



Appendix E – The Chronology of Key Intelligence Issues

Part 1: The alleged acquisition of Uranium from Africa

Date	Event
Late 2001 – early 2002	The CIA receives first indications of Iraq's attempt to source uranium from Africa.
February 2002	<p>Former Ambassador, Joseph Wilson, sent by CIA to Niger to investigate report of Iraq's attempted uranium purchase. Wilson reported back saying it was doubtful that any transaction had occurred because of the close controls exercised over Niger's uranium industry and monitoring by the IAEA.</p> <p>It should be noted that information relating to this visit and its outcomes were not passed on to intelligence agencies in Australia or the UK.</p>
1 March 2002	The US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research advises Secretary of State Powell that claims of Iraqi attempts to source uranium from Niger are not credible.
June 2002	UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), acquired intelligence regarding Iraq's intention to obtain uranium from Africa.
26 August 2002	US Vice President, Dick Cheney portrayed Hussein's nuclear ambitions as a "mortal threat" to the US.

Date	Event
September 2002	The CIA expresses “reservations” to British intelligence about information regarding Iraqi efforts to acquire African uranium ¹ , after the UK informs the agency about its intention to include the allegation in a forthcoming report.
24 September 2002	The UK Dossier, <i>Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government</i> , dated 24 September 2002, refers the fact that ‘there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.’ ²
24 September 2002	Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq’s weapons capability. Including CIA intelligence that Iraq had between 1999 and 2001 attempted to buy 500 tonnes of uranium oxide from Niger.
26 September 2002	US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also ‘cited Iraq’s attempt to obtain from Niger as evidence of its persistent nuclear ambitions.’ ³
September / October 2002	US Intelligence officials advise Senate Committees of their differing view to the UK report of Iraq’s attempt to source uranium from Niger.
October 2002	US State Department receives documents relating to uranium acquisition by Iraq. Documents are distributed to appropriate agencies.
October 2002	Release of the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s WMD programmes. It includes reference to foreign intelligence reporting on Iraq’s acquisition of uranium from Niger. The reference is qualified and indicates that the CIA ‘cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources’. ⁴

1 P. Kerr, *Chronology of Bush Claim that Iraq Attempted to Obtain Uranium from Niger*, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, September 2003

2 The UK Government, *Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government*, dated 24 September 2002, p. 25

3 S. Hersh, *Who Lied to Whom*, The New Yorker, 25 September 2003

4 CIA, National Intelligence Estimate *Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*, October 2002, p. 84

Date	Event
5 – 7 October 2002	The CIA, noting US intelligence community differences with the UK over Iraqi uranium acquisition, requests the White House remove a statement referring to the uranium acquisition, from the draft of a speech to be given by President Bush on 7 October. (The delivered speech contained no reference to uranium acquisition by Iraq).
19 December 2003	The US State Department through the release of a “fact sheet” for the first time publicly identified Niger as the alleged source of the uranium being sought by Iraq. The IAEA requested information from the US on the alleged acquisition immediately after the release of the fact sheet.
20 January 2003	President Bush reported to Congress that Iraq in its 7 December 2002 declaration to the United Nations failed to declare its attempts to acquire uranium from Africa.
23 January 2003	US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, in the New York Times regarding Iraq’s 7 December 2002 declaration, ‘fails to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get uranium from abroad.’ ⁵
26 January 2003	The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in a speech in Switzerland questioned, ‘why is Iraq still trying to procure uranium and the special equipment needed to transform it into material for nuclear weapons?’
27 January 2003	The Director General of the IAEA, Dr El Baradei, reports to the United Nations Security Council, ‘no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities at those locations has been detected during these inspections.’ ⁶
28 January 2003	President Bush’s State of the Union address includes reference to Iraq’s attempt to source uranium from Africa, crediting UK as the source of the information. This reference is also used in three other administration statements in January 2003.
29 January 2003	The US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated in a media briefing that Iraq was recently discovered attempting to source uranium from Africa.

5 Dr C. Rice, *Why We Know Iraq is Lying*, New York Times, 23 January 2003

6 Director General IAEA, *IAEA Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)*, 27 January 2003, p. 7

Date	Event
4 February 2003	The US State Department passes to the IAEA the information it requested regarding Iraq's attempts to source uranium from Africa. The information is qualified with the descriptors; "cannot confirm these reports" and "has questions regarding some specific claims".
5 February 2003	The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, address to UN Security Council. But does not mention Iraq's attempt to obtain uranium from Africa.
14 February 2003	The Director General of the IAEA confirmed that the IAEA and UNMOVIC through its inspection programme had found no proscribed nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq. Although, he added that a number of issues were subject to continuing investigations.
7 March 2003	The Director General of the IAEA, Dr El Baradei, in his update to the United Nations Security Council reported that the IAEA had concluded, 'with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents – which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger – are in fact not authentic.' ⁷
14 March 2003	The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, acknowledges that the documents relating to Iraq's attempts to source uranium from Niger may be false.
9 September 2003	The UK Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee report into the UK intelligence assessments of Iraq's WMD confirmed that the (UK) SIS continued 'to believe that the Iraqis were attempting to negotiate the purchase of uranium from Niger' ⁸ , based on information from a second independent source.

Notes:

- The International Institute of Strategic Studies (UK), does not refer to the issue of the alleged attempts by Iraq to import uranium from Africa in its publication; *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction – A net Assessment*, dated 9 September 2002

7 Director General IAEA, *Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update*, 7 March 2003, p. 3

8 UK Intelligence and Security Committee, *Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments*, 9 September 2003, p. 28

Part 2: Acquisition of Aluminium Tubes

Date	Event
July 2001	<p>Approximately 3000 aluminium tubes intercepted in Jordan on their way into Iraq. (Iraq sought to purchase the tubes from China in 2000 through an Australian intermediary).</p> <p>Claimed by CIA to be a big step forward in understanding what Iraq was attempting to achieve. CIA supported early claim that this demonstrated Iraq's nuclear ambitions.</p>
Late 2001	<p>A noted US centrifuge expert advises that it would be extremely difficult to make these tubes into centrifuges.</p> <p>The CIA in response said the agency does have support for its view from centrifuge experts, but did not elaborate.</p>
7 August 2002	<p>Vice President Cheney in San Francisco: Speaking of Hussein, that `left to his own devices, it's the judgement of many of us that in the not-too-distant future, he will acquire nuclear weapons'.⁹</p>
26 August 2002	<p>Vice President Cheney describes Hussein as a sworn enemy of the US.</p>
August 2002	<p>The US White House Iraq Group (WHIG) is established with the purpose of educating the public about the threat from Saddam. The Group was to set the strategy for each stage of the confrontation with Baghdad. Planned speeches and white papers on many themes, but the Iraqi nuclear issue was prominent.</p>
6 September 2002	<p>White House Chief of Staff Chard, while not publicly mentioning the WHIG, hinted at its mission.</p>
7 September 2002	<p>US President Bush and UK Prime Minister Blair met at Camp David. They described alarming new evidence citing an IAEA report which showed what had been going on at former Iraqi nuclear sites. President Bush claimed the IAEA had reported Iraq was six months away from developing a weapon.</p> <p>While there was no new IAEA report, a White House spokesman acknowledged that the President was `imprecise' in his reference to the source of the advice, however, maintained that the thrust of the President's claim was valid. The spokesman also acknowledged that the source of the advice was the CIA.</p>

⁹ US Vice President, Mr Dick Cheney, Address to Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, 7 August 2002.

Date	Event
8 September 2002	A headline appears in the Sunday edition of the New York Times. The aluminium tubes were intended components of centrifuges. The issue has become public.
8 September 2002	In separate statements US Vice President Cheney, US Secretary of State Powell, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Rice, refer to the issue of the aluminium tubes and their as part of the Iraqi nuclear programme.
9 September 2002	<p>The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence questioned why there had been no authoritative estimate of the danger posed by Iraq. The Committee expressed concern that the views of the US intelligence community are not receiving adequate attention by policymakers in both Congress and the executive branch.</p> <p>The Chair of the Committee requested the preparation of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).</p>
11 September 2002	<p>Director of the CIA Tenet, agreed to the preparation of an NIE.</p> <p>Comment: The NIE was subsequently produced in two weeks when normally such documents take months to prepare.</p> <p>‘The US intelligence community was now in a position to give its first coordinated answer to a question that every top official had already answered.’¹⁰</p> <p>The White House preferred to avoid an NIE as it was aware there were disagreements over details in almost every aspect of the administration’s case against Iraq. It did not want a document with lots of footnotes and disclaimers.</p>
12 September 2002	US President Bush address to United Nations General Assembly covers numerous themes, with reference to Iraq’s nuclear program being given prominence.

10 B. Gellman and W. Pincus, *Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence*, Washington Post, 10 August 2003, p. A01

Date	Event
Late September 2002	<p>A draft White Paper was being prepared by the WHIG. They wanted to use telling images, not the qualified language of intelligence assessments. The draft paper also made reference to Iraq's attempt to source uranium from Africa.</p> <p>The draft was never published as according to Condoleezza Rice and senior director for counterproliferation, Robert Joseph, the paper "was not strong enough".</p> <p>The US Energy Department and Bureau of Intelligence and Research, do not accept that aluminium tubes were intended for a centrifuge.</p>
24 September 2002	<p>The UK Dossier, <i>The Assessment of the British Government on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction</i>, refers specifically to Iraq's repeated attempts 'to acquire a very large quantity (60,000 or more) of specialised aluminium tubes'.¹¹ The Dossier also states however, that there is no definitive intelligence which indicates that the tubes are intended for use in Iraq's nuclear programme.</p>
October 2002	<p>Release of the NIE on Iraq's WMD programmes. One of its key judgements was: 'Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.'¹²</p>
7 October 2002	<p>President Bush reference to a "Mushroom Cloud" increases the rhetoric on the threat of Iraq's nuclear programme.</p>
12 October 2002	<p>Similarly, General Tommy Franks, (COMCENCOM), also claims that inaction on Iraq may result in a "mushroom cloud".</p>
December 2002	<p>Gas centrifuge experts previously consulted by US government said new evidence further undermined assertion regarding the use of the tubes.</p> <p>Administration response portrayed the scientists as a minority and continued to promote the centrifuge theory as possible.</p>

11 UK Government, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government*, 24 September 2002, p. 26

12 CIA National Intelligence Estimate: *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*, October 2002, p. 1

Date	Event
9 January 2003	UNMOVIC/IAEA inspections. `IAEA's analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminium tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it.' ¹³
28 January 2003	President Bush's State of the Union address includes reference to aluminium tubes as well as Iraq's attempt to source uranium from Africa, despite advice from US intelligence analysts. This reference is also used in three other administration statements in January 2003.
5 February 2003	The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in his address to the UN Security Council included the US Government's most extensive account of the use of the aluminium tubes. He also however, acknowledged disagreement among US intelligence analysts on the issue.
February 2003	Experts from US national (missile) laboratories working with UNMOVIC, advise the aluminium tubes "fit perfectly in launcher", and confirmed that Iraq had run out of rocket body casings.
14 February 2003	The Director General of the IAEA confirmed that the IAEA and UNMOVIC through its inspection programme had found no proscribed nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq. Although, he added that a number of issues were subject to continuing investigations.
7 March 2003	The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in his remarks to UN Security Council, accepted the UNMOVIC/IAEA findings relating to the aluminium tubes, however, he also advised that the US were aware of further technical information regarding the tubes, and was pleased to hear that the IAEA would continue to monitor the issue.

Notes:

- The International Institute of Strategic Studies (UK), does not refer to the issue of the aluminium tubes in its publication; *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction – A net Assessment*, dated 9 September 2002.

13 Director General IAEA, *Status of the Agency's Verification Activities in Iraq As of 8 January 2003*, 9 January 2003, p. 2

Part 3: Mobile BW Agent Production Trailers

Date	Event
25 January 1999	UNSCOM's report on Disarmament to the United Nations Security Council highlights that Iraq's fifth Full, Final and Complete Disclosure (September 1997) of its BW programme `omits any reference to mobile production facilities once considered, according to Lt. Gen. Amer Al Saadi. ¹⁴
9 September 2002	The UK International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), in its document, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction – A Net Assessment, cites advice from former Iraqi officials that Iraq had `a fleet of disguised refrigerator Renault trucks, which have been converted to mobile biological production laboratories. ¹⁵ The IISS does however qualify this claim by stating that it could not be confirmed.
24 September 2002	The UK Dossier, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government, cites that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNSCOM had established that Iraq had considered the use of mobile BW production facilities; • Evidence from defectors during 2000 – 2001 pointed to their existence, and • Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities.¹⁶
October 2002	The CIA in its National Intelligence Estimate cited `that Iraq has now established large-scale, redundant and concealed BW agent production capabilities based on mobile BW facilities. ¹⁷ <p>CIA Intelligence indicated that in 1995 Iraq planned to secretly construct seven sets of mobile biological warfare (BW) production plants; six on semi trailers and one on a railroad car.</p>
28 January 2003	President Bush's State of the Union address includes reference to fact that according to Iraqi defectors, Iraq in the late 1990's, had several mobile biological weapons laboratories.

14 UNSCOM, Report on Disarmament to the United Nations Security Council, S/1999/94, dated 29 January 1999, p. 168

15 International Institute of Strategic Studies (UK), *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction – A Net Assessment*, 9 September 2002, p. 39

16 The UK Government, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government*, 24 September 2002, p. 22

17 CIA, National Intelligence Estimate: *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*, October 2002, p. 17

Date	Event
5 February 2003	The US Secretary of State Powell, in his address to UN Security Council on Iraq's failure to disarm, provided extensive supporting evidence on the `existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. ¹⁸
7 March 2003	The Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr Hans Blix in his report to the United Nation Security Council stated, in response to the intelligence on mobile BW production facilities as presented by US Secretary of State on 5 February 2003, that Iraq had said the mobile facilities do not exist. He added that `several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found. ¹⁹
Late April 2003	Kurdish forces take possession of a specialised tractor-trailer near Mosul. It is subsequently handed over to the US military. US forces discover a mobile laboratory truck in Baghdad. It is a toxicology laboratory from the 1980s that could be used to support BW or legitimate research. ²⁰
Early May 2003	US Military forces discover another mobile BW production facility at the Al Kindi Research, Testing, Development and Engineering facility in Mosul. It is similar to the one found by the Kurdish forces. Senior Iraqi officials at Al Kindi claimed the `trailers were used to chemically produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons. ²¹
2 June 2003	According to the New York Times, the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) disputed the CIA findings on the Iraqi mobile BW trailers. INR claimed `that it was premature to conclude that trailers were evidence of such weapons' ²² .

18 US Secretary of State, *Iraq Failing to Disarm*, Address to the United Nations Security Council, 5 February 2003, p. 8

19 Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Oral introduction to the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC, 7 March 2003

20 CIA and DIA, *Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants*, 28 May 2003, p. 1

21 *ibid*, p. 5

22 D. Jehl, *After the War: Intelligence; Agency Disputes CIA View On Trailers as Weapons labs*, The New York Times, 26 June 2003, p. 1

Date	Event
5 June 2003	<p>The Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr Hans Blix in his report to the United Nation Security Council commenting on the media attention being given to the issue of Iraq's mobile BW production facilities stated, 'Even before UNMOVIC began its inspections in November 2002, the Commission had received information about such facilities and our inspectors were looking for sites where such mobile units could be hooked up for support services. Upon our request, the Iraqi side presented some information about mobile systems they possessed. As you can see from our report, neither the information presented nor pictures given to us by the Iraqi side, match the description that has recently been made available to us, as well as to the media, by the United States.'²³</p>
8 June 2003	<p>The UK Government requested that its intelligence agency MI6, and technical experts from Porton Down, (the UK microbiological research establishment), review the Iraqi mobile BW trailers after US analysis cast serious doubts on whether they actually were BW laboratories. It was considered 'likely that the units were designed to be used for hydrogen production to fill artillery balloons, part of a system originally sold to Saddam by Britain in 1987.'²⁴</p> <p>The official UK investigation confirmed that the trailers were not mobile BW laboratories, but rather they were as the Iraqis had insisted, 'for the production of hydrogen to fill artillery balloons.'²⁵</p>
26 June 2003	<p>US Senator Carl Levin, a member of the US Senate Committee on Armed Services, formally wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence (George Tenet), regarding the 2 June 2003 New York Times article and raised a number of questions including the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'If the New York Times article is accurate and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research issued a report disagreeing with the CIA's conclusion ... why isn't this dissenting view noted on the CIA's website? • Is the statement in the New York Times article that the CIA and DIA did not consult with other intelligence agencies before issuing the 28 May report accurate?'²⁶

23 Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Oral introduction to the 13th quarterly report of UNMOVIC, 5 June 2003

24 P. Beaumont and A. Barnett, *Blow to Blair over 'mobile labs'*, The Observer, 8 June 2003

25 P. Beaumont and A. Barnett, *Iraqi mobile labs nothing to do with germ warfare, report finds*, The Observer, 15 June 2003

Date	Event
2 October 2003	Dr David Kay in his interim report on activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) stated that the ISG had not yet been able to corroborate the existence of a mobile BW production effort. Investigation into the origin of and intended use for the two trailers found in northern Iraq in April has yielded a number of explanations, including hydrogen, missile propellant, and BW production, but technical limitations would prevent any of these processes from being ideally suited to these trailers. ²⁷

26 US Senator C. Levin, Letter to Director Central Intelligence, 26 June 2003

27 Dr David Kay, *Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 2 October 2003, p. 6

Part 4: Development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for BW and CW Agent Delivery

Date	Event
September 1995	<p>Iraq declared to UNSCOM `the existence of two projects concerning the use of aircraft drop tanks to disseminate BW agents. One employed a Mirage F-1 aircraft and the other a MIG 21.²⁸ Iraq indicated that the MIG 21 was intended to be an unmanned delivery system for BW agents.</p> <p>Iraq declared that work on this project halted as a result of the 1991 Gulf War. However, in subsequent declarations Iraq provided conflicting advice regarding the MIG 21 project, and according to UNSCOM `there has been no clear evidence of the termination of the development of pilotless aircraft for BW dispersal.²⁹</p>
17 December 1998	<p>During Operation Desert Fox, an attack on a military installation in southern Iraq revealed up to 12 unmanned L-29 aircraft fitted with wing tanks and spray nozzles. UK intelligence concluded they could be used for the delivery of chemical and biological agents.</p> <p>US intelligence analysts were more sceptical of the possible use for these aircraft, they do however, acknowledge the delivery of CW and BW agents as a possibility.</p>
2000	<p>The CIA reported what appeared to be new aerial testing of the L29 drones.</p>
January 2001	<p>The US Defense Department reported that `Iraq has continued work on the conversion of a L-29 jet trainer aircraft', which `may be intended for the delivery of chemical and biological agents.³⁰</p>
9 September 2002	<p>International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK), in its document, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction – A Net Assessment, includes reference to the possible use of modified L-29 aircraft as unmanned aerial vehicles for the delivery of biological and chemical agents.</p>

28 United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), Report No S/1999/94 dated 25 January 1999, p. 121

29 bid, p. 123

30 US Secretary for Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response – January 2001*, 10 January 2001, p.42

Date	Event
24 September 2002	The UK Dossier, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government, dated 24 September 2002, refers the fact that the UK were aware from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which is potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area. ³¹
October 2002	The CIA concludes in its National Intelligence Estimate as a key judgement that Iraq is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely chemical warfare agents. ³² UAV specialists from the US Air Force and analysts at the Pentagon based US Missile Defense Agency do not agree with the NIE conclusions on the UAVs. Their dissenting opinion is noted in the NIE.
7 October 2002	US President Bush in an address to the nation specifically refers to Iraq's growing fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical and biological weapons across broad areas.
8 December 2002	In response to questions on the content of Iraq's declaration to the United Nations Security Council, (UNMOVIC), Iraq denies any connection between unmanned aerial vehicle programs and the dispersal of chemical and biological agents. (Despite its 1995 confirmatory declaration).
28 January 2003	President Bush's State of the Union address includes reference to Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, but does not specifically refer to UAVs.
5 February 2003	US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in his address to UN Security Council referred to UAVs fitted with spray tanks that would constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons. ³³ He referred specifically to the MIG 21 and L-29 aircraft, but also to smaller UAVs as being developed for disseminating biological and chemical agents.

31 The UK Government, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government*, 24 September 2002, p. 23

32 CIA, National Intelligence Estimate: *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*, October 2002, p. 1

33 US Secretary of State, Address to the United Nations Security Council, 5 February 2003, p. 10

Date	Event
February 2003	UNMOVIC inspectors, including US scientists and weapons experts, following the inspection of an Iraqi UAV, manufactured from an aircraft fuel tank, believed that Iraq's unmanned aerial vehicle programs were for reconnaissance ³⁴ , and not associated with the Iraqi CBW programme as had been suggested by Secretary of State Powell and others.
19 March 2003	Iraq forwarded to UNMOVIC a letter providing further detail on its remotely piloted and UAV programmes, including reference to the MIG 21 and L-29 aircraft and smaller UAVs. UNMOVIC reported that inspections confirmed the existence of these UAVs, however, as a result of the withdrawal of inspectors on 18 March 2003, it was not possible to determine whether Iraq had pursued the development of unmanned aerial vehicles for possible use in chemical and biological weapons dissemination, ³⁵ or for legitimate purposes.
9 September 2003	The UK Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee report into the UK intelligence assessments of Iraq's WMD noted that the (UK) Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) immediately prior to the commencement of coalition action, judged that Iraq had a usable CBW capability, deliverable by artillery, missiles and possibly unmanned aerial vehicles. ³⁶ In making this judgement, the JIC also assessed the difficulties that Iraq would face if it chose to employ these systems.
2 October 2003	The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) in its interim report to the US Senate and Congressional Committees on Intelligence reported that Iraq was continuing to develop a variety of UAV platforms and maintained two UAV programs'. ³⁷ One of these was never fully declared to the UN and is the subject of on-going work by the ISG ³⁸ to determine whether or not its intended use was for dispensing chemical or biological agents.

34 D. Linzer and J. Lumpkin, *Weapons experts: Iraqi drones posed no threat*, Associated Press, 25 August 2003, p. 2

35 UNMOVIC, Thirteenth quarterly report to the United Nations Security Council, S/2003/580, dated 30 May 2003, p. 23

36 UK Intelligence and Security Committee, *Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments*, 9 September 2003, p. 34

37 Dr David Kay, *Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 2 October 2003, p. 9

38 *ibid*, p. 9

