



Submission No 8

Inquiry into Australia's Defence Relations with the United States

Name: Professor William T Tow & Associate Professor
Russell Trood

Address: Griffith University

+61 7 38753731



Griffith Asia Pacific Research Institute

Professor Robert Elson
DirectorTelephone +61 (0)7 3875 3730
Facsimile +61 (0)7 3875 3731Nathan Campus, Griffith University
Brisbane, Queensland 4111, Australia

8 March, 2004

Committee Secretary
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Department of the House of Representatives
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600
AUSTRALIA

To Whom It May Concern,

Please find attached a submission on 'ANZUS: Still in the National Interest?' by William T. Tow and Russell Trood made on our own behalf. We hope that the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade will accept this submission as part of its 'Inquiry into Australia's Defence Relations with the United States'. We have opted to emphasise the first term of reference listed in your call for submissions: the applicability of the ANZUS treaty to Australia's defence and security.

We would be pleased to appear before the Committee to discuss our submission if it deems such a session to be appropriate. The content of the submission is entirely original and has not been published in any other venue. No part of the submission need remain confidential and we would welcome the Committee's response to its content.

Dr Trood and I can be contacted at:

Department of International Business and Asian Studies
Griffith University
Nathan, QLD 4111

Tel. 07-3875-7514 (Tow)/07-3875-7527 (Trood)

Fax. 07-3875-5111

e-mail: w.tow@griffith.edu.au (Tow); r.trood@griffith.edu.au (Trood)

We look forward to hearing from you regarding your receipt of this submission.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "William T. Tow".

William T. Tow
Professor in International Relations
Griffith University

ANZUS: Still in the National Interest?

Professor William T. Tow, Griffith University
Associate Professor Russell Trood, Griffith University

Submitted to the Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee
On Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

Inquiry into Australia's Defence Relations with the United States

8 March 2004

Since Federation, Australia has pursued a foreign policy largely underscored by the principle of forging and cultivating alliances with 'great and powerful friends'. The appeal of this strategy has been, and remains widespread, with three-quarters of the Australian electorate traditionally supporting their country's alliance with the United States. However, restive forces opposing this course of action as degrading Australia's separate identity and political independence, and railing against tying that country's ultimate destiny too closely to the fate of a larger power, have never been far below the surface.

More specifically, Australian critics of the American alliance have argued that it has generated false expectations of guaranteed American protection, reinforced fears held in this country about the 'tyranny of distance' and raised false hopes of greater Australian influence through unqualified association with larger powers. Indeed, they assert, this country's ever growing linkages with American power and values have exacerbated Australia's vulnerabilities by giving international terrorists and other forces hostile to it greater reason to target the Australian populace and to forge ties with radical forces closer to home. For these sceptics, apprehensions about intensified threats are complemented by what they view as the uncertainty of American commitment: the ANZUS treaty provides no legal guarantee or ironclad 'tripwire' for an American defence, as does NATO.¹ Other alliance critics have advanced a different argument: Australia may not wish to be a beneficiary of contemporary American hegemony at a time when the U.S. has become a radically reformist country, hell-bent to reconstitute the world to suit its own ideological and cultural predilections.² One of the most powerful spokespersons for this group, Owen Harries, has succinctly characterised this view of the problem of too much association with the U.S. at the wrong time in history: 'For a country such as Australia, with its vested interest in international (and especially regional) stability, to associate itself closely and conspicuously with such an enterprise would be inappropriate and dangerous'.³

There is, of course, an inherent anomaly in criticising an alliance lacking a tripwire guarantee while emphasising the need to distance Australia from American power. Alliance proponents have, moreover, countered that by seeking close affiliation with the United States, particularly after the Second World War, Australia

has been able to influence international politics in ways it never could have without it. They posit that, fundamentally, Australia has enjoyed the benefits of what international security analysts term 'existential deterrence' – preventing hostile parties from directly threatening Australia by invading its homeland or seriously challenging its resource and trading lifelines. Even the mere prospect of American military intervention on Australia's behalf has been enough to check what threats may otherwise have emerged against the Australian homeland or its security becoming seriously compromised by other regional and extra-regional powers. Australian involvement in successive American military operations in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq has been a small price to pay, ANZUS supporters have asserted, for the benefits of sustaining enduring and salubrious ties with the world's most formidable power that also happens to have a close affinity to Australia's own political values and culture.

Alliance critics have understandably demanded that the American relationship undergo intermittent scrutiny to ascertain its continued value to Australian foreign policy. This is a natural component of any democracy's political system and the accountability inherent in this process should be welcomed. Significantly, the logic and national benefits of the American alliance have been sustained in every such instance.

In 1983, for example, ANZUS was officially scrutinised by the Australian Parliament after a new Labor government assumed power in Canberra. Concerns leading to this appraisal evolved around the relative strength of the U.S. commitment to defend Australia and of Australia's need to function as an independent regional defence actor. The alliance had already been tested by the new government on such issues as MX missile testing (the Fraser government had promised Australian logistical assistance for such tests in the early 1980s but the Hawke government withdrew it), and during the ongoing ANZUS crisis between the U.S. and New Zealand when many from the Australian left-wing supported New Zealand's unpromising anti-nuclear stance.

The 1983 appraisal, the 'Hayden Review', concluded that ANZUS remained central to Australia's and to its national security and foreign policies.⁴ American intelligence operations carried out at Pine Gap and Nurrangar, for example, proved to be far less controversial than Hayden and left-wing factions of the Australian Labor Party originally anticipated. These installations were found to enhance the operation and verification of international arms control agreements and thus to act as Cold War stabilisers. Their value in underwriting the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, by adding to the efficiency and reliability of the American command and control network, was reaffirmed.⁵

Australian apprehensions over issues of alliance abandonment and entrapment have, nonetheless, remained during successive stages of ANZUS history.⁶ Australian policy officials have preferred that alliance scope be restricted when the U.S. has occasionally asked for Australian support in its confrontations with China over Taiwan. The risk of abandonment was later found, moreover, to pale in comparison with the political costs of strategic entrapment when Australia enjoined the United States to intervene militarily in Indochina. ANZUS application was sought (without complete success in winning a clear U.S. commitment) during the 1964-65 Confrontation to neutralise an 'Indonesian threat' to Malaysian independence. More recently (in late 1999), American support was again slow in coming after the Howard government elected to intervene militarily against pro-Indonesian militia disruption of a UN-administered election in East Timor. The very purpose of ANZUS has been tested in recent years as Article IV of the Treaty has been interpreted broadly by the Howard government to include terrorist strikes in New York and Washington, D.C. as sufficient grounds for Australia to invoke ANZUS for the first time in its existence 'in response to an attack against a 'Pacific power'. The deployment of Australian forces in Afghanistan (well beyond the Treaty's initial 'Pacific purview'), and the more recent dispatch of ADF forces to Iraq to allegedly enforce UN resolutions have prompted the latest calls in Australia for alliance re-evaluation.

It is striking that such oscillating concerns about the purpose and scope of ANZUS have not been reflected at any time in postwar U.S. national security policy.

Since its inception in San Francisco over fifty years ago, the Australian component of ANZUS has never been subject to anything like the Hayden Review in the American Congress. Only the New Zealand nuclear crisis temporarily (1984-1986) galvanised American concerns over the treaty's strategic utility. Extensive polling conducted in Australia over the years has reaffirmed strong and enduring levels of support for the alliance in this country. Intermittent surveys conducted in the U.S. have been less 'alliance specific' but no less consistent in their results: Americans regard Australia at the top or near the top of those countries they regard to be 'friendly' with the U.S. and extremely desirable as an alliance partner. Given this legacy of mutual support, one could understandably ask why any need currently exists for an alliance review at all.

The answer lies in the remarkable pace and scope of structural change now taking place in international relations. 'Security', for example, must now be viewed in much broader terms than was the case during the Cold War when competing bipolar ideological blocs predicated the genesis of ANZUS. Although the 'calculus of threat' remains central to today's security outlooks, economics, globalisation and development politics have become integral to how policy-makers in both the U.S. and Australia think about and deal with contemporary security issues. Even more centrally, an increased emphasis is now assigned to new transregional security challenges. International terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ramifications of living with 'failed states' in an increasingly complex international system have largely supplanted, although not completely replaced, more traditional and state-centric preoccupations with power balancing and hegemonic competition. As one of the United States' closest allies, Australia is clearly affected by American power having become a catalyst for those harbouring various grievances against the international status quo.

Certainly Australian policy analysts are entitled to be concerned about the style and philosophical underpinnings of America's current leadership. Owen Harries used this year's ABC Boyer Lecture series to question the United States' sensitivity toward working with established international institutions to manage a stable world order. The Bush administration's propensity for exercising unilateralist strategies, he asserted, has marginalised or even alienated allies normally accustomed to the levels of access to, and substantial consultations with their American policy counterparts,

needed to reconcile potentially divergent national interests. Former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser has similarly warned that the prospect of Australia's strategic abandonment could once again emerge. The U.S. *expected* - and received - Australian political and military support for its recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would expect similar support in future contingencies involving Taiwan and North Korea, even if such Australian intervention alienated it from China, fast becoming Australia's most important trading partner, and from the rest of Asia. As a global hegemon, however, America may be slow to intervene on behalf of Australia's core national security interests unless Washington believed the stakes also involve its own central concerns. Initial U.S. reluctance to become involved in the East Timor crisis, and its *de facto* strategic neglect of the South Pacific's so-called 'arc of crisis', are illustrative.

Neither Harries nor Fraser are 'liberals' in the classical sense. Neither is 'anti-American' (Harries lived in Washington for years as a well respected conservative journalist and commentator and Fraser eased American fears about the rise of the Australian left under his predecessor during his term of office). Yet both of these 'establishment figures' are concerned that as the world's one remaining superpower, the United States may invariably relegate the interests of its allies to a lower priority status unless ways can be found to interact with Washington as respected associates rather than as surrogates of strategic convenience. The apprehensions of Harries, Fraser and other analysts concerned about America's current posture may prove to be misplaced. However, they reflect a growing concern among many quarters within Australia, and shared by other Western observers, over how Washington is projecting its power and to what ends.

In such a context and at this juncture in history, therefore, a review of both the logic and viability of ANZUS is warranted. How important aspects of alliance politics have evolved since the Howard government's election to power in March 1996 and how the Bush administration's foreign policy has affected that process will be initially addressed. Three key questions will then be raised to determine ongoing ANZUS relevance. First, does the evolution of ANZUS adequately reflect interests that are sufficiently important to both the United States and Australia to sustain the alliance in an era of rapid international change? Second, do the perceived gains from

the alliance still outweigh the potential costs that may be incurred by affiliating with it? Third, if so, will these gains, and will the alliance itself, be sustainable as Asia-Pacific and international security politics unfold throughout this decade and beyond?

ANZUS: Recent Hallmarks

As he approached the 1996 federal election, Opposition Leader John Howard and his colleagues in the Liberal and National Parties exhibited a clear discomfort with what they regarded as the Labor Government's unwarranted preoccupation with integrating Australian geopolitical interests too closely with those of various Asian states. An Agreement for Maintaining Security (AMS) had been reached with Indonesia the previous year without formal parliamentary consultation. The Hawke/Keating governments had also made extensive use of multilateral regional forums to advance Australian diplomacy, a tactic that departed sharply from Australia's traditional preference for identifying and cultivating a 'great and powerful friend' to underwrite its most fundamental security postulates. The concern was that such an orientation lacked balance and was risk-laden, potentially compromising Australia's security by eroding American and other western security ties.

Insufficient hard evidence had actually emerged to support this proposition. Indeed, a number of Labor Party figures, including Defence Minister Kim Beazley, had cultivated strong ties with a wide range of American officials. The allegedly 'compromised American connection' was the stuff of differentiation, however, for a Coalition Party that had as yet unproven credentials for challenging the incumbent government's foreign policy.

With the intensification of the Taiwan Strait crisis during that island's presidential election in March 1996, the extent to which the new Howard government was prepared to support American strategy in Asia was soon evident. How that crisis unfolded has been assessed comprehensively elsewhere. The major point here is that Australia's own limited role as a supportive observer of American intervention in the East China Sea against Chinese pressure exerted toward Taiwan incurred the wrath of China's leadership but simultaneously crystallised the new Australian government's

determination to 'resuscitate' the American connection, notwithstanding regional sensitivities.

The Sydney Statement released during President Clinton's visit to Australia in July 1996 reaffirmed the centrality of the U.S. alliance to Australia's national security interests and to U.S. regional strategy.⁷ ANZUS was deemed to be significant 'in maintaining and consolidating Australia's capability for self-reliant defence. It also constituted a crucial element in the United States' permanent presence in the Asia Pacific region' by facilitating the regional presence of forward-deployed U.S. forces, while allowing Australian access to state-of-the-art American military technology. The statement further postulated that the alliance provided '...close cooperation in intelligence matters, the assurance of resupply and logistics support in a crisis, and [encouraged] combined exercises and training to promote interoperability'. To some policy-makers in Beijing, Kuala Lumpur and elsewhere in the region, the Australian posture appeared to clearly shift away from assigning primacy to cultivating ties and mutual interests with them and toward offering unqualified Australian support of American power and interests in Asia. For such critics, this trend appeared to intensify with the Australian military intervention in East Timor during late 1999, culminating in the unfortunate labelling of Australia as a 'deputy sheriff' for advancing American interests in that region. This appearance was perceptually reinforced by Howard's endorsement of the Bush administration's new pre-emption strategy directed against 'rogue states', and by the Australian military role in the 'coalition of the willing' that deposed Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Little prospect was apparent for Australian involvement in emerging Asian institutional arrangements such as the ASEAN + 3 initiative.

Supporters of the Coalition government can label any such image of Australia as a regional outcast to be patently unfair. They can point to Australia's success in winning a softening of terms from the International Monetary Fund for a nearly bankrupt Indonesia to repay or extend loans during the Asian crisis in 1997. They can also underscore this government's undeniable success in negotiating lucrative commercial agreements with China for liquid natural gas and other commodities. Australia's normalisation of diplomatic ties with North Korea have allowed it to play a minor but still important role in facilitating that country's willingness to participate

in the 'Six Power Talks' process designed to find ways of denuclearising the Korean peninsula. Extensive trade ties with Japan and South Korea have continued and a low-key but potentially significant politico-security relationship with Japan has been cultivated independent of, but supplementary to, the United States' traditional regional alliance system. A free trade agreement has been reached with Singapore and negotiations have continued with Thailand for the forging of a similar accord. These developments perhaps underscore how the American tie can reinforce Australian interests in, and influence with, Asia in positive ways, providing Australia with the means for dealing with its regional neighbours more confidently and meaningfully.

To achieve this condition, however, it has been recognised that Australian regional interests must be reconciled with American global strategy to an even greater extent than has transpired over the Howard government's lifespan. In a submission forwarded to this parliamentary inquiry, the U.S. government has endorsed Howard's "Pacific Doctrine" that envisions Australia guaranteeing the future stability of Southwest Pacific states.⁸ Australia's recent military interventions in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and its role as a security guarantor for Papua New Guinea, are regarded by Washington as prime examples of a highly valued Australian capability to assume the primary burden of preserving strategic stability in its own approaches.

The question nevertheless remains precisely where to 'draw the line' in defining Australia's strategic purview and how, if at all, evolving U.S. international security postures as reflected in the Bush administration's 'transformation strategy' affect such definition. The Howard government's submission to this inquiry calls for the U.S. to incorporate Indonesia more closely into its 'global war on terror' by providing greater financial and training support for Southeast Asian countries – and especially Indonesia – to combat terrorist cells in that country and in neighbouring Southeast Asian states. The difficulty is gaining consensus over what constitutes a 'terrorist' as opposed to 'rebel factions' or 'freedom fighters' in Indonesia or the South Pacific. Indonesia's long-standing military campaign against the Free West Papua rebels is illustrative. Future skirmishes between FWP factions and the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) may well lead Indonesia's political and military leadership to conclude that it must intervene against the FWP's enclaves in the PNG, violating

the latter's sovereignty and triggering an Australian defence commitment.⁹ If crisis escalation were to lead to direct confrontation between Australian and Indonesian troops, how would U.S. global strategy, that envisions both Australia and Indonesia to be vital components of its own global war on terror, be applied? Although discussions between Australian policy-planners and their U.S. counterparts about such scenarios may be uncomfortable, they are necessary to shape American policy as to how the global war on terror may not always coincide with local or regional interests of its allies.

ANZUS Partners' Core Interests

Notwithstanding potential complications of coordinating a common Australian-American approach to South Pacific security, the core geopolitical interests of Australia and the United States largely coincide.

The apprehensions of Harries and other critics are justified relative to the Bush administration's unilateral quest to preserve global stability. The Howard government's propensity to readily comply with American strategy on the basis of its expectations about receiving strategic and economic payoffs from Washington is also a subject of critical concern. Australian involvement in missile defence programs and acceptance of a highly complex free-trade agreement that was reportedly near ruin before both parties signed are specific points of contention in this regard.

Yet both the United States and Australia remain 'status quo' powers with a keen interest in sustaining an international security environment and global political economy that work to their advantage. Along with Britain, Australia is ideally suited in a post-9/11 context to forge an 'anglospheric' coalition in the defence of liberal democratic principles.¹⁰ It is this mutual instinct to defend what Howard refers to the 'open society' of liberal democracies (anglophile or otherwise) against new forms of totalitarian (often theocratically-based) threats emerging in the 21st century that forms the essence of alliance cooperation. All other discussion pertaining to specific rationales for entering into particular conflicts (e.g., to eradicate existing or potential weapons of mass destruction from Iraq) are mere components of this predominantly value-based and culturally grounded foundation.

Within this framework, key geopolitical and geoeconomic interests shared by the ANZUS allies can be identified. They include:

- Preventing or responding to direct attacks against either the Australian or U.S. homelands.
- Deterring such attacks against mutual friends and allies within, and beyond, the Asia-Pacific region.
- Maintaining dominance over the key sea and air lanes of communication needed to sustain trade and commerce at levels required for preserving their populations' standard of living.
- Facilitating international political changes that will enhance their own influence and minimise that of hostile states and other actors.
- Developing key technologies for social progress and for defence.

The first two, and arguably most critical of these reasons, will be discussed here in some detail. The omission of detailed discussion of the others does not denigrate their importance but simply recognises their interdependence with those discussed in the analysis of ANZUS benefits, costs and future viability.

The partial or comprehensive incapacitation of the U.S. would signal a major challenge to Australia's own survival. As Australia's largest single trade and investment partner, its second largest export market that is set to expand if the just completed free trade agreement performs to expectations, and its largest source of foreign investment, the survival of the United States and its economy is mandatory for Australia's own continued existence as a modern nation-state. The military intelligence, defence technology and strategic support flowing from America likewise underpins Australia's own strategic capabilities at a cost and on a scope that could not be replicated by any other international actor. Generating one-third of the world's gross domestic product (GDP), generating more spending on research and development than the next five countries combined (over \$500 billion) and, arguably still more often than not, cultivating positive cooperation, the U.S. exercises a relatively benign hegemony. A world without U.S. power would be a far more tenuous and dangerous place for an Australia desiring to maintain its own heritage and values that are so similar to those of its ANZUS ally.¹¹

How critical is Australia's survival to the core interests of United States? Perhaps unexpectedly, it has become an increasingly important, even central, player in U.S. global strategy. The process of globalisation has favoured the Australian economy which now is among the most robust in terms of growth among the world's industrial democracies. More centrally, however, is that the Howard government's conscious choice to 'reinvigorate' ANZUS through both symbolic and tangible means has meant that Australia over the past few years has become a 'global' ally of the United States rather than one restricted to a specific region. This is true notwithstanding a continued American tendency to view Australia's role within the world as 'compartmentalised', tacitly assigning it a particular geographic 'sector' (i.e., the South Pacific and sometimes the Indonesian archipelago) to safeguard for overall Western interests. In reality, the Australian role has been far more universal at a time when U.S. leaders and the American public-at-large view their fundamental way of life as at stake in a global war on terrorism and by rogue states. The utility of a 'globalised' ANZUS from an American strategic perspective is multidimensional. It includes Australian loyalty and reliability in a crisis-ridden world. It also entails Australia's increasingly critical role in an American 'transformation strategy' that relies on projecting power more quickly over longer distances from more secure rear areas. Australia also has the ability to fill limited but critical 'niche areas' of military capability (special operations, long-distance surveillance and tracking and some missile defence-related technology) at a time when large armies or manpower pools are perhaps less important in winning wars.¹² Considering these specific assets with such Australian attributes such as the world's fourteenth largest economy and one of the world's most abundant natural resource bases, it is clear that the loss of Australia as an ally would be a serious (although not fatal) blow to U.S. strategy.

A second mutual core interest, defending regional allies within the Asia-Pacific region, remains critical to both America and Australia. Its fulfillment is becoming more complex at a time when Japan's security identity is undergoing a fundamental review and South Korea's strategic interests regarding North Korea may no longer coincide as closely with the United States as they once did. Singapore is the ASEAN state with interests most compatible to those of both the United States and Australia, especially in regard to its support of a maritime balancing strategy conducive to U.S. and Australian geopolitical interests. The Bush administration has

designated Thailand and the Philippines as important 'non-NATO allies' collaborating with Washington on anti-terrorism. But Thailand's visibly closer affinity with China and the Philippines inability to stem its own insurgents or to check their networking with other Southeast Asian terrorist organisations render both of these countries less viable candidates than Japan and Singapore for Australia and the U.S. in coordinating future regional defence strategy. Japan's stable democratic government and high technology base makes it a particularly appealing security partner if that country can succeed in convincing its neighbours, and itself, that it has come to terms with its unfortunate history and can assume the identity of a 'normal' and mature security actor.

Australia's de facto exclusion from recent initiatives in East Asian institutionalism (i.e. ASEAN + 3) and the United States' spotty track record in promoting Asian multilateralism are largely uncontested realities. The Bush administration's perceived unilateralist postures on key UN issues: arms control, global warming and trade have been poorly regarded by many who previously looked to Washington to take the lead on such issues. Australia retains a relatively greater commitment to multilateralism but the Howard government is correctly viewed as favouring more bilateral approaches to foreign policy than its predecessors. It thus has been stereotyped (fairly or otherwise) as a minion of U.S. geopolitics rather than an independent force willing to help modify more extreme U.S. positions.

Ultimately, the Howard government must defend its choice of nurturing greater intimacy with Washington as a sometimes hard but highly rational decision in an increasingly uncompromising and competitive world where U.S. power prevails. It remains unclear if a change of government in either Canberra or Washington or in both capitals later this year will bring about radical changes in the relationship as it has developed since 1996. External forces largely beyond a specific group of politicians' ability to control may well continue to be the critical determinants in reinforcing ANZUS or sharply testing its durability. The alliance will be shaped by its adherents and critics assessment of its benefits and costs.

Alliance Benefits and Costs

When ANZUS was initially negotiated, it was expected that Australia and New Zealand would be its primary beneficiaries by enjoying American extended deterrence guarantees against regional powers posing future threats to their own territories. A terrorist attack against American landmarks in New York and near Washington, however, proved to be the unexpected catalyst for Australia to trigger the first application of that treaty's key Article 4. The mutual Australian-American interest in activating ANZUS was clear. Without establishing solidarity against those forces that had declared a *jihad* or holy war against western governments and others who supported their basic values and policies, the credibility of any alliance response to 9-11 would have been more ambiguous and less effective. There was little dissent from normally highly polarised factions in these two democratic societies about the need to impose a formal and powerful imprimatur for projecting force against such a clear threat.

Future contingencies where treaty application is at issue may well be less distinct. Opponents of Australia's military involvement in Afghanistan in early 2003 have argued that its military action there cut against the grain of international law in the absence of a Security Council resolution explicitly authorising the use of force. The formal application of ANZUS was never even considered. A variety of complex scenarios involve the potential introduction of Australian forces in a new Korean War, including the safety of Australian expatriates living in South Korea, the horrendous damage to South Korea, and possibly Japan, leaving Australia's major export markets there destroyed or devastated for years to come and the future propensity of the United States to apply military power in the region. U.S. forces deployed in South Korea would be attacked and most likely suffer substantial casualties in the process of defending an armistice that the United Nations (but not North Korea) still recognises. The U.S. would expect Australia to make a major military contribution and for any Australian government to refuse such a commitment would be tantamount to New Zealand defecting from long-standing alliance deterrence strategy in the mid-1980s. ANZUS would be effectively terminated.

If the Bush administration or its successor were to pursue the same type of pre-emption strategy that rationalised the introduction of coalition warfare against Saddam Hussein, however, the task of any Australian government persuading its electorate to support an Australian military role in Korea would be immensely complicated. That an American administration would go to war against the DPRK without absolute proof that the U.S. and its allies were under threat, in the aftermath of the intelligence failures on Iraq's WMD capabilities now emerging, is highly unlikely. Yet the breakdown or standstill of the Six Power Talks, the disclosure of North Korean WMD-related sales to international terrorists or the development of North Korean missile capabilities sufficient to overwhelm current or projected U.S. defences against them could all intensify what is already a very serious security dilemma. Increased North Korean bellicosity in response to such developments as the United States' redeployment of B-52 bombers in Guam during early 2004 as a hedge against the shift of some U.S. ground forces from Okinawa to Iraq also cannot be discounted. In January, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that North Korea could build eight to thirteen nuclear weapons per year by 2005 or early 2006 – an assessment that pre-emptive strike adherents would argue provides the rationale for just the type of American strike the North Koreans claim Washington is planning if negotiations to end their nuclear program prove unsuccessful.¹³

It is against these types of prospects and developments and how Washington responds to them that Australian policy-planners must determine in the continued advantages and costs of supporting American policy toward the Korean Peninsula. The advent of the Trilateral Security Dialogue between Japan, Australia and the United States is a constructive development in this context, affording Australia a systematic forum for consultation and occasional debate with the U.S. and Japan on how best to approach the Korean issue. Australian diplomatic forays to North Korea for consultations on nuclear weapons politics and, more specifically, on nuclear non-proliferation initiatives are of value in this regard.

Australia's interests regarding Taiwan *do not* coincide completely with those of its U.S. ally. Both Australia and the United States recognise the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole government of China. But Australia has no commensurate legislation to the United States' Taiwan Relations Act that commits the U.S. to defend

Taiwan if that island incurs an unprovoked military attack by the PRC. Notwithstanding recent shifts in U.S. global strategy, this long-standing commitment remains in place and the U.S. has emphasised its expectations for Australia to support an American defence of Taiwan if such a confrontation were to occur. Australia remains scrupulous in observing its own one-China policy, restricting ministerial visits to Taiwan to one per year (always in the commercial or trade sector) and convening an annual human rights dialogue with China that critics say is nothing more than a rubber stamp for continued Chinese human rights violations. Chinese trade and commercial ties are becoming too central Australia to Australian trade and investment for Canberra to risk alienating Beijing over Taiwan, or other regional disputes that may rupture Sino-U.S. relations without very good cause. The respected Stratfor. com intelligence analysis service has aptly summarised this challenge:

Though John Howard has clearly thrown his lot with the Bush administration, China can and does offer Australia tremendous economic opportunity, and China is too close and too big to ignore. The two big gas deals that have already been signed are likely just a precursor to wider economic cooperation. Australian companies are very well-positioned to benefit from the China boom -- so long as Canberra doesn't get crosswise with Beijing on Taiwan, North Korea, or some other strategic issue.¹⁴

The implication perhaps to be drawn from this analysis is that Australia's policy pragmatism directed toward its regional interests is less susceptible to the domestic politics that impede successive U.S. administrations' relations with the PRC over the Taiwan issue, human rights and related other issues. To date, however, successive American presidents have experienced a 'learning curve' in China policy that has invariably shifted their China posture to something resembling the Australian stance. Given this trend, there is a strong basis for optimism that Australia will continue to avoid an 'ANZUS nightmare' of having to make a choice between the United States and China in a future regional crisis. Barring any such contingency, the core interests that have served as the glue for sustained alliance ties between Australia and the U.S. remain in place.

ANZUS: Future Viability

When emerging regional and global security issues are considered, there appears to be no valid impediment to ANZUS remaining highly relevant and viable to both of its adherents for years to come. Alliance ties do not appear to be susceptible to erosion through generational change as some critics have warned; the percentages

for alliance support in both Australia and America remain consistently high within all age brackets.¹⁵ Nor is there much prospect for widespread political opposition developing to the alliance as long as the United States remains sensitive to the need to avoid ANZUS 'entrapment' by insisting that Australia extend direct military support in a future Sino-American military confrontation in Taiwan or other regional contingency where Australia's own vital national security interests are not directly involved. The Bush administration's modification of its initial strong 'China threat' position indicates that even the most hardline American government will recognise the benefits of relating to Beijing on Taiwan in non-confrontational and pragmatic ways in the hope that an exclusively 'Chinese' solution to this problem will evolve.

This does not, however, necessarily apply to the North Korean situation. Here, Australian policy-planners are confronted with a more immediate security challenge and, in important ways, one with nearly equal impact on crucial Australian strategic and economic interests as the Taiwan issue. Australia's intelligence community is clearly preoccupied with North Korea, and is quite likely advising the Howard government that if another Korean War breaks out Australia should contribute military forces to an American-led coalition. Neither this government nor the Opposition appears to be sufficiently engaged in public analysis and policy debate relative to that situation's potential explosiveness and widespread ramifications, however, to ensure that public support for such alliance participation will be forthcoming if such a contingency does unfold. A concern here is that the Australian government found it necessary to go to war against Saddam Hussein without first winning support from the majority of Australians before doing so, and upon the premise that by supplanting Saddam weapons of mass destruction that could directly threaten Australians' national security would be eradicated. The credibility of ANZUS intelligence has suffered in the aftermath of revelations that no such WMDs may have existed. The ramification of this revelation having become a serious domestic political issue is that the alliance rationale may be seriously weakened if a similar logic of pre-emption must be applied to the North Korean case.

Agreement on strategic interdependence and how it will actually work in either an ANZUS or related coalitional framework over the remainder of this decade and beyond is the key to Australian security. Australia's relative strategic power and

its infrastructure are too small for it to indulge in the luxury of continuing policy changes, of oscillations between compromises on inter-service rivalries, or to succumb to indecision regarding force procurements and deployments. It is certain that an American link will be involved when most of these issues are addressed. Dealing with that reality, and engendering high levels of bipartisan support within the Australian body politic for ANZUS interdependence, will be made easier by future Australian governments lending encouragement for continuing policy analysis that identifies what this country's security interests are and how they can be best realised.

It is critical to alliance viability that such initiatives as the Proliferation Security Initiative (largely, if not exclusively, directed toward thwarting prospects of WMD or related delivery system transfers by Pyongyang to rogue states or international terrorists), Australian participation in future American missile defence research and the precise nature of Australia's UN/ANZUS commitment to Korea be weighed openly and extensively in the context of alliance relations. The relationships between U.S. global strategy and Australian interests in the Asia-Pacific should also be subject to comprehensive review within the already ongoing and vigorous debate about what should be the proper focus of Australian strategic thinking.

To date, there is no fully accepted successor to the 1986 'Dibb Report' that set the context for Australia's 'concentric circles' approach to geopolitics and strategy for well over a decade.¹⁶ The Howard government has argued strongly that a more global or internationalist posture should supplant the concentric circles approach that emphasised Australia's homeland defence and a fundamentally regionalist security orientation. But neither its 2000 Defence White Paper or successive official documents has yet captured the imagination or has enjoyed the long-standing conceptual influence of the Dibb Report. In the absence of a comprehensive Australian strategic doctrine, ANZUS will survive. However, it could become less engrained in Australia's strategic posture as the forces of regional and global change vie for this country's attention and resources. The development of such an overarching posture is an essential security requirement for Australia and should be vigorously pursued.

NOTES

¹ See, for example, Gary Brown, 'The ANZUS Alliance: The Case Against' in Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes, eds., *Security and Defence: Pacific and Global Perspectives* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), especially pp. 232-237 where it is argued that success Australian postwar governments misinterpreted the ANZUS 'security guarantee' contained in Article 4 to be commensurate with the tripwire clause contained in the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 5.

² This perspective is developed by Mark Beeson, 'Australia's Relationship with the United States: The Case for Greater Independence' *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 3 (November 2003), pp. 387-405.

³ Harries, 'Don't get too close to the US', *The Australian*, February 17, 2004.

⁴ As cited in William T. Tow and Henry Albinski, 'ANZUS – Alive and Well After Fifty Years' *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 48, no. 2 (June 2002), p. 166.

⁵ Coral Bell, 'The ANZUS Alliance: The Case For' in Ball and Downes, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

⁶ The notion of alliance entrapment and abandonment as an issue of alliance management is developed in -depth by Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 165-200. The concept has been applied to the ANZUS case by Tow & Albinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-164.

⁷ A text can be found at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/sydney_statement.html

⁸ John Kerin, 'You Police the Pacific: US' *The Australian* March 5, 2004, p. 1.

⁹ The scenario is spelled out by Paul Daley, 'Canberra's warning: invade at your peril' *The Bulletin*, March 9, 2004, p. 31.

¹⁰ Douglas T. Stuart, 'NATO and the wider world: from regional collective defence to global coalitions of the willing' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 41-42.

¹¹ Many of these observations are advanced in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign And Trade Policy White Paper* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003), pp. 86-87.

¹² For analysis of these trends, see Rod Lyon and William T. Tow, *The Future of the Australian-U.S. Security Relationship* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2003).

¹³ On the Guam deployments see Robert Burns, Associated Press, 'Pengaton using air power to replace Iraq-bound GIs', *Philadelphia Daily News* January 19, 2004 at <http://www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/2004/01/19/news/nation/7744523.htm>. The Rumsfeld trip is covered by the Cybercast News Service Pacific Rim Bureau at <http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/Foregin Bureaus/archive/20...> The North Korean news report accusing the United States of planning an attack is at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/2004/newpage24.shtml. The IISS report is covered by *The Guardian* (online) at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1128248,00.html>.

¹⁴ As cited in 'U.S. Focus on Terrorism While China wins on Trade and Good Will Global Market Brief: Oct. 27, 2003 at <http://www.againstbombing.org/china-australia.htm>.

¹⁵ Minor party illuminaries such as Australian Democrats Natasha Stott-Despoja and Andrew Bartlett speculated during ANZUS 50th anniversary argued that only 30% of 21-year old Australians support greater defence spending. However, they also acknowledged that 80% of respondents an Australian Peace Committee and Anti-Bases Campaign poll still supported the ANZUS alliance. See Stott Despoja and Bartlett, 'ANZUS? ANZ who?' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55, no. 2 (July 2001), p. 291.

¹⁶ Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister of Defence*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986.