



Submission No 11

Inquiry into Australia's Defence Relations with the United States

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Australia's Defence Relations with the United States

**Submission to the Defence Sub-Committee of the Parliamentary
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade,**

Inquiry into Australia's Defence Relations with the United States

Peter Jennings

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[Note: this submission does not present a common position on behalf the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). As with all ASPI's material, the views expressed are those of the author.]

Australia's Defence Relations with the United States

It would be a mistake to concentrate on the alliance's daily activities at the expense of its more foundational aspects.

It is important to start with the foundations of the Australia-US alliance relationship – that is the combination of values, interests and popular engagement between the two countries that collectively underpin the strength of the alliance. Too often the alliance is described in terms of the specific benefits it brings in terms of military cooperation – intelligence, combined exercises, logistics and so on. These are all valuable assets but they reflect the alliance's attributes rather than its fundamental purpose. It would be a mistake to concentrate on the alliance's daily activities at the expense of reviewing its more foundational aspects – whether Australia and the United States still have sufficient common interests, shared values and popular support to keep the alliance healthy into the future.

Common interests

Australia and the United States have many common interests, but few common points of comparison, such is the difference of scale between the two countries. The differences shape our alliance relationship as much as the similarities. So, for example, on economic strength the US alone accounted in 2001 for one third of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In that year Australia, as the world's 15th largest economy, produced only 1.18% of the world's GDP, or US\$368.7 billion. This was close to the 2001 Gross State Product of New Jersey (US\$365 billion) and about a quarter of California's economic output (US\$1,359 billion).¹

On military spending the differences are even more stark. In 2002 the US defence budget was US\$335.7 billion, fully 43% of global military spending and was significantly larger than the combined defence budgets of the next fourteen biggest spenders. US spending on counter terrorism has since dramatically increased. By comparison Australian defence spending in 2002 was around US\$6.8 billion, only 0.87 of the world's total and about what the United States spends every week on defence.²

Clearly, America is no ordinary power. Its military and economic strength and its remarkable capacity for innovation will underpin Washington's dominance as the world's only 'hyper-power' over the coming generation. One consequence for the United States is that has security interests in every corner of the globe. Speculation about the dangers of US isolationism has become redundant – America's size and scale and the global spread of its interests means that Washington must remain engaged.

¹ US and Australian GDP figures are sourced from the World Bank. (www.worldbank.org); US Gross State Product sourced from the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. (www.bea.gov)

² Data sourced from SIPRI (www.sipri.org)

... the two countries continue to share a remarkable degree of overlapping security interests.

It is inevitable that America's global dominance is a major factor shaping how Australia defines its own strategic interests and equally inevitable that Australia's overall impact on US is small. That said, the two countries continue to share a remarkable degree of overlapping security interests. Both countries need a stable Asia-Pacific if they are to prosper economically; both need open economies for trade and investment; both are strongly committed to democratic systems; both have a century-long record of active global engagement in conflicts fought to protect open societies.

This identification of common interests is a strong foundation for our alliance relationship. But our interests are not identical – Canberra and Washington will often differ on setting priorities. For Australia, stability in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia remain critical to our security. For the United States, these areas are of secondary strategic concern. US attention will inevitably focus on the biggest economic and security issues of the day and more often than not Australia's strategic preoccupations will only be on the margins of America's deepest concerns.

... we should do what we can to maximise our national access and influence in key decision-making forums in Washington.

It follows that a vital Australian interest is that we should do what we can to maximise our national access and influence in key decision-making forums in Washington. It is often claimed that our close alliance relationship gives greater access and influence to US policy makers relative to our size. We should test that assumption regularly and constantly look for new avenues and opportunities to engage with the United States. There are, of course, existing forums like the AUSMIN Ministerial talks and strategic dialogues between officials, but there would be value in looking at new ways of engaging the US policy community.

For example, there would be great value in establishing an Australia-US strategic dialogue on China's emergence as a major power in the Asia-Pacific. China's future security role is centrally important both to Australia and the US and a regular dialogue bringing together policy makers, country analysts and political decision makers could help both Washington and Canberra to refine their thinking on China. Such a meeting would provide invaluable insights and opportunities for Australia help shape directions in Sino-US ties – probably the most important strategic relationship of the coming generation.

Shared values and public opinion

Australia and the United States share many common values including our support for democracy, the rule of law, a free press, religious tolerance – the list is familiar. A harder question is whether national values are changing in ways that might create some potential gaps between our two societies. Robert Kagan's 2003 book, *Of Paradise and Power* asked whether such a gap was opening between the United States and Europe. His formulation "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus" captured to some degree a difference in world-views between a unilateral, interventionist, realist Washington and Europe's multilateral idealism. If you substitute Australia for Europe Kagan's

aphorism sound's much less believable. Indeed, Australians too are generally from Mars – when it comes to defence and security policy we are avowedly realist in outlook. This has been shown in the level of popular support for Australian involvement in military operations ranging from East Timor to Afghanistan, Iraq (once our forces were deployed) and the Solomon Islands.

Opinion poll data shows a remarkably high level of support for the alliance and for the view that the United States can be trusted to come to Australia's defence. The polling data on the following page is taken from successive *Australian Election Surveys* from 1993, '96, '98 and 2001. Support for the proposition that the ANZUS alliance is 'fairly' or 'very' important to protect Australia's security has run close to 90% in the last three surveys. Again, in the last three polls, around 80% surveyed said they had a 'great deal' or a 'fair amount of trust that the United States will come to Australia's defence if our security was threatened.

Popular support for the alliance, remains very strong. Few if any other areas of public policy would enjoy such high levels of community consensus

Even after the experience of the Iraq war, Australians were among the strongest supporters of the US globally. In June 2003 the Pew Research Centre in Washington conducted polls in forty-four countries. Australia was among the top half-dozen countries expressing a favourable view of the US (60%), of Americans (74%) and in support of the US-led war against terrorism (68%).

Popular support for the alliance, therefore remains very strong. Few if any other areas of public policy would enjoy such high levels of community consensus about the importance of the alliance or the trustworthiness of the US to support Australia in time of need.

One should be mindful, though, of the potential for values and public opinion to change. New Zealand went through such a transformation in the 1980s and 1990s and now defines its security interests quite differently from its former ANZUS allies. A seismic change of that magnitude seems unlikely in Australia. But both Canberra and Washington can help to guard against that possibility by tending to the sensitivities each other may have about alliance cooperation. That means (to quote Kagan) hoping the US "... would begin to show more understanding for the sensibilities of others." It also means Australia must work harder to understand the dynamics and drivers of US policy.

There is a paradox at the heart of Australian relations with the United States. No country is more familiar to us – through consumer goods and cultural habits, through television, movies and music we are intimately familiar with the surface veneer of America. But this is seldom matched with any extensive knowledge of their history, politics or international relations. This cultural familiarity combined with a lack of understanding of the complexity and sophistication of US society may be the reason why Australians can at times appear so easily dismissive of America's politicians and preoccupations.

**Strong Alliance Supporters:
Australian Public Opinion on the US Alliance**

**How much trust do you feel Australia can have in the
United States to come to Australia's defence?**

	March 1993	March 1996	October 1998	November 2001
	%	%	%	%
A great deal	25.9	35.5	33.1	38.5
A fair amount	43.2	45.1	46.7	44.5
Total that trust	69.1	80.6	79.8	83.0
Not very much	26.8	16.2	17.7	14.4
None at all	4.0	3.2	2.5	2.6
Total not trusting	30.8	19.4	20.2	17.0

Source: Australian Social Science Data Archives; *Australian Election Studies for 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2001*. (<http://www.sdda.anu.edu.au/>) (Question wording varies slightly across elections.)

**How important do you think the Australian alliance with the United States under
the ANZUS treaty is for protecting Australia's security?**

	March 1993	March 1996	October 1998	November 2001
	%	%	%	%
Very important	37.1	55.4	47.0	57.9
Fairly important	42.4	33.4	41.1	31.9
Total important	79.5	88.8	88.1	89.8
Not very important	17.4	9.0	9.6	8.3
None at all important	3.2	2.2	2.3	1.9
Total not important	20.6	11.2	11.9	10.2

Source: Australian Social Science Data Archives; *Australian Election Studies for 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2001*. (<http://www.sdda.anu.edu.au/>) (Question wording varies slightly across elections.)

Pew Research Centre Survey of global attitudes, June 2003

Favourable view of the US (%)		Favourable view of Americans (%)		Support US led war on terror (%)	
Israel	79	UK	80	Israel	85
UK	70	Israel	79	Italy	70
Kuwait	63	Canada	77	Canada	68
Canada	63	Italy	77	Australia	68
Nigeria	61	Australia	74	Spain	63
Australia	60	Sth Korea	74	UK	63
Italy	60	Kuwait	71	Germany	60
Sth Korea	46	Nigeria	67	Nigeria	60

Source: Pew Research Centre for the People & the Press, *Views of a Changing World, June 2003*. (Washington, D.C.) (www.people-press.org)

Government and Parliament should do more to bolster an informed public understanding of the alliance.

It also suggests that Australian popular support for the alliance is built more on sentiment than a deep knowledge of the United States, or of the benefits that flow (in both directions) from bilateral security cooperation. That is a potentially dangerous situation because sentiments can change.

There is a strong case to argue that the Government and Parliament should do more to bolster an informed public understanding of the alliance. Over the long term a greater emphasis on learning about the US and on promoting more interaction between our peoples will help to sustain a national consensus in favour of the alliance.

Strengthening public understanding of the United States

In preparation for this submission my ASPI colleague, Dougal McInnes, surveyed the state of American studies in Australian universities (see attachment 'A'). The findings are disturbing because they show the very limited range of American studies available in Australian universities. We reviewed the offerings of forty-two tertiary institutions as posted on their web sites. Of these only five universities offered undergraduate programs majoring in American studies – the Australian National University, New England, Queensland, Melbourne and Flinders. A further three offered a reasonably large range of undergraduate courses focussing on the US – Tasmania, La Trobe and Western Australia.

... given America's economic and strategic importance, the lack of opportunities for young people to study the US is a huge deficiency.

In all other cases there were either no undergraduate course offerings, or only one or two US-centred courses. Only Flinders University appeared to offer a specific post-graduate major in American studies, although a number of universities offered Masters programs in international relations and strategic studies in which the US could play a major part. The Australia and New Zealand American Studies Association (ANZASA) maintains a register of Australian postgraduate students currently studying US-related topics – currently there are only 31 students on the register. There is a department of American Studies at Flinders University, and an American Studies division in Melbourne University's History Department. Sydney University's American-Australian Studies Centre ceased operations in 1997.

No one would argue with the need for Australians to study Asia. But given America's global economic and strategic importance, the lack of opportunities for young people to study the US is a huge national deficiency. Our lack of detailed knowledge about the US suggests that Australia is missing opportunities to strengthen and extend our current relationship.

The government could help to reverse this situation with a number of initiatives designed to increase Australian knowledge and understanding of America. Specifically, we propose the following measures:

Funding a number of **Percy Spender Scholarships**. Named after the foreign minister who did so much to create the ANZUS Treaty, the Percy Spender Scholarships would be awarded to people undertaking postgraduate and post-doctoral study on US topics at Australian universities. The Scholarships could include short-term study visits to the US.

Supporting the development of a **Cooperative Research Centre on the United States**. A CRC would help to bring together the disaggregated expertise on the US that exists in Australian tertiary institutions and to provide a way of linking the academic, policy and business communities. A US-focused CRC could seek to develop new commercial, research and innovation links with the US

Finally, we suggest that the Government and/or Parliament should consider providing funding support for an **Australia-US Young Leaders Dialogue**. There is already a prominent annual Australia-US Dialogue involving some leading Australian figures from the public and private sectors. However this is a well established group of senior individuals. This type of contact should actively be promoted between the next generation of Australian and American leaders. A Young Leaders Dialogue would seek to get young Australians from the private and public sectors engaging with their American counterparts, learning more about each-other's national experience and grappling with the key strategic issues of our time. One element of this could be to involve younger federal Parliamentarians and their counterparts in Congress and the US Administration. This would be a valuable long-term investment on the part of the Australian Government and would help to build contacts and networks between the next generation of leaders on both sides of the Pacific.

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Specific questions in the Committee's terms of reference

The Committee's terms of reference set out some specific areas of investigation. Below, we present some brief thoughts and suggestions for consideration.

Applicability of the ANZUS Treaty to Australia's defence and security

The terms of the ANZUS treaty remain highly relevant to Australia's defence and security. The treaty contains only eleven articles. A preamble affirms the importance of the United Nations and the signatories' support for strengthening "the fabric of peace in the Pacific area." Article two commits the signatories:

...separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Under article three the parties commit to:

...consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article four is the most significant:

Each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

For Australia, Article four has underpinned a broader security relationship with the United States.

An academic mini-publishing industry has been sustained by studies seeking to weigh the value and strength of the security guarantee provided by the treaty. Those opposed to the alliance argue that Article four is essentially without any value, that the reference to 'constitutional processes' provides a mechanism whereby any party can avoid the requirement to provide military support. That argument is credible only if one accepts that Australia and the US do not take treaty obligations seriously. There certainly are states that sign treaties without intending to comply with their terms. But that is not a feature of how Canberra and Washington regard international instruments.

What is clear is that article four does, in fact, go much further than just providing for political consultations. Article four's statement that the parties will "act to meet the common danger" in the event of an armed attack on their territory or forces underwrites a seriousness of national intent which cannot easily be dismissed. This was demonstrated by Australia's invocation of the treaty following the terror attacks of September 11 2001.

For Australia, Article four has underpinned a broader security relationship with the United States. In the early decades of the alliance the security guarantee was seen to be the source of its prime importance. In the post Vietnam war period the focus of policy makers shifted to a more practical emphasis on the material elements of defence cooperation. But Article four remains important -- as Hugh White, then a senior Defence official, put it at a conference on the alliance in 1997:

What is important about Article four is not that we can assume that the United States would send their armed forces to defend Australia, it is that any potential attacker would have to think very carefully about whether they wouldn't.³

³ Hugh White, then Deputy Secretary, Department of Defence, quoted in The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *ANZUS After 45 Years: Seminar Proceedings 11-12 August 1997* (Parliament House, Canberra) p. 155.

The value of US-Australian intelligence sharing

Intelligence sharing remains one of the greatest benefits of the alliance -- it is valuable to both countries, although particularly so to Australia. Of all America's allies, only the UK is likely to have closer intelligence links than Australia.

Without the alliance, Australia would be substantially blind in many critical areas of intelligence gathering and assessment.

Without the alliance, Australia would be substantially blind in many critical areas of intelligence gathering and assessment. We cannot afford the investment levels necessary to duplicate America's intelligence gathering capability which, is worth billions of dollars annually. US investment in highly technical intelligence systems is an essential foundation for the alliance intelligence effort. Further, US analytical assessments help to inform Australia's judgements about many intelligence issues over which we simply do not have the resources or scale to act as our own primary gatherer of information.

Australia has particular intelligence strengths in terms of our nearer region and our assessments of developments in the Asia Pacific provide a valuable counterpoint to US thinking and policy development in these areas.

Inevitably after Iraq we need to ask if Australia was too dependent on US-sourced intelligence. The role of US intelligence assessments in the picture will take some time to emerge, but this was hardly the only source of information available to Australia. It should be remembered that there was a very strong consensus in western countries, including France and Germany, about Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. This consensus was underwritten by the information gathered by the United Nations' Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and before that the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM).

Australia would have been in a far worse situation if it were required to make assessments about Iraq without access to US intelligence. Essentially, we would have to make decisions on the basis of open-source information. But the alliance relationship does not remove the necessity for Australia to be able to make its own assessments of all available data. Fundamentally this comes down to a question not about our alliance links but about how adequately we resource our assessment agencies, and in particular how well resourced they are to make assessments of strategic issues beyond our immediate region.

Australia should do what it can to encourage a continued strong US engagement in the region.

The role and engagement of the US in the Asia Pacific region

The US remains a vital stabilising force in the Asia Pacific. America assuages the region's worries about China's growing power, about Japan's latent military capability and about rogue states and proliferating weapons of mass destruction. Occasional bursts of rhetoric notwithstanding, no country in the region wants to see the US stop playing this stabilising role in Asia-Pacific security.

It follows that Australia should do what it can to encourage a continued strong US engagement in the region. An alliance relationship built around active and worthwhile co-operation and focussed, intelligent dialogue on strategic issues provides a strong incentive towards sustaining US engagement.

This Committee inquiry could make a major contribution to Australian thinking about the alliance if it devoted some time to refuting the old canard that Australia's US relationship undermines our ability to pursue closer relations with Asia. Beyond the occasional newspaper editorial it is difficult to point to any evidence that suggests that our links with the US and with Asia reflect mutually incompatible goals.

At a time when almost all countries in the Asia-Pacific consider their bilateral relations with the United States to be critically important to them, it would be absurd to argue that Australia could enhance its regional relations by downgrading the importance of our American alliance. Indeed the opposite is true -- a close US relationship boosts Australian credibility in the region. Many regional states consider the Australian Defence Force a highly competent partner with which to work precisely because of our US defence links. At a more strategic level, Canberra is seen to have influence in Washington policy making circles. Again that adds to our worth as a regional partner.

A key Australian policy objective must be to pursue **both** a close US alliance and closer ties with strategically important states in the Asia-Pacific. Promoting one set of relations while neglecting the other advances neither priority. In fact if Australia loses its value as a partner with the US, it will surely become less relevant to Asia.

Adaptability and interoperability of Australia's force structure and capability for Coalition operations

The Australian contribution to coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that the ADF is able to deploy significant and highly interoperable capabilities with American and Coalition forces. However the rate of American investment in new defence equipment and the speed of new technological developments suggest that it is becoming increasingly hard for Australia to sustain interoperability across all our ADF capabilities.

That reality presents some difficult policy choices: How do we decide which ADF capabilities should be maintained at a sufficiently high capacity to work with US forces on coalition operations? This goes to the current debate about so-called 'niche forces' – the SAS Regiment clearly represents one such Australian niche. But it would be too limiting to Australian interests to suggest that the SASR should be our potential coalition contribution in all circumstances.

The Committee might explore whether there would be value in articulating a set of 'niche rules' for ADF force development. The purpose of such 'rules' would be to guide capability development decisions in ways that best address Australia's

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alliance and other defence interests. A set of 'niche rules' might include the following elements:

- The ADF must develop a range of niche capabilities across maritime, air combat, strike, land forces and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in order to maximise the government's options for committing forces to coalition operations.
- Although niche capabilities are designed to be interoperable with US and Coalition forces, they must primarily be useful to tasks that the ADF may need to independently perform in our immediate region.
- Niche capabilities must logically fit with our wider force structure and not distort broader investment priorities for other defence capabilities.

Implications of Australia's dialogue with the US on missile defence

The Committee could provide an important public service by seeking to explore and explain some of the issues involved in the rather confused Australian public debate about missile defence. For example a lot of Australian thinking on missile defence is still conditioned by the 'Star War' debate in the early 1980s. However the current US program is considerably more modest than President Reagan's proposal, and it has benefited from twenty more years of investment and research and development.

Strategic circumstances have also changed. The US-Russian relationship has dramatically improved, significantly reducing the danger of the massive nuclear exchanges feared during the Cold War. Indeed, now we see some joint US-Russian work on missile defence. At the same time the threat of WMD proliferation has grown and a wider number of states have access to ballistic missile technology. So the focus of missile defence is now on dealing with states with significantly smaller nuclear arsenals, and the concern that some of these countries may not be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Missile defence enjoys mostly bipartisan support in Washington, although there may be some differences between Democrats and Republicans on the speed and scope of planned work. Given US concerns about WMD proliferation and rogue states, it is very likely that future administrations in Washington will continue to fund missile defence, to deploy systems when they become available and to invest substantially in research and development.

These trends suggest that Australia needs to think through a reasoned approach to cooperating with the US on missile defence. At this stage Australian involvement has been largely confined to general statements of support, but there would be value in fleshing out the detail of some practical areas of co-operation. The Committee could consider making recommendations relating to the type of Australian involvement which could be provided by the Defence

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Science and Technology Organisation as well as from the private sector and Australian research institutions.

Australia could also play a useful role helping develop US thinking on how to address regional interests and concerns about missile defence. The Committee might consider recommending that Australia and the United States hold discussions at a senior level to explore the strategic impact in the Asia-Pacific of deploying these systems.

The development of space based systems and the impact this will have for Australia's self-reliance.

It is not entirely clear what the Committee means in relation to this item. US national technical means of intelligence gathering is an essential capability that Australia cannot duplicate short of massive levels of investment. Access to this material underpins our capacity to operate independently in our region. Australian forces deployed in a coalition operation may need access to US communications systems and it should remain a high priority for the ADF to ensure our communications and data transmission capabilities are interoperable with US systems. In terms of other space-based applications, Australia has its own need for communications links which can be based on commercial satellites. The ADF's needs for bandwidth continues to grow, but this is largely a matter for our own investment plans rather than an alliance issue.

The value of joint defence exercises between Australia and the US

Exercises between the ADF and US forces remain a very important part of the relationship. They provide practical experience of the challenges of interoperability between the forces. This experience on the training field is an essential precursor to operating on the battlefield in coalition operations. Part of the success of ADF operations in Afghanistan and Iraq must be attributed to the habits of military cooperation with the US developed over years of exercising together.

Combined exercises with the US also provide a powerful public statement of the health and closeness of the alliance. For the US this is an important expression of its continuing commitment to Asia-Pacific security. For Australia, exercises tangibly show the value both countries put on working with each other.

For these reasons the proposal to establish a joint US-Australian exercise and training facility in Australia is one that deserves the Committees' support. Although many of the details of this arrangement are still in early negotiations, it is a positive sign that the US is looking to engage Australia in what would be a major expression of America's continued commitment to the alliance and to a strong focus on the region.

The level of Australian industry involvement in the US defence industry

The proposal to establish a joint US-Australian exercise and training facility in Australia is one that deserves the Committees' support.

The current strength of the bilateral relationship and the good will that exists in Washington for Australia are levers that we should use as much as possible to promote Australian business involvement in US defence industry activities. A number of Australian businesses have been able to secure work in the Joint Strike Fighter program as a result of Australia's early involvement in the project. Thus far, however the scale of our industry involvement is small, and it is always likely to remain small in comparison to the size of our military acquisitions from America.

The Committee might care to investigate if there are any avenues for the Parliament to become actively involved in initiatives to promote Australian defence industry in the US. This might include Parliamentary support for a program to engage Congress (perhaps through their Australia-US friendship group) on the alliance value of promoting joint defence industry activities.

The Joint Strike Fighter project, Abrams tank acquisition, Navy to Navy co-operation on the Collins Submarines as well as a number of major projects still to be decided, all provide a major opportunity for Australian business to work more closely with their US counterparts. It would be useful for the Committee to investigate how adequate current government support is to facilitate and promote Australian business in the US.

The adequacy of research and development arrangements between the US and Australia.

Given the enormous importance of innovation as an engine of American growth, it would make great sense for Australia to seek to link our own research and development sectors more closely into American R&D. Within the defence to defence relationship there are well established channels for collaborative research and development. Outside of the defence sector it is less clear to what extent business and the academic world engage in collaborative R&D. As suggested earlier, an Australian based Collaborative Research Centre on the US could be a useful measure to bring Australian expertise together and to provide a focus for extending cooperation with the United States in this area.

Attachment A: American Studies at Australian Universities, 2004.

Dougal McInnes, Australian Strategic Policy Institute

(Note. These tables were compiled by searching the current internet sites of Australian Universities in January and February 2004. Course offerings may have subsequently changed.)

Australian Capital Territory

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>Australian Defence Force Academy</u> (University College, UNSW)	1665	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Politics of the US 2. Social and Cultural History of the United States 3. Twentieth Century American Literature 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. American Empire: American Culture in Context 	
<u>The Australian National University</u>	10 800	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Foundations of US History 2. 20th Century American Drama 3. American Sixties 4. Government and Politics in the USA 5. 19th Century American literature 6. 20th Century American Drama 7. African-American History 8. American Accents 9. American Voices 10. Modern Media in the USA 11. Gov and Politics in the USA 12. Popular Culture in the USA 13. Twentieth Century American History 14. US Cinema 15. US Immigration and Ethnicity 16. Foundations of US History 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Native America Fiction 2. African American History 3. 20th Century US History 4. American Voices 1900-1990 5. Modern Media in the US 6. America in the Sixties 7. US Immigration and Ethnicity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Under Graduate American Studies Major offered. The American Studies major consists of 42 units, made up of 12 units at first year level (generally two courses) and 30 units at second and third year level. ▪ Postgraduate Masters in International Relations/ Security Studies/ Diplomacy offered with many courses looking at American policy and politics.
<u>University of Canberra</u>	10 000			No American studies specific courses offered

New South Wales

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>Charles Sturt University</u>	35 000	1. American Literature		
<u>Macquarie University</u>	27 000	1. American Politics 2. American in the Twentieth Century	1. The American Civil War	
<u>Southern Cross University</u>	12 000			No American studies specific courses offered
<u>The University of New England</u>	17 000 (12 500 via Internet)	1. American Literature 2. Modern American Literature 3. Modern American Literature 2 4. Issues in US Church History 5. Nation Building in the US 6. Swinging Sixties in the US		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Under Graduate & Honours in American Studies offered
<u>The University of New South Wales</u>	40 000	1. The Sixties: Australia and the US 2. Politics of the USA 3. Modern America 4. American Literature and Film		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Post Graduate Masters in International Relations offered however no US specific courses
<u>The University of Newcastle</u>	20 000			No American studies specific courses offered
<u>The University of Sydney</u>	42 300	1. American Culture in the Depression 2. Early American Pragmatism 3. American Literature 4. American History from Lincoln to Clinton 5. The Black Experience in the Americas 6. The American Civil War 7. Race and Gender in America 1 8. Race and Gender in America 2 9. Post Modern American Poetry 10. A History of the US to 1865		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ American-Australian Studies Centre ceased operating in 1997 due to funding shortage ▪ Post Graduate Masters in Peace and Conflict studies offered however no US specific courses
<u>University of Technology, Sydney</u>	29 053	1. Contemporary Latino USA		

New South Wales (continued)

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>University of Western Sydney</u>	35 000			No American studies specific courses offered
<u>University of Wollongong</u>	20 000	1. Hollywood and American Culture 2. Politics in the USA		

Northern Territory

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>Northern Territory University</u>	14 000			No American studies specific courses offered
<u>Batchelor Institute of Indigenous Tertiary Education</u>	1 900			No American studies specific courses offered

Queensland

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>Bond University</u>	2 500			No American studies specific courses offered
<u>Central Queensland University</u>	19 405	1. North American Fiction and Film 2. USA in Contemporary World History		
<u>Griffith University</u>	27 451	1. America's World		
<u>James Cook University</u>	10 700	1. American Literature		
<u>The University of Queensland</u>	33 345	1. American Literature and Culture 2. The American Revolution 3. The American Dream: Social History 4. The American Nation 5. The Making of America to the Present 6. The American West 7. American and Australia: History of a relationship 8. Globalisation and American Popular Culture	1. Forming the American Republic 2. American History: The Civil War Era	▪ Under Graduate American Studies Major Offered
<u>Queensland University of Technology</u>	30 000	1. The USA and the Asia Pacific Region		
<u>University of Southern Queensland</u>	25 000	1. American History		
<u>University of the Sunshine Coast</u>	3451	1. The Politics of the Americas		

South Australia

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>The University of Adelaide</u>	16 000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. American Gothic 2. Twentieth Century American Literature 		
<u>The Flinders University of South Australia</u>	13 550	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. American Popular Culture 2. America and the World 3. American Century 4. American Politics 5. The African American Experience 6. Race Class and Gender in America 7. An Introduction to Workers Culture in the US, Japan and Australia 8. America at War 9. The Making of American Foreign Policy 10. American Civil War 11. Internship Program, Washington DC 12. The US Australia Alliance 13. Multinational Corporations in America, Australia and Japan 14. The US, International Relations and World Politics 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reading in American Bibliography and History 2. American Studies Diploma and Literature Review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Under Graduate & Post Graduate American Studies Major offered within the Department of American Studies
<u>University of South Australia</u>	32 845	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. United States Politics and International Relations 		

Tasmania

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>University of Tasmania</u>	13 000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. American Literature and Film 2. American Woman Writing 3. Post-Modern American Poetry 4. American Nature Writing 5. African-American History 6. History of the Indigenous People of North America 7. Ore Despots of South America (Mining) 8. Colonial USA 9. USA: The Nation 		
<u>Australian Maritime College</u>	1603			No American studies specific courses offered

Victoria

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>Deakin University</u>	29 000			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Course work Master of Arts (International Relations) offered ▪ No American studies specific courses offered
<u>La Trobe University</u>	26 575	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Contemporary American Cinema 2. American 20th Century Literature 3. British and American Romanticism 4. North American Autobiography 5. Conquest of the Americas 6. American Since 1945 7. America's War in Vietnam 8. Making America 9. Civil War in the USA 10. Introduction to American Politics 11. Slavery in the USA 12. History of the USA 13. USA Intellectual Property Law 14. USA Securities Regulations 15. USA Corporations Law 16. USA Contracts Law 		
<u>Monash University</u>	49 500	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. America: Decay of the Liberal Dream 2. American Music and Popular Culture 		
<u>Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology</u>	57 000			No American studies specific courses offered

Victoria (continued)

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>Swinburne University of Technology</u>				No American studies specific courses offered
<u>The University of Melbourne</u>	38 674	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. USA Today 2. American Liberals and Moderns 3. American Voices 4. Imagining Hollywood 5. The 1950s: Film, Perfection and Propaganda 6. Slavery and Freedom: US History 7. Searching for the American Dream 8. American Modern 9. Rebels and Revolution in Latin America 10. American Politics and Society 11. Issues in American Foreign Policy 12. US Scandals from Watergate to Whitewater 13. Australia and America 14. Contemporary Hollywood Cinema 15. The Irish Abroad: US, UK and Australia 16. Art in New York 17. Current Themes in American History 18. American Nation 19. Reading African-American History 20. Post-war American Fiction 21. American Studies Thesis 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Under Graduate American Studies Degree offered through the American Studies Division of the Department of History ▪ On average there are 6 Masters Students completing dissertations on US studies
<u>University of Ballarat</u>	21 000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. American Horror 2. Hollywood Cinema 		
<u>Victoria University</u>	50 000			No American studies specific courses offered

Western Australia

	No. of Students	Under Graduate	Post Graduate	Remarks
<u>Curtin University of Technology</u>	30 519			No American studies specific courses offered
<u>Edith Cowan University</u>	3 000			No American studies specific courses offered
<u>Murdoch University</u>	13 018	1. American Indian History 2. Hollywood and History		
<u>The University of Western Australia</u>	16 000	1. The US From Civil War to World War 2. The US since 1945 3. African American History in the Twentieth Century 4. Politics in the US 1 5. Politics in the US 2		
<u>The University of Notre Dame</u>				No American studies specific courses offered

Multi-state

<u>Australian Catholic University</u>				No American studies specific courses offered
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