4

Screening and controlling access and egress

4.1 Responding to the Australian Government's announcement of aviation security upgrades of 7 June 2005,[1] DoTaRS required the following screening and access measures to be immediately implemented at CTFR airports and other airports from which screened air services operate:

- reduction of the number of points to access the airside;

- inspection/validation of identification and bags at access points into airside and Security Restricted Areas;

- posting of aviation security guards at access points to check ASICs;

- engaging with sub-lessees who control access to airside areas to limit access points to essential purposes only.[2]

4.2 A second phase of measures would be implemented in consultation with industry including:

- random searches and inspection of all persons, bags and vehicles entering airside areas;

- augmentation of perimeter barriers and control systems; and

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1   Deputy Prime Minister, 'Securing and Policing Australia's Major Airports', 7 June 2005.
2   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52*, pp. 23-4.

- removal of legislative impediments to increasing use of video surveillance in security controlled airports and aircraft operating to and from security controlled airports. [3]

4.3   Designated airport operators were required to complete an initial Airside Access Management Plan by 31 July 2005 to identify how they would comply with the second phase of announced measures.[4]

4.4   The following chapter considers the impact on the aviation industry of upgraded security requirements relating to screening, access points and perimeter security.

Screening of aircrew and other airside workers

4.5   The New South Wales Government supported the upgraded screening requirements announced on 7 June:

> the Commonwealth's announcement that it will require all major airports to intensify the inspection of all persons, vehicles and goods entering and leaving the airside of major airports, and that this increased scrutiny will include airline and airport staff, contractors and their possessions. Such measures are essential in discharging the Commonwealth's responsibilities…[5]

4.6   However, the security outcomes of screening aircrew was claimed to be ineffectual because of the nature of the airside environment in which they work:

> security screening of airline crews has no discernible benefit for airline security beyond the dubious claim that it means all persons on an aircraft have been security screened. The counter argument that aircrew have a number of weapons on the flight deck to use to take over an aircraft and the only two suspected incidents of airline crew involvement in an attack (SilkAir flight 185 and Egypt Air flight 990) resulted in co-pilots simply diving the aircraft into the water…
>
> [Furthermore] the extension of security screening to aviation industry employees would be ineffective due to the

3   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52*, pp. 24-5.
4   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52*, p. 25.
5   NSW Government, *Submission No. 70*, p. 1.

abundance of prohibited items in the normal airport environment…[6]

4.7   Mr Peter Kerwin, a captain in a regional airline for nearly thirty years, reiterated the case against screening aircrew:

> I … spend the day ensuring the aircraft and occupants do not come to any harm. I do this strapped in a seat less than 10 cm from a nice sharp crash axe and a pressurised fire extinguisher installed there for everyone's safety.
>
> …Professional licensed crew are now treated as the enemy … We cannot be trusted with nail clippers, but we can be let loose with a plane load of passengers.[7]

4.8   RAAA linked the insistence on screening pilots to a flawed security risk analysis:

> DoTaRS regulation of aviation security is driven by Regulations … which not are outcome based and which are unnecessarily prescriptive producing large cost impositions for no appreciable security gain, for example, the repeated screening on one day of pilots of regional aircraft…[8]

4.9   Regional sectors of the aviation industry criticised the decision to require screening of pilots and aircrew not only on the grounds that the measure delivered no security outcomes but that it also introduced significant inefficiencies for no gain.

4.10   RAAA detailed the inefficiencies attached to what it considered was the unnecessary screening of commercial pilots operating between screened and unscreened airports:

> a regional pilot who is going to do three or four runs out to Dubbo or three or four runs out to a regional port in Queensland is screened when he goes out in the morning. He comes back and he has to get out of the aeroplane, take his flight bag out of the aeroplane, go back into the terminal and be rescreened before getting back into his aeroplane. He does that three or four times a day.[9]

4.11   REX confirmed the negative consequences of imposing screening requirements on aircrew:

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6   Name withheld, *Submission No. 21*, pp. 5-6.
7   Mr P. Kerwin, *Submission No. 13*, p. 1.
8   RAAA, *Submission No. 28*, p. 2.
9   RAAA, *Transcript*, 10 October 2005, p. 7.

One particular regulation causing concern for regional operators is the requirement for all aircrew to be screened. REX crew operate from screened airports to unscreened airports and return. Each time the crew return to a screened airport they must escort the passengers across the apron and perform their weight and balance calculations and other duties in the terminal. This means that, under the current Regulations, the crew must be screened.

At Sydney and Adelaide the screening points are a considerable distance from the areas where crew perform their duties. The journey to and from screening and the act of screening takes a considerable amount of time. The turn around times demanded of the crew at these airports is 20 minutes in order to maintain the REX schedule. The added requirement of screening has induced considerable delays to departures, with subsequent delays within the REX network.[10]

4.12   REX estimated that security screening of aircrew between 1 March 2005 and 30 November 2005 had cost the airline $27,680.[11]

Committee comment

4.13   The Committee accepts that the *security* outcomes in screening aircraft crew are limited, given their access to weapons in airside areas and, indeed, the fact that they are in control of aircraft.

4.14   However, the unscreened access of aircraft crew to secure airside and Security Restricted Areas does present some potential vulnerabilities to aviation security.

4.15   First, an explosive device or weapon could be introduced into the carry on luggage of aircrew without their knowledge.

4.16   Second, an explosive device or weapon could be introduced into a secure airside area by aircrew to be smuggled on to aircraft that they are not operating.

4.17   Third, screening of aircrew and other aviation industry personnel serves to impose a barrier against the introduction or removal of any illicit substance to or from secure airside areas, which at international airports can be highly vulnerable border areas.

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10   REX, *Submission No. 39*, pp. 3-4
11   REX, *Submission No. 39*, p. 5 & *Submission No. 39.1*, p. 2.

4.18   To this end the Committee supports the requirement to screen aircrew and other aviation industry personnel entering and exiting secure airside areas.

4.19   The Committee is sympathetic to aviation industry participants and their personnel whose tight schedules are put under further pressure by upgraded screening requirements. However, accommodating the new security requirements is an area for the aviation industry to resolve through reworking scheduled turn around times and so forth.

4.20   The Committee is concerned at expressions of alienation from some aviation industry personnel. This may indicate an area in which the DoTaRS could work more closely with industry in providing information on the reasons for and expected outcomes of announced security upgrades.

Passengers and hand luggage

4.21   The following issues were raised in relation to passenger and hand luggage screening requirements:

- excessive prohibited items list;

- the efficacy of screening requirements at regional airports;

- verification of identity of persons travelling; and

- training of personnel responsible for screening;[12]

Prohibited items

4.22   A major concern raised by aviation industry participants and users regarded the consistency of Australia's classification of prohibited items when compared with other countries.

4.23   DoTaRS stated that:

> The … ICAO provides guidance to aviation industry participants on what constitutes prohibited items. This guidance is contained in Appendix 35 of ICAO's *Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference* (a restricted document)…

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12   Considered at Chapter Five.

> ICAO's prohibited items list is intended to provide guidance only. It is up to individual states to establish their own prohibited items list, based on their own risk assessments. ICAO also provides a further list of items that states may wish to include on their prohibited items listings, including corkscrews, knitting needles, metal cutlery and blades of less than 6 cm.[13]

4.24   Qantas stated:

> there has been little notable progress in harmonising Australian legislation with international practice, so as to reduce the inconsistencies and additional burden which necessarily resulted from the short term measures instituted unilaterally by different countries immediately after 11 September 2001. Most other countries have, like Australia, amended their legislation and sought to harmonise it with guidelines issued by ICAO. However, the ATSA and ATSRs deviate from ICAO in a number of important areas, most significantly in relation to definitions of … prohibited items … the result is that Australia maintains a regulatory regime inconsistent with most countries and more restrictive in some ways than even the US and UK.[14]

4.25   WAC stated:

> we need to be consistent in the items that we do have on the prohibited items list, particularly with other countries coming in. There needs to be consistency in that prohibited items list so that we are all doing the same thing, otherwise we create a lot of confusion for the passengers. The list is something that the industry is working closely with government to try and rationalise, to come up with a list that is appropriate, given the risk of the use of those items as a weapon on board the aircraft.[15]

4.26   SACL stated:

> lists of prohibited items permitted in Australia are different to those that are allowed by other regulators such as New Zealand. This inconsistency amongst States makes the management of prohibited items through passenger

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13   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52.1*, p. 2.

14   Qantas, *Submission No. 61*, p. 32.

15   WAC, *Transcript*, 22 September 2005, p. 4.

screening points more difficult. Metal cutlery on aircraft is not permitted in Australia but allowed most everywhere else. The ICAO lists of prohibited items allow small knives (under 6 cm) and knitting needles; however, Australia does not permit such items.[16]

4.27   Qantas stated that:

> There are only two countries that I am aware of now that prohibit metal knives: Japan and southern Ireland. I might just say, though, that the other countries prescribe what that knife should be – the length of the blade and the cutting ability of the blade. We support a regulation that permits the return of the metal knives but that also prescribes the cutting ability.[17]

4.28   DoTaRS stated that Australia was not alone in having a unique prohibited items list:

> The US Transport Security Administration has again recently relaxed some aspects of the system but even the US and Canada are a little bit out of kilter, and the US and Canada are a little bit out of kilter with New Zealand. So we are not alone in the problem.[18]

4.29   A list of prohibited items under the Australian regulatory regime that are beyond minimum ICAO guidelines and a comparison with anomalies in countries comparable to Australia is included at Appendix A.

4.30   AAL identified the increased breadth of prohibited items in Australia as an instance of the failure to implement an adequately flexible risk assessment approach:

> Prior to September 11, we were required to search for metal objects and so forth on passengers going through our terminals. September 11 came and we screwed those down a bit further – nose hair clippers, bangles and so on – but at the same time introduced higher levels of in-flight training for flight crews and lockable doors to cockpits … So the finding of these small "sharps" or small metallic objects pales into

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16   SACL, *Submission No. 44*, p. 5.
17   Qantas, *Transcript*, 23 November 2005, p. 48.
18   DoTaRS, *Transcript*, 5 December 2005, p. 9

insignificance once you have introduced these other measures**…**

we need to have an exit strategy. If you have introduced another measure that will make it extremely difficult to take over the aeroplane with your bangle, why do we need to find your bangle?[19]

4.31   DoTaRS conceded that:

The fact of the hardened cockpit doors means that, frankly, it wouldn't matter what you had on the plane by way of a weapon; unless it was a tank it would not get through that hardened cockpit door.[20]

4.32   DoTaRS stated that:

Ultimately [the list of prohibited items] are policy questions and the Government is best placed to make the judgement, given the nature of the environment that we are in, about what it thinks should or should not be on the list.[21]

4.33   DoTaRS outlined the procedures available for review of the listed prohibited items under the *Aviation Transport Security Regulations*:

The Office of Transport Security is currently undertaking a review of the recently introduced *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004* and the *Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005*. The prohibited items list will be considered in the context of this review. This issue is also being considered by a working group established under the framework of the Aviation Security Advisory Forum.

The Department of Transport and Regional Services will provide a report to government in June 2006 with suggested policy changes identified in the legislative review process. This report will include the issue of the prohibited items list.[22]

19   AAL, *Transcript*, 21 September 2005, p. 15.
20   DoTaRS, *Transcript*, 5 December 2005, p. 10.
21   DoTaRS, *Transcript*, 5 December 2005, 8.
22   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52.1*, p. 4.

Passenger screening at regional airports

4.34   DoTaRS stated that:

> The current policy setting for passenger screening at regional airports captures those airports receiving Regular Passenger Transport services using jet powered aircraft. This setting was designed with regard to the Aviation Security Threat Assessment.[23]

4.35   New entrant airports were provided with a metal detection capability under the Securing Our Regional Skies program:

> The Australian Government announced that it will provide $8.5 million over four years to provide [hand wand] metal detection capability at 146 regional airports…

> Although the current threat level to regional airports has been assessed as low, the Government has determined that all regional airports that operate under Transport Security Programs should be in a position to establish and operate hand wand metal detecting capability quickly in the event of a change in alert levels.[24]

4.36   Kangaroo Island Council related the circumstances in which hand wanding equipment is used:

> We only do that if required to by the Department of Transport. They or the Secretary will notify us and say, "We want you to wand … every flight this week," or "all the REX flights this week."… We are allowed to bring [the equipment] out and use it as a training exercise to keep up skills.[25]

4.37   Albury City expressed concern that if hand wanding was required:

> we do not have a separate sterile area where we can do it. We would have to establish a sterile area, and that would be a bit more onerous.[26]

4.38   DoTaRS stated that:

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23   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52*, p. 28.

24   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52*, Annexure Q, p. 120.

25   Kangaroo Island Council, *Transcript*, 21 September 2005, p. 31. The use of hand-held metal detection equipment is determined by Regulation 4.07.

26   Albury City, *Transcript*, 24 November 2005, p. 36.

> Airports will only be required to conduct hand wand screening should there be a change in the nature of the threat, and this will only be made on the basis of an assessment by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.
>
> Airports that might [be] subject to such a requirement will have some flexibility in implementation. For example, wanding could occur prior to boarding an aircraft. The Department would provide advice to airports should this contingency be required.
>
> It is unlikely that the Department will require non-screening airports create a sterile area comparable to those in place at screening airports.[27]

4.39   Dr Barry Dowty suggested that an anomalous situation prevailed at regional airports where physical security such as fencing had been upgraded but, screening of passengers or hand luggage did not take place. He likened the situation to:

> building a fowl pen to keep out the fox but leaving the door opening without a way of it being closed.[28]

Verification of travellers

4.40   Concern was expressed that:

> We do not have an effective system to identify false IDs for passengers getting on board aircraft … False IDs are a major way that persons commit [illegal] acts, be they criminal or terrorist.[29]

4.41   DoTaRS stated:

> At present there is no requirement for domestic passengers to present identification on boarding and therefore no real verification to a domestic airline that the person they believe they are carrying is indeed that person. This has security implications in that should Australia move to a watch list of persons of concern, there is no real way of matching this to passengers on Australian domestic flights.[30]

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27   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52.2*, p. 11.
28   B. Dowty, *Submission No. 20*, p. 2.
29   In Camera, *Transcript*, 21 September 2005, p. 2.
30   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52*, p. 43.

Committee comment

4.42   Australia has one of the most restrictive prohibited items lists in the world and this contributes a layer of security to an aviation security system which is recognised to be one of the world leaders.

4.43   The Committee notes the concerns of aviation industry participants that disparities between the prohibited items lists of various countries create difficulties for international passenger carriers and their customers. However, the issue of security in this area is not one that should be compromised in the name of convenience.

4.44   The Committee acknowledges that the security threat to passenger aircraft posed by the introduction of items that could be used to take control of the aircraft has been significantly decreased with the introduction of hardened cockpit doors.

4.45   However, the security and safety of persons travelling in the cabin of aircraft must be taken into account.

4.46   At a time when strong evidence exists that those who have ill intent towards aviation security are exploring new avenues to execute their crimes, as indicated by the detection on 10 August 2006 of attempts to detonate liquid explosives aboard flights travelling between the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the Committee is not convinced that it is appropriate to explore making the prohibited items list less restrictive.

4.47   The Committee acknowledges advantages of having an internationally uniform prohibited items list in terms of providing greater acceptance and leading to less public resistance.

4.48   However, the ramping up of restrictions applying to carry-on hand luggage for Australian flights travelling to the United States and transiting through London immediately following the alleged transatlantic bomb plot shows the overriding importance of authorities being able to implement a rapid and flexible response to identified threats.

4.49   The rapidity with which prohibited items lists were extended shows an effective response mechanism to urgent threats. The flexibility of the response showed that authorities were capable of identifying new risks, in this case flights with specific points of destination, without subjecting the entire industry to unnecessary security restrictions.

4.50   The Committee is concerned, however, that in response to questions on the prohibited items list the Department stated that the

Government, meaning the Minister, is best placed to make the judgement.[31] The Office of Transport Security ought to have the facility to explain and contribute to Government policy in this area of high importance.

4.51   DoTaRS stated that the prohibited items list was constantly under review by the Department.[32] The Committee believes that security would benefit from a more formal reporting mechanism for items to be included on the prohibited items list at Regulation 1.07 of the ATSRs.

Recommendation 10

4.52   **That the Department of Transport and Regional Services adopt a formal mechanism for making six monthly reports, and as required at other times, advising the Minister for Transport and Regional Services on what, if any changes, should be made to the list of items prohibited to be introduced into the cabin of a prescribed air service set out at Regulation 1.07 of the *Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005*.**

4.53   The Committee supports the provision of metal detection capability to new entrant airports.

4.54   Providing passenger and carry-on luggage screening capability to new entrant airports, without requiring the implementation of this layer of security, reflects the current low security threat assessment that attaches to this class of aviation industry participants, while acknowledging the desirability of imposing screening if required at short notice.

4.55   The provision of hand wand metal detection capability for new entrant airports also recognises the thin financial margins of many of these smaller regional operations. To require the installation of more permanent and expensive screening equipment would either impose an unnecessary burden on Commonwealth taxpayers or increase the costs of flying in regional Australia to a point where services might not be sustainable.

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31   DoTaRS, *Transcript*, 5 December 2005, p. 8. See para 4.32 above.
32   DoTaRS, *Transcript*, 5 December 2005, pp. 8-11.

4.56   Based on confidential information, the Committee is satisfied that
        DoTaRS has implemented a considered and sound risk based
        approach to passenger and hand luggage screening requirements at
        regional airports.[33]

4.57   However, the screening of passengers who transit from unscreened
        airports through ports with screening, the practice known as reverse
        screening, needs to be rigidly adhered to.

Checked baggage

4.58   In December 2002 screening of all checked baggage was required for
        international baggage originating at Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne,
        Perth, Sydney, Cairns, Canberra, Coolangatta and Darwin airports,
        with effect from 31 December 2004.[34]

4.59   On 10 March 2005 the Government, based on advice from DoTaRS,
        announced that from 1 August 2007 100 percent of checked baggage
        would be screened at the nine CTFR airports listed above as well as
        Alice Springs and Hobart Airports for all domestic flights [35] This
        upgraded screening requirement was imposed on the entry into force
        of Aviation Transport Security Regulation 4.29(3).

4.60   Therefore, after 1 August 2007 all checked baggage departing from or
        transiting through a major Australian airport will be screened.

4.61   The 100 percent checked baggage requirement has not been extended
        to security classified airports that do not have CTFR status. This is in
        accord with the Wheeler review's observation that:

>   It is neither practicable nor desirable to expect 100 percent
>   security at regional airports. The sheer diversity of Australia's
>   regional airports makes the challenge of common standards
>   of security an impossibility. Any protective security
>   enhancements should be undertaken in accordance with a
>   local threat and risk assessment and not instituted on the
>   basis of what is sometimes media-driven scare-mongering.[36]

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33   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52*, Confidential Annexure AB.
34   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52*, p. 21.
35   SACL, *Submission No. 44*, p. 7.
36   Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler, *An Independent Review of Airport security and policing for the
      Government of Australia*, September 2005, p. 50.

4.62   The cost of requiring smaller regional airports to provide checked baggage screening would either impose a cost burden upon the operators taking the cost of regional aviation out of reach of a large proportion of users of regional aviation, or it would require the provision of taxpayer funded support to a level that can not be substantiated under the low threat assessment level currently accorded to regional airports.

4.63   The imposition of unnecessary security requirements on small regional airports would also exacerbate their difficulty in recruiting and retaining trained security personnel.

4.64   It needs to be borne in mind that all checked baggage transiting through major Australian airports that has arrived from unscreened airports will be subject to screening. That is checked baggage transiting through major airports will be reverse screened in the same way that passengers who transit through major airports arriving from unscreened airports are screened.

4.65   The reason for transitioning airports having been required to screen passengers and their hand luggage is that they operate jet services, which are obviously an increased security risk because of the planes' speed and the amount of fuel they carry. As the Committee noted in its *Report 400*, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 focussed world attention on the use of fully loaded and heavily-fuelled passenger jet aircraft as "flying bombs".

4.66   The Committee notes that those airports not required to screen all checked baggage from August 2007 vary widely in terms of passenger movements; the number of jet services operating; and their proximity to major population centres (which in turn affects the amount of fuel jets will be carrying when flying into, or near, those population centres).

4.67   As noted above, it is simply not feasible to demand screening of all checked baggage at every regional airport. The Committee again draws attention to the conclusions of the Wheeler review:

> …it is clear that 'one size does not fit all' in imposing security, regulations and standards across disparate airports…
> Security measures at regional airports should be balanced and proportionate and must be based on enhanced threat and

risk assessments. It is always difficult to draw firm lines, and these could vary as a result of changed circumstances.[37]

4.68   However, certain airports at major regional centres close to capital cities might be thought to involve significantly greater security risks than other, more remote, airports where checked baggage will not be fully screened.

4.69   The Committee welcomes the screening of all checked baggage from August 2007 at the eleven airports listed above. Of Australia's remaining airports, some carry greater risks than others, and the scale of that risk may increase with time and increased volumes.

4.70   The Committee believes that it is inevitable that additional airports will, in time, warrant screening of all checked baggage. The Committee does not claim to have the expertise to identify which individual airports should be included in this category. As an example of the complexity of this issue, the Wheeler review called for the status of Avalon Airport to be reviewed immediately. The review was conducted and concluded that no alteration in security status was required at the present time.[38]

4.71   Instead, there should be a process to ensure continuous review by the appropriate government agency, DoTaRS, of the list of airports at which all checked baggage is screened.

4.72   The Committee also notes that as the eleven airports already identified have until August 2007 to implement full screening, the opportunity exists for DoTaRS to identify any further airports that should be required to implement full screening within the same timeframe.

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37   Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler, *An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia*, September 2005, p. xiv.

38   'Terror Cops at Avalon', *Herald Sun*, 25 August 2006, p. 29.

Recommendation 11

4.73   **That the Department of Transport and Regional Services report to the Parliament within three months as to whether any additional airports should be required to screen all checked baggage from August 2007, taking into account factors including the additional risk associated with airports operating jet services in close proximity to capital cities. The Department should update its advice to the Parliament twice yearly.**

4.74   The Committee welcomes the extension of checked baggage screening measures. On a related matter, the Committee had recommended in its interim *Report 406* that all checked baggage be issued with weight certification at the time of check in.

4.75   With the inquiry now complete, the Committee is no longer persuaded that the security benefits of this measure would outweigh the costs. Baggage weighing might also engender a false sense of security, and therefore reduced vigilance, on the part of travellers, in terms of the potential for contraband or dangerous items to be placed in their luggage. The Committee therefore suggests that this earlier recommendation not be pursued by the Government at this time.

Air cargo

4.76   DoTaRS stated that:

> Prior to 10 March 2005, the regulatory environment for air cargo was limited to international cargo leaving Australia … the Regulated Agents scheme ensured that those who handled or made arrangements for international air cargo were registered with DoTaRS and adhered to a model security program that was primarily designed to prevent the carriage of explosives on prescribed aircraft.

> The Regulated Agents scheme has … been replaced as of 10 March 2005 with the Regulated Air Cargo Agents (RACA) scheme … There are two primary differences to the previous Regulated Agents scheme. Firstly, the movement of domestic cargo is now also regulated. Secondly, rather than there being a model security program for all RACAs, the Office of

> Transport Security … has now implemented a policy
> whereby each RACA has an individualised …TSP based
> upon a RACA-specific Security Risk Assessment.

4.77   DHL stated:

> we have … been advised that by the end of June 2006 the
> target is to have 75 per cent outbound explosive trace
> detection of cargo with a build-up then to 100 per cent.[39]

4.78   Toll Transport specified that the screening targets referred to air cargo
on international flights.[40]

4.79   Many air cargo industry participants viewed the current
arrangements as sound in ensuring security standards.

4.80   DHL stated:

> currently shipments which are not 100 per cent screened by
> the air industry are from people we know, so they are not just
> aircraft passengers who walk in off the street and book a
> ticket. We have a business arrangement with these people; we
> have established their bona fides through established criteria
> and we have also set up processes whereby they must carry
> out certain measures to give us their cargo, so there is some
> difference there.[41]

4.81   UPS outlined that to become a known shipper or regular customer the
freight forwarder must have had three consignments cleared together
with checks of its bona fides by a RACA. On receiving cargo from a
known shipper no further screening by a RACA is required.[42]

4.82   Australian Air Express (AaE) stated:

> It is not just the three first consignments that you move; you
> have to carry three consignments within the previous three
> months, otherwise you fall off the list and then everything
> would be screened from there. There certainly is an element
> of risk but, in terms of the risk assessment itself and the
> additional measures that we have in place, I think we protect
> the domestic aircraft quite adequately at the moment.[43]

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39   DHL, *Transcript*, 23 November 2005, p. 71.
40   Toll Transport, *Transcript*, 23 November 2005, p. 71.
41   DHL, *Transcript*, 23 November 2006, p. 65.
42   UPS, *Transcript*, 23 November 2005, pp. 76-7.
43   AaE, *Transcript*, 24 November 2005, p. 44.

4.83   DHL added that:

> we will also inspect a percentage of known shippers as well
> as a hundred per cent of the unknown shippers. That
> percentage will change depending on the current risk
> environment, so it is not just a free-for-all.[44]

4.84   Australian air Express (AaE) stated:

> The volume of what we are screening going onto passenger
> aircraft at the moment is around 20 per cent. To raise that
> level to 100 per cent would be a huge cost impost to the
> business and I guess there would be a flow-on cost to
> customers.[45]

4.85   As a consequence of the known shipper system and RACA schemes,
CAPEC stated:

> there should be no need to subject shipments by air into
> Australia to further screening upon their arrival in Australia,
> so long as these are kept secure when they are transloaded
> from international to domestic carriers and they are handled
> by a Regulated Agent operating under an approved TSP.

> In respect of shipments exported from Australia, we believe
> that the current international shipment screening, Regulated
> Agent and the Regulated Customer Programs obviate the
> need to screen shipments when they are tendered for air
> transport from one airport in Australia to another, before they
> are subsequently loaded onto international aircraft.[46]

4.86   UPS added:

> We do not advise on which services packages or freight
> moves, whereas passenger baggage is dedicated to a
> particular flight. It is known at the time you book your
> ticket.[47]

4.87   Qantas stated:

44   DHL, *Transcript*, 23 November 2005, p. 77.
45   AaE, Transcript, 24 November 2005, p. 43.
46   CAPEC, *Submission No. 30*, Attachment 2, pp. 1-2.
47   UPS, *Transcript*, 23 November 2005, p. 66.

> If we all believe that passengers, carry-on baggage, all the staff servicing the aircraft and the catering should be screened, then it defies logic to ignore the cargo.[48]

4.88   In not accepting the known shipper arrangement as providing adequate security, Qantas stated:

> we do not accept the fact that you are a known passenger. Regardless of the frequency with which you may travel, that provides you with no preference from a security outcome point of view. It would be very difficult to say that, because of the frequency that you cause cargo to be carried, that gives you a particular security profile. Our position has been that if there is a risk and one has to screen baggage, why does that not necessarily apply to cargo? … that was the logic … several years ago where we introduced the screening by trace detections and, in some cases, the X-raying of all cargo carried on our international aircraft.

> A decision we made some years ago was that we would not rely on the regulated agent regime. I think that that has a part to play. If the freight forwarder has a security program and their facilities are audited by the government agencies, that is fine, but at the end of the day the cargo is going on the passenger aircraft and it has to be the operator of the passenger aircraft who is responsible for the passengers. That is why we, of our own accord, introduced that screening for international cargo.[49]

4.89   CAPEC stated:

> it is recognised that the threat profile of passenger aircraft is significantly different (as in greater) to that of cargo-only aircraft. As per Annex 17 guidelines, security measures should therefore be applied to cargo transported on passenger aircraft, not to that carried on cargo-only aircraft.[50]

4.90   This is because:

> you are dealing with hundreds of people if a passenger aircraft was involved in an incident. If you are dealing with a cargo aircraft, you are dealing with perhaps two human lives

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48   Qantas, *Transcript*, 23 November 2005, p. 27.
49   Qantas, *Transcript*, 23 November 2005, p. 56.
50   CAPEC, *Submission No. 30*, Attachment 2, p. 1.

in most cases. That is the essence of the risk matrix with respect to less risk on a cargo only aircraft.[51]

4.91   The Wheeler report recommended that:

the screening of cargo be expanded and include mandatory screening of all cargo on passenger aircraft where passengers' checked baggage is screened.[52]

4.92   The Government announced its in principle support of the Wheeler recommendations on 21 September 2005.

4.93   As part of its response to the Wheeler Report, the Australian Government announced $38 million to strengthen air cargo security arrangements including the introduction of improved technology for the detection of explosives.[53]

4.94   Toll Transport stated that the funds were dedicated to supporting screening of outbound international air cargo.[54]

4.95   In the May 2006 budget, the Australian Government announced a further $13 million:

to expand the deployment of Explosive Trace Detection equipment for the examination of domestic air cargo at each of Australia's major airports; improve the quality of security training for cargo handlers; and partner with customs and industry to undertake a number of trials to test a variety of existing and emerging explosive detection technologies.[55]

Committee comment

4.96   The Committee views the confining of checked baggage screening requirements to CTFR airports as appropriate on condition that all checked baggage that is transferred to a flight out of a CTFR airport will be subject to full screening requirements.

4.97   The Committee supports the extension of screening to domestic cargo shipments, and strongly supports the principle that flights required to screen checked baggage also be required to screen air cargo.

51   CAPEC, *Transcript*, 21 July 2005, p. 32.

52   Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler, *An Independent Review of Airport Policing and Security for the Government of Australia*, Recommendation 14.

53   Prime Minister, *Press Release*, 21 September 2005.

54   Toll Transport, *Transcript*, 23 November 2005, p. 73.

55   Minister for Transport and Regional Services, 'Air Cargo Security Strengthened', *Budget Media Release*, 9 May 2006.

4.98   The Committee notes that the considerations that limited screening checked baggage to flights departing from and transiting through major CTFR airports logically extend to the screening of air cargo on flights with checked baggage screening.

4.99   The measures introduced by the Government will result in the screening of a considerably increased proportion of air cargo.

Recommendation 12

4.100   **That the Department of Transport and Regional Services report on the timetable for implementing screening of all air cargo on passenger aircraft where passengers' checked baggage is screened.**

The Department's report should include consideration of the feasibility of implementing the screening of all air cargo on passenger aircraft where passengers' checked baggage is screened by 1 August 2007 when 100 percent check baggage screening from Counter Terrorism First Response airports is required.

Closed charters

4.101   The cases for and against screening closed charter flights were provided by aviation industry participants.

4.102   On the one hand, Nhulunbuy Corporation pointed to an apparent inconsistency in the security arrangements applying to regular Public Transport services and closed charters operating at Gove Airport:

> we have a BAE146 Jet RPT Service twice a day, catering for approximately 75 people each trip. Everyone of these passengers require screening.

> A Boeing 737-400 Series jet charter also operates at times with a seating capacity of 140 approximately. None of these passengers who get on and off the plane at the same terminal, but outside jet RPT hours, get screened. The 737 is a much

larger aircraft than the 146 and has a much further travel capacity.[56]

4.103 Shire of East Pilbara argued closed charters operating from mining airports without screening into CTFR airports constituted a greater threat than Regular Public Transport jet services operating from screened airports:

> There is more access to explosives on an isolated mine site … than with a normal passenger walking on to a domestic flight…[57]

4.104 The Western Australian Government's Department of Planning and Infrastructure (DPI) suggested that the application of screening requirements to Regular Public Transport jet services, while allowing closed charter jets to operate unscreened, was yet another pressure on public services to regional communities:

> To recoup the money from … small annual passenger numbers adds significantly to the cost of the ticket and it cascades onto other things, such as mining companies saying, "Well, perhaps I shouldn't use the RPT service because it's far more expensive for us to take our employees up there," and look at alternative means such as charter. If we then extrapolate that out, that could well diminish the RPT service's strength because passenger numbers go down. We believe that some airports are in a bit of a conundrum.[58]

4.105 DPI provided an example of security requirements directly threatening RPT services at Ravensthorpe in the state's south east:

> BHP decided that, rather than fly in, fly out, dedicated charter, they would have an RPT service so that it would be open for the general public to use. What they are doing in the course of the construction [of the mine] is to have turboprop services more frequent, then there is going to be a period of jet services, which will then go as the construction is nearing completion, then it will go back to turboprop services, and then there may not be too many air services on a long-term basis at the completion of the mine. However, because there was a jet service down there and it was RPT, they have had to put in passenger screening at that airport. BHP provided $5

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56   Nhulunbuy Corporation Limited, *Submission No 22*, p. 3.
57   Shire of East Pilbara, *Transcript*, 8 March 2006, pp. 2-5.
58   DPI, *Transcript*, 22 September 2005, p. 23.

> million to build the airport and the state government put
> some money in also …. Its a false economy in the sense that it
> is not a long-term prospect to have a jet RPT service down
> there, yet they have had to do all the passenger screening.[59]

4.106   On the other hand, it was argued that closed charter operations
constituted a lower threat than RPT services and thus should not
require screening. Closed charters:

> have a higher degree of security than the normal RPT
> operation for one critical reason: their clientele have been
> identified and are known.[60]

4.107   Furthermore, the consequences of breaching security requirements for
passengers on closed charters can be more severe. For example, in the
event that a:

> person has caused an incident … or refused to obey a lawful
> instruction … the mining company then gives that person a
> final warning. Unless he behaves in future, he will be kicked
> off the site, not allowed to fly in the aircraft and lose his job.[61]

4.108   DoTaRS concurred:

> Threat assessments, such as those produced by the Australian
> Secret Intelligence Organisation, are utilised to determine the
> most appropriate security measures for the current threat
> level.

> At this time, screening of closed charters is not considered by
> the Government to be a necessary security measure.[62]

Committee comment

4.109   The Committee notes that:

- the requirement that all aircraft of 30 seats or more to be fitted
  with hardened cockpit doors included closed charter aircraft; and

- the passengers of closed charter services are known to the provider
  of the service to a far higher degree than in Regular Public
  Transport services

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59   DPI, *Transcript*, 22 September 2005, p. 30.
60   In camera, *Transcript*, 21 September 2005, p. 3.
61   In camera, *Transcript*, 21 September 2005, p. 10.
62   DoTaRS, *Submission No. 52.2*, p. 19.

4.110   The Committee also notes concerns among operators of airports that take both Regular Public Transport and closed charter jet services at the disparity between screening requirements for each of these types of operations.

Recommendation 13

4.111   **That the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DoTaRS) report to the Committee on the screening requirements for closed charter jet services operating in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The report should include:**

- **a detailed analysis of the risks of closed charters in Australia; and**

- **an estimate of the costs of imposing screening requirements upon closed charter jet services operating in Australia.**

That DoTaRS report on this matter within three months of the presentation of this report.

Perimeter security

4.112   Measures following the Australian Government's aviation security upgrades announced on 7 June 2005 included the reduction of access points and enhancement of physical perimeter security at security controlled airports.

4.113   CCTV is also a vital instrument in physical perimeter security. The security benefits of CCTV are discussed in a broader context of policing criminality at airports at Chapter Five.

4.114   DoTaRS referred to upgrades in perimeter security measures but cautioned against over-reliance on them:

> we are now ratcheting up the requirements around fencing where there is high-volume passenger transport.

> … the fence … is a legal boundary and it is a layer. The fence keeps honest people out. If you have a dishonest intent, you can cut your way through the fence; but, in cutting your way

> through the fence, you draw attention to yourself, and we have an armed response to come and get you…
>
> [However] there is a bit of frustration about how far people would like us to take the fencing thing. We are upgrading it. The Government is putting its hand in its pocket for smaller airports. It is only one layer. Again, we have looked at overseas models and over time we will drive the industry, particularly, at the major sites, to invest more in fencing – but you can easily overdo the fencing thing.[63]

Access points

4.115   In the course of inspecting CTFR airports,[64] the Committee was pleased to discuss with airport operators and observe significant upgraded security measures associated with the reduction in the number of access points and the increased scrutiny of personnel accessing secure airside areas.

4.116   The Committee was impressed by the increased use of swipe card activated airlock gates to prevent unauthorised vehicular access by tail gating at unmanned access points and encourages the continued installation of these devices where required.

4.117   The Committee was particularly impressed by the installation of fast closing roller doors at AaE air cargo facilities at Cairns International Airport.

4.118   The Committee was also informed that vehicular access to secure airside areas was being curtailed by airport operators particularly through the closure of drive through hangars in General Aviation sectors of airports.

Regional aviation

4.119   Regional airports new to the regulatory regime received funding support to upgrade security including CCTV monitoring, access points, perimeter fencing and signage.

4.120   The funding arrangements for new entrant are considered in detail at Chapter Six.

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63   DoTaRS, Transcript, 5 December 2005, p. 18.

64   For details see Appendix XX

4.121   The remoteness of some regional airports and the consequent lack of supervision of perimeter fencing provoked criticism that new perimeter security and signage requirements in particular would deliver no significant security outcomes.

Access points

4.122   North West Travel Services stated that pilots using Paraburdoo Airport:

> call up and get the security gate code, which we are obliged to give them, and they will just go in and out … they can leave the gate open and we will not know.[65]

4.123   Shire of East Pilbara agreed:

> you can ring up the manager or some other person and get the codes. You do not know who you are talking to. They could give a code for a plane and say, "I am inbound, on my way," or "I am here tomorrow; can I have the code for your gate?" You do not know who they are.[66]

4.124   Shire of Northampton stated:

> You have coded locks and the idea is that no-one can gain access to airside; therefore, you need to tell the pilots how to get out of the gate. Originally it was planned to be published in ERSA [AirServices Australia's En Route Supplement Australia[67]] and that has now been disallowed by DoTaRS. The only option that we have available is to put a sign near the gate facing the airside with a number for the lock. But some members of DoTaRS are saying that the pilot should find out first before he lands. That is not always going to be the case.[68]

Fencing

4.125   Linfox Airports commented on the importance of perimeter security for smaller airports in populated areas:

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65   North West Travel Services, *Transcript*, 8 March 2006, p. 18.

66   Shire of East Pilbara, *Transcript*, 8 March 2006, p. 18.

67   See http://www.airservices.gov.au/publications/aip.asp?pg=40&vdate=8-Jun-2006&ver=2. Accessed 5 May 2006.

68   Shire of Northampton, *Transcript*, 7 March 2006, pp. 3-4.

> For an airport like Essendon, just 12 kilometres from the city in a residential area, this is a tremendously important security initiative.[69]

4.126   However, perimeter security requirements at Essendon were contrasted with the other airport operated by Linfox at:

> Avalon [which] is a property of 4½ thousand acres with a boundary probably in excess of 20 or 25 kilometres. The furthest boundary from the passenger terminal would be approximately four kilometres away. So our emphasis on security with our RPT operations very strongly focuses on fencing the terminal, lighting the terminal and screening passengers. The issue is … that spending many millions of dollars on fencing four kilometres away is unnecessary.[70]

4.127   RAAA questioned the security outcomes of perimeter fencing in remote locations:

> Fences seem to be one of the primary things that most of the [new entrant] airports have gone for – extra money for extra fencing – and you have to ask what is the security advance of a fence in the middle of nowhere when you have an RPT service once or twice a week.[71]

4.128   Shire of Roebourne expanded upon this point:

> It is well understood that … trained personnel can gain entry to any fence in 20 seconds and an average person in less than a minute.
>
> It would therefore seem that increased fencing is more about perceived security than real security impact.[72]

4.129   However, Shire of Halls Creek referred to the benefits of increased perimeter security at some regional airports where there are limited personnel to ensure runways are clear in the event of after hours landings. As a result of new perimeter fencing Council staff no longer:

> have to be called out at all hours of the night to attend to some of these [kangaroos, wallabies, dogs and local people,

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69   Linfox Airports, *Transcript*, 24 November 2005, p. 20.

70   Linfox, *Transcript*, 24 November 2005, p. 25.

71   RAAA, *Transcript*, 10 October 2005, p. 6.

72   Shire of Roebourne, *Submission No. 31*, p. 3.

>wheel events, people having campfires on the runway] .issues.[73]

Committee comment

4.130   The Committee supports the requirement that airports review and limit the number of access points they require to airside areas and upgrade security measures at remaining access points.

4.131   While cognisant of the limited security benefits of physical perimeter security enhancements, particularly at remote locations, the Committee found some strong outcomes in terms of aviation safety; for instance, taking pressure off limited resources – particularly personnel – that arose as the result of enhancing physical perimeter security in remote locations.

4.132   Physical security is only effective as a security measure if it is monitored and the Committee's consideration of monitoring of perimeter security occurs in the Chapter Five.

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73   Shire of Halls Creek, *Transcript*, 8 March 2006, p. 20