



Parliament of Australia
Department of Parliamentary Services

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13 January 2011

Mr Russell Chafer
Secretary
Joint Select Committee on the
Parliamentary Budget Office
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600

Dear Mr Chafer

I am pleased to provide a submission from the Department of Parliamentary Services about the proposed Parliamentary Budget Office.

The Parliamentary Librarian will also provide a submission focussing on issues specific to the Parliamentary Library, and providing considerable detail about existing Library policies and procedures, copyright issues and overseas models for Budget Offices. I have attempted to minimise overlap with that submission.

Officers of the Department would be pleased to attend meetings of the Committee to clarify and discuss any relevant issues.

Yours sincerely

Alan Thompson
Secretary



Submission to the Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office by the Secretary, Department of Parliamentary Services

January 2011

Introduction

The Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS) welcomes the establishment of the new Joint Select Committee to assess the scope, benefits and costs of Commonwealth Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO).

Over recent years there have been various proposals to establish PBO to assist the Australian Parliament with its policy and decision-making processes.

DPS provides "whole of Parliament" services, and encompasses the Parliamentary Library. Prior to the establishment of the Joint Select Committee, DPS had already begun to consider the potential benefits, costs and structural options for a PBO. We are now pleased to provide a submission to the Committee.

This submission will address the broad issues identified in the Committee's terms of reference. It will also provide information about important contextual matters, and some specific issues which would be pertinent to the effective operation of a PBO.

Further, this submission will address the matter of "adequate resources". We are aware of another national PBO where the level of resourcing appears to be inadequate to provide the services expected by Parliamentary stakeholders.

As the issues in the main body of this submission are presented in a different order to that listed in the Committee's terms of reference, **Attachment 4** provides brief responses in the same order as the terms of reference.

Potential benefits of a PBO

Every year the Federal Government collects over \$300 billion in revenue. The Government then makes decisions on the use of this revenue (and possibly borrowings) to provide a wide range of services and infrastructure investments. This level of revenue raising and expenditure is well over 20% of Australia's Gross Domestic Product.

The success or otherwise of this revenue-raising and expenditure has a major impact on the prosperity and well-being of Australians and their country. This includes immediate effects and long-term inter-generational consequences.

Against this background, a PBO would play an important role in providing members of parliament with high quality, independent analysis of government revenue-raising, government expenditure, and broader fiscal and economic issues. A PBO would contribute to enhanced parliamentary debate, support

accountability and transparency, and provide an independent source of information about government forecasts and budget estimates. It could:

- (a) provide members of parliament with analysis and information on the budget and government expenditure;
- (b) improve the clarity of budget process and forecasts;
- (c) provide quick responses to budget committees; and
- (d) act as an independent, non-partisan research unit, providing equal information to all in the Parliament, thereby improving accountability.

Even if the enhanced deliberations of Parliament were to influence the priorities for (say) 1% of the annual budget, this would amount to some \$3 billion, which is several magnitudes greater than the operating costs contemplated for a Commonwealth PBO.

Based upon the experience in other Parliaments, an effective PBO would also provide greater public awareness of budget, fiscal and economic issues.

Setting the scene

Department of Parliamentary Services—DPS was established in 2004 as an outcome of the so-called Podger Review. The Department provides a wide range of services to the Parliament, including Library services, Hansard, broadcasting, IT, security, catering, cleaning, building and landscape maintenance, and a Project Branch which progressively renews and upgrades infrastructure within Parliament House.

DPS could potentially provide the “home” for the new PBO, and is well-accustomed to recognising the need for editorial independence for the Parliamentary Library. Moreover, the Project Branch has been working constructively with the Library to progressively upgrade numerous information systems, including the ParlInfo search system and the new Parliament House web site. Similar project skills could also support a new PBO.

However, it is important to note that the DPS operational budget outlook is very challenging, as detailed in **Attachment 3**. Consequently, if the decision is taken to locate the PBO within DPS, the costs of supporting the new unit will have to be provided through additional funding to DPS.

Existing services of the Parliamentary Library—Since 1901, parliamentarians have used the Parliamentary Library as a source of information to assist in policy development and decision-making by the Parliament.

The Parliamentary Librarian will provide greater detail in a separate submission, but in summary, the Library provides two broad strands of service:

- (a) “Information access” through books, numerous other publications and media monitoring. Increasingly, this access focuses on electronic forms of publication, rather than hard copy publications.

- (b) "Publications and commissioned research", which focuses on the specific issues being considered by each Chamber of the Parliament, and by various Committees.

This service is provided by the Research Branch and is normally in response to inquiries by parliamentarians or their staff. Advice about financial and economic issues, notably the annual federal budget, is provided by the Economics section within the Research Branch.

The Library services are provided impartially, and within a confidentiality framework established by the *Parliamentary Service Act 1999*. The Library also uses a proven set of policies and procedures to prioritise client services, ensure quality standards, and reinforce confidentiality provisions.

The Library has already begun to be involved in work similar to that proposed for the PBO. The 2010/11 federal budget provided funding for the Library to establish a Pre-election Policy Unit to provide advice to non-government parliamentarians in the lead up to the 2010 federal election. This unit was quickly established in July 2010, and its operation over the following weeks provided some useful pointers to the role of a PBO (as detailed in the submission from the Parliamentary Librarian).

Other existing institutions—Existing within the Australian public sector are agencies which provide important budgetary, financial and economic information for use in Parliamentary policy-making and decision-taking.

These agencies are well-respected and include the :

- Treasury and the Department of Finance and Deregulation
- Productivity Commission
- Australian Bureau of Statistics
- Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)

However, none of these agencies have a currently legislated role to respond in a timely way to the full spectrum of queries raised by parliamentarians about budget, financial and economic issues. Apart from the ANAO, the primary obligation of these agencies is to directly serve the Government of the day.

In theory, it would be possible to amend legislation to establish a PBO as an adjunct of the Productivity Commission or ANAO; this possibility is mentioned elsewhere in this submission. Nevertheless, ultimate accountability of those agencies is to executive government, not to the Parliament.

Under current legislation, the Treasury and the Department of Finance and Deregulation oversee the election period "Charter of Budget Honesty" process to cost pre-election promises. This issue is further discussed in the Functions section of this submission.

A new PBO for NSW—over the last three months the NSW Government and Parliament have taken action to establish a Parliamentary Budget Office for the NSW Parliament. We understand that the new office is planned to be operational

before the upcoming NSW 2011 election, and that appointment of a Director is imminent.

The indicative budget will be \$4 million for Year 1, and \$3 million pa thereafter.

It might be useful for the Joint Select Committee to monitor progress of this NSW institution as the Committee finalises its recommendations.

Important issues

To assist in the deliberations of the Committee, we have identified the following important issues:

- (A) Functions, mandate and clients of a PBO
- (B) "Output" of a PBO
- (C) Legislative and institutional basis for the PBO
- (D) Parliamentary oversight
- (E) Resourcing the PBO
- (F) Relationship to existing Library services
- (G) Post-establishment review
- (H) Accommodation

We set out below our preliminary thinking on each of these issues, *but note that decisions about "function, mandate and clients" will drive many of the final decisions about the other issues.*

(A) Functions, mandate and clients of a PBO

These matters require careful consideration as they have major consequences on the effectiveness and cost of a PBO.

There are PBOs serving a number of other national Parliaments, but essentially, three broad "functional" options are available.

Option A—an office that only produces publications according to a defined plan—this model most closely resembles the United States Congressional Budget Office (US CBO).

Option B—an office that provides information, analysis and advice in response to client requests, as well as publications requiring "significant research"; this model resembles the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau.

Option C—an office that provides information, analysis and advice in response to client requests, as well as publications requiring "limited research"; this model resembles the new Canadian Parliamentary Budget Office.

We have provided further preliminary information on the US, Netherlands, and Canadian models in **Attachment 1**, noting that we are obtaining further detailed

information about the operation of each of these organisations. **Attachment 2** is our initial proposal to create similar workable options for the Parliament of Australia.

In assessing which options would be most suitable for the Australian Parliament, we also note the Committee's terms of reference and the agreements between the political parties and the independent members in August/September 2010. *These documents suggest that a suitable functional option would be one that delivers both publications AND answers individual inquiries from senators and members (that is, Option B or Option C).*

The decision to choose Option B over Option C has clear cost consequences, probably amounting to an extra \$2 million pa. This extra cost should not be incurred without good reason.

DPS considers that decisions about which final functional option to adopt should only be taken after Committee members have had the opportunity to review the quality of publications from (say) the US CBO, the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau, and the Canadian PBO. The Parliamentary Library could work with the Committee Secretariat to provide a selection of sample publications.

A further important functional question is the extent to which the PBO investigates and reviews the underlying assumptions and modelling of Government agencies as they develop policy, legislative and budgetary proposals. It will be desirable that the PBO should not unduly duplicate the role of the Productivity Commission, Treasury and the Department of Finance and Deregulation in this area. However, it is difficult at this stage to definitely "draw the line". It is therefore suggested that this issue should be considered as part of the post-establishment review proposed elsewhere in this submission.

Finally, there is the issue of whether the Charter of Budget Honesty role should transition to the new PBO. We suggest that the Committee obtain views from Treasury and the Department of Finance and Deregulation before taking final decisions about the role of the PBO in this matter.

The "mandate" issue is also vital, and has two broad components.

Firstly, there is the question about whether the PBO has a narrow mandate (such as commenting only on annual budgets), or has a much wider mandate to comment on all legislation and policy proposals of the Government, as well as the proposals of other parliamentarians.

Taking into consideration the previously mentioned September 2010 agreements, we consider that a wide mandate is appropriate. However, we note that a wide mandate could require high levels of resourcing unless clear guidance is provided to the PBO through an appropriate Parliamentary Committee. We will return to this guidance issue later in this submission.

Second is the matter of timely access to information held by Government agencies. We recognise that this is a very challenging issue, but note that the Parliamentary Library has not always been able to provide timely or comprehensive advice to parliamentarians because the source information about a particular issue has not been provided by the relevant Government agencies.

DPS considers that the issues of "timely and comprehensive access to government information" should be explicitly included in the enabling legislation for a new PBO.

In relation to clients of the PBO, the September 2010 agreements suggest that the service be made available to all members of parliament. This is consistent with the statutory requirement on the Parliamentary Librarian to provide services to all members of parliament. In practice, the research provided by the Parliamentary Library is, because of the nature of parliament and government, primarily driven by non-government members of parliament. About 75% of research hours of the Library are spent on non-government members of parliament. Based on past experience, the PBO would likely provide more services to non-government senators and members.

The level of service provided to parliamentary committees is another issue to be determined. Currently, the Library produces background analyses for parliamentary committees on request, but not costings, or detailed financial policy analysis. Given the prominence of a PBO, there may be some interest in mechanisms for committees to shape the program of publications of the PBO, or to request the PBO to make formal submissions to committee inquiries. However, committee-driven activity could dramatically increase the workload of the PBO.

(B) "Output" of the PBO

The primary outputs of the PBO will be large and small reports. The "mix" between regular reports and client-specific reports/advice will be driven by the choice of functional model for the PBO. For these reports to be credible, it is essential that they:

- (i) respond to the agreed format (for regular reports), or specific client requests (as appropriate);
- (ii) are factually-based, and that assumptions are clearly spelt out;
- (iii) provide readily understood information, including written text, tables and graphs; and
- (iv) are timely.

It is also likely that officers of the PBO will be requested to attend Committee meetings and provide further elaboration about these reports. It is essential that this secondary, verbal advice be clear, accurate, impartial, and of a high standard.

For the PBO to be a durable and value-adding institution, it is also essential that the outputs are tailored to the information needs of the Parliament, rather than any focus on promoting the new institution.

(C) Legislative and institutional basis for the PBO

Given the likely functions, mandate and clients of the PBO, it will be very desirable for the PBO to have a legislated basis. There are three broad options for institutional arrangements and associated legislation:

Option 1 *A stand-alone Parliamentary Service agency (with its own legislation). This would be similar to the arrangement for the US Congressional Budget Office. This option clearly establishes the "separateness" of the new entity, but would require extra funding to provide services equivalent to those provided by Option 2 or 3 below.*

We also note that in 2003/04, the Parliament took decisions to reduce the number of parliamentary departments from five to three, thus reducing overall corporate costs. We query whether it would now be credible to create a separate new Parliamentary agency.

Option 2 *Establish the PBO as an adjunct to (say) the ANAO or the Productivity Commission. Under this option, the enabling legislation for the PBO would amend the enabling legislation of either the ANAO or the Productivity Commission. While both of these agencies have established reputations for providing independent advice, ultimately they serve the Government, and are accountable to the Parliament via a minister; this could create perceptions of conflict.*

Option 3 *Establish the PBO within DPS, possibly within the Library or as a parallel agency within DPS. Under this option, the enabling legislation would amend the *Parliamentary Services Act 1999*.*

Among other matters, the existing Act already contains provisions that make it clear that the Parliamentary Librarian has editorial independence regarding the information provided to parliamentarians. We would envisage that similar provisions could apply to the PBO.

We note that Options 2 and 3 would have a lower cost than Option 1.

At this stage, and subject to final decisions about functions and mandate of the new office, the DPS preference is for Option 3, noting that it will have a lower total cost than for Option 1, and would avoid the ambiguous accountability of Option 2.

Regardless of which legislative and institutional option is adopted, it is recommended that the legislation contain two further components:

- (a) provisions to set the framework for "timely and comprehensive information access" by the PBO to data held by Government agencies. A starting point for this component of the legislation could be the powers contained in the *Auditor-General Act 1997*; and
- (b) provisions for the appointment of the Director of the PBO to be similar to those for appointment of a Secretary or Parliamentary Librarian under the *Parliamentary Services Act*. These provisions provide for appointment by the Presiding Officers, but only after receipt of a report by the Parliamentary Service Commissioner (or Secretary of DPS).

(D) Parliamentary oversight

Any public sector agency needs to be ultimately accountable to the Parliament. For the PBO, this could possibly be directly through the Presiding Officers.

However, at times, there will be issues related to peak workloads and work prioritisation. We consider that these issues will be best resolved through an appropriate Joint Standing Committee of the Parliament. This committee could then provide advice to the Presiding Officers.

DPS does not have a strong view about whether the oversight committee should be an existing committee or a new committee. However, we note that if the PBO is to be "nested" within the Parliamentary Library, then it will be desirable and logical for governance to be via a modified version of the Joint Standing Committee on the Parliamentary Library.

It will also be very useful for the Director of the PBO to receive advice from an expert external panel. We will return to this point under the issues of resourcing, discussed below.

(E) Resources and budget

Without an adequate budget the PBO will fail. In Canada the limited budget has led to significant public debate, aggrieved staff, and aggrieved members of parliament. The suggested preliminary costings in **Attachment 2** include funding for:

- (a) a "head of office" at a senior SES level;
- (b) approximately 20 to 30 senior research, research and support staff (primarily senior research staff);
- (c) external services to answer enquiries, including external specialists (based on the experience with the pre-election policy service);
- (d) publications and data required to provide analysis; and
- (e) running costs, photocopying, printing etc.

Staff costs will be a significant part of the PBO budget. In addition to being headed by an officer with outstanding economic and financial credentials, the staff in the office will need to be highly numerate and very well qualified in areas such as government finance, economics and social policy. Staff will need high level communication skills and be able to work flexibly to cope with the demands from clients. Senior staff will need to be capable of providing clear and measured verbal advice to Committees.

It is essential that pay rates be comparable to those of officers in the Treasury, Department of Finance, and the Productivity Commission.

Development of an implementation plan for the PBO will detail the number of staff, appropriate levels and skill requirements.

Subject to final decisions about functions and mandate for the PBO, there will also be value for the Director of the new office to receive advice from an expert external panel.

Whichever final functional model is determined, we request the Committee to note that:

- (a) The annual costings in **Attachment 2** are preliminary and will need to be refined to reflect any recommendations of the Joint Select Committee. For example, costs could increase significantly if the required level of "inputs" to Parliamentary Committees were to dramatically expand. Similarly, if the full election year "Charter of Budget Honesty" role were to be transferred, this would also increase costs.
- (b) The costings listed in **Attachment 2** assume that the PBO operates within an existing agency. In other words, we have assumed that the PBO will not need to establish its own corporate functions. If, however, the PBO were required to operate as a clear and separate entity, it would be prudent to assume an extra \$1 million pa in operating costs.
- (c) There will also be some "one off" set-up costs. Our preliminary estimate is that these will total \$4 million, including some \$3 million to create appropriate office space, and \$1 million to allow the new office to acquire appropriate information resources IT systems software.
- (d) The issue of efficiency dividends could have adverse consequences for the ability of the PBO to provide high quality services in the long-term. The Committee may wish to endorse a funding model where the budget for the PBO is recommended by the longer-term Standing Committee (that oversees the PBO) to the Presiding Officers and Government. This approach would be unusual for the Australian public sector, but is an approach which is utilised to set overall funding levels for the Canadian House of Commons and the UK House of Commons.

(F) Relationship to existing Parliamentary Library services

Subject to final decisions about the functions, mandate and clients of the PBO, there will likely be some slight overlap with services provided by three sections within the Research Branch. The most likely areas of overlap relate to the post-budget briefings which are now provided by the Economics section.

Savings would be the result of any functions which the Committee recommends be transferred to the PBO.

A more critical issue is that requests may be made by parliamentarians (or their staff) to the PBO or the Library which would be better answered by the other organisation. As a consequence, DPS considers that:

- (a) it will be very desirable for the staff of the PBO to be located in close proximity to the staff of the Research Branch; we will return to this issue later in this submission; and
- (b) there could also be some "coordination benefits" if there is one overall management structure for the PBO and the Library; however, final decisions about this issue are dependent on decisions about functions and mandate of the PBO.

(G) Post-implementation reviews

If decisions are taken to establish a PBO for the Australian Parliament, even with the best planning and greatest goodwill, it is very clear that the clients of the new agency, as well as the staff of the new agency, will be on a steep learning curve as the new service evolves.

Hopefully, the overall legislated framework and levels of resourcing will meet stakeholder expectations, but we suggest that a post-implementation review of operations should be included in the overall planning. This review could occur after (say) 3 years. The review should be overseen by whichever Standing Parliamentary Committee has oversight of the new entity, and be conducted at arm's length from the PBO; for example, the Parliamentary Service Commissioner/Public Service Commissioner could be requested to conduct the review, possibly assisted by the Auditor-General.

An important component of the review could be consideration of the "boundaries" of the work of the PBO, notably the extent to which the PBO reviews the underlying assumptions of Government agencies in policy development. A second important component of the review will be about the adequacy (or otherwise) of the budget.

(H) Accommodation

Earlier in this submission we noted that it will be very desirable for the staff of the PBO to be physically close to the staff of the Library Research Branch. This will facilitate effective and timely responses to the wide range of queries from parliamentarians and their staff. The comments below assume that the PBO would have a maximum of 30 staff.

The space currently occupied by the Parliamentary Library also provides offices for a number of DPS project managers, and the Art Services section.

To achieve the desired "co-location" of the PBO and Research Branch staff, DPS therefore proposes to free up space in the Library area by:

- (a) carefully reviewing space currently occupied by Library staff and the collection; and
- (b) identifying options for alternative accommodation for Project and Art Services staff. This could include creation of modest additional accommodation elsewhere in the building, similar to some office space now being created beyond the Staff Dining Room.

Our preliminary estimate is that some \$3 million would be required to relocate existing staff, and re-configure the space in the Library. This is a "one-off" cost.

Responding to the terms of reference

We acknowledge that this submission has not provided information in the same order as the terms of reference of the Committee. There have been valid reasons for our approach. However, if the Committee wishes to see our comments "mapped" against the terms of reference, this information is provided in **Attachment 4**.

Conclusion

DPS has provided constructive input to the Joint Select Committee about the proposals for a new PBO.

We would also welcome early face-to-face discussions with the Committee to answer any questions.

Attachment 1

International examples of Parliamentary Budget Offices			
OPTIONS	Publications only model	Client requests and publications – significant research capacity	Client requests and publications – limited research capacity
	<p>Style of Congressional Budget Office (USA) (est. 1975) In fiscal year 2009 the CBO employed approximately 250 staff with a US\$45.2 million annual budget</p>	<p>Central Planning Bureau (Netherlands) (est. 1945) In 2007 the CPB employed 144.5 full-time equivalent positions, occupied by 164 employees. The CPB website claimed base funding of €11 million plus a supplementary budget of €1.5 million for one-off unforeseeable research requests</p>	<p>Parliamentary Budget Officer (Canada) (est. 2007) The PBO budget for 2010-11 is CAD\$2.8 million with 14 employees. <i>Note this resourcing has been insufficient to meet client requests and has led to considerable public comment.</i></p>
AUD equivalent	\$48m	\$18.5m	\$2.96m
Mission	<p>Provide budgetary analysis and information to the House and Senate on matters pertaining to the federal budget process in a timely, objective and non-partisan manner, but without policy recommendations.</p>	<p>Provide annual Central Economic Plan and other research reports the conduct surveys, analysis and forecasts to inform strategic policy development.</p>	<p>Support Parliament in exercising its oversight role in the government's stewardship of public funds by ensuring budget transparency and promoting informed public dialogue with an aim to implement sound economic and fiscal policies.</p>

Attachment 2

Possible Options for the Parliament of Australia			
OPTIONS	Option A— Publications model	Option B— Client requests and publications - significant research capacity	Option C— Client requests and publications - limited research capacity
Client Services	<p>Would provide major papers commissioned by Parliamentary Committees, annual reports on the budget and costs of specific policy proposals.</p> <p>This model does not include answering questions from individual members of parliament.</p>	<p>Could answer enquiries from individual members of parliament including costs to aid policy development. Could provide some publications and briefings on the budget and government expenditure and some policy issues.</p>	<p>Could answer enquiries from individual members of Parliament, including costs to aid policy development. Could provide a limited range of publications.</p>
Publication Outputs	<p>Could include publications on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the Budget and Economic Outlook • Analysis of the Budgetary Proposals • Budget Options • the Long-term Budget Outlook • cost estimates, analytical reports, background papers and other reports. 	<p>Could produce:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic Outlook • Analysis of selected Proposals • Budget Options • background papers and other reports 	<p>Could produce:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic Outlook • Analysis of selected Proposals • Budget Options background papers and other reports
Staffing	Approx 30 External experts on demand	Approx 30 External experts on demand	Approx 20 External experts on demand
INDICATIVE COST AUS\$	\$8+m pa	\$8m pa	\$6m pa

External Review—All options assume an expert panel will be established to provide advice on and review forecasts and reports. The PBO would be able to commission external experts for peer review and selected papers.


Attachment 3

DPS Operational budget challenges

DPS officers are proud of the services they provide to the Australian Parliament. However, the "operating budget" of DPS continues to be a real challenge.

The operating budget is used to provide day-by-day services, and it has been hovering around \$100 million for the last 11 years, while real purchasing power has declined by more than 30% over that period.

Specifically, over the last 11 years, CPI has increased by some 35%, but the available funding has only increased by around 3% (from \$98.45m to \$100.9m), as illustrated below.



DPS would require extra funding to support the new PBO. Otherwise, existing services for the Parliament would be severely affected.

Attachment 4

Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office

DPS comments—summarised against Committee Terms of Reference

Item	Term of Reference	DPS summary comment
(a)	Appropriate mandate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DPS recommends a broad mandate to comment on all legislation and policy proposals of the Government, as well as proposals of other parliamentarians. • DPS also recommends that the mandate provide for timely and comprehensive access to government information.
(b)	Nature of information needed (from the PBO) by Parliament	The detailed "information requirements" will need to be finalised once the function and mandate of the PBO are agreed.
(c)	Role and adequacy of current institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Parliamentary Library (through its Research Branch) is able to provide partial budget scrutiny but is not resourced to provide the full services envisaged for a PBO. • Various agencies of government provide important and useful budgetary, financial and economic information, but none of them have responsibility to provide timely coordinated information to parliamentarians.
(d)	Cost-effective performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall cost-effectiveness could be assessed against the backdrop of a federal budget, which annually raises over \$300 billion, and spends a similar amount. • Cost-effectiveness should also be assessed by benchmarking against other national PBOs. • For example, the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau has an annual budget of some \$18.5 million. Our proposal would require a budget of around half that figure.

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by the Secretary, Department of Parliamentary Services
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(e) (i)	PBO functions, accountability and oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DPS recommends a set of functions broadly similar to a blend of those undertaken by the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau and the Canadian Parliamentary Budget Office, but with the scale of research and publications should be further considered by the Joint Select Committee. • Accountability and oversight of the PBO to the Presiding Officers and Parliament would be via an appropriate Standing Committee.
(e) (ii)	Routine work of the PBO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The routine work program is discussed in detail in the submission from the Parliamentary Librarian.
(e) (iii)	Protocols for parliamentarians requesting non-routine work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Non-routine work" protocols should be similar to those in place for the Parliamentary Library, but subject to review and fine-tuning by the relevant Standing Committee.
(e) (iv)	Protocols for confidentiality and disclosure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confidentiality and disclosure protocols should be similar to those for the Parliamentary Library.
(e) (v)	Relationship with other institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is very desirable that the PBO staff be physically close to the Library Research Branch. • It is also very desirable that there be a high level of respect and cooperation from Government agencies. Legislated information access protocols could assist this relationship.
(e) (vi)	Appropriate staffing and resourcing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This issue is discussed in the Resourcing section of the main DPS submission.