




ATTORNEY-GENERAL  
THE HON ROBERT McCLELLAND MP

Submission No:.....	1
Date Received:.....	10-3-09
Secretary:.....	



08/28913, 08/28927, 08/28916, 08/28925, 08/28930, 08/29496

The Hon Arch Bevis MP  
Chair  
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security  
Parliament House  
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Mr Bevis

I am writing to advise you that I have decided to re-list Ansar al-Islam (formerly Ansar al-Sunna), Asbat al-Ansar (AAA), Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) as terrorist organisations for the purposes of section 102.1 of the Criminal Code.

These organisations were last listed as terrorist organisations in March 2007 by the *Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2007*. The listings sunset in March 2009.

I am satisfied on reasonable grounds that Ansar al-Islam, AAA, IAA, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, JeM and LeJ are organisations directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

The re-listing of Ansar al-Islam, AAA, IAA, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, JeM and LeJ will ensure that all offence provisions under Division 102 of the Criminal Code will continue to apply in relation to these organisations.

My decision to re-list Ansar al-Islam, AAA, IAA, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, JeM and LeJ was made following careful consideration of unclassified intelligence information provided by ASIO in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as legal advice provided to me by the Australian Government Solicitor.

Section 102.1A of the Criminal Code provides that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security may review the regulation as soon as possible after it has been made, and report the Committee's comments and recommendations to each House of the Parliament before the end of the applicable disallowance period for that House.

To assist the Committee, I enclose a copy of the Statements of Reasons provided by ASIO, in relation to Ansar al-Islam, AAA, IAA, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, JeM and LeJ, upon which my decision to re-list these organisations was based. Additional information detailing

the procedure followed for the purposes of listing Ansar al-Islam, AAA, IAA, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, JeM and LeJ will be provided to you upon the registration of the regulations.

I also refer to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) which was last re-listed as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code by the *Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2007 (No. 6)* with effect from 31 March 2007. These regulations will sunset on 30 March 2009.


I have recently considered advice from the Director-General of Security with respect to the EIJ. This advice notes that there is a lack of contemporaneous information from either classified or open sources to demonstrate that the EIJ continues to meet the legislative criteria under the Criminal Code.

I am therefore not satisfied on reasonable grounds that the EIJ is an organisation which continues to be directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur) or advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

As such, I will not be re-listing the EIJ as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code after the current listing expires on 30 March 2009.

The action officer for this matter in my Department is [REDACTED] who can be contacted by e-mail at [REDACTED] or by telephone on [REDACTED]

Yours sincerely



Robert McClelland

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### **Ansar al-Islam**

**(Also known as Ansar al-Sunna, Partisans of Islam, Protectors of Islam, Kurdistan Supporters of Islam, Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan, Followers of Islam in Kurdistan, Kurdish Taliban, Devotees of Islam, Jaish Ansar al-Islam, Jaish Ansar al-Sunna, Ansar al-Islam Army, Army of Ansar al-Islam, Jund al-Islam, Soldiers of Islam, Soldiers of God, Protectors of the Sunna Faith)**

The following information is based on publicly available details about Ansar al-Islam (formerly listed as Ansar al-Sunna). Ansar al-Islam is listed as Ansar al-Islam in the United Nations 1267 Committee's consolidated list and by the governments of Canada and the US. Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna, though the same entity, are listed separately by the UK government. It is also listed by the European Union (EU) for the purposes of its anti-terrorism measures.

#### ***Current status of Ansar al-Islam***

Ansar al-Islam has been through several name changes since its formation in December 2001. Originally established under its present name, Ansar al-Islam emerged from a conglomeration of several smaller Kurdish-based Sunni extremist groups within the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) in northern Iraq. At this stage, Ansar al-Islam focused on the defeat of the secular Kurdish leadership to establish an independent Islamic state in the KAZ.

In March 2003, successful joint Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and US military operations against Ansar al-Islam strongholds forced many in the group to disperse to other locations, including Iran. Ansar al-Islam members regrouped shortly thereafter and returned to Iraq, where they sought, in cooperation with other foreign and Iraqi militants, to create a more broad-based and less overtly-Kurdish organisation for the Sunni jihadist resistance to the Coalition presence in Iraq.

As a result, Ansar al-Islam evolved into Ansar al-Sunna. In late 2003, the new group formally announced its existence in an internet statement calling upon all jihadists in Iraq to unite under the name Ansar al-Sunna. Following the release of this statement, attacks conducted by Ansar al-Islam operatives were claimed under the name Ansar al-Sunna.

Because they were one and the same group, Ansar al-Sunna's leadership was similar to that of Ansar al-Islam as was its mainly Arab-Kurdish composition. Further, Ansar al-Sunna focused its attacks on the same enemies as its predecessor – in its first major strikes, Ansar al-Sunna, on 14 October 2003, bombed the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad, killing one bystander, and on 1 February 2004, it claimed responsibility for multiple simultaneous suicide car bombings on PUK offices in Arbil that killed at least 105 civilians and injured 130 others.

Like other Salafist terrorist groups, especially al-Qa'ida, Ansar al-Sunna's ultimate objective was to establish a Sunni-dominated Islamic state in Iraq. For this reason, Ansar al-Sunna, as well as conducting attacks on members of the 'apostate' Iraqi government, banned participation in democratic elections and increasingly targeted state-sponsored 'collaborators', especially Iraqi police and military forces. A series of Ansar al-Sunna bombings on police stations and police recruitment centres in northern Iraq in early-2004 killed at least 20 people.

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Ansar al-Sunna, though mainly preoccupied with Iraqi official interests, also promised to 'step up and double' its attacks on the Coalition, a pledge that became reality in December 2004 when Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for a suicide attack at a US military base in Mosul that killed 18 Americans, including 14 soldiers. It also assassinated civilians, including Iraqi and foreign contractors. In August 2004, the group released a video showing 12 Nepalese hostages being executed. As a measure of the group's fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, Ansar al-Sunna announced that they had been killed not merely for 'serving the Jews and the Christians' but also for 'believing in Buddha as their God'.

Over the next few years, Ansar al-Sunna conducted a steady stream of attacks against Iraqi government and security institutions, Coalition forces, civilian contractors, religious groups, diplomatic facilities and Iraqi infrastructure. Its tactical repertoire was already extensive and traversed the full range of insurgent operations for which the group is currently renowned, including suicide attacks, car bombings, emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs), hostage-taking, executions, assassinations and conventional military attacks. By February 2007, Ansar al-Sunna had claimed responsibility for approximately 1,600 attacks in Iraq.

Ansar al-Sunna, as well as openly declaring its fealty to Usama bin Laden, had historical links to al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), a proscribed terrorist organisation formerly known as Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (TQJBR). AQI's founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, operated one of the Ansar al-Islam training camps prior to US and PUK operations against the group in 2003.

However, despite sharing an obvious ideological affinity with AQI as well as personnel, equipment and an almost identical target set and attack methodology, Ansar al-Sunna was determined to maintain its independence. It thus refused to join either of AQI's umbrella organisations, the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), established in January 2006, and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISoI), which superseded the MSC in October 2006.

Meanwhile, in April 2007, the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), a native nationalist-jihadist group that had always been uncomfortable with AQI's indiscriminate violence against Iraqi Muslims and which felt increasingly threatened by the ISoI's ruthless efforts to monopolise the Sunni insurgency, openly criticised 'the unlawful practices of the brothers from al-Qa'ida'. This was followed, in May 2007, by the IAI's establishment of its own competing pan-Islamic political organisation, the Reformation and Jihad Front, or RJF (also known as the Jihad and Reformation Front), a body that reportedly incorporated the IAI, the Mujahideen Army and Ansar al-Sunna.

These events led to the first signs of a split within Ansar al-Sunna. The group's Shariah Council, or Legal Committee, which had already criticised AQI in January 2007 for allegedly killing Ansar al-Sunna members, began promoting the idea of a partnership with an unspecified group – presumably the IAI – that other members, including Ansar al-Sunna's Emir, Abu Abdullah al-Hassan bin Mahmud, claimed was 'deviating from the principles of Shariah'. Two Shariah Council members in particular, Abu Sajjad and Shaykh Abu Hind, who subsequently resigned from or were asked to leave Ansar al-Sunna, then helped form the RJF.

Continuing claims by the RJF that pro-AQI Ansar al-Sunna had joined forces with a front group led by AQI's enemy were denied by the group's leaders, who criticised

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the Reformation and Jihad Front for perpetrating 'false allegations'. There was no split, Ansar al-Sunna announced, despite subsequent claims by the Shariah Council that 'most of the group's cadres had joined the breakaway faction' – an unlikely claim given the consistently higher profile of the original group over its erstwhile Shariah Council.

On 16 May 2007, moreover, Ansar al-Sunna's leadership issued a statement of support for 'our brothers' in the ISOI as well as a number of subsequent statements claiming joint operations with AQI. These included an attack on a US military convoy that reportedly killed six American soldiers and an operation against US forces and 'their quislings from the [Kurdish] Peshmerga' in Mosul on 28 January 2008, allegedly resulting in 'great losses' for the Coalition.

To distance itself from the high-profile defection of its Shariah Council earlier in the year, Ansar al-Sunna, on 28 November 2007, issued a formal statement to 'all Muslims' announcing that its leadership had 'mutually agreed' to revert to the group's original name of Ansar al-Islam. The statement, which implored its members to 'stand united behind our banner' and 'avoid unnecessary internal battles', stipulated that Ansar al-Islam would be the group's official name in all future communiqués and statements.

Though continuing to resist overtures to join the ISOI, Ansar al-Islam maintains a continuing close relationship with AQI. These ties are perhaps stronger now than at any other time, due mainly to the numerous 'Awakening' movements – variously comprised of Sunni tribal, religious and insurgent elements – pushing AQI into Ansar al-Islam's geographical areas of operation in northern Iraq. Ansar al-Islam has also shown a continuing loyalty to AQI by not only recognising the ISOI as the base of a legitimate Islamic caliphate but also criticising the Reformation and Jihad Front, which, in July 2008, it accused of colluding with the US to undermine the jihad in Iraq.

Ansar al-Islam, though already sharing the same fundamentalist ideology as AQI, has increasingly adopted that group's hardline attitude to fellow insurgents and Sunnis who participate in the political process. On 23 July 2008, in the first sign of its willingness to target its own constituency, Ansar al-Islam warned the 'Sunni brothers' that 'joining the dangerous infidels' was an act of 'apostasy'. Those thus seeking to extinguish 'the firebrand of jihad' would be 'killed without trial'.

### *Objectives*

Ansar al-Islam's immediate objectives are to overthrow the Iraqi Government, expel Coalition forces from the country and establish a Sunni Islamic state administered under Shariah law.

In the long-term, Ansar al-Islam supports the global militant Sunni jihadist ideology espoused by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, including the re-establishment of the historical Islamic caliphate.

### *Leadership and membership*

The identity of Ansar al-Islam's current leader is unknown, although Abu Abdullah al Hasan bin Mahmud was the last national-level Emir identified by the group – a

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position he was still occupying as late as November 2007, when he announced that Ansar al-Sunna had reverted to its original name of Ansar al-Islam.

Ansar al-Islam is comprised of a mix of Sunni Arabs, including former Baathist regime elements, and Kurdish Islamist fighters, a condition that stems partly from its Kurdish origins but also from its base of recruitment in Iraq's more heterogeneous areas – especially Mosul, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din. In marked contrast to AQI, which is controlled by foreigners, Ansar al-Islam's leadership is Iraqi.

Ansar al-Islam is believed to be divided into six divisions including a military and information division. The precise size of the group is unknown but estimates indicate numbers to be between 500-1000 members.

***Targets, Methodology and Funding***

Ansar al-Islam, and before it Ansar al-Sunna, have conducted terrorist attacks against a range of political, religious and foreign targets in Iraq, most notably Iraqi and Coalition security forces, Kurdish government officials, Western individuals and interests based in Iraq, Iraqi civilians believed to be cooperating with Coalition forces and sectarian Shia targets.

Ansar al-Islam has historically employed assassinations and executions against Iraqi security and official personnel in particular but also foreign contractors from almost all countries, including the US, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, Jordan and Sudan. At the same time, Ansar al-Islam is known to execute individuals whom its leaders view as an affront to Islam. On 18 June 2006, for instance, the group decapitated several 'homosexual transvestites' for flouting 'the Prophet Muhammad's teachings'.

Small arms, IED and mortar attacks are frequent and mainly employed by Ansar al-Islam against high-profile targets, especially Iraq's political and security institutions, Coalition forces and Shia religious communities. The group has proven especially adept at suicide bombings, having conducted attacks using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs). In accordance with the group's tactical range and weapons sophistication, Ansar al-Islam has also attacked military targets using rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-aircraft weapons including man portable air defence systems (MANPADS).

Australians are considered a legitimate target by Ansar al-Islam, which was responsible for a suicide car bombing in March 2003 that killed ABC journalist Paul Moran and five Kurdish soldiers. The group's founder and original leader, Mular Krekar, reiterated these sentiments recently, claiming in November 2007 that not only was Moran's death justified but also that it was legitimate for Ansar al-Islam 'to kill Australian soldiers in Iraq ..., to kill his translator, to kill the people which [sic] give him food and water'.

Ansar al-Islam is predominantly based in Iraq. However, it has also been involved in plans to conduct attacks overseas, most notably in Germany in December 2004 when three Ansar al-Islam operatives were arrested for planning to assassinate the then-Iraqi Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, during a Deutsche Bank reception in Berlin. All three were convicted of terrorism offences by a German court in July 2008.

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The group receives funding from a variety of sources, including expatriate remittances from Diaspora communities in Jordan, Turkey and Europe, donations from local Sunni sheikhs and former Baathist officials, and criminal activities. Ansar al-Islam also benefits financially from its association with al-Qa'ida, which has provided money as well as training, equipment and combat support to the group.

*Ansar al-Islam's engagement in terrorist attacks*

Ansar al-Islam currently claims responsibility for several attacks each week in Iraq against a variety of sectarian, Iraqi government and Coalition targets. Recent significant terrorist attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by, or reliably attributed to, Ansar al-Islam include:

- 23 July 2006: Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for multiple attacks, including the assassination of a Shia political figure in Diyali, shooting two US soldiers in Heet and detonating an IED in al-Miqdadiya;
- 30 October 2006: A suicide bombing killed the Director of Police in Kirkuk as well as several others, including a three year-old girl;
- 5 December 2006: The group claimed responsibility for an ambush that killed several US service personnel on foot patrol in the al-Haqaniyah market, west of Baghdad;
- 25 January 2007: Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for killing five American Blackwater members, four of whom were shot execution-style in the back of the head;
- 8 May 2007: A suicide truck bombing outside the Interior Ministry in Irbil, a mostly Kurdish city in northern Iraq, killed at least 15 people and wounded 65;
- 13 May 2007: A suicide car bomb against the headquarters of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) killed at least 30 people and injured 115 others;
- 16 July 2007: Seven Peshmerga border guards and a civilian were killed in an ambush on the Iranian frontier near Penjwin, in the autonomous Kurdistan region;
- 18 September 2007: Two Iraqi 'apostates' accused of working for the Iraqi government were executed by Ansar al-Sunna militants;
- November 2007: In Tikrit, in northern Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for a roadside bombing that killed one policeman and two Iraqi military personnel;
- 28 January 2008: Five US soldiers were killed in Mosul in a joint operation by Ansar al-Islam and AQI;
- February 2008: Ansar al-Islam claimed responsibility for a series of attacks that included bombing a Coalition tank in Mosul, wounding a member of the Iraqi police force and capturing, interrogating and executing a number of Iraqi 'apostates';

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- April 2008: The group was responsible for a series of attacks in Baqubah, the regional capital of Diyala, including the bombing of an al-Mahdi Army checkpoint that killed six, the assassination of an Iraqi policeman and an explosion in a 'booby-trapped' house that killed two 'soldiers of the Cross';
- 13 April 2008: Ansar al-Islam bombed an Awakening Council member, who was taken to hospital but died an hour later;
- 12 May 2008: Ansar al-Islam reportedly shelled US military headquarters based at Al-Lahum, in southern Iraq;
- 20 July 2008: A roadside bombing on a convoy of Iraqi National Guardsmen travelling through Mosul purportedly killed or injured 15 'apostates';
- 13 August 2008: Ansar al-Islam claimed an attack on a Peshmerga barracks, reportedly killing 19 people and destroying two vehicles.

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**Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)**

**(Also known as: League of Partisans; Band of Partisans, Band of Helpers, League of the Followers, Partisans' League, Usbat al-Ansar, Usbat ul-Ansar, Osbat al-Ansar, Isbat al-Ansar, Esbat al-Ansar).**

The following information is based on publicly available details about Asbat al-Ansar (AAA). AAA is listed in the United Nation's 1267 Committee's consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the governments of Canada, the UK, the US and Russia.

AAA adheres to an extremist jihadist ideology akin to that of al-Qa'ida (AQ). AAA's objectives are to establish a Sunni Islamic state in Lebanon by overthrowing the Lebanese government, eliminating Israel and impeding anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in Lebanon. The group believes its struggle justifies violence against civilians and the group's strategy in seeking its objective includes the use of terrorist tactics.

AAA is a Sunni Muslim extremist group, largely based in the Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon. The group was established by Hisham al-Shraidi after Lebanon's Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya group removed him in 1986. Shraidi was assassinated in 1991, apparently on the orders of Amin Khayid, a Fatah member also based in the Ayn al-Hilwah camp. He was succeeded by Ahmed Abd al-Karim al-Saadi, who is also known as Abu Muhjin.

**Current status of AAA**

In the 1990's, AAA limited its operations to Lebanon and engaged in a number of low-level attacks against 'un-Islamic' targets. These included attacks against religious institutions, bars, and theatres, as well as Lebanese forces, elements of the Lebanese government and foreign nationals. The group became more widely known following a series of attacks on nightclubs, theatres and liquor stores. AAA widened its operations to conduct attacks against foreign interests in Lebanon and assassinations of significant religious leaders. AAA's attack methods included rocket-propelled grenades, explosive charges, rockets and car bombs. Since 2004 there is no record of AAA conducting any violent operations in Lebanon. However, there is evidence of AAA members being involved in violent incidents, including fighting Coalition forces in Iraq.

AAA has recently been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon as it fears it will attract the attention of the Lebanese Armed Forces and threaten its uninterrupted operations in Ayn al-Hilwah. Various extremist web forums criticized AAA for its failure to support fellow Sunni extremist group Fatah al-Islam (FAI) during the Lebanese Armed Forces campaign in summer 2007 that forced FAI out of Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in northern Lebanon, which had a significant impact on the operations of the group. AAA now concentrates on recruiting, training and dispatching volunteers to the insurgency in Iraq. On 3 June 2008, Jund al-Sham gunmen attacked a Lebanese army position on the edge of Ayn al-Hilweh but AAA appears to have distanced itself from the fighting and joined a united Palestinian group to maintain peace in the camp. AAA is likely to actively urge for peace in the camp to ensure it can continue to provide fighters for Iraq without interference from the Lebanese Armed Forces.

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AAA maintains close ties with al-Qa'ida. They share the same doctrine and AAA openly supports the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, AAA does not support al-Qa'ida's operations in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria and Syria.

AAA remains active and has shifted its focus to Iraq, sending fighters in support of the insurgency in collaboration with al-Qa'ida. AAA continues to announce the death or martyrdom of AAA members fighting the 'crusader' forces in Iraq.

AAA's leaders continue to make statements supporting attacks conducted by other groups and advocates violent acts against the West, such as the February 2006 statement praising attacks by angry mobs against the Danish consulates in Beirut and Damascus in response to the Danish cartoons controversy, and the April 2004 announcement urging Iraqi insurgents to kill Western hostages to avenge the death of Hamas leaders Abdul Aziz Rantisi and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.

AAA primarily receives funding from other extremist Sunni terrorist organisations, such as al-Qa'ida. AAA is one of a number of Sunni Salafist groups located in Lebanon to receive funds from Saudi Arabia. Financial assistance is also received by AAA from Muslims living abroad and repatriated to AAA in Lebanon and also from people of Lebanese origin visiting Lebanon from abroad.

### **Objectives**

AAA is a Lebanon based, Sunni extremist group, composed primarily of Palestinians and associated with al-Qa'ida. The group follows an extremist interpretation of Islam that justifies violence against civilians to achieve political ends. Some of those goals include overthrowing the Lebanese Government and impeding perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences. It also supports the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and the activities of violent extremists in the Palestinian Territories.

### **Leadership and Membership**

AAA was formerly led by Ahmed Abd al-Karim al-Saadi (aka Abu Muhjin). Abu Muhjin has continued his activities in secret after being sentenced to death by the Lebanese Government *in absentia* for the 1994 assassination of Sheikh Nizar al-Halabi, the leader of a rival Islamic extremist group. In his absence, Abu Muhjin's brother, Haytham 'Abd Al-Karim Al Sa'di (aka Abu Tariq), had been nominally leading the group.

AAA is primarily Palestinian and its membership is estimated to be 100-300 members. AAA operatives have previously fought in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, the Balkans and Iraq.

### **AAA engagement in terrorist activities**

On 8 January 2008 the Lebanese military judiciary security forces charged Mu'ammar Al-Awami (aka Ibn al-Shahid), who is believed to be associated with AAA, and charged him with planning attacks against American fast food outlets in Beirut in 2002 and 2003. AAA members were involved in other violence in Lebanon in 2003, including a June 2003 rocket attack on the Hariri affiliated Future TV building in Beirut.

Around 2003, AAA gave priority to supporting the insurgency in Iraq with a corresponding reduction in its activities in Lebanon. AAA operatives have been

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involved in fighting Coalition Forces in Iraq since at least 2005 and several members of the group have been killed in anti-Coalition operations.

In September 2004 AAA linked operatives were believed to be involved in a plan to target foreign embassies and Lebanese Government offices for terrorist attacks. In October 2004, Mahir al-Sa'idi, a member of AAA, was sentenced *in absentia* to life imprisonment for plotting to assassinate former US Ambassador to Lebanon David Satterfield in 2000. Al-Sa'idi was working in cooperation with Abu Muhammad al-Masri, the head of al-Qa'ida at the Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp, where fighting has occurred between Asbat al-Ansar and Fatah elements.

Members of AAA were believed responsible for a Katyusha rocket attack on the Galilee region of Israel in December 2005 and most likely sought refuge in southern Lebanon in AAA controlled neighbourhoods.

In May 2007 AAA announced one of its members was "martyred" during an attack outside Ayn al-Hilwah against the Lebanese Army in support of the Fatah al-Islam conflict in Nahr al-Barid refugee camp.

Lebanese authorities detained a cell of al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) extremists in June 2007 in the Bekaa Valley that had trained with AAA and was possibly planning terrorist attacks throughout Lebanon against United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) or Western targets.

In 2007, AAA remained focused on supporting jihad in Iraq and planning attacks against UNIFIL, Lebanese security forces, and Western interests. AAA associates were implicated in the 17 June 2007 Katyusha rocket attack against northern Israel.

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### **Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)**

**(Also known as: Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA); Islamic Army of Aden Abyan; Aden Islamic Army; Muhammed's Army/Army of Mohammed; Jaish Adan al Islami)**

The following information is based on publicly available details about the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA). The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) is listed in the United Nations 1267 Committee's consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the European Union and the governments of the UK, New Zealand and Canada. The US has designated the IAA as a terrorist organisation on the Terrorist Exclusion List.

#### ***Current status of the IAA***

The IAA is a Sunni Islamic extremist group and was formed in 1996 as a splinter group of the Yemeni Islamic Jihad. The IAA first came to public prominence in 1998 when it issued statements detailing its intention to overthrow the Yemeni government and implement Sharia law; and called for operations against Western interests in Yemen.

The IAA predominantly operates in the southern governorates of Yemen – particularly Aden and Abyan. The IAA has been involved in a number of terrorist attacks against Yemeni and Western interests. It has used bombings and hostage-taking as a means of furthering its goals. In 1998, the IAA abducted 16 Western tourists. Four of the tourists, including an Australian, were killed in a rescue attempt. The IAA also claimed responsibility for the suicide bomb attack against the USS Cole on 12 October 2000 and the MV Limburg on 7 October 2002. However, these operations are generally believed to have been al-Qa'ida operations.

The IAA is associated with al-Qa'ida and shares similar goals of driving Westerners from the region and removing the Yemeni government in order to establish an Islamic state.

Although current specific funding arrangements for the group are unknown, the IAA has traditionally conducted criminal activities as a means of raising money.

Between 2003 and 2006, counter-terrorism operations by Yemeni authorities reduced the size of the group and limited its operational effectiveness. However, the IAA has not been completely eradicated and there is no indication the intent of the IAA has changed. IAA members were last arrested in 2006, including the reported arrest of individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities in Iraq. In June 2008, IAA's leader, Khalid Abd al-Nabi, gave an interview which suggested he retained similar goals and ideology. He also stated the Abyan Governorate is ready for the emergence of IAA. While the interview does not explicitly call for a return to violence, it contains nothing to suggest that IAA has departed from its previous intentions to engage in terrorist acts.

#### ***Objectives***

The IAA aims to remove Western interests from Yemen and wider Arabian Peninsula, overthrow the current Yemeni government and establish an Islamic state.

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***Leadership and membership***

The IAA's founder and former leader Zain al-Abidin al-Mihdar (aka Abu Hassan) was executed in 1999 for his role in the 1998 hostage-taking of 16 Western tourists in Yemen. Founding members were veterans of the struggle in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Khalid Abd al-Nabi assumed leadership of the IAA before surrendering to authorities in October 2003. In return for his cooperation Abd al-Nabi received a Presidential pardon that same year. Abd al-Nabi continues to appear in, and make statements to, the media, usually in relation to IAA.

Although the current strength of the IAA is unknown, previous estimates of the group's size were between 30 to 100 core members divided into a number of small groups or cells. The group is likely to now have no more than 30 core members.

***IAA engagement in terrorist activities***

Security operations by the Yemeni authorities have restricted the IAA's capabilities within Yemen. However, IAA operatives still exist in Yemen and could undertake terrorist activities if and when the opportunity arises.

Terrorist attacks and plans for terrorist attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by, or reliably attributed to, the IAA, have included:

- August 2002: three Yemenis belonging to the IAA were convicted of carrying out bombing attacks in the southern port of Aden on 1 January 2001;
- 21 June 2003: attack on a military medical convoy, injuring 7 soldiers;
- June 2003: arrest of four alleged IAA members and seizure of a car packed with hand grenades, explosives and rocket-propelled grenades that had been used in the attack on a military medical convoy on 21 June 2003;
- 25 June 2003: clash between IAA members and government troops at the group's hideout in Harat – captured IAA members revealed they were waiting for orders to carry out terrorist operations;
- October 2003: a planned car bomb attack against the US, UK and German embassies in Sana'a allegedly involving the IAA was disrupted;
- March/April 2006: arrest of IAA members suspected of planning to travel to Iraq to fight foreign forces.

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**Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan**  
**(Also known as: IMU, Islamic party of Turkestan, Islamic Movement of Turkestan)**

The following background information is based on publicly available details about the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU has been listed in the United Nations 1267 Committee's consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the governments of the UK, US, and Canada.

***Current Status of the IMU***

The origins of the IMU date from the early 1990s, when Juma Namangani, a former Soviet soldier who fought in Afghanistan, and Tahir Yuldosh (variant of name, spelled Yuldashev in most reporting), an unofficial mullah and head of the Adolat (Justice) Party, joined forces to implement sharia law in the city of Namangan in Uzbekistan's part of the Ferghana Valley. Alarmed by Adolat's demands to transform Uzbekistan into an Islamic state, the government banned Adolat in March 1992. A period of repression followed, forcing many Islamic militants to flee the Ferghana Valley.

Namangani fled to Tajikistan, where he participated in the Tajik Civil War and established a base for his fighters in that country. Yuldashev escaped to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, where he established links to other Islamic militants. He also made clandestine trips to Uzbekistan, maintaining contact with his supporters and setting up underground cells. By the late 1990s, the IMU was officially formed. Its stated goal, as posted on the internet in August 1999, was the "establishment of an Islamic state with the application of the Shariah" in Uzbekistan.

The IMU's reach into Central Asia peaked from 1999 to 2001, when it conducted a series of attacks in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and made incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, from bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The IMU's goal of an Islamic state was expanded in 2001 to encompass an area stretching from the Caucasus to China's western province of Xinjiang, under the new banners of the Islamic Party of Turkestan in April 2001 and the Islamic Movement of Turkestan in May 2001. However, the group has always been and continues to be known as the IMU, and that is the name under which it is listed by the US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism as a foreign terrorist organisation.

By the end of the 1990s, the IMU had relocated to Afghanistan, due to the lack of support for the movement in Uzbekistan and the measures taken against it by the government. The IMU suffered heavy losses in the fighting that followed the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, including the death of Namangani. The remnants of the IMU fled to the tribal areas of neighbouring Pakistan, where their behaviour in some areas brought them into conflict with the local tribesmen and the Pakistani military. However, many IMU fighters have successfully integrated into the local community, where they have enjoyed the hospitality and sanctuary provided by the tribes.

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The IMU continues to recruit fighters, and IMU members fight alongside the Taliban and al-Qa'ida against coalition and Pakistani forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders converge, is a fertile recruiting ground for the IMU, which has successfully exploited the widespread poverty in the region in its recruitment strategy.

IMU members have received training in camps in Afghanistan, some controlled by al-Qa'ida or the Taliban. The IMU also trains in camps in Pakistan and maintains bases there. Typical IMU tactics have included hostage-taking, raids on government security force outposts, and bombings.

The IMU has close ties with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. Senior IMU leaders have held positions in the al-Qa'ida hierarchy. Sources of funding for the IMU have included criminal activities such as drug trafficking, as well as donations from sympathisers and al-Qa'ida.

On 11 September 2006, the IMU leadership renewed its commitment to attack the governments of Central Asia and issued personal threats against the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik Presidents. This statement reinforced the IMU leadership's commitment to al-Qa'ida's ideology of global jihad and continued anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric.

The IMU's losses in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the defection of fighters to a splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union, have not diminished the group's capability and intent to conduct terrorist attacks.

### *Objectives*

The IMU's initial objective was to overthrow the Uzbek regime and replace it with an Islamic state. Uzbekistan is part of what its Russian conquerors called Turkestan, a collective name for the old Central Asian feudal states. The IMU's stated goal now is to establish an Islamic caliphate in Turkestan, stretching from the Caspian Sea to China's Xinjiang Province and encompassing the current Central Asian nations.

### *Leadership and membership*

Tahir Yuldashev is the leader of the IMU. His co-founder, Juma Namamgani, was killed in Afghanistan following the US invasion.

The IMU has attracted support from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, principally Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Chechens, and Uighurs from western China. The strength of the IMU is approximately 500, with members located in South Asia, Central Asia, and Iran. Among the IMU's supporters in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia are a large Uzbek diaspora and several Islamic extremist groups.

### *Terrorist activities*

Terrorist attacks and activities inside Central Asia for which the IMU has claimed responsibility or for which responsibility has been reliably attributed include:

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- 16 February 1999: five car bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, that killed at least 16 people and wounded over 130, in an apparent attempt to assassinate President Karimov;
- 21 August 1999: taking hostage four Japanese geologists, their interpreter, and the head of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior troops;
- 12 August 2000: taking hostage four US mountain climbers;
- 27 December 2002: a bombing in a market in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, that killed six people and wounded 40;
- 8 May 2003: a bombing in a currency exchange office in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, that killed one person;
- 31 January and 13 June 2005: bombings outside the Ministry of Emergency Situations in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, that killed one person and wounded at least 12;
- 25 January 2006: an armed attack on a pre-trial detention centre in Kairakum, Tajikistan, that killed the centre's chief;
- 12 May 2006: armed attacks on border and customs posts in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The IMU is now fighting in support of the Taliban and other Islamic groups against the Afghan government and international military forces in Afghanistan.

- In mid-2007, seven heavily armed militants connected to the IMU were arrested while planting a mine on a road used by International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) patrols in northern Afghanistan. The group admitted to carrying out rocket attacks, suicide missions and recruitment activities.
- In May 2008, two IMU members in possession of explosives and hand grenades were arrested in Afghanistan. The two admitted to planting mines on a road and providing a base for militant activities.

IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev has also stated his support for the Pakistani Taliban in its conflict with the Pakistani security forces, and Pakistan claims to have killed at least 150 Uzbek militants in 2007.

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### **Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)**

**(Also known as Jaish-e-Mohammed; Jaish-e-Muhammed; Jaish-i-Mohammed; Jaish-i-Mohammad; Jaish-i-Muhammad; Jaish-i-Muhammed; Jeish-e-Mahammed; Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem; Tehrik Ul-Furqaan; Army of Mohammed; Mohammed's Army; Army of the Prophet; National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty and Army of the Prophet; Khuddam ul-Islam (KuI); Khudamul Islam; Kuddam e Islami; Jamaat ul-Furqan (JuF); Jesh-e-Mohammadi.)**

The following information is based on publicly available details about Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). JeM is listed in the United Nations 1267 Committee's consolidated list and by the governments of the US, the UK, Canada, New Zealand, the European Union, India and Pakistan.

#### ***Current status of JeM***

JeM is a Sunni Islamic extremist organisation based in Pakistan which operates primarily in Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK). Recently, however, there are indications that JeM's operational focus has turned towards attacks in Pakistan proper, Afghanistan and wider India.

Established in 2000, JeM was founded by the radical Islamic scholar and jihadist leader, Maulana Masood Azhar, following his release from an Indian jail in exchange for 155 hostages hijacked aboard an Indian Airlines aircraft on New Years Eve 1999. With support from Usama bin Laden, the Taliban, and several other Sunni extremist organisations in Pakistan, Azhar did not return to his former group, the Islamic militant group Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HuM), but formed JeM as a new group. JeM is aligned politically with prominent Islamic Pakistani party, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F).

Funding for JeM is derived from both legitimate business interests, including commodity trading and property, and through Islamic charitable foundations including the al-Rashid Trust (also known as the al Amin Trust) whose accounts were ordered to be frozen by the UN Security Council for suspected links to al-Qa'ida.

JeM operates with other Islamic militant groups in IAK, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), as well as conducting joint operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan with groups such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI), Lashkar e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Furthermore, JeM remains closely associated with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban.

JeM was banned by the Pakistan government in January 2002. Following the ban, JeM split into two factions, Khuddam ul-Islam (KuI) headed by Azhar and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JuF) headed by Maulana Abdul Jabbar. Jabbar was detained for two years, until 2004, on charges relating to the assassination attempt on the President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf.

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Both KuI and JuF were also subsequently banned by Pakistan in November 2003. Despite these factions, the group is commonly regarded as a single entity and referred to as JeM.

The organisation continues to concentrate its efforts against Indian security forces (military and police), government installations, and civilians in the disputed territories of IAK. While the India-Pakistan peace initiatives to resolve the Kashmir issue have led to an overall reduction in the level of infiltration and insurgent activity in IAK, JeM maintains an active presence in the region.

There has been a recent shift in JeM's operational focus, in particular, to join the Taliban movement in attacks against government and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. A large meeting of various extremist groups in Pakistan, in early June 2008, included members of JeM. The gathering reportedly resolved to co-operate and combine forces to concentrate on the Afghan conflict, while continuing the Kashmir struggle as a lesser imperative. The threat to Coalition forces in Afghanistan is said to have increased in 2008, resulting in increased levels of casualties, due mainly to this added onslaught from Pakistani jihadist groups such as JeM. Their complicity in the Afghan Taliban movement was evidenced by the late June 2008 public beheading by JeM members of two Afghans in Pakistan, accused of passing information to international forces in Afghanistan.

JeM operates a number of camps in Pakistan which provide both religious instruction and military style guerrilla training and support. Training and support is provided, not only to JeM members from Kashmir and Pakistan, but also to individual jihadists from other parts of the world. Reporting also indicates JeM may be helping to facilitate the activities of international jihadists intending to conduct terrorist operations outside Kashmir or India, including the UK and US. The British national, Rashid Rauf, arrested in Pakistan as one of the main coordinating figures allegedly responsible for the disrupted British trans-Atlantic plane bombing plot in August 2006, is strongly suspected of having links with JeM. Investigators have also uncovered possible connections between JeM and the British-born suicide bombers responsible for the 7 July 2005 London subway attacks.

***Objectives***

JeM is a group that uses violence in pursuit of its stated objective of uniting IAK with Pakistan under a radical interpretation of Islamic law, as well as the eradication of Hindu and other non-Muslim presence on the sub-continent. JeM actively promotes jihad against the US and other nations for perceived violations of Muslim rights.

***Leadership and membership***

JeM's founder, Maulana Masood Azhar, remains the group's Amir, despite maintaining a low profile following JeM's implication in the 2003 assassination attempts on President Musharraf.

JeM is organised into military and missionary bands, administered through six or seven departments. Although exact numbers cannot be accurately determined, it is estimated that JeM has several hundred active fighters and thousands of followers.

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The majority of JeM's membership consists of jihadists from Pakistan and Kashmir, but also includes some Arabs and Afghans.

*JeM engagement in terrorist activities*

Few attacks have been openly claimed by JeM since it was last re-listed for proscription. However, recent instances where JeM militants have publicly acknowledged acts, or plans to conduct acts, of terrorism are listed:

- Three separate grenade attacks on police targets in Srinagar in May 2006, injuring a total of 34 people; were claimed by JeM.
- In May 2006 another grenade attack on police vehicle escorting a Human Rights Commission vehicle through the Iqbal Park area of Srinagar killed one policeman and injured ten other people.
- Three separate firearm attacks on police targets in Srinagar, attributed to a new JeM module, killed two police and injuring one other in July 2006.
- In August 2006, three separate firearm attacks on police officials resulted in four dead and three injured.
- In October 2006 two firearm attacks on police officials were claimed by JeM militants.
- Indian police arrested two reported JeM members in Delhi in November 2006 and recovered 2 kilograms of explosives and a sum of money.
- Three JeM extremists arrested in November 2007 in Lucknow, India, with a large amount of arms, ammunition and explosives, admitted on camera that they had been planning to kidnap Congress leader Rahul Gandhi to secure the release of 42 Pakistani prisoners.
- A public beheading by JeM members of two Afghans who were accused of passing information to international forces in Afghanistan occurred late June 2008.
- According to a report on a Jihadist website in Pakistan, JeM claimed the July 2008 killing of a total of 47 Indian troops in Kashmir.
- Jailed JeM militant threatens former Pakistani president with assassination.
- Pakistani interior ministry sources stated on 17 December that the jailed Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) militant Ahmed Omar Sheikh had made a telephoned assassination threat to former president Pervez Musharraf in the middle of November 2008.

While arrests and disruptions have been moderately successful, and despite their lack of visibility, reporting continues to suggest that JeM remains operational and is continuing to recruit and train new members as well as plan attacks.

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**Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)**

**(Also known as: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvie, Laskar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkare Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangwi, Lashkar-i-Jhangwi, Jhangvi Army, Lashkar Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhanvi, Lashkar-i-Jangvi, Lashkar e Jhangvi, Lashkar Jangvi, Laskar e Jahangvi).**

The following information is based on publicly available details about Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ). The LeJ is listed in the UN 1267 Committee's consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the governments of the UK, the US, Canada and Pakistan.

*Current status of the LeJ*

Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) is a Sunni Deobandi Islamic terrorist group based primarily in Pakistan's Punjab region and the city of Karachi. The group was formed in 1996 by Akram Lahori, Malik Ishaque, and Riaz Basra of the radical sectarian organisation, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), who accused the SSP's leadership of deviating from the ideals of its co-founder, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi.

Sectarian terrorist groups have been responsible for over 4,000 deaths in Pakistan since the late 1980s, and LeJ has established a reputation as the most violent Sunni extremist organisation in the country, killing hundreds of Shias since its formation. Among the Shias LeJ has targeted for killing have been doctors, lawyers, teachers, politicians, lobbyists, and scholars. LeJ attacks have also targeted Christians, including attacks on a Christian church and a Christian school in Islamabad in 2002, and Iranian nationals in Pakistan, accusing the latter of funding groups in Pakistan perceived as trying to establish Shia dominance.

While sectarian attacks remain LeJ's primary driving force, it has broadened its focus to target the Western presence in Pakistan, such as the abduction and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi in 2002, the car bomb attack on French nationals in Karachi in May 2002, and car bombings outside the US Consulate in Karachi in June 2002 and March 2006.

LeJ has also been involved in attacks on Pakistani government targets, including two failed assassination attempts against President Musharaff in 2003, and the failed assassination attempt against former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. LeJ chief Qari Zafar is suspected of involvement in the September 2008 truck bombing of the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad.

A large portion of LeJ's funding comes from wealthy supporters in Karachi. Additional funding is derived from sources in Saudi Arabia, as well as from criminal activities, such as protection rackets and extortion from both Shia and Sunni banks and businesses.

Pakistani government security crackdowns on sectarian groups have been only partially successful, as fear of retaliation means that some judges are reluctant to hear sectarian cases, and police officers investigating sectarian murders have been killed. The large increase in the number of Deobandi madrassas (religious schools) in Pakistan provides a pool of manpower from which LeJ can recruit.

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LeJ operated major training camps in Muridke and Kabirwal, Pakistan, and in Sarobi, Afghanistan. However, the camp in Afghanistan was destroyed during the US invasion in 2001, and the camps in Pakistan have reportedly been closed due to pressure from the police. LeJ has reportedly been one of several terrorist groups that have set up eight training camps in the Darra Adam Khel area of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, and LeJ was described as the most active group in the area.

As part of the Sunni militant community, LeJ can rely on the assistance of other Pakistani terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami, Jaish-e-Mohammad, all of which are members of Usama bin Laden's International Islamic Front.

LeJ also has an extremely close relationship with the Afghan Taliban, having fought with them against the Northern Alliance and participated in killings of Shias during the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

***Objectives***

LeJ's goals are to establish an Islamic Sunni state in Pakistan based on Sharia law, through the use of violence if necessary; to have all Shias declared non-believers; and to eliminate followers of other faiths, especially Jews, Christians, and Hindus.

***Leadership and membership***

The current leader of LeJ is reportedly Qari Zafar of Karachi, who also has links to al-Qa'ida. He probably assumed the role in early 2007, following the 4 February 2007 arrest of former leader Rizwan Ahmad in Lahore on suspicion of planning suicide attacks.

LeJ is estimated to have around 300 active members. It maintains a multi-cellular structure, made up of loosely co-ordinated regional sub-units, further divided into several small cells of five to eight members each that operate independently of one another.

***Terrorist activities***

Recent events confirm LeJ's continued existence and involvement in terrorist attacks and planning for future attacks:

- 26 September 2008: three LeJ-trained terrorists were killed in a police raid. The police also found bomb-making material and LeJ literature, as well as the body of a Pakistani businessman who had been kidnapped and killed by the terrorists.
- 26 September 2008: LeJ member Raheemullah was arrested. He had been involved in past attacks and had been planning attacks against police officers and Shias.
- 20 September 2008: suicide bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad; LeJ leader Qari Zafar is suspected of involvement in the attack.
- 8 September 2008: LeJ member Zeeshan was arrested again. He had previously been arrested for a 7 July 2008 bombing in Karachi, and is also suspected of involvement in the Nishtar Park bombing in Karachi on 11 April 2006.

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- 27 July 2008: senior LeJ member Shafiqur Rehman was arrested in Quetta. He confessed to seven assassinations in Quetta, and is suspected of involvement in over 100 cases of sectarian terrorism.
- 20 June 2008: two LeJ members were among five men arrested in Lahore who confessed to planning suicide attacks in Lahore and other cities.
- 27 February 2008: three LeJ members were arrested for planning attacks on several important political leaders in the district of Jhang.
- 26 February 2008: four LeJ members were arrested for planning attacks on political and religious leaders and senior police officers in Lahore.
- 5 February 2008: LeJ member Fida Hussain, believed to have been involved in the suicide bombing of a Pakistan Air Force bus in October 2007, was arrested in Lahore.
- 27 January 2008: a bombing near a mosque in Peshawar that killed a police chief and 14 others was attributed to LeJ.
- 17 January 2008: a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in Peshawar that killed 10 people was attributed to the LeJ.
- 10 January 2008: 40 LeJ members were arrested in Lahore with several weapons recovered.
- 18 October 2007: attempted assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto; the Mati-ur-Rehman group, which includes LeJ members, was suspected of involvement in the attack.
- 16 June 2007: Karachi police announced the arrest of two LeJ members suspected of involvement in the Nishtar Park bombing on 11 April 2006.
- 24 February 2007: three would-be suicide bombers, travelling by bicycle, were killed when a speed bump set off the explosives they were carrying. The bombers were LeJ members attempting to attack a prayer meeting in Chechawatni, where a large number of police officers were expected to be in attendance.
- 13 February 2007: two LeJ members were arrested in connection with several attacks, including a raid on a Shia community centre in Rawalpindi in 2002 that killed 15 people.

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