND EXPORTS ADVISORY COUNCIL**

### **About the Council**

The Quarantine and Exports Advisory Council (QEAC) is a non-statutory, independent advisory body which was established in 1997 as part of the Government's response to the 1996 (Nairn) Review of Quarantine. It replaced the Quarantine and Inspection Advisory Council (QIAC).

### **Terms of reference**

The Council's terms of reference are to:

- provide advice to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the Director of Quarantine on major quarantine and export certification policy issues and strategic directions for AQIS/AFFA;
- inquire into and provide advice to the Minister on matters referred to it by the Minister;
- act as a focal point to ensure broad ranging, effective consultation between AQIS/AFFA, industry and stakeholders;
- provide advice on the effectiveness of AQIS's program delivery;
- oversight implementation of the Government's decisions on the Quarantine Review, Fish Task Force and Meat Inspection Reform reports and provide necessary support, particularly to achieve the change agenda in the public domain;
- assist AQIS/AFFA in evaluating its performance.

### **General principles for Council membership**

- QEAC is a ministerially-appointed and expertise-based advisory council;
- the Council consists of up to 14 members, including the Chairman, the Director of Quarantine and the Executive Director of AQIS;
- it is skills based, not an industry representative-based council;
- it should contain members with skills in quarantine services (entomology, botany, agronomy, veterinary), animal and plant health, importing/ exporting, business management, the environment and communications;
- all appointments are made by the Minister and usually approved by Cabinet, for a period of 2 or 3 years.

## **Membership**

(as at March 2002)

### ***W. Murray Rogers (Chairman)***

Mr Rogers has had a distinguished career with Kellogg's, both in Australia and overseas, before being appointed Managing Director of the Australian Wheat Board in 1997 and then CEO of AWB Ltd from 1998 to 2000. More recently, Mr Rogers was appointed Chairman of the National Management Group established in March 2001 by agriculture ministers to help forge a national approach to possible disease incursions such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and foot and mouth disease (FMD). Mr Rogers is also an Associate Fellow of the Australian Marketing Institute and a Fellow of the Australian Institute of Management.

### ***Andrew Inglis (Deputy Chairman)***

A farmer, former Chairman of the Grains Research and Development Corporation, former member of the Australian Wheat Board and member of the 1996 review of Australian quarantine, Mr Inglis has extensive experience on national and international agriculture-related industry and government bodies, especially in relation to grains research and production. He is currently the Chair of Plant Health Australia.

### ***John Crosby***

A grazier, former office holder in the National Farmers' Federation, including Chairman of the NFF Economics Committee, Mr Crosby has had senior appointments with Elders, and as former Chair of the NSW Meat Industry Authority developed national meat hygiene standards. He is currently Australian manager of an international trading company.

### ***Jim Cullen***

Chief of CSIRO Entomology, Dr Cullen has an extensive background in research specialising in the biological control of insect pests and weeds. He has held a number of senior positions in CSIRO Entomology, including a period as officer-in-charge of the CSIRO Biological Control Unit, Montpellier, France.

### ***Brian Jeffriess***

Mr Jeffriess holds a number of fisheries-related board and executive positions, including Executive Officer of the Southern Tuna Management Advisory Committee, Chair of the Northern Prawn Management Advisory Committee, member of the Australian Marine Industry and Science Council and member of the SA Fisheries Research Advisory Board.

### ***Hart Krtschil***

Mr Krtschil has held senior executive and board positions in local and international cargo logistics companies as well as consulting to key companies across the industry. He currently holds a range of cargo related positions on national consultative bodies and is chair of the AQIS/Industry Cargo Consultative Committee (AICCC). He was consultant to the Commonwealth Law Reform Commission Review of the *Customs Act*.

### ***Lee-Ann Monks***

With a background in agricultural science and public relations, and a master's degree in communications, Ms Monks has worked in the dairy industry and was Communication Manager of the Dairy Research and Development Corporation. She currently runs her own consultancy specialising in providing communication and public relations services to rural industries.

***Lyndy Scott***

Dr Scott has a background in veterinary science and business management, is former Commercial and Program Manager for the Pig Research and Development Corporation, and has worked in a number of veterinary practices. Dr Scott worked as a Program Business Manager of Animal Health Australia until mid 2001, and now is a consultant in Animal Health Management and Research in Canberra.

***Meryl Stanton***

Executive Director of AQIS.

***Anne Story***

Principal Consultant and Managing Director of Story Horticultural Services, Ms Story specialises in developing post harvest handling and distribution systems for horticulture. She is Chair of the Nursery, Landscape and Allied Industries Development Council (Queensland), a Director of the Brisbane Market Corporation and Executive Officer of the Australian United Fresh Transport Advisory Committee Ltd. She is involved in commercial operations incorporating horticultural production, processing and wholesale.

***Carolyn Tanner***

Senior Lecturer in Agricultural Economics at the University of Sydney and member of the 1996 review of Australian quarantine, Ms Tanner has expertise in trade and agricultural policy. In 1998 she chaired the National Competition Policy Review of the *Imported Food Control Act 1992*.

***Mike Taylor***

Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and Australia's Director of Quarantine.

**What QEAC does**

QEAC's role is to provide strategic direction and advice to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the Director of Quarantine, on major quarantine and export issues affecting AQIS and the portfolio.

The Council meets five times each year, usually in Canberra, but at least one meeting each year is held interstate, to allow members the opportunity to visit quarantine and export facilities and to meet with industry representatives and state-based AQIS staff.

At formal meetings the Council discusses key policy and operational issues affecting AQIS and AFFA and makes decisions as appropriate. The Council also reviews the performance of AQIS's quarantine and export programs and this includes an assessment of the effectiveness of the relevant industry consultative committees.

The Chairman reports to the Minister after each meeting and advises him of any key issues which need to be brought to his attention.

**Attachment 5 – AQIS/Industry Consultative Committees**

## **AQIS/INDUSTRY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES**

### **AQIS-AIRLINE INDUSTRY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE**

The AQIS-Airline Industry Consultative Committee (AAICC) provides a forum for discussion and advice on key operational and administrative matters relating to the AQIS Airports Program.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by Mr Warren Bennett, from the Board of Airline Representatives of Australia (BARA).

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### **AQIS-GRAIN INDUSTRY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE**

The AQIS-Grains Industry Consultative Committee is the principal advisory forum for AQIS to consult with the Grains and related industries, on export certification, export market access, quarantine and other issues relevant to the industry.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by Mr Jock Kreitals, from the Grains Council of Australia.

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### **AQIS-INDUSTRY CARGO CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE**

The AQIS Industry Cargo Consultative Committee (AICCC) is the principal advisory forum for AQIS and the cargo handling and importing industry to consult on all issues arising from the management of AQIS's Import Clearance and Seaports programs.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by Mr Hart Krtschil, from the Industry Working Group on Quarantine and QEAC.
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## **AQIS/INDUSTRY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES**

### **AQIS/ BIOLOGICALS CONSULTATIVE GROUP**

The AQIS/Biologicals Consultative Group is the principal advisory forum for AQIS to consult with the biologicals and animal feed industries on quarantine issues relevant to biologicals industries.

- This Consultative Group is chaired by a senior AQIS officer.

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### **DAIRY EXPORT INDUSTRY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE**

The AQIS/Dairy Export Industry Consultative Committee is the principal advisory forum for consultation between AQIS and the Dairy Export Industry on export certification, export market access and quarantine issues relevant to the Dairy Export Industry.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by a senior AQIS officer.

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### **EXPORT MEAT INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

The Export Meat Industry Advisory Committee provides a forum for discussion between AQIS and the export meat industry.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by a senior AQIS officer.

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### **HORTICULTURE EXPORT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE**

The AQIS Horticulture Export Consultative Committee is the principal advisory forum for AQIS to consult with the horticulture industry on all issues relevant to horticultural exports, including export certification, export market and export quarantine issues.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by Mr Tony Walsh, from the Market Gardens Ltd.



## **AQIS/INDUSTRY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES**

### **IMPORTED FOODS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE**

The Imported Food Consultative Committee provides a forum for consultation between AQIS and the food and beverage importing industry.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by Mr Tony Beaver, from Tony Beaver & Associates Secretary, Food and Beverage Importer's Association.

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### **MEAT INDUSTRY CHARGING REVIEW COMMITTEE**

The Meat Industry Charging Review Committee provides advice to AQIS on the cost structure of the AQIS Meat Program and related charging issues.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by a senior AQIS officer.

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### **MEAT INDUSTRY TASK FORCE**

The AQIS-Meat Industry Task Force was formed in September 1997 as a result of an agreement between the meat processing industry and the Government as part of the AQIS meat inspection reforms. It provides for joint AQIS/industry review of the Meat Inspection Program.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by Mr Tony Wharton, from QMeat Brisbane.

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### **ORGANIC PRODUCE EXPORT COMMITTEE**

The Organic Produce Export Committee provides a consultative forum between AQIS and the organics industry.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by a senior AQIS officer.
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## **AQIS/INDUSTRY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES**

### **POST-ENTRY PLANT INDUSTRY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE**

The Post-Entry Plant Industry Consultative Committee (PEPICC) is the principal advisory forum for AQIS to consult with the plant importing and exporting industry on quarantine issues relevant to the plant importing and exporting industry.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by a senior AQIS officer.
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### **SEAFOOD EXPORT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE**

The Seafood Export Consultative Committee (SECC) provides a consultative forum to AQIS and the export fishing industry.

- This Consultative Committee is chaired by Mr Alex Ziolkowski, from Mallacoota Abalone Co-operative.

**Attachment 6 – Commonwealth/State Cooperation Arrangements**



**Attachment 7 – International Reference Organisations and Standards**

### *CODEX*

The Codex Alimentarius Commission, which was established in 1961, is responsible for making proposals to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) on matters pertaining to the implementation of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme. The purpose of the Programme is to protect the health of consumers, promote coordination of all food standards work undertaken by international governmental and non-governmental organisations, and guide the drafting, finalisation, publication and review of food standards.

One of the principal purposes of the Commission is to prepare and publish food standards in the Codex Alimentarius, which is intended '... to guide and promote the elaboration and establishment of definitions and requirements for foods to assist in their harmonisation and in doing so to facilitate international trade.'

PIAPH is responsible for managing and coordinating the Australian contributions to Codex.

### *OIE*

PIAPH represents the Commonwealth on the Office International des Epizooties (OIE). The OIE is the world organisation for animal health and is an inter-governmental organisation created by the *International Agreement of 25 January 1924*, signed by 28 countries.

The objectives of OIE, laid out in 1924, continue to be valid:

- to keep member countries informed of the occurrence and course of significant animal diseases throughout the world, and of means of controlling these diseases;
- to coordinate at the international level, studies devoted to the surveillance and control of significant animal diseases; and
- to harmonise health standards covering trade in animals and animal products.

OIE currently comprises 155 member countries and operates under the authority of an international committee formed by permanent delegates designated by the governments of all member countries.

### *IPPC*

The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is a multilateral treaty deposited with the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. IPPC provides a framework and forum for international cooperation, standards harmonisation and information exchange on plant health in collaboration with regional and national plant protection organisations (RPPOs and NPPOs). Its prime purpose is to help prevent the spread and introduction of pests of plants and plant products and to promote measures for their control. Currently, 111 governments are contracting parties to IPPC.

**Attachment 8 – Recommendations of the 1996 Quarantine (Nairn) Review**

## Summary of the Recommendations of the Quarantine (Nairn) Review Committee and the Government Response

### Definitions

In the following text the words "accepted" and "accepted in principle" are widely used to describe the Government's response to individual recommendations. These are to be interpreted as follows: "Accepted": indicates that the Government agrees with the recommendation and will take the necessary steps to implement it.

"Accepted in Principle": indicates that the Government agrees with the issues raised by the report (or the need to address the issues raised) and will consider and implement these to the maximum extent possible when addressing other directly related but usually wider based issues.

Recommendation No.	Recommendation	Government Response
1	The Review Committee recommends that the vision for quarantine be 'that Australia will maintain its relative freedom from unwanted pests and diseases while fulfilling national and international obligations in a responsible manner'.	Accepted.
2	The Review Committee recommends that the goal of national quarantine should be to prevent the establishment and spread within Australia of exotic pests and diseases that are deemed to have a significant deleterious effect on humans, animals, plants or the natural environment.	Accepted.
3	The Review Committee recommends that the goal of quarantine be achieved through a nationally coordinated, consistent and transparent quarantine system using pre-border, border and post-border measures.	Accepted.



4	<p>The review Committee recommends that a major cultural change in the scope of quarantine be achieved through an ongoing and nationally coordinated awareness campaign that emphasises: the continuum of quarantine (pre-border, border and post border); the importance of protecting animal and plant industries and the natural environment; a partnership approach leading to shared ownership and responsibility (by governments, industry and the general public); and the principle of manageable risk.</p>	Accepted. See recommendation 5.
5	<p>The Review Committee recommends that the public awareness campaign: be developed by a professional public relations agency; be launched by the Prime Minister; adopts the Beagle Brigade as the national symbol for quarantine;</p> <p>Uses a range of strategies including a schools program, a national Quarantine Week, and improved information for the travelling public; ensures that the penalties imposed for serious offences reflect the high value that the community places on quarantine; and reinforces commitment under Australia's international obligations.</p>	Accepted. Some \$5.612 million will be provided to AQIS over the next four years to develop and implement a targeted national quarantine awareness campaign aimed at industry, Australians travelling overseas, visitors to Australia, ethnic communities, schools and the general community.
6	<p>The Review Committee recommends that the present Industry Charging Review Committees become Industry Consultative Committees that are:</p> <p>re-formed to include consultation on policy and strategic issues relating to quarantine programs; and expanded to include other relevant industry groups.</p>	Accepted.
7	<p>The Review Committee recommends that Government re-establish formal communication links on quarantine policy and programs with States including through: formal meetings of the chief veterinary and plant officers, or their equivalents; and regular meetings of specialist quarantine staff across all disciplines.</p>	Accepted. Existing formal communication links through SCARM Committees will continue. Other mechanisms will be discussed with States.

<b>8</b>	The Review Committee recommends that Government undertake appropriate consultation with indigenous peoples and remote local communities in the development and implementation of quarantine policies and programs that affect their communities.	Accepted
<b>9</b>	The Review Committee recommends that the Government establish a statutory authority, to be named Quarantine Australia, to provide quarantine policy and services in accordance with Government policy.	Not Accepted. AQIS will be maintained as an independent operating group within the Department of primary Industries and Energy (DPIE). Quarantine policy and programs are essential elements of the business of Government and should operate under the framework of Ministerial responsibility and Departmental accountability. It is considered that the major objectives of the Review Committee can be better achieved without the costs of severing direct current links with either parts of Government that are central to the operation of an efficient and effective quarantine service. Such a change would be disruptive and add unnecessarily to costs.
<b>10</b>	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia assume all the functions and responsibilities of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, with the exception of meat inspection.	Not accepted (refer Recommendation 9). However, both the Nairn Report and the Report on Reform of the Meat Inspection program proposed separation of the meat inspection functions from the rest of AQIS's functions. This is accepted by the Government.
<b>11</b>	The review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia and the Australian Customs Service continue to work in close collaboration but remain as separate agencies for the time being.	Accepted. To be undertaken in a manner consistent with other adopted recommendations. A specific initiative will be embarked upon to ensure no duplication occurs and a 'one stop shop' is offered to clients of AQIS and ACS. For the time being, the concept of management of the border activities by one agency will not be proceeded with.

12	The Review Committee recommends that policy and operational direction for Quarantine Australia be determined by a Board of Directors appointed by and responsible to the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy.	Not accepted (refer Recommendation 9).
13	The Review Committee recommends that the Board of Quarantine Australia assume the responsibilities of the Quarantine and Inspection Advisory Council as they relate to the charter of Quarantine Australia.	Not accepted (refer Recommendation 9). The Quarantine and Inspection Advisory Council (QIAC) will be replaced by an independent Quarantine Export Advisory Council (QEAC) with revised Terms of Reference and membership to advise the Minister on quarantine and export certification issues. Additional funding of \$0.78 million will be provided to AQIS over the next four years for QEAC functions and secretariat.
14	The Review Committee recommends that the Board of Quarantine Australia comprise up to nine members: a Chairperson appointed by the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy; up to seven members appointed by the Minister following an independent competitive selection process based on skills criteria; and a Managing Director appointed by the other members of the Board.	Not accepted (refer Recommendations 9 and 13).
15	The review of the Committee recommends that the members of the Board of Quarantine Australia should have, collectively, experience and qualifications in a wide range of fields including: animal health or production; plant health or production; agricultural processing; importing and exporting; public health; conservation and management of the natural environment; business management or economics; finance; industrial relations; communications and promotion; and Commonwealth and State governance.	Refer Recommendations 13 and 14. The membership of the Quarantine and Exports Advisory Council (QEAC) will be expertise based and incorporate relevant essential experience and qualifications as outlined in this recommendation. Industry and other interest groups will be invited to nominate suitable candidates for consideration. Members will be appointed by the Minister.

16	The Review Committee recommends that the Chairperson of the Board of Quarantine Australia be the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine under the <i>Quarantine Act 1908</i> .	Refer Recommendations 9 and 12.
17	The Review Committee recommends that management of Quarantine Australia be provided by an executive management group consisting of its Managing Director and senior managers, with determination of the actual functional structure to await the outcome of the Meat Inspection Reform Task Force.	The Government considers that the day to day management of AQIS should rest with the Executive Director of AQIS and senior executive officers, reporting to the Secretary Department of Primary Industries and Energy (the Director Quarantine) and the Minister. Regarding operational and structural improvement of AQIS (eg separation of Meat Export Inspection Services), refer Recommendation 10.
18	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia establish a register of stakeholders to be regularly consulted on key quarantine issues, and that its Chairperson report annually to a meeting of registered stakeholders.	Accepted. \$0.54 has been allocated over the next four years. The register will be used to ensure effective consultation with all stakeholders, including relevant agencies and organisations; on key quarantine issues including proposed agricultural imports.
19	The Review Committee recommends that a Quarantine Development Unit be established within Quarantine Australia.	Accepted. AQIS will receive an additional \$1.34 million over the next four years to establish and operate the Unit.
20	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia adopt a total quality management approach to the development and implementation of quarantine policies and programs.	Accepted in principle. The resources required to undertake a full TQM approach are not available. The objective will therefore be pursued on a longer time frame, building on work already under way to improve manuals, training and performance measures.
21	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia develop Memoranda of Understanding (or their equivalent) with key organisations, including relevant groups within the Department of Primary Industries and Energy.	Accepted in relation to agreements external to DPIE. To be undertaken within approved resource levels.

22	The Review Committee recommends that the Department of Primary Industries and Energy immediately establish a task force to manage the movement of the relevant responsibilities under the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service to a new statutory authority, Quarantine Australia.	Not accepted. See recommendation 9.
23	The Review Committee recommends that Australia continue to take a lead role in the development of international definitions, standards, rules and procedures related to quarantine, including risk analysis, area freedom and market access arrangements.	Accepted in principle. To be undertaken within approved resource levels.
24	The Review Committee recommends that Australia's international position on quarantine-related issues be based on objective scientific principles consistent with Australia's national quarantine goal.	Accepted.
25	The Review Committee recommends that greater encouragement and support should be provided by Government to persons with relevant experience in quarantine issues to assume a leadership role internationally.	Accepted in principle. To be undertaken within existing resource levels.
26	The Review Committee recommends that Australia maintain an international leadership role in relation to ballast water management.	Accepted. AQIS will receive an additional \$1 million in 97/98 from Environment Australia to fund ballast water research. (This funding is separate to the Nairn funding package.)
27	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia coordinate the identification of quarantine threats in neighbouring countries and in countries that have significant contact with Australia through trade and tourism.	Accepted. Additional funding of nearly \$1.307 million will be provided over the next four years to AQIS to undertake this recommendation.

28	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia assess the need for, coordinate, broker and where necessary participate in cooperative programs in neighbouring countries (and, where appropriate, in countries that have significant contact with Australia through trade and tourism) in: pest and disease monitoring and surveillance; pest and disease control and eradication; preparedness and response against incursions; and relevant education, training and diagnostic services.	Accepted in principle. AQIS already participates in offshore monitoring of pests and diseases through cooperative arrangements with our neighbouring countries.
29	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia collaborate with overseas quarantine authorities in the areas of staff exchange and training, research, technology development, and treatment measures.	Accepted in principle.
30	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia negotiate with overseas quarantine agencies to continue development of arrangements for offshore pre-clearance of goods by appropriate export authorities and companies.	Accepted in principle. Negotiations will take place as opportunities arise and/or resources permit.
31	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia take a proactive role in selected countries to promote greater awareness of Australian quarantine requirements among their travel authorities, travel agencies and travelling citizens, and among their international trading authorities and companies.	Accepted. Funding provided under recommendation 5.
32	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia ensure that information on Australia's quarantine requirements is more clearly presented to Australian residents before they travel overseas.	Accepted. Funding provided under recommendation 5.

33	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia continue to use and refine scientifically based risk analysis comprising risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication to develop its quarantine policies and procedures.	Accepted. This and other recommendations on risk analysis will be implemented and resources required to handle incoming workloads will be provided. Funding for risk analysis for AQIS and DPIE totalling \$13.24 million will be provided over the next four years. A modified Import Risk Analysis process, consistent with the principles espoused by Nairn will be introduced.
34	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia use a process to ensure that import risk analysis is consultative, scientifically based, politically independent, transparent, consistent, harmonised and subject to appeal on process.	Accepted. Refer recommendation 33.
35	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia improve community and stakeholder understanding of import risk analysis by: developing and circulating a public handbook on its risk analysis process as a matter of urgency; and using print and electronic information media to inform registered stakeholders, other interested parties, and the general public of the receipt of import access requests and progress with the risk analysis of these requests.	Accepted. Refer recommendation 33.
36	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia routinely consult with relevant registered stakeholders in a partnership approach to agree on what type of risk analysis should be used for each import access request.	

37	The Review Committee recommends that, for each import access requires that consultation with registered stakeholders identifies as meriting detailed risk analysis, Quarantine Australia coordinate and chair a Risk Analysis Panel including members with experience and expertise in quarantine risk analysis plus members with scientific expertise relevant to the import access request under consideration.	Accepted. Refer recommendation 33.
38	The Review Committee recommends that each Risk Analysis Panel: develop a specific timetable with deadlines for each stage of consideration of its import access request, for agreement with relevant registered stakeholders; and prepare an issues paper for relevant registered stakeholders before commencing detailed risk analysis on the import access request referred to it.	Accepted. Refer Recommendation 33
39	The Review Committee recommends that, where necessary, each Risk Analysis Panel appoint and contract expert Working Parties to undertake work required to complete its risk analysis.	Accepted. Refer Recommendation 33.
40	The Review Committee recommends that each Risk Analysis Panel assess risks and examine appropriate risk management strategies needed to approve or reject the import access request referred to it.	Accepted. Refer recommendation 33.



41	The Review Committee recommends that if a Risk Analysis Panel considers that an appropriate risk management strategy can be applied to an import access request, it advise the Department of Primary Industries and Energy, which would be responsible for: determining if approval is likely to have a significant effect on an Australian industry; identifying any structural adjustment measures that might be required; and liaising with other agencies such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade concerning any international implications arising from approving the request.	Accepted. Refer recommendation 33.
42	The Review Committee recommends that: responsibility for the risk analysis decision rest with the Chairperson of the In-House Risk Analysis Team or the Risk Analysis Panel; and the decision reflect the deliberations of the Team or Panel.	Not accepted. The Director of Quarantine (the Secretary DPIE) or his delegate (usually the Executive Director of AQIS) will be the decision maker.
43	The Review Committee recommends that any appeal against the decision of a Risk Analysis Panel be restricted to consideration of the appropriate discharge of the agreed process and be considered and adjudicated by the Board of Quarantine Australia within 45 days of lodgement with the Board.	Accepted with the exception that as a Board will not be constituted, that the Chairman of QEAC will convene a panel comprising the Director of Quarantine, the Chief Veterinary Officer or the Chief Plant Protection Officer and one other member of QEAC to determine appeals, where necessary utilising a reviewer or group to provide advice on such an appeal. The normal provision for appeal under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act will remain available.
44	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia's import risk analysis process and associated decisions on import access requests should be subject to periodic external review.	Accepted.

45	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia include increased consideration of the potential environmental effects of proposed introductions of new species, breeds or varieties of animals and plants or their germ plasm, including their propensity to become weeds, vertebrate pests or invertebrate pests in Australia.	Accepted. Refer recommendation 33.
46	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia develop a proposal for a streamlined process for considering imports of agents into secure premises for evaluation of their potential as biological control agents, and submit this for the consideration of the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management.	Accepted. Will be performed within approved resource levels. To be discussed with the States.
47	The Review Committee recommends that Government provide funds to establish a Key Centre for quarantine-related risk analysis to enhance Australia as a world leader in this field.	Not accepted. Within the additional resources provided for risk assessment, AQIS and the Bureau of Resource Sciences will continue to develop risk assessment methods.
48	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia use risk analysis based on comprehensive detection databases and information systems to target resource allocation to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of border activities.	Accepted in principle. Existing databases will be improved as resources permit, consistent wherever possible with the ACS Cargo Management Strategy and Passenger Management Systems.
49	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia ensure consistent, effective and efficient national delivery and reporting of quarantine services.	Accepted.
50	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia establish, as a matter of priority, performance objectives and indicators for all border programs, and implement regular audits of programs against these indicators for both efficiency and effectiveness.	Accepted. To be undertaken within approved resource levels and incorporated in AQIS Business Plans

51	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia facilitate the use of industry-developed quality assurance arrangements for low risk quarantine goods and tasks, subject to appropriate audit arrangements.	Accepted.
52	The Review Committee recommends that a national system for the approval and audit of private premises for the performance of quarantine be established and implemented as a matter of urgency.	Accepted. Additional funding of around \$1.17 million will be provided over the next four year; this will be fully cost-recovered.
53	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia impose mandatory fumigation at approved and audited premises overseas for cut flowers from sources with an established record of high prevalence of accompanying pests or diseases.	Accepted. Additional funding of around \$0.256 million will be provided over the next four years; this will be fully cost-recovered.
54	The Review Committee recommends that the regulations governing the import of seeds and plant germ plasm be based on a permitted list for entry rather than solely the current prohibited list.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$0.716 million will be provided over the next four years to implement this recommendation.
55	The Review Committee recommends that tolerances for contaminants of imported seeds (including bulk grains) be consistent, equitable and based on scientific risk analysis.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$0.202 million will be provided over the next four years to implement this recommendation. A proportion of this will be cost recovered.
56	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia undertake regular audits of seeds, bulbs, tubers and other plant material imported for human consumption to ensure that those originating from high risk sources are not viable for propagation.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$0.227 million will be provided to AQIS over the next four years to implement this recommendation. A proportion of this will be cost recovered.
57	The Review Committee recommends Quarantine Australia urgently develop and adopt consistent sampling methods and techniques based on internationally accepted scientific procedures.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$0.384 million over the next the next four years. This will be fully cost recovered.
58	The Review Committee recommends that the Australian Animal Health Council should address, as a matter of importance, the issue of unwanted contaminants in imported feedstuffs for animals.	Accepted. To be referred to AAHC for action, in consultation with States.

59	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia strengthen training programs on biological products for staff to ensure proper implementation of this border program.	Accepted. To be undertaken within approved resource levels.
60	The Review Committee recommends that quarantine authorities ensure that a national system for issuing import permits be developed and implemented as soon as practicable.	Accepted. Additional funding of around \$0.110 million will be provided. This will be fully cost recovered.
61	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia make increased use of X-ray technology to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of quarantine delivery at the border including airports, seaports, mail exchanges and courier depots.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$5.05 million will be provided to AQIS over the next four years. Both AQIS and ACS will consult to avoid unnecessary duplication with any new equipment to be used in a rational and effective manner to reflect a whole of Government approach.
62	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia liaise closely with the Australian Customs Service to ensure that customs electronic information systems meet Australia's quarantine requirements, including for the quarantine inspection and clearance of air cargo.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$4.363 million will be provided to AQIS over the next four years. This will be fully cost recovered. The funds will be used to improve existing joint systems with ACS consistent where appropriate with the ACS Cargo Management Strategy.
63	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia develop and increase the use of electronic information systems to speed the clearance of cargo, subject to the development of satisfactory quality assurance systems and audit procedures.	Accepted. Additional funding of around \$2.597 million will be provided to AQIS over the next four years. This will be fully cost-recovered. The funds will be used to improve existing joint systems with ACS consistent where appropriate with the ACS Cargo Management Strategy.
64	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia provide import protocols and manuals via electronic information systems, including the internet through a home page on the worldwide web.	Accepted in principle. To be implemented as far as possible within approved resource levels.

<b>65</b>	The Review Committee recommends that the detector dog program be expanded as soon as possible to ensure that: at least one dog team is available for all shifts at all major international airports; teams are available for clearance of passengers and for wharf surveillance at seaports; and teams are available for use at international mail exchanges and courier depots.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$7.325 million will be provided to AQIS over the next four years to implement this recommendation.
<b>66</b>	The Review Committee recommends that pratique for aircraft and vessels move to a system of reporting by exception.	Accepted. This will reduce costs in this program by around \$0.179 million over four years.
<b>67</b>	The Review Committee recommends that aircraft disinsection be discontinued.	Not accepting pending further scientific assessment.
<b>68</b>	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia ensure that vector monitoring is undertaken in accordance with World Health Organization guidelines at all first ports of call.	Accepted. To be implemented as far as possible within approved resource levels.
<b>69</b>	The Review Committee recommends that experienced quarantine officers be used as marshals in international airport arrival halls to profile passengers for quarantine purposes.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$2.05 million over the next four years will be provided to implement this recommendation. AQIS will not appoint marshals per se, rather senior experienced officers who will be available to assist with clearance processes. The Government will be further reviewing the efficiency and integration of all its border programs during the course of 1997-98
<b>70</b>	The Review Committee recommends that the Travellers Statement be retained and improved by the addition of more strategic quarantine questions.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$1.3545 million over the next four years will be provided to AQIS to undertake this recommendation. This will be fully cost recovered.
<b>71</b>	The Travellers Statement is being addressed by the Ministerial Committee on the Sydney 2000 Games.	Accepted. To be undertaken as far as possible within approved resource levels.

72	The Review Committee recommends that quarantine security for goods stored or transported under bond be tightened to ensure that the quarantine risks to Australia associated with these goods are appropriately addressed.	Accepted. To be undertaken as far as possible within approved resource levels.
73	The Review Committee recommends that as a minimum, all containers should be subject to thorough external inspection at their port of entry.	Not accepted. However additional funding of \$4.065 million over the next four years will be provided to AQIS to increase its activity in this area, in co-operation with ACS, based on targeted risk assessments. This will be fully cost recovered.
74	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia investigate with industry the use of quality assurance arrangements, with an appropriate audit system, for clearing consignments of low risk timber and timber products.	Accepted. This will be fully cost recovered.
75	The Review Committee recommends that, as a matter of urgency, procedures for the identification of the presence and type of timber dunnage and packing associated with imports be uniformly implemented across all ports of entry, and that the required quarantine inspection be undertaken.	Accepted. Additional funding of around \$5.756 million over the next four years will be provided to AQIS to undertake this recommendation. This will be fully cost recovered.
76	The Review Committee recommends that tightened inspection procedures introduced to address the risk posed by imported second-hand and field-tested agricultural machinery continue until completion of risk analysis of border programs.	Accepted. To be undertaken within approved resource levels.
77	The Review Committee recommends that for general cargo, Quarantine Australia develop and implement a system of sanctions and incentives to encourage compliance with Australia's quarantine requirements.	Accepted. No additional resources required.
78	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia undertake an immediate review of international mail operations to ensure that quarantine surveillance of all international mail is effective.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$1.713 million over the next four years will be provided to implement improvements to the current systems. This will be fully cost-recovered.

79	That galley waste and other refuse from international aircraft may be disposed of at municipal or other commercial waste disposal facility under standard waste control measures, and subject to audit by Quarantine Australia.	Not accepted pending further scientific assessment
80	The Review Committee recommends that disposal of galley refuse from vessels continue by means of incineration, deep burial at marked sites or by heat treatment, and that auditing of this disposal be intensified.	Accepted. Additional funding of around \$0.381 million over the next four years will be provided to AQIS to undertake this recommendation. This will be fully cost recovered.
81	The Review Committee recommends that the animal quarantine stations operated by Quarantine Australia should be on a more commercial basis by introducing a system of forfeitable bonds for allocations of space, with bonds being forfeited if offers are not taken up within a specified period.	Accepted. No further resources required.
82	The Review Committee recommends that, in principle, Government animal quarantine stations should be offered for privatisation, subject to audit by Quarantine Australia and maintenance of appropriate security.	Accepted in principle. The operation of existing stations will be reviewed within existing resources.
83	The Review Committee recommends that, in principle, private onshore high security animal quarantine stations should be permitted, subject to audit by Quarantine Australia and maintenance of appropriate security.	Accepted
84	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia form a review committee to set priorities for imports of plant genetic material.	Accepted. To be implemented within approved resource levels. State environmental interests will be reflected in the composition of the review committee.
85	The Review Committee recommends that Government continue to provide Quarantine Australia with community service obligation funding for its avian and plant quarantine stations.	Accepted. Forward estimates make provision for this funding.
86	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia give high priority to auditing and reviewing its border activities.	Accepted. To be undertaken within approved resources.

<b>87</b>	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia ensure that it reviews its import protocols on a regular basis to take account of changing circumstances.	Accepted. Additional funding of around \$0.414 million over the next two years will be provided to AQIS to undertake this recommendation.
<b>88</b>	The Review Committee recommends that monitoring and surveillance programs are essential, require increased national coordination, and should be conducted in a cost-effective manner.	Accepted in principle. Will be accommodated within existing resources to the maximum extent possible. These issues will be pursued in full consultation with the States given their responsibilities and role in these areas.
<b>89</b>	The Review Committee recommends that the enhanced Commonwealth-delivered initiatives under the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy should continue to be funded after 1998–99, subject to regular analysis of their effectiveness and appropriateness.	To be considered in the 1998-99 Budget context.
<b>90</b>	The Review Committee recommends that Government support the development and management of national pest and disease databases and information systems.	Accepted in principle however the Government has identified more critical areas that need to be addressed with available resources before this recommendation can be fully implemented. In the meantime existing systems will be enhanced where possible. These issues will be pursued in consultation with the States given their responsibilities and role in these areas.
<b>91,92</b>	The Review Committee recommends that until the Australian Plant Health Council is incorporated and operating, the Department of Primary Industries and Energy undertake a coordinating role with respect to plant health.	Accepted. DPIE will establish an expanded Plant Health Unit to strengthen its contribution in these areas. \$2.025 million has been allocated to DPIE.
<b>93</b>	The Review Committee recommends that a Chief Plant Protection Officer be designated at a Commonwealth level with responsibilities in plant health, equivalent to those of the Chief Veterinary Officer for animal health.	Accepted. Additional funding of \$2.52 million over the next four years will be provided for the establishment of the CPPO and supporting staff.



94	The Review Committee recommends that the Chief Veterinary Officer and the Chief Plant Protection Officer in the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and Energy take leadership roles to ensure national coordination of monitoring and surveillance of pests and diseases of animals and plants in Australia, and the development of pest and disease databases and information systems.	Accepted in principle. The OCVO and OCPPO will provide input to national projects including those being developed by SCARM, the AAHC and the proposed APHC.
95	The Review Committee recommends that the Australian Animal Health Council and the Australian Plant Health Council take responsibility for coordinating the national delivery of monitoring and surveillance programs relevant to Australia's animal and plant health status, respectively.	Responsibility for monitoring arrangements and post border surveillance has generally resided with States. AQIS will coordinate targeted monitoring/surveillance for pests and diseases of quarantine importance in high risk areas, i.e. Northern Australia and major ports of entry. Definition of role and responsibilities for the future will be agreed with States.
96	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia coordinate targeted national monitoring and surveillance for pests and diseases of quarantine importance in high risk areas, in liaison with the Chief Veterinary Officer, Chief Plant Protection Officer, Australian Animal Health Council and the Australian Plant Health Council.	Accepted. Australian Animal Health Council and the CPPO (until the Australian Plant Health Council is established) will address these issues as part of the preparedness and response strategy. States will also have a direct role in these issues.
97	The Review Committee recommends that Government establish plant diagnostic laboratories and secure post-entry quarantine facilities at Eastern Creek, near Sydney.	Additional funding of \$1.5 million will be provided for transfer of AQIS plant quarantine facilities from Rydalmere to Eastern Creek near Sydney. Recommendation to fund establishment of additional secure plant diagnostic facilities is not accepted and should be reviewed by the APHC - see recommendations 98 and 99.
98	The Review Committee recommends that the Australian Plant Health Council investigate the need, optimal location and possible funding options for a national secure containment facility for plant pests and diseases.	To be discussed with States and addressed by the APHC when it has been established.

<b>99</b>	The Review Committee recommends that the Australian Animal Health Council and the Australian Plant Health Council review national field, diagnostic and research capacity in animal and plant health.	To be addressed by the AAHC and the APHC when it has been established.
<b>100</b>	The Review Committee recommends that the Department of Primary Industries and Energy, through the Chief Veterinary Officer and the Chief Plant Protection Officer, take a leadership role to ensure that appropriate contingency plans are available for major exotic pests and diseases that threaten animals (including aquatic animals), plants (including forestry) and the natural environment.	Accepted in principle. See also Recommendation 101. To be discussed with States through the SCARM processes. Additional funding of \$0.683 million will to OCVO over the next four years and additional funding will also be provided to OCPPO and the Plant Health Unit to contribute to the progress achieved under ARMCANZ.
<b>101</b>	The Review Committee recommends that the Australian Animal Health Council and the Australian Plant Health Council take responsibility for coordinating the development of national contingency plans for major exotic pests and diseases that threaten animals (including aquatic animals), plants (including forestry) and the natural environment.	Accepted in principle. See also Recommendation 100.
<b>102</b>	The Review Committee recommends that the Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services complete its handbook on the management of human diseases of quarantine concern.	Accepted. To be referred to the Dept of Health and Family Services.
<b>103</b>	The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia, in association with the Chief Veterinary Officer and the Chief Plant Protection Officer, determine where possible the method of introduction of any new incursion of an exotic pest or disease and use this information to develop strategies to reduce the likelihood of future incursions.	Accepted. To be undertaken within approved resource levels.

104	The Review Committee recommends that the Australian Animal Health Council and the Australian Plant Health Council investigate means for ensuring that appropriate compensation is an integral part of contingency plans and response strategies for incursions of exotic pests and diseases.	Accepted in principle. To be discussed with the States. AAHC and APHC to be asked to investigate this issue of compensation as part of the contingency planning for preparedness and response to outbreaks.
105	The Review Committee recommends that governments increase their commitment to budgetary funding of quarantine and quarantine-related activities to reflect community expectations in line with the partnership approach to the development and delivery of effective quarantine.	Accepted. The Commonwealth Government is providing an overall package of an additional \$76 million over the next four years to AQIS and key areas of DPIE to improve Australia's quarantine systems.
106	The Review Committee recommends that the Government increase its commitment to quarantine and quarantine-related activities to reflect community expectations by providing budgetary funding for the resources needed to implement the recommendations of this Review.	Partially accepted. AQIS will recoup costs of services from industry where this is consistent with existing Government cost recovery policy.
107	The Review Committee recommends Quarantine Australia ensure that work on updating the Quarantine Proclamations and Regulations and facilitating their passage through Parliament, continue as a matter of urgency.	Accepted. Is being undertaken within existing resources.
108	The Review Committee recommends that relevant sections of the <i>Quarantine Act 1908</i> be revised as soon as possible to reflect fully the changed scope and focus of quarantine advocated in this Report.	Accepted in principle.
109	The Review Committee recommends that legislation establishing Quarantine Australia have a sunset clause of 10 years, with a review of its performance in the development and delivery of national quarantining policy and programs to be undertaken in the two years preceding this date.	As the Recommendation to establish Quarantine Australia, as a statutory authority under enabling legislation is not accepted, the need for appropriate legislation, a sunset clause and review mechanism is not relevant (See response to Recommendation 9).

**Attachment 9 – Framework for Import Risk Assessment**



Department of  
**AGRICULTURE  
FISHERIES &  
FORESTRY -  
AUSTRALIA**



**DRAFT**

# **ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR IMPORT RISK ANALYSIS**

A Handbook



## Additional copies of the Handbook

The *Handbook* is available in both hardcopy and electronic forms. Electronic copies (in pdf format) are available on the Biosecurity Australia webpage:

[http://www.affa.gov.au/docs/market\\_access/biosecurity/index.html](http://www.affa.gov.au/docs/market_access/biosecurity/index.html)

If you experience trouble accessing the electronic file at the above URL or wish to obtain a hard copy, please contact:

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## Acronyms and definitions

AFFA	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry - Australia
appropriate level of protection (acceptable level of risk) ALOP	the level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory (according to Annex A of the <i>SPS Agreement</i> )
ANZFA	Australia New Zealand Food Authority
AQIS	Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
AQRC	Australian Quarantine Review Committee
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
CPPO	Chief Plant Protection Officer
Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine	Secretary of AFFA, who has decision-making power under the <i>Quarantine Act 1908</i>
Environment Australia	Department of the Environment and Heritage
Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia	Officer in charge of Biosecurity Australia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
import risk analysis	the discipline through which major biosecurity policy is developed and reviewed; import risk analysis incorporates risk assessment, risk management and risk communication
IPPC	International Plant Protection Convention
IRA	import risk analysis
IRA team	the group of experts, led by an officer from Biosecurity Australia, which conducts the IRA
IRAAP	Import Risk Analysis Appeal Panel
MAB	Market Access and Biosecurity
NPPO	national plant protection organisation
OIE	Office International des Epizooties
QEAC	Quarantine and Exports Advisory Council
RPPO	regional plant protection organisation
SCARM	Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management
SPS Agreement	WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
stakeholder	<b>government agencies, individuals, community or industry groups or organisations, whether in Australia or overseas, which have an interest in the subject matter of an IRA, including the proponent/applicant for a specific proposal</b>
TBT Agreement	WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
TWG	technical working group
WTO	World Trade Organization
WHO	World Health Organization

## Introduction

People and goods arriving in Australia from overseas may bring pests and diseases with them. Illegal imports, either through smuggling or as undeclared items at airports and seaports, also pose risks. Such risks are addressed through development of biosecurity policies by Biosecurity Australia, and through application of those policies by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) in the form of operational procedures. Import risk analysis is a science-based methodology for determining and managing biosecurity risks. This *Handbook* describes the administrative framework Biosecurity Australia uses when conducting an import risk analysis (IRA)<sup>1</sup>.

In 1996, the Australian Quarantine Review Committee (AQRC), chaired by Professor Malcolm Nairn, independently reviewed Australia's plant and animal quarantine programs in *Australian Quarantine: a shared responsibility*<sup>2</sup>. The Nairn Committee identified six principles which should be applied to import risk analysis. An IRA should be:

- . conducted in a consultative framework
- . a scientific process and therefore politically independent
- . a transparent and open process
- . consistent with both Government policy and Australia's international obligations
- . harmonised by taking account of international standards, guidelines and recommendations
- . subject to appeal on process.

These principles were endorsed by the Government in its response to the review report. The publication in 1998 of the *Handbook on the Import Risk Analysis Process* responded to recommendations of AQRC and of other committees that a more formal and consultative import risk analysis process should be developed. Experience since then has indicated that the process could be improved. Consequently, the Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry - Australia (AFFA) reviewed the process in conjunction with the Quarantine and Exports Advisory Council (QEAC) and in consultation with stakeholders. This new edition of the *Handbook* (with an amended title to better reflect the content) arose from that review.

The *Handbook* will be reviewed regularly to ensure that the approach remains up to date.

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this *Handbook*, an import risk analysis will be abbreviated to the acronym, IRA; the discipline of import risk analysis will not be abbreviated.

<sup>2</sup> Nairn ME, Allen PG, Inglis AR and Tanner C (1996) *Australian Quarantine: a shared responsibility*, Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Canberra

## **Biosecurity policy framework**

### Biosecurity Australia

Biosecurity Australia was established as a group within Market Access and Biosecurity in AFFA in October 2000. It was established to distinguish biosecurity policy development and market access technical negotiations from the operational roles of AQIS in ensuring border biosecurity, issuing import permits and providing export health certification.

Biosecurity Australia is responsible for

- developing new biosecurity policies and reviewing existing policies for the safe importation of live animals and plants, and animal and plant products
- working with AQIS on the implementation of biosecurity policies
- conducting technical negotiations with counterpart agencies in other countries, to develop new market access and maintain existing market access for Australian live animals and their genetic material, and plants and plant products.

Three teams make up Biosecurity Australia

- Animal Biosecurity
- Plant Biosecurity
- Biosecurity Development and Evaluation.

Animal and Plant Biosecurity conduct their biosecurity policy development and market access technical negotiations in consultation with other Commonwealth government agencies, States and Territories, industry and the community. Biosecurity Development and Evaluation complements these activities by conducting and coordinating research and development on policy, procedures and other issues relevant to protecting Australia's animal, plant and human health, and the environment.

Under these responsibilities, Biosecurity Australia is committed to maintaining a high level of expertise in import risk analysis, and in using that expertise consistently and transparently.

Biosecurity Australia participates in international standard-setting organisations and in WTO fora with respect to import risk analysis principles and practices.

### Australia's biosecurity policy

The primary purpose of biosecurity is to protect Australia from the entry, establishment and spread of unwanted pests and diseases which may cause social, economic or environmental damage, while minimising restrictions on the entry of agricultural commodities.

The *SPS Agreement* defines '*appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection*' as the level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory. In setting their ALOP, Members are to take into account the objective of minimising negative trade effects (Article 5.4).

Determination of Australia's ALOP is an issue for government in consultation with the community — it is not a prerogative of WTO. ALOP reflects government policy that is affected by community expectations; it is a societal value judgement to which AFFA contributes by providing technical information and advice. It is important to note that the *SPS Agreement* does not require a Member to have a scientific basis for its ALOP determination.

Because of Australia's unique and diverse flora and fauna and the value of its agricultural industries, successive Federal Governments have maintained a highly conservative but not a zero-risk approach to the management of biosecurity risks. This approach is evident in the strictness of all biosecurity related activities, including policies on imported commodities, procedures at the border and operations against incursions of pests and diseases.

Recent inquiries into Australia's biosecurity regime have recognised that it is impossible in practice to operate a zero-risk biosecurity regime. In 1979, the Senate Standing Committee on Natural Resources stressed that there is no such thing as a zero-risk quarantine policy, and it believed that Australia's approach would be better described as '*scientific evaluation of acceptable risk*'. In 1988, the Lindsay review of Australian quarantine concluded that '*a no risk policy is untenable and undesirable and should be formally rejected*'. In 1996, the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee took the view that a zero-risk approach was unrealistic and untenable, and that widely held views to the contrary only demonstrated that the concepts of risk assessment and risk management were widely misunderstood. These themes were repeated in the AQRC report. In its 1997 response to that report, the Government confirmed a managed risk approach.

#### Policy development and review

Biosecurity Australia may develop or review a biosecurity policy in response to:

- . a proposal to import a plant, an animal, a plant/animal derived commodity, a micro-organism, or associated commodities which may pose a biosecurity risk
- . the work of task forces and independent reviews
- . identification of a changed risk profile or the receipt of new information by Biosecurity Australia or AQIS; or
- . an application to AQIS for an import permit.

Proposals and applications may arise from individuals, companies and organisations (both in Australia and overseas) Australian State, Territory and Federal government agencies, and overseas governments.

Historically, most proposals and applications are for commodities from sources where the pest and disease status is similar to cases covered by existing policy. Such cases are usually assessed relatively quickly by Biosecurity Australia. Frequently they comprise practical questions associated with existing trade and in general they would not be dealt with through the administrative framework described in this *Handbook*. These involve no significant new technical issues, and are of insufficient concern to stakeholders to warrant formal consultation, although informal stakeholder discussions may be held.

In contrast, Biosecurity Australia carries out IRAs using the administrative framework described in this *Handbook* for a proposal or application:

- . for which there is no existing relevant biosecurity policy; or
- . which may involve a variation in established policy because pests and diseases, likelihoods and/or consequences differ significantly from those previously assessed.

Import risk analysis is the discipline of identifying the pests and diseases relevant to a proposal, assessing the risks posed by them and, if those risks are unacceptable, determining what measures or actions must be taken to reduce those risks to an acceptable level. In some cases, available measures may not provide acceptable protection, and imports would not be permitted. In other cases, procedures such as quarantine, testing or treatment may be specified.

The administrative framework is designed to ensure that the Government's biosecurity objectives are met, in that:

- . there is a sound scientific basis for biosecurity policies
- . importation is permitted only when the risks posed can be managed in a manner consistent with Australia's highly conservative approach to pest and disease risk
- . stakeholders have had reasonable opportunities to contribute to the outcomes of the IRA
- . stakeholders are aware of the reasons for new or revised policies.

In circumstances when there is a significant change in the basis upon which an IRA is being conducted, for example if a relevant import policy is established through another process or if a new relevant international standard is developed, the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia, in consultation with stakeholders, may determine that the conduct of an IRA should be varied to address the changed circumstances better.

Biosecurity Australia may terminate an IRA at any stage if a proponent/applicant requests that it be terminated.

### Protection of the environment

Although protection of the natural and built environment has always been an objective of Australian quarantine policy and practice, recent amendments to the *Quarantine Act 1908* make explicit the responsibility of quarantine officers to consider impact on the environment when making decisions. In particular, the scope of quarantine (as described in Section 4 of the Act) and the level of quarantine risk (as described in Section 5D of the Act) include explicit reference to the environment. *Environment* is defined in Section 5 of the *Quarantine Act* as:

*... all aspects of the surroundings of human beings, whether natural surroundings or surroundings created by human beings themselves, and whether affecting them as individuals or in social groupings.*

When undertaking an IRA, Biosecurity Australia fully takes into account the risk of harm to the environment to ensure that the biosecurity policies developed reflect the Federal Government's approach to risk management. This is achieved by involving Environment Australia in decisions on the IRA work program and, for particular IRAs, through discussions on the scope, the likely risks, and the expertise which may be required to address those risks. Environment Australia may identify additional technical issues which it believes should be considered during an IRA, and may nominate officers with relevant expertise who would be available to participate in the IRA, as a member of the IRA team or on a technical working group (TWG).

The *IRA Guidelines* address in detail this responsibility to protect the environment, particularly in the discussion on consequence assessment.

### IRA Guidelines

The technical discipline of import risk analysis is carried out within the administrative framework described in this *Handbook*.

The *IRA Guidelines* provides guidance on the different types of import risk analysis methodologies used by Biosecurity Australia. The structured approach described is in line with Australian government policy, the *Quarantine Act (1908)* and subordinate legislation. It is consistent with the requirements of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the *SPS Agreement*), and the relevant international animal and plant health standards.

A copy of the *IRA Guidelines* may be obtained from Biosecurity Australia through the contact points listed in Annex 1.

### Stakeholder register

A register of stakeholders has been established to facilitate stakeholder consultation and communication. A stakeholder is any individual, agency, organisation or association, in Australia or overseas, interested in the importation of animals, plants and animal and plant products or associated commodities which may pose a biosecurity risk.

Further details on the stakeholder register are in Annex 6.

If a person or organisation chooses not to be placed on the stakeholder register, they may access information on the IRA work program and on the status of IRAs pending or underway through the Biosecurity Australia webpage: [http://www.affa.gov.au/docs/market\\_access/biosecurity/index.html](http://www.affa.gov.au/docs/market_access/biosecurity/index.html).

Copies of completed IRAs are available for downloading in Word and pdf format.

### Public file

A public file containing non-confidential submissions and other technical documentation will be established at the commencement of each IRA. Each public file will be held at Biosecurity Australia offices in Canberra and paper-based documents will be available to stakeholders during business hours for perusal and copying. Submissions and other documentation in electronic form will be available to stakeholders on request. Stakeholders are encouraged to make submissions electronically to maximise access to documents.

An index for each public file will be placed on the Biosecurity Australia webpage. Further details of the material to be placed on the public file are given in Annex 7.

### Other assessment processes

In keeping with the scope of the *Quarantine Act* and Australia's obligations as a Member of the WTO, an IRA may take into account only the social, environmental and economic considerations arising from the potential impact of pests and diseases which could enter and establish in Australia as a result of importation. Relevant economic considerations include the cost of programs required to manage pest and disease outbreaks, the cost to a community of an outbreak and the cost to industry of markets lost as a result of an outbreak. The potential competitive economic impact of prospective imports on domestic industries is not within the scope of IRAs.

The removal or reduction of biosecurity restrictions on imports, when consistent with appropriate risk management, may expose domestic industries to substantially greater import competition and consequent structural adjustment pressure. In such circumstances, the Government may seek relevant economic analysis and consider options available for an appropriate response. Such considerations may occur in parallel with, but will in no way influence, the IRA performed in accordance with the framework described in this *Handbook*.

The framework described in this *Handbook* does not include procedures used to assess plants for weediness potential, organisms imported as biological control agents or the evaluation of traits conferred on a plant species by genetic manipulation where there are existing import conditions for that species. Information on these assessments is available from Plant Biosecurity through the contact point listed in Annex 1.

To meet the legislative requirements regarding the pest potential of exotic breeds or species of animals, Biosecurity Australia will include an assessment of pest potential in any relevant IRA using the process recommended by the Vertebrate Pest Committee (VPC). To facilitate this process, VPC may be used as a technical working group to assist Biosecurity Australia in reaching a determination on the pest potential of the breeds/species being assessed.

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### International Standards

One of the principal objectives in developing the administrative framework outlined in this *Handbook* was to ensure that it complied with Australia's international rights and obligations. These derive principally from the WTO *SPS Agreement* but other WTO Agreements, including the *Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)*, may be relevant in certain circumstances. Also relevant are specific international guidelines on risk analysis developed under the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and by the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), the world organisation for animal health.

The framework described is consistent with Australian / New Zealand Standards AS/NZS 3931:1998 (*Risk analysis of technological systems — application guide*) and AS/NZS 4360:1999 (*Risk management*) although the terminology used differs to some degree because Biosecurity Australia follows the terminology used in the OIE and IPPC guidelines.

### WTO SPS Agreement

The *SPS Agreement* applies to measures designed to protect human, animal and plant life and health from pests and diseases, or a country from pests, and which may directly or indirectly affect international trade. It also recognises the right of WTO Member countries to determine the level of protection they deem appropriate and to take the necessary measures to achieve that protection. Sanitary (human and animal health) and phytosanitary (plant health) measures apply to trade in or movement of animal- and plant-based products within or between countries.

In the *SPS Agreement*, a sanitary or phytosanitary measure is any measure applied:

- . to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms
- . to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs
- . to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
- . to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.

The key provisions of the *SPS Agreement* are:

- . An importing country has the sovereign right to adopt measures to achieve the level of protection it deems appropriate (its appropriate level of protection or ALOP) to protect human or animal life or health within its territory, but such a level of protection must be consistently applied in different situations.
- . An SPS measure must be based on scientific principles and not be maintained without sufficient evidence.
- . In applying SPS measures, an importing country must avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in levels of protection, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
- . An SPS measure must not be more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve an importing country's ALOP, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.



- . An SPS measure should be based on an international standard, guideline or recommendation, where these exist, except to the extent that there is scientific justification for a more stringent measure which is necessary to achieve an importing country's ALOP.
- . An SPS measure conforming to an international standard, guideline or recommendation is presumed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and to be consistent with the *SPS Agreement*.
- . Where an international standard, guideline or recommendation does not exist or where, in order to meet an importing country's ALOP, a measure needs to provide a higher level of protection than accorded by the relevant international standard, such a measure must be based on a risk assessment; the risk assessment must take into account available scientific evidence and relevant economic factors.
- . When there is insufficient scientific evidence to complete a risk assessment, an importing country may adopt a provisional measure(s) by taking into account available pertinent information; additional information must be sought to allow a more objective assessment and the measure(s) reviewed within a reasonable period of time.
- . An importing country must recognise the measures of other countries as equivalent, if it is objectively demonstrated that the measures meet the importing country's ALOP.

The rights and obligations in the *SPS Agreement* must be read as a whole. The articles must be interpreted in relation to each. That is, the articles do not stand alone.

In many instances the biosecurity policies Biosecurity Australia develops are based on the relevant international standards, guidelines and recommendations. In certain instances and in conformity with rights under the *SPS Agreement*, Australia has not adopted such international norms because to do so would result in an unacceptably high level of risk of disease or pest entry and establishment. Instead, the policies are based on a risk analysis.

Further information on the *SPS Agreement* can be found at the WTO website, listed along with other useful addresses at Annex 8.

### SPS Committee

The WTO SPS Committee was established to oversee the implementation of the *SPS Agreement*, and to provide a forum for discussion of any trade issues related to biosecurity measures. As with other WTO committees, all WTO Members have the right to participate in the work and decision making of the SPS Committee; decisions are taken by consensus. The SPS Committee has accepted, as observers, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, OIE and IPPC, as well as other international and regional inter-governmental organisations with activities in food safety, animal health and plant protection to maximise knowledge of and participation in its work.

The SPS Committee normally meets three times a year at the WTO headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.

In addition to considering any specific trade concerns raised by governments, the *SPS Agreement* has set specific tasks for the Committee. One of these is to monitor the extent to which governments are making use of internationally developed standards as their requirements for imported products. Countries identify cases where the non-use, or non-existence, of an appropriate international standard is causing difficulties for international trade. After being considered by the SPS Committee, these concerns may be brought to the attention of the relevant standard-setting organisations.

Notification obligations

Under the *SPS Agreement*, Members are required to notify WTO of new sanitary or phytosanitary regulations, or changes to existing regulations, that are not substantially the same as the content of an international standard and that may have a significant effect on international trade. Australia notifies new measures and comments on draft policies proposed by other countries through the SPS Notification Point in AFFA.

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### International reference organisations and standards

The *SPS Agreement* has conferred new responsibilities on three international organisations by requiring WTO Members to harmonise their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on the standards, guidelines and recommendations produced by those organisations unless there is scientific justification for a more stringent measure.

The three international organisations are referenced in Annex A of the *SPS Agreement*:

- . for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice
- . for animal health and zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under the auspices of the OIE
- . for plant health, the international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under the auspices of the Secretariat of the IPPC in cooperation with regional organisations operating within the framework of the IPPC.

### **Office International des Epizooties**

OIE, the world organisation for animal health, is an inter-governmental organisation created by the *International Agreement of 25 January 1924*, signed by 28 countries.

The objectives of OIE, laid out in 1924, continue to be valid:

- . to keep member countries informed of the occurrence and course of significant animal diseases throughout the world, and of means of controlling these diseases
- . to coordinate, at the international level, studies devoted to the surveillance and control of significant animal diseases
- . to harmonise health standards covering trade in animals and animal products.

OIE currently comprises 155 member countries and operates under the authority of an international committee formed by permanent delegates designated by the governments of all member countries.

The standards referenced in the *SPS Agreement* include the following OIE Codes and Manuals:

- . the *OIE International Animal Health Code*, prepared by the International Animal Health Code Commission, contains standards, guidelines and recommendations designed to prevent the introduction of pests and diseases into the importing country during trade in animals, animal genetic material and animal products
- . the *Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines*, prepared by the Standards Commission, lists laboratory diagnostic techniques and requirements for production and control of biological products (mainly vaccines)
- . an *Aquatic Animal Health Code* and a *Diagnostic Manual for Aquatic Animal Diseases*, prepared by the Fish Diseases Commission (These are sister publications to the other Code and Manual above.)

OIE has developed guidelines for risk analysis which recognise that the importation of animals and animal products may involve a degree of risk to the importing country. OIE supports risk analysis because it provides importing countries with an objective method of assessing risks associated with importation and of determining how those risks may be managed. It notes that analysis should be transparent so that the exporting country is provided with a clear and documented decision on the measures imposed on imports or the reasons for refusing to allow importation.

## **International Plant Protection Convention**

IPPC is a multilateral treaty deposited with the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. IPPC provides a framework and forum for international cooperation, standards harmonisation and information exchange on plant health in collaboration with regional and national plant protection organisations (RPPOs and NPPOs). Its prime purpose is to help prevent the spread and introduction of pests of plants and plant products and to promote measures for their control.

Currently, 111 governments are contracting parties to IPPC.

The New Revised Text of IPPC provides for the establishment of a Commission on Phytosanitary Measures to serve as the IPPC's new governing body. Membership in the Commission is open to all contracting parties of the IPPC. The Commission meets annually to establish priorities for standard-setting and harmonisation of phytosanitary measures in coordination with the IPPC Secretariat.

The functions of the Commission are to provide direction to the work program of the IPPC Secretariat and promote the full implementation of the objectives of the Convention and, in particular, to:

- . review the state of plant protection in the world and the need for action to control the international spread of pests and control their introduction into endangered areas
- . establish and review procedures for the development and adoption of international standards, and to adopt international standards
- . establish rules and procedures for the resolution of disputes
- . cooperate with other relevant international organisations.

The new IPPC International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures (*Guidelines for Pest Risk Analysis*) adopts a similar approach to that of OIE and notes the importance of documenting all steps in the process.

## **Codex Alimentarius Commission**

The Codex Alimentarius Commission, which was established in 1961, is responsible for making proposals to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) on matters pertaining to the implementation of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme. The purpose of the Programme is to protect the health of consumers, promote coordination of all food standards work undertaken by international governmental and non-governmental organisations, and guide the drafting, finalisation, publication and review of food standards.

One of the principal purposes of the Commission is to prepare and publish food standards in the *Codex Alimentarius* which is intended '*... to guide and promote the elaboration and establishment of definitions and requirements for foods to assist in their harmonisation and in doing so to facilitate international trade.*'

## **Administrative framework for import risk analysis**

*[See flowchart, Annex 9].*

### Initiation

#### **1. Lodgement of import proposals**

A proponent/applicant may submit an import proposal which necessitates that Biosecurity Australia develop or review a biosecurity policy, or may apply to AQIS for an import permit.

#### **2. Policy development or review initiated by Biosecurity Australia**

As part of its activities, Biosecurity Australia may initiate the development or review of policy where this is seen as warranted as a result of changed risk profiles or the receipt of new information by Biosecurity Australia or AQIS.

#### **3. IRA work program**

Under the principles of good administration as well as from the perspective of stakeholders and bilateral/multilateral relationships, Biosecurity Australia has a responsibility to consider all proposals in a timely manner.

Biosecurity Australia will examine proposals and applications, and determine which necessitate an IRA being conducted. As noted above, many will not have to be dealt with through an IRA. Those requiring an IRA will be prioritised, taking into account factors such as:

- . the availability of the necessary technical information
- . the order of receipt of proposals and applications
- . the existence of a related proposal or application
- . the breadth and nature of interest in the establishment of new or revised policies, or clarification of an existing policy
- . the need to consider access by a particular date
- . the availability of resources within Biosecurity Australia.

Biosecurity Australia will routinely place on the Biosecurity Australia webpage, and in the *Biosecurity Australia News*, advice to stakeholders on the IRA work program. The advice will address the status of IRAs currently underway and IRAs which Biosecurity Australia expects to commence in the foreseeable future. Provision will need to be made for changing priorities, research needs and resource constraints. Biosecurity Australia welcomes stakeholder comment at any time on its work program and priorities.

At the time a proposal or application necessitating an IRA is made, it need not contain the detail required for Biosecurity Australia to commence work. Before any specific risk analysis is commenced, however, Biosecurity Australia may seek written confirmation of the purpose and scope of the proposal or application from the proponent/applicant.

#### **4. Consultation with States, Territories and Environment Australia**

States and Territories have a special role in making biosecurity policy because of their responsibility for managing animal and plant health within Australia.

A partnership approach to managing risks is required, whether for the movement of product into Australia or for trade within Australia.

AFFA will work closely with the chief executive officers of State and Territory agriculture, fisheries and forestry agencies and Environment Australia on the IRA work program and on arrangements for IRAs about to commence. For particular IRAs, they will also discuss the scope, the likely risks, and the expertise which may be required to address those risks. The States and Territories and Environment Australia may identify additional technical issues which they believe should be considered during an IRA, and may nominate officers with relevant expertise who would be available to participate in the IRA.

Biosecurity Australia will also consult the Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA) on IRAs which involve commodities for human consumption to ensure a harmonised approach to common issues.

## **5. Proposed IRA team membership, timetable and scope**

An IRA team will conduct each IRA. Membership of the team will be governed by whether the required technical expertise is available in Biosecurity Australia and to what extent expertise outside Biosecurity Australia may be required. In all IRAs, the IRA team will be chaired by Biosecurity Australia, which will also provide the secretariat.

Details of the IRA team's terms of reference, operating procedures and considerations on membership are in Annex 2.

Biosecurity Australia will have determined with the proponent/applicant the intended scope of the IRA, that is the commodity to be assessed and the source (zone or country or countries of origin). The commodity and the source need to be defined to allow an accurate list of relevant pests and diseases to be drawn up for categorisation. Biosecurity Australia may determine that, for reasons of efficiency or to address related proposals or applications, the scope of the IRA should be broadened to include other commodities and/or other sources.

Biosecurity Australia will develop an indicative timetable based on the availability of technical resources, the expected technical complexity posed by the issues, and other factors which may need to be taken into account.

Stakeholders may wish to discuss with Biosecurity Australia whether Biosecurity Australia's resources and work program would allow part(s) of the IRA relating to pest and disease categorisation and risk assessment to be carried out by a third party. In such cases, Biosecurity Australia would assess the documents produced by the third party in terms of their adherence to the *IRA Guidelines* and their scientific basis, and whether they are in line with the Government's objectives for biosecurity. Subject to the suitability of the documents and the availability of Biosecurity Australia resources, Biosecurity Australia would form an IRA team and circulate the documents for stakeholder consultation. The documents would be subject to the same processes as would documents completely developed an IRA team. Circulation of the documents would not imply that Biosecurity Australia endorses the content or the draft conclusions. This approach may provide a way of progressing IRAs that are given a low priority by Biosecurity Australia.

## **6. Initial consultation with registered stakeholders**



When work on an IRA is about to commence, Biosecurity Australia will consult with registered stakeholders via a circular which includes the proposed scope of the IRA, an indicative timetable and a list of the required expertise, including nominations for membership of the IRA team from external sources. The information will also be placed on the Biosecurity Australia webpage.

Stakeholders will have 30 days<sup>3</sup> after the circular is issued to provide comment and membership nominations to Biosecurity Australia. Submissions received will be placed on the public file created for the IRA.

## **7. Biosecurity Australia decision**

Biosecurity Australia will consider submissions received from stakeholders and will meet with stakeholders when the nature of matters raised in submissions makes it appropriate. Biosecurity Australia will then make recommendation(s) to the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia for decision. The recommendation(s) will identify the issues raised by stakeholders and the manner in which they have been addressed.

The Executive Manager's decision will include reasons. Biosecurity Australia will circulate the decision to registered stakeholders, and will place a copy on the Biosecurity Australia webpage and on the public file.

## **8. Provision for stakeholder appeal**

A stakeholder may appeal to a Deputy Secretary of AFFA against the Executive Manager's decision within 30 days of its publication. In lodging an appeal, stakeholders must give reasons for their appeal.

Matters the Deputy Secretary will take into account are given in Annex 3.

## **9. Determination of appeal**

The Deputy Secretary of AFFA will consider the appeal, make a determination and notify the appellant(s) within 30 days of receiving the appeal.

If an appeal is upheld, the IRA will return to step 5 and Biosecurity Australia will reconsider the issues. If the appeal is rejected, the IRA team will commence work on the IRA.

Biosecurity Australia will communicate the outcome of the appeal to the appellant(s) and registered stakeholders, and the information will be placed on the Biosecurity Australia webpage and the public file. The determination will include reasons.

### Risk Analysis

## **10. Initial work**

After an IRA team is established, it will liaise with the proponent/applicant about the technical information needed to enable an IRA to proceed. When there is insufficient information, conservative estimates of risk may be necessary.

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<sup>3</sup> Time periods in this *Handbook* are indicative and, in special circumstances, Biosecurity Australia may approve an application for an extension of time

The IRA team will commence work by:

- . determining a work program for the IRA
- . establishing a risk communication strategy, including identifying relevant stakeholder groups
- . preparing the technical issues paper.

In due course, the IRA team will also:

- . identify independent scientific peer reviewers
- . commission, as appropriate, consultancies and TWGs to examine and report on specific technical, economic or environmental issues.

The technical issues paper will:

- . summarise background and administrative matters pertaining to the IRA
- . outline the additional tasks identified at that stage for TWGs and consultants
- . list the pests and diseases which the IRA team has identified as being associated with the importation of the commodity
- . categorise the pests and diseases (in some cases in a preliminary manner) according to whether they need to be considered in the subsequent risk assessment.

Pests and diseases will be conservatively categorised — if there is any doubt about their significance, they will be included for risk assessment.

## **11. Consultation on technical issues paper**

Biosecurity Australia will distribute the technical issues paper to registered stakeholders and place it on the Biosecurity Australia webpage. Stakeholders will then have 60 days to submit comments.

This will be their first opportunity for detailed input into the IRA. Submissions will be sought on:

- . the completeness of the list of pests and diseases
- . the list of potential scientific peer reviewers
- . any additional work to be commissioned.

The IRA team will meet with stakeholders when the nature of matters raised in submissions makes it appropriate. The team may conduct field trips to relevant regions, and may investigate trading patterns, and industry practices and procedures in Australia and overseas.

Submissions received, and the IRA team's response to the issues raised, will be placed on the public file. The IRA team will also place a synopsis of submissions received (subject to clearance by submitters) and the response on the Biosecurity Australia webpage, and will circulate them to stakeholders as an annex to the draft IRA report.

## **12. Preparation of draft IRA report**

The IRA team, assisted by TWGs and consultants as necessary, will prepare a draft IRA report, taking into account submissions received on the technical issues paper and any additional consultation with stakeholders.

The draft report will:

- . confirm the pests and diseases being assessed
- . describe the pathways by which these could enter, establish and spread in Australia
- . identify, for each pest and disease, the likelihood of its entry, establishment and spread, and the probable harm that would result
- . determine whether the resulting risk(s) requires mitigation



- . in cases where the risk(s) are determined unacceptable, evaluate technically and economically feasible risk management measures to determine if the risk can be successfully mitigated to achieve Australia's ALOP
- . include a preliminary view of the appropriate risk management option(s).

### **13. Consultation with stakeholders on draft IRA Report**

Biosecurity Australia will distribute the draft IRA report to stakeholders and place it on the Biosecurity Australia webpage. Stakeholders will then have 60 days to submit comments. As required, the IRA team will meet with stakeholders to discuss the draft report and to clarify issues such as alternative approaches to managing risk(s).

Submissions received will be placed on the public file.

### **14. Notification to WTO**

At the time the draft IRA report is distributed to stakeholders, Biosecurity Australia will notify the WTO, in accordance with Australia's obligations.

### **15. Independent scientific peer review**

Before finalising the IRA report, the IRA team will commission independent scientific peer reviewers to examine the report to ensure that all relevant information has been assembled and considered appropriately.

### **16. Preparation of final IRA report**

The IRA team, assisted by TWGs and consultants when needed, will prepare a final IRA report, taking into account submissions received on the draft, and consulting with stakeholders and the scientific peer reviewers as appropriate.

If new information which may have a significant impact on the analysis comes to light, or if the IRA team intends to make significant changes to the draft in finalising the IRA report, the IRA team will consider whether it would be in the public interest to prepare a revised draft IRA report for stakeholder consultation. In this case, Biosecurity Australia will distribute the revised draft IRA report to stakeholders and place it on the Biosecurity Australia webpage. Stakeholders will then have 60 days to submit comments.

The final IRA report will include:

- . a synopsis of all stakeholder submissions (subject to clearance by submitters) and the IRA team's response to the issues raised
- . an inventory of changes to the draft IRA report, with reasons for those changes
- . information on the issues raised by the independent scientific peer reviewers and the IRA team's response
- . recommendations on the appropriate risk management option(s).

### **17. Consideration of final IRA report**

The IRA team will present the final IRA report to the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia.

In considering the recommendations in the final IRA report on a new or revised biosecurity policy, the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia will take into account whether:

- . the IRA has been conducted in accordance with the framework described in the *Handbook*
- . the recommendations are reasonable in the light of the evidence assessed
  
- . the recommendations meet the Government's objectives for biosecurity
- . the recommendations accord with Australia's international rights and obligations under the *SPS Agreement*.

## **18. Scientific Advisory Panel**

When the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia considers it necessary to gain additional assurance about the validity of the scientific arguments underpinning the recommendations, the Executive Manager will refer the final IRA report to the Scientific Advisory Panel. The work of the Scientific Advisory Panel will be in addition to the more detailed scientific peer review described above, and will not replace subsequent stakeholder appeal mechanisms.

The terms of reference for the Scientific Advisory Panel are given in Annex 4.

The proponent/applicant and registered stakeholders would be advised of any such referral.

The Scientific Advisory Panel would report its findings to the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia within 60 days of referral of the final IRA report.

If the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia or the Scientific Advisory Panel identifies deficiencies in the final IRA report, discussions will be held with the IRA team to address the deficiencies. This may involve minor amendments to the report by the IRA team. If significant revision is needed, stakeholders will be consulted further.

## **19. Consultation with States and Territories**

The chief executive officers of State and Territory agriculture, fisheries and forestry agencies will be consulted further on the outcomes of the IRA to address aspects of joint responsibility arising from the IRA team's recommendations.

### Policy Determination

## **20. Release of final IRA report and provisional policy determination**

In making a provisional policy determination on a proposal/application, the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia will take into account:

- . the recommendations of the IRA team and of the Scientific Advisory Panel (when such a panel has been requested)
- . outcomes of discussions with the relevant State and Territory chief executive officers
- . any further scientific assessment of the risk the Executive Manager believes necessary.

Biosecurity Australia will advise the proponent/applicant and registered stakeholders of the provisional policy determination, the final IRA report and any report of the Scientific Advisory Panel (and the IRA team's response). This information will also be placed on the Biosecurity Australia webpage, in *Biosecurity Australia News* and on the public file.

If there are no appeals, the policy will be implemented by AQIS after 30 days.

## **21. Provision for appeals on final IRA Report**

A stakeholder will have 30 days from the publication of the provisional policy determination to lodge an appeal with the Import Risk Analysis Appeal Panel (IRAAP) on one or both of the following grounds:

- . there was a substantial deviation from the *Handbook* framework
- . a significant body of scientific information relevant to the outcome of the IRA was not considered.

In lodging appeals, stakeholders must give reasons for their appeal.

If there are no appeals, the process is complete.

## **22. Appeal determination**

The IRAAP will consider any appeal and report its findings to the appellant(s) and the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia, within 45 days of receiving the appeal.

If the appeal is rejected, the process will be complete.

If the appeal is upheld, the IRAAP will discuss ways of overcoming the identified deficiencies with the appellant(s), the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia and the IRA team. This may involve minor amendments by the IRA team, or significant revision and further stakeholder consultation.

The Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia will advise the appellant(s) and the IRAAP of the outcomes. The information, with reasons, will also be placed on the Biosecurity Australia webpage and on the public file.

## **23. Notification of final policy determination**

When all processes are complete, the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine will make the final policy determination.

Biosecurity Australia will notify the proponent/applicant, registered stakeholders and the WTO of the final policy determination.

The final IRA report, the final policy determination, the outcomes of any appeals, reports issued by scientific peer reviewers and (if relevant) the Scientific Advisory Panel, and the IRA team's responses to the issues raised, will all be placed on the Biosecurity Australia webpage and on the public file. Information will also be placed in *Biosecurity Australia News*.

Biosecurity Australia will work with AQIS on implementing the policy.

## **Annex 1: Contact information**

### Animal Biosecurity import risk analyses

*Postal address:* Animal Secretariat  
Animal Biosecurity  
Biosecurity Australia  
GPO Box 858  
CANBERRA ACT 2601

*Facsimile:* +61 2 6272 3307

*E-mail:* warren.vant@affa.gov.au

*Street address:* Edmund Barton Building  
Broughton Street  
Barton  
CANBERRA ACT

### Plant Biosecurity import risk analyses

*Postal address:* Risk Analysis Secretariat  
Plant Biosecurity  
Biosecurity Australia  
GPO Box 858  
CANBERRA ACT 2601

*Facsimile:* +61 2 6272 3399

*E-mail:* neil.mcwaters@affa.gov.au

*Street address:* Edmund Barton Building  
Broughton Street  
Barton  
CANBERRA ACT

## **Annex 2: IRA team**

An IRA team will conduct each IRA using the *IRA Guidelines* and associated templates as the basis for its technical work. The outcome of the IRA team's work will be a final report containing recommendations for consideration by the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia.

### Terms of reference

The standard terms of reference for an IRA team are to:

- . develop a detailed work program for the IRA
- . establish a risk communication strategy, including the identification of relevant stakeholder groups
- . determine whether TWGs and/or consultants will be required to conduct research, carry out other assessments (environmental, economic) or to assist the IRA team on specific issues; and, if so, determine their terms of reference
- . consult as appropriate to obtain a full and accurate understanding of all relevant issues
- . use internal and external scientific peer review as appropriate in preparing papers and reports
- . take appropriate account of Australia's ALOP and quarantine legislation, and Australia's rights and obligations under the *SPS Agreement*
- . take appropriate account of stakeholder submissions in preparing papers and reports
- . produce a technical issues paper for consultation
- . produce a draft IRA report for consultation
- . produce other papers and reports as necessary for efficient conduct of the IRA
- . produce a final IRA report for consideration by the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia
- . provide additional advice and information as requested by the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia.

### Membership

The IRA team will generally comprise three to six members. Their capacities will collectively provide an appropriate combination of experience and expertise in biosecurity risk analysis, regulatory science, animal and plant pests and diseases, and other disciplines relevant to the proposal or application under consideration. Biosecurity Australia employs scientists on a permanent and temporary basis, depending on the work program and the required skills which may include veterinary science, epidemiology, statistics, entomology, pathology, virology and botany.

Membership will depend on whether the required technical expertise is available in Biosecurity Australia and to what extent expertise outside Biosecurity Australia may be required. Outside expertise may be drawn from other government agencies (Federal and State), industry, scientific organisations, academia, private consultants and the general public. International expertise may be used. In selecting members, Biosecurity Australia will draw on the register of experts it maintains and on nominations made by stakeholders and other agencies.

In all cases, the IRA team will be chaired by Biosecurity Australia, which will also provide the secretariat. The chair will have experience in biosecurity policy, and a sound knowledge and understanding of Australian quarantine legislation, our international rights and obligations under the *SPS Agreement* and the Government's objectives for biosecurity.

In finalising IRA team membership, Biosecurity Australia will assess each prospective IRA team member against the following criteria and document its conclusions:

- . experience and expertise in biosecurity risk analysis and/or technical expertise in pests and diseases, or other disciplines relevant to the import proposal under consideration (such as industry processes and trading patterns)
- . proven capacity to exercise sound scientific judgement
- . knowledge of government processes and the national and international context of the IRA
- . absence of conflict of interest — any member would need to declare that their sources of income and/or representational responsibilities would not prevent them from providing impartial and independent advice; this is to ensure their membership of the IRA team would not put at risk stakeholder confidence in the scientific basis of the IRA
- . any other consideration relevant to particular circumstances of the IRA

If, in the course of an IRA, a member of the IRA team ceases to be available, or if for another reason the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia believes it is necessary to change the membership of the IRA team, the Executive Manager may decide, in consultation with stakeholders, to make such changes as are appropriate to ensure that the work of the IRA team can be satisfactorily completed. In this event, stakeholders will be advised of the changes at the next consultation step.

#### Operating procedures

The IRA team will conduct the IRA, using Biosecurity Australia resources for producing papers and reports, and for circulating these reports to stakeholders.

The IRA team will operate within the operational and financial constraints of Biosecurity Australia. The chair of the IRA team and Biosecurity Australia will agree on a budget and the Biosecurity Australia resources needed to conduct the work program efficiently. The agreed budget will fund the necessary meetings of the IRA team, required research, members' costs for face-to-face meetings with stakeholders, publications etc., and may need to be adjusted as work progresses and unforeseen issues arise.

Biosecurity Australia will contract external members for the duration of the IRA in accordance with government policies.

The IRA team will determine whether additional work will be required and the most effective method of carrying out that work; for example, by TWGs and/or consultants. In deciding to use TWGs or in commissioning consultancies, the IRA team will take into account resource and time constraints, and relative cost effectiveness. The criteria for selection as a member of a TWG or as a consultant, and the contracting conditions, would be similar to those for selecting members of the IRA team.

Each TWG would have a Biosecurity Australia member with knowledge of risk analysis techniques and the context in which the risk analysis is being conducted.

The IRA team will work by consensus but there is provision for a minority report if consensus cannot be achieved.

### **Annex 3: Appeal to Deputy Secretary**

Stakeholders may appeal to the Deputy Secretary of AFFA against the determination of the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia on the proposed scope of the IRA, the indicative timetable and the required expertise, including nominations for membership of the IRA team. The appeal must be made within 30 days of the publication of the determination. In lodging an appeal, stakeholders must give reasons for their appeal.

The Deputy Secretary of AFFA will consider the appeal, make a determination and notify the appellant(s) within 30 days of receiving the appeal.

#### Contact details

IRA appeals  
Deputy Secretary  
AFFA  
GPO Box 858  
CANBERRA ACT 2601

#### Matters the Deputy Secretary will take into account

In making a determination on the appeal, the Deputy Secretary will take into account:

- . whether the scope of the IRA is reasonable (with regard to the proposal or application, and any current related work) and is an efficient use of public resources
- . whether the timetable will allow adequate opportunity for stakeholder input
- . whether the nominated IRA team membership will provide appropriate expertise for consideration of all relevant scientific issues
- . any other matter that the Deputy Secretary may think is relevant.



## **Annex 4: Scientific Advisory Panel**

When the Executive Manager of Biosecurity considers it necessary to gain additional assurance about the validity of the scientific arguments underpinning the recommendations, the Executive Manager will refer the final IRA report to the Scientific Advisory Panel.

If called upon, the Scientific Advisory Panel will review the report to ensure that it is based on sound scientific principles, meets appropriate standards of scientific method and that the conclusions reached are reasonable in the light of the evidence assessed. The Scientific Advisory Panel will not conduct an in-depth analysis of the technical content of the report but will address the scientific issues to the extent required for its deliberations.

### Membership

The Scientific Advisory Panel will comprise seven eminent scientists appointed for terms of three years; each member may be reappointed once. The terms of three of the members appointed at the beginning of the Scientific Advisory Panel's operations will be for two years.

Each Scientific Advisory Panel report will be based on an evaluation of the IRA by three members (in rotation).

### Terms of reference

If called upon, the Scientific Advisory Panel will review the final IRA report and report its findings to the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia on the following terms of reference:

- . whether the report represents good scientific method; that is, it is based on scientific principles and is logically argued and presented
- . the balance and objectivity with which scientific information and expert opinion are treated
- . the extent to which the exercise of professional judgement in reaching the conclusions in the report is supported by and consistent with the scientific information and expert opinion presented
- . whether scientific uncertainty is handled reasonably
- . whether the risk management recommendations logically follow from the risk assessment and the evaluation of the risk management options.

The Scientific Advisory Panel may use any other document it considers relevant in its deliberations. This may include stakeholders' submissions on the draft IRA report and the technical issues paper, and scientific peer reviews. It is not intended that the Scientific Advisory Panel would commission special reports or call witnesses but it may wish to discuss issues with the IRA team.

It is not the role of the Scientific Advisory Panel to advise on Australia's ALOP or whether the proposed measures meet Australia's ALOP, or to propose alternative measures that could be used to manage risk. The Scientific Advisory Panel will report in writing within 60 days of referral of the final IRA report.



## **Annex 5: The IRAAP**

The IRAAP will convene when a stakeholder(s) has appealed and produced a prima-facie case of a deficiency or failure falling within the IRAAP's terms of reference to the Chair of the IRAAP.

The Chair will advise the appellant(s) through the IRAAP Secretariat of the Chair's decision on whether the appeal warrants consideration by the IRAAP. If consideration is warranted, the proponent of the import proposal will also be advised.

### Contact details

The IRAAP Secretariat, which lies within AFFA but outside Biosecurity Australia, will coordinate all IRAAP activities and handle all correspondence.

Appeals should be made to:

The Manager  
IRAAP Secretariat  
AFFA  
GPO Box 858  
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Facsimile: +61 2 6272 4600  
E-mail: IRAAP@affa.gov.au

### Terms of reference

A stakeholder may appeal on one or both of the following grounds:

- . there was a substantial deviation from the framework described in the *Handbook*
- . a significant body of scientific information relevant to the outcome of the IRA was not considered.

In lodging an appeal, a stakeholder must give reasons for the appeal.

The IRAAP will not consider questions relating to:

- . matters falling within the ambit of the appeal in step 8
- . the scientific merits of the IRA
- . whether stakeholder views were considered on their merits; or
- . the consistency of the outcome of the IRA with the Government's objectives for biosecurity and with Australia's international obligations.

If new information relevant to the IRA is produced during the appeal process, the IRAAP will refer the information to the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia.

### Membership

The IRAAP will routinely comprise five members:

- . Chair of QEAC (Chair)
- . Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) / Chief Plant Protection Officer (CPPO)  
(chosen according to the subject of the IRA)
- . member from AFFA (from outside Biosecurity Australia)

- . member from a State or Territory agriculture, fisheries or forestry agency (nominated by SCARM on rotation from the pool of State and Territory CVOs and equivalent plant health officers)
- . one other member of QEAC (nominated by the Chair).

Members other than the Chair and the CVO/CPPO will be appointed for terms of two years.

The Chair of QEAC, the CVO/CPPO or any other member of the IRAAP will nominate alternatives if they believe there may be a conflict of interest or perception of bias because they are directly or indirectly involved in the IRA under appeal.

Every effort should be made to have the full IRAAP membership (or their alternatives) hear an appeal to ensure a balanced discussion.

### Operating procedures

When the Chair of the IRAAP decides that evidence presented by the appellant(s) warrants consideration by the IRAAP, the Chair will consult with the Director of Quarantine on:

- . scope and timetable of the appeal
- . IRAAP membership, regarding for example issues of conflict of interest
- . the likely need for access to particular expertise for appeals concerning whether a significant body of scientific or technical information relevant to the outcome of the IRA had not been considered.

The IRAAP will consider the appeal in the context of either or both of the criteria above, and report its findings to the appellant(s) and the Director of Quarantine, within 45 days of receiving the appeal. The appellant(s) will be advised if the IRAAP is unable to finalise the appeal within the 45 days.

The IRAAP will not consider oral submissions from any appellant unless they are determined by the IRAAP to be necessary to complement an appellant's written submission.

Upholding of an appeal will require majority support. The Chair will not exercise a casting vote.

If the appeal is upheld, the IRAAP will discuss with the appellant(s), the Director of Quarantine and the IRA team the identified deficiencies and the manner in which they may be overcome.

## **Annex 6: Stakeholder register**

A register of stakeholders has been established to facilitate stakeholder consultation and communication. A stakeholder is any individual, agency, organisation or association, in Australia or overseas, interested in the importation of animals, plants and animal and plant products or any other goods which may pose a biosecurity risk.

The interested parties wishing to be included in future communications and consultation on a particular proposal or application, or generally, should complete and return the stakeholder registration form to Biosecurity Australia. When a biosecurity issue is being actively considered, the stakeholders listed on the register with an interest in that issue will be contacted. More than one person within an organisation may register as a stakeholder if a separate registration form is completed for each individual.

The registration form (in Word and pdf format) may be downloaded from:

<http://www.affa.gov.au/biosecurityaustralia>, then click on 'register as a stakeholder'

and completed registration forms mailed to:

**Stakeholder Register Administrator**  
**Market Access and Biosecurity**  
**AFFA**  
**GPO Box 858**  
**CANBERRA ACT 2601**

or Facsimile to: +61 2 6272 3678

or returned by e-mail to the Stakeholder Register Administrator: [stake.holder@affa.gov.au](mailto:stake.holder@affa.gov.au)

If you experience any trouble accessing the file in the above downloadable formats, a copy can be obtained from the Stakeholder Register Administrator.

## Annex 7: Public file

A public file containing non-confidential submissions and other technical documentation will be established at the commencement of each IRA. Each public file will be held at Biosecurity Australia offices in Canberra and paper-based documents will be available to stakeholders during business hours for perusal and copying. Submissions and other documentation in electronic form will be available to stakeholders on request. To maximise access to documents, stakeholders are encouraged to make submissions electronically.

An index for each public file will be placed on the Biosecurity Australia webpage.

A public file for an IRA will contain the following material and may contain additional information relevant to an IRA:

- . the background to the import proposal, if not classified as in-confidence
- . factors taken into account by Biosecurity Australia in prioritising the IRA
- . determinations and decisions made by the Deputy Secretary and the Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia during the IRA
- . documents publicly circulated by Biosecurity Australia during the IRA, e.g., Policy Memoranda providing advice and/or seeking input on:
  - commencement of the IRA
  - scope, timetable and composition of the IRA team etc.
  - appeals
  - the technical issues paper and draft IRA report
  - policy determination and the final IRA report.
- . technical submissions and other correspondence raising technical issues received during an IRA, including technical information provided orally by stakeholders which they request be recorded as notes for file, subject to clearance of the wording by the stakeholder:
  - This will not include a submission, or part of a submission, that a stakeholder indicates is confidential and is capable of being classified as such in accordance with the *Freedom of Information Act*, or which Biosecurity Australia reasonably considers may give rise to an action for defamation.
  - Advice that confidential material has been received will be placed on the public file; this advice will include a summary, subject to clearance by the submitter.
- . technical material used in the IRA, not available in the public domain and not subject to copyright, in full
  - a list of technical material used in the IRA but subject to copyright (titles or references only)
- . AFFA's responses to submissions, including statements of reasons
- . reports in final form provided by a technical working group (TWG), consultant or peer reviewer
- . any appeal and the subsequent determination
- . any report by the Scientific Advisory Panel

Minutes of IRA team meetings will not be placed on the public file, although summaries may be made available.

## **Annex 8: WTO SPS Agreement**

The full text of the WTO SPS Agreement will be included in the final of this document.

The relevant web links for WTO/SPS, OIE and IPPC are, respectively:


[http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/sps\\_e/spsagr\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm)

[http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/A\\_summry.htm](http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/A_summry.htm)

<http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFO/AGRICULT/AGP/AGPP/PQ/>

Draft

**Annex 9: IRA Flowchart**



**Attachment 10 – Progress with Implementation of ANAO Report No 47**

## **ANAO RECOMMENDATIONS** **MANAGING FOR QUARANTINE EFFECTIVENESS**

### **SUMMARY OF ACTION**

**Recommendation 1** – The ANAO recommends AFFA ensures that resource allocation, cost recovery and risk treatment decisions across all modes of entry and the quarantine continuum are based on a systematic and integrated risk management framework, including appropriate strategies to treat and manage quarantine risk. This required both short and long term measures to provide:

- information that supports comparative assessment of risk and risk treatments;
- appropriate analysis of consequences in risk assessment; and
- proper monitoring and review of the effectiveness of risk treatments.

#### *Response*

Since the delivery of the ANAO *Managing for Quarantine Effectiveness* report, AFFA has been building on existing risk management initiatives to establish a systematic and integrated risk management framework. The AQIS Risk Management Steering Committee oversees this work and, to date, has been concentrating on achieving consistency between programs on their understanding of and approach to risk, including the development of a consistent measure of quarantine risk through the Border Risk Management Project.

The concept of risk is being applied to resource allocation, cost-recovery and risk treatment decisions wherever possible, however there is a large amount of ‘groundwork’ (as identified by the ANAO) that needs to be completed before risk can comprehensively be applied to these areas. AQIS has been undertaking this groundwork over the last 12 months and has been planning the future expansion of risk management.

#### *Specific Achievements*

- A Quarantine Risk Glossary of risk terms and definitions has been developed to improve consistency in the understanding of risk and risk terminology across programs.
- Business Plans have been reviewed and updated to ensure consistency in the application of risk concepts across programs.
- A streamlined approach to data systems has been established across programs where appropriate. The Airports and International Mail programs have redeveloped their databases (Airport Management System and Seizure Database) into a single streamlined database (Mail and Passenger System). The Seaports Program will also use the redeveloped database to record seizures from cruise-vessel passengers. The Import Clearance Program is making enhancements to both ACS and AQIS electronic systems to allow for improved data collection and analysis. The program is working with other border programs in the development of an Incidents system to record failures through several of AQIS’ systems. As a result of this work, different lists of countries and commodities have been harmonised across programs.
- The Border Risk Management Project has been established to measure relative quarantine risk (Quarantine Risk Indicators), taking into account the consequences of possible breaches, and to apply this to resource management. The project has been expanded to include the four major border programs (Airports, International Mail, Import Clearance and



Seaports programs) so that comparisons can be made between programs. The project is in its pilot phase and, while AFFA is cautiously optimistic about the project, it is breaking new ground for quarantine and AFFA has sought input from New Zealand quarantine who are also working on risk management.

**Recommendation 2 – the ANAO recommends that, in order to ensure the highest risk pathways are subject to appropriate quarantine treatment, AFFA takes early action to ensure that program risk profiles are:**

- **based on comprehensive analysis of data on the incidence of quarantine risk material;**
- **applied effectively to all incoming goods and passengers; and**
- **regularly reviewed to ensure they remain effective at directing effort at the border.**

#### *Response*

Since the ANAO report, AFFA has reviewed many of its program risk profiles, using available quarantine risk data, and has established mechanisms (such as profiling networks) to improve the application of profiling in each program.

AFFA's action to improve program risk profiling since the ANAO report has coincided with the Government's decision to increase quarantine intervention. This has had a significant effect on the use of profiling in activities that now apply 100% intervention. Where 100% intervention is applied to an activity, the need to determine *which* items should be targeted for quarantine intervention is no longer relevant as all items are subject to intervention. However, profiling is still an important tool in determining *the most effective level or type of intervention* required.

The data that is being collected from 100% intervention is also providing an excellent source of information on the incidence of quarantine material through different risk pathways. Programs are building a more complete picture of the risks along each pathway that can be used to verify and review profiles. It should be noted, however, that not all quarantine activities are applying 100% intervention and that, in these areas, profiling still remains an essential management tool.

#### *Specific Achievements*

- the Airports Program has established a National Network of Airports Risk Managers to ensure consistency in the application and use of profiles as well as to communicate contemporaneous profiles across regions. A monthly newsletter 'Risky Business' is being produced for distribution to regional staff to outline new or unusual profiles and to address other risk issues. The program regularly reviews profiles and has engaged the Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE) to help validate and refine the profiling process;
- the Mail Program has significantly improved its profiling through the use of 100% intervention data. The program reviews its profiles on a monthly basis, distributing results to AQIS staff and using this information to target quarantine awareness activities to high risk demographic groups. Mail Risk Managers have been appointed in each mail centre to be responsible for the implementation and monitoring of profiles in the regions and to provide national coordination. The Mail Program has also sought feedback from ABARE on the techniques used for profiling activities;
- the Import Clearance Program applies 'profiles' to systems such as COMPILE to determine which commodities require AQIS intervention and also to target non-commodity items for known risks. The Program is continuing to develop systems to allow more sophisticated analysis of import data. Random audit regimes, such as the Broker Accreditation Scheme, allow AQIS to inspect consignments that may otherwise have passed the border unchecked - anomalies provide information for future targeting needs. The planned Incidents database will also provide more comprehensive information on quarantine failures for profiling

purposes. The Program is currently considering a more rigorous and systematic review and assessment of tariff classification based profiles;

- under the 100% intervention regime now applied to vessels, risk profiling is primarily used to determine the most effective level or type of intervention required e.g. for those vessels arriving from a high risk Asian Gypsy Moth port a more thorough and specialised inspection will be required. The Seaports Program is readying to analyse the 100% inspection regime data for profiling purposes.

**Recommendation 3 – the ANAO recommends that, in order to ensure appropriate management of quarantine risk offshore, AFFA strengthen its management of pre-border cargo activities by:**

- **clearly articulating government policy directions in operational targets and criteria to guide the use of pre-border arrangements; and**
- **where pre-border strategies (such as certification) are found to be unreliable, AFFA act promptly to ensure quarantine risk is effectively managed.**

*Response*

With a view to allowing clearer articulation of government policy directions AQIS is preparing a policy paper on *Pre-Border Cargo Quarantine Arrangements*, in consultation with industry, for the Minister's consideration by mid 2002. This paper will describe offshore and pre-border cargo schemes and provide guidelines for:

- Policy and scheme criteria;
- Operational targets;
- Performance indicators;
- Monitoring and reporting to stakeholders; and
- Models for sanctions policies.

Within the context of this policy framework, AQIS plans to actively seek submissions from industry for the establishment of new schemes and the extensions of existing schemes. Responsibility for the development and distribution of information on such schemes rests with both AQIS and industry in a partnership approach.

All schemes would be subject to regular internal AQIS reviews against the newly developed best practice principles. In cases where there are quarantine and administrative failures in the system, AQIS will re-assess the risk of the system. Existing pre-border schemes will also be re-assessed against the new criteria. Additionally, AQIS has developed a series of leakage measurement and incidents recording systems to rapidly and accurately identify when and how failures in offshore systems occur. This will facilitate rapid management of such failures.

AQIS has initiated a series of measures to address situations where pre-border strategies prove unreliable. Firstly, measures have been implemented to more rapidly identify failures in pre-border systems, including the use of leakage measurement and scheme reviews as described above. Additionally, AQIS is expanding the offshore fumigation accreditation scheme to cover a wider range of countries, in light of failures identified in the current fumigation certification system. AQIS is also developing an incidents system whereby the intensity of audit inspections on consignments, which have been subject to pre-border strategies, will be linked to compliance system. The frequency of border inspections will be rapidly increased when failures are detected.

Improving compliance will result in a graduated return to lowered direct inspection intensity. The additional resources available under IQI initiative have already allowed AQIS to direct more resources to surveillance and monitoring activities where there are indicators that pre-border strategies are not performing sufficiently.

**Recommendation 4 – the ANAO recommends that, in order to effectively support management decision making and reporting to Parliament and other stakeholders, AFFA establish more appropriate and useful effectiveness indicators for each border program (and for important elements within each program) which should:**

- **address the likelihood of detecting seizable material arriving in Australia through measures such as the ‘seizure rate’;**
- **address the risk consequence of quarantine items escaping detection; and**
- **include appropriate performance targets.**

#### *Response*

AFFA has reviewed and refined its effectiveness indicators and set effectiveness performance targets for each program in accordance with the comments made in the ANAO report. Each program has also been continuously improving its data collection and analysis to enhance the quality of performance information. Each program now measures the ‘seizure rate’ or equivalent for their program and performance targets have been set and are being reviewed regularly. A cross-program initiative to improve data quality and cross-program consistency is seeking to engage a biometrician to develop a Data Quality Plan and to supply specialist advice to programs on performance indicators. This initiative is expected to commence in July 2002.

The Quarantine Risk Indicator project (described under Recommendation 1) is addressing the issue of assessing risk consequences of quarantine items escaping detection in the long term. In the short term however, programs are using the ‘higher risk’ and ‘risk’ categories to assist in determining, and addressing, the effectiveness of the program in targeting items with a higher risk consequence.

#### *Specific Achievements*

- The Airports Program regularly measures the ‘seizure rate’, using Leakage Survey information, data from the Airport Management System, and Amnesty Bin Survey information. Performance targets for effectiveness indicators and intervention levels have been set and the categories of ‘higher risk’ and ‘risk’ items are used as a guide to the potential consequences of items escaping detection and therefore the areas to target. The Airports Program has also identified Airport Risk Officers to drive specific responses to performance information outcomes.
- The Mail Program regularly measures the ‘seizure rate’, using End-point sampling information, data from the Seizure Database and indicative volume data from Australia Post. Performance targets for effectiveness indicators and intervention levels have been set and, as in the Airports Program, the categories of ‘higher risk’ and ‘risk’ items are used as a guide to the potential consequences of items escaping detection. Strategies are developed, in consultation with regional Mail Risk Officers, to address performance information outcomes, including enhancing profiling activities, x-ray and product ID training, investigation of new screening technologies etc.
- The Import Clearance Program has improved data collection and reporting for performance information purposes. The program has developed effectiveness indicators (based on leakage rates) and performance targets for a number of key cargo activities and work is continuing to ensure full coverage across all Import Clearance risk pathways. Results of performance information are regularly reviewed and addressed internally and through industry committees.

- The Seaports Program commenced data collection to measure effectiveness for the vessel inspection process (based on leakage) from 1 December 2001. Performance targets for effectiveness and intervention have been set and are being regularly reviewed.

### **General Comment on Recommendations 5-8**

After extensive consultation, a revised Import Risk Analysis (IRA) Framework has been formulated and it is expected that implementation will occur around the middle of this year. This Framework provides for improved consultation, transparency and rigour.

While this framework involves enhancements, it has a solid foundation from the process put in place in 1998.

From the outset, it had been planned to conduct a review after sufficient experience had been gained from the performance of IRAs under those procedures.

### **Recommendation 5 - the ANAO recommends that, to improve the transparency in the treatment of science in IRAs, AFFA consider:**

- **encouraging early discussion and agreement of scientific issues by means such as issuing discussion papers that focus on hazard identification and risk assessment; and**
- **arranging adequate access to experts familiar with the industry under consideration.**

#### *Response*

The revised Draft Framework deals specifically with transparency. Relevant specifications are set out below. The “Hazard Scoping paper” referred to in ANAO Report No 47 of 2000-2001 is now called a “technical issues paper”.

*Biosecurity Australia will distribute the technical issues paper to registered stakeholders and place it on the Biosecurity Australia web site. Stakeholders will then have 60 days to submit comments. This will be their first opportunity for detailed input into the IRA. Submissions will be sought on:*

- . *the completeness of the list of pests and diseases*
- . *the list of potential peer reviewers*
- . *any additional work identified.*

*The IRA team will meet with stakeholders when the nature of matters raised in submissions makes it appropriate. The team may conduct field trips to relevant regions, and may investigate trading patterns, and industry practices and procedures in Australia and overseas.*

### **Recommendation 6 - the ANAO recommends that AFFA consider more effective means of communicating with stakeholders the concept, definition and application of Australia's appropriate level of protection in order to facilitate stakeholder understanding of the IRA process and achieve better outcomes.**

#### *Response*

The newly completed IRA Guidelines provide clearer explanation of the policy relating to Australia's import requirements. Further, this matter was considered at the May 2002 meeting of the Primary Industries Ministerial Council. The Media Release/Communiqué stated:

*“The Council agreed that the current level of definition of Appropriate Level of Protection meets Australia’s current needs. Council members from all Australian jurisdictions are committed to addressing differences in regional pest and disease status and risks through early and comprehensive cooperation as part of the import risk analysis process.”*

**Recommendation 7 - the ANAO recommends that AFFA:**

- **give consideration to the costs and benefits of including the consequences of pest and disease incursions in the criteria for use of the non-routine process;**
- **ensure that the consultation process allows provision of commercially sensitive information, while remaining consistent with Australia's WTO obligations;**
- **develop and promulgate guidelines on the purpose and conduct of consultation in the IRA process; and**
- **seek stakeholder views on the major issues or considerations at the start of the IRA.**

*Response*

- **Give consideration to the costs and benefits of including the consequences of pest and disease incursions in the criteria for use of the non-routine process:** As covered elsewhere, a single process will replace the routine and non-routine processes. All issues relating to our responsibilities arising from the WTO/SPS Agreement are considered during the course of the IRA. Biosecurity Australia is considering ways and means of further improving information capture and analysis in this phase of risk assessment.
- **Commercially sensitive information:** The majority of information is not commercially sensitive, and is available on the Public File. Information that is more commercially sensitive is labelled “Commercial in Confidence” and is not released during the consultation phase (or after, as appropriate). The fact that information is commercially confidential would not prevent a third party from seeking access to it under the FOI Act. However, in that case, it could be expected that access would be refused under the business affairs exemption (s.43) of the FOI Act.
- **Develop and promulgate guidelines on the purpose and conduct of consultation in the IRA process:** A comprehensive consultation strategy, together with the steps in the process is specified in the new draft IRA Framework, which was released to stakeholders in September 2001.
- **Seek stakeholder views on the major issues or considerations at the start of the IRA:** When work on an IRA is about to commence, Biosecurity Australia will consult with registered stakeholders via a circular which includes information on the proposed scope of the IRA, an indicative timetable and the required expertise, including nominations for membership of the IRA team from external sources. The information will also be placed on the Biosecurity Australia web site. Stakeholders will be consulted early in the process under the new Framework and will have 30 days after the circular is issued to provide comment and membership nominations to Biosecurity Australia. Early consultation has also been occurring under the present system.

**Recommendation 8 - the ANAO recommends that AFFA consult with relevant State/Territory agencies on the priority of IRA applications.**

*Response*

The new IRA Framework covers this aspect in detail and provides for consultation very early in the IRA process. Relevant specifications are set out below.

*States and Territories have a special role in making biosecurity policy because of their responsibility for managing animal and plant health within Australia. A partnership approach to managing risks is in place, both for the movement of product into Australia or for trade within Australia. The 1995 MOU between the Commonwealth and States/Territories on Animal and Plant Quarantine Measures defines the parties' respective rights and obligations.*

*AFFA will work closely with the chief executive officers of State and Territory agriculture, fisheries and forestry agencies and Environment Australia on the IRA work program and on arrangements for IRAs about to commence. For particular IRAs, they will also discuss the scope, the likely risks, and the expertise that may be required to address those risks. The States and Territories and Environment Australia may identify additional technical issues that they believe should be considered during an IRA including regional differences in pest and disease status and risk, and may nominate officers with relevant expertise who would be available to participate in the IRA.*

*Biosecurity Australia will also consult the Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA) on IRAs that involve commodities for human consumption to ensure a harmonised approach to common issues.*

**Attachment 11 - Progress With Implementation of Increased Border  
Intervention**

Attachment 11 – Progress with Implementation of Increased Border Intervention

**QUARANTINE INTERVENTION AND EFFECTIVENESS**

<i>Inbound Quarantine Activity</i>	<i>Intervention<sup>1</sup></i>			<i>Effectiveness<sup>2</sup></i>	
	<i>Government Target %</i>	<i>Estimated February 2001 %</i>	<i>Estimated % March Quarter 2002</i>	<i>Government Target %</i>	<i>#Estimated % March Quarter 2002</i>
<b>CARGO</b>					
<b>Sea Containers</b>	100	5	100	96	82
<b>Air Containers</b>	100	2	98	96	98
<b>HVLV Air Cargo</b>	100	< 2	82	96	92
<b>Personal Effects</b>	Increase surveillance	30	91	Not specified	-
<b>Non-Containerised Cargo (break bulk)</b>	Increase surveillance	35	93	Not specified	-
<b>AIRPORTS</b>					
<b>Passengers</b>	At least 81	35	88*	Higher risk at least 87	70
				Risk at least 50	40
<b>SEAPORTS</b>					
<b>Vessels</b>	100	70	98	96	87
<b>Disembarking Passengers</b>	100	30	100	96	**
<b>INTERNATIONAL MAIL</b>					
<b>EMS/Registered/P arcels</b>	100	< 5	100	Higher risk 96	61
				Risk 50	47
<b>Other Articles</b>	100	< 5	86	Higher risk 96	***
				Risk 50	***
<b>Letter Class</b>	100	< 5	79	Higher risk 96	***
				Risk 50	***

1. Intervention is defined as the application of quarantine measures to identify and manage items of quarantine interest.

2. Effectiveness is the likelihood that quarantine measures will intercept items of quarantine interest.

# All effectiveness estimates are preliminary as measurement systems are new and still being refined.

\* Current airport intervention levels may not be sustained due to current passenger demand being down on expectations, and the long queues at peak periods at Melbourne, Adelaide and Cairns airports ahead of projected infrastructure spending.

\*\* Planning for effectiveness data collection has commenced and a trial will take place mid 2002.

\*\*\* Effectiveness data collection has commenced but no reliable results are yet available.



## INCREASED QUARANTINE INTERVENTION – ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Additional	<i>FTEs</i>	<i>Detector Dog Teams</i>	<i>X-rays</i>
AQIS projected May 2001	907	65	49
AQIS progress March 2002	882	31*	48

\* 14 dogs were also in training

### PROGRESS WITH INFRASTRUCTURE UPGRADES AT AIRPORTS

Changes to airport infrastructure arising from Increased Quarantine Intervention (IQI) are managed by DOTARS with active input from AQIS and Customs. Infrastructure projects at Brisbane and Sydney were completed mid March and late March 2002, at estimated costs of \$2.8m and \$10.0 million, respectively.

In Cairns tenders have been called with construction to commence in September 2002 with completion in February 2003 – project estimate of \$3.0 million.

In Darwin, new staff accommodation (Customs and AQIS) is due for occupancy in mid July 2002. Tenders have been called for Baggage Hall work in April with work to commence as soon as Customs and AQIS staff move to new accommodation in July. Baggage Hall work should be finalised during September 2002. Estimated cost is \$1.2 million

In Perth final design documentation was completed in early May 2002. Tenders have been called for construction, which is expected to commence in June 2002 with anticipated completion in October 2002. Estimated cost is \$1.6 million.

In Adelaide negotiations with the Airport owner are still progressing. Estimated cost of up to \$0.5 million, with the option of Adelaide Airport contributing additional funding if they wish to address pre-existing terminal inadequacies.

In Melbourne negotiations also continue and consultants are currently re-scoping works. Estimated cost is \$6.0 - \$7.5 million.

### PROGRESS WITH INFRASTRUCTURE UPGRADES AT MAIL CENTRES

In the May 2001 Budget Australia Post (AP) obtained \$49.4M to improve infrastructure in mail centres for increased quarantine intervention. AQIS, Customs and AP have worked closely to develop both short term and long term infrastructure changes in each mail centre. Perth, Darwin and Brisbane will have completed infrastructure changes by July 2002. AP is currently reviewing the Adelaide operations and will make a decision on its future.

Australia Post in close consultation with ACS and AQIS has implemented short-term changes within the two Sydney mail centres, which has raised the intervention levels. Australia Post has had difficulty in finding a site for a new mail centre in Sydney and is yet to finalise a decision on how they will meet the long-term quarantine requirements within Sydney. It is believed that this decision will be announced by end May 2002. If the new centre goes ahead it will not be completed until at least the end of 2003. In the interim AQIS will continue to pursue further changes in these

two centres to ensure that the key government targets are met and the OH&S issues within these centres are resolved.

Within Melbourne there has been some difficulty in gaining short-term changes and negotiations with AP are continuing. AP are also negotiating to acquire a land site to build a new centre in Melbourne and have indicated that this will be functional by mid 2003.

**Attachment 12 – 2000 Olympics and Paralympics**

## **2000 Olympics and Paralympics**

This attachment briefly outlines the quarantine arrangements that were put in place for the Olympic and Paralympic Games held in Sydney in 2000. Substantial pre-border work was undertaken offshore with participating countries, officials, participants and media, border operations were strengthened in the lead up to and during the Games periods, and post border work was also increased in relation to quarantine surveillance, monitoring and surveys.

The range of sports, tradition, spectators and wide diversity of associated activities such as tourism, conferences, cultural events and trade fairs made the quarantine planning, administration, logistics and overall operational demands very complex. As well as the arrival in Sydney and other border entry points of increased people, cargo, ships, aircraft, equipment and animals for the Olympics, AQIS had to maintain full services to all its usual clients in Sydney and elsewhere in Australia.

The quarantine arrangements covered a range of issues associated with pre-border, border and post-border activities. Great pressure was placed on quarantine controls because of the vast increase in tourism and cargo, number of athletes, support staff and equipment arriving by sea and by air. Special attention had to be given to equestrian events including equine health, nutrition, husbandry and welfare. Assistance with the construction and management of a world-class equestrian facility to cater for quarantine, health and welfare issues was a major undertaking.

Australian quarantine policies were not changed for the Olympics. The Government determined that all effort needed to be made to protect our animal and plant health status. The usual rigorous risk management practices were adopted and, as events unfolded, adjustments were made as required to operational controls to ensure that Australia's quarantine integrity was maintained while Olympics activities were facilitated. The protocols, processes and practices adopted were consistent with Australia's existing quarantine policy framework.

The participants and viewing public saw a successful Olympics. Almost all visitors and tourists understood that quarantine controls had to be met, were tolerant with officials and impressed by the level of professionalism shown. Behind the scenes, operations were hectic with an enormous amount of work devoted to planning for public, animal and plant health emergencies, and the management of potential border incidents.

The number of passengers who arrived at Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne airports in August–September 2000 was 8.2 per cent higher than in August–September 1999. There were 745,968 passengers through Sydney Airport, 107,000 additional to 1999. Correspondingly there were 25,771 seizures, an increase of 19.5 per cent and 31,185 red/green channel intuitive examinations, an increase of 71.7 per cent. The success of this primary screening process can be assessed by the subsequent screening of 10,000 people on entry to the Olympic Village. This resulted in 13 items (0.1 per cent) of quarantine interest being detected and seized. There was scientific verification of the pest and disease risk of many confiscated products.

Additional staff were allocated to bolster existing resources at expected pressure points such as international airports, seaports and the Sydney International Equestrian Centre (SIEC). They included temporary part-time officers who were recruited and undertook training, others who converted from permanent part-time to full-time, those transferred from interstate, redeployed local experienced staff and former officers who were re-employed. Flexibility in staffing especially through providing appropriate training and through the use of part-time staff was a critical factor in

the success of AQIS's operations. AQIS made accommodation arrangements by billeting transferred staff with Sydney staff on the basis of common work locations to maximise efficiencies in travelling together to and from work sites. Social events involving interstate staff members helped ease some of the pressure that staff members were under.

The major elements of the horse quarantine arrangements included the design of SIEC so that it could operate as a gazetted animal quarantine station for the mandatory two weeks post entry quarantine period for all Olympics horses immediately before equestrian competition events started. AQIS made special arrangements for horse feed entering Australia and undertook a formal import risk assessment for the short-term entry to Australia of horses with the disease, piroplasmiasis. Australia is currently free of this disease but an infected horse was not allowed entry at the Atlanta Olympic Games in 1996.

The successful contribution of AQIS to the Olympics has proved invaluable in preparing for other events. AQIS regularly handles significant numbers of visitors to Australia for other large-scale events such as the Australian Grand Prix and cargo including sporting equipment and yachts. Preparations are being made for the World Masters Games in Melbourne in October 2002 when more than 25,000 participants from over 70 countries are expected. AQIS is preparing information for team members participating in the 2002 International Gay Games being held in Sydney in November 2002 when an estimated 14,000 athletes and 45,000 spectators are expected to travel to Australia. Preparations are also now commencing for the Rugby World Cup to be held in Australia in October and November 2003.

Early estimates for the 2006 Commonwealth Games in Melbourne include over 14,000 participants from 72 countries and over 15,000 international visitors. Import permits will need to be arranged before arrival in Australia for food and other items of cultural significance that may be imported as part of the cultural festival that is associated with the Games or to be used for promotion or consumption at international hospitality venues.