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Dear Secretary,

This is a submission for the Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The aim of this submission is to highlight a number of issues which, on the information available in the public arena, suggest fundamental failures in either the gathering of intelligence in relation to Iraq's WMDs, the assessments of such intelligence, and/or the government's responses to such intelligence and assessments.

ATTACHMENT 1 to this submission contains several references. I urge all members of the inquiry to highly regard each of these references, and to be familiar with them.

Many questions posed by public figures and by private individuals in public forums, in relation to the war against terrorism, the war against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq have either gone unanswered, been answered with self-evident lies, been answered in manners which lack credibility and/or have no plausible answer. I say that it is totally inappropriate for the engendering of public support of, and for satisfaction with, Australia's security arrangements to ignore these questions, or to answer such questions in rhetorical terms. There seems to be confusion among our leaders between: the interests of national security, the interests of economic security, and the interests of political expediency. This confusion is apparent in both our ruling federal government and in much of our opposition party. Whether the confusion is based on poor intelligence, or on poor assessments of intelligence, is difficult to know, though finding out is of course one role of this inquiry. As a result, at least in part, of the confusion, many Australians fear, and I believe rightly so, that our national security is as much in jeopardy by the painfully transparent attempts (and successes) at misinforming and disinforming the Australian public on matters such as the nature of Iraq's WMDs and by our responses to the supposed threats, than it is by direct attack by terrorists. I say this for several reasons. The most glaring reason is that if the public is constantly duped into accepting deceptions and part truths if not blatant lies, then the fabric of democracy disintegrates. Many Australians will agree with me on this point. I doubt though that many would accept that our very democracy is under threat from terror attacks. Our lives perhaps are threatened; but not our political system. Our system is in danger from within. It is not possible for me to know to what extent our problems are due to intelligence agency failures, or due to our government's responses to intelligence.

If our agencies have acted appropriately and effectively, then we have a crisis (perhaps many crises) in the manner in which our government acts without sufficient checks to ensure that it is responding appropriately to such intelligence. It may be insufficient, for example, to brief only the leader of the opposition party, on matters of national security. It may be, for example, appropriate to consider intelligence briefings for leaders of minor parties and if necessary, independent members of parliament. For the risks that may be involved in such a measure, such measures must be preferable to relying on whistleblowers resigning from ONA or other agency and going public to warn that there is an intelligence crisis.

As an Australian citizen with no background in intelligence, nor in defence, this is a submission that I should not have to make. That an inquiry of this nature has been called at all is probably both at once our saving grace and a national disgrace. This is an inquiry that does not need the benefit of hindsight in order to have seen the shortcomings and complete failures, of sensible intelligence, that underlay the public reasons for our invasion of Iraq. I am aghast that in an e-world in which we have been virtually bathed in clear, consistent, and compelling rationale for rejecting the pre-emptive strike arguments, whether with or without UNSC backing (itself sought in reprehensible manner), Australians have been subjected to a barrage of incoherent, changing and irrational rhetoric, punctuated by timely warnings of imminent terrorist threats, by our own government, and its in-our-face lie that a lack of support for the war would be a lack of support for our forces in country.

Since the senate debate at the onset of the war, and here it is noted that our federal parliament, as a democratically elected law making body, refused to support the decision to go to war, the federal government has acted in deference to the clear wishes of the majority of Australian people (that we should not have invaded Iraq), with little substantive complaint from our main opposition party. What is politics and what is national security became murky in the despicable resolve of our government's reliance on the goodwill of Australians toward our defence forces, once at war, as our government hitched itself to that goodwill and hid behind an Orwellian-style banner of 'Liberators'.

To what extent these failures are attributable specifically to intelligence: creation; reporting; or reliance; is something for this inquiry to decide, and on which I have little to say. My role here, in horror, is to point out some of the more glaring of those failures. While I do so, I fear that my task is in some way like presenting evidence to a bushfire inquiry, but not so much to work out what went wrong, rather to work out whether there was a fire in the first place. I have said many times in conversations discussing this WMD inquiry, that it feels like you are on the edge of the Grand Canyon holding an inquiry to decide whether there is any evidence of soil erosion. In light of the security and secrecy issues, to complete the analogy it feels like this inquiry is to be held with curtains drawn to block out the views of the canyon, with only the occasional whistleblower running in with photos as evidence of a cover up.

It is difficult, and mostly pointless to distinguish between statements made by Howard and his government, and statements made by Bush and Blair and by their governments. With rare (though at times not insignificant) exceptions, there is little or no dispute between the "Coalition of the Willing" (CoW) countries over the WMD issue. Similarly, Australia's intelligence gathering necessarily includes assessments of intelligence from both the US and the UK, and I would hope vice versa. In the main I cannot, nor do not seek to distinguish between intelligence sources.

## **Failures of Common Sense.**

There are a number of points below, for which it would seem that common sense would predict a different view than the opinions and actions of our government and defence leaders, that seem to have resulted from our intelligence systems. It may be that time will vindicate some of the views about the WMDs that I assume our government has derived from intelligence, but even if it does, such will not explain how many of the following obvious points did not seem obvious to our government in the period leading up to the attacks, during the attacks, or since the stated cessation of major hostilities. This latter concern, that the obvious is so magnificently ignored, is deeply troubling.

1. Many times, I heard and read words such as: “If Saddam does not have WMDs then he should let us verify it. If he does not let us inspect, then he must have them.” Yet the obvious point is that if a country without WMDs feared attack, and knew that the enemy thought they might have WMDs, a form of defence for them would be to imply they do in fact have them. This is simple bluff, though I never heard it countenanced as such by the CoW countries; rather, resistances to inspectors were stated by people, such as Rumsfeld, as conclusive evidence of possession.

And after the invasion, we have had this question put: “If Saddam did not have chemical or biological weapons, why did he issue protective suits to his troops?” That people, such as Armitage, can pose such questions publicly tells of a frightening stupidity that they either believe they have a point, or they stupidly believe that such a question will fool the public. And yet our leaders and our media, though I hope not our intelligence agencies, do seem to have swallowed it. This point is so typical of the audacity that has led us into war that I will follow it at a little length. Yes, there is the possibility that such suits, if issued at all, may have been to protect Iraqis from Iraqi chemicals or germs. Equally there is the possibility that they could have been to protect Iraqis from US, British, Israeli, Iranian, and in their minds perhaps even Australian chemicals or germs. And there is the possibility that the issuing of suits was a part of a bluff, to fool the easily fooled. It seems to me that what is more likely, given how much people like Rumsfeld have bragged about knocking out the Iraqi communications lines, (indeed doing so prior to the official war, probably in violation of the UNSC resolution to enforce the no-fly zone), that many people in the Iraqi military had no clear idea of what WMDs may or may not be used by either Iraq or by invaders. If you had suits at your disposal, would you not, under such circumstances, issue them to your troops? The troops would hope so. This is kindergarten logic that the US, the UK and the Australian government administrations would have us overlook. This is the kind of mindless stupidity in which this inquiry finds itself. If the US military believed the threat was real, then we should be very wary of them as military allies, given that they sent their forces into the middle of Baghdad without wearing protective suits. In any case there are many reasons why such suits may have been issued, whether or not WMDs were likely to be used by Iraq.

2. If a country has WMDs and is attacked, it would be entirely plausible that the WMDs would be used. This point is not presented to suggest that, because WMDs (apparently) were not used when we invaded Iraq, Iraq may not have had any. It is presented to suggest that the danger of having WMDs released was made quite likely by our invasion. It follows that perhaps we did not think there was a significant danger of WMDs, in which case the government’s case for a pre-emptive strike falls back on the flimsy “production capability” (which to some extent could be used as a basis to attack every country on earth).

3. If a country has no way to resist an invasion of overwhelming force, and its people are suspicious of the motives of “liberators”, and if international politicking fails to end an invading onslaught, then, as an alternative to suicidal stances, an obvious ploy is to disappear and reappear as guerrilla movements. Yet our government neither warned of this likelihood, nor seems to have been well prepared for it. (An appalling if not criminal response to this by our government would be that such preparations were the responsibility of the USA.)

4. a) There are several things that basic common sense dictates that you would not do if you were attacking a country that you believed held WMDs including biological and chemical weapons, particularly when you do not know where they are. You would not, sensibly, nor sanely, bomb numerous locations and installations relentlessly, in a campaign of ‘shock and awe’ when such bombings could release germs or chemicals into the atmosphere. Yet we did. You would not sensibly nor sanely conduct a campaign of ‘shock and awe’ when chaos might follow which would allow chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or any resources which might assist with nuclear, chemical or biological capability, to be looted. Such insanity, I mean ours, - ie, creating a scenario which would enhance the chance of any potential terrorists in Iraq getting their hands on WMDs - has barely been questioned, even in relatively unbiased media, and I can only guess it is because most people who would raise such questions, never took the claimed WMD threats seriously in the first place. It was insane of Australia to condone such attacks, let alone be part of them.

5. There are several things that common sense dictates not to do if attacking a country to liberate a people (even when attacking as a pre-emptive strike)

- a) use any level of radioactive weapons (many reports of their use by the US)
- b) attack without serious plans, including allowing for multiple contingencies, for post-war liberation
- c) demand that while the liberated country must become a democracy, demand also that it must not vote for an Islamic state. (The US administration stated that such an outcome would not be acceptable to the US!)

6. If we, as self-proclaimed liberators, with sufficient resources to end regimes or conflict, could see, and did see, prior to attacking Iraq, the difficulties faced by people such as Ethiopians, Congans (including 12 year olds roaming urban war zones with automatic weapons), Burmese, West Papuans, and so on...., plus we could see widespread famine and AIDS, and we could see that Iraq had been long contained, as a matter of prioritising, should we pat ourselves on the back for liberating those of the Iraqis whom we did not kill in the process of ‘liberation’ while we continue to all but ignore Africans and others dying in their millions?

So where are we in terms of common sense? It seems to me that we either acted stupidly, or we stupidly believe our own self-congratulatory rhetoric despite the obvious limitations. What issues, then, should our intelligence have raised? What follows is a list of concerns, most of which were freely circulating in the public arena prior to our invasion of Iraq. If our intelligence agencies had reasons to ignore what was in the public arena, it seems now that

their reasons were baseless and that our government could have gained better advice by a single internet connection.

## **Issues that should have been and should now be raised by our intelligence agencies.**

At least to allay public concerns, the level of outcry over the following matters, all of which have been raised by others, should have been met with extensive and considered responses from our senior government leaders. The few relevant responses I have seen or heard have been carelessly dismissive. These are issues that, if well founded, go more to the heart of our national security than possible future threats by possible future terrorists, and on which our intelligence agencies should most urgently have made assessments. I say this because we are in danger of breeding apathy, complacency, and stupefied bewilderment in our population. And I am not the first to say so.

### **Firstly, specifically US-based concerns that cry out for public explanation:**

- a reasoned explanation why Australians should not be alarmed by the number of people who have been militarily trained by the US, usually for the US's short term needs, and who then turned against the US.
- the role of senior US administration figures in the oil industry, particularly in Asia.
- the role of oil in the invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq
- why we should not be concerned, to the point of alarm, about the 'neo-cons'
- why we should not be alarmed at Bush taking Presidential power undemocratically, perhaps by judicial coup, and why we did not speak up for the millions of Americans who felt an impostor had stolen the Presidency. As their long term ally, many Americans should rightly feel betrayed by our acquiescence in that coup.
- why we should not be concerned about the use of bullets made from radioactive materials, (depleted uranium) by our coalition partner
- why this despot (Saddam) was: a) more of a threat than others around the world; and b) why the Iraqis who survived our invasion were more deserving of 'liberation' than the people's of other countries around the world.

Without sensible explanations of these issues, we are creating an Australian society that engenders a culture of indifference and half truths even to the extent that peoples' lives, families, homes and health are sacrificed. This is a recipe for the breakdown of a society, and if it is not the job of our intelligence to say so, then who *will* say so???

Who?

### **Secondly, concerns that should have been addressed from an Australian perspective, by our intelligence agencies**

1. It should be apparent that despite the political games, many politicians (mostly US and UK rather than Australian) who are now claiming to have been misled over the seriousness of the WMD threats (whether or not any will be found), knew that they were being misled, but went along for the ride until a time of political opportunism arose to voice disapproval, such as now when no evidence has yet been verified, despite assertions by Howard presumably acting

on the poor intelligence advice that he had, and now that a predictable (and predicted by many) guerrilla war takes its toll in Iraq.

2. At issue is NOT whether there are WMDs in Iraq, but whether their existence justified invading; and moreover whether intelligence lines worked effectively in the making of the decision to invade. Such intelligence should have included whether our attack could have led to a WMD response by Iraq. The fact that we invaded in spite of the alleged WMD threat suggests EITHER that there really was no perceived threat OR that if there was a perceived threat, then the decision to ‘shock and awe’ was mindless stupidity. Similarly, such intelligence should have led to assessments that included the likelihood that anarchy would follow the ‘shock and awe’ campaign and lead to a situation where looters, including the supposed terrorists in Iraq, (pre-war terrorists, not those who have arrived in Iraq since the war or have been created because of the war) would be in a position to grab at whatever WMDs or WMD “capabilities” were portable. Since the WMDs are not where we “knew” they were, this portability apparently includes all of them, along with all evidence of them. (eg 4 August 2003, SBS World News reported that US forces found a number of Iraqi fighter jets buried in the desert and that the jets had been stripped by looters.)

3. Intelligence? For all the secret sharing between the CoW countries, it would seem that there was little if anything secret that was useful\*, at least in the decisions to invade, to target WMD sources, and to find Saddam. What was more useful (though not used) was the abundance of knowledge in the public domain to warn of both the futility of invading and of the great troubles that could follow such an invasion. Such knowledge which was apparently either overlooked or ignored – a shocking tragedy given that the advice of truly experienced journalists, ex- and whistleblowing western intelligence agents, correspondents and commentators (such as the often maligned but often precise likes of Fisk, Pilger, Chomsky, Roy, Vidal, Mailer and their ilk), and the stream of like articles linked on sites such as counterpunch, znet, anti-war, vicpeace and countless others, – was and remains, extensive, consistent and coherent. Such knowledge and related assessments should be compared to the often raving, changing and rhetorical lunacy that has come from all levels of the “coalition” (CoW) supporters. (\*The greatest success of the US efforts at finding Saddam and sons so far, came from a \$40 million dollar reward rather than from intelligence.) Given the cost to the US taxpayers (and consequently to consumers around the world) of the US intelligence agencies, and the cost of millions of lives around the world of people who have suffered criminally and atrociously in part because of poor US intelligence, the menace of this shocking juggernaut cannot be understated, and our own intelligence agencies should not only be acutely aware of these problems, they should be advising our government accordingly. The question is begged: Do our intelligence agencies exist to serve our government (replete with its changing political motives)? Or do they exist to serve the Australian people? For there can be a chasm of a difference. And it seems there is.

4. Our intelligence should have had much to say about the role of the United Nations. Instead of us saying that the UN was broken, by which our government helped break it further, our support could have helped boost its effectiveness. I hope that the intelligence agencies have considered both the effectiveness of the UN and the impacts of Australia’s outspoken denigration of its roles in various matters in recent years. I further hope that intelligence assessments were made to consider the legality, within Australia, of such a war without UNSC approval. This point comes up below.

5. Our intelligence should have a say about the impact of our involvement in the CoW in the war against Iraq, and of our role in the Pacific region, on our relationships with the US as an ally and as a trading partner. I hope that the warnings of useless subservience from people of such eminence and standing as Keating and Fraser were acknowledged. Any arguments to suggest that such is an economic consideration, and not for ASIO or ONA, should be met the argument that we need to have expert economic guidance within the agencies.

6. ASIO in particular should have sought to assess the level to which our own government was driven by considerations of economic dependence on the US, or even on military dependence, and whether those considerations were appropriate, in the recent circumstances, in deciding whether to invade another country. There will of course be arguments that such assessments are political and not the role for ASIO, but to counter that, I make two points. Firstly, ASIO is only there to assess and advise, and not to subvert, so it has limited powers to be abused. (Dawn raids aside!) Should we find ourselves with a government that, under cover of secrecy, advertently or otherwise, through ineptitude or otherwise, is exposing Australia to serious security risks, and seems unwilling to accept sound intelligence advice, it is essential that an agency such as ASIO ensures that the opposition and/or the parliament is made aware of those risks. We now see that it is not enough to advise only the opposition leader.

7. As a matter of national security, Australia should be seen to be abiding by the rule of law. It must therefore be appropriate for our intelligence agencies to consider all relevant matters that may have an impact on our ability to act militarily, whether in defence or as an aggressor. As such, assessments should have been made about the legality of the attacks. Was any consideration given to the impact there would have been on Australia if the entire federal government had been prosecuted for murder under Australian state and territory laws? And given that there is a possibility that private prosecutions may yet be undertaken against the executive members and the former governor-general, if not, why not?

There was indeed a minor public outcry over the source of and the nature of the advice given to the government over the legality of the war. Given that people of such standing as the leader of the opposition; the leader of the Democrats; Senator Bob Brown; and the Chief Minister of the ACT, described our involvement in the war as illegal, great concern should have been given to ensuring that the entire federal executive, if not the entire government did not put itself at risk of criminal prosecution. On this matter, the intelligence agencies may well have failed; a national calamity being averted publicly only by the element of audacity. See ATTACHMENT 2.

8. Following Point 7. above, ASIO should have a role in keeping tabs on advices given to the government from departmental advisors when such advisors are commenting on matters of public security. I hope they do.

9. Given that I see that our involvement in the war was inappropriate, probably illegal, and despite clear reasons to not join the CoW attacks, it follows that I see that we have had a catastrophic failure of intelligence at almost every level and at every turn. We have had an opposition too scared of electoral backlash to speak out: still hurting from the tragic and shameful Tampa, children overboard and SIEV-X disgraces. At least in such a climate, with a questionably effective opposition, ASIO should assess the long term impact on Australia if our government uses political lies and rhetoric on matters of national security, for short term political outcomes.

10. I would expect that ASIO, ONA, DIO and ASIS would all have concluded that the likely threat (terrorist, military, economic) to Australia has, and would have been expected to increase as a result of our attacks on Iraq. Mr Tony Abbott (MP) publicly accepted this point, though it seems to have been given insufficient weight either in assessments or by the government, given especially that our stated aim was to increase national security.

11. Efforts should have been made to determine the extent to which Australians were the intended targets of the Bali bombs; and we should have been advised of any findings, though the most I have heard on this issue has come from evidence given in the current trials in Indonesia. Consideration should have been given to discovering, and assessing the concerns of Indonesians toward Australia and its citizens. And still should be so given.

12. Given the perception within Australia if not in the international media, that Australia's role in the war against Iraq was in some ways related to our border protection issues and to our growing fear of, it seems mainly Muslim, terrorists, the comments of members of the federal executive during and after the "children overboard" fiasco should have raised eyebrows in our intelligence agencies. Comments made by federal ministers generalising about "these sorts of people" (implying the sorts who would come here by boat and then throw children overboard) in a climate where the government at least was claiming that some of the asylum seekers could be terrorists, were not only inappropriate, they were provocative and possibly illegal under our racial discrimination laws. I hope that the agencies recognised such comments as dangerously inflammatory, and that as a matter of national security quickly advised the ministers to desist from such comments. If they did not, they should have.

Efforts should have been made to discover how various security events (border protection incidents, Afghanistan and Iraqi wars) have been viewed by reactionaries both in Australia and overseas. What dangers are we now in as a result of those events? If the government's various spin doctors are aware of the impact of these events, in combination, on the minds of Australian voters, (and it is clear that they are) then it would be strange if we did not expect others in other lands to be similarly influenced (eg to believe – or at least that we believe - that people seeking to escape injustices in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Kashmir, etc, are queue jumping, child throwing, illegal immigrant terrorists) by the various related spins. Follow? It would therefore be shocking if our intelligence officers were not advising the government, if not various Australian law enforcement agencies, of the possible impacts of these events and comments. I for one would like to know why federal ministers were not considered to have racially discriminated with the "sorts of people" comments.

Other related questions of concern are raised briefly below. Their brevity should not diminish their importance:

13. What advice was given by the intelligence agencies about Bush's claims to the US Presidency, despite clear abuses of democratic processes? Given that the US, (and its citizens) are our allies, what advice was given to the Australian government about the concerns of perhaps many millions of US citizens that they had been the victims of a judicial coup? Is hypocrisy (regime change is claimed to be in the name of democracy) compatible with intelligence?

14. What concerns have been passed on to our government about comments such as those from Rumsfeld that the US would not tolerate a Muslim state in Iraq, even if a Muslim state turns out to be the wishes of a majority of Iraqis?



15. Given anecdotal reports and sporadic media reports that DFAT is peopled by unworldly and narrow-minded if not ignorant and incompetent staff, concerned in the main with not stirring the Minister nor rocking any (Australian) boats, what concerns have ASIO et al expressed about the effectiveness of such a department? Is there a concern in our intelligence agencies for this “sort of culture” in such a sensitive department? Are the various departments and agencies safely at arms length, or is there unanimity to exclude criticism?

16. What efforts were made to respond to the concerns of intelligence failures, or more particularly, failures to respond to intelligence, in the lead up to the independence referendum in East Timor? In accordance with Point 15, the last official word I heard on the matter was an impolite outburst from an insulted and outraged A. Downer. This issue is so significant, that although it was not Indonesian nationalists who suffered the most we should not discount its shockwaves even as far as the Bali bombings. Unless you know something we all don't.

17. Is there a view that ASIO et al should limit their intelligences to securing Australia by looking only at events which could destabilise us from military, otherwise armed or external espionage sources? Or is there concern that internal and political systemic failures and inadequacies can harm our security? I trust the latter.

18. Anti-war concerns may have been alleviated somewhat in the minds of the Australian people if some of the problems with the US administration's selective memory had been addressed and justified where appropriate. Of the many matters which I find particularly troubling is the oft claimed possibility that the murders which Saddam apparently ordered soon after coming to power, were either orchestrated by or at the suggestion of US agents, probably CIA agents. Rumsfeld's dealings with despots are not secret, and his response to being quizzed about his deals with devils, is along the lines that sometimes it is expedient to make use of oppressive and perhaps criminal regimes (for some greater good?). He repeated the point during the attempts to gain UN support earlier this year.

I hope that such comments ring alarm bells loudly in the corridors of ASIO. In any case Australian leaders have remained horrifyingly silent on these, and many other clearly hypocritical issues. Other similar major concerns include eg the Afghanistan oil pipeline deals. I will add some of my Afghanistan war references in the resources folder, and see eg [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/1626889.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1626889.stm). An inquiry similar to this current one, (as to what terrorist threats were posed by Afghanistan, more than, say, Saudi Arabian al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Florida and so on), should have been held before or any time since that supposedly successful war of less than two years ago. Another major concern, coincidentally, is the lack of comment by our leaders on if and why the Ministry of Oil building in Baghdad was given such priority protection.

19. What expectation is there that problems in the Middle East will be resolved while we turn our backs on the sufferings of countless innocent Palestinians?

20. What expectation is there, against the tide of history, that war will kill hatred rather than engender it?

As I complete what I have time to include in this submission, (5 August) another terror bomb explodes in Indonesia – much closer to home than Iraq. Our media in the same hour focuses on the execution of the Bali bombers before they have been convicted. If we expect to kill

terrorism, we are in for a never ending struggle. In the last 50 years many wars have waged on earth. I know of none which have on their own, without concessions and negotiations, crushed terrorism. Conversely many wars have created terrorists where they did not exist before. It is relevant and pertinent that many (non-Murdoch) reports came out of New York in September 2001, revealing deeply troubled people wanting to find out what Americans were doing to be so hated. Bush and his people hijacked any hope of looking at the root causes of the September 11 attacks. If this is the path our intelligence wants us to follow, we are in deep trouble and face a long era of hostility.

## **A note on Propaganda and intelligence**

If propaganda has a 'legitimate' role anytime, it may be as a means of diminishing the strength or resolve of opponents. (Indeed the apparent pretence that Iraq had viable WMDs may well have been Iraqi propaganda to deter invaders.) And propaganda may have a role in increasing the strength or resolve of a country's own people to withstand an enemy. 'Legitimate' if it helps to quell a legitimate enemy. Yet we now talk of propaganda as a means of deluding our own people in order to convince them (us) of the need to go to war.

Think about that for a while: Propaganda that is not to convince us that we can be victorious against an enemy, but to convince us that we have an enemy at all.

If an argument could be mounted that the pro-US, pro-war, anti-Iraq propaganda to which we have been long subjected was to bolster legitimate claims that an enemy did exist, then perhaps the propaganda in that sense could be argued to be legitimate. But what if the propaganda is all that there is? What if there are no substantial claims? What if there is only a feeling that a regime should be changed? Or that pre-emptive strikes should be allowed to maintain the supremacy of a superpower? What if the only foreseeable way to change the Iraqi regime was by a pre-emptive strike and if the only way to gain authority for such a pre-emptive strike was by deluding the peoples of at least three willing nations by way of baseless or at best insubstantial propaganda?

Legitimate?

What if it was apparent, both to the government and to the public, that the claims about the threats posed by Iraq were baseless, or weak at best: Should our intelligence agencies have been able to recognise the revelations (that the pro-war rhetoric was often disinformation) circulating on countless websites and in numerous newspapers around the world? And if they did, should they have had a role in forming assessments that Australia should have distanced itself from the cumbersome and perverse lies of two of those willing countries? And if such assessments were passed onto our government, would our government have been justified in weighing up an illegitimate war against the removal of one of many despots around the world, thereby placating the super power and alienating countless millions around the world? Any Australian who has not clearly rejected such a weighing, let alone a decision to go to war in such circumstances, has no place in public office, particularly not in an arena of national security, though quite probably deserves a place in a prison.

That such baseless propaganda has been able to flourish, in the absence of any consistent and rational arguments, ie for a need to have invaded Iraq, highlights either a failure of our intelligence agencies to assess the situation and to inform our government of such

assessment, or a failure of our government to appropriately respond to such assessment and information.

## **My Evidence?**

My resources are mostly newspaper, TV, radio and internet media. Much of what I accumulated, and copied onto the forwarded CD, was to present arguments on matters now so commonplace in the media that they need no proof – such as the lack of post-liberation contingency plans in Iraq; such as the continued decline into war-lord zones in Afghanistan, the stage of our previous “military success”; such as the lack of any evidence that Iraq posed any threat, now or in the future to our national security. Words of whistleblowers such as Wilkie and Kelly are troubling more for the concern that the good people leave the responsible positions, than for the revelations of what they had to say!

Based on evidence freely available in the public arena\* prior to Australia’s attack on Iraq, it is clear that there have been fundamental failures in the creation of, delivery of, and/or action on, intelligence resources. To repeat “Based on evidence freely available in the public arena...” Free information, available prior to April 2003, was and is to this day more coherent, predictive and apparently more reliable, and therefore more intelligent, than the combined product of whatever classified intelligences have been discovered, analysed, disseminated and acted upon by our intelligence agencies and our government.

\* It should not be thought that I have been unduly influenced by articles on some of the many extreme websites; rather, I have relied as a minimum on information from sites such as SMH, Age, abc.net.au, ninemsn, Washington Post, New York Times, PBS Newshour, BBC, The Times, New Scotsman, and few any more critical than The Independent, Observer and the Guardian.

With hindsight\* it seems that Australian security interests would have been better served by listening to and watching free to air public TV and radio, and by trawling popular sites on the internet and then having our intelligence agencies verify freely available information, rather than seeking to generate its own information. Perhaps the former is what the agencies have been doing, but if so, they have not been doing it well.

\* I say with hindsight not because the bases for our involvement in the attacks on Iraq, nor the consequences of them, were not obvious with foresight, but rather because with hindsight we see how appalling has been our intelligence production and/or the use of it.

I must say that many times as I scratched my head in disbelief at comments and actions of our leaders, there remained specks of doubt that perhaps our intelligence agencies were truly on top of the Iraq situation, having some accurate, reliable and relevant information that could have justified our government’s belief of eg WMD programs, imminent threats, Iraq’s relative danger as a threat, that Iraq needed a regime change more than other countries, or that Iraq’s human rights abuses (the most cited of which dated back to the early 1990s and beyond to when our allies supported the regime) were worse to us than recent problems in Burma, Cambodia, and at least four areas of Indonesia, let alone China and even the Cuban base of the USA. Those specks have all but gone. Australia’s selective morality is shameful.

And if there was some greater plan to benefit Iraqis, what then was the idea of regime change? We were not sold a regime destruction, but a regime change. This implies a change

to something; though what it was that was planned still seems to be elusive. Other than a US occupation, and the need to get the oil fields running before getting drinkable water running, plans for a democracy are being made up on the run; and at the cost of CoW and Iraqi civilian lives. If our intelligence agencies did not see this coming, then we would be better off without these agencies and not living in a state of false security. And if they did see it coming, then at some point between analysis and government responses, there have been horrendous failures to communicate, not the least of which, to the Australian people.

As a last concern, you might recall that earlier this year our major newspapers showed maps with the range of Korean missiles including much of Australia, and referred to as a warning by members of our government. You might also recall that last week a statement was made that Korea does not pose a nuclear threat to Australia. These inconsistencies do not engender comfort in our leaders nor in their advisors.

If this inquiry turns out to be a whitewash, I hope that those responsible for reporting its conclusions spend some time on their ways home at the inquiry's end wondering why our leaders have rarely responded to some of the more critical issues on the public agenda, so much as have whistleblowers. Is that really where we want to leave our national security?

Yours Faithfully

Michael Dunne

## Attachment 1. Essential Resources

There are several resources which I implore all members of the committee to closely read:

- scott burchill articles
- australia talks back
- cooperative research site
- gore vidal interview on dateline
- operation saddam – america’s war of propaganda
- war on iraq archive
- others

In more detail:

### 1. scott burchill articles

see page 19 of <http://www.greens.org.au/resources/Green-web-101.pdf> and included on CD as scott burchill.jpg  
also <http://www.vicpeace.org/stories/04/1094.html>  
and <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/09/1034061258019.html>

### 2. cooperative research site

Included on the CD is a copy of the cooperative research site with its 9/11 Timeline and its Iraq Outline. I have included the site on the CD as a copy of what was available on line prior to the invasion of Iraq. For up to date sites use: <http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/>

### 3. australia talks back

The ABC supplies tapes of this program, and the show on the Friday of the week the attacks on Iraq began is one of the most disturbing, troubling and emotional collection of ashamed and concerned people that you could ever hear. Elderly people, including war widows, who were in tears at the actions of our government. There were also pro-war voices who rang in; they are noticeable for their level of rational comment. I urge the Inquiry to obtain a copy of this show and listen to it.

<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/austback/stories/s811744.htm>

#### **Week In Review**

#### **Friday 21 March 2003**

We'll be taking your calls on the War on Iraq -  
Australian troops have been committed and hostilities have commenced.  
Also, how well are our war veterans treated when they return home?  
And is the media guilty of racial stereotyping?

**Presenter:** Sandy McCutcheon

**Producer:** Paul Barclay

#### **4. gore vidal interview on dateline**

“This is lunacy”: Gore Vidal interviewed by Mark Davis after the release of his book:  
*dreaming war-blood for oil-cheney bush junta*

March 12, 2003

links at <http://www.sbs.com.au/dateline/index.php3?archive=1&artmon=3&arty=2003#>

and see: dateline gore vidal.doc on the CD

#### **5. operation saddam – america’s war of propaganda**

aired by sbs in the last week of july 2003

a film by helmut grosse

production by wdr

interviews with ray mcgovern, former cia analyst and seymour hersh the site in deutsch is <http://wdr.de/tv/dokumentation/operationsaddam.html> though I do not have an English site for the same. This includes a claim that has been reported in other polls that half or more of Americans believe that Iraq helped with the September 11 attacks. As a friendly ally, we should strenuously encourage the Bush administration to explain publicly that there is no basis for this belief.

#### **6. war on iraq archive** from the VICPEACE site.

(Sept 2002 - May 2003) <http://www.vicpeace.org/meast/iraqwar.html>

This is a wealth of links to articles which were in the public arena prior to the invasion of Iraq.

See also: War on Iraq Archive.doc

#### **7. others**

##### **THE JOURNALISM AND FILMS OF JOHN PILGER**

<http://pilger.carlton.com/> eg the recent, 04 Jul 2003, <http://pilger.carlton.com/print/133018> on “the Blair government's secret approval of export licenses for chemical weapons technology”

##### **A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES & REPORTS BY MR. ROBERT FISK**

[www.robert-fisk.com/](http://www.robert-fisk.com/) this includes a good link to Chomsky articles

##### **WON’T TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER**

September 20, 2002

As Iraq slowly but eventually met US demands in relation to weapons inspectors during 2002, the concessions seemed to upset the Bush administration which asked for more each time a request was made. This led to the comment during a Shields and Brooks discussion that “This is an administration that won't take yes for an answer.” It was a pattern that lasted until the invasion began. [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/political\\_wrap/july-dec02/wrap\\_9-20.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/political_wrap/july-dec02/wrap_9-20.html)

##### **SENATOR SAYS BEST INTELLIGENCE DATA NOT GIVEN TO U.N.**

March 6, 2003

[www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-03-06-intel-usat\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-03-06-intel-usat_x.htm)

## COUNTING CIVILIAN CASUALITIES

June 19, 2003

[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle\\_east/jan-june03/iraq\\_06-19.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june03/iraq_06-19.html) or see

COUNTING CIVILIAN CASUALITIES.doc

Margaret Warner discusses the number of civilians who died in the Iraq conflict with retired Col. Samuel Gardiner; Alex Roland, professor of history at Duke University; and Niko Price, a correspondent with the Associated Press.

## GROWING DANGER

June 24, 2003 [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle\\_east/jan-june03/iraq\\_6-24a.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june03/iraq_6-24a.html)

This looks at the lack of accountability for the false expectations of those who were liberated; the lack of planning and resources in post-war Iraq; and some of the problems of America acting without UN support.

or see: growing danger 24 june 2003 pbs newshour.doc on CD

## PAUL MORAN STORY

July 23, 2003

<http://www.sbs.com.au/dateline/index.php3?archive=1&artmon=7&arty=2003#> and link to

paul moran story

or see on CD: sbs dateline July 23, 2003

## **Attachment 2: Legality of War against Iraq.**

There is a simple argument that to wage war on another country, without lawful authority, is a criminal act under Australian criminal codes, including the crime of murder. It is not enough to say that war is waged under executive power, for the High Court has been very clear that any such power must be supported by the constitution. Unless and until the orders to attack Iraq are tested in the High Court, there remains a question over the culpability of the federal executive. I must assume that ASIO at least would have warned the government of the inherent dangers of acting without lawful authority. Yet it has gone unheeded.

The following letter is similar to letters that were sent to Police Commissioners in all states and in the NT in June of this year. Previously, similar letters were sent to all state and territory Directors of Public Prosecution. The relevance for intelligence agencies, should be obvious, though it does not seem always to be so. There are two national security issues here to which we should be alerted. One is the concern that an entire government could have committed serious indictable offences. One of the many problems is that our law enforcement agencies might find themselves faced with weighing the rule of law against the disruption to the running of, and even to the defence of the nation, by the possible losing of a large number of elected members from the government. Because of the possibility of such an outcome, I hope that our intelligence agencies considered what might happen and the likelihood of such an outcome.

The second concern has to do with the public perception that the rule of law has not been applied. Many public figures stated that the Iraq war was illegal, and almost nothing was done to convince the public otherwise. If we allow our nation to see that laws can be ignored, then we are setting horrendous precedents that in the long run could be more harmful to our security (from within) than violent attacks on our sovereignty. The content of the letter below is currently being considered for further action. I will be alarmed if our intelligence agencies are not concerned.

I should point out that not one of the above recipients (police commissioners and DsPP) sought to provide, for the PM and the executive, any legal arguments for their failures to prosecute. Several replies suggested that I put the matter to other agencies.

The text of the letter:

Dear Commissioner

This letter by no means attempts to cover all legal issue raised by the concerns below; it merely outlines reasons for the concerns. Detailed analyses of related issues have been omitted for brevity.

It is public knowledge that the recent attack by Australian Defence Forces on the country of Iraq was made under order from the Prime Minister acting on behalf of the then Governor-General and the Commonwealth Executive. Prior to that order, threats were made by the Prime Minister and others, publicly, that an attack was imminent. In his capacity to make those threats, and to give the order to attack, the Prime Minister was, and remains, supported by all federal Liberal Party and National Party Members of Parliament. A number of those Members, and some of their advisors, reside in your jurisdiction and it is inconceivable that



no part of the planning for the order to attack Iraq was carried out within your jurisdiction. In order to determine whether any crimes have been committed in this state, it would seem that the only investigative role for the NSW Police is to determine whether any of those who planned, approved or supported the attack, were at any relevant time in New South Wales.

Clearly, unless there is substance to the claim of lawful authority, the planning for and the attacks on Iraq have led to a number of offences under the Crimes Act 1900, including: murder, assaults, offences against property, conspiring to commit those offences, accessories to those offences and attempts to commit those offences. Under Sections 10A, 10B, 10C, 10D, 10E of the Crimes Act such offences have been committed if any part of an offence was carried out within NSW.

The onus of establishing lawful authority, if it is in doubt, falls on those who breach the Crimes Act. There have been many public statements by prominent Australians that the attack on Iraq, as ordered, was without lawful authority. At the very least, there is some doubt over the lawfulness of the attack. This is not a trivial point. This is a question over whether murder has been committed. Unless we have abandoned the rule of law, the standing in the community of those who perpetrated the killings is no reason to absolve them from criminal action. Indeed their standing should demand that any question of legality be cleared up in the public's eyes. It is difficult to see how such questions can be removed without testing the lawfulness of their actions in court. Ultimately, of course, it is the High Court that is able to make the decision as to whether or not the attack and consequently the apparent offences were lawful.

Despite the Prime Minister's statement that his advice was that attacking Iraq was lawful by virtue of reliance on an outdated United Nations Security Council resolution, such reliance, under objective scrutiny, does not seem to be supported by any head of power, express or implied, in the Australian Constitution. Further, any power that the Executive may have had was subject to, under the Westminster system, the support of Parliament. Whatever claims the Executive or the Executive-in-Council had that the order was made with lawful authority, prior to the matter being put to the parliament, were lost when the Senate rejected the PM's decision to order Australian Forces to attack Iraq. At that point, if not before, the maintenance of the order to attack Iraq was without lawful authority, and so any person whose support assisted such an unlawful order at any time while in New South Wales was in breach of the Crimes Act.

The Prime Minister did not, nor was able to point to any power under the Australian Constitution for ordering the attack. The only relevant heads of power, other than the Executive power, are those of defence and of external affairs. It was clear prior to the attack that there was no substantiable threat to Australia from Iraq, and indeed the view was put frequently, including by a federal government minister, that an attack on Iraq would and did increase threats to our security. It follows that the order to attack Iraq was not an order to defend Australia, and so that head of power was not available. The external affairs power can be relied on for military purposes as a part of our international obligations, however, our paramount international obligation is to the United Nations. This paramountcy is a provision of the UN's own charter, as approved by Section 5 of the Charter Of The United Nations Act 1945, and, since it was approved by an Act of Parliament, it is binding on the Executive unless and until the Parliament withdraws or overrides its approval. Indeed the paramountcy of the UN is also a proviso of the ANZUS agreement. As the UN Security Council expressly refused to support the attack on Iraq, then, in the absence of a decision from the federal

Parliament to withdraw from the UN, the Commonwealth Executive is precluded from relying on the external affairs head of power if it is attempting to act against the wishes of the UN. In any case, the Senate refused to accept any so-called reliance under any head of power.

There have been some suggestions that there is a royal prerogative of the Governor-General to declare war, but this is, at least in the recent circumstances, also unreliable. It is clear from a number of authorities that whatever prerogative powers remain with the Governor-General, they are ultimately subject to the Australian Constitution. It is clear that even if such a power could have been relied on by monarchs of past eras, the Governor-General's role is limited by the nature of our federation. Prerogatives can be used only to give effect to the Constitution or to valid legislation created under it. There is no substantiable evidence that the Constitution was under any threat. Further it is clear from past High Court rulings that prerogatives cannot override the clear intentions of parliament, and since the clear intention of the federal parliament for the past fifty years and more has been to support the UN, and further, since the Senate (and therefore the parliament) refused to accept the order to attack Iraq, there is no prerogative power on which the PM, the Executive nor the Executive-in-Council can rely.

It seems that perhaps the most blatant and public mass murder in Australia's history, has, despite constant outcries of illegality, gone unchallenged by our law enforcement agencies. While it may be that your own investigations are still underway, there is a growing impatience among many members of the community, including members of peace activist groups. It is increasingly likely that unless some statement comes from your office, moves will be made toward private prosecutions.

Are you able to shed any light on the status of any past or current investigations into the matters raised in this letter? Should these concerns go unattended, we may find an increasing perception that there are persons in public office with immunity from prosecution.

----- end of attachment 2

8 August 2003

## **ATTACHMENT 3 - Prominent Figures Reject War**

to the submission to the WMD Inquiry

In my main submission, I noted that the internet abounds with rational arguments which belittle either the Coalition of Willing (CoW) countries intelligence agencies, or at least the CoW countries use of the intelligence. I stated also that as a minimum I sought to rely on sources that are generally regarded as reliable. I initially left out many UK and US sources, as I thought that problems were self-evident in Australia regarding the use of intelligence, so I did not want our failures to be seen as dependant on, nor to be blamed on, those of the US or the UK. I also left out some articles from reliable sources if I knew little or nothing of the authors. It has since been pointed out to me, that it might be useful as a back up to my claim, that the internet abounds with clear rationale about the stupidity of attacking Iraq, to include some relevant sites and links. So in this attachment there are a number of articles and references that are in the main quite rational and the sources of which seem, at least, to be quite reliable.

Many of the sites here are articles by prominent people, warning, often in advance, of the dangers of this war (which is clearly far from over) against Iraq. I have included comments below, based in part on the nature of some of the views expressed in the articles. Some of the points I make lower in this document are the most important points to be found in this attachment. Some of these sites are to useful links, too many to copy. I would like to think that you become familiar with at least the articles referenced here, and a browse of the links.

### **Part A**

#### **Current and former politicians, intelligence and military officials, from the UK and the US.**

1. Republicans advertise against Iraq war in Wall Street Journal – this is at many sites, including a pdf of the original advertisement - <http://wand.org/issuesact/WSJad.doc>
2. Gen. Schwarzkopf is 'Skeptical' (28 Jan 2003) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A52450-2003Jan27?language=printer>
3. Colin Powell and the Great "Intelligence" Fraud  
<http://www.counterpunch.org/cockburn02152003.html>
4. George Tenet, when he was allowed to be sceptical (Oct 2002)  
<http://www.naplesnews.com/02/10/perspective/d838246a.htm>  
Guardian article: Who controls the CIA? - Tenet does not seem too sure -  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4714031,00.html> or at  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,999737,00.html>
5. FBI investigators unable to find evidence <http://www.iht.com/articles/85354.htm>.
6. 'Official' doubts <http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/4234259.htm>

7. Retired Gen Wesley K Clark [http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2002-09-09-oplede\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2002-09-09-oplede_x.htm)

8. Col. David H. Hackworth

[http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\\_ID=29786](http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=29786)

Col. David H. Hackworth, in one of many scathing articles about the Bush approach to war, writes in this one on the difficulties of troops fighting in chemical proof suits.

[http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\\_ID=29547](http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=29547)

9. Gen. Anthony Zinni <http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/10/17/zinni/> and <http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/10/17/zinni/index1.html>

10. Anti war comment (Dec 2002) from UK's Gen Fraser -

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/Content/displayPopup.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2002/12/24/dt2407.xml&site=15>

11. Ex President Clinton (a hypocrite he may be, but even our own Malcolm Fraser seems to have come good, so perhaps we should take heed) on alternatives to Bush's wars. Oct 2002

[http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2002/10/10/intelligence/index\\_np.html](http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2002/10/10/intelligence/index_np.html)

12. Anti war views from UK ex Def & Foreign Secretary

<http://www.warmwell.com/2jul19rifkind.html>

13. Desert Rat speaks out <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2551707.stm>

14. A forum on the resignation of Kiesling. This is included because the entry by Daniella Leifer led me to most of the above criticisms.

[http://misnomer.dru.ca/2003/02/28/john\\_brady\\_kieslings\\_letter\\_of\\_resignation.html](http://misnomer.dru.ca/2003/02/28/john_brady_kieslings_letter_of_resignation.html)

15. Last in this group but not least, is the US Senator Byrd. I have yet to come across serious answers to his questions to Rumsfeld, but if they exist, our government, with opposition support, should make sure such that any answers are well announced. Equally, we should be advised if the US administration has no satisfactory replies to Senator Byrd's concerns. The sites listed below have been copied and are saved on the CD in the *Senator Byrd* folder, which is in the folder: *D. Reference Documents for Attachment 3*. See for example:

The Administration's Dangerous Wartime Rhetoric 13 Feb 2003 -

[http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd\\_newsroom/byrd\\_news\\_feb/news\\_2003\\_february/news\\_2003\\_february\\_12.html](http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd_newsroom/byrd_news_feb/news_2003_february/news_2003_february_12.html)

Rush to War Ignores U.S. Constitution 3 October 2003 -

[http://www.senate.gov/~byrd/byrd\\_newsroom/byrd\\_news\\_oct2002/rls\\_oct2002/rls\\_oct2002\\_2.html](http://www.senate.gov/~byrd/byrd_newsroom/byrd_news_oct2002/rls_oct2002/rls_oct2002_2.html)

Providing a Cookbook for Iraqi Biological Weapons 26 September 2003 -

[http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd\\_issues/byrd\\_iraqi\\_bioweapons/byrd\\_iraqi\\_bioweapons.html](http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd_issues/byrd_iraqi_bioweapons/byrd_iraqi_bioweapons.html)

Reaping What We Have Sown in Iraq 20 Sept 2003 -

[http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd\\_issues/byrd\\_iraqi\\_bioweapons/byrd\\_sept202002/byrd\\_sept202002.html](http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd_issues/byrd_iraqi_bioweapons/byrd_sept202002/byrd_sept202002.html)

Transcript from the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing

*September 19, 2002 -*

[http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd\\_newsroom/byrd\\_news\\_feb/news\\_2003\\_february/news\\_2003\\_february\\_12.html](http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd_newsroom/byrd_news_feb/news_2003_february/news_2003_february_12.html)

## **Part B**

### **Other sources and my comments.**

#### 1. Independent article

“Iraq war has possibly increased the popularity of al-qai’da?”

<http://www.obv.org.uk/reports/2003/rpt20030801b.html>

#### 2. A comment on the UK MoD report on Iraq Operations – (see link at 3. below) -

<http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=422713>

or at

<http://www.google.com.au/search?q=cache:TbYE-8fXSggJ:news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/index.jsp%3Fpage%3D2+%22Britain+and+the+United+States+had+no+clear+intelligence+on%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>

#### 3. UK Ministry of Defence report

[http://www.mod.uk/linked\\_files/publications/iraq2003operations.pdf](http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/publications/iraq2003operations.pdf)

#### 4. Salon.com

Hesitantly pro-war Arkin commenting on Bush incompetence -

<http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/10/11/arkin/index.html>

#### 5. DOCUMENTARY: Hidden Wars of Desert Storm – Nov 2001 about the 1991 war against Iraq. A review of the doc is at <http://people.ee.ethz.ch/~tawfiko/GulfWar/GULFWAR.htm>

6. CIA activities? Whether true or not, the contents of sites like this give insights into why the public is so mistrustful, and why terrorists find such willing fodder. If we clear up the past, we may not need to blast so much in the future. Dismiss sites and views like this at the peril of your country – for it is perception that drives terrorism (or at least expands terrorism) more than hard facts. And in any case the question remains: Are they facts?

[http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/CIA%20Hits/CIA\\_GreatestHits.html](http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/CIA%20Hits/CIA_GreatestHits.html)

7. Malaysian commentator Dr. Farish A. Noor, writes an article that closes with this:

“Sadly the "liberator" who will free their peoples happens to be the same corrupt, immoral and thuggish superpower that propped them up in the first place: the United States of America, patron and benefactor to the universal league of power-hungry tyrants.”

<http://www.shaghaghi.net/blog/newArchives/001021.html>

As with point 6. above, if we do not address beliefs like this, a “war against terror” will be a “war to increase terrorism”. We have here the most fundamental failing of intelligence and/or a massive lie that we wish to stop terrorism. It is difficult at present to see how we could do much more to incite terrorism. Even our PM on death penalty is bizarre. He wants to kill the Bali bombers because they killed us; yet he seems not to recognise that their ilk might want to kill us because of our support for the killing of terrorists. Come on. It’s the same thing. Vidal was right when he said that Tim Mc Veigh should have been listened to more carefully – not because of his murders, but because of what led him to murder. Within months of McVeigh’s execution, the twin towers collapsed for what may have been motives similar to those that drove McVeigh. If we do not listen to Amrosi before we gloat over the few bullets that may yet snuff out his human life, we can expect more of his kind to come after us. We should be engrossed in establishing how he came to be like he is. Yet we are bent on dumbing our nation into believing that a few executions will scare off suicide bombers. We seriously place our future security on the expectation that we can threaten suicidal terrorists with death penalties. What??? Listen to these murderers, consider what they consider, and make our war one that deals with getting the world on side; not off side.

Here lie the challenges for our intelligence people and for our government. Their combined efforts so far, and this inquiry must judge why, have us on a downward and horrendous slide.

8. A Critical Guide to the Iraq War. An excellent set of links is at

<http://www.jasonbeale.com/iraqwar.html>

9. Links on warmwell site (several articles on the CD).

For a browse of a number of relevant anti-war articles that are easily available, go to:

*iraq – aftermath* link at <http://www.warmwell.com/>

There are many useful links – scroll down to war archives -

<http://www.warmwell.com/sitemap.html>

For links back to 9 feb 2003 <http://www.warmwell.com/wararchive.html>

And see also <http://www.warmwell.com/warmarchivenov02.html>

End of Attachment 3.