

**Electoral Commissioner**

Our Ref: 13/997

Ms Siobhan Leyne
Inquiry Secretary
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
PO Box 6021
PARLIAMENT HOUSE ACT 2600

Dear Ms Leyne,

Inquiry into the 2013 federal election – Response to letter from JSC EM Chair dated 7 July 2014 and provision of requested information

This submission outlines the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) response to requests for additional information identified in a letter from the Committee's Chair, dated 7 July 2014. Additionally, the submission addresses two requests for information taken as questions on notice (QoN) at the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters' (JSC EM) public hearing in Canberra.

The information provided is organised as follows:

Attachment	Title	Page
Attachment A	Responses to requests for further information by the Hon. Tony Smith MP in a letter to Tom Rogers, Acting Electoral Commissioner dated 7 July 2014	1
Attachment B	Keelty Implementation Taskforce (KIT) recommendations table	28
Attachment C	Evaluation of implementation of new measures for the WA half-Senate election, including recommendations from the Keelty Report	29
Attachment D	Photographs of ballot paper packages in storage	30
Attachment E	Electronic Certified List (ECL) discussion paper	31

As I have noted before Senate Estimates on 29 May 2014, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) is taking steps to rebuild the community and Parliament's faith in our capacity to deliver an accurate and reliable election result.

The progress of this, as implemented at the 2014 Western Australian half-Senate election and the Griffith by-election, is reported at Attachment B. This report evaluates measures implemented in response to certain Keely report recommendations. The AEC has been working to instil the principles of both the Keely and ANAO report recommendations as the minimum standard for all policies, practices, and procedures.

In recent weeks, 320 of the AEC's staff, particularly the Executive, State Managers and election managers, have met to discuss the future direction of the agency and to define and reinforce the concepts of integrity and quality. Elements of the discussions have focused on compliance, and on national consistency in the application of policies and procedures. The AEC is committed to the elimination of inconsistencies, and implementing a process of continuous improvement across the agency.

As part of the AEC's renewed focus on integrity and quality, the AEC implemented the following measures at the Griffith by-election and Western Australia half-Senate election in 2014 to mitigate the risk of ballot paper incidences such as those that occurred at the 2013 election:

- introduction of 'ballot paper principles' to emphasise the sanctity of ballot papers from creation to statutorily-authorized destruction,
- formalised documentation to provide an unbroken chain of custody of ballot papers from creation to statutorily-authorized destruction,
- revised parcelling and packaging procedures following polling and fresh scrutiny,
- overnight teams to reconcile parcels of ballot papers following return from polling places,
- mandatory ballot box guards at every polling place,
- improved role descriptions for selected key roles; and
- an improved compliance regime.

At the hearing of 12 March 2014 in Canberra, I tabled a 'Folio of Interim Measures' used for the Western Australian half-Senate election, which included much of the documentation referred to above. However, I also attach to this submission some photographs (Attachment D) that demonstrate the implementation of the AEC's refreshed approach to quality and consistency. These photographs are of ballot

paper packages, wrapped and palletised following the fresh scrutiny, ahead of transport and final storage at the warehouse.

The implementation of the Keelty recommendations, trialled during the Griffith by-election, and the Western Australian half-Senate election in 2014, have resulted in significantly enhanced electoral processes, and a renewed focus by the agency on safe electoral practice. This is an ongoing process, and it will take time to embed new practices, processes and indeed, culture. However, the AEC has now embarked on this journey and is committed to ensuring that all elections are delivered within this enhanced framework of quality and integrity.

Although it is a matter that will be put before the Department of Finance, it should be noted that the ongoing implementation reform outlined in this submission may present financial pressures for the Commission under its current arrangements.

I also note that there have been other matters previously highlighted by the Special Minister of State as issues for JSCEM consideration that have not yet been raised with the AEC. The AEC emphasises its commitment to assist in the provision of any technical information to support the Committee in its ongoing review of these and any other matters.

As always, I look forward to appearing before the Committee at its next hearing, and I am happy to expand on any of these matters should members wish to discuss them further.

Yours sincerely 

Tom Rogers
Acting Electoral Commissioner

25 July 2014

Responses to requests for further information by the Hon. Tony Smith MP in a letter to Tom Rogers, Acting Electoral Commissioner, dated 7 July 2014

1. Issues arising from the Western Australia half-Senate election or from Committee hearings

1.1. Update on table of Keelty recommendations and ongoing reform

- 1.1.1. Page one of the Chair's letter asked the AEC to provide an updated table of the Keelty recommendations with an overview of how the responses worked during the 2014 Western Australia (WA) half-Senate elections.

AEC Response

- 1.1.2. Attachment B contains a revised version of the Keelty Implementation Taskforce (KIT) recommendations table as of 22 July 2014. Attachment C contains the KIT evaluation of implementation of new measures for the WA half-Senate election, including recommendations from the Keelty Report.

Issues highlighted at 11 June 2014 hearing

1.2. Issues highlighted at 11 June 2014 hearing

- 1.2.1. The report into the investigation of the missing 50 House of Representatives ballot papers from the Division of Grey was requested on page one of the Chair's letter.

AEC Response

- 1.2.2. Following the JSCEM Hearing in Adelaide on 11 June 2014, the acting Electoral Commissioner directed the State Manager for South Australia to conduct a further, comprehensive review into the circumstances surrounding the missing 50 House of Representatives ballot papers from the Port Lincoln static polling place in the Division of Grey.
- 1.2.3. That review has established that all issued ballot papers (formal and informal) and all unissued ballot papers for the Division of Grey have been accounted for. The review, undertaken by the AEC's most senior officers in South Australia, involved the opening of parcels of ballot papers from the Port Lincoln static polling place and re-checking ballot papers against first preferences results recorded in the AEC's primary election information management systems (ELMS) and the Officer in Charge (OIC) return.

- 1.2.4. It is now evident that, on polling night, a bundle of 50 first preference ballot papers marked for Mr Browne (ALP) were incorrectly placed with the first preference ballot papers marked for Mr Ramsey (LP), and were reported with the original results as votes for Mr Ramsey.
- 1.2.5. In the following days at the scrutiny centre, staff identified the incorrectly sorted bundle of ballot papers and returned them to Mr Browne's package of first preference ballot papers. The number of ballot papers for Mr Ramsey was adjusted downwards by 50 votes but a corresponding upwards adjustment was not made to the total number of ballot papers for Mr Browne.
- 1.2.6. When the discrepancy between the number of ballot papers counted for Mr Ramsey on polling night and the number of ballot papers counted for Mr Ramsey at fresh scrutiny became apparent, AEC staff conducting the scrutiny were asked to check the ballot papers for this polling place and confirmed that the ballot papers for Mr Ramsey were 50 less than reported on polling night.
- 1.2.7. The error would have been detected at the time had the AEC staff conducting the scrutiny rechecked all ballot papers for the Port Lincoln static polling place. The most recent review has found that only the first preference ballot papers for Mr Ramsey were checked.
- 1.2.8. The original investigation into the 50 missing ballot papers undertaken in September 2013 was flawed because – while scrutiny staff reported that boxes containing used ballot papers had been rechecked – they did not recheck all used ballot papers, and instead only rechecked the first preference ballot papers marked for Mr Ramsey. This failure to undertake the expected full recheck of all ballot papers for the Port Lincoln static polling place resulted in the Divisional Returning Officer (DRO) erroneously concluding that 50 ballot papers were missing.
- 1.2.9. The AEC is currently reviewing processes and procedures to ensure that in the future, there is a consistent process and adequate guidance for staff on how to deal with such issues and whether further action is warranted. The acting Electoral Commissioner is currently considering whether disciplinary or administrative action may be warranted in this matter.

1.3. Formal complaint

- 1.3.1. The Chair has requested that the AEC provide the report into the formal complaint lodged by Ms Gorham.

AEC Response

- 1.3.2. Ms Gorham has raised a number of matters in correspondence with the AEC. The AEC's investigation into these matters is continuing. The AEC is

addressing matters internally in line with its standard processes and policies, such as where they relate to matters of pay and conditions of employment, or seeking the services of an independent person to investigate some of the matters raised where it is more appropriate to have an external person do so. The AEC is in the process of identifying an appropriate person in WA to conduct an independent investigation as needed. The AEC intends that the full investigation will be conducted as soon as practicable.

2. Roll Management issues

2.1. Public access to the electoral Roll

- 2.1.1. On page two of the Chair's letter, the Committee requested the AEC's view on public access to the electoral Roll for reasons unrelated to Commonwealth electoral purposes.

AEC Response

Legislative framework

- 2.1.2. The right to access the Commonwealth electoral Roll is absolutely integral and critical to the conduct of free and fair federal elections, as it ensures a degree of public transparency and accountability in terms of accuracy of enrolment, and is a measure to mitigate electoral fraud. A lack of access to the electoral Roll has the potential to undermine the public confidence in the integrity of electoral process. In accordance with the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (the 'Electoral Act'), the AEC provides access to the Roll through two pathways:
- by providing a viewable, publicly available Roll in accordance with subsections 90A(1), (2) and (3) of the Electoral Act; and
 - by providing copies of the Roll and extracts from the Roll in accordance with section 90B.
- 2.1.3. There is an absolute need to provide members of the public with access to the electoral Roll to be viewed for electoral purposes; a need for the Roll to be accessible for socially worthwhile purposes; and a need to balance the protection of citizens' personal data.
- 2.1.4. Historically, there have been several pendulum swings in the treatment of access to information contained in the electoral Roll. Until 2004 the Roll was available for sale to the public. Since that time there has been a tightening of access to the Roll.
- 2.1.5. The publicly available version of the Roll is provided in an electronic format in each of the AEC's divisional and capital city offices, and may be

viewed without fee at any time during ordinary office hours.¹ The only information that is contained on the public version of the Roll is the name and address of each elector and the name of their Commonwealth electoral division (and in most cases, the name of their state or territory and local council electorates). Registered silent electors, itinerant electors, and eligible overseas electors do not have an address displayed.² No information about an elector's date of birth or gender is displayed on the publicly available version of the Roll. No part of the publicly available version of the Roll may be copied or recorded by electronic means.³

- 2.1.6. Copies of the Roll and extracts from the Roll are provided to a range of eligible individuals and entities under Section 90B of the Electoral Act by electronic means. The particulars in each extract vary depending on the section of the Electoral Act under which an individual or organisation is entitled to the extract.⁴ Information provided in an extract may include additional 'personal information' about an elector which is not available on the publicly available version of the Roll. Extracts may include all information on the publicly available version of the Roll plus electors' dates of birth, gender, occupation, Commonwealth and state or territory enrolment entitlements, whether an elector has been recorded as having voted at a given election, and details of their most recent enrolment transaction. Individuals and entities entitled to receive extracts are detailed in Table A2.

Approach to use of the publicly available electoral Roll

- 2.1.7. The primary purpose of the Commonwealth electoral Roll and the collection of the 'personal information' contained on the Roll is for the conduct of federal elections and referendums. However, in contrast to the range of purposes specified in the Electoral Act in relation to the Roll being provided under s90B, s90A does not provide any specific guidance in relation to permitted use of information obtained from the publicly accessible Roll.
- 2.1.8. Over a number of years the AEC has noted, based on the experience in divisional offices, that individuals and organisations appeared to be accessing the publicly available version of the Roll for what may be

¹ In accordance with subsections 90A(1), (2) and (3) of the Electoral Act.

² A registered silent elector is one who has submitted a request for their address not to be shown on the Roll, as doing so would present a risk to their safety or to the safety of their family (section 104 of the Electoral Act); a registered itinerant elector is one who resides in Australia and is not entitled to be enrolled for any subdivision because they do not reside in any subdivision or because they are a homeless person (section 96 of the Electoral Act); and an eligible overseas elector is an elector who is enrolled for a subdivision, has ceased or intends to cease residing in Australia and intends to return in six years or less (section 94 of the Electoral Act).

³ In accordance with subsection 90A(5) of the Electoral Act.

⁴ The particulars are prescribed in section 90B of the Electoral Act.

socially worthwhile, and indeed laudable reasons, but which do not appear to be purposes connected to elections and referendums.

- 2.1.9. As part of the ongoing review of internal policy and operations, in late 2012, the then-Electoral Commissioner adopted a policy position in relation to access to the Roll which the then-Commissioner believed was more consistent with our obligations to protect the privacy of elector information.
- 2.1.10. There were a range of factors that led the AEC to rewrite its policies and procedures resulting in the tightening of public access to the Roll, including: JSCEM findings and recommendations in its report on the conduct of the 2001 election; examination of provisions in the Electoral Act related to the use of 'personal information'; risks identified by the Australian National Audit Office's *Performance Audit Report No. 28 of 2009-10* examining the AEC's preparation and conduct of the 2007 Federal Election; and other research identifying concerns with third party access to 'personal information' contained on the Commonwealth electoral Roll.⁵
- 2.1.11. Notices are now displayed at the public terminals located at AEC premises advising users that the publicly available version of the Roll may be inspected for the purposes of checking the user's own enrolment details or making an objection to the enrolment of another elector⁶. The AEC's policy regarding access to the publicly available version of the Roll is also available on the AEC's website.⁷

Why people wish to access the electoral Roll

- 2.1.12. Based on feedback from divisional office staff and correspondence to the AEC since the new policy was implemented, it is clear that there is a diverse range of reasons for which the publicly available Roll was being accessed.
- 2.1.13. Below is a summary of the reasons for requiring access to the electoral Roll, as provided in correspondence to the AEC since access to the Roll was tightened in 2012:

⁵ ALRC's Report No. 108 *For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice*, recommendations 16-3 and 16-4, p.33.

⁶ Election candidates or a member of a political party (or their representatives) may also use the publicly available Roll for any purpose in relation to an election or referendum.

⁷ Available from: http://www.aec.gov.au/Enrolling_to_vote/About_Electoral_Roll/.

Table A1: Categories of correspondence requesting access to the electoral Roll

Category of organisation or entity	Purpose for which access to the 'personal information' contained on the Commonwealth electoral Roll has been sought
Adoption agencies and organisations (both private and public)	To assist in locating relatives of individuals affected by adoption, including forced adoption
State and Territory Public Trustees (and private organisations)	To assist with managing estate related matters
State and territory police services	To assist with locating individuals who may be able to contribute to their criminal investigations
Courts, legal firms, individual lawyers	To assist with serving legal documents to individuals
Community legal organisations	To assist with serving legal documents
Superannuation providers	To assist with locating beneficiaries of superannuation
Courier and postal organisations	To assist in correcting their customer records
State and local council libraries	To assist with general research purposes, often on behalf of members of the public
Debt collectors	To assist with locating individuals regarding debt recovery
Information technology companies that manage 'customer data'	To assist with their record keeping
Private security firms and professional security industry organisations	To assist with attempting to locate missing persons, estate beneficiaries, private investigations
Sports gambling companies	To assist in confirming customer identity and residential address for their records
Genealogical societies (professional and amateur)	To assist with identifying family lineage
Other individuals	To assist with preparing for family or school reunions or return lost property (including a request to locate a person to return recovered war medals)

Broadening access to information on the electoral Roll?

2.1.14. The AEC acknowledges that, because it contains information on some 14.8 million electors, the Commonwealth electoral Roll is a valuable resource for many people, and that there are many uses for the information that may carry a high degree of social utility.

2.1.15. The issue surrounding third party access to the Roll therefore presents some difficult policy challenges. On the one hand, people have accessed the publicly available Roll for socially worthwhile purposes such as the location of adopted children or parents. However, the Roll is also being accessed for a range of other commercial and private purposes.

2.1.16. In determining the appropriate level of public access to the Roll, the following factors need to be considered:

- What is an appropriate use of the Commonwealth electoral Roll information by individuals and organisations, including socially worthwhile activities;
- the challenges of balancing the privacy of electors with the requirement to provide a publicly available version of the Roll;
- the ability for the AEC to exercise oversight of what Roll information is accessed and why; and
- the need for an approach that provides clarity in relation to which individuals and entities can be granted access to publicly available Roll information, and what the permitted purposes are for use of this information.

AEC Position

2.1.17. The AEC recognises the sensitivity that surrounds Roll access, the high level of community interest in this matter, the difficulty in striking the right balance between access and privacy, and that decisions around who should be provided access to Roll data and for what purposes is ultimately a matter for Parliament.

2.1.18. Against that backdrop, the AEC does not wish to promote any particular position. However, amongst other options the Committee may consider, one way forward might be to provide more clarity around the purpose of the electoral Roll. This could be then supported through the development of a legislative definition of socially worthwhile activities (in the context of Roll access), which would enable the AEC to make more targeted determinations at the operational level.

Table A2: Categorisation of individuals and organisations who may be provided Roll information and for what purpose

Who	Purpose	What information they are provided	How is information obtained
Member of House of Representatives, Senator, Political Party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> any purpose in connection with an Election or referendum; research regarding electoral matters monitoring the accuracy of information contained in a roll; the performance by the Senator or member of his or her functions as a Senator or member in relation to a person or persons enrolled for the Division, State or Territory. 	A wide range of elector information	On request from the AEC
Organisations that conduct medical research or provide health screening programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> medical research purposes in accordance with the 'Guidelines under Section 95 of the <i>Privacy Act 1988</i>, issued by National Health and Medical Research Council (March 2000). 	A copy of a Roll that contains a persons' surname, given name and place of living (or an extract of a Roll); and if the Electoral Commission wishes—information about: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) the sex of; or (ii) the age range that covers; a person included on the Roll 	On request from the AEC
Prescribed authorities: Commonwealth agencies and authorities prescribed in Schedule 1 of the Electoral and Referendum Regulations 1940. eg Centrelink and AFP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> any purpose that is prescribed for the prescribed authority that are contained in the Regulations. These purposes tend to be for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Identifying or locating offenders, suspects or witnesses; (b) collecting, compiling, analysing and disseminating statistics and related information; (c) Identifying or locating taxpayers; preventing, detecting or investigating taxation fraud. 	Any information on a roll; and if the Electoral Commissioner wishes—information about: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) the sex of; or (ii) the date of birth of; or (iii) the occupation of; a person whose name is included on the Roll 	On request from the AEC
Persons and organisations prescribed in Regulation 7 of the Electoral and Referendum Regulations 1940 for the purposes of satisfying identity verification obligations under the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 and the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> carry out an applicable customer identification procedure under the <i>Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006</i> verification of the identity of persons for the purposes of the <i>Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988</i> 	A copy of a Roll (or an extract of a Roll) that contains a persons' surname, given name and place of living	On request from the AEC

Table A3: Prescribed authorities with access to State and Territory Rolls

Electoral and Referendum Regulations 1940 (no 163 as amended) Schedule 1 Prescribed authorities and permitted purposes for use of information (regulations 5A and 8), as at 30 June 2014		
Item	Agency or authority	Purpose
1	Australia Post	Investigating postal and criminal offences committed against the Commonwealth under the Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 or the Crimes Act 1914
1AA	Australian Bureau of Statistics	Collecting, compiling, analysing and disseminating statistics and related information
1A	Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity	(a) Identifying or locating offenders, suspects or witnesses in relation to the investigation of, or reporting on, a corruption issue within the meaning of the <i>Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006</i> (the LEIC Act) (b) Collecting, correlating, analysing or disseminating information or intelligence in relation to: (i) corruption generally in a law enforcement agency within the meaning of the LEIC Act (a LEIC agency); or (ii) the integrity of a staff member of a LEIC agency (c) Collecting, correlating, analysing or disseminating information or intelligence in relation to corruption generally in, or the integrity of a staff member of, a Commonwealth government agency (other than a LEIC agency) that has a law enforcement function within the meaning of the LEIC Act (d) Security vetting of employees or potential employees
2	Australian Communications and Media Authority	Identifying offences relating to interference with radiocommunications or telecommunications
3	Australian Competition and Consumer Commission	(a) Identifying or locating offenders, suspects or witnesses (b) Verifying the identity of individuals for enforcement of the criminal law or of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty in relation to the <i>Trade Practices Act 1974</i>
4	Australian Crime Commission	(a) Collecting, correlating, analysing and disseminating criminal information and intelligence (b) Undertaking intelligence operations (c) Investigating matters relating to relevant criminal activity (d) Assembling or analysing evidence about offences and suspected offences (e) Conducting criminal and operational investigations to support authorised national security functions (f) Security vetting of employees or potential employees
5	Australian Customs Service (Customs)	(a) Verifying the identity or status of travellers and consignees of cargo or postal articles (b) Verifying the identity and status of importers and exporters (c) Investigating criminal offences and offences against legislation administered by Customs (d) Checking the accuracy of information given to Customs (e) Verifying the identity of individuals on behalf of: (i) the government of another country; or (ii) a law enforcement administration under an international agreement or arrangement

		(f) Surveillance purposes
6	Australian Federal Police (AFP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Identifying or locating offenders, suspects or witnesses (b) Deciding whether suspects can be eliminated from an investigation (c) Target development (d) Intelligence checks (e) Protecting the safety of officers, staff members, AFP employees and special members (f) Law enforcement (g) Surveillance (h) Identification of potential or actual disaster victims, and notification of victims' families (i) Security vetting of AFP officers or potential AFP officers
7	Australian Securities and Investments Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Identifying or locating suspects or witnesses (b) Surveillance (c) Law enforcement
8	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Confirming the identity of Australian citizens to determine whether or not they are of security interest (b) Security vetting of employees or potential employees
9	Australian Taxation Office (the Statutory Agency consisting of the Commissioner of Taxation and staff)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Identifying or locating taxpayers (b) Preventing, detecting or investigating taxation fraud
10	Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre	<p>Conducting investigations in relation to the enforcement of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) the criminal law; or (b) a law imposing a pecuniary penalty <p>regarding the <i>Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988</i></p>
12	ComSuper (the Statutory Agency consisting of the Commissioner for Superannuation and staff)	Locating members and former members for the purpose of protecting public revenue in relation to the payment of benefits, the recovery of overpayments and the review of entitlement to benefit
13	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry	Identifying individuals suspected of breaching legislation administered by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
14	Department of Defence	(a) Identifying or locating an individual suspected of fraud or another criminal offence under:

		<p>(i) a law of the Commonwealth administered by the Department of Defence; or</p> <p>(ii) another law of the Commonwealth, or a law of a State or Territory, that is connected with:</p> <p>(A) the defence of Australia; or</p> <p>(B) the operations or activities of the Department of Defence</p> <p>(b) Security vetting of employees or potential employees</p>
15	Department of Education, Science and Training	Preventing, detecting or investigating fraud and other criminal offences in relation to the Department's programs and public money managed by the Department
16	Department of Employment and Workplace Relations	Identifying or locating suspects, debtors or witnesses in relation to criminal investigations
16A	Department of the Environment and Water Resources	Verifying the principal place of residence of applicants under the Photovoltaic Rebate Programme and the Solar Hot Water Rebate Programme
17	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	<p>(a) Confirming the identity of passport applicants or identifiers of documents</p> <p>(c) Verifying information relating to a passport or an application for a passport</p> <p>(d) Locating parents who have not lodged an application for a passport, in connection with seeking consent to issue a passport to a minor</p> <p>(e) Assisting in consular operations to locate next-of-kin in Australia</p>
18	Department of Human Services	<p>(a) Preventing and detecting fraud relating to identity or incorrect payments</p> <p>(b) Identifying or locating clients for debt management, determination or correction purposes</p> <p>(c) Undertaking compliance, investigation or enforcement activities relating to the Chief Executive Medicare's functions under section 5 of the <i>Human Services (Medicare) Act 1973</i></p> <p>(d) Recovering overpayments or other amounts due to the Commonwealth in relation to the performance of the Chief Executive Medicare's functions under section 5 of the <i>Human Services (Medicare) Act 1973</i></p>
19	Department of Immigration and Citizenship	<p>(a) Facilitating travel to Australia, or entry to Australia, for an Australian citizen who may have lost his or her passport</p> <p>(b) Enabling airport officers to identify travellers and confirm their status</p> <p>(c) Assisting investigations and compliance staff in the detection of persons suspected of:</p> <p>(i) being in Australia unlawfully; or</p>

		(ii) working without authority; or
		(iii) being involved in people smuggling; or
		(iv) committing offences against legislation administered by the Department
20	Department of Veterans' Affairs	(a) Undertaking reviews of, or research into, the health of former members of the Defence Force
		(b) Protection of the public revenue in relation to reviews of entitlement to benefit
21	Director of Public Prosecutions	Verifying the identity of, or locating, persons of interest in relation to property ownership matters conducted under the <i>Proceeds of Crime Act 2002</i>
21A	Federal Court of Australia (the Statutory Agency consisting of the Registrar and the APS employees assisting the Registrar)	<p>(a) Preparing a written jury roll for a jury district</p> <p>(b) Determining if a person included on a jury list is not qualified to serve as a juror or should be excused from serving as a juror</p> <p>(c) Giving the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police the name and other details of any or all of the persons included on a jury list so that the Commissioner may give information about the criminal history (if any) of each of those persons</p> <p>(d) Disclosing to an officer responsible for convening juries for trials before a court of a State or Territory information identifying a juror or former juror so that the officer can consider whether to summons the juror or former juror when convening a trial before the State or Territory court</p> <p><i>Note</i> The purposes described in this item relate to functions performed under Division 1A of Part III of the <i>Federal Court of Australia Act 1976</i>.</p>
22	Insolvency and Trustee Service of Australia	<p>(a) Locating and investigating bankrupts and their associates in relation to obligations under the <i>Bankruptcy Act 1966</i></p> <p>(b) Conducting criminal investigations in relation to the <i>Bankruptcy Act 1966</i></p> <p>(c) Investigating identity fraud</p>

2.2. Enrolment identification requirements

2.2.1. At page two of the letter from the Chair, the Committee expressed interest in any further work undertaken by the AEC on an expansion of the types of identification that can be used to support a person's enrolment, as mentioned in the AEC's primary submission. Additionally, information is requested on what types of identification are being considered and the AEC's position on s98AA, which allows a person's enrolment application to be supported by the attestation of another person who is enrolled.

AEC Response

2.2.2. Australians already use a wide range of identifying documents in establishing and maintaining their identity with Commonwealth and state/territory government agencies. The AEC is aware of the variety of different identification forms which exist and has been examining additional forms of identification types which may be suitable as evidence of identity (EOI) for enrolment purposes under s98AA of the Electoral Act.

2.2.3. The list of possible documents under discussion is in no way exclusive, nor does it reflect a commitment to a particular preference by the AEC. Additionally, the AEC is aware of previous consideration by JSCEM and the Parliament of possible appropriate forms of identity documents. For example, in 2001, Electoral and Referendum Regulations⁸ were made following passage of legislation requiring that a person making a claim for enrolment must verify their identity by providing at least one original document prescribed in the regulations. The AEC also notes the 'Gold Standard Enrolment Framework' (gold standard)⁹ published by the Attorney-General's Department as part of the National Identity Security Strategy¹⁰. The gold standard provides an evidence of identity framework, listing a range of documents that could be used as identification for enrolment purposes with varying levels of corresponding integrity.

2.2.4. Section 98AA provides for the use of a driver's licence number, Australian passport number, signed attestation to the person's identity by another enrolled person, or any other evidence of identity prescribed under the Regulations. At present, no other form of identification is prescribed in the Regulations.

2.2.5. Not all eligible Australians hold a driver's licence or Australian passport. During 2013/14 some 5.5% of enrolment applications relied on

⁸ *Electoral and Referendum Amendment Regulations 2001 (No. 1)*.

⁹ Available from: <http://www.ag.gov.au/rightsandprotections/identitysecurity/pages/technical-resources.aspx>

¹⁰ The Council of Australian Governments has endorsed a [National Identity Security Strategy](#) to ensure Australia's approach to identity is ready to meet the opportunities and challenges presented by the digital economy and respond to the rapidly evolving nature of identity crime.

attestation for the purpose of evidence of identity. Adding other forms of identity for the purpose of enrolment may reduce the need to use attestation for enrolment purposes.

- 2.2.6. The AEC has started examining a number of other forms of identity that might be suitable for enrolment purposes. In considering the suitability of alternative identification, the AEC would have regard to the means by which these forms of identity are created or maintained (in line with the National Identity Security Strategy) and the capacity to access relevant information to validate these forms of identity.
- 2.2.7. Forms of identity that the AEC considers worthy of consideration include Medicare card/number, Citizenship Certificate/number, and Proof of Age card. These forms of identity either cover much of the whole Australian population or fill in gaps left by other forms of identity for some part of the Australian population.
- 2.2.8. The AEC is aware of past criticism of the integrity of Medicare cards. However, ANAO's Performance Audit No. 27 of 2013-14 entitled *Integrity of Medicare Customer Data* concluded that Medicare's customer data is underpinned by unique reference numbers intended to identify individual customers, and that the reference numbers possessed a high degree of integrity. It is this reference number that the AEC would seek to have electors supply for EOI.
- 2.2.9. In 2012-13, more than 120 000 individuals were conferred with Australian citizenship of whom 80 000 enrolled to vote. A person does not become a citizen until they have attended a ceremony (conducted by local government authorities (local councils), local Immigration Department offices, and community groups) and received a Citizenship Certificate. The use of the Citizenship Certificate number as a form of EOI would make it easier for this group to enrol as soon as they become eligible.
- 2.2.10. The AEC is also examining Proof of Age cards as a further form of evidence of identity. The cards are issued by a range of state and territory bodies. In order to verify the cards, the AEC would need to negotiate separate arrangements with each body to verify the card information.
- 2.2.11. An attestation of the identity of a claimant operates as a further EOI option for enrolment, and particularly for individuals who do not have other forms of enrolment identification. There will continue to be a number of people who do not possess one of the verifiable forms of EOI specified by the Electoral Act, but who are nonetheless eligible and obligated to comply with the requirement to enrol. Having an attestation option available for this group will enable them to enrol and vote. However, attestation may not be available or appropriate in certain circumstances as potential attestors may be reluctant to provide their enrolled address – for instance in prisons – so

increasing the range of alternative forms of EOI such as Medicare card numbers or Citizenship Certificate numbers would assist in these situations.

2.3. Electoral Roll harmonisation

- 2.3.1. The Committee has raised concerns regarding divergence between the Federal and state and territory electoral Rolls, and how this can affect a voter's ability to understand their enrolment and voting obligations. The Committee has requested information concerning the means by which the AEC is addressing Roll divergence and what scope exists for co-operation with State and Territory Electoral Commissions without legislative change.

AEC Response

- 2.3.2. The causes of Roll divergence can be categorised into two types:
- divergence caused by differences in legislation regarding the qualifications and evidence required to enrol; and
 - divergence caused by differences in the process undertaken by the Commonwealth and State/Territory Electoral Commissions to enrol and maintain the currency of enrolment details.
- 2.3.3. Either type of divergence may result in an elector being enrolled for electoral events at one government level but not the other, or being enrolled at different addresses for different levels of government. There will always be Roll divergence while there are differences between Commonwealth, State and Territory and local government enrolment provisions.
- 2.3.4. The AEC has a joint Roll arrangement with each State and Territory Electoral Commission for the purposes of preparing, updating and revising rolls of voters for Commonwealth, state/territory and local government elections. The AEC works with State and Territory Electoral Commissions wherever possible to provide electors with a seamless service which maximises electors' enrolment for each jurisdiction for which they are entitled to enrol, while minimising Roll divergence.
- 2.3.5. The table below provides a high level perspective on current levels of alignment between the Commonwealth and the states and territories. In practice, the states and territories in the first two groups in Table 4 below are closely aligned with the Commonwealth law, while the States in the third group have some differences.

Table A4: Commonwealth enrolment as a basis for state/territory enrolment

State/Territory	Qualification
SA	States where electors who are on the Commonwealth Roll can be enrolled for state/territory purposes – that is, aligned jurisdictions where enrolment for Commonwealth purposes results in enrolment for state purposes.
Queensland, Tasmania, ACT, NT	States and territories where electors who are entitled to be on the Commonwealth Roll can be enrolled for state/territory purposes – that is, aligned jurisdictions where legislative and administrative requirements result in the same Commonwealth and state/territory enrolment outcomes.
NSW, Victoria, WA	States where specified categories of electors who are on the Commonwealth Roll can be enrolled for state purposes – that is, jurisdictions with legislation and/or administrative requirements (such as direct enrolment, or the need for a witness signature) which may result in differing Commonwealth and state enrolment outcomes.

AEC practices to address Roll divergence

- 2.3.6. In jurisdictions where electors are able to enrol to vote using a declaration vote envelope, these envelopes are approved by the Electoral Commissioner as an 'enrolment form' so that the envelope can serve the same dual purpose as an ordinary enrolment application.¹¹
- 2.3.7. The AEC also actively ensures that electors are able to enrol and maintain their enrolment through provision of the online enrolment service as well as widely available paper enrolment forms. In addition, special election-time messaging aims to remind electors to enrol or to check, and if necessary update, their enrolment details.
- 2.3.8. The AEC will continue to engage with electors and work with the State and Territory Electoral Commissions to minimise Roll divergence to the extent possible. However, without full legislative and administrative harmonisation, divergence will continue to be a challenge.

¹¹ Under p.98(2)(a) of the Electoral Act, a claim for enrolment or transfer for enrolment must be in an approved form. An approved form is one which has been approved by the Electoral Commissioner in writing and has been published by the Electoral Commissioner (s.4 of the Electoral Act).

3. Election Management

3.1. Postal Vote Certificate (PVC) privacy concerns

- 3.1.1. Paragraph 7.2.25 of the AEC's primary submission states that 'the AEC is engaging with service providers to investigate the possibility of alternate designs for postal vote applications (PVAs) and postal vote certificates (PVCs) that may alleviate community privacy concerns'. On page 3 of the Chair's 7 July 2014 letter, additional detail of the work currently underway to address PVC privacy concerns and any potential legislative change that may ameliorate this issue is requested.

AEC Response

- 3.1.2. Following the 2013 election the AEC is again reviewing, with the central print contractor and its own design team, a PVC design that protects an elector's details while it is in the postal system, that is unlikely to be damaged by Australia Post sorting machinery and that will not adversely impact on the preliminary scrutiny of PVCs that is required by Schedule 3 of the Electoral Act.
- 3.1.3. Schedule 3 of the Electoral Act assumes that the elector will return the ballot papers inside the PVC. As such, any ballot papers that are returned outside the PVC will be excluded from the scrutiny process. An approach trialled in 1998 to address elector concerns about privacy involved double enveloping; however, the trial resulted in a significant number of postal vote ballot papers being returned outside of the PVC but inside the second exterior envelope. These ballot papers were subsequently excluded from the scrutiny in accordance with the Act.
- 3.1.4. One possible solution under consideration proposes the incorporation of a privacy flap on the PVC. This is being developed as a proof of concept. The AEC will work with the contractor, Australia Post, and a test group of electors over the coming 12 months to mitigate the risk of the redesigned envelope not working as intended to protect the franchise. Legislative change would not be required for the redesigned envelope that is currently under consideration.

3.2. Polling place suitability and disabled person access

- 3.2.1. On page three of his letter, the Chair requested an outline of the process used for assessing [potential] polling places, issues identified from the 2013 election and solutions rectifying these issues in time for the next election. The letter also identified that a number of submissions to the Committee contained concerns about a lack of trained and/or capable staff to assist at polling places identified as having disabled person access (either partial or full).

AEC Response

Polling place suitability

- 3.2.2. The AEC's policy position is to hire premises with full access for disabled electors, where available, in preference to premises without disabled access.
- 3.2.3. Premises that are proposed for use as polling places in a general election are reviewed at least once in each electoral cycle by way of the AEC's polling place inspection program. All polling premises were physically inspected throughout 2012 and will again be physically inspected throughout 2015. A breakdown of polling places used at the 2013 federal election by level of accessibility is provided in Table A5.
- 3.2.4. All polling premises are rated against the [Disability \(Access to Premises - Buildings\) Standards 2010](#), using a nationally standard polling place inspection form. The inspection form was updated in 2011 to take account of the new disability access standards and remains current. The form enables an accurate accessibility assessment to be made of the polling place.
- 3.2.5. The updated standard contains a higher test for accessibility and applies to all new buildings.

Table A5: Accessibility breakdown of polling places at the 2013 federal election.

	Fully accessible	Accessible with assistance	Not accessible	Total
Australian Capital Territory	20	60	4	84
New South Wales	134	1 784	679	2 597
Northern Territory	2	41	2	45
Queensland	268	995	166	1 429
South Australia	180	370	83	633
Tasmania	5	240	63	308
Victoria	178	1 369	249	1 796
Western Australia	118	502	118	738
Total	905	5 361	1 364	7 630
	12%	70%	18%	

- 3.2.6. Disability groups have requested that additional information be available about the reasons for a premises being rated as accessible with assistance, to enable disabled electors to make a more informed decision about how and where to cast their vote. Modifications are underway within our election systems that will enable this information to be included on the AEC website at the next general election.
- 3.2.7. For the 2015 inspection program AEC staff have been asked to approach premises owners in cases where small modifications to a premises would allow a premises to be rated as fully accessible. For example, by opening up a staff car park for disabled electors where this is closer to the polling place entrance than the general parking facilities, a premises that may have been rated as not accessible in 2013 could be rated as accessible at the next election.

Polling staff training

- 3.2.8. Electors who experience difficulty in accessing a polling place may have voting materials brought outside the polling place to enable them to vote more easily. Prior to the 2013 election, a DVD was produced and provided to all polling staff to assist disabled persons to cast their votes. Scenes in the DVD depict assistance being provided to disabled electors, and an elector being assisted to vote outside the polling place.
- 3.2.9. In written training materials polling place staff are asked to be mindful of electors requiring assistance for any reason, and to offer assistance where appropriate. For example, included in the duties of certain polling officials is a requirement to identify electors who require assistance, assist them or refer them to an inquiry officer or the officer-in-charge of the polling place, and to escort elderly and frail electors to the head of the queue. Additionally, voter information officers are employed in some polling places specifically to engage with electors in the queue to determine if they require additional assistance and, if requested by the voter, to assist at any stage of the voting process. Issuing officers are asked to inform electors, before they are directed to an empty voting screen, that assistance is available if required.
- 3.2.10. Based on complaints received following the 2013 federal election and the 2014 WA half-Senate election, training and support materials will be reviewed and revised to clarify the level of assistance that can be provided to electors.

4. Workforce management

4.1. Learning and Development

4.1.1. The Committee seeks further detail about the AEC's learning and development framework, and specifically as to how the AEC aims to.

- Put into operation election training for permanent staff (mention made of the Election Ready Operational Capacity Development Program (EROCDP) at 12 March hearing, along with an undertaking for follow up information to be provided);
- Assess and harness the capability of permanent staff to skill up for election delivery; and
- Deliver better training outcomes for temporary polling officials.

AEC Response

4.1.2. In late 2013, the AEC initiated an assessment of the design, delivery and evaluation of learning programs across the AEC. A Learning and Development framework has been developed this year by external specialists in consultation with the AEC's internal learning and development team, and supported by a working party comprising AEC staff across all branches and states.

4.1.3. The AEC's revised Learning and Development framework is based on the following four reforms:

- a focus on performance coaching – to create a culture of performance through learning, performing and feedback;
- development of certification processes and competency-based assessment – to assess ability against key capabilities in order to be assigned to various roles;
- the adoption of key principles and shared frameworks for learning design – to create learning programs that are performance focussed and outcome driven, that use authentic contexts in which learners make realistic decisions and gain a sense of real world consequences; and a redefined role for the Learning and Development Team to create a centralised national training model.

4.1.4. Other work underway that will improve learning and development delivery include;

- purchase and implementation of a new Learning Management System to deliver training to employees and polling officials in more flexible and innovative ways;
- development of training programmes for ongoing staff that allow them the opportunity to develop and practice the capabilities

required to undertake election work using practical simulation exercises; and

- development of a simplified training approach for temporary and non-ongoing staff. This would involve a reduction in the amount of information supplied to temporary polling officials, a renewed focus on what the AEC requires them to be able to do and a greater level of on-the-job support and just-in-time training.

4.2. Permanent workforce composition

- 4.2.1. At pages 3 and 4 of the Chair's letter, the Committee requested a breakdown of the of the workforce utilised by the AEC at the 2013 election, excluding temporary polling officials; with emphasis on contractors and previous staff brought back into the employ of the AEC and the jobs undertaken. Furthermore, the Committee seeks information on how these staff transfer knowledge and skills to current staff.

AEC Response

- 4.2.2. At the 2013 election, the workforce, excluding temporary polling officials, is broken down in the following table:

Table A6: AEC Workforce by Category:

Category	Number
Ongoing	843
Non-Ongoing	94
Irregular and Intermittent	1 839
Total	2 776*

*An average was taken from staffing numbers at 30 August and 30 September 2013

- 4.2.3. The AEC sourced contractors from a variety of labour hire firms across the country. In addition, a total of 39 former AEC staff were re-employed by the AEC to assist with the 2013 federal election. The main tasks these staff assisted with were:

- the Close of Rolls, including enrolment processing,
- acting as Divisional Returning Officer or mentoring a person in this position,
- production of election ballot papers,
- declaration vote exchange and scrutinies,
- election management,

- post-election evaluation,
- postal voting services,
- House of Representative and Senate scrutiny,
- nomination checks and group voting tickets,
- election staff training – polling and operational, and
- election public relations.

4.2.4. These alumni transferred their knowledge and skills to current staff on a case-by-case basis through a variety of methods including:

- mentoring,
- coaching,
- on the job training,
- contributing to the creation and delivery of training, and
- participating in post-election evaluations.

4.2.5. Positions undertaken by supervised contract staff included:

- the Close of Rolls,
- declaration vote scrutiny,
- House of Representatives and Senate scrutiny,
- overseas declaration exchange,
- imaging enrolment forms,
- operating the Wizard Cell (Call Centre),
- postal voting services,
- quality assurance on the production of certified lists, and
- maintenance of enrolment and election systems.

5. Other issues

5.1. Performance measures and KPIs for DRO performance and election delivery

5.1.1. The Chair's letter requested an update concerning the actions the AEC is undertaking to develop National Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and standards that will allow the AEC and Parliament to measure performance against the national program directions for conduct of elections, as well as against legislative, policy and procedural requirements. Development of KPIs was the subject of a previous ANAO recommendation.

AEC Response

5.1.2. In seeking to respond to the ANAO recommendation, the AEC reviewed relevant reference materials including the system developed by the UK Electoral Commission, (noting a very different delivery model for elections in the UK compared to Australia) including standards adopted internationally, and in Australian state electoral jurisdictions.

- 5.1.3. The AEC has progressed work identifying critical tasks that must be completed and ways in which the competency of an employee, or potential employee, can be assessed prior to the role being undertaken.

A discussion paper was considered by State Managers in the lead up to the 2013 federal election but it recognised that further work was needed. Further development of any indicators will be assessed against the issues identified at the 2013 federal election, and experiences with the Division of Griffith by-election and the WA half-Senate election in 2014.

- 5.1.4. The AEC also notes that progress of the development of performance indicators is one topic under review as part of the current ANAO audit, the report of which may provide additional insights. The AEC will then seek to finalise a set of KPIs with a view to implementation prior to the next federal election.

5.2. Photographing of ballot papers

On page four of his letter, the Chair requested to know the outcome of the AEC's examination of scrutineers taking photographs of ballot papers at the 2013 federal election. This issue was flagged in the AEC's primary submission 20.3 that stated the issue would be examined following the WA half-Senate election.

AEC Response

- 5.2.1. Some issues were experienced at the 2013 election with scrutineers taking photographs of ballot papers. The AEC's primary submission noted that the protection of the secrecy of the vote is a fundamental tenet of Australian democracy.

Additionally, scrutineer appointment forms contain the following undertaking: '(vi) Not to use any image recording device (including cameras, video recorders and video enabled mobile phones) to record images of ballot papers or declaration envelopes, or any other images that might identify an elector and how they have voted, in a polling place or counting centre.'

- 5.2.2. Post-election reviews indicate that the issues experienced in 2013 were isolated. The AEC proposes below a technical amendment to the Electoral Act (*Technical Amendment 4*) to specifically prohibit the image recording of any ballot papers or declaration envelopes by a scrutineer.

5.3. Inconsistencies in the Electoral Act and other technical and minor amendments

- 5.3.1. On page four of the Chair's letter, it was noted that the AEC has proposed a number of technical amendments to the Electoral Act and the

Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (the 'Referendum Act') in the primary AEC submission. Furthermore, the Chair requested that the AEC inform the committee of any analysis that the AEC has undertaken on a wholesale review of the Electoral and Referendum Acts and consequential impacts this may have on other Commonwealth legislation.

Revision of legislation

AEC Response

- 5.3.2. As part of the inquiry into the 2001 election, the AEC recommended to the JSCEM that a major review of the Electoral Act was overdue and necessary to rectify the complexities and inconsistencies built up over the previous 20 years.¹² JSCEM had some concerns with the AEC's proposal (see page 210 of the Report). In May 2004, the AEC engaged the law firm Minter Ellison to scope a review of the Electoral Act. Minter Ellison undertook some work during 2004-05, which considered possible amendments to the Electoral Act to make the language more straightforward and accessible. The work undertaken by Minister Ellison did not eventuate into any comprehensive legislative proposal, although elements of the work were reflected in subsequent technical and minor amendments proposed by the AEC.
- 5.3.3. Other than the Referendum Act, the re-drafting proposed by Minter Ellison to the Electoral Act did not affect any other Commonwealth legislation. Since that time the AEC has actively sought to address inconsistencies and errors in the electoral legislation, and update provisions for matters such as changes in technology, by a series of technical and minor amendments to the Electoral Act and the Referendum Act. Since Minter Ellison's work, there has been no further analysis of a wholesale review of these Acts.
- 5.3.4. In September 2009, the then-Government issued the *Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia's Democracy* (the Green Paper). The Green Paper noted some issues with the Electoral Act but did not specifically address redrafting the Electoral Act and no comprehensive legislative proposal arose from the Paper.
- 5.3.5. Finally, in December 2009, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs recommended that the Australian Government consolidate and harmonise the machinery of referendums provisions with the Electoral Act.¹³ At page 68 of the Committee's report attention was drawn to the pitfalls of having separate

¹² Submission 147, *Inquiry into the 2001 Federal Election*, p. 5.

¹³ Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, *A Time for Change: Yes/No? – Inquiry into the Machinery of Referendums*, 2009, Recommendation 17.

legislation for the conduct of elections and the conduct of referendums. The amalgamation of the referendum provisions with the provisions in the Electoral Act would necessarily result in substantial amendments to the Electoral Act. In October 2012, the Government responded to the Report and supported recommendation 17. Drafting instructions to implement this recommendation remain in draft form.

Technical Amendments which the JSCEM may wish to consider are as follows:

Electoral Roll information and certified lists

Technical Amendment 1

5.3.6. The AEC recommends that section 90B of the Electoral Act, and any other relevant provisions, be amended to specifically require that persons who received electoral Roll information must destroy the information where the circumstances in which the Roll information was given no longer exists. In an effort to ensure the continuing integrity of the electoral Roll, the persons would also be required to provide a written undertaking attesting to the destruction of the Roll information.

5.3.7. The AEC presently requests that parties, organisations, prescribed authorities and candidates destroy Roll information within six months of receipt under section 90B. However, there is no requirement under the Electoral Act for Roll information provided under section 90B to be destroyed. In the absence of a statutory basis for seeking an undertaking from an entity or candidate, the AEC will have limited recourse through the courts should the Roll information not be destroyed within the requested time period.

Technical Amendment 2

5.3.8. The AEC recommends that section 208 of the Electoral Act be amended to provide that a certified list of voters for a Division must include the enrolled address of the elector for the Division, except for silent electors. This technical amendment is a direct response to the recommendations of the ANAO Audit Report No. 28 2009-2010, and seeks the amendment of section 208 to require the inclusion of an elector's address on the certified list so long as that elector is not a silent elector. This amendment will enable the issuing officer to verify the answer provided to the questions put to the voter under section 229(1)(b).

Scrutineers

Technical Amendment 3

5.3.9. The AEC recommends that the Electoral Act be amended to provide that a ballot paper shall *prima facie* be an authentic ballot paper if it bears

the official mark and the initials of a presiding officer or issuing officer as the case may be. This amendment would effect a change to the presumption of authenticity so that ballot papers bearing the official mark or the initials of the presiding officer or issuing officer will be considered authentic, unless evidence to the contrary is submitted by the objecting party. We are of the view that - by reversing the burden of proof - the scrutiny of formal ballot papers will be protected against frivolous and unfounded objections by scrutineers, which detract from the legitimate purpose of scrutiny which is to evince the clear intention of the voter.

Provisions relating to ballot papers

Technical Amendment 4

- 5.3.10. The AEC recommends that section 339 of the Electoral Act and any other relevant provisions be amended to specifically prohibit the image recording of any ballot papers or declaration envelopes by a scrutineer. Technical amendment 4 seeks to amend the Electoral Act to make it an offence for a scrutineer to use any image recording devices to capture images of ballot papers, including declaration votes, that might identify an elector and how they voted at a polling place or counting centre. The amendment is an extension of the existing requirement imposed on officers at section 271 and aims to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.

Technical Amendment 5

- 5.3.11. The AEC recommends that a technical amendment be made to section 232 of the Electoral Act to provide that the polling official must mark the certified list or an approved list prior to handing a ballot paper to an elector. Section 232 presently provides that the issuing officer must issue the ballot paper to the elector before marking the list. The amendment will help assure the integrity of the issuing process.

Nomenclature of polling officials

Technical Amendment 6

- 5.3.12. The AEC recommends that the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 be amended to substitute all references to presiding officers, deputy presiding officer and assistant presiding officers be replaced by the existing operational language of officer in charge (OIC), and second in charge (2IC). Technical amendment 6 is an extension of the review of administrative functions under the Electoral Act and seeks to amend all references to presiding officers, deputy presiding officers and assistant presiding officers. In an effort to ensure consistency, it is recommended that the above references be substituted for the existing language of officer in charge and second in charge.

Technical Amendment 7

- 5.3.13. The AEC recommends that the Electoral Act be amended to allow for the year of an election event to be clearly printed at the top of all House of Representatives ballot papers, as per the current requirement for Senate ballot papers. This amendment would eliminate inconsistency in the format between the Senate and House of Representative ballot papers. Currently, section 209 and Schedule 1, Form E require the year of an election to be listed on all Senate ballot papers. No such requirement exists for House of Representatives ballot papers.

Keelty Implementation Taskforce Recommendation Table

Provided as a separate attachment

Evaluation of implementation of new measures for the WA half-Senate election, including recommendations from the Keelty Report

Provided as a separate attachment

Photographs of ballot paper packages in storage



WA 2014 half-Senate election: Ballot paper packages, wrapped and palletised following the fresh scrutiny, ahead of transport and final storage at the warehouse.

Barriers to the universal deployment of Electronic Certified Lists

Contents

Executive Summary.....	32
Background	33
Business Benefits	33
Polling.....	33
Preliminary Scrutiny.....	34
Cost Implications.....	35
Future Deployment Options	36
Universal deployment.....	36
Deployments by polling type	36
Deployments for entire divisions.....	37
Table 1 – Estimated deployment costs	38
By-elections and preliminary scrutiny	38

Executive Summary

In the JSCEM hearing of 12 March 2014, the use of Electronic Certified Lists (ECL) for the 2013 federal election and 2014 Griffith by-election was raised with the AEC. The committee requested the AEC provide further advice concerning the barriers that may exist which limit a broader deployment of ECL's at subsequent electoral events.

AEC response

At the 2013 Federal Election, the AEC piloted a new Electronic Certified Lists (ECL) system. The overall objective of this pilot was to demonstrate that ECLs could be deployed and operated to the benefit of electors and the electoral system, proving that the people, processes and technology surrounding ECL's operated effectively across the pilot deployment.

To demonstrate this, 768 ECL's were deployed across all states and territories at a selection of pre-poll, mobile and static polling places and used for both ordinary and declaration issuing points.

At the 2014 Griffith by-election, 145 ECL's were then used at all ordinary issuing points and 230 ECL's were also used at the 2014 WA Senate election for all remote mobile polling, the majority of pre-poll voting and at the Perth Superbooth on polling day at ordinary and declaration issuing points.

The operation of the ECL process, dedicated mobile wireless network, laptop hardware and IT application was undertaken using a mixed sourcing model of vendors and internal AEC resources. While the actual operations of ECL devices was undertaken by AEC staff, the supply of the leased laptop hardware, loading of software and certified lists onto the laptops, their distribution and recovery was undertaken by specialist service providers under contract to the AEC. This contract was let following an approach to market for the pilot ECL project and resulted in a service cost of \$1,400 per ECL unit package.

Following the success of the ECL pilot project, the AEC is of the view that the ECL process and technology is scalable to a far broader deployment. However, this will require further development work, with a new approach to market required to achieve a reduction in ECL unit costs as under the pilot project pricing model, universal deployment to all issuing points at a federal election would cost in excess of \$60m using the pilot ECL pricing model.

Background

The design of the current ECL system has the electoral Roll loaded on each device so that although the device will always attempt to connect to the central Roll (via a wireless network connection), there is no interruption to the issuing of votes if for any reason there is no network connectivity. The system demonstrates flexibility as it is designed to operate across every type of polling (pre-poll, mobile, static) in Australia and can be set up to facilitate voting at ordinary or declaration issuing points or a combination of both (combination of both is currently used for mobile polling only). ECLs are also able to be connected to a printer and print House of Representatives ballot papers where there is a need to print large numbers of different House of Representatives ballot papers, such as at pre-poll voting centres and declaration vote issuing points where absent voting is available for all divisions in a state. In these cases the ECL selects and prints the correct ballot paper for each elector.

The ECL system was piloted at the 2013 federal election with a deployment of 768 ECLs across all states and territories at a selection of pre-poll, mobile and static polling places and used at both ordinary and declaration issuing points. ECLs were then also used at the 2014 Griffith By-election at all ordinary issuing points and also at the 2014 WA half-Senate election for all remote mobile polling, the majority of pre-poll voting and at the Perth Superbooth on polling day at ordinary and declaration issuing points. ECLs were also used in all three events by divisions to support the preliminary scrutiny of absent and pre-poll declaration votes after election day.

Business Benefits

The ECL system has been proven as a robust system and the evaluation of the pilot and subsequent use at the Griffith By-election and 2014 WA half-Senate election has shown it has delivered on the electoral business benefits the ECL project set out to achieve.

Polling

The business benefits of using ECLs rather than paper certified lists during polling include:

- Reduction in the number of apparent multiple marks due to the electronic mark off to a central Roll (when devices are connected).
- More accurate mark off of ordinary votes (easier to use an electronic list than a paper list).
- More accurate division identification during declaration voting (the ability to search for an elector electronically in the state/territory or national Roll rather than looking up an address in the hard copy division finder).
- Recording that a declaration vote has been issued which assists post-election processing.

- Ability for AEC officers to monitor polling (number of votes issued, ballot paper usage, queue times) in real time (when devices are connected).
- Improved voter flow.
- Removing the need to scan paper certified lists (which also eliminates errors that can happen during the scanning process).
- Deliver a contemporary polling process in-line with state/territory electoral authorities.

Pre-Poll ECL usage also has the added benefits of:

- Being able to monitor voting activity over the entire pre-poll period which enables better management of pre-poll voting centres and better preparation for scrutiny of pre-poll votes.
- Search of national Roll and printing of ballot papers on demand rather than holding pre-printed stocks of ballot papers for all 150 divisions.

Mobile ECL usage also has the added benefits of:

- Being able to monitor voting activity over the entire mobile polling period which enables better management of mobile teams and better preparation for scrutiny of mobile polling votes.
- Combined issuing of ordinary and declaration votes from one issuing point is supported, providing greater flexibility for staff issuing votes.
- Ability to search for electors within a locality or habitation, such as a hospital or remote community, which provides assistance where voters may have difficulty providing their full enrolment details.

Deployments' encompassing all types of polling across an entire division has the added benefits of:

- Reducing the number of erroneous multiple marks caused by polling official error.
- Significantly reducing the ability to lodge more than one ordinary vote (provided the ECLs have a network connection).
- Simplifies back-end processing as there are no paper lists to scan for the division.

Preliminary Scrutiny

The benefits of using ECLs rather than paper certified lists for the preliminary scrutiny of pre-poll and absent declaration votes include:

- Increased productivity rates for the preliminary scrutiny of pre-poll and absent declaration votes.
- Ability to monitor each pre-poll and absent declaration envelope through the ECL system providing better audit trails and management information.

Cost Implications

ECLs are very costly compared to paper certified lists. The current average cost to deploy an ECL is \$1 400 compared to an average of \$50 to deploy a certified list. The average cost of \$1 400 to deploy an ECL includes the leased hardware costs and associated managed services (configuration, storage, deployment and sanitisation). The \$50 to deploy a paper certified list comprises \$20 to print and distribute the list and \$30 to scan the list post-election.

It is expected that the current technical solution put in place for the pilot could support up to 1 000 devices without any major review or changes. A deployment of more than 1 000 devices would trigger a review of the solution to confirm that scaling could be achieved which may result in additional costs and the need to source additional funding.

If future deployments were in excess of 5 000 devices, the current ECL solution would need further evolution to scaling the ECL's including addressing the following issues:

- Sourcing of appropriate IT hardware for a large number of ECL devices to be used for only a short period of time. Unknown election dates also means additional costs in maintaining election readiness well in advance of the actual election.
- The cost per ECL unit would need to be investigated with a view to reducing the overall costs per unit (current ECL devices are deployed on a standard laptop).
- Supporting the logistics and management of a larger deployment such as a higher level integration with internal systems, improvements to the management portal component, larger volume tracking and security requirements and overcoming tight time barriers in deployment.
- Further improvements to the solution to increase the return on investment including potentially leveraging the ECL system to improve elector service and polling place management.

A new phase of the ECL project would be required to address the above items to ensure the successful implementation of the pilot could be replicated in a much larger deployment. The new project would have to commence as soon as possible in the 2014-2015 financial year for viable processes to be implemented at a 2016 federal election. Approximate resource implications of a further project would depend on the scope (the size and type of deployment being planned for) but may be comparable to the initial ECL project which included costs for project support, business process input and IT development and testing as well as the creation of support materials at a cost of \$3.33m. The provision of ECLs is not currently built into the agreed base election funding amount. Productivity savings from ECL usage in preliminary scrutiny would enable the AEC for future events to deploy up to 1 000 devices under current funding arrangements. Future deployments in excess of 1 000

devices would involve a proposal for additional election funding for deployment costs.

Future Deployment Options

The evaluation currently being conducted by the AEC on the introduction of ECLs has found that AEC staff, polling officials, and voters have seen ECLs as a significant improvement to the electoral process and the majority of stakeholders would like to see them deployed as widely as possible.

Universal deployment

A universal deployment to all polling places and mobile teams in Australia is estimated to cost \$66m (\$63m for the deployment costs and \$3.33m for the project costs) to deploy an estimated 45 000 ECL devices to all ordinary and declaration vote issuing points. There would be a savings offset of \$1.35m as paper lists would not be scanned.

It should be noted that for a universal deployment there may be locations where ECL devices cannot always make a connection back to the network and the following two benefits may not be fully realised in these circumstances.

- Reduction in the number of apparent multiple marks due to the electronic mark off to a central Roll (**when devices are connected**).
- Ability for AEC officers to monitor polling (number of votes issued, ballot paper usage, queue times) in real time (**when devices are connected**).

In addition to a universal deployment, the AEC notes there are alternative deployment options that also achieve significant business benefits.

Deployments by polling type

Deployments by polling type achieve the additional business benefits of:

For Pre-Polls:

- Being able to monitor voting activity over the entire pre-poll period which enables better management of pre-poll voting centres and better preparation for scrutiny of pre-poll votes.
- Search of national Roll and printing of ballot papers on demand rather than holding pre-printed stocks of ballot papers for all 150 divisions.

For Mobiles:

- Being able to monitor voting activity over the entire mobile polling period which enables better management of mobile teams and better preparation for scrutiny of mobile polling votes.
- Combined issuing of ordinary and declaration votes from one issuing point is supported, providing greater flexibility for staff issuing votes.

- Ability to search for electors within a locality or habitation, such as a hospital or remote community, which provides assistance where voters may have difficulty providing their full enrolment details.

To facilitate either or both of the above deployments the following number of devices would be required:

1. Deployment to all mobile polling teams (ordinary and declaration issuing), estimated to need 1 512 ECL devices at a deployment cost of \$2.1m.¹⁴
2. Deployment to all pre-poll voting centres (ordinary and declaration issuing), estimated to need 5 250 ECL devices at a deployment and project cost of \$10.6m.
3. Deployment to all mobile polling teams and pre-poll voting centres (ordinary and declaration issuing), estimated to need 6 762 ECL devices at a deployment and project cost of \$12.8m.

Deployments for entire divisions

Deployments for entire divisions achieve the additional business benefits of:

- Reducing the number of erroneous multiple marks caused by polling official error.
- Significantly reducing the ability to lodge more than one ordinary vote (provided the ECLs have a network connection).
- Simplifies back-end processing as there are no paper lists to scan for the division.

The average number of ordinary and declaration vote issuing points for a division is 300, so this is the approximate number of devices required for a full divisional deployment. Therefore it is estimated it would cost \$420 000 per division to deploy ECLs. Deployments to more than 3 divisions (estimated to be over 1 000 devices) would trigger a review of the current technical solution which may result in additional costs and the need to source additional funding. For roll-outs to more than 16 divisions (estimated to be over 5 000 devices) the estimated associated project cost of \$3.33m would apply.

Full division deployments are most appropriate for metro divisions (due to the expected high level of connectivity) and divisions with higher levels of apparent multiple marks and polling official error. The following table gives an indication of the likely costs for the deployment of ECLs for the deployment options discussed above.

¹⁴ A deployment of more than 1 000 devices would trigger a review of the technical solution, which may result in additional costs and the need to source additional funding.

Table 1 – Estimated deployment costs based on the ECL pilot pricing model

Deployment Type - Federal Election (including ordinary and declaration issuing points)	Estimated Number of ECLs Needed ¹⁵	Estimated Cost	Estimated Savings for not having to scan paper lists ¹⁶
Full deployment of ECLs to a single division	300	\$420 000	\$9 000
ECLs for all mobile teams	1 512 ¹⁷	\$2 116 800	\$45 360
ECLs for all pre-poll voting centres	5 250	\$10 680 000	\$157 500
ECLs for all pre-poll voting centres and mobile teams	6 762	\$12 796 800	\$202 860
Full deployment of ECLs to 25 divisions	7 500	\$13 830 000	\$225 000
Full deployment of ECLs to 50 divisions	15 000	\$24 330 000	\$450 000
Full deployment of ECLs to 75 divisions	22 500	\$34 830 000	\$675 000
Full deployment of ECLs to 100 divisions	30 000	\$45 330 000	\$900 000
Full deployment of ECLs to all divisions (150)	45 000	\$66 330 000	\$1 350 000

By-elections and preliminary scrutiny

The AEC is maintaining readiness for full ECL roll-outs for all future by-election events, should funding at the time be approved for the deployment.

The AEC is also maintaining readiness for full ECL roll-outs for all future events for the preliminary scrutiny of pre-poll and absent declaration votes post-election day. The current allocation to AEC divisions for this process is four ECL devices per division, meaning a total of 600 ECL devices are required (the devices used for preliminary scrutiny are usually reused from devices that have already been used for polling).

¹⁵ Where the number of ECLs needed is in excess of 5 000 devices the project cost of \$3.33m has been included in the estimated costs.

¹⁶ Currently paper certified lists are still printed for ECL polling places for redundancy purposes so estimated savings are only based on not scanning the lists.

¹⁷ A deployment of more than 1 000 devices would trigger a review of the technical solution which may result in additional costs and the need to source additional funding.

As at 22 July 2014

Rec #	Recommendation	Contributors (other than KIT)	Proposed long-term outcome	Griffith	WA	Current Activities	Next steps
Logistics/Material management							
1	The AEC undertakes quality assurance and benchmarking of material management systems against national and international industry logistics standards, including other electoral authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• GRA consultants (Scoping Study team)• State Managers (liaising with state electoral bodies in conjunction with KIT)	Practices benchmarked against international and state electoral authorities, as well as leading logistics industry suppliers	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• AEC officials held meetings with State electoral bodies in NSW, QLD and Tasmania; meetings and visits with industry have taken place with leading industry suppliers.• Initiatives trialled for the Griffith By-election are detailed at recommendations 2, 3 and 4.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• AEC officials liaised with State electoral bodies in NSW, QLD, Tasmania, Victoria, WA and NT (and were in attendance at SA and Tas state elections on 15 march) and industry. This is a national initiative and implementation is underway.• Initiatives that were trialled for the Griffith By-election were evaluated and adjusted for implementation for the WA Senate election. These initiatives are detailed at recommendations 2,3 and 4.• Improved logistics options built into Toll transport contract for 2014 WA Senate election (use of consignment notes - enabling tracking - for all ballot paper packages transported by Toll).	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner.• New material management initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders.• Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• GRA consultants 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' is complete and initial report has been submitted. It is currently being considered by the Acting Electoral Commissioner.• Briefing and ongoing liaison with ECANZ scheduled for September 2014.• Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable.
2	<div>The AEC develops and applies national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's active existence (election, scrutiny, warehousing, transfers), including:<ul style="list-style-type: none">- the application of national standards for the parcelling, and movement of components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets)- the tracking of components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets)- the use of detailed, trackable and accountable inventories to account for components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) at any point in time- the creation, maintenance and retention of transfer records including, as a minimum, accurate consignment notes- the secure packaging of boxes onto pallets at premises prior to shipment (whether by shrinkwrapping or use of other technology)- the counterchecking and countersigning of the number of components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) as an additional assurance measure at critical points in the cycle of transmission- the segregation of used ballots, unused ballots, and other material identified for disposal at all times, including at count and recount centres, at fresh scrutiny centres and at warehouses.</div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• GRA consultants (Scoping study team)• Various sections, Elections Branch<ul style="list-style-type: none">• ICE KIT• Commercial Law and Procurement Section - Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Contracts & Financial Management Working Party• Warehousing team	National and state material management policies and procedures and minimum standards, including relevant forms, materials, labels etc, for application at all stages of a ballot papers' life cycle	<p>Specific components implemented for the Griffith by-election, included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• enhanced documentation and tracking of movements of ballot papers at all stages of the life cycle (and pressure points in that life cycle);• review of documentation of roles throughout the life of the ballot paper cycle;• interim role descriptions developed where necessary, including in relation to materials management and transport;• allocation of those role descriptions to individuals;• implementation of interim guidance around the transport of ballot papers by people who are not logistics professionals;• improved material handling processes and procedures, including more comprehensive labelling, a trial of tamper-evident materials and packaging, and formalising procedures regarding rubbish and recycling disposal;• new ballot paper security directions and acknowledgement to alert polling staff to their obligations around ballot paper security; and• additions to training of polling place staff;• interim guidance regarding the packaging and packing of parcels of ballot papers from polling places through to long term storage (including the use of fresh boxes after fresh scrutiny). <p>Further measures on ballot paper security, such as ballot secure zones and revised guidance on overnight storage of ballots, is outlined at recommendations 9-12, 20, 25 and 27.</p>	<p>Specific components being implemented for the WA Senate election include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• further enhanced documentation and tracking of movements of ballot papers at all stages of the life cycle (and pressure points in that life cycle), including roll-out of forms that demonstrate chain of custody throughout the life of ballot papers;• continuing review of documentation of roles throughout the life of the ballot paper cycle;• interim role descriptions developed where necessary, including in relation to materials management and transport;• allocation of those role descriptions to individuals;• compilation of a document explaining logistics procedures, including step-by-step instructions, for use by operational staff;• guidance issued to OICs regarding secure transport and storage of ballot papers - this will include not storing ballot papers in cars and the use of tamper-evident labels on ballot papers issued to OICs ahead of polling;• improved material handling processes and procedures, including more comprehensive and enhanced labelling, enhanced tamper-evident labels;• further enhanced procedures for the disposal of rubbish and recycling (see recommendation 5 for more detailed information);• new ballot paper security directions and acknowledgement to alert polling staff to their obligations around ballot paper security; the implementation of a similar direction & acknowledgement to be signed by all non-polling staff;• further additions to training of polling place staff including a dedicated Keelty implementation module in face-to-face polling official training; improved messaging around ballot paper security in online training; and the provision of hard copy and email messaging around improved ballot paper security;• improved guidance regarding the parcelling and packaging of ballot papers from polling places and greater rigour around the reconciliation of materials receipt on polling weekend;• the provision of new materials for packing and securing materials including better quality plastic bags, labels and boxes;• documentation of ballot paper movements and the chain of custody at every point from production until they are placed in long term storage; transport contractors will be required to complete consignment documentation for each transfer (this will include the implementation of the Toll Online system where it is available);• secure movement of unused ballot papers from printer to divisions via sealed and secured cages;• development of unique tracking sheet for airport PPVCs;• countersigning of components at packaging point prior to transport as a measure to confirm contents are correct and packaged securely in accordance with revised instructions;• utilisation of consignment notes on all packages containing ballot papers;• procurement of improved packaging and labelling materials for housing Senate ballot papers following fresh scrutiny process ahead of final storage;• complete revision and rewrite of project plan for transport of ballot paper packages to final storage to enable improved packaging, strapping, shrink-wrapping, consignment noting and labelling. Associated instructional procedure document developed and distributed to all relevant parties. <p>Further measures on ballot paper security, such as ballot secure zones and revised guidance on overnight storage of ballots, is outlined at recommendations 9-12, 20, 25 and 27.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new material management initiatives.• Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new material management initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies.• New material management initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders.• Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised.• Arrangements made to TRIM file all tracking documentation from the Griffith By-election and Western Australian Senate election.• Examination of surveys compiled by Divisional Materials Managers in WA to determine possible improvements to new materials management initiatives.• Creation of improved forms for use by Industrial and Commerical Elections (currently undergoing review with a view to national roll out).• Initial meeting held with Elections Branch to discuss plan for absorption of reviewed products, policies and procedures into national documentation.• GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner.• Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keelty report and the wider reform agenda.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events.• ICEKIT undertaking implementation in relation to industrial and commercial elections.• KIT (now the Reform Team) to liaise with Elections Branch to determine which products, policies and procedures are ready for absorption into national documentation.• Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch to review key contracts from 2014 WA Senate election to assist in informing transport contract template.• Warehousing team (see recommendation 19) to liaise with KIT (now the Reform Team) regarding implementation of rubbish and recycling process at all warehouses nationally.• GRA consultants 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' is complete and initial report has been submitted. It is currently being considered by the Acting Electoral Commissioner.• Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable.• Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.
3	The AEC introduces, where practical, systems that minimise the movement of ballot papers. This may include consideration of centralised processing options including the use of relevant technologies such as the scanning of ballot papers.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• GRA consultants (Scoping Study Team)• Information Technology Branch	National and state material management policies and procedures and minimum standards, including relevant forms, materials, labels etc, for application at all stages of a ballot papers' life cycle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Use of larger premises to undertake the majority of post-election activities (in terms of ballot papers) and thereby avoid unnecessary movement of ballot material (in accordance with interim 'minimum standards and operational guidelines for out-posted centres').• Site safe used to secure ballot material in one PPVC rather than moving between locations for storage.• State management approved materials management plans developed to adhere to Keelty recommendations.• Scanning of ballot papers not achievable in the time frame.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Procurement of out-posted centres based on enhanced 'minimum standards and operational guidelines for out-posted centres' enabling divisions to undertake the majority of post-election activities (in terms of ballot papers) in one place, thereby avoiding unnecessary movement of ballot material.• Utilisation of a checklist to assist in procurement of suitable out-posted centres (used in conjunction with existing checklist).• Procurement of PPVCs based on preference for secure building with a lockable space in which ballot papers can be securely stored, thereby negating the need to move ballot material to another location for secure storage.• Review of materials management plans underway to ensure adherence to Keelty recommendations and ballot paper principles.• Implementation of a direct declaration vote exchange between divisions in WA, rather than a central exchange.• Direct despatch of ballot papers via Toll consignment to interstate PPVCs rather than via State Offices.• All ballot paper parcels / packages stored securely in out-posted centres in sealable cages; fresh scrutiny and preparation for final storage undertaken in out-posted centres thus mitigating the need to move ballot papers between locations.• Final packaging and transport plan successfully executed. All ballot paper packages confirmed received in WA storage facility and the exact location of ballot papers for each polling place recorded on the final storage record.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new material management initiatives.• Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new material management initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies.• Examination of surveys compiled by Divisional Materials Managers in WA to determine possible improvements to new materials management initiatives.• Creation of improved forms for use by Industrial and Commerical Elections (currently undergoing review with a view to national roll out).• Initial meeting held with Elections Branch to discuss plan for absorption of reviewed products, policies and procedures into national documentation.• GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner.• New material management initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders.• Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events.• KIT (now the Reform Team) to explore additional processing options such as scanning of ballot papers that would minimise movement of ballot papers.• The Reform Team to review declaration exchange policy / process to work towards reduced movement and improved rigour around that movement.• GRA consultants 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' is complete and initial report has been submitted. It is currently being considered by the Acting Electoral Commissioner.

Rec #	Recommendation	Contributors (other than KIT)	Proposed long-term outcome	Griffith	WA	Current Activities	Next steps
4	The AEC institutes controls around the movement of ballot papers acknowledging that some individuals will not be logistics 'professionals'; these controls should include guidelines regarding transportation of ballot papers in private vehicles and storage at non-AEC premises.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GRA consultants (Scoping Study Team) • Commercial Law and Procurement Section - Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch • Contracts & Financial Management Working Party • ASA, Finance and Business Services Branch • Election Policy and Procedures Section, Elections Branch 	National and state material management policies and procedures and minimum standards, including relevant forms, materials, labels etc, for application at all stages of a ballot papers' life cycle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of sealed, plastic moulded ballot boxes for transport of ballot papers to and from polling place officers in charge. • Use of tamper-evident labels on ballot paper parcels. • Development of 'guidance for the establishment of ballot secure zones' providing staff with definition of secure zone and examples on how and when to establish a zone. • Messaging via face-to-face training, hardcopy and email to staff on importance of ballot paper security. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of improved tamper-evident labels on ballot paper parcels and packages, including when issuing ballot papers to OICs ahead of polling. • Improved documentation around 'ballot secure zone guidance'; examples provided to operational staff in training; signage and materials provided to assist in the establishment of ballot secure zones. • Enhanced guidance provided around the storage of ballot papers in vehicles. • Documentation of ballot paper movements and the chain of custody at every point from production until they are placed in long term storage; transport contractors required to complete consignment documentation for each transfer (this includes the implementation of the Toll Online system where it is available). • Messaging via face-to-face training, hardcopy and email to staff on importance of ballot paper security - this includes developing a poster on ballot paper principles and mandating its display across all AEC offices and off-site premises. • Review of existing materials management plans to ensure consistency with Keelty recommendations. • Development and provision of 'ballot paper management guide' to polling place Officers in Charge and Team Leaders containing information on transport, storage and packaging of ballot papers while in their possession. • Compilation of a document explaining logistics procedures for use by operational staff containing step-by-step instructions. • Comprehensive procedural document developed for preparation and transport of ballot paper packages for final storage. • Final packaging and transport plan successfully executed. All ballot paper packages confirmed received in WA storage facility and the exact location of ballot papers for each polling place recorded on the final storage record. Positive feedback received from staff regarding utilisation of clear and detailed process document with illustrations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new material management initiatives. • Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new material management initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. • Examination of surveys compiled by Divisional Materials Managers in WA to determine possible improvements to new materials management initiatives. • Creation of improved forms for use by Industrial and Commercial Elections (currently undergoing review with a view to national roll out). • Initial meeting held with Elections Branch to discuss plan for absorption of reviewed products, policies and procedures into national documentation. • GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner. • New material management initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. • Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. • Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keelty report and the wider reform agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. • GRA consultants 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' is complete and initial report has been submitted. It is currently being considered by the Acting Electoral Commissioner. • Review ballot paper movement facilitated by Elections Branch, particularly APVIS, overseas voting and BLV. KIT to undertake in conjunction with EB. • Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable. • Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.
5	The AEC introduces a process for disposal of recycling or rubbish which ensures that no ballot material is inadvertently lost or destroyed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Property Team, Finance and Business Services Branch • Warehousing team 	A comprehensive suite of documents detailing the policy and procedures for the disposal of rubbish and recycling and certifying that no ballot paper or other 'accountable document' is destroyed other than inline with statutory requirements.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of a more detailed draft rubbish and recycling policy, including guidelines on when types of rubbish can be disposed of, documentation to record disposal of rubbish colour-coding different types of waste and reviewing associated guidelines. • Instruction ordered to all divisional offices to consult with cleaning contractors to discuss rubbish removal during election period. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancement of new 'rubbish and recycling process guide' to provide briefing documentation for staff and scrutineers around how to use bins in out-posted centres; colour coded bin liners; waste area posters; and layout maps for staff to assist in suitable bin placement. • Segregation of food/household waste, clean waste and recycling. All waste must be approved for disposal on new form. Clean waste and recycling must be retained for duration of election until disposal authority issued by AEO. • Training provided to DROs to explain new procedures. • Instruction ordered to all divisional offices to consult with cleaning contractor to discuss rubbish removal during election period. • Secure destruction arranged for sensitive and branded waste material as appropriate. • Interim measures implemented in Welshpool warehouse (segregation and labelling of waste areas). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. • Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new material management initiatives. • Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new material management initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. • Examination of surveys compiled by Divisional Materials Managers in WA to determine possible improvements to new materials management initiatives. • New material management initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. • Initial meeting held with Elections Branch to discuss plan for absorption of reviewed products, policies and procedures into national documentation. • Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keelty report and the wider reform agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. • KIT (now the Reform Team) to liaise with NPT to expand rubbish & recycling process guide across Divs, S/Os and N/O. Ensure cleaning contracts are addressed. • The Reform Team to liaise with warehousing team to expand rubbish & recycling guide across warehouses. • Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable. • Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.
Contract management							
6	The AEC ensures that staff have developed skills in contract management, including contract enforcement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commercial Law and Procurement Section - Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch • Recruitment, Learning and Workforce Planning Section, People Services Branch 	Regular and ongoing quality assurance of contracts and contract enforcement. Recommendations to be made for long term implementation, including best practice enforcement and quality assurance, training and skill development, process and reporting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is a national initiative and implementation is underway. • Contracts relating to the division of Griffith were reviewed ahead of the Griffith by-election. • Selected contractors were asked to complete a deed of confidentiality, including a declaration of political neutrality, as an extra assurance. Guidelines were issued to all AEC staff regarding instructions to contract cleaners during any election period. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contracts relating to WA were subjected to a high level review by staff from the Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch ahead of the WA Senate election. Relevant contractors were asked to complete a deed of confidentiality, including a declaration of political neutrality, as an extra assurance. • The Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch are working with the WA State Office to ensure improved rigour around management and enforcement of contracts. • Staff from the Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch have been, and will continue to be, consulted on an ongoing basis. • Development and roll-out of face-to-face procurement and contract management training. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. • Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new material management initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. • Initial meeting held with Elections Branch to discuss plan for absorption of reviewed products, policies and procedures into national documentation. • Procurement and contract management training has been undertaken by selected National, State and Divisional Office staff. • New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. • Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. • Extension of procurement and contract management training. • Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable.
7	The AEC conducts regular quality assurance to ensure contract suppliers are meeting their obligations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commercial Law and Procurement Section - Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch • Recruitment, Learning and Workforce Planning Section, People Services Branch • State Managers and Branch Heads 	Regular and ongoing quality assurance of contracts and contract enforcement. Recommendations to be made for long term implementation, including best practice enforcement and quality assurance, training and skill development, process and reporting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is a national initiative and implementation is underway. • Contracts relating to the division of Griffith were reviewed ahead of the Griffith by-election. • Selected contractors were asked to complete a deed of confidentiality, including a declaration of political neutrality, as an extra assurance. • Guidelines were issued to all AEC staff regarding instructions to contract cleaners during any election period. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contracts relating to WA were subjected to a high level review by staff from the Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch ahead of the WA Senate election. Relevant contractors were asked to complete a deed of confidentiality, including a declaration of political neutrality, as an extra assurance. • The Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch are working with the WA State Office to ensure improved rigour around management and enforcement of contracts. • Staff from the Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch have been, and will continue to be, consulted on an ongoing basis. • Improved communication implemented with Toll - including assigning a dedicated AEC contract liaison officer and project manager. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. • New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. • Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. • Procurement and contract management training has been undertaken by selected National, State and Divisional Office staff. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guidance documentation developed to enable relevant parties to undertake contract QA. • Extension of procurement and contract management training. • Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable.
8	The AEC conducts regular market research and testing to ensure that contract suppliers for material management are utilising industry best practice.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GRA consultants (Scoping Study team) • State Managers (liaising with state electoral bodies in conjunction with KIT) 	Regular and ongoing quality assurance (Recommendation 7) to also include regular market research and testing.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is a national initiative and implementation is underway. • Initiatives trialled regarding the movement and storage of ballot papers. See recommendations 2, 3 and 4. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meetings to undertake benchmarking and market research undertaken with a variety of major industry providers. • Initiatives against recommendations 2, 3 and 4 provide more detail about new initiatives that draw on industry best practice. • GRA consultants in attendance in WA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GRA consultants 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' is complete and initial report has been submitted. It is currently being considered by the Acting Electoral Commissioner.
Ballot paper security							

Rec #	Recommendation	Contributors (other than KIT)	Proposed long-term outcome	Griffith	WA	Current Activities	Next steps
9	The AEC institutes a culture of security in ballot handling through developing a concept of ballots being 'live' until they are destroyed in line with statutory obligations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Various sections, Elections Branch IT Internal Communications, Education and Communications Branch 	The development and publication of underpinning 'ballot paper principles' in relation to the security and safety of ballot papers, which are to be displayed in all AEC offices and included in polling official training manuals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of ballot paper principles and the roll-out across the agency of a poster displaying the principles. Messaging of these principles has occurred via email from the Acting EC, via State Managers and via the intranet. Improved processes for storage and transport of ballot papers. Restricting access to the ballot paper images that allow other divisional offices to print the ballot paper for voting outside of the Division, and regular scanning of all internal computer drives for electronic versions of ballot papers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development and mandated display of ballot paper principles posters in all AEC offices and out-posted centres in WA and in offices across the country. WA staff have been briefed by the Keely Implementation Team on four occasions (two briefings on new measures and two operational training sessions), ballot paper handling principles have been central to these sessions. Establishment of ballot paper secure zones in all offices and AEC premises (including off-site premises). All polling staff undertaking face-to-face training signed the 'ballot paper security direction and acknowledgement' to confirm they understand the importance of mandated ballot paper principles. All non-polling staff signed the 'ballot paper security direction and acknowledgement' to confirm they understand the importance of mandated ballot paper principles. Development and provision of 'ballot paper management guide' to polling place Officers in Charge and Team Leaders containing information on transport, storage and packaging of ballot papers while in their possession. Final packaging and transport plan successfully executed. All ballot paper packages confirmed received in WA storage facility and the exact location of ballot papers for each polling place recorded on the final storage record. Further improvements to the storage and transport of ballot papers, as outlined in Recommendations 2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner. Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keely report and the wider reform agenda. Managers Forums entitled 'Looking to the Future' held for all election managers and operations managers in Sydney and Melbourne June 2014. These forums reinforced to all staff the need to refocus on integrity and compliance, and the need to ensure full, consistent adherence to national policies and procedures. It also flagged continued change and reform following receipt of reports from internal and external auditors. Information forum held in Canberra in June 2014 to share a similar change and compliance message for all National Office staff. Operations Managers in all states are finalising visits to all offices to undertake a 'culture check' utilising a purpose built script and checklist. An Operational Reform Team has been officially integrated into the agency structure. The team will be focussed on the implementation of recommendations accepted by the AEC in reports by relevant auditors; planning frameworks; cultural change; compliance and auditing. Foundation members are drawn from the Keely Implementation Team and are therefore familiar with the change imperative. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. Absorption of ballot paper principles messaging across policies and procedures. Wider publication of ballot paper principles messaging (on desktops, signature blocks etc.). This message will also continue to be built into formal and informal messaging from the leadership team, including emails and intranet columns from the acting Commissioner and other executives. Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable. Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.
10	The AEC institutes a concept of 'ballot secure zones' at all premises where 'live' ballot papers are handled or stored (including fresh scrutiny centres and non-AEC premises).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Property Team, Finance and Business Services Branch Warehousing team ASA, Finance and Business Services Branch Various sections, Elections Branch Recruitment, Learning and Workforce Planning Section, People Services Branch 	The development and publication of underpinning 'ballot paper principles' in relation to the security and safety of ballot papers, which are to be displayed in all AEC offices and included in polling official training manuals; and consistent and clear policy around what constitutes a ballot secure zone in particular contexts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formalisation and improved rigour of the establishment and maintenance of 'ballot secure zones' in premises where ballot papers are being handled or stored. Improving security measures around the access of contractors and visitors to AEC sites and restrictions on accessing ballot secure zones. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved documentation around 'ballot secure zone guidance'; examples provided to operational staff in training; signage and materials provided to assist in the establishment of ballot secure zones. Procurement of PPVCs based on preference for secure building with a lockable space in which ballot papers can be securely stored, thereby negating the need to move ballot material to another location for secure storage. Procurement of out-posted centres based on enhanced 'minimum standards and operational guidelines for out-posted centres' containing a space that would facilitate the establishment of a ballot secure zone. Utilisation of a checklist to assist in procurement of suitable out-posted centres (used in conjunction with existing checklist). The provision of secure cages to act as ballot secure zones within lockable out-posted centres in the absence of a lockable internal room suitable for use as a ballot secure zone. Development and provision of 'ballot paper management guide' to polling place Officers in Charge and Team Leaders containing information on transport, storage and packaging of ballot papers while in their possession. Enhanced instruction for DROs to give to OICs around the establishment of ballot secure zones in polling places. Review by National Property and States of security standards of ballot secure zones in Divisional offices, State offices and National office; subsequent replacement of locks in some areas. Final packaging and transport plan successfully executed. All ballot paper packages confirmed received in WA storage facility and the exact location of ballot papers for each polling place recorded on the final storage record. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keely report and the wider reform agenda. Managers Forums entitled 'Looking to the Future' held for all election managers and operations managers in Sydney and Melbourne June 2014. These forums reinforced to all staff the need to refocus on integrity and compliance, and the need to ensure full, consistent adherence to national policies and procedures. It also flagged continued change and reform following receipt of reports from internal and external auditors. Information forum held in Canberra in June 2014 to share a similar change and compliance message for all National Office staff. Operations Managers in all states are finalising visits to all offices to undertake a 'culture check' utilising a purpose built script and checklist. An Operational Reform Team has been officially integrated into the agency structure. The team will be focussed on the implementation of recommendations accepted by the AEC in reports by relevant auditors; planning frameworks; cultural change; compliance and auditing. Foundation members are drawn from the Keely Implementation Team and are therefore familiar with the change imperative. Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. KIT (now the Reform Team) to liaise with NPT, ASA and Elections Branch to ensure ballot secure zone guidance document covers all required scenarios. The Reform Team to liaise with EB to ensure ballot secure zone messaging and branding is absorbed into relevant policies, procedures and training documents. The Reform Team to liaise with PSB to progress changes to AEC Employment to enable a certification of secure zone in the home of OICs or those taking receipt of ballot papers. The Reform Team to investigate the production of a new polling place equipment to be used as a ballot secure zone by OICs in polling places without a separate lockable room. Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable. Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.
11	The AEC ensures all ballot secure zones are cleared before the arrival of 'live' ballot papers and that they remain secured and 'sterile' at all times when ballots are presented.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Warehousing team Various sections, Elections Branch 	The development and publication of underpinning 'ballot paper principles' in relation to the security and safety of ballot papers, which are to be displayed in all AEC offices and included in polling official training manuals; and consistent and clear policy around clearance of ballot secure zones in particular contexts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formalisation and improved rigour of the establishment and maintenance of 'ballot secure zones' in premises where ballot papers are being handled or stored 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development and mandated display of ballot paper principles posters in all AEC offices and out-posted centres in WA and in offices across the country. Instruction issued to staff to ensure designated ballot secure zones are cleared prior to the arrival of other ballot material. Continued communication regarding the importance of the ballot paper principles. Development of warehouse preparation checklist to ensure preparation of a designated 2014 WASE ballot secure zone. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. Development of guidance on this recommendation for implementation across the agency (in all AEC premises). Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable.
12	The AEC introduces processes and develops doctrine for the handling of ballot papers at all stages from 'cradle to grave'.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Election Policy and Procedures Section, Elections Branch ASA, Finance and Business Services Branch National Property team, Finance and Business Services Branch 	The development and publication of underpinning 'ballot paper principles' in relation to the security and safety of ballot papers, which are to be displayed in all AEC offices and included in polling official training manuals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduction of a binding ballot paper security declaration and acknowledgement for all polling place staff undertaking face-to-face training, which included all OICs taking custody of ballot papers. Enhanced training for staff, highlighting the importance of ballot paper security and implementation of the initiatives outlined in this table Restricted access to ballot paper image so printing of stock was tracked and monitored. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mandated display, and reinforcement of, ballot paper principles posters in all AEC offices and out-posted centres in WA and in offices across the country. WA staff have been briefed by the Keely Implementation Team on four occasions (two briefings on new measures and two operational training sessions), ballot paper handling principles have been central to these sessions. Establishment of ballot paper secure zones in all offices. Development and provision of 'ballot paper management guide' to polling place Officers in Charge and Team Leaders containing information on transport, storage and packaging of ballot papers while in their possession. All polling staff undertaking face-to-face training to sign the 'ballot paper security direction and acknowledgement' to confirm they understand the importance of mandated ballot paper principles. All non-polling staff to sign the 'ballot paper security direction and acknowledgement' to confirm they understand the importance of mandated ballot paper principles. Further improvements to the storage and transport of ballot papers. Enhancements to training to ensure clear messaging around ballot paper sanctity at all levels (operational staff and polling staff). Secure movement of unused ballot papers from printer to divisions via secure cages. Development of warehouse preparation checklist to ensure preparation of a designated 2014 WASE ballot secure zone. Compilation of a document explaining logistics procedures for use by operational staff containing step-by-step instructions. Comprehensive procedural document developed for preparation and transport of ballot paper packages for final storage. Final packaging and transport plan successfully executed. All ballot paper packages confirmed received in WA storage facility and the exact location of ballot papers for each polling place recorded on the final storage record. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keely report and the wider reform agenda. Managers Forums entitled 'Looking to the Future' held for all election managers and operations managers in Sydney and Melbourne June 2014. These forums reinforced to all staff the need to refocus on integrity and compliance, and the need to ensure full, consistent adherence to national policies and procedures. It also flagged continued change and reform following receipt of reports from internal and external auditors. Information forum held in Canberra in June 2014 to promote the change and compliance message for all National Office staff. Operations Managers in all states are finalising visits to all offices to undertake a 'culture check' utilising a purpose built script and checklist. An Operational Reform Team has been officially integrated into the agency structure. The team will be focussed on the implementation of recommendations accepted by the AEC in reports by relevant auditors; planning frameworks; cultural change; compliance and auditing. Foundation members are drawn from the Keely Implementation Team and are therefore familiar with the change imperative. Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. Absorption of messaging across policies and procedures. Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable. Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.

Rec #	Recommendation	Contributors (other than KIT)	Proposed long-term outcome	Griffith	WA	Current Activities	Next steps
13	The AEC uses tamper-evident materials (eg bags and tape) for the transfer and storage of ballot papers, including the transport of materials to and from fresh scrutiny centres and for long-term storage in warehouses.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State MPOs Election Policy and Procedures Section, Elections Branch Election Services Delivery Section, Elections Branch 	National and state material management policies and procedures and minimum standards, including relevant forms, materials, labels etc, for application at all stages of a ballot papers' life cycle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trial of tamper evident labels on ballot paper parcels and packages. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved material handling processes and procedures, including more comprehensive and enhanced labelling, enhanced tamper-evident labels. Improved labelling and packaging for final storage, including fluorescent final packaging labels for placement on box exterior; tamper-evident labelling; pallet identifier labels; plastic pallet strapping; improved shrink-wrapping and security taping. Enhanced instruction and rigour around the use of sealed moulded ballot boxes for the storage and transport of declaration envelopes; development of numbering systems and label templates for use on these boxes. Final packaging and transport plan successfully executed. All ballot paper packages confirmed received in WA storage facility and the exact location of ballot papers for each polling place recorded on the final storage record. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keely report and the wider reform agenda. GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable. Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.
Processes, procedures and compliance							
14	The AEC specifies and defines the role of employees (permanent and temporary) at every stage of ballot handling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Election Policy and Procedures Section, Elections Branch Recruitment, Learning and Workforce Planning Section, People Services Branch 	National and state material management policies and procedures and minimum standards, including relevant forms, materials, labels etc, for application at all stages of a ballot papers' life cycle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of documentation of roles throughout the life of the ballot paper cycle Interim role descriptions developed where necessary, including in relation to materials management and transport 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a long term project, as it involves the collation of an extensive body of knowledge. Work is continuing to make sure roles, policies, procedures and minimum standards are reviewed. These will be further enhanced following the evaluation of the Griffith by-election and the WA Senate election. Enhancement to new Divisional Materials Manager (DMM) job profile and associated documentation. Briefing material developed to assist DRO in training DMM. Development of State Materials Manager job profile to assist in implementation of DMM position in divisions, provide coordination and consistency in practice across sites, and ensure compliance with new policy. Greater rigour around supervision of tasks involving ballot papers, with additional support available if necessary. Existing Election Procedures Handbooks have been updated to include key messages around ballot paper handling. Provision of an array of new forms to assist DROs with tracking, security and monitoring. Training given and instructions provided in writing in the form of policy documents and an implementation timeline. Development and provision of 'ballot paper management guide' to polling place Officers in Charge and Team Leaders containing information on transport, storage and packaging of ballot papers while in their possession. Implementation of enhanced visual identification of AEC staff in all polling venues and out-posted centres. Compilation of a document explaining logistics procedures for use by operational staff containing step-by-step instructions. Comprehensive procedural documents developed for preparation and transport of ballot paper packages for final storage. Positive feedback received from staff regarding utilisation of clear and detailed process document with illustrations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keely report and the wider reform agenda. Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new material management initiatives. Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new material management initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. New material management initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. Refinement and review of NSW election role briefs and wider roll out. Review of new DMM and SMM positions by People Services Branch to ensure the classification and work levels are appropriate. KIT (now the Reform Team) to liaise with EB to ensure absorption into relevant policies, procedures and training documents. Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable. Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.
15	Once roles are specified, the AEC allocates these roles to individuals with instructions provided in writing.		National and state material management policies and procedures and minimum standards, including relevant forms, materials, labels etc, for application at all stages of a ballot papers' life cycle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interim role descriptions developed where necessary, including in relation to materials management and transport. Allocation of those role descriptions to individuals. Implementation of enhanced visual identification of AEC staff in all polling locations and out-posted centres. 			
16	The AEC establishes policy and procedures for the conduct of a Senate recount.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Election Policy and Procedures Section, Elections Branch 	Development of a Senate recount policy and procedures. The House of Representatives recount policy and procedures also to be reviewed.	The Acting Commissioner has directed a review of the House of Representatives recount policy and procedures, and for the development of a Senate recount policy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recount policy approved. A working party has been established to review and document detailed recount procedures. The review draws on the processes that supported the 2013 Fairfax and WA recounts to arrive at a consistent set of support materials for all staff. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elections Branch currently developing recount procedure document after having finalised the recount policy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elections Branch to develop recount procedure document.
17	The AEC introduces a system of more proactive audits to determine compliance, performance and adherence with policies and procedures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Election Policy and Procedures Section, Elections Branch States Employee Relations Section, People Services Branch Business Assurance Committee and Portfolio Management Office, Strategic Capability Branch 	Regular audits of all offices, including regional offices, including a possible system of 'spot checks' to determine compliance, performance and adherence with policies and procedures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The AEC's internal audit provider conducted a review of the Griffith by-election. Internal stakeholders such as senior executive and Keely Implementation Team members also played a compliance role throughout the event. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a long term issue. The AEC continues to work on measures to address this recommendation, including work with the Business Assurance Committee and the internal audit providers on operationalising the focus and ensuring a more comprehensive program of internal audits. In addition, the AEC is working with internal staff to develop complementary measures, which includes consideration of compliance teams and enhancements to reporting. In relation to the WA Senate election: the AEC's internal audit provider will conduct a review of the WA Senate election; the implementation of Keely initiatives will be monitored throughout the event; the State Materials Manager and Operations Managers will undertake joint compliance activities; Polling Place Liaison Officers have been given fewer polling places to visit on polling day which will enable them to allocate more time at each venue to monitor compliance; roll-out of Keely Implementation Team Extended (KITE) program where a team of staff from across the organisation undertook observation of polling weekend activities; DRO certification built in to final packaging and transport document whereby DROs sign-off to confirm they understand instructions; final packaging & transport process enhanced to include several compliance steps including the implementation of an oversight team to observe the process on site in out-posted centres and the warehouse. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Managers Forums entitled 'Looking to the Future' held for all election managers and operations managers in Sydney and Melbourne June 2014. These forums reinforced to all staff the need to refocus on integrity and compliance, and the need to ensure full, consistent adherence to national policies and procedures. It also flagged continued change and reform following receipt of reports from internal and external auditors. Information forum held in Canberra in June 2014 to promote the change and compliance message for all National Office staff. Operations Managers in all states are finalising visits to all offices to undertake a 'culture check' utilising a purpose built script and checklist. An Operational Reform Team has been officially integrated into the agency structure. The team will be focussed on the implementation of recommendations accepted by the AEC in reports by relevant auditors; planning frameworks; cultural change; compliance and auditing. Foundation members are drawn from the Keely Implementation Team and are therefore familiar with the change imperative. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. Consider polling weekend compliance model options for a full-scale event. Continued involvement from the internal audit team and Business Assurance Committee to ensure an appropriate level of formal audits, supported by other compliance models. KIT (now the Reform Team) to liaise with EB to ensure absorption into relevant policies, procedures and training documents. The message of integrity, consistency and compliance will also continue to be built into formal and informal messaging from the leadership team, including emails and intranet columns from the acting Commissioner and other executives. Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable.
18	The AEC consider the benefit of cross-posting senior staff between states to assist in giving a consistent approach to performance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elections Branch Various sections, People Services Branch Legal Services Section, Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch 	A long term systematic approach to sharing experience and knowledge across the organisation at all levels.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A number of staff from outside the Division of Griffith, including interstate staff, were utilised for the By-election. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a long term issue. The AEC continues to work on measures to address this recommendation, which includes consideration of statutory barriers. In relation to the WA Senate election, a large number of staff from outside WA are being utilised to provide support and assistance, including the AEO NSW, National Office, Queensland, New South Wales, Victorian and South Australian staff. Staff from across the organisation (interstate Divisional offices, State Offices and National office) posted to WA. Roll-out of Keely Implementation Team Extended (KITE) program where a team of staff from across the organisation undertook observation of polling weekend activities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. This will also touch on the cross-posting of staff to WA for the event. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Further exploration of options for cross-posting staff. Compilation of a central skills register to enable the agency to better utilise skills of staff for particular projects and events.
19	<div>The AEC develops and applies improvements to national and state warehousing management practices, including:</div> <div>- the standardisation of minimum required skill sets</div> <div>- the processes to engage warehouse employees with the wider AEC, particularly where warehouses are in isolated locations</div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GRA Consultants (Scoping Study Team) Warehousing team Recruitment, Learning and Workforce Planning Section, People Services Branch 	Comprehensive documentation outlining minimum standards for security, material handling, workplace health and safety and other warehouse processes and procedures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Checks of the relevant premises have been conducted in line with the national response and interim guidelines have been issued regarding security, material handling and WHS standards. Security arrangements include a back-to-base alarm system that is monitored and bars on the windows, in addition to a chain and barbed wire fence around the complex. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Checks of the relevant premises have been conducted in line with the national response and interim guidelines have been issued on a national basis regarding security, material handling and WHS standards. Security arrangements include a back-to-base alarm system that is monitored and for the election period, physical security guards are on site. Installation and connection of CCTV considered cost-prohibitive. Development of warehouse preparation checklist to ensure preparation of warehouse for receipt of pallets of ballot paper packages. Improved WHS practices implemented. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner. Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. This will also touch on the changes to warehousing for the event. Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish warehousing team to ensure full implementation of recommendations relevant to warehousing across the agency. GRA consultants 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' is complete and initial report has been submitted. It is currently being considered by the Acting Electoral Commissioner. Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.

Rec #	Recommendation	Contributors (other than KIT)	Proposed long-term outcome	Griffith	WA	Current Activities	Next steps
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the mitigation of WHS risks, including guidelines around unaccompanied visits to AEC warehouses and storage facilities - the application of systems to control ballot material access, receipt and general handling - the standards and processes around the treatment of partial loads or portions of loads, and - the installation and monitoring of CCTV and alarms at warehouses. 					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	
20	The AEC revises guidelines regarding the suitability of all storage and ballot handling facilities (whether AEC, temporary, or contractor premises), including security, egress, accessibility and exclusive use by the AEC.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Property Team, Finance and Business Services Branch • ASA, Finance and Business Services Branch • Election Policy and Procedures Section, Elections Branch • GRA Consultants (Scoping Study Team) • Commercial Law and Procurement Section - Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch 	The development and publication of underpinning 'ballot paper principles' in relation to the security and safety of ballot papers, which are to be displayed in all AEC offices and included in polling official training manuals; and the development of policy and associated guidance documentation on premises procurement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing interim guidance on minimum standards for non-AEC premises that handle or store ballot papers. • Improving security measures around transport and storage of ballot papers and materials and trialling new ways to securely store ballot papers overnight during the polling period. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procurement of out-posted centres based on enhanced 'minimum standards and operational guidelines for out-posted centres' enabling divisions to undertake the majority of post-election activities (in terms of ballot papers) in one place, thereby avoiding unnecessary movement of ballot material. • Utilisation of a checklist to assist in procurement of suitable out-posted centres (used in conjunction with existing checklist). • Procurement of PPVCs based on preference for secure building with a lockable space in which ballot papers can be securely stored, thereby negating the need to move ballot material to another location for secure storage. • The AEC is currently working toward a "request for information" from the transport and storage industries that will inform a decision about how and where we store our ballot papers in the longer term. • The AEC has met with and been briefed by, a number of leading transport and storage providers as part of this process. • The AEC will continue to assess whether it should operate warehousing facilities in-house in the long term. • Security guards in attendance 24 hours at all AEC out-posted sites, State Office and warehouse for the duration of event. • GRA consultants in attendance in WA. • Review by National Property and States of security standards of ballot secure zones in Divisional offices; subsequent replacement of locks in some areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keely report and the wider reform agenda. • GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner. • Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GRA consultants 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' is complete and initial report has been submitted. It is currently being considered by the Acting Electoral Commissioner. • Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. • KIT (now the Reform Team) to continue to liaise with National Property Team and Commercial Law and Procurement Sections to ensure absorption of key requirements into premises procurement checklists. • Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable. • Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.
21	The AEC ensures that all instructions and planning documentation for specific events (such as a recount) are sufficiently detailed, are followed and updated where necessary.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All sections, Elections Branch • States 	In the long term, all relevant documentation will be reviewed and updated to ensure they are sufficiently detailed. A regular system of audits and spot checks will be used to ensure compliance (see recommendations 17 and 28).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentation was developed for the use of interim processes and procedures. This includes training material, guidelines, position descriptions and forms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentation was developed and implemented for the use of interim processes and procedures, including training material, guidelines, position descriptions and forms. • A range of instruction and planning documents developed specifically for WA Senate Election 2014: ballot paper movement instructions; final packaging and transport instructions; guidance on use of new forms and materials; utilisation of Toll consignment noting. • Comprehensive procedural document developed for preparation and transport of ballot paper packages for final storage. • Final packaging and transport plan successfully executed. All ballot paper packages confirmed received in WA storage facility and the exact location of ballot papers for each polling place recorded on the final storage record. Positive feedback received from staff regarding utilisation of clear and detailed process document with illustrations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An Operational Reform Team has been officially integrated into the agency structure. The team will be focussed on the implementation of recommendations accepted by the AEC in reports by relevant auditors; planning frameworks; cultural change; compliance and auditing. Foundation members are drawn from the Keely Implementation Team and are therefore familiar with the change imperative. • KIT has held initial an initial meeting with Elections Branch to discuss the enhancement of the Election Procedures Manual. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. • KIT (now the Reform Team) to liaise with EB to ensure absorption of new, reviewed measures into relevant policies, procedures and training documents. • The Reform Team to liaise with EB regarding update to EPM specifically. • The Reform Team to liaise with EB & States regarding ensuring consistency re procedural documentation (with a view to creating a nationally consistent approach rather than having States or Divisions creating and utilising local versions). • Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable.
22	The AEC reviews labelling policies to ensure that labelling is tamper-proof, accountable, consistently applied and legible.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Election Policy and Procedures Section, Elections Branch • Election Services Delivery Section, Elections Branch • GRA consultants (Scoping Study Team) 	National and state material management policies and procedures and minimum standards, including relevant forms, materials, labels etc, for application at all stages of a ballot papers' life cycle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved material handling processes and procedures, including more comprehensive labelling, a trial of tamper-evident materials and packaging. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The provision of new materials for packing and securing materials including better quality plastic bags, labels and boxes. • Improved material handling processes and procedures, including more comprehensive and enhanced labelling, enhanced tamper-evident labels. • Documentation of ballot paper movements and the chain of custody at every point from production until they are placed in long term storage; transport contractors will be required to complete consignment documentation for each transfer (this will include the implementation of the Toll Online system where it is available). • Consistent labels developed for placement on fresh boxes after the fresh scrutiny process for final storage. • The provision of an updated policy document (and associated procedures) of parcelling and packaging of ballot papers by OICs on polling night. • Compilation of a document explaining logistics and packaging procedures for use by operational staff containing step-by-step instructions. • Comprehensive procedural documents developed for preparation and transport of ballot paper packages for final storage. • Note the materials utilised are geared towards being tamper-evident rather than tamper-proof. • Final packaging and transport plan successfully executed. All ballot paper packages confirmed received in WA storage facility and the exact location of ballot papers for each polling place recorded on the final storage record. Positive feedback received from staff regarding utilisation of clear and detailed process document with illustrations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keely report and the wider reform agenda. • GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner. • Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. • Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. • New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. This will also touch on the changes to warehousing for the event. • Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. • KIT (now the Reform Team) to liaise with EB to ensure absorption of new, reviewed measures into relevant policies, procedures and training documents. • GRA consultants 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' is complete and initial report has been submitted. It is currently being considered by the Acting Electoral Commissioner. • Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable. • Liaise with other key stakeholders, such as agency WHS representatives prior to absorption into policy and procedure.
23	The AEC reviews packaging policies, particularly in relation to the cardboard standard for boxes used in the transport and storage of ballot papers and the repackaging of ballot papers and parcels into used boxes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Election Policy and Procedures Section, Elections Branch • Election Services Delivery Section, Elections Branch • GRA consultants (Scoping Study Team) 	National and state material management policies and procedures and minimum standards, including relevant forms, materials, labels etc, for application at all stages of a ballot papers' life cycle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interim guidance regarding the packaging and packing of parcels of ballot papers from polling places through to long term storage (including the use of fresh boxes after fresh scrutiny). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of cardboard boxes for packing of Senate ballot papers from despatch to OICs through to return of materials from polling places and fresh scrutiny, except in extenuating logistical circumstances where specific sealed transport bags will be utilised. Boxes of improved quality. • Guidance was issued directing that boxes were to be replaced when in disrepair. • Fresh boxes used for final storage based on Tasmanian / Victorian telescopic design. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial meeting held between Chair of KIT and agency WHS coordinator to discuss policy and procedural changes in light of the Keely report and the wider reform agenda. • GRA consultants have liaised with a range of AEC staff and with the 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' Project Team in compiling their report for the Acting Electoral Commissioner. • Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. • Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. • New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. This will also touch on the changes to warehousing for the event. • Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalise evaluation of improved measures adopted for 2014 WA Senate election and subsequent plan developed for procurement and implementation for future events. • KIT (now the Reform Team) to liaise with EB to ensure absorption of new, reviewed measures into relevant policies, procedures and training documents. • GRA consultants 'Scoping Study of Secure Ballot Paper Transportation' is complete and initial report has been submitted. It is currently being considered by the Acting Electoral Commissioner. • Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable.

[illegible]

Rec #	Recommendation	Contributors (other than KIT)	Proposed long-term outcome	Griffith	WA	Current Activities	Next steps
29	In view of the findings of this report, that the AEC conduct a check of storage and packaging of 'live' ballots currently in its possession.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ELT • Assistant Commissioner, Elections Branch 	A direction has been issued for a check of the storage and packaging of 'live' ballots currently in the AEC's possession. This is a significant body of work and is expected to continue over the forthcoming months.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A direction has been issued for a check of the storage and packaging of 'live' ballots currently in the AEC's possession. This is a significant body of work and is expected to continue over the forthcoming months. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The review has been completed and a report is being prepared for EC consideration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check is complete. Report written and signed off by the Acting Electoral Commissioner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendation implementation be marked complete.
30	The AEC ensures that lessons learned during post-election evaluation are sufficiently captured in the evaluation report and acted upon ahead of any subsequent election.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic Research and Evaluation Section, Strategic Capability Branch • ELT 	Agreed recommendations are reported on and built into relevant planning and reporting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Post-election evaluation is continuing and a report is being compiled. Any agreed recommendations requiring action are to be added to election planning documentation, the national business plan and where appropriate, the relevant area's business plan. These are regularly monitored and acted upon. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Post-election evaluation is continuing at all levels of the organisation and reports are being compiled. Any agreed recommendations requiring action are to be added to election planning documentation, the national business plan and where appropriate, the relevant area's business plan. These are regularly monitored and acted upon. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. KIT has commenced the integration of some suggested changes and enhancements. • Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. KIT has commenced the integration of some suggested changes and enhancements. • New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KIT (now the Reform Team) will work with the relevant stakeholders (primarily Elections Branch) to ensure all necessary changes are implemented nationally and communicated to relevant staff. Significant flow on effects to training and IT systems will also be considered.
31	<div> <div>The AEC improves learning and development, including:</div> <div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mandating the provision of training regarding ballot security and material management - the accurate recording of courses successfully completed and - the benchmarking of its training against that offered by like institutions. </div> </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recruitment, Learning and Workforce Planning Section, People Services Branch • Election Services Delivery Section, Elections Branch 	<div> <div>The AEC has assurance of successful completion of training, which is benchmarked.</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning and development events will be scheduled to assist in communicating important aspects of the Keely review and implementation, including culture and a refocussing on quality delivery of services. </div>	<div> <div>This is a national initiative and implementation is underway. Actions taken for Griffith include:</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • incorporation of key principles into the training of key staff as an interim measure; and • interim arrangements to the current training assurance process to ensure centralisation of training records. </div>	<div> <div>This is an ongoing national initiative. The AEC has commenced the development of an L&D blueprint which will provide the foundation block for reforming current training practices for APS and CEA employees. A provider has been engaged and will commence work Friday 14 March 2014. Additional measures for the WA Senate election include:</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • all 'tier one' training recorded on a central database to enable national and state monitoring; • operational training in Senate Fresh Scrutiny; • operational training in implementation of Keely-related forms and policies; • development of training in ballot security; • localised discussion on materials management plans in light of Keely recommendations; • enhanced training for polling staff: face-to-face training now contains a ballot security module; existing Election Procedures Handbooks have been updated to include ballot security messaging; online training now includes messages on ballot paper sanctity; • development and roll-out of face-to-face procurement and contract management training. </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalisation of Learning and Development Blueprint. The Blueprint was developed by external specialists in consultation with AEC staff. It is a roadmap for learning and training and will assist in ensuring quality training and enhanced staff development and performance. • Evaluation meeting held in Western Australia in July to review new initiatives. • Targeted workshops held with Western Australian operational staff to review new initiatives, particularly new tracking forms and new policies. • New initiatives implemented for the WA Senate election are being evaluated as part of reports compiled by KIT, WA Divisional and State Office staff and other agency stakeholders. This will also touch on the changes to training. • Report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election currently being finalised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KIT (now the Reform Team) to liaise with PSB and EB regarding applicable training enhancements and the development and implementation of the L&D Blueprint. • Consider report by internal auditors (Price Waterhouse Coopers) into the WA Senate election once finalised and progress improvements as applicable.
32	The AEC consider bringing to the attention the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters the impact of the statutory appointments of AEC State Managers on the ability of the AEC Commissioner to achieve national uniformity of approach and consistency of approach in the conduct of Federal Elections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ELT <p><i>No action from KIT</i></p>	This matter would require legislative change and therefore immediate implementation is not possible.	The AEC acknowledges that some JSCEM members may have views on this recommendation.	The AEC acknowledges that some JSCEM members may have views on this recommendation.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AEC to seek consideration through JSCEM.

Evaluation of implementation of new measures for the WA half- Senate election

Including recommendations from the Keelty Report

24 July 2014

Contents

1. Executive Summary	4
Background	4
Scope	4
Methodology	4
Findings	5
Conclusion	6
2. Background	7
3. Purpose, objective and scope	8
4. Methodology	9
Costings	10
5. Implementation evaluation	11
5.1 Ballot paper tracking forms.	11
5.2 Ballot Paper Packaging and Labelling	19
5.2.1 Adjusted Packaging Labels	19
5.2.2 Ballot Paper Final Storage Label	21
5.2.3 Tamper evident labels	23
5.2.4 Use of cardboard boxes to despatch and return ballot papers from polling places	25
5.2.5 Use of plastic bags for creation of individual sealed candidate / group parcel for used Senate ballot papers	27
5.2.6 Application of consignment notes on all packages containing ballot papers	28
5.3 Training and Ballot Paper Principles	29
5.3.1 Ballot Paper Principles poster	29
5.3.2 Email to WA polling staff	30
5.3.3 Additional Training of Polling Staff (TOPS) slides relating to ballot paper security	32
5.3.4 Election Procedures Handbook addendum	33
5.3.5 Ballot secure zone guidance & posters	34
5.3.6 Ballot paper management guides	35

5.3.7	Instruction documents for DROs regarding ballot paper movement	37
5.4	Contracts and Premises.....	38
5.4.1	Minimum Standards and Operational Guidelines for Out-posted Centres.....	38
5.4.2	Improved rigour relating to the use of visitor's registers at all AEC sites....	39
5.4.3	Allocating Ballot Box Guards to all polling places	40
5.4.4	Review of all contracts relating to the WA half-Senate election	41
5.4.5	24-hour security guard presence at all out-posted centres and State Office for election duration.....	43
5.4.6	Utilisation of cages / temporary rooms as ballot secure zones in out-posted centres	44
5.5	Waste Management.....	46
5.5.1	Rubbish and Recycling Disposal Processing Guide	46
5.5.2	EF025(a): Record of Rubbish / Recycling Disposed.....	47
5.5.3	EF025(b) – (c): Waste Disposal Labels.....	48
5.5.4	EF025(d) – (f): Waste Area Posters	49
5.6	Materials Management Roles.....	51
5.6.1	Divisional Materials Manager Job Profile	51
5.6.2	Divisional Materials Manager Log	52
5.6.3	Implementation of State Materials Manager Position	53
5.7	Staffing	54
5.7.1	Character checks of all temporary staff	54
5.7.2	Altered allocations for Polling Place Liaison Officers.....	56
5.7.3	Mandating clear visual identification for all permanent and temporary AEC staff at polling places and out-posted centres	57
5.8	Other WA election initiatives	59
5.8.1	Despatch of ballot papers direct to interstate Divisions	59
5.8.2	Adjustments to the despatch of certified lists.....	61
5.8.3	Revised project plan, materials and procedures for final packaging and transport of ballot papers to warehouse	62
5.8.4	Keelty Implementation Team – Extended (KITE) polling weekend observation team	63
5.8.5	Additional KIT items	65

6. Summary and Conclusion	67
Appendix A – Keelty Recommendations Advanced at the WA half-Senate election.	69
Appendix B – List of Keelty Report recommendations	72
Appendix C: Election Procedure Handbook Addendum	74

1. Executive Summary

Background

On 5 November 2013 Mr Mick Keelty AO was appointed to investigate into the matter of 1370 lost Senate ballot papers in WA during the 2013 Federal Election. His subsequent report on 2 December 2013 detailed 32 recommendations on processes and procedures for the handling, movement and storage of ballot papers. A taskforce was immediately established to oversee the implementation of the recommendations. This is referred to as Keelty Implementation Taskforce (KIT).

A writ was issued on 28 February 2014 for the election of 6 Senators in Western Australia which condensed the timeframe for the implementation of the recommendations in the Keelty Report and made it an absolute priority for the AEC.

The taskforce worked closely with AEC staff in WA and the National Office in Canberra to develop and implement a range of measures to operationalise the various recommendations from the Keelty Report and to ensure a robust and accountable framework for the transport, movement, accountability and storage of ballot papers.

Scope

This evaluation report covers any new measures implemented for the WA half-Senate election. The majority of measures were implemented as a result of recommendations contained in the Keelty Report developed by the Keelty Implementation Team; others were initiatives by WA State Office or National Office.

Methodology

A folio of *Interim Measures for the WA half-Senate Election* was developed and implemented which include forms, and policy and guidance. Similarly, there were numerous other Keelty related initiatives developed by AEC business areas in consultation with KIT.

These measures were evaluated by assessing how they addressed the recommendations, level of success, areas for improvement and deployment for future electoral events.

The evaluation of each measure has been undertaken by the primary developers and staff who delivered the initiatives on the ground at the election. A rating scale of *Essential*, *Useful* or *Not Required* was used.

Findings

Broadly, the measures listed below will be further reviewed with a view to full adoption and incorporation in AEC operational policies, procedures, instructional documentation and training of operational staff:

- Development and embedding of the Ballot Paper Principles into AEC culture.
- A range of new and revised forms for the tracking and accountability of ballot papers.
- Visitor security registers for all AEC sites.
- Security Direction and Acknowledgement declarations for polling and non-polling staff.
- A range of new and revised packaging and storage labels.
- Minimum standards and operational guidelines for AEC out-posted scrutiny centres.
- New rubbish and recycling disposal procedures and guidelines.
- Creation of new Materials Manager positions and associated logs for greater accountability.
- Establishment of ballot paper secure zones (BSZ).
- Review of all election delivery contracts.
- Revised and improved packaging for movement of ballot papers – cardboard boxes.
- Revised staffing profiles for Election Day – Additional Ballot Box Guards and Polling Place Liaison Officers.
- Use of appropriate colour coded outer clothing (vests) to clearly identify AEC staff at polling places and out-posted centres.

There are a range of other measures that will require further development, cost benefit analysis and full evaluation to assess operational feasibility. These include:

- Character checks for all temporary staff.
- Plastic bags for the parcelling and sealing of ballot papers at the polling place for return to scrutiny centres.
- 24 hour static security guards.
- CCTV at storage facilities.
- Extended taskforce to observe polling day activities, provide assistance and ensure compliance. This was referred to as KITE for the 2014 WA Senate half Senate election.
- Security arrangements for mobile polling and temporary storage of ballot papers.

Conclusion

The AEC acknowledges that considerable further work is required to address the Keelty report recommendations, and notes that during the conduct of the 2014 WA Senate election a matter arose (the ballot paper matter at RAAFA Merriwa) which highlights both the complex nature of the AEC's operations, and the work that still needs to be done to ensure consistent and safe electoral practice is applied across the breadth of the AEC's operations. This report notes though that the range of actions taken and measures put in place for the WA Senate election go a long way towards addressing the recommendations in the Keelty report and to provide a more secure and accountable framework within which ballot papers are created, transported, counted, and then ultimately stored prior to final authorised destruction in line with the requirements of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (CEA). While there is still work to be done on addressing the cultural aspects of the AEC's operations as raised in the Keelty report and the need to refine some of the measures already implemented, and noting that additional measures may yet also be developed and implemented for future electoral events, significant progress on the majority of the Keelty recommendations has been made during the conduct of the 2014 WA Senate event as is reflected in the detail contained in this evaluation report.

Image 1. Final storage of ballot papers in AEC WA storage facility



2. Background

On 31 October 2013 the Electoral Commissioner announced that 1 375 Senate ballot papers (later confirmed as 1 370) could not be found for the purposes of the 2013 Western Australia Senate recount. Mr. Mick Keelty AO was formally appointed on 5 November 2013 to undertake an investigation into the circumstances which led to the loss of the ballot papers. Mr Keelty provided his report *Inquiry into the 2013 WA Senate Election* (the Keelty Report) on 2 December 2013.

The report outlined significant failures in some of the processes and procedures for the handling, movement and storage of Western Australian (WA) Senate ballot papers and made 32 recommendations. All of Mr. Keelty's recommendations were accepted by the full three-person Australian Electoral Commission (AEC).

In December 2013, a dedicated task force was established to oversee the implementation of Mr. Keelty's recommendations. The task force is led by a First Assistant Commissioner and is made up of two groups:

- The Keelty Implementation Reference Group (KIRG) to lead the implementation program; and
- The Keelty Implementation Taskforce (KIT) as a smaller team to lead implementation tasks.

In addition to the work of KIRG and KIT, other relevant business areas in the AEC have been involved in adjusting procedures and products in order to facilitate the implementation of the Keelty recommendations.

Within a month of the formation of KIRG the Speaker of the House of Representatives issued a writ, on 6 January 2014, for the Griffith by-election to be held on 8 February 2014. The AEC prioritised implementation of practical measures that would enhance processes and procedures relating to ballot paper security for the purposes of the Griffith by-election. These measures were reviewed in the document: 'Keelty Implementation Team evaluation of implementation of interim measures for relevant recommendations for the Griffith by-election'.

On 28 February 2014, the Governor of Western Australia issued a writ for the election of six Senators in Western Australia. Again, the implementation of the recommendations contained in the Keelty Report was a priority for the AEC.

3. Purpose, objective and scope

The purpose of this report is to evaluate the implementation of measures and activities intended to give effect to selected recommendations from the Keelty Report at the 2014 Western Australian half-Senate election, from the perspective of the Keelty Implementation Taskforce and the staff involved in implementing the measures, noting that several other broader evaluation activities are occurring, including work by AEC's internal auditors (PwC), the ANAO and the WA state office who conducted the election.

The objective of this report therefore is to evaluate the 30 measures and activities implemented for the purposes of the WA half-Senate election for their effectiveness in addressing the relevant recommendations and assess their suitability for application at future electoral events. The objective is expressly not to evaluate the measures and activities to demonstrate complete and final implementation of each recommendation for closure.

The AEC anticipates a series of further refinements, and where possible trials, of particular measures and activities to ensure that the final suite of measures in response to all recommendations is effective and appropriate for successive general elections.

The scope of this particular evaluation is limited to the recommendations from the Keelty Report that were of direct relevance or consequence to the conduct of the half-Senate election in Western Australia. Of the 32 Keelty recommendations, two were deemed not applicable to the conduct of the WA half-Senate election. The remaining 30 Keelty recommendations were advanced in some way by the measures implemented; and by way of conducting this evaluation. Appendix A lists each measure and identifies which Keelty recommendation relates to it; furthermore, it identifies the two Keelty recommendations that were deemed to be extraneous to the conduct of the half-Senate election. Appendix B lists the full Keelty Report recommendations.

4. Methodology

Implementation of the recommendations commenced immediately following acceptance of Mr Keelty's report by the AEC. KIRG and KIT worked to operationalise the concepts articulated by the recommendations. Subsequently, a range of measures was in place for the Griffith by-election. KIT and KIRG had a small window of opportunity in which to evaluate the measures implemented for Griffith and then refine in readiness for the WA half-Senate election. The taskforce again worked industriously in the lead up to the announcement of the event to compile the 'Folio of Interim Measures for the WA half-Senate Election' which is an enhanced and wider ranging version of the folio that was implemented for the Griffith by-election. Broadly, these operational measures relate directly to the handling, movement and storage of ballot papers and fall into the following three groups:

- The Folio of Interim Measures for the WA half-Senate Election: Forms
- The Folio of Interim Measures for the WA half-Senate Election: Policy and guidance
- Other Keelty-related initiatives. Developed by AEC business areas outside KIT, but in consultation with the group.

For each measure within these groups the evaluation will consider:

- How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?
- Was it successful?
- Is it usable for any future electoral events?
- How may it be improved?
- Initial conclusion, which ranks each measure's necessity in addressing the Keelty Report recommendations, using the following scale:
 - Essential – the measure is critical to addressing the Keelty Report recommendations and must form part of the AEC's business-as-usual (BAU) practice
 - Useful – the measure assists with addressing the Keelty Report recommendations, the adoption of which, will improve the AEC's BAU practice

- Not required – the measure assists with addressing the Keelty Report recommendations, however alternative solutions should be sought.

Evaluation of each measure or initiative in this report has been undertaken by the primary developer in consultation with key stakeholders as applicable.

Costings

Costs for items involving additional staff (such as additional ballot box guards, PPLOs or security staff) carry particularly high price tags, and will need to be carefully considered in the overall context of the cost of running elections, and the security and confidence they provide in the context of the other measures being proposed for implementation.

At the time of writing this report, a cost analysis of the WA election in relation to the additional costs resulting from the implementation of recommendations of the Keelty report has not been conducted. This analysis will be conducted shortly.

5. Implementation evaluation

5.1 Ballot paper tracking forms.

A number of new forms were designed and introduced into the election process in order to systematically record the movement of ballot papers from the point of printing through to despatch to polling places to return to Central Senate Scrutiny (CSS) and storage.

Overall, the new folio of forms were produced to respond to recommendations 2, 4, 9 and 12 by:

- Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence; in this case, from production to delivery to the AEC;
- Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals', and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
- Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling; and
- Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling; and
- Giving practical effect to the introduction of processes for the handling of ballot papers 'from cradle to grave'.

These forms impose a nationally consistent approach to the accountability and movement of ballot papers, recognising that many of the staff who will be undertaking some of these tasks are not permanent AEC staff, and may not be logistical experts.

All of the forms are considered to be "Essential" for the purposes of integration into the AEC's election management procedures for future elections. However all of the forms could use additional improvements in order to maximise effectiveness. The improvements suggested for each are listed with the forms.

For clarity, the new forms below are divided into those which are usable for future electoral events without additional modification, and those which would benefit from some improvement.

EF001(a): Polling Place Ballot Paper Tracking Form - Senate

The EF001 (a) is designed to track ballot papers from the time they are allocated within the Divisional office (or material preparation area) to a polling place right through to the despatch of the ballot papers for final storage. The steps along the way include; despatch, return of materials, fresh scrutiny, Central Senate Scrutiny and final despatch.

Was it successful?

- The EF001 (a) was successful as it allowed the AEC to demonstrate chain of custody for all ballot papers leaving the AEC office. It also provided a clear chronology of the movement of ballot papers for a particular polling place.

How may it be improved?

- The form design is relatively straight forward however the logistical plans for rural divisions in particular can be quite complex. Thought needs to go into how this form can better support complex logistical arrangements. Some work also needs to be done to ensure rural divisions where possible are using a consistent approach to track change of custody.

Initial conclusion

- Use of the EF001 (a) can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent improvement.

EF001(b): Declaration Count Ballot Paper Tracking Form - Senate

The EF001 (b) is a new form designed to track declaration envelopes, and their associated ballot papers, from after preliminary scrutiny through to despatch of the ballot papers for final storage. The steps along the way include reconciling envelopes, receipt of envelopes by appropriate staff, scrutiny, Central Senate Scrutiny and despatch to final storage.

Was it successful?

- The EF001 (b) was successful in allowing the AEC to demonstrate chain of custody for all declaration envelopes and their associated ballot papers. It also provided a clear chronology of the movement of ballot papers for a particular declaration count.

How may it be improved?

- The form assumed that fresh scrutiny would be conducted on the ballot papers at the same time as the initial scrutiny. While this in essence is correct, on occasion fresh scrutiny was done the next day due to time constraints and this should be reflected on the form. Another area which may require refinement is the tracking of envelopes from preliminary scrutiny to further scrutiny. More work could also be done to aid with the balancing of declaration vote counts.

Initial conclusion

- Use of the EF001 (b) can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent improvement.

The EF001(c) tracks ballot boxes and stocks of unused ballot papers from a pre-poll voting centre (PPVC) or mobile team that are returned to a central point for secure overnight storage.

[illegible]

- The form enabled ballot boxes containing votes and unused ballot papers to be tracked between polling venues and storage in the Divisional office or out-posted centre. However, as the different needs and arrangements for storage of ballot papers and ballot boxes became clear during the early voting period, it was evident that the form didn't suit all scenarios (e.g. a modified form had to be designed for use by airport PPVCs because of the unique nature of their ballot paper allocations and return). Some cells in the form were too small making it difficult for staff to fill in.

Page 13 Keely Implementation Taskforce | Evaluation of Interim Measures Implemented for WA

- Consideration might need to be given to making this two forms rather than one. If not, the design and layout of the form needs to be significantly revised. The seal record could potentially be removed and replaced with a check box to indicate that the seal record on the ballot box is intact & no seals have been removed.

Initial conclusion

- Use of the EF001(c) can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent improvements.
- Ultimately there is a need for this form in order to track ballot boxes and unused ballot papers stored away from the Officer in Charge (OIC) overnight and also to keep a log of full ballot boxes returned to the Division ahead of counting. PPVC and mobile ballot box and unused ballot paper movement *must* be thoroughly tracked.

EF001(d): Ballot Paper Transport Exception Record

The EF001(d) was designed to provide staff with a generic form which allowed the tracking of ballot papers in any scenario that was not covered within the suite of other EF001 tracking forms.

Was it successful?

- The EF001(d) proved beneficial in many areas such as rural areas with complex logistical plans. The EF001(d) was successful as it provided staff with the flexibility required to complete their logistical plans but still demonstrate chain of custody.

How may it be improved?

Minor formatting improvements were suggested through the WA staff feedback process.

Initial conclusion

- Use of the EF001(d) can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation.

EF001(e): PPVC/Mobile Team Ballot Paper Tracking Form – Senate

The EF001(e) was designed to track ballot papers from the time they were allocated within the Divisional office (or material prep area) to a PPVC or mobile team right through to the despatch of the ballot papers for final storage. The steps along the way included; despatch, return of materials (Friday night), fresh scrutiny, Central Senate Scrutiny and final despatch. The form was very similar to the EF001(a) but was altered to capture the return of ballot papers on the Friday night after polling had completed.

Was it successful?

- The EF001(e) was successful as it allowed the AEC to demonstrate chain of custody for all ballot papers leaving the AEC office. It also provided a clear chronology of the movement of ballot papers for a particular PPVC or mobile team.

How may it be improved?

- The form design is relatively straight forward however the logistical plans for rural divisions in particular can be quite complex. Thought needs to go into how this form can better support complex logistical arrangements. Some work also needs to be done to ensure rural divisions where possible are using a consistent approach to track change of custody. While the form allowed for early return of ballot papers (generally the Friday before polling day) some more work is required to ensure the form is designed to capture as many logistical permutations as possible.

Initial conclusion

- Use of the EF001(e) can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent improvement.

EF009: Ballot Paper Security Direction and Acknowledgement – polling staff

Polling staff who received face-to-face training were required to sign an acknowledgement that they understand and will uphold the AEC's ballot paper security principles regarding the sanctity of the ballot paper.

Was it successful?

- This form was one of a number of items to communicate and reinforce the ballot paper sanctity and security message. The aim of the document was to convey and reinforce the ballot paper sanctity message to senior polling officials and to communicate the expectation of compliance. Signing of the document was preceded by the inclusion of a presentation of targeted messaging at the face-to-face Training of Polling Staff (TOPS) (see Section 4.15.3.3).
- This measure was well received by senior polling officials and easy to implement. It provides an assurance to the AEC that senior polling officials have understood the ballot paper sanctity message and have signed that they understand their role in ensuring compliance and security.

How may it be improved?

- In time, Keelty specific references will be removed but the overall concept and messaging should remain. The form may also be adjusted somewhat based on further legal advice.

Initial conclusion

- Use of the EF009 for polling staff can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation, eventually without the Keelty specific references.

EF009: Ballot Paper Security Direction and Acknowledgement – non-polling staff

All non-polling staff who may – in the course of their duties – handle ballot papers signed an acknowledgement that they understand and will uphold the AEC's ballot paper security principles regarding the sanctity of the ballot paper.

Was it successful?

- The forms was successfully deployed at the election and used by staff. This form was one of a number of items to communicate and reinforce the ballot paper sanctity and security message. Having staff sign the undertaking and acknowledgement reinforced the ballot paper sanctity message, communicated the gravity of the issue and helped to ensure staff accountability. It has also provided the AEC with evidence that staff agreed to ensure the sanctity of ballot papers and undertake this role.

How may it be improved?

- In time, Keelty specific references will be removed but the overall concept and messaging should remain.
- The form proved to be a useful tool to assure the AEC of understanding and compliance of the ballot paper sanctity message.
- Investigate if this form could be combined with the current s202A acknowledgement and undertaking form.

Initial conclusion

- Use of the EF009 for non-polling staff can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation, eventually without the Keelty specific references.

Adjusted EF024 (CSS Consignment Form)

The EF024 was an existing form that was modified to incorporate a more robust custody-tracking section.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The EF024 tracks batches of below-the-line ballot papers from Divisions to Central Senate Scrutiny (CSS). The adjusted form added sign-off areas to enable the tracking of custody between parties in possession of the ballot paper packages and a section for recording consignment note numbers. The form was retained by the Divisional Returning Officer (DRO) and a copy was dispatched inside a plastic sleeve stuck on the cardboard box. The adjusted form advances recommendations 2, 4, 9 and 12 by:
 - Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence by being able to record the transfer of ballot papers at all times under AEC control;
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals', and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling; and
 - Giving practical effect to introduction of processes for the handling of ballot papers 'from cradle to grave'.

Was it successful?

- The adjusted EF024 worked very well and enabled custody to be tracked effectively. The process for using the form was communicated via a slide in operational training then via a WA election bulletin, without this training and extra instruction the form may be misinterpreted.

How may it be improved?

- Consider including instructions on the rear of the form as per the EF001 forms. Reconsider utility of contact information sections on the base of the form.
- CSS planning is done at a state level and there would need to be some assurance that this is done consistently to ensure the EF024 is appropriate for use across states.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the adjusted EF024 can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent improvements.

EF124 (a): Ballot Paper Despatch: Printer to AEC Location Manifest

The EF124 (a) form was utilised in the Griffith by-Election to track the movement of ballot papers between the printer and AEC office. For the WA half-Senate election KIT mandated its use for all WA printer despatches. The EF124(a) was an existing form which was modified to better represent the rigour required around despatching ballot papers from the printer to AEC offices.

Was it successful?

- The form was successful as it was the means to provide a consistent approach toward demonstrating a chain of custody from the printer to the courier to the AEC office. When the form was used for interstate despatches the initial handover was not correctly reflected on the form. This was quickly identified and corrected. This oversight does not impact on the usefulness or success of the form rather a breakdown in communication between staff and the transport contractor. The situation was rectified once identified.

How may it be improved?

- The form primarily deals with ballot papers at the carton level which works well. Unfortunately one section of the form did not specify that the packages were tracked at the package level. This caused minor confusion and is easily fixed through a minor text change.

Initial conclusion

- Use of the EF124 (a) can be expanded for implementation in a full electoral event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent improvements.

EF124 (b): Ballot Paper Despatch: AEC Location to Storage Manifest

The EF124 (b) form was utilised to track movement of ballot papers between the AEC office and storage warehouse. It tracked ballot paper packages at box level and provided for sign-off by all parties taking possession of the ballot paper packages. In the WA context it supplemented the use of Toll Lite consignment noting on all packages.

Was it successful?

- The EF124 (b) was very successful. Once a project plan was decided upon, the original form only required some minor adjustments to enable recording of

consignment notes for each pallet being despatched; this gave an additional level of tracking. The form actually provided a record of the physical number of ballot papers leaving a Division, then tracked their custody at ballot box level through the courier to the warehouse, and also provided a record of where those pallets were racked. The process for utilising the form was communicated via an instruction document including photos which was an important attributor to the form's success.

How may it be improved?


- Consider including instructions on the rear of the form as per the EF001 forms. Section for recording consignment note at pallet level probably won't be relevant as that was a state-specific requirement. However some other form of free-text area or adjustable space will allow states to insert their own requirements about how pallets are racked at the warehouse.
- With some minor system enhancements to assist in determining the final BP figure this form is able to be used at subsequent events. Final storage planning is done at a state level and there would need to be some assurance that this is done consistently to ensure the EF124 (b) is appropriate for use across states. Otherwise the form is scalable with refinement.

5.2 Ballot Paper Packaging and Labelling

5.2.1 Adjusted Packaging Labels

Existing packaging labels for election materials returned from polling places, PPVCs and mobile polling teams were redesigned to improve consistency and to add a witness signature section and declaration that the contents were packaged correctly. In addition, a label for the despatch of ballot paper packages to OICs was created.

Image 4. Polling place labels



How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The use of the labels advance recommendations 2, 4, 9, 12 and 22 by:
 - Giving practical effect to the application of national standards for the parcelling and packaging of ballot papers; the counterchecking and countersigning of the number of components of parcels and packages as an additional assurance measure
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals', and by introducing a form control relating to the allocation of ballot papers;
 - Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Giving practical effect to the introduction of processes for the handling of ballot papers 'from cradle to grave'; and
 - Giving practical effect to ensuring that labelling is tamper-proof, accountable, consistently applied and legible.

Was it successful?

- The labels facilitated the ballot packages being labelled consistently across all divisions, which enabled a better-organised way of allocating ballot papers to OICs.
- The counterchecking and countersigning of package labels was successful as added measures to confirm the contents of election material packages.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with minor improvements.

How may it be improved?

- Changes need to be made to Label 6 (for parcels of senate ballot papers) to clarify what information is required. There were different interpretations amongst AEC staff regarding this which resulted in different information being provided to polling staff.
- Training for permanent and temporary staff should be considered with regards to the completion of the ballot paper labels due to the major adjustment.
- Examples of how to complete the labels could also be included in the Election Procedures Handbooks (EPHs).
- The remaining packaging labels (Labels 5, 7 and 9 -12) should also be modified for consistency
- The signing and countersigning of a large number of ballot paper parcels may be onerous for staff who have worked a long day. The AEC should consider seeking legislative change regarding ballot paper parcelling that retains the integrity elements of the current provisions, yet provides for a more efficient work practice.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the adjusted packaging labels can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent improvements.

5.2.2 Ballot Paper Final Storage Label

A unique label was developed for adhesion to cardboard boxes prior to despatch to final storage. The label enables quick identification of the contents of ballot paper packages.

Image 5. Final Storage Label

AEC
Australian Electoral Commission

Division

FINAL STORAGE – PACKAGE SENATE BALLOT PAPERS

Polling Place, PPVC, Mobile Team, Declaration Count, Divisional Office reserve etc.

Package _____ of _____

14_0356 THIS LABEL MUST BE PLACED ON THE END OF THE STORAGE BOX

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The final storage label for adhesion on final ballot paper storage boxes advances recommendations 2, 12, 22 and 23 by:
 - Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence; in this case, final storage;
 - Introducing processes for the handling of ballot papers 'from cradle to grave';
 - Employing labelling that is able to be applied consistently; and
 - Providing informed options for the review of packaging policies.

Was it successful?

- The label successfully provided a method for clearly identifying the contents of final ballot paper storage boxes. The label did not fit the Toll consignment barcode (which had to remain intact with the rest of the consignment note and was therefore placed on top of the cardboard box), but the free text area was used for another purpose instead (to record the pallet number as a cross-check) and worked quite well. The process for utilising the label was communicated via an instruction document including photos which was an important attributor to the label's success.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, but with some adjustments.

How may it be improved?

- The label needs to be re-designed to increase the size (dependent on final storage boxes procured for national use at the next event) and increase the space to record the Division. The terminology 'package __ of __' may be misinterpreted in the absence of clear instructions on usage too (i.e. some may think it refers to number of packages for that polling place rather than the number in the overall sequence for the Division).
- Final storage planning is done at a state level and there would need to be some assurance that this is done consistently to ensure the label is appropriate for use across states. Otherwise the label is scalable with refinement.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the Final Storage Label can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation once determinations have been made on final storage boxes being utilised for the next event and warehousing options moving forward. KIT notes that the label may need significant review if a decision is made to outsource final storage of ballot paper packages.

5.2.3 Tamper evident labels

Tamper evident labels were created for use on packages containing ballot papers. The labels were designed to be fixed over the packaging tape so that if the packaging tape was removed or cut the tamper evident label would also be damaged.

Image 7. Tamper evident label

AEC Australian Electoral Commission		TAMPER EVIDENT LABEL	
	Signature	Date	
Labelled by			
Label broken by			
		REASON TO BREAK LABEL <input type="checkbox"/> Check count of unused BPs <input type="checkbox"/> Fresh scrutiny <input type="checkbox"/> Access unused BPs <input type="checkbox"/> Recount <input type="checkbox"/> Parcel reconciliation <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify "Other"	

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The use of tamper evident labels advances recommendations 2, 13 and 22 by:
 - Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence by being able to record the transfer of ballot papers at all times under AEC control;
 - Using tamper evident material for the transfer and storage of ballot papers; and

- Employing tamper-proof labelling that is able to be applied consistently.

Was it successful?

- Conceptually the labels were successful as staff understood the purpose of the label and it was widely used as per the intent, which was to be a tamper evident product that recorded the reason for opening of the box rather than a tamper proof product. Further refinement and training should alleviate the few instances of staff confusion as to proper use that were observed.
- The provision of a how-to-use guidance document was effective in that the majority of staff applied the labels as per the instructions.
- The use of professionally produced, high-tack self-adhesive labels was a significant improvement from the Griffith by-election, where labels were of a poorer quality and less user friendly.
- There were still a number of instances where the labels did not adhere well.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with further improvements.

How may it be improved?

- There were reports that some of the labels came unpeeled due to the heat. The market should be investigated for tamper-evident and tamper-proof labelling material suitable for the AEC's needs.
- The application instructions should be reviewed to apply to different types of boxes used. Some boxes used in the WA half-Senate election had more than one area where the contents could be accessed, and some staff applied labels to all, while others strictly followed the guidance.
- Explore additional tamper evident products for possible use (i.e. tamper evident door labels for use in ballot secure zones).

Initial conclusion

- Essential. The use of tamper evident labels can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent improvements.

5.2.4 Use of cardboard boxes to despatch and return ballot papers from polling places

Cardboard boxes were utilised for the despatch from the printer, and to OICs of polling places. Additional cardboard boxes were supplied to supplement polling place cardboard inventory for the return of ballot papers. Note that the initial cardboard boxes were supplied by the printer and were of a light manufacture not intended for re-use following receipt at the polling place. The additional cardboard boxes were of a heavier and more robust manufacture for the return of ballot papers. In previous elections ballot papers were returned in heavy duty plastic bags.

Image 10. Return of ballot papers from polling places



How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The use of cardboard boxes in this context advances recommendations 2, 9, 12 and 23 by:
 - Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence; in this case the transfer from the polling place through the fresh scrutiny process to final storage;
 - Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Introducing processes for the handling of ballot papers 'from cradle to grave'; and

- Providing informed options for the review of packaging policies.

Was it successful?

- The measure was successful. Feedback from polling officials and officers present at return of materials on polling night reported that ballot papers in boxes was an improvement in identification and handling. Note that in concert with this measure was the parcelling of ballot papers inside the cardboard boxes. Because of the parcelling, securing the parcels in a cardboard box package enabled efficient verification of receipt of ballot papers.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with some improvements.

How may it be improved?

- Decisions to utilise the cardboard boxes for return of ballot papers was made late. Consequently some deliveries to remote and regional polling places were unable to be achieved. In the future cardboard boxes can become part of the polling place cardboard inventory and this issue should not be repeated.
- The quality and design of cardboard boxes is a consideration. WA operations procured cardboard boxes from a local supplier, which were of a heavier board grade than what was supplied by the ballot paper printer and were suitable for purpose.
- Guidance is required as to how much weight or how many ballot papers should be in the box. Some were 'overloaded'.
- Exercises in assembly of the cardboard boxes would be a beneficial component of training of polling staff (as with all cardboard, and ballot box assembly).

Initial conclusion

- Essential. This measure can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends further investigation into packaging options for securely and neatly enclosing ballot paper despatches, then wider implementation of the policy.

5.2.5 Use of plastic bags for creation of individual sealed candidate / group parcel for used Senate ballot papers

For the WA Senate election, purpose-manufactured plastic bags were used to meet the parcelling requirements of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (Electoral Act), in particular the legislative requirement that each parcel of ballot papers must be separately sealed and labelled with a description of its contents. Pre-election estimates were that some 80,000 separate parcels may be required across WA to meet the requirements of the Electoral Act. It was decided to secure parcels of ballot papers by means of plastic bags that were specifically manufactured to hold Senate ballot papers.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The use of plastic bags in this context advance recommendations 2, 9, 12, 13 and 23 by:
 - Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence; in this case the transfer from the polling place through the fresh scrutiny process to final storage;
 - Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Introducing processes for the handling of ballot papers 'from cradle to grave';
 - Using tamper evident material for the transfer and storage of ballot papers and;
 - Providing informed options for the review of packaging policies.

Was it successful?

- The implementation of this measure successfully ensured that ballot papers were properly parcelled in accordance with the Electoral Act and properly packaged to meet the relevant Keelty recommendations. There were many reports from OICs however that the packaging materials supplied were not easy to use and resulted in extra time taken at polling places to pack up at the conclusion of the scrutiny. Similar issues were reported at fresh scrutiny and when ballot papers were packaged for long-term storage.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with improvements.

How may it be improved?

- Packaging materials that support the more efficient preparation of ballot paper parcels are likely to be readily available, or capable of being manufactured in the quantities required for an election. Investigations with the suppliers of packaging materials should be undertaken to identify the best materials for this purpose.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. This measure can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event, but a more efficient means of parcelling ballot papers is likely to be available and should be investigated. KIT recommends the investigation of alternative parcelling options to enable compliance with the Electoral Act and secure packaging and transport of ballot papers.

5.2.6 Application of consignment notes on all packages containing ballot papers

The AEC mandated that as a result of the Keelty Report all packages containing ballot papers, regardless of how they were transported by a commercial courier, be consignment noted. This was to occur whether they were part of a bulk deliver (by truckload or pallet) or whether it was a direct despatch.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The despatch of ballot papers directly to interstate Divisions advances recommendation 4, 9, 12 and 22 by:
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals', and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Introducing processes for the handling of ballot papers 'from cradle to grave'; and
 - Employing labelling that is able to be applied consistently.

Was it successful?

- The measure was successful but there are some limitations to its effectiveness when delivering in bulk on direct despatch services and in cases when manual consignment notes had to be used for operational reasons.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with some improvements.

How may it be improved?

- Refinements to streamline the process further would assist both the AEC and the commercial service providers
- When delivering material in bulk by the pallet by a commercial contractor a number of the internal KIT designed ballot paper transfer forms could, with minor modification, be used as a substitute consignment note or manifest, in particular, where the AEC engaged the commercial courier to deliver the bulk delivery of ballot papers from the printers and the transfer of the ballot papers to final storage.
- Both instances involved a direct despatch by Division and delivered at the pallet level. The EF124 and ballot paper register provided sufficient information that with minor modification they could be used for manifest purposes. The investigation of a more streamlined process should be considered, so that the benefits of commercial consignment notes and the AEC's internal manifest could be combined in the one document.
- The return of polling place material from OIC/polling places to the divisional off site premises post polling day (Saturday night and Sunday) is undertaken by means of dedicated vehicles (aircraft and/or trucks) through the engagement of the commercial contractor. This area needs greater review to ensure greater consistency of process across the state/country.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. In principle this can be implemented in a full federal event however there will need to be discussions and/or contract amendments with commercial contractors to ensure compliance and understanding. KIT recommends further exploration of track and trace options (this is currently underway via a consultant's scoping study on secure ballot paper transport).

5.3 Training and Ballot Paper Principles

5.3.1 Ballot Paper Principles poster

The Acting Electoral Commissioner sent an email to all AEC staff containing a Ballot Paper Principles poster and explanatory text outlining the implications for the agency of the Keelty Report on 20th January 2014.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- Developing and disseminating the Ballot Paper Principles to all permanent AEC staff advances recommendations 9, 12 and 25 by:
 - Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Giving practical effect to the introduction of processes for the handling of ballot papers ‘from cradle to grave’; and
 - Adopting a ‘ballot paper doctrine’ that emphasises the security and sanctity of ballot papers and underpins all aspects of the AEC’s election operations.

Was it successful?

- The poster is on display in all AEC offices and in temporary AEC out-posted centres in use for the WA half-Senate election.
- It effectively communicates the ballot paper doctrine to which the AEC adheres.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes

How may it be improved?

- Broader circulation of the Ballot Paper Principles, via display on AEC computer desktops, in signature block branding, embedded in training material etc. would further the effectiveness of this measure. A more concise version should be considered for this wider application.
- The posters were also printed using the local AEC printers. Consideration should be given to having them printed professionally for a more refined appearance, emphasising its importance.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. The Ballot Paper Principles poster should be in all AEC offices. Dissemination of the principles to all permanent and temporary AEC staff can be done at any time. KIT recommends its continued use and further promotion and awareness through different channels.

5.3.2 Email to WA polling staff

An email was sent to all confirmed Western Australian polling staff to reinforce an important message that was included as an addendum to the Election Procedures Handbook (EPHs). The message outlined the AEC’s renewed focus on ballot paper integrity and security resulting from the Keelty Report’s recommendations.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- Disseminating the key ballot paper security messages to polling officials advances recommendations 9, 14 and 27 by:
 - Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling
 - Specifying and defining the role of employees at every stage of the ballot handling process; and
 - The AEC assuring itself, to the best of its ability, of the political neutrality of all persons handling ballot papers.

Was it successful?

- The email was one of a number of messaging channels utilised for the ballot paper sanctity message and was received well by polling officials. The email communicated the message to polling officials who did not attend the face-to-face training and reinforced the message for those who did.
- There was liaison with People Services Branch (PSB) about the method of delivery. PSB developed a set of detailed instructions for each division to send their own emails to their confirmed polling staff. Given the workload of the WA divisions during the election this was not an optimal solution. To reduce divisional workload an external agency was engaged and sent the email on behalf of divisions.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes.

How may it be improved?

- Agreement on the process of delivery is required. Consider options for central distribution.
- Consider testing the message on a diverse audience to identify improvements in delivering the message's key components to ensure universal understanding.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. The email to polling staff can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event via central distribution. KIT recommends its ongoing use at electoral events be done centrally in order not to impose extra workload on divisions.

5.3.3 Additional Training of Polling Staff (TOPS) slides relating to ballot paper security

The inclusion of additional slides in the existing TOPS training slideshow outlined the changes implemented as a result of the Keelty recommendations

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- Enhanced and additional training for polling officials advances recommendations 9, 14, 27 and 31 by:
 - Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Specifying and defining the role of employees at every stage of the ballot handling process;
 - The AEC assuring itself, to the best of its ability, of the political neutrality of all persons handling ballot papers; and
 - Improving learning and development processes and content.

Was it successful?

- Feedback received from polling staff indicated that the addition of the TOPS slides proved successful in communicating the ballot paper security and accountability message in a consistent manner across divisions. The slides were used in training sessions of senior polling officials and were followed with the signing of the acknowledgement and undertaking (EF009). In addition, ballot paper security information was provided in a handout.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes

How may it be improved?

- No improvements identified at this stage, noting two issues. One, no matter how staff are advised and instructed, some staff will not always understand the message as intended, and the AEC needs to further consider how to ensure the best possible method of delivering training information to ensure compliance, and; two any additional slides or information incorporated into the existing TOPS session will result in time constraints. Training for polling staff via all mediums needs to be reviewed to ensure effectiveness. Ballot paper security messaging should be integrated throughout all polling official training rather than be delivered as a stand-alone message only.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the slides relating to ballot paper security can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation, following a review of polling staff training in general and in the context of the AEC's Learning and Development (L&D) blueprint.

5.3.4 Election Procedures Handbook addendum

A one-page addendum (See Appendix C) was included in the Election Procedures Handbook (EPH) to highlight to all polling staff the AEC's renewed focus on, and expectations regarding, the sanctity of ballot papers.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The addendum to the EPH advances recommendations 9, 14 and 27 by:
 - Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Specifying and defining the role of employees at every stage of the ballot handling process; and
 - The AEC assuring itself, to the best of its ability, of the political neutrality of all persons handling ballot papers.

Was it successful?

- The addendum was one of a number of measures to communicate the ballot paper sanctity message to all polling officials. Used with the suite of other measures, the addendum was designed to ensure that polling officials understood the gravity of the Keelty recommendations and the AEC's commitment to ensuring the sanctity of the ballot paper.
- This addendum was supported by a 'just-in-time' email (discussed in Section 5.3.3) sent to polling officials with the same messaging, an explanation of the new measures in the polling official face-to-face training sessions, and a ballot paper security direction and acknowledgement that was signed by all polling officials who attended a face-to-face training session.
- The addendum was the first page of all the EPHs and was printed on yellow paper for prominence.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes.

How may it be improved?

No necessary improvements have been identified at this stage beyond integration of the messaging into the EPH itself. In time, Keelty specific references will be removed but the overall concept and messaging should remain.

Initial conclusion

- Useful. The permanent integration of the addendum in the EPH can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation.

5.3.5 Ballot secure zone guidance & posters

A guidance document was developed to provide staff with information and guidance around the implementation of ballot paper secure zones for the WA half-Senate election. Posters were also developed for display in these zones: one for use in polling locations and another for use in AEC Offices and out-posted centres.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The ballot secure zone guidance advances recommendations 4, 10, 11 and 21 by:
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals', and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Instituting a concept of 'ballot secure zones' at all premises where ballot papers are handled or stored;
 - Ensuring ballot secure zones are cleared before the arrival of ballot papers and that they remain secure and 'sterile' at all times when ballots are present; and
 - Ensuring instructions and planning documents are sufficiently detailed.

Was it successful?

- The implementation of ballot secure zones across WA was very successful. KIT were consulted in a number of scenarios (i.e. ballot secure zone for the state postal voting cell; creation of interim ballot secure zones for return of materials) to determine the best approach to creating a ballot secure zone, thus demonstrating engagement with the concept. The policy of creating ballot secure zones was also implemented outside WA for the storage of ballot papers in interstate Divisions acting as pre poll voting centres. Confirmation that these were in place was received from State Managers.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with minor improvements.

How may it be improved?

- The guidance could be made more specific around the creation of ballot secure zones, particularly in polling places, Divisional offices and National and State offices.
- The document would also benefit from the inclusion of viable alternatives to lockable rooms in out-posted centres (i.e. cages, lockable pallets, temporary rooms etc.).
- The range of posters available will need to be expanded to allow for the range of scenarios where a ballot secure zone must be created.
- Procurement of a cardboard product branded 'no unauthorised access' for use as ballot secure zones for unused ballot papers in polling places should be considered.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the ballot secure zone policy can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent improvements.

5.3.6 Ballot paper management guides

A handout was given to polling place OICs and team leaders during their face to face training. The handout covered new ballot paper handling procedures introduced for the WA half-Senate election, including transport and storage of ballot papers, ballot paper secure zones, tamper evident labels and packaging of ballot papers for return to the DRO. Three versions of the ballot paper management guide were created: static, mobile and PPVC.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The ballot paper management guides advance recommendations 4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15 and by:
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals' and, by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Instituting a concept of 'ballot secure zones' at all premises where ballot papers are handled or stored;

- Introducing processes for the handling of ballot papers ‘from cradle to grave’
- Specifying and defining the role of employees at every stage of the ballot handling process; and
- Providing written instructions to individuals in specified roles.

Was it successful?

- It was a successful method of introducing new procedures and materials that were finalised too late to be included in polling official home based training content or the EPH. By discussing the new procedures in the face to face training and providing a handout, OICs/team leaders had a guide to refer to during polling if needed.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, although with minor improvements.

How may it be improved?

- Further instructions could have been included for completing Label 6 as this caused some confusion (even amongst the KIT and KITE teams). However changes being made to Label 6 will help remove the confusion as the Label itself will provide a lot more instruction to users.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. The guides can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. It is low cost, easily distributed and easily maintained. However it may not be needed as the new information can be included in the polling officials training and handbooks, reducing the requirement for a separate handout that could be misplaced. The only reason this could not happen for the WA event was the new procedures were implemented after printing and release of training materials.
- KIT recommends integration of the information contained in the ballot paper management guides into polling official training and materials. Disseminating key information to polling officials via hard copy handout at face-to-face training is a good method for delivering information or guidance that has been omitted from core materials. This would be a useful approach in the instance where legislative change occurs late in the electoral cycle, after training materials have been developed and printed.

5.3.7 Instruction documents for DROs regarding ballot paper movement

Owing to the new tracking and packing measures implemented for the WA Senate event and the intersection of those measures with WA-specific requirements for strict consignment noting and documentation through Toll, a set of instruction documents was developed for DROs to provide clear guidance on the new requirements for ballot paper movement during key activities.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The ballot paper management guides advance recommendations 4, 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15 by:
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are ‘logistics professionals’ and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Giving practical effect to instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Instituting a concept of ‘ballot secure zones’ at all premises where ballot papers are handled or stored;
 - Introducing processes for the handling of ballot papers ‘from cradle to grave’
 - Specifying and defining the role of employees at every stage of the ballot handling process; and
 - Providing written instructions to individuals in specified roles.

Was it successful?

- The instruction documents were progressively made available to staff and successfully provided a central reference point for a set of diverse requirements. The outcome of WA staff evaluation processes (currently underway) will determine the extent to which staff found the documents useful.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, however there should not be a need for these sorts of documents at full federal events in future, as the advice will be contained in standard manuals etc, and not need to be supplementary advice.

How may it be improved?

- Ultimately there should not be a need for these kinds of documents. The WA scenario was unique because new measures were being implemented that needed to take account of existing operational requirements defined by the WA State Office. The outcome of WA staff evaluation processes will determine what sort of improvements could have been made to these particular instructions.

Initial conclusion

- Not required. This measure cannot be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. These documents served a critical purpose for the WA event but should not be required in future events provided national policy and procedure documents are sufficiently clear and thorough.

5.4 Contracts and Premises

5.4.1 Minimum Standards and Operational Guidelines for Out-posted Centres

The Minimum Standards document provides guidance on procuring a suitable venue for a range of election tasks undertaken outside the Divisional Office. The document includes reference to security, egress, accessibility and exclusive use by the AEC.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- Establishing Minimum Standards and Operational Guidelines for Out-posted Centres advances recommendations 3, 20 and 21 by:
 - Introducing systems that reduce the movement of ballot papers;
 - Revising guidelines regarding the suitability of premises; and
 - Ensuring instructions and planning documents are sufficiently detailed.

Was it successful?

- The guidelines document was successful. The guidelines provided managers with direction on the type of premises they should procure for an electoral event. Managers in WA consulted this document to inform their decision making.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with some adjustments.

How may it be improved?

- Revise assessment of space required based on experience in WA and Griffith; revise/expand risk management matrix; consider how this policy fits with the existing polling place inspection tools.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the guideline can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends guidance documents should be incorporated into relevant process guides such as the Election Procedures Manual (EPM).
- It is noted that the AEC makes every endeavour to obtain ideal premises for the conduct of an electoral event. However, the AEC is subject to the variables of local property markets across the country

5.4.2 Improved rigour relating to the use of visitor's registers at all AEC sites

The AEC Visitor Access, Implementation and Usage Policy is in line with the Protective Security Policy Framework PHYSEC-5 where visitor registers are operational at all AEC offices. The message was reinforced through an item on the AEC Intranet to all staff in January 2014.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- Improved rigour relating to the use of visitor registers advances recommendations 9 to 13, 19 and 20 by:
 - Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Introducing processes for the handling of ballot papers 'from cradle to grave';
 - Developing and applying improvements to national and state warehousing management practices; and

Was it successful?

- Within the context of the WA event the visitor register concept was successful in demonstrating that the AEC was tracking all individuals and administering a traceable register.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with improvements.

How may it be improved?

- The main area which requires improvement is around the consistent approach to the content of the register. Many sites had adjusted the mandated register by adding or removing fields. Additionally, moving forward with this concept the AEC must consider privacy implications regarding the recording of names and personal detail on a register which can be viewed by any individual signing in.
- The person responsible for controlling the register must be aware of current security policy.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. A new version of the visitor declaration has recently been rolled out across the AEC by the Agency Security Advisor. This can be printed on site and meets privacy requirements.

5.4.3 Allocating Ballot Box Guards to all polling places

For the WA half-Senate election, ballot box guards were assigned to all polling places. To address this measure approximately 200 additional ballot box guard positions over those employed at the 2013 election were required across Western Australian polling places.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The allocation of ballot box guards at all polling places advances measures to meet recommendations 9 to 14:
 - Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Instituting a concept of 'ballot secure zones' at all premises where ballot papers are handled or stored;

Was it successful?

- This measure was successful where the initiative was properly understood by the OIC and polling official. For example ballot box guards were observed to be standing close to the ordinary ballot box and actively ensuring that voters deposited their ballot papers before leaving the booth. Full boxes were appropriately transferred to the ballot secure zone.
- There were some instances where declaration vote ballot boxes were observed to be unattended for a period, or it wasn't obvious which was the ordinary ballot box and which was the declaration box, resulting in some confusion for electors. In some cases the presence of the ballot box guard certainly stopped unenveloped declaration votes being incorrectly placed in the ballot box.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with some improvements.

How may it be improved?

- The initiative was well understood by the OICs with appropriate use being made of the additional staff member. Some further work is required to ensure the security of all declaration vote ballot boxes.

Initial conclusion

- Useful. KIT recommends further cost/benefit analysis to determine whether this is implemented in full at the next federal election.

5.4.4 Review of all contracts relating to the WA half-Senate election

A review of contracts relating to the WA half-Senate Election was undertaken (the Review).

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The Review advanced recommendations 6, 7, 9 and 27 by:
 - Supporting AEC staff with contract management responsibilities;
 - Conducting a quality assurance process for relevant contracts prior to the WA half-Senate election;
 - Highlighting contractual provisions around the movement and secure storage of AEC Material and Contract Material; and
 - Providing a mechanism for the AEC to assure itself, to the best of its ability, of the political neutrality of all persons handling ballot papers.

Was it successful?

- The Review was successful in identifying:
 - the end dates for relevant contracts, ensuring the AEC could access required goods/services to conduct the WA half-Senate Election;
 - whether political neutrality clauses were included in the contract; and
 - contractual security requirements, particularly with respect to contracts involving ballot papers.

- Following the Review, where appropriate, suppliers were reminded of the AEC's political neutrality requirements and asked to sign Deeds of Confidentiality and Political Neutrality. For example, on request AEC suppliers that handled or had access to premises where ballot papers were held (eg. printer, cleaner and freight suppliers) signed a Deed of Confidentiality and conflict of interest in relation to all services they provided to the AEC.
- The Review also identified general security requirements contained in the contracts that need to be managed at an operational level, including highlighting security provisions relating to the movement of ballot papers. For example, the Toll contract was varied to enhance the security requirements. Amongst other things, the term "Sensitive Election Material" (eg. Ballot papers, certified lists etc.) was defined and additional security requirements when freighting this material were specifically addressed in the variation.
- While a Review of this nature can support contract managers and potentially mitigate contractual issues, the enforcement of the contract provisions relies on contract managers at an operational level.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, the reporting functionality of the Procurement and Contract Management register (the Register) will continue to be refined.

How may it be improved?

- Similar contract review processes would be significantly improved by the use of the Procurement and Contract Management Register (the Register). The Register became mandatory from 20 January 2014. The Register has been expanded to include additional functionality and became operational on 1 July 2014.
- Future Reviews of this nature could be automatically generated based on information that has been entered into the Register. However, this process relies on contract managers accurately entering all contract information into the Register in a timely manner.
- To improve future Reviews of election related contracts, the AEC's Legal, Parliamentary and Procurement Branch will continue to:
 - work with contract managers to ensure all agreements are accurately entered into the Register;

- liaise with Elections Branch to ensure the register identifies all election related contracts;
 - work with IT Solutions to continually improve the Register, including the reporting function; and
 - deliver face-to-face training to AEC Officials on procurement, contract management and use of the Register.
- In addition to effective contract management, the AEC may benefit from developing consistent security requirements for certain contracts, such as ballot paper printing contracts. This would contribute to the implementation of recommendation 9.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. This measure can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends ongoing contract review processes for future electoral events.

5.4.5 24-hour security guard presence at all out-posted centres and State Office for election duration

For the WA half-Senate election a 24-hour security guard presence was implemented at all out-posted centres and State Office for the duration of the event.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The implementation of 24-hour security guards at all out-posted centres and State Office for the duration of the election advances recommendation 9 by:
 - Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling.

Was it successful?

- This measure was successful. It provided a visually obvious form of security and allowed the leasing of premises that could not otherwise have been leased due to insufficient inbuilt security. If security guards are employed 24/7, the use of the cages for storing ballot papers at offsite premises may not be necessary.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with some improvements.

How may it be improved?

- Greater role identification and clarity for security guards and better use of them to do perimeter checks in some premises (for example) and staff attendance lists to provide assurance that the individual presenting themselves had a right to be at the premises.

Initial Conclusion

- Useful. While this measure can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event, and 24 hour security guard presence may be useful in locations where lockable rooms within secure premises do not exist, it is recommended that this, along with other security options be explored to cater for a range of possible circumstances.

5.4.6 Utilisation of cages / temporary rooms as ballot secure zones in out-posted centres

For the WA half-Senate election, any out-posted centre that did not have a lockable room for the secure storage of ballot papers and boxes was required to use portable cages or temporary lockable rooms.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The use of cages / temporary rooms advances recommendations 4, 9, 10, 1, 12 and 20 by:
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals' and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Instituting a concept of 'ballot secure zones' at all premises where ballot papers are handled or stored;
 - Ensuring ballot secure zones are cleared before the arrival of ballot papers and that they remain secure and 'sterile' at all times when ballots are present;
 - Introducing processes for the handling of ballot papers 'from cradle to grave'; and
 - Revising guidelines regarding the suitability of premises.

Was it successful?

- From a public scrutiny perspective the cages and rooms were successful. The temporary lockable rooms used at the CSS site worked well.
- However, working with the cages was hazardous as many were dirty, rusty, had sharp edges, had heavy lids, and were cumbersome to lift and difficult to seal. The cages had to be spaced apart to allow the lids to be opened, which then required additional space. Staff had to continually bend to lift heavy boxes of ballot papers. Some out-posted centres did not have enough room for the number of cages required to store ballot papers and boxes. They were not large enough to store plastic ballot boxes with declaration envelopes.
- Continue to look for better and more efficient storage options that could be monitored by security guards and/or CCTV. The Fresh Scrutiny sites' ballot paper secure zone had restricted access to only those with a 'need to be there'. One site provided staff with orange vests as a brighter and unique visual representation, to differentiate from all other staff in purple vests (see section 4.15.7.3).

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with improvements.

How may it be improved?

- The concept of having a facility to house ballot papers, where a room is not available, remains sound in certain circumstances. A less "industrial" solution might be able to be found that enables the kind of access and repeated movements in restricted spaces experienced during an election.

Initial conclusion

- Useful in certain situations, though a more "fit for purpose" product would need to be sourced. Use of the cages may be difficult to expand for implementation across all sites in a full federal event.
- KIT recommends investigation of alternative options for creating ballot secure zones in out-posted centres where an appropriate lockable room is not available and the creation of a temporary room is not possible.

5.5 Waste Management

5.5.1 Rubbish and Recycling Disposal Processing Guide

The Rubbish and Recycling Disposal Processing Guide provides instructions for the establishment of segregated and labelled rubbish bins and holding bays; necessitates written authorisation of all rubbish and recycling disposal, and instructs staff to retain clean waste and cardboard recycling until the AEO has given authorisation for disposal once the election is completed. The guide is supported by other products discussed in paragraphs 4.1.17, 4.1.18 and 4.1.19.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The establishment and dissemination of the Rubbish and Recycling Disposal Processing Guide advances recommendations 2, 5 and 21 by:
 - Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence; in this case, the segregation of materials for disposal;
 - Introducing a process for disposal of recycling and rubbish which ensures that no ballot material is inadvertently lost or destroyed; and
 - Ensuring instructions and planning documents are sufficiently detailed.

Was it successful?

- The guide was successfully implemented at the WA half-Senate election following the resolution of minor implementation issues that became apparent through the deployment process. Staff utilised the bins, attached labels and sought DRO authorisation as instructed before disposing of rubbish.
- The suggested bin placements were followed, and food/household bins were only placed in kitchen areas.
- Briefing notes to staff and scrutineers were added as appendices to the guide following evaluation of the Griffith by-election implementation, which enabled standard messaging across the state.
- The use of black bin liners for food/household waste only and clear liners for clean waste were effective in quickly identifying the type of waste.
- Polling places that returned rubbish were processed correctly in accordance with the guide.
- Once staff were familiar with the process it was not onerous to dispose of rubbish in accordance with the guide.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with further enhancements.

How may it be improved?

- Training for both permanent and temporary staff on the new process will be essential going forward. There were two instances of non-compliance observed in one of the out-posted centres. Full food/household waste bags were kept in a pile amongst other materials instead of being placed in the designated area. Black bin liners were at times used for clean waste. However, once highlighted the errors were immediately rectified and were not repeated.
- There is also a need to extend the process more rigorously to other AEC premises where ballot materials are placed, particularly National, State and Divisional Offices, and storage facilities / warehouses.
- A more rigorous policy is required for the disposal of AEC branded materials, identifying which items should be securely destroyed and which items can be placed with general rubbish/recycling. Consideration could also be given to having a separate recycling bin for paper products in out-posted centres, for example the AEC's paper recycling services could be extended to election time out-posted centres.
- The eventual disposal of clean waste and recycling should be included in election planning, in order that the AEO authorisation and subsequent collection of the items can be scheduled. It should also be added to the Election Diary.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the policy can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent enhancements.

5.5.2 EF025(a): Record of Rubbish / Recycling Disposed

The EF025(a) is a form used by (Divisional Materials Managers) (DMMs, see Section 4.15.6.1) to seek authority to dispose of rubbish and recycling in out-posted centres. This form works in conjunction with the Rubbish and Recycling Processing Guide, the Waste Disposal Labels and the Waste Area posters discussed in Sections 5.5.1, 5.5.3 and 5.5.4.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The establishment and utilisation of the EF025(a) advances recommendations 2, 5 and 17 by:

- Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence; in this case, the segregation of materials for disposal;
- Introducing a process for disposal of recycling and rubbish which ensures that no ballot material is inadvertently lost or destroyed; and
- Ensuring instructions and planning documents are sufficiently detailed.
- Providing written documentation in order to facilitate compliance checks.

Was it successful?

- Following the resolution of minor issues encountered in the implementation process, EF025(a) was utilised to authorise the disposal of waste for the WA half-Senate election.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, but with minor enhancements.

How may it be improved?

- The form should be reviewed for use in joint-Division out-posted centres where the bins are communally used by participating Divisions, in particular the separate DRO sign-off process. In reality, DROs are signing off for the whole site, not just for their Division. Consideration should be given to the DRO managing the site as the person responsible for sign-off.
- The use of the form should be part of operational training for permanent and temporary staff, so that it is correctly used. One out-posted centre completed a form for each bag that was placed in the designated area, when the form is designed to be completed only at times when the waste is disposed (and one form can record disposal of multiple bags).

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the EF025(a) can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following subsequent enhancements.

5.5.3 EF025(b) – (c): Waste Disposal Labels

These brightly coloured, self-adhesive labels are placed on sealed bags of rubbish which are in turn placed in the designated rubbish holding bay. They provide a visual identification of the contents of sealed rubbish bags. These labels work in conjunction with

the Rubbish and Recycling Processing Guide, form EF025(a) and the Waste Area Posters discussed in paragraphs 5.5.1, 5.5.3 and 5.5.4.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- Providing visual identification of the contents of sealed rubbish bags advances recommendations 2 and 5 by:
 - Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence; in this case, the segregation of materials for disposal; and
 - Introducing a process for disposal of recycling and rubbish which ensures that no ballot material is inadvertently lost or destroyed.

Was it successful?

- EF025(b) and EF025(c) were effective in providing visual identification of the different waste bag types for the WA half-Senate election. This was also enhanced by the use of different coloured bin liners for each type.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, but with minor enhancements.

How may it be improved?

- The bag number field on the label should be reconsidered for use in joint-division out-posted centres. Multiple Divisional Materials Managers (DMMs, see section 4.15.6.1) take carriage of the bags and it is not always easy to know the next number series of the bag to be disposed.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the waste disposal labels can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends their wider implementation following subsequent enhancements.

5.5.4 EF025(d) – (f): Waste Area Posters

The EF025(d), EF025(e) and EF025(f) are posters displayed in designated waste bays in accordance with the Rubbish & Recycling Process Guide. These posters work in conjunction with the Rubbish and Recycling Disposal Processing Guide, form EF025(a) and labels EF025(b) and (c) discussed in paragraphs 5.5.1, 5.5.3 and 5.5.4.

Image 6. Waste Area Posters



How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The display of waste area posters advances recommendations 2, 5 and 17 by:
 - Giving practical effect to the development and application of national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's existence; in this case, the segregation of materials for disposal;
 - Introducing a process for disposal of recycling and rubbish which ensures that no ballot material is inadvertently lost or destroyed; and
 - Ensuring instructions and planning documents are sufficiently detailed.

Was it successful?

- The use of the waste area posters was effective in easily identifying and segregating the different designated waste areas. The posters are colour-coded in accordance with the waste disposal label colours, with an additional colour for cardboard recycling. Although these were professionally printed, the posters can be easily printed in-house.

Is it usable in its current form for future electoral events?

- Yes

How may it be improved?

- No necessary improvements identified at this stage.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. The use of the waste label posters is scalable for a full federal event and KIT recommends their wider implementation.

5.6 Materials Management Roles

5.6.1 Divisional Materials Manager Job Profile

The Divisional Materials Manager's (DMM) role is to undertake and record in the Division Material Manager Log a range of tasks central to secure ballot paper handling and proper rubbish processing.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The creation of the DMM role and their completion of a log advances recommendations 4, 14 and 15 by:
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals', and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Specifying and defining the role of employees at every stage of the ballot handling process; and
 - Providing written instructions to individuals in specified roles.

Was it successful?

- Every WA division successfully implemented the role of the DMM. The DMM position was assigned the responsibility of policing ballot secure zones, facilitating ballot paper tracking, completing key forms and monitoring the disposal of rubbish. In addition to the DMM, WA also implemented a position of State Materials Manager.

Is it usable in its current form for future electoral events?

- Yes, with some improvements.

How may it be improved?

- Consideration to be given to the work level standard and consideration of recruitment options

- Differing models for larger work units will need to be considered
- Sign off on the DRO briefing for the DMM could be monitored to provide assurance that discussion/training has occurred and additional training materials may be useful.
- DMM staff are currently being surveyed as part of the WA election evaluation process. Results of this survey will also be considered.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. KIT recommends the DMM role's wider implementation following subsequent improvements. Sufficient training should be provided to ensure staff are skilled and well-equipped to undertake the role.

5.6.2 Divisional Materials Manager Log

The DMM's role is to undertake and record in the Division Material Manager Log a range of tasks central to secure ballot paper handling and proper rubbish processing.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The creation of the DMM role and their completion of a log advances recommendations 4, 14, 15 and 17 by:
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals', and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Specifying and defining the role of employees at every stage of the ballot handling process;
 - Providing written instructions to individuals in specified roles; and
 - Providing written documentation in order to facilitate compliance checks.

Was it successful?

- DMM logs were completed by all WA divisions. It was observed that some were more detailed than others, and as such the log is being improved to facilitate better completion by staff.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with minor enhancements.

How may it be improved?

- Compliance and monitoring of the completion of the logs is required.

- Results of the DMM survey will also be considered.
- Continue to review content of the log to determine efficacy and facilitate ongoing improvement.
- Include section for DMM authorisation for ballot secure zone access.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the Log can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation following any subsequent improvements.

5.6.3 Implementation of State Materials Manager Position

A State Materials Manager (SMM) was implemented in order to provide a coordination point for Divisional Materials Manager (DMMs). The SMM is responsible for materials movement, packaging, storage, security and disposal of ballot papers. The core duty of the SMM, in collaboration with Operations Managers (OMs) is to certify the safe custody of ballot papers at various points during the election period through the monitoring of ballot paper documentation, principally the EF001. SMMs utilised compliance checklists when visiting out-posted centres and Divisional offices.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The implementation of the SMM position advances recommendations 4, 14, 15 and 17 by:
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals', and introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Specifying and defining the role of employees at every stage of the ballot handling process;
 - Providing written instructions to individuals in specified roles; and
 - Introducing a system of proactive audits to determine compliance.

Was it successful?

- The position was successful in so far that a staff member was allocated responsibility for oversight of ballot paper security. The Job Profile and Materials Management Project Plan, including compliance tools were developed by the assigned officer but there was no clear linkage with DMMs.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with improvements.

How may it be improved?

- The SMM role and classification should be reviewed prior to a full election.
- The duration of the position should also be reviewed, including the optimal commencement time in advance of an anticipated election date to facilitate inclusion in all facets of the ballot paper life cycle.
- There needs to be national standardised compliance tools.
- Provide capacity for SMM to integrate with DMMs and determine lines of responsibility, etc.
- SMM and DMM positions to be provided with training, reference material (ideally included in face to face training with OICs).
- Dependent on the responsibilities and functions assigned to the SMM, some form of compliance checking must be undertaken during the election phase across all electoral sites. Whether this is something that is undertaken by OMs, DROs or SMMs is up for discussion.

Initial conclusion

- Useful. The SMM position can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event under the proviso that appropriate training and support is provided. KIT recommends further evaluation of the SMM position and consideration of the framework for wider implementation in future.

5.7 Staffing

5.7.1 Character checks of all temporary staff

Character checks were implemented for all CEA Employees. In most instances this assessment was completed via a standard police records check, however some staff had already received similar clearances such as emergency service workers or those who work with vulnerable people, and these existing accreditations were accepted. An appropriate Character Clearance Policy was implemented. Support documentation was developed including referencing the requirement in offers of employment, the temporary employment handbook and Collective Determination. A team was established to co-ordinate activities, collect and process paperwork and report outcomes.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The implementation of character checks of temporary staff advances recommendation 9 by:
 - Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling.

Was it successful?

- The task was successful in that just under 95% of all CEA Employees completed a character assessment. An additional 2.5% had provided some paperwork to undertake the clearance but it was incomplete. 0.19% of employee's characters were assessed as not suitable for employment with the AEC and as a result had their employment terminated, or were not employed.
- The public can be assured that AEC polling staff were required to undertake character assessments and that the overwhelming majority of those who worked for us were cleared to do so, especially where those people employed played a supervisory/management role as an officer in charge or a second in charge at a polling booth.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with improvements.

How may it be improved?

- Improvements to the way in which employees provide their information and our access to that information could simplify and speed up the process. (Online form, enhancement to AEC Employment system, more flexible approach to employment offers and accompanying information, online record of outcome and date of clearance would be useful.)
- Ability to provide current National Police Clearance information or other suitable character assessment certification at point of registering interest in employment would reduce the need for last minute processing.
- Requirement to update such information for each electoral event would ensure currency of information.
- Improved interface with and reporting from Crimtrac would improve efficiency and time frames for advising managers of outcomes.

- Paperless records management system to support exchange of information without the requirement to print and retain paper-based records would be an advantage.
- Effective communication with and training of regional staff in the importance of supporting the activity could have improved both the provision of accurate and complete information as well as supporting prospective employees in complying with the requirement in a more timely manner.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. System enhancements and significant process re-design would need to be a feature of this review. KIT recommends that relevant business areas review this measure and consider wider implementation.

5.7.2 Altered allocations for Polling Place Liaison Officers

For the WA half-Senate election, the Polling Place Liaison Officer (PPLO) ratio was altered from 4 to 8 per Division, to increase PPLO visits to polling places so as to ensure adequate supervision and support.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The alteration of PPLO allocations advances recommendation 17 by:
 - Introducing a system of proactive audits to determine compliance.

Was it successful?

- The altered allocation of PPLOs was successful in metropolitan Perth in achieving the goal of increasing the number of visits by PPLOs to polling places. However, the implementation of this initiative has brought into focus the issue of training and selecting PPLOs so as to ensure we can get full value out this initiative (i.e. quality assurance).

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes with some enhancements.

How may it be improved?

- Dedicated training for PPLOs that highlights the key aspects of their role, including promoting key messages and rigorously checking compliance in polling places. Messaging in regards to the role needs to also emphasise post 6.00pm visits to polling places to check progress of counting and any other issues.

Initial conclusion

- Useful. This measure can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends further consideration of changes to PPLO allocations (including in provincial and rural areas) to encourage compliance.

5.7.3 Mandating clear visual identification for all permanent and temporary AEC staff at polling places and out-posted centres

All polling staff, including Polling Place Liaison Officers (PPLOs), and all staff in out-posted centres wore purple AEC branded bibs for the WA half-Senate election.

Image 9. Out-posted centre staff



How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- Clear visual identification of staff advances recommendation 14 of the Keelty Inquiry Report by:
 - Specifying and defining the role of employees (permanent and temporary) at every stage of ballot handling.

Was it successful?

- Feedback indicated that there were a number of positive responses resulting from the implementation of this policy.
 - It made identification of AEC staff in a polling place easier from both the staff and public perspective. At a glance the OIC knew key positions were

in place and operating, such as the ballot box guard and queue controller. It made a snap head-count possible to assist with meal break rostering.

- Members of the public were able to identify AEC staff easily and early on in their voting experience, and therefore people who could be of assistance.
- As far as branding is concerned, it addressed a view that owing to the local nature of traditional AEC distributed operations through the Divisional network, identification of AEC staff through some form of uniformity was called for. The purple bibs met this need in a manner that is sustainable in a largely temporary workforce.
- In a scrutiny centre environment this policy allowed for ‘at a glance’ identification of who were staff and who were scrutineers. It also ensured that only authorised staff wearing purple bibs entered ballot paper secure zones. In the Wangara out-posted centre this identification was taken a step further by having the authorised staff wear orange vests to easily distinguish them from other AEC staff in the purple vests who were not authorised to enter the secure zone, thereby seeking to further address Keelty Recommendations 9-12 in a tangible manner.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with improvements.

How may it be improved?

- Consistent branding is important and appropriate materials should be investigated. Consider that during the election period, WA saw weather forecasts regularly in the high 30 degree Celsius range.
- The disposable “shopping bag” bibs were shapeless and warm. They added another layer of material that in the warm WA climate at the time of the election was inappropriate and increased the risk of heat stress.
- The Spandex© over the head “netball” bibs were better as they allowed for all sizes and the colour was prominent and looked smarter than the disposable bibs. The downside was that again a tight fitting extra layer produced a heat burden on staff that was inappropriate in a WA environment. The same issue for both could also occur in QLD and NT normally and other states around a summer election.
- The smartest looking and best wearing for staff were the fabric “vest” style bibs. They were comfortable and breathable. At the Griffith by-election there was

criticism of due to many personnel not properly doing up the vests, diminishing the effect. This could be addressed by selecting more appropriate sizes, rather than a generic medium size.

- In a Scrutiny Centre environment, there could be advantage in further defining and restricting access to the ballot paper secure area. In Wangara this was done with allocating a small number of orange vests to those undertaking specific roles within the ballot paper secure zone. This exclusion could also be enforced by locating guards at the entrance and briefing both staff and scrutineers that they were not to approach the ballot paper secure area.
- Consideration should also be given to identifying key staff with an alternate colour. In a large work area with many staff it was at times difficult for inexperienced staff to identify an appropriate person for guidance.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. The clear visual identification for AEC staff can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends its wider implementation with varied designs for different roles and following subsequent improvements.

5.8 Other WA election initiatives

5.8.1 Despatch of ballot papers direct to interstate Divisions

It was decided that for the 2014 half-Senate Election ordinary ballot papers printed in Perth would be despatched directly from the printers, to all interstate Divisions. This was a shift from the usual practice of despatching to each State Office or central storage facility, where the ballot papers are then dispersed to all Divisional sites within that State or Territory, and was designed to meet a Keelty recommendation to limit the unnecessary movement of ballot papers. TOLL Logistics was used to collect and then transport the ordinary ballot papers to 81 sites outside of WA. Revised documentation and despatch procedures were to be utilised for the first time with the EF124 (a) being the critical form of documentation to show evidence of chain of custody. This form would be supplemented with the relevant consignment note for TOLL. It was crucial that the EF124 (a) be completed and signed at each stage of the despatch, transport, delivery and receipt process.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The despatch of ballot papers directly to interstate Divisions advances recommendation 3, 4 and 9 by:

- Introducing systems that minimise the movement of ballot papers;
- Acknowledging that not all individuals are ‘logistics professionals’; and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers; and
- Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling.

Was it successful?

- The process was successful in that all ordinary ballot papers were received in the correct locations without any losses.
- A shortcoming in the process was that the courier collecting the consignments was not required to sign in Section 2 of EF124 (a). This essentially created a weaker chain of custody, although this could be reconstructed using the matching consignment note. This caused some confusion at the receiving sites (Divisions) as they received a scanned copy of the EF124 (a) which was not completed properly, as noted above. Some sites attempted to get the delivering courier to sign but this was usually refused.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, provided the despatching paperwork is correctly completed.

How may it be improved?

- Adherence to the despatch instructions and the proper use of the EF124 (a) form.
- Training for staff involved in the process.
- Instructional material (photos, video) on the proper packaging and despatch of ballot papers.
- Strict contract management controls with the printer and logistics provider.

Initial conclusion

- Not required. The practice of direct delivery to all interstate sites may well be expanded for a full federal event, however, other options may be available (e.g. printing the division’s ballot paper requirements locally) and KIT recommends a further, thorough exploration of the best option for interstate ballot paper despatches which ensures compliance with Keelty recommendations.

- KIT also recommends a review of ballot paper movement for Automated Postal Vote Issuing System (APVIS), overseas voting, Australian Defence Force voting (ADF) and Blind and Low Vision (BLV) voting.

5.8.2 Adjustments to the despatch of certified lists

The delivery of Certified Lists for the WA half-Senate election introduced enhanced security measures. These measures included: labelling of all despatches with 'election materials' stickers; use of black shrink-wrap to protect all despatches that were not point-to-point deliveries (Bunbury, Geraldton and Kalgoorlie deliveries were first taken to the courier's Perth service depot, then loaded onto a long distance carrier); and use of the AEC's EF125 form to record the transfer of custody of certified lists between relevant parties.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The implementation of measures to improve the security of certified list despatches does not address any particular recommendation contained in the Keelty Report but demonstrates the AEC's ongoing commitment to quality in all aspects of the agency's operations.

Was it successful?

- The use of 'election materials' labelling ensured that the courier service could identify the nature of the content of the parcel/package and follow appropriate procedures. However, the risks in overtly identifying the contents as election materials should also be considered, i.e. this could result in the ability to target opportunistic fraudulent activity.
- The use of black shrink-wrap intended to conceal the nature of the contents of the packages for secondary courier service handlers for long distance deliveries. There is no feed-back on this matter from the courier service.
- The use of the EF125 ensured that the AEC was able to define the contents of each despatch and permitted the AEC to be instantly alerted to any discrepancy in the contents upon receipt. The counter-signing at each stage of the delivery process identified the party responsible for that particular stage in the process.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, with some adjustments.

How may it be improved?

- The EF125 should include the name of the Division. For single despatches containing contents for multiple Divisions, each Division contained within the despatch should have an individual EF125 defining its contents.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. Use of the EF125 can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends appropriate review of this approach to the despatch of certified list and then wider implementation for the next event.

5.8.3 Revised project plan, materials and procedures for final packaging and transport of ballot papers to warehouse

For the WA half-Senate election a new project plan was developed for the return of ballot papers from the Divisions to the Welshpool warehouse for final storage.

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The revised project plan for final packaging and transport of ballot papers to the warehouse advances recommendations 3, 4, 14, 15 and 17 by:
 - Introducing systems for reducing the movement of ballot papers
 - Acknowledging that not all individuals are 'logistics professionals' and by introducing a form of control relating to the movement of ballot papers;
 - Specifying and defining the role of employees at every stage of the ballot handling process;
 - Providing written instructions to individuals in specified roles; and
 - Introducing a system of proactive audits to determine compliance.

Was it successful?

- This measure was successful. The labelling and the end product with identifiable white boxes produced a very professional product. The strapping and wrapping of pallets resulted in a product far superior to previous experience. A detailed approach to despatch and receipt of ballot paper boxes was also critical to success. Ensuring capacity for despatch (a team of 5-6 with designated roles) and receipt (a team of 3 including receipt coordinator, assistant and forklift driver) was crucial to success. The instructions were very clear and supported by photos.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- Yes, however, there are some planning issues that need to be considered.

How may it be improved?

- Final packaging and return of ballot papers to the warehouse for this event was deliberately planned to occur post Declaration of Poll. This may well be the case for future events. If so, there needs to be a timetable established in advance for final packaging/transport for each Division/LWU at future events. This timetable would need to consider property implications for out-posted premises and staffing capacity for despatch and receipt.
- There was a deliberate strategy to hasten slowly to ensure quality. A two day process was implemented for country Divisions and a one day process was implemented for metropolitan Divisions. While there were benefits in both, the two day process allowed for a first day associated with preparation and checking and second day for final check and despatch. The downside was this did involve the double handling of putting away boxes at the end of day one and then restarting on day two. The despatch of both House of Representatives and Senate packages would lend itself to a two day approach.

Initial conclusion

- Essential. This measure can be expanded for implementation in a full federal event. KIT recommends wider revision of final packaging and transport processes across all states to ensure consistency in the context of the current logistics review undertaken by GRA consultants.

5.8.4 Keelty Implementation Team – Extended (KITE) polling weekend observation team

A group of staff from diverse work groups and states was formed to assist with the Keelty Implementation Evaluation Program on polling weekend. This program was designed to critically review the processes introduced to address recommendations from the Keelty Report. The functions of KITE included:

- Observing operations and compliance with new measures
- Capturing data on operations, compliance, issues and feedback
- Provide assurance and guidance on measures
- Observe temporary workforce (polling place staff) and their management of new initiatives

- Feedback on critical issues and dissemination of information
- Provision of guidance where compliance could be improved
- Evaluation of the program

How did the measure seek to assist meeting or addressing the recommendations?

- The KITE program advances recommendations 9, 15 and 17 by:
 - Instituting a culture of security in ballot handling;
 - Providing written instructions to individuals in specified roles; and
 - Introducing a system of proactive audits to determine compliance.

Was it successful?

- The use of KITE for election weekend was extremely successful as the team provided a level of visibility of practical implementation and compliance with new measures which would not have otherwise been achieved. KITE was also able to collect meaningful data on the implementation of the new initiatives and provide a presence in all WA divisions.

Is it usable for any future electoral events?

- In regards to the concept, yes.

How may it be improved?

- The overall knowledge of KITE members at WA was excellent and was increased with the experience gained on polling weekend. The provision of this exposure to a greater number of staff prior to the next Federal Election would be beneficial. How this is achieved will need to be considered.

Initial conclusion

- Useful. Although the concept and implementation of the team was a success, that was hinged on the fact that the AEC was not running a full scale national event, and was therefore able to deploy staff from its own workforce. The concept has merit though and is worth exploring further.
- KIT recommends assuring the accountability and visibility of implementation of new measures achieved by KITE. At future events this may be achieved by redefining the PPLO role, supported by DROs and Operations Managers.

5.8.5 Additional KIT items

A series of additional items were developed and implemented in a responsive manner for the WA half-Senate event. The decision was made to make these particular items non-mandatory only owing to late development and/or inability to sufficiently train and support staff in the new measures. Due to these measures not being consistently applied across the election, it has not been possible to conduct evaluations of these measures.

1. DMM briefing

- A briefing document was developed to assist DROs to train and prepare their DMMs. The briefing document proved crucial to the implementation of the new DMM role. Further evaluation will be undertaken by KIT in conjunction with WA staff but KIT's initial conclusion is that the DMM briefing should form part of the eventual suite of documents for wider implementation of the DMM position.
- Essential for future electoral events

2. No food or drink poster

- A generic poster displaying the instruction: 'no food or drink in this area' was developed for display in areas where ballot papers might be placed / processed. Further evaluation will be undertaken by KIT in conjunction with WA staff to determine the level of usage, but KIT's initial conclusion is that the poster should be re-designed and then made part of the election materials catalogue and absorbed into relevant policy and procedure.
- Useful for future electoral events

3. Missing / Multiple ballot paper slips for use in declaration scrutiny

- Sheets were developed to be utilised as part of the declaration scrutiny process in the event that an envelope was missing a ballot paper (i.e. the elector did not include the ballot paper in the envelope) or there was an additional ballot paper contained in the envelope. The sheets assist in achieving a balance and provide an additional level of accountability. Further evaluation will be undertaken by KIT in conjunction with WA staff to determine the level of usage, but KIT's initial conclusion is that the sheets should be redesigned and then made part of the election materials catalogue and absorbed into relevant policy and procedure.
- Essential for future electoral events

4. Preliminary scrutiny tools

- A number of documents were developed to assist staff with the preliminary scrutiny process, these were: the preliminary scrutiny tracking and balancing guidance; the manual control sheet for reconciliation of declaration envelopes; the

preliminary scrutiny ballot box label; and the preliminary scrutiny envelope transfer record. Generally these were designed to offer some consistency in the process where there is a divergence of practices and where DROs typically utilise localised forms. Further evaluation will be undertaken by KIT in conjunction with WA staff to determine the level of usage, but KIT's initial conclusion is that preliminary scrutiny processes and materials need revision and enhancement with a view to ensuring national consistency.

- Essential for future electoral events.

5. Scrutineer attendance register template

- A scrutineer register template was developed and the design finalised in order to improve consistency across sites in WA. Further evaluation will be undertaken by KIT in conjunction with WA staff to determine the level of usage, but KIT's initial conclusion is that the register should be made part of the election materials catalogue and absorbed into relevant policy and procedure.
- Useful for future electoral events

6. Parcel control sheet

- A parcel control sheet was developed to assist Divisions in managing the fresh scrutiny process. It provides a visual progress document for fresh scrutiny managers and DROs. Further evaluation will be undertaken by KIT in conjunction with WA staff to determine the level of usage, but KIT's initial conclusion is that the control sheet should be reviewed in terms of the layout, then made part of the election materials catalogue and absorbed into relevant policy and procedure. Alternatively, the control sheet could be a form of report out of the Election Management System (ELMS).
- Essential for future electoral events

7. Materials despatch / return manifest templates

- At the request of WA staff, templates were developed for materials despatch and return for Divisions utilising the hub method of ballot paper transport due to distance. The templates provide a consistent format for 'alternate means' ballot paper custody tracking. Further evaluation will be undertaken by KIT in conjunction with WA staff to determine the level of usage, but KIT's initial conclusion is that the templates should be reviewed, enhanced, then made part of the election materials catalogue and absorbed into relevant policy and procedure.
- Essential for future electoral events

6. Summary and Conclusion

A number of themes were evident across the entirety of the evaluation of the implementation of the responses to the Keelty recommendations.

- In general, most of the initiatives appear to have been successful, at least in principle. Given the time constraints under which they were implemented, it is not surprising that further refinement is necessary in some cases, however the general approach appears sound. Pending appropriate refinement, where necessary, these initiatives will be incorporated into the AEC's standard election procedures to apply at all electoral events.
- Some of the initiatives, particularly some of the new forms, did not sufficiently account for the unique logistical challenges of more rural and remote areas. This knowledge will inform further development.
- In some cases better instructions are required for new forms, either in the form of further training or as part of the form itself.
- The initiatives form the basis of a nationally consistent approach to the key logistical elements of electoral events, particularly regarding the movement of ballot papers. They provide the checks and balances necessary to ensure that temporary staff and staff without logistical expertise are guided through and accountable for the crucial logistical processes of an election.

A large volume of work was undertaken by the AEC, in a very short time period to implement interim measures and activities for the WA half-Senate election that form part of the AEC response and commitment to fully implementing all 32 recommendations contained in the Keelty Report.

The report outlines the many activities that are being undertaken and aspects of the AEC's operations that are being touched upon in addressing the recommendations contained in the Keelty report. It is also evident that it is not any one single element of change, rather the combination of the measures, that has contributed to the improved ballot paper security achieved in the running of the WA half-Senate election in April 2014 – not least of which has been the very willing engagement of all AEC staff in the reform process. Overall this Report finds that the majority of the measures advanced during the WA half-Senate election contribute well towards the AEC's full implementation of the Keelty Report's recommendations and makes various suggestions for improvements for subsequent electoral events for management consideration. This evaluation has provided an initial assessment of which measures and activities will enable the AEC to effectively meet the recommendations without modifying the solution utilised in WA, and those which might need some modification in order to better deliver on the intended outcomes

The various forms completed during the WA event should now be thoroughly reviewed to assess future usability and efficacy, and how they will be integrated into the AEC materials catalogue and form part of election records. The best way for policies and guidance documents to be incorporated into relevant process guides such as the Election Procedures Manual (EPM) should now also occur.

These measures and initiatives will also undergo a more comprehensive evaluation assisted by the WA staff and the next step is to consider the measures more thoroughly as a whole in the context of the AEC's existing policies, procedures and materials with a view to standardisation. This includes the dissemination of key messages and information within the AEC's upcoming new learning and development (L&D) framework as well as the final result of the AEC's ballot paper logistics review. The evaluation of ballot paper handling procedures will address all categories of ballot papers with a view to consistent plans and uniform policy, procedures, practices, documentation and training.

In addition, the cost of each measure will be quantified. Finally, all the measures and initiatives will continue to be evaluated at subsequent electoral events in order to constantly improve practices and operationalise all of the Keelty Report's recommendations for full implementation.

Appendix A – Keelty Recommendations Advanced at the WA half-Senate election.

The Keelty Report contained 32 recommendations. Of the 32 recommendations, the following two were deemed not to be applicable to the conduct to the WA half-Senate election and out of scope for the purposes of this evaluation;

- Recommendation 29 relates to the conduct of a check of storage and packaging of 'live ballots' in its possession (i.e. AEC warehouses); and
- Recommendation 32 relates to engagement with the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters regarding statutory appointment of AEC State Managers.

The conduct of this evaluation, and providing options for improvement for future electoral events, advances the following three recommendations that did not have specific measures for the conduct of the WA half-Senate election:

- Recommendation 1 relating to benchmarking of material management systems against industry and other electoral management body standards;
- Recommendation 28 relates to the AEC conducting regular reviews of the culture of its regional offices to ensure full adherence to national policies and procedures; and
- Recommendation 30 relates to that the AEC ensures that lessons learned from post-election evaluations are acted upon pursuant to future electoral events.

The remaining Keelty recommendations were directly effected in some way by the implementation of the measures evaluated in this report.

The table on the next page summarises each measure implemented and the relevant recommendation(s) it advanced.

Table 1. List of measures adopted at the WA half-Senate event

Item number	Measure	Recommendation addressed	National Implementation
BALLOT PAPER TRACKING			
5.1	EF001(a) Polling Place Ballot Paper Tracking Form - Senate	2, 4, 9 and 12	Essential
5.1	EF001(b): Declaration Count Ballot Paper Tracking Form - Senate	2, 4, 9 and 12	Essential
5.1	EF001(c): Daily Exchange of Ballot Papers Form	2, 4, 9 and 12	Essential
5.1	EF001(d): Ballot Paper Transport Exception Record	2, 4, 9 and 12	Essential
5.1	EF001(e): PPVC/Mobile Team Ballot Paper Tracking Form – Senate	2, 4, 9 and 12	Essential
5.1	EF009: Ballot Paper Security Direction and Acknowledgement – polling staff	12, 14 and 27	Essential
5.1	EF009: Ballot Paper Security Direction and Acknowledgement – non-polling staff	12, 14 and 27	Essential
5.1	Adjusted EF024 (CSS Consignment Form)	2, 4, 9 and 12	Essential
5.1	EF124(a) Ballot Paper Despatch: Printer to AEC Location Manifest	2, 9 and 12	Essential
5.1	EF124(b): Ballot Paper Despatch: AEC Location to Storage Manifest	2, 9, 12	Essential
BALLOT PAPER PACKAGING AND LABELLING			
5.2.1	Adjusted Packaging Labels	2, 4, 9, 12 and 22	Essential
5.2.2	Ballot Paper Final Storage Label	2, 12, 22 and 23	Essential
5.2.3	Tamper evident labels	2, 13 and 22	Essential
5.2.4	Use of cardboard boxes to despatch and return ballot papers from polling places	2, 9, 12 and 23	Essential
5.2.5	Use of plastic bags for creation of individual sealed candidate / group parcel for used Senate ballot papers	2, 9, 12, 13 and 23	Essential
5.2.6	Application of consignment notes on all packages containing ballot papers	4, 9, 12 and 22	Essential
TRAINING AND BALLOT PAPER PRINCIPLES			
5.3.1	Ballot Paper Principles poster	9, 12 and 25	Essential
5.3.2	Email to WA polling staff	9, 14 and 27	Essential
5.3.3	Additional Training of Polling Staff (TOPS) slides relating to ballot paper security	9, 14, 27 and 31	Essential
5.3.4	Election Procedures Handbook addendum	9, 14 and 27	Useful
5.3.5	Ballot secure zone guidance & posters	4, 10, 11 and 21	Essential
5.3.6	Ballot paper management guides	4, 9, 10, 12, 14 and 15	Essential
5.3.7	Instruction documents for DROs regarding ballot paper movement	4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15	Not required
CONTRACTS AND PREMESIS			
5.4.1	Minimum Standards and Operational Guidelines for Out-posted Centres	3, 20 and 21	Essential
5.4.2	Improved rigour relating to the use of visitor's registers at all AEC sites	9 to 13, 19 and 20	Essential
5.4.3	Allocating Ballot Box Guards to all polling places	9 to 14	Useful
5.4.4	Review of all contracts relating to the WA half-Senate election	6, 7, 9 and 27	Essential

5.4.5	24-hour security guard presence at all out-posted centres and State Office for election duration	9	Useful
5.4.6	Utilisation of cages / temporary rooms as ballot secure zones in out-posted centres	4, 9, 10, 1, 12 and 20	Useful
WASTE MANAGEMENT			
5.5.1	Rubbish and Recycling Disposal Processing Guide	2, 5 and 21	Essential
5.5.2	EF025(a): Record of Rubbish / Recycling Disposed	2, 5 and 17	Essential
5.5.3	EF025(b) – (c): Waste Disposal Labels	2 and 5	Essential
5.5.4	EF025(d) – (f): Waste Area Posters	2, 5 and 17	Essential
MATERIALS MANAGEMENT ROLES			
5.6.1	Divisional Materials Manager Job Profile	4, 14 and 15	Essential
5.6.2	Divisional Materials Manager Log	4, 14, 15 and 17	Essential
5.6.3	Implementation of State Materials Manager Position	4, 14, 15 and 17	Useful
STAFFING			
5.7.1	Character checks of all temporary staff	9	Essential
5.7.2	Altered allocations for Polling Place Liaison Officers	17	Useful
5.7.3	Mandating clear visual identification for all permanent and temporary AEC staff at polling places and out-posted centres	14	Essential
OTHER WA ELECTION INITIATIVES			
5.8.1	Despatch of ballot papers direct to interstate Divisions	3, 4 and 9	Not required
5.8.2	Adjustments to the despatch of certified lists	NA	Essential
5.8.3	Revised project plan, materials and procedures for final packaging and transport of ballot papers to warehouse	3, 4, 14, 15 and 17	Essential
5.8.4	Keelty Implementation Team – Extended (KITE) polling weekend observation team	9, 15 and 17	Useful
5.8.5	Additional KIT items:		Essential
	▪ DMM briefing		Essential
	▪ No food or drink poster		Useful
	▪ Missing / Multiple ballot paper slips for use in declaration scrutiny		Essential
	▪ Preliminary scrutiny tools		Essential
	▪ Scrutineer attendance register template		Useful
	▪ Parcel control sheet		Essential
	▪ Materials despatch / return manifest templates		Essential

Appendix B – List of Keelty Report recommendations

Table 2. Keelty Report recommendations

Recommendations	
1	The AEC undertakes quality assurance and benchmarking of material management systems against national and international industry logistics standards, including other electoral authorities
2	<p>The AEC develops and applies national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's active existence (election, scrutiny, warehousing, transfers), including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the application of national standards for the parcelling, and movement of components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) - the tracking of components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) - the use of detailed, trackable and accountable inventories to account for components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) at any point in time - the creation, maintenance and retention of transfer records including, as a minimum, accurate consignment notes - the secure packaging of boxes onto pallets at premises prior to shipment (whether by shrinkwrapping or use of other technology) - the counterchecking and countersigning of the number of components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) as an additional assurance measure at critical points in the cycle of transmission - the segregation of used ballots, unused ballots, and other material identified for disposal at all times, including at count and recount centres, at fresh scrutiny centres and at warehouses.
3	The AEC introduces, where practical, systems that minimise the movement of ballot papers. This may include consideration of centralised processing options including the use of relevant technologies such as the scanning of ballot papers.
4	The AEC institutes controls around the movement of ballot papers acknowledging that some individuals will not be logistics 'professionals'; these controls should include guidelines regarding transportation of ballot papers in private vehicles and storage at non-AEC premises.
5	The AEC introduces a process for disposal of recycling or rubbish which ensures that no ballot material is inadvertently lost or destroyed.
6	The AEC ensures that staff have developed skills in contract management, including contract enforcement.
7	The AEC conducts regular quality assurance to ensure contract suppliers are meeting their obligations.
8	The AEC conducts regular market research and testing to ensure that contract suppliers for material management are utilising industry best practice.
9	The AEC institutes a culture of security in ballot handling through developing a concept of ballots being 'live' until they are destroyed in line with statutory obligations.
10	The AEC institutes a concept of 'ballot secure zones' at all premises where 'live' ballot papers are handled or stored (including fresh scrutiny centres and non-AEC premises).
11	The AEC ensures all ballot secure zones are cleared before the arrival of 'live' ballot papers and that they remain secured and 'sterile' at all times when ballots are presented.
12	The AEC introduces processes and develops doctrine for the handling of ballot papers at all stages from 'cradle to grave'.
13	The AEC uses tamper-evident materials (e.g. bags and tape) for the transfer and storage of ballot papers, including the transport of materials to and from fresh scrutiny centres and for long-term storage in warehouses.

14	The AEC specifies and defines the role of employees (permanent and temporary) at every stage of ballot handling
15	Once roles are specified, the AEC allocates these roles to individuals with instructions provided in writing.
16	The AEC establishes policy and procedures for the conduct of a Senate recount.
17	The AEC introduces a system of more proactive audits to determine compliance, performance and adherence with policies and procedures.
18	The AEC consider the benefit of cross-posting senior staff between states to assist in giving a consistent approach to performance.
19	The AEC develops and applies improvements to national and state warehousing management practices, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the standardisation of minimum required skill sets - the processes to engage warehouse employees with the wider AEC, particularly where warehouses are in isolated locations - the mitigation of WHS risks, including guidelines around unaccompanied visits to AEC warehouses and storage facilities - the application of systems to control ballot material access, receipt and general handling - the standards and processes around the treatment of partial loads or portions of loads, and - the installation and monitoring of CCTV and alarms at warehouses.
20	The AEC revises guidelines regarding the suitability of all storage and ballot handling facilities (whether AEC, temporary, or contractor premises), including security, egress, accessibility and exclusive use by the AEC.
21	The AEC ensures that all instructions and planning documentation for specific events (such as a recount) are sufficiently detailed, are followed and updated where necessary.
22	The AEC reviews labelling policies to ensure that labelling is tamper-proof, accountable, consistently applied and legible.
23	The AEC reviews packaging policies, particularly in relation to the cardboard standard for boxes used in the transport and storage of ballot papers and the repackaging of ballot papers and parcels into used boxes.
24	The AEC introduces minimum packing standards, including box and pallet integrity.
25	The AEC adopts a 'ballot paper doctrine' that emphasises the security and sanctity of ballots and underpins all aspects of the AEC's election operations.
26	The AEC implements measures to ameliorate: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the pressure arising from the expectation that all results will be known on Election Day, and - the logistical issues arising from the size of Senate ballot papers.
27	The AEC should continue to assure itself, to the best of its ability, of the political neutrality of all persons, including subcontractors, having contact with a ballot paper (other than electors at the time of voting).
28	The AEC conducts regular reviews of the culture of its regional offices to ensure full adherence to national policies and procedures.
29	In view of the findings of this report, that the AEC conduct a check of storage and packaging of 'live' ballots currently in its possession.
30	The AEC ensures that lessons learned during post-election evaluation are sufficiently captured in the evaluation report and acted upon ahead of any subsequent election.
31	The AEC improves learning and development, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mandating the provision of training regarding ballot security and material management - the accurate recording of courses successfully completed, and - the benchmarking of its training against that offered by like institutions.
32	The AEC consider bringing to the attention the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters the impact of the statutory appointments of AEC State Managers on the ability of the AEC Commissioner to achieve national uniformity of approach and consistency of approach in the conduct of Federal Elections

Appendix C: Election Procedure Handbook Addendum
