


**Committee Chair
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works:**

**Department of Defence
Submarine Rotational Force West, Priority Works
HMAS Stirling, Western Australia**

Submission:

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Reference List of Acronyms

Acronyms & Meanings	Description
AG-D	Australian Government Defence
AUKUS	Australia, United Kingdom, United States
AUKUS SRF - West	U.S. and UK, Submarine Rotational Force – West: CRS June 12, 2024, AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project, pp.17-36
CRS	Congressional Research Service
<i>fait accompli</i>	Thing that has already happened or been decided before those affected hearing about it, leaving them with no option but to accept (<i>faits accomplis</i> - plural): Oxford Languages
intangible	An intangible thing – intangibles life, self-confidence, responsibility
PWC	Public Works Committee: Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works
PWCM	PWC Procedure Manual, <i>Version 9.6 December 2022</i>
PWC-T-O-R	PWC Terms of Reference: 1.22-3, Committee responsibilities and processes
SRF – West	Submarine Rotational Force - West Priority Works
tangible	Capable of being touched, discernible by touch, material or substances
UK	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States

18 July 2024

Dear Committee Chair, Mr Graham Perret MP, and the PWC Members

Introduction and Submission Outline:

This submission is against a comprehensive approval of SRF - West's Priority Works Submission before the PWC. It relates to pertinent sections of the Department of Defence, Statement of Evidence to the Parliamentary Standing Committee of Public Works, Submission 1 (SRF-West) or (the Statement). This is copied and pasted, in my Submission in Part 1 and 2, in "***bold italics and aligned***" so that you can differentiate between the SRF-West and my Submission.

This will enable the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works (PWC) to understand what I disagree with across the Department of Defence Statement of Evidence. I will mostly follow their table of contents where possible in Part 1 and 2 of this Submission.

Part 2 of my Submission to the PWC will address my concerns of the Australian Government's financial outlay, of the four-components of the AUKUS Pillar 1, SRF-West's Infrastructure Project, that commenced, in 2023 and 2024, at HMAS *Stirling*. These estimated costs are \$8 Billion dollars, and are designed to establish an AUKUS, SRF-West: "U.S. and UK Submarine Rotational Force-West, *Offensive Naval Base*, at HMAS *Stirling*, in Western Australia."

In the PWC Procedure Manual (PWCM) the 'terms of reference,' are identified in Chapter 1. In Section 1.22, and in more detail in Chapter 2.

Chapter 1. Public Works Committee, under the "Committee responsibilities and processes," the following are the 'terms of reference' (PWC-T-O-R):

1.22 The Committee is required to consider and report on public works referred to it under the Act. In considering works. the Committee must have regard for:

- the stated purpose of the proposed work and its suitability for that purpose;
- the need for, and advisability of, the work;
- the cost effectiveness of the proposal;
- ...
- the current and prospective public value of the work.[10]

Parliamentary approval...

1.28 While the Committee can make any recommendations it sees fit for the implementation by the entity, the final recommendation of any report will be:

- if the Committee is satisfied that the project has merit 'that the House of Representative resolve that it is expedient that the works be carried out'; or
- if the Committee is not satisfied that the project has merit 'that the work does not proceed.'

1.29 If the Committee has recommended that the work not proceed, the Committee will give justification for this recommendation.

1.30 At any stage after the Committee has reported, works can be again referred to it for further consideration and the Committee also has the power to review its reports. If after the works have been approved there are significant changes to project scope, delivery timeframes, cost, function or design, the Committee must be advised and may choose to make a further report to the Parliament on the work.

What does not constitute a public work?

1.38 Also specifically, a ‘work’ does not include: ...

- a work proposed to be carried out by or for the Commonwealth by way of assistance to an overseas country;”

I will follow the PWC-T-O-R, Public Submission Recommendations, with a significant focus on “*Other Issues 2.16, Cost effectiveness and public value, as addressed in sections 2.17 to 2.20, Public Value, sections 2.22 to 2.23, Risk estimation, assessment and management, and Whole-of-life costs and cost-benefit analysis.*”

PWC please note: Section 2.54 is directly applicable to the SRF West Priority Works Project, in that, at:

“2.54 This section should provide a summary of the whole-of-life costing analysis. In considering whole-of-life costing, the Committee requires that, at a minimum, the following are considered:

- capital cost;
- life-time operating costs;
- lifetime maintenance costs;
- asset disposal costs; and
- summary of the assumptions that underpinned the analysis model. [n.8]

2.57 In assessing whole of life costs, the Committee will take into consideration the design stage as well as the confidence level attached to the project.

Follow-up activities:

2.68 The Committee must be updated on any significant changes to the scope, time, cost, function or design for all projects, including medium works notifications. Updates should be provided to the Committee in writing.”

PWC please note: Part 2. of my Submission will also focus on AUKUS Legislation, or lack thereof, Treaties, Trilateral Agreements, along with many other official Australian, and/or U.S. Documents, including Congressional Service Reports presented to the U.S. Congress.

In some cases, these documents will be listed within the text of my Submission, nevertheless, these documents are meant to be read by the PWC. The documents form an integral part of my comprehensive comparative analysis addressed throughout my Submission against the:

[AUKUS SRF – WEST, AND SRF - WEST PRIORITY WORKS: READING MATERIAL to assist in an understanding of the complexities and the problematic nature of the AUKUS SRF-West Pillar 1 enhanced security partnership:](#)

It is important to question the Australian Government-Defence (AG-D), and the Australian Submarine Agency (ASA), along with the ASA licence application to ARPANSA, to understand the wicked problem of *not* being able to publicly monitor all the machinations of any Government of the Day. For instance, the controlled method of delivery, of the four public components of the SRF-West Infrastructure Project, which commenced, at HMAS Stirling, sometime in 2023-4.

The pending DCCEEW-EPBC Act Approvals, before the Minister for the Environment, regarding the Maritime Infrastructure Upgrades, and the Controlled Industrial Facility (CIF), for AUKUS Pillar 1, are eagerly awaited by members of the Public. Especially, as the AUKUS enhanced security agreement partnership, in my opinion, is a military existential threat, to our civil society, and our fresh water supply.

My greatest concern is that the PWC Submission process are just a series of *“faits accomplis”*, for example, under the **SRF-West Priority Works, Section 24: a-c, Scope of the Projects Works**, addressing the following three project elements, that currently must be approved and built before early, 2027, for the benefit of the U.S. and UK. Navy’s nuclear-powered submarines.

I reject the submarine rotational visits of any Foreign Navy coming to Australian Ports with their nuclear-powered and possibly nuclear-armed boats and ships. It is obvious that they diminish Australian security, protection and sovereignty; see:

Section 24a Project Element 1 – Maritime Infrastructure - I reject 24.a.(1) and (3); I do support the priority work of 24.a.(2).

Section 24.b.(1) Project Element 2 – Operational Facilities - I reject the construction of **a Radiological Controls Technical Field Office; and**

Section 24.c. Project Element 3 – Maintenance and Sustainment Facilities:

(1) construct a Controlled Industrial Facility; I adamantly reject the building of a Nuclear and Radiated Waste Facility, to be stored for a period of 15 to 30 years, in this CIF at HMAS *Stirling* on Garden Island. The building of a workshop to repair Australian non-nuclear boats and ships I do support, along with subsections 24.c.(2)-(4).

I also reject the fourth element, not mentioned in this current Scope of Project Works, because of the probable cancellation of the U.S. selling nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, and as a consequence, a failing AUKUS enhanced security partnership. Thus, there is no need to build housing accommodation for the U.S and UK Navies, either, that is, if they would withdraw from HMAS *Stirling*.

I recommend that HMAS *Stirling* remains an Australian Navy Base, however, under a “Permanent Non-Nuclear Armed Neutrality for Australia.” One that suits our Australian Sovereign ADF which is a *defensive*, rather than an *offensive* ADF; that only needs to protect Australia’s exclusive economic zone and the States and Territories of Australia.

Naturally, the building of approved housing and non-nuclear facilities for the benefit of the Australian Navy, and associated ADF, should be completed at HMAS Stirling. The remainder of the 8 billion budget set aside for the U.S. and UK Navies can now be spent on providing housing, medical centres, educational facilities, and transport infrastructure required for the people of Rockingham, Kwinana, across Cockburn Sound, and associated localities.

SRF West is not a cost-effective project, in fact, it does not reflect the whole-of-life costs, that will be expended in building and maintaining a “Forward Home-ported U.S. and UK Nuclear-powered and

pending Nuclear-armed SSN Submarine Rotational Force – West, an *Offensive* Naval Base at HMAS Stirling, in Western Australia.”

The SRF-West is not an AUKUS Pillar 1, Naval Base, without its previous alleged transfer and sale of U.S. Virginia-class and UK SSN-AUKUS Submarines to Australia; even if the U.S. Congress decides in 2025, to honour their publicly stated agreements with Australia:

“AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project

Overview

In September 2021, the Australian, UK, U.S. governments announced a significant new security partnership, called AUKUS...³⁹ One major initiative under AUKUS, referred to as Pillar 1, is a project to rotationally deploy four U.S. SSNs and one UK SSN out of a port in Western Australia; more significantly, to sell three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia and subsequently build three to five additional replacement SSNs for the US Navy; and to have the United States and UK provide assistance to Australia for an Australian effort to build additional three to five SSNs of a new UK-Australian SSN design called SSN AUKUS to complete a planned eight boat Australian SSN force.”¹

In my opinion, the delivery of these submarines will only exacerbate the “U.S.-China Crisis and Conflict,” of the United States’ “near-peer-competitor required to maintain their U.S. Economic and Military, and Global Hegemony.” Meanwhile, China taunts the U.S. across the Indo-Pacific. While these games, of “push, shove, and provoke” between these parties continues, it will remain an existential threat to all life, across the Indo-Pacific Region; in fact, it is a credulous situation.

PCWM FOCUS: 1.22 The Committee is required to consider and report on public works referred to it under the Act. In considering works. the Committee must have regard for:

- the stated purpose of the proposed work and its suitability for that purpose:
Purpose of the Works - Aim of the project 8. The aim of the project is to provide critical facilities and infrastructure required at HMAS Stirling to support the initial establishment of the Submarine Rotational Force - West in 2027.

PLEASE NOTE: AUKUS SRF-WEST is for the U.S. and UK Navies, it is no-longer an available option for the Australian Navy, or its ASA, under the U.S proposal before Congress for an “Alternative Division-of-Labor.”²

- the need for, and advisability of, the work:
No longer required as the need for the Project has changed: AUKUS SRF-West is, allegedly, to be a U.S. and UK Forward Homeported Nuclear-Powered Submarine Naval Base, under the U.S Proposal before Congress for an Alternative Division-of-Labor.
- the cost effectiveness of the proposal;
Australia is funding the U.S. and UK Government’s “Offensive” Occupation of the Indo-Pacific: West of the International Date Line (IDL)
- the current and prospective public value of the work.[10]:
No public value for the Australian People “West of the International Date Line “³

¹ Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 2024, Congressional Research Service <http://crsreportes.congress.gov>, RL 32418, p.17, (CRS, June 12, 2024)

² *Ibid* at pp.20-1

³ Admiral John C AQUILINO, “Statement of Admiral John C. AQUILINO, U.S. Navy Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command, US Indo-Pacific Command Posture, 20 March 2024, unclassified as of 18 March 2024, pp.1-43: p.2

PWC Submission Part 1:

PWC Caution: Possible U.S. Congress AUKUS Pillar 1 Cancellation and/or Alteration and an Alternative Division-of-Labor Agreement being consider by Congress, to counter the original agreement “to acquire a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability through the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS), enhanced security partnership.”⁴ The Congressional Research Services⁵ (CRS, June 12, 2024) has noted initially three problematic issues, regarding the AUKUS Partnership with Australia. Australia has asserted its Sovereign Rights, and Australia will honour their prior Treaty obligations, about, a pending:

1. U.S.-China Conflict over the defence of Taiwan
2. Australia’s Sovereign Right to refuse to confirm, whether they would support the U.S and UK, (if they decide to publicly carry nuclear-weapons on their SSNs, under INDOPACOM, Command) and carry “U.S. nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) with an aim of enhancing deterrence”^{6,7} and that
3. Australia intends not to breach their Obligations, under Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (NPT).⁷

Therefore, because of this Australian Government position, AUKUS Pillar 1’s proposed sale of three to five Virginia Attack Class conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines, from the U.S. to Australia, is *unlikely* to occur before 2040, if ever, under the current AUKUS Pillar 1 Pact.

Hence, the U.S. is proposing that they will not sell the boats to Australia, instead, the US will own, and control the SSNs, at SRF-West, so that USINDOPACOM SSN Missions from 2024 through to 2040, remain under USINDOPACOM Command, and the USPACOM Control.

Congressional Research Services, Background and Issues for Congress, under AUKUS Pillar 1:

The outcome of these matters should rest with the Sovereign Government of Australia, its Parliamentarians, and as it is an SRF-West’s existential threat, the people of Australia.

Alas, the decision will be one of “might is right”, in my opinion, and I assume that the U.S. Congressional “**Arguments for Implementing Alternative Divisions-of-Labor Approach,**” will prevail. This option or decision is available to all (Parliamentary) Congressional Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Senate. To be referred and assessed in the F.Y. 2025 (potentially heard in 2024-25), as part of the *National Defence Appropriation Act*, (NDAA), and in its Defense related H.R.3939 – 118th Congress (2023 – 2024) AUKUS Undersea Defense Act, in their Committee Hearings of the Committee on Foreign

⁴ White House, Press Release: March 13, 2023, “Fact Sheet: Trilateral Australia-UK-US Partnership on Nuclear-Powered Submarines, p.1 of 7

⁵ Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 24, Congressional Research Service <https://crsreport.congress.gov> RL 32418, “Arguments for Implementing Alternative Division-of-Labor Approach...*Deterrence and Warfighting Cost-Effectiveness*, pp.30-31

⁶ CRS, June 12, 2024, p.31; [See: Pending U.S. proposals concerning the SLCM-N, and their ability to supply these nuclear-weapons for their U.S. Virginia-class submarines, from 2032-2034]

⁷ Statement of Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, USN, Director Strategic Systems Programs, before the Subcommittee of Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee an FY 2025 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces an Atomic Energy Defence Activities, 22 May 2024, p.6; An estimated initial cost at \$30 billion. Please note, the upgrade will be addressed by the DoD and the NNSA in June 2024, it will include supply issues and production problematics and plans.

Affairs, and the Committee on Armed Services. Referred to these Committees on 06/09/2023, where they currently remain.”⁸

I assume unless the Australian Government has already capitulated to the proposed alterations and the alternative divisions-of-labor approach, to facilitate an alleged deterrence and warfighting cost-effective opportunity against the U.S. peer competitor and their allies and partners; *if* the U.S. does not sell U.S. Virginia-class boats to Australia.

It is important to note that the U.S. Congressional Research Service, June 12, 2024, Report, is also querying the lack in U.S. **whole-of-life costs and cost-benefit analysis** along with the **assumptions that underpin the analysis model**, as required under the PWC-T-O-R, for example:

- “There is little indication that, prior to announcing the AUKUS Pillar 1 project in September 2021, an analysis of alternatives (AOA) or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis was conducted to examine whether Pillar 1 would be a more cost-effective way to spend defence resources for generating deterrence and warfighting capability than potential alternative courses of action, such as a U.S.-Australia division of labor for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions. Such as AOA or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis (or a summary of one) has not been released. Performing an AOA or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis can test the validity of beliefs or presumptions about the cost-effectiveness of an envisioned course of action and can produce unexpected or counter-intuitive results. Programs initiated in the absence of an AOA or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis can lack a sound business case. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that “a program should not go forward into product development unless a sound business case can be made,” and that “weapons systems without a sound business case are at greater risk for scheduled delays, cost growth, and integration issues.” The US Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, for example, was initiated without a prior rigorous AOA. The LSC the LCS program subsequently became controversial, was widely criticized, and was ultimately truncated.⁷¹⁹

Meanwhile, to confirm my prior statements, under the Congressional Research Services: “Arguments for Implementing Alternative Division-of-Labor Approach”

“Supporters of the alternative division-of-labour approach for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions outlined earlier-in which up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be procured and retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the U.S. and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia under Pillar 1, while Australia invested in military capabilities (such as for example, long range anti-ship missiles, drones, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft) for performing non-SSN missions-can make various arguments, including those outlined below.

Deterrence and Warfighting Cost-Effectiveness

Arguments relating to deterrence and warfighting cost-effectiveness include the following:

[The US will still have to dissuade the Australian Government’s Sovereign Right stance, and to counter the comments reported in The Associated Press, March 20, 2023, by Rod McGuirk]

“Australia Defence Minister Richard Marles in March 2023 reportedly confirmed that in exchange for the Virginia-class boats, Australia’s government made no promises to the United States that Australia would support the United States in a future conflict over Taiwan.⁶⁴ Selling three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia would thus convert those SSNs from the boats that would be available for use in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict

⁸ Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 24, Congressional Research Service <https://crsreport.congress.gov> RL 32418, “Arguments for Implementing Alternative Division-of-Labor Approach...*Deterrence and Warfighting Cost-Effectiveness*, pp.30-31; H.R.3039 – 118 Congress (2023-2024), AUKUS Undersea Defense Act: Introduced to Congress on 06/09/2023,

⁹ Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 24, Congressional Research Service <https://crsreport.congress.gov> RL 32418, “Arguments for Implementing Alternative Division-of-Labor Approach...*Deterrence and Warfighting Cost-Effectiveness*, p.33

into boats that might not be available for use in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict. This could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence and warfighting capability in connection with the U.S.-China crisis or conflict. The reduced certainty of whether boats sold to Australia would be available for use in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict would be, in effect, the flip side of the argument made by supporters of Pillar 1 about having Australia become a second allied decisionmaking center (along with the United States) for SSN operations in the Indo-Pacific. Selling Virginia-class boats to Australia could also weaken deterrence of potential Chinese aggression, if China were to find reason to believe, correctly or not, that Australia might use its Virginia-class boats less affectively than the US Navy would use them.⁶⁵

- Australian officials have stated consistently that, in line with Australia’s commitment as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),⁶⁶ Australia’s SSNs would be armed only with conventional weapons. Selling three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia would thus convert those SSNs from boats that could in the future be armed with the U.S. nuclear-armed sea launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) with an aim of enhancing deterrents⁶⁷ into boats that would never be armed with SLCM-Ns. This reduction in the number of SLCM-N-capable Virginia-class boats could weaken rather than strengthen the deterrence capability in connection with a U.S.-China crisis or conflict.”¹⁰

PWC to reiterate my inferred belief that the United States lacks integrity and honour, and rarely meets their International Rules Based Order, mantra. It appears that the U.S. “Business as Usual Tactics” have out manoeuvred the Australian Government of the Day, who may now be stuck with allowing Foreign Military Bases in Australia, that might have complete control and command of the Australian Government of the Day, under AUKUS, and its enhanced security partnership.

With the Australian Defence Forces (ADF),
said to be interoperable and interchangeable with the United States of America
Is the ADF under the USINDOPACOM Command, of Commander, Admiral Samuel J. Paparo,
and the USPACOM Control, of Admiral Stephen Keohler.

In fact, like the U.S. pending legislative control identified in the Bill of the “**AUKUS Undersea Defense Act**,” currently held, “for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker,” in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee of Armed Services. For example, under the proposed AUKUS Undersea Defence Act, at

“(b) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT OF AUKUS SUBMARINES-SECTION 8680 of the title 10, United States Code is amended- ...

“(e) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT OF CERTAIN SUNMARINES-(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the Secretary of the Navy shall determine the appropriate shipyard in the United States, Australia, or the United Kingdom to perform any repair or refurbishment of a United States submarine involved in submarine security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (in this section referred to as ‘AUKUS’).”¹¹ (pp.6-7)

¹⁰ Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 24, Congressional Research Service <https://crsreport.congress.gov> RL 32418, “Arguments for Implementing Alternative Division-of-Labor Approach...*Deterrence and Warfighting Cost-Effectiveness*, pp.30-31

¹¹ H.R. 3939 – 118th Congress (2023-2024): AUKUS Undersea Defence Act, pp.6-7 (There is one summary for H.R.3939. Bill summaries are authorised by CRS).

Seriously, PWC you are Members of the Australian Federal Parliament, owing a potential allegiance to the U.S. Presidents, who will under Trump revamp the “Joint Publication 3-72, Nuclear Operations, 11 June 2019; or under President Biden’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

The likely action under the: CRS Report, June 12, 2024: “**Arguments for Implementing Alternative Division-of-Labor Approach**” is to ensure that the US will continue to own Virginia-class boats capable of carrying, U.S. nuclear-armed sea launched cruise missile SLCM-Ns, therefore, to commandeer HMAS *Stirling*, to protect the U.S. Homeland from their near-peer competitor China:

- “Some observers are concerned about potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan over the next few years, a period sometimes characterized as the Davidson window (the time between now and 2027) or decade of concern (the time between now and 2030).⁶⁸ Pillar 1 as currently structured would not increase the total number of SSN’s available for performing U.S., UK, an Australian SSN missions above what it otherwise would have been until sometime in the 2040s, when the first replacement SSN for the U.S. Navy or the first SSN AUKUS boat for the Australian Navy (whichever comes first) enters service. Pillar 1 as currently structured would, however, absorb resources over the next few years that could instead be invested in Australian military capabilities that could be fielded sooner, and in some cases (e.g., drones) soon enough to address the Davidson window or decade of concern.⁶⁹ This could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence within the Davidson window or decade of concern.”¹²

The Davidson window discussed in the quote above is hopefully a moot point!

¹² Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 24, Congressional Research Service <https://crsreport.congress.gov> RL 32418, “Arguments for Implementing Alternative Division-of-Labor Approach...*Deterrence and Warfighting Cost-Effectiveness*, p.31

Problematic U.S. Military Capabilities

U.S. Military Production-Line Backlogs in Ships and Boat Building, the delivery of defective parts, lack of component parts, and the mechanism used in the “*Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended*”¹³ to address numerous supply problems:

The U.S. seems to have forgotten that they were scheduled to deliver the first SSN of three to five, U.S. Virginia Attack Class conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarines to Australia in 2032. Needless, to say, the US in 2023, only had 49 SSN “Submarines in Force” and only 31 of those were operational ready.¹⁴

PWC: SRF-West Priority Works, is not cost effective – why is Australia spending approximately 8 billion dollars, on a four-part individually submitted, SRF-West Infrastructure Project, that is unstable, and unable, to meet the AUKUS Pillar 1, Partnership Obligations?

I acknowledge that the SRF-West, Priority Works, Submission, is estimated to cost: **\$739.1 million**, and it is noted that there **“will be ongoing operating costs as a result of the works.”**

Too further clarify the problematic nature of the AUKUS Military Partnership with the US, it requires an understanding of their inability to deliver military contracts. The AUKUS Pillar 1 Partnership requires regular scrutiny of what the U.S. can deliver, in a prompt and cost-effective manner.

A rigorous comparative analyses, of the **whole-of-life costs** of the SRF-West Infrastructure Project must be completed, by the PWC if you are to understand, why the AUKUS Partnership appeals to the U.S. and UK. Beyond needing the Australian AUKUS Pillar 1 Partnership to bolster their workforces, and supply chains.

As of 15 March 2024, the U.S. have three classes of SSNs, in service approximately, 49 boats, with three to four soon to be decommissioned; only 21 of these are SSNs Virginia-class boats. Nevertheless, the U.S. did not list how many SSN Virginia-class boats might have been in depot maintenance or awaiting depot maintenance (aka idle), in 2023.¹⁵

Therefore, I am not sure how the U.S. could possibly supply, to Australia 3 to 5 U.S. SSN Virginia-class boats, from 2032, when it is evident that they will not meet their own service requirements, in the U.S. or at their “SRF-West’s forward rotation, from 2024-to-early-2027.”

While attesting that they will “forward homeport” twelve U.S. SSN Virginia-class nuclear powered and nuclear armed submarines, at SRF-West, under the USINDOPACOM Command, and USPACOM Control, in a Western Australian “Forward Homeported SRF-West, Naval Base,” from 2027-2040.

¹³ “[50 U.S.C. ... 4501 *et seq.*], current through P.L., enacted August 12, 2018.”

¹⁴ Congressional Research Service” Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background an Issues for Congress, December 21, 2023, Congressional Research Service <https://crsreports.congress.gov>, RL.32418, p.5

¹⁵ Congressional Research Service” Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background an Issues for Congress, December 21, 2023, Congressional Research Service <https://crsreports.congress.gov>, RL.32418, p.5

The Australian Government-Defence does not meet PWC-T-O-R Requirements:

The SRF-West proposal to the PWC, does not meet its Statement of Evidence requirements relating to the **Purpose of the Works**, the **Need for the Works**, and **Nuclear Safety**. It appears that neither the U.S. nor the Australian Government will meet their AUKUS Pillar 1, enhanced security partnership requirements.

PWC The use of language is incredibly important when analysing AUKUS:

"In the March 13, 2023, FACT-SHEET: Trilateral Australia-UK-US Partnership on Nuclear Powered Submarines, that "Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of the United Kingdom and President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of the United States announced an arrangement for Australia to acquire a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability through the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) enhanced security partnership.

On September 15, 2021, our three nations embarked on an 18-month consultation period to identify the optimal pathway for Australia to require this capability, while setting the highest nuclear non-proliferation standard. The plan announced today will deliver on that commitment. Further, this plan will lift all three nations submarine industrial bases and undersea capabilities, enhancing deterrence and promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific...

A Phased Approach to Build Stewardship and Sustain Australia's Undersea Capability

Our nations have outlined an ambitious approach that will provide Australia with a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability at the earliest possible date while ensuring Australia's capacity to safely operate, maintain and regulate this technology, and setting the highest standards for nuclear non-proliferation. Our phased approach includes the following elements, each underwritten by the mutual commitments of each nation:

- Embedded Personnel and Port Visit...
- Submarine Rotational Forces...
- Sale of U.S. Virginia Class Submarines...
- SSN-AUKUS...

The implementation of this approach will be consistent with trilateral partners' respective international obligations and domestic law and underpinned by future legal and enabling arrangements for sharing sensitive, equipment and technology."¹⁶

The US assert that they *may not sell* their boats to Australia, mentioning our lack of capacity, as above, and consistently below, against the whole-of-life costs of AUKUS and its enhanced security partnership. This also includes the United States Force Posture Initiatives, across Australia. Thus, the Australian SRF-West, East, South and North, Infrastructure Projects covering all U.S. Military domains across Australia.

The U.S. has serious concerns that Australia cannot manage the nuclear safety requirements of their U.S. Nuclear Propulsion Technology.

¹⁶ White House, Press Release: March 13, 2023, "Fact Sheet: Trilateral Australia-UK-US Partnership on Nuclear-Powered Submarines, pp.1 of 7

The U.S. are likely to propose an SRF-West solution to address the project shortfalls, in the SRF-West delivery phase, because they are asserting to Congress, alternatives to the AUKUS enhanced security partnership. In fact, it maybe a new division-of-labor, to ensure Australia can support the USA and UK nuclear-powered, and the future nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), under the USINDOPACOM, “Mission-Controlled Submarines.”¹⁷

PWC I certainly cannot remember being informed about SRF-West becoming a U.S. and UK Forward Homeported Naval Base. As stated above, the U.S. aim is to enhance deterrence and thus denial, of their near peer competitor, in a future U.S.-China, crisis or conflict over Taiwan, or various other disputes in the USPACOM Theatre; and that Australia is aware of these, U.S. proposed “AUKUS, enhanced security partnership” agreements! Nevertheless, while the SRF-West Priority Works’ Submission, infers such notions, it is not written in their Submission.

PWC please note: The Four Components of the Four-Part-SRF-WEST-Infrastructure Projects are allegedly meant to be completed between 2023 and 2027; that is, without crucial approvals, from the proposed ‘Australian Nuclear Powered Submarine Safety Regulator (ANPSSR).¹⁴:

“What are the regulated activities?”

The ANNPS bill sets out three types of *regulated activities*: *facility activities*, *submarine activities*, and *material activities*. n.123 It is these activities that are subject to the nuclear safety discussed below. Facility activities will occur in a *designated zone*. *Submarine activities and material activities could occur in either a designated zone or in relation to an Australian submarine.*¹²⁴¹⁸

Thus, the AG-D are also failing to manage and meet the **PWC-T-O-R** requirements under ***Maintenance and environmental concerns***, alluded to in ***The Scope of the Project***, along with the ***Nuclear Safety*** regulations. As evidenced by Australia’s haste in allowing “in-water” maintenance, service and repair of U.S. SSNs, at HMAS *Stirling*. The proposed increases in managing the nuclear and radiated waste taken from these SSNs will, I assume, be stored on the USS Emory S Land, or other USS Sub Tender, before the CIF is commissioned.

USS Emory S Land, Sub Tender, to be deployed to HMAS *Stirling*, Summer 2024-5:

This really is a problematic matter, as there is no public known, knowledge on how the nuclear and radiated waste is to be stored at SRF-West, from 2023, to the completion of the CIF, sometime before early 2027.

Other than reflecting-back, to the ASA HMAS *Stirling*, Controlled Industrial Facility (CIF) application for an ARPANSA Licence, which has not been granted, yet! The ASA stated in their Licence Application, that the Nuclear and Radiated Waste from an SSN, is no more dangerous than that of Medical Radiated Waste stored (insecurely) across Perth’s Hospitals.

Seriously PWC, it is not good enough for me, and it now appears it isn’t good enough, for our “AUKUS, enhanced security partnership, within the U.S and UK!

Further, in the Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, Bills Digest, Parliamentary Library, Bill Digest No. 32, 2023-24, Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 [and] Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023, at pages 7-8, and 38-39:

¹⁷

¹⁸ Parliamentary Library, Bill Digest No. 32, 2023-2024, 14 February 2024, Australian Navy Nuclear-Power Safety Bill 2023 [and] Australian Navy Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023, Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, Bills Digest, p.23.

- Framework for management of nuclear safety and nuclear security, does present a brief history of how this will be achieved. “On 6 May 2023, the Defence Minister announced an intention to establish an Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) and the Australian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Safety Regulator (ANPSSR).” (p.7)

PWC please note, I do have the ASA Corporate Plan, 2023-27, and the ASA HMAS Stirling, Controlled Industrial Facility, (CIF) ARPANSA licence submission overview, being built, and soon to be operated on Meeandip-Garden Island. And while it is said to be a low level nuclear radiated waste storage building, with a Workshop. It is not temporary solution, in my opinion, a 100 m by 30 metre building to store Nuclear and Radiated Waste, which does include liquids from the maintenance of the Nuclear Propulsion Unit, for 15-30 years.

The Australian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Safety Regulator (ANPSSR), as of 14 July 2024, to my knowledge has not been commissioned.

I understand that the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 [and] Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023, were referred to a Senate Committee, and that this Committee has referred them back to the Minister for further clarification, even though:

- “Australia is required to enter into a new arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA under article 14 of its *Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement* because the nuclear submarine enterprise will involve the use of nuclear material in an activity that does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement.¹⁹ The arrangement will establish how Australia will ensure the security of nuclear material contained within the nuclear naval nuclear reactors, as well as verification mechanisms, and relate to matters such as temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements.²⁰ Work on negotiating that arrangement commenced in May 2023, with further negotiations held in August 2023, and set to continue in 2024.²¹ The Director General of the IAEA last reported on the issue on 31 May 2023.²² (pp.7-8).”

PWC-T-O-R, seriously, you are about to approve the SRF-West Priority Works, and its \$738.1 million dollar, estimated budget, without honouring your terms of reference. As evidenced by the pending arrival of the USS Emory S Land, a Sub Tender, to complete the maintenance, servicing, and repairs, of a U.S. SSN Virginia-class submarine. Without passing the required two legislative regimes, establishing the ANPSSR, and without completing the required pending approvals with the IAEA.

If my assumptions are correct, that the maintenance, servicing, and repairs, of a U.S. SSN, Virginia-class submarines is occurring at HMAS Stirling, in 2024.

Sound Safety Records

PWC please read the “U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, of the Department of the Navy, “Report and NT-23-1, May 2023, “Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of Radiated Waste from US Naval Nuclear Powered Ships and their Support Facilities.” The U.S. Department of Navy, under their Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, and its “NNSA.”¹⁹ Particularly, as the U.S. Navy are allowed to discharge their radiated waste within the 12 Nautical Miles of Naval Bases, and/or in the Ocean, beyond the 12 Nautical Mile Limit. In the case of Australia, it would need to be beyond the Australian “Exclusive Economic Zone.”

I assume that this “Nuclear and Radiated Waste, Ocean Dumping,” will be assessed under the DCCEEW-EPBC Act’s examination of the Controlled Industrial Facility, in our next two proposed Submissions to the AG-D, ASA, and/or another Parliamentary Committee. If it isn’t examined under this PWC-T-O-R, SRF-

¹⁹ Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administrator, (NNSA).

West Priority Works requirements, then your whole-of-life costs, that the PWC has been commissioned to determine, cannot be assessed appropriately, and therefore, ***the SRF-West Priority Works must be rejected.***

PWC please note” The SRF-West U.S. Rotations and/or visits commenced in 2024, and the USS Emory S Land has been deployed to SRF-West from summer 2024, the UK Rotation starts in 2026, this increase in U.S. and UK SSNs ***are likely*** to be initially conventionally-armed.

The Congressional division-of-labor proposal, however, may see these SSNs not only being nuclear-powered, but in the case of a U.S.-China crisis or conflict with nuclear-armed weapons, a full range available if required.

Perhaps the USS Emory S Land is carrying them in their ships ***munition storage room-vault*** which increases the ***whole-of-life costs*** and the ***further environmental degradation*** of the Marine Eco-Systems across the Nyungah Island Land Bridges, out to the continental shelf of Australia:

- Naturally this does mean that U.S. Ocean Nuclear Dumping Practices will ***not*** be allowed to dump their Low-Medium-High Level Nuclear and Radiated Waste anywhere within Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, or on Country, as it would breach Nyungah Lore!
- Indigenous Australian Dreaming and Creation Stories only differentiate within their own climatic environments. This means that in general, teaching across Indigenous Country, across Australia, there are similarities applicable to our histories, past, present, and future; our Lore, Knowledge, Culture, and to how and why our Indigenous Environment Sustainability’s are concerned.

SRF-West Priority Works – Proposed Facilities Solution, Scope of the Project, and Omissions:

I can make no apology to the PWC for my laborious submission. Especially, as I am unable to decipher what SRF-West Priority Works are directly involved, in this minimum 738.1 million dollar project:

- The SRF-West Priority Works may include the estimated cost of building tunnels and perhaps underground buildings, across Garden Island, as the tunnels must go somewhere, and
- I assume it’s over to the Armament Wharf’s Mmunition Storage Building, either above or below the ground.
- Perhaps the CIF has an underground Storage Area; it really is all non-sensical to me.
- Surely, our Naval Service Personnel would not be expected to work in the CIF Workshop Area, next to the storage of each nuclear-powered submarines, 1 cubic metre of Nuclear and Radiated Waste, that is removed, per submarine, per year!
- The U.S., and the Australian embedded Naval Service Personnel, are said to be shielded from the on-board Nuclear Propulsion Unit, and its low level nuclear and radiated waste.
- Oh, these boats also have defective air-conditioned circulatory and temperature controls that can also react to extremes, in on-board temperatures. Apparently, the boats are not fond of the extreme weather events of climate change!

- Let's hope the boats' air-conditioning units are separated from the Nuclear Propulsion Units containment zone; and that there are no accidents, or incidents when transporting this alleged low-level nuclear and radiated waste within the boat and eventually over to the CIF.

The AUKUS SRF-West Priority Works

Surely, if the U.S. have decided not to sell nuclear-powered boats to Australia this is a moot point.

Maritime Engineering

- 44. *The low watermark and tide and tidal plane data for Fremantle has been adopted for all maritime engineering designs. This approach aligns with previous projects involving the provision of maritime engineering at HMAS Stirling. The characteristics of the Virginia, Astute and Collins class submarines primary design vessels have had provided the basis for selecting the suitable fendering system and dredging requirements.***

The maritime engineering component of SRF-West remains problematic until the PWC-T-O-R Requirement are applied to *the whole of life costs*. I assume this means that the depth of dredging around the Diamantina Pier and the Armament Wharf will not cause any sea-water incursion under the water line into the ground water or by seeping up through fracture rock.

Further, I am querying the depth of the tunnels that criss-cross under the Island and whether partially underground or submerged buildings might draw sea-water into the underground secondary and pending territory levels of water, quite deep beneath the HMAS Stirling Naval Base.

Western Australia has and will be severely impacted, by sea level rise, in spite of the hills along the western shore of Meeandip-Garden Island. There will be vulnerable parts of the island within the foreseeable future, in the life span of HMAS *Stirling*. As you are aware, the sea has been rising steadily from the continental shelf of Australia to the current shoreline of Western Australia, over a period of 4 to 12,000 years, perhaps even much longer.

The current and projected sea level rise maybe exacerbated by extreme weather events associated with climate change. Nevertheless, my understanding of the conversation between the Colonel, in charge of the SRF West infrastructure Project and myself, in May 2024, was initially alarming to me, at the time, as I was not aware that Meeandip-Garden Island's hills to the west, were quite high.

The Colonel informed me that sea level rise was not an issue or a matter of concern at SRF-West, that was going to impact the HMAS Stirling Infrastructure Project, or be overwhelming to the engineering prowess of the Australian Government, and its Engineers, at Garden Island-Meeandip. I further understand that the Colonel does have access to an Environmental Assessment under the EPBC Act that confirms his stance. I would love to read that document, and I hope that it will form the public submissions, under:

SRF-West, Section 59:

- 59 *Defence has agreed an approach to assessment under the EPBC Act with the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water. The project will be referred to the Minister for the Environment and Water under the EPBC Act for the following elements that may significantly impact the environment.***
- a. *Maritime intrusive activities. Project elements and activities that intersect with the seafloor and marine environment such as piling, dredging and dredge disposal.***

b. *Controlled Industrial Facility. The development and operation of control industrial facility and its associated radioactive waste management activities.*

Consequently, I am still quite surprised by the Colonel's assertion on this matter, when the CSIRO Climate Change, Technical Report, and the Western Australian component of the Technical Report of 2014, clearly, assert otherwise. Any disturbance of the seafloor is an issue of concern considering how far the seawater incursions have travelled into the mainland through the surface water. I can supply the PWC with numerous academic reports and articles attesting to this fact, as this information directly relates to the *whole of life costs* of SRF-West Priority Works.

Further, it is important to note that the Australian Federal Court, and the High Court of Australia, hold sacred and significant information, not to be released to the public, which has been taken from numerous Indigenous Peoples in WA, and around Australia. Much of this knowledge holder's information, has a pivotal focus, within their native title claims. Certainly, concerning the Indigenous Peoples rejection of various "mining corporate, and/ or governmental projects" that usually, are ill-informed claims, that have or will, continue to destroy our Country.

Sea level rise is a significant problem along the Western Australian coastline of the Indian Ocean. It will dramatically affect the Swan River. As you are aware, the British colonialists altered the mouth of the Swan River at Fremantle. I am sure they were *likely* unaware of the length of the Swan River. The river mouth is past the north-side of Wadjemup (Rottneest Island), out to the edge of continental shelf. And naturally, it was also interfered with in various other places along the river, adjoining the Swan Coastal Plain, and the Darling Ranges.

PWC, please understand this caution, it is applicable across Australia, regarding the three tiers of potable water, the tiers commence with surface, underground secondary levels, and tertiary levels of water. Indigenous Peoples across Australia were never allowed to interfere with the tertiary levels of water. Interference in the tertiary levels of water results in a loss of all potable surface and groundwater.

This is currently evident in WA as we have ignored Nyungah Knowledge and Lore, that had protected, for example, the Yarragadee, that had been quietly sitting and preserving, what has now been declared internationally the first Global Ecological and Biodiversity Hotspot, across the South-West of Western Australia.

Due to the colonialist deforestation that commenced, in haste in 1829,²⁰ and one that has unfortunately been supported by most governments of the day, we now have limited portable water.

Desalination Drinking water plants and Cockburn Sound:

Our wicked problem does not stop there: we now need multiple Desalination Plants in WA. The 1st of 3 Coastal Desalination Plants, currently is pumped around the Darling Range' Dams. The pivotal dam, in this equation, is at Mundaring Weir. Its huge Mundaring Water Treatment Plant (MWTP) is owned in part by the "Beijing Enterprise Water Group," who owns and controls TRILITY, ACCONA is a Spanish Water Infrastructure Company, and an Australian, \$2.00 company ensures the PPP's contractual legalities are maintained, and the Water Corporation-WA State Government.

The MWTP further treats this water, in preparation for the Perth and Peel, pump-back system, and for the journey of the remaining water out along the longest water pipeline in WA, that services, all communities along it, out to Kalgoorlie, and the Mining Industry of the Goldfields. My concerns, on this

²⁰ Bunbury, Bill, "Invisible Country, South-West Australia: Understanding a Landscape," (Crawley, UWA Publishing, 2015), pp, vi-254.

point, has never been responded too, by the Western Australian Government of the Day, or for that matter, by the Federal Government, and its WA Parliamentarians. A nuclear accident anywhere near any one of these proposed plants or the current desalination plant would be catastrophic for Western Australia.

It is, therefore, important to note PWC-T-O-R, exactly what the *whole of life costs effect both financially and to the sustainment of all life*, and respect for life, under the negative effects of climate change, on the three tiers of potable water, along with a **potential impact** of a significant Military Nuclear Accidents, on:

Managing Flora and Fauna Impacts, and Environmental Sustainability at SRF-West:

Environmental Sustainability – SRF-West

57. *Defence is committed to ecologically sustainable development and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. While assuring nuclear safety, security and Fire Protection requirements are paramount objectives, adopting cost effective ecologically sustainable development will also be a key objective in the design and development of the proposed works.*

Agreed, however, PWC we all know there is much more substance to the tenets of environmental sustainability than what the Australian Government alludes to in Section 57 of the SRF-West Priority Works has proposed. Both in tangible and intangible elements.

Climate Change Considerations:

50. *Western Australian Planning Commission's statement of planning policy number 2.6 state coastal planning policy guidance for mean sea level changes has been adopted as a basis for design for the facilities an infrastructure proposed in the Project.*

1. **Climate Change effects and affects:**

- persistent sea level rise,
- marine environmental degradation,
- underwater seawater incursion into the lands of Western Australia, especially as I was interviewed on this subject back in 2002-3, with the correctness of the content of my interview being confirmed by Water Corporation, before the interview commenced, on Curtin University Radio. In a response to my assertions, that the seawater intrusion-incursion had reached Perry Lakes, and many other Swan Coastal Plain's Lakes and Wetlands, and the
- negative damaged affects have had in the hastening of premature deaths on the Native Flora – and its consequential, effects on native fauna, market gardens, parklands, detrimental to suburban gardens across Perth and Peel, it has been significant notable loss of our Green Inner Perth Suburbs, local deforestation, regardless of the source these incidents and accidents are heart wrenching, and
- aberrant mining, of critical minerals and rare earths throughout the Darling and Stirling Ranges is as damaging as the oil and gas projects across Western Australia, in and around marine and riverine waters and the three tiers of water of our Indigenous Lands:

2. **Potential Impacts of the AUKUS enhanced security partnership:**

- The proposed Critical Minerals and Rare Earth Mining, Processing, and Production, under AUKUS Pillar 2 enhanced security partnership, throughout WA, includes Iluka Resources Projects, across WA, Australia, along with being:

- Particularly damaging to the Darling and Stirling Ranges, of the first in Australia acknowledged Global Ecological Biodiversity Hotspot, in the Southwest of WA; and
- *All of this interferes with the survivability of the three tiers of potable water, and in the case of a nuclear accident anywhere along the coastline of Australia, or in our ports these nuclear-powered and potentially nuclear-armed Boats and Warships need to be homeported in the U.S. or UK.*

Low-Medium-High Level Nuclear Accident at HMAS Stirling or somewhere along the WA Coastline:

We would assume this scenario would include other Ports across Australia, and their Coastlines and/or Rivers. These assets are all under threat and will impact equality of life, environment and social wellbeing of Australia.

- Now under the threat by the pending US and UK: Submarine Rotational Force-West's *future proposed* "Forward Homeported," SSNs Naval Base, for the U.S and UK and their nuclear-powered submarines.
- ***Especially, if a catastrophic U.S. Nuclear Propulsion Unit accident occurs, and/or a direct hit in a U.S.-China conflict occurs, at HMAS Stirling, in Perth and Peel, in WA; or anywhere else in Australia; and finally***

PWC how is this whole of life costs, such as the expansion of the precedent AUKUS SRF-West's sets across Australia-Wide, to a future SRF-North, SRF-South, and SRF-East for the AUKUS, enhanced security partnership, an apparent servitude pact.

Meanwhile back in WA, it is assumed that the dying Perth and Peel coastal native flora remnants, and much of the WA's native flora and fauna, cannot survive, further seawater incursions and/or intolerance to the increases, in desalination water, now seen as potable water, across our gardens, and food producing areas of Western Australia.

The loss is significant, parts of the Northern Jarrah Forest, of the South-West Region, its native flora and fauna, and in particular, the three varieties of black cockatoos are all dying!

Indigenous Lore, Culture, Knowledge Holders, Environmental Management, Histories, and Truth Telling

I reflect on this because Australian governments of the day, still do not understand the Indigenous Creation-Dreamtime Stories, and their scientific benefits directly relating to Indigenous Peoples prior to their colonisation, in the present and known future. Who had ensured their survivability across Australia, immemorial. For example, the Elders and their Indigenous Knowledge Holders understand the significance of all life, across their Country.

Just a glimpse of this knowledge through the following examples to ensure how to preserve sentient life, that must be protected. If you wish to survive in harmony within your Country, and that of your direct neighbours, and other related Indigenous Peoples across Australia.

Sustainable Air, Land, Water, and Marine Management Practices by enhancing the Preservation of:

- Animal and Fish Nurseries in "Fresh - Brackish water, and Marine Ecosystems," in the case of

- The three tiers of water they require an absence of any interference, there must be no interference with the Territory Level of Water, it is a Land and Sea Boundary, stopping the intrusion and loss of the viability between these waters
- Land clearance and burning for the attraction of food sources must be strictly managed and conserved for the benefit of the AIR, and viability of breeding for animals, birds, all sentient life. and humans, for the future prosperity, and sustainability of the
- Historical, Lores, Knowledge, Culture, and Environment, which are all central to the Peoples Wellbeing and Security; to overcome the
- AUKUS SRF-West, enhanced security agreement, that will destroy the last of our shared humanity.

Particularly, as I had sought advice from Iva Haywood-Jackson, a Nyungah Knowledge Holder, concerning the Swan Coastal Plain that extends to the Australian Continental Shelf. In fact, the mouth, of what we now know, as the Swan River, that still flows out past, the North of Wadjemup-Rottnest Island.

I can only address matters within the consent and knowledge of the public information that Iva Haywood-Jackson has discussed with me. Further, I have no sacred or significant information to share with the PWC.

The PWC, would need to call, Iva Haywood-Jackson and Bella Bropho, who are both Directors of the Wadlemup-Rottnest Island Deaths Aboriginal Corporation. Particularly, in my opinion, if you do not want to breach the sacred and significant knowledge of the current Land Bridge from Meeandip to Wadjemup.

The SRF-West Priority works and all decisionmakers are about to breach sacred and significant native title matters, and creation stories. I can state that Meeandip, and Wadjemup will become a significant issue in WA, and across Australia, when these truth stories are shared about the horrors an indignity, of the prior “colonial deaths and torture in custody” on both islands of sorrow.

****I understand that Aboriginal People from across WA, are also buried at Meeandip. Yet again a burial ground is to be blasted apart to house, under the U.S and UK, SRF-West, heinous toxic materials, and disruption to the:

- The place of the Nyungah Dreaming, The Emu, with Emu Dreaming stretching across Australia
- The extinction of the Little Penguins, they are distinct species across each land bridge island, hence they are sacred, the native flora and fauna of these Landbridge Islands creates sacred holy places, entrenched in the creation stories, beyond the dreamtime...
- Two Man Dreaming, and its relationship to the Western Desert; and
- The scientific knowledge of the known outcomes, if you destroy or interfere with Lores and Customs that preserve all Peoples who come to this Country, for example
- Life, Death, and Peaceful Outcomes all jeopardised by governmental ignorance of Country
- The drinking water of the People of Perth and Peel, and as a
- Consequence, an existential threat of Climate Change in Western Australia,
- The Water Corporation’s Cockburn Sound Desalination Plant, and its seawater drawn from the adjacent Cockburn Sound Heavy Industrial Area.
- The pending Low-Medium-High Nuclear and Radiated Waste, and known storage, along with PFAS Contamination on Meeandip, and the
- Current and pending Military Fuel Depots, now that the U.S. is transferring its “HAWAII Red Hill” problems to our fragile Country;

- An admixture of toxic wastes that does and will draw seawater into the Desalination Plant, in Cockburn Sound that supplies approximately 50% of our potable water, that is
- Pumped around the Darling Ranges Dams, along with
- Being pumped back through the Suburban Areas of Perth and Peel, and way out from the Mundaring Weir, and its Mundaring Water Treatment Plant, to all the
- Communities along the Mundaring Weir Pipeline, for approximately, 600 kms, to the Goldfields of Kalgoorlie.

Seriously, PWC you must focus on your holistic PWC - "T-O-R", and on the whole-of-life costs. I would hate to have to make the applicable foregone decision, that you will probably make, concerning SRF-West and its 738.1 million, Priority Works.

Nyungah Culture does not differentiate between the associated other three components of the SRF-West Infrastructure Project at Meeandip, on Garden Island, and neither should the PWC, as you do have ample room under the PWC Procedural Manual:

Parliamentary approval...

1.28 While the Committee can make any recommendations it sees fit for the implementation by the entity, the final recommendation of any report will be:

- if the Committee is satisfied that the project has merit 'that the House of Representative resolve that it is expedient that the works be carried out'; or
- if the Committee is not satisfied that the project has merit 'that the work does not proceed.'

1.29 If the Committee has recommended that the work not proceed, the Committee will give justification for this recommendation.

1.30 At any stage after the Committee has reported, works can be again referred to it for further consideration and the Committee also has the power to review its reports. If after the works have been approved there are significant changes to project scope, delivery timeframes, cost, function or design, the Committee must be advised and may choose to make a further report to the Parliament on the work. ...

What does not constitute a public work?

1.38 Also specifically, a 'work' does not include:

- the production of, or anything done in relation to, intangible things
- the production of, or anything done in relation to, a movable property unless the work is, under the regulations, a movable work to which the Act applies;
- the installation, alteration or repair of plant or equipment with the plant or equipment:
 - Is not designed to be used in, or in relation to, the provisions of services for a building or other structure; and
 - is not necessary or desirable to make a building or structure a complete building;
- A work proposed to be carried out within the parliamentary zone;
- a work proposed to be carried out by or for the Commonwealth by way of assistance to an overseas country; or
- Any other matter declared by the regulations not to be a work."

This is a sacred and significant Country, you are a decision-maker, on/in, and a-midst NYUNGAH, Lores, Knowledge, Culture, History, Scientific Dreaming and Creation Stories.

PWC, I advise a vivid consciousness of honourable, and respectful decisionmakers:

WHY?

So, we-you do not destroy trade in our region, or under the AUKUS enhanced security partnership, create the perfect environment for U.S.-China, WWII preparation. Conflict, crisis, for the 2027-30, alleged dispute between the parties, over Taiwan, or any other disputed Territory; and

To inhibit our consistent disrespect across the international community. Along with ignoring the climate change plight affecting the Indo-Pacific, intensifying a deep sense of loss of security, culture, knowledge, food, water and land-viability across small island states, and the global south; and

For a loss of humanity, for all of us living west of the IDL, under the USINDOPACOM, amongst a raging clash of civilisations.

We all mingle, and clash, and predominately focus on our shameful international records of neglects of the “other” along with the knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, of Australia, and those across the Indo-Pacific Region.

PWC-T-O-R: The responsibility for the **Nuclear Safety** at SRF West has not been finalised.

It is under the current responsibility of ARPANSA, ANSTO, and under the watchful eye, of the IAEA. To my knowledge, the HMAS *Stirling’s* proposed, Controlled Industrial Facility, ASA licence has not been finalised by ARPANSA.

Further the proposed new nuclear regulator for SRF-West has not been commissioned at HMAS *Stirling*, even though, the U.S. SSNs and some Virginia-class submarines continue to receive their in-water Maintenance, services and repairs, at SRF-West.

In fact, it is remiss, as the SRF-West, Priority Works, has not been passed by the PWC, or the DCCEEW; it lacks Australian Parliamentary, and Parliamentarian Democratic scrutiny. The SRF-West lacks risk estimations, assessment and management, confidence levels, and my favourite *Whole-of-Cost and cost-benefits analysis. To reiterate the SRF-West’s cost effectiveness is flawed.*

The SRF-West’s Priority Works current budget is for \$738.1 million, however, under PWC-T-O-R requirements, throughout this four-part SRF-West Infrastructure Project, lacks appropriate:

“Confidence levels

2.50 The Committee acknowledges that projects are brought to it at varying stages of development and, consequently, cost estimates within are within a range of accuracy relating to the design stage. While the Committee expects a single point estimate of delivery project costs, it also expects information pertaining to the accuracy and confidence level attaching to the cost estimate.⁷

2.51 At a minimum, the Committee requires submissions to include:

- the cost estimate range in the confidence level attaching to the estimate; and
- key milestones when project costs are reviewed and the project confidence level at that stage.”

The Lethality of SRF-West’s Offensive Naval Base:

Seriously, PWC, and AG-D, the nature of the proposal at SRF-West, cannot be rushed through, it is not a harmless series of civilian buildings that the PWC is to approve. SRF-West is to become a Lethally Offensive U.S Naval Base, similar too Pearl Harbor in WWII. It requires the ability of Australia,

the U.S. and UK, under the “AUKUS enhanced security partnership,” to protect and preserve the wellbeing of the people of Perth and Peel, Western Australia, and across Australia.

To date, I have not been assured that the AUKUS Enhanced Security Partnership, can deliver what the U.S. have been asserting, since 2021. Particularly, with the lack of confidence the U.S. has in Australia’s ability to manage the responsibility for the nuclear safety at SRF-West.

PWC-T-O-R have not been met and, therefore, the people of Perth and Peel, and Western Australia, are endangered just by living through this SRF-West development phase as inferred by the U.S. acknowledgment made by the USA concerning Australia’s critical nuclear safety flaws.

Further it is interesting how the US uses language to assert their prowess and power over the less experienced nation state. Does this mean, for example, that the US is suggesting that because they own and control the US-SSNs, and their nuclear propulsion technology, that the U.S. nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines, and warships will not have accidents, incidents, or breach a U.S. SSN regulatory nuclear safety requirement?

Seriously, the US are asserting “that the US has a proven record extending back to 1954 of safety operating its nuclear powered ships”, even though the U.S. regularly release nuclear and radiated waste at Sea and have two nuclear powered and armed submarines sitting on the ocean floor, the USS Thresher sank on 10 April 1963, and the USS Scorpion on 22 May 1968.”²¹ All nuclear powered boats and warships in ports, in or on the oceans, across the INDO-PACIFIC have incidents and accidents. Apparently, these sorts of nuclear safety concerns relating to U.S. owned and controlled SSN's, especially those to rotate at SRF-West are immune from ever having a nuclear accident or nuclear incident!

Nuclear Safety

Is an important reason why the Australian Government, must cancel the current U.S. 2024-2027 along with the UK's 2026-7 rotations at SRF-West. Further, if the U.S. are to cancel the transfer and sale of nuclear-powered Virginia-class submarines to Australia, then Australia’s:

SRF-West “Need for the Project,” is indeed null and void:

Para 13: *The 2023 Defence Strategy Review reaffirmed the need to develop a nuclear-powered submarine capability by including ‘investing in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS partnership’ as the first of its six priorities for action.*

Para 14: *The 2024 National Defence Strategy confirmed ‘the Optimal Pathway’ for Australia to acquire conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will be implemented as a conditions-based three phase program, with the Submarine Rotational Force - West beginning operation as early as 2027.”*

Is no longer required, therefore, the AUKUS enhance security partnership, can now be cancelled.

PWC-T-O-R because the ‘Need of the Project’ has not been adequately addressed by SRF-West, Priority Works Submission:

²¹ Report NT-23-1, May 2023, Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of Radioactive Waste from U.S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and their Support Facilities, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. 20350, pp.1-35

- It is apparent that one of the three phase programs has failed. Therefore, I recommend that Australia cancel the SRF-West AUKUS enhanced security partnership, of the AUKUS Pillar I Pact.
- **PWC-T-O-R** have not been met due to a lack of Australian Nuclear Safety Capabilities, alleged by the U.S. This ensures that ARPANSA must reject the ASA licence Application, before ARPANSA.
- The two DCCEEW Maritime and CIF Reports to the Minister for the Environments Approval are no longer required as the U.S. will not transfer or sell Virginia-class submarines to Australia.
- Australia will not be generating any nuclear and radiated waste at HMAS *Stirling*.
- The people of Perth and Peel, West Australians and Australia wide must not be subjected to managing the Low Level Nuclear and Radiated Waste of the U.S. and UK, across all military domains, including the U.S. Force Posture Initiatives across Australia.
- And Australia should reject, outright the passage of medium to high level nuclear waste, and radiated materials from the Nuclear-powered and Nuclear Military's of the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

HMAS Stirling is a Defensive Non-Nuclear Naval Base:

- Any need for the work for just the Australian ADF Non-Nuclear Forces can still be delivered to HMAS *Stirling*.
- Will the PWC recommend that the U.S. USS Emory S Land, Sub Tender no longer needs to be deployed at HMAS *Stirling*, in 2024.
- It is inappropriate for the Emory S Land to work with Australia's in-experienced nuclear navy personnel to complete the U.S and UK "in water maintenance, service and repair, of their nuclear powered submarines." The SRF-West has not met their PWC-T-O-R requirements.

Part 1: Recommendations to the PWC:

Recommendation 1

1.22 the stated purpose of the proposed work and its suitability for that purpose:

Recommendation 2

1.22 the need for, and advisability of, the work

Recommendation 3

1.22 the cost effectiveness of the proposal

Recommendation 4

1.22 the current and prospective public value of the work

Recommendation 5

1.38 a work proposed to be carried out by or for the Commonwealth by way of assistance to an overseas country

Recommendation 6

Whole of life costing analysis

2.54 lifetime maintenance costs

Recommendation 7

Whole-of-life costing analysis

2.54 summary of the assumption that underpin the analysis model

Recommendation 8

2.57 In assessing whole of life costs, the Committee will take into consideration the design stage as well as the confidence level attached to the project.

Part 2 of my Submission to the PWC:

AUKUS Enhanced Security Partnership’s Estimated Australian Budget: \$368 Billion:

SRF-West’s Infrastructure Australian Budget: \$8 Billion, with the SRF-West Priority Works estimated budget: \$738.1 Million:

As stated above in Part 1 of my Submission, I am extremely concerned, by the Australian Government’s SRF-West Infrastructure Projects’ financial budget of \$8 billion to establish a U.S. and UK Submarine Rotational Force - West (*Offensive*) Naval Base at HMAS *Stirling*, in Western Australia (WA), officially from early 2027.

The overall under-estimated budget of the AUKUS enhanced security partnership of \$368 Billion, is ridiculous, and is lacking factual contingency costs over decades. It will blow out; *it is not cost-effective*.

PWC Procedural Manual – (PWCM)

As you are aware, the PWC SRF-West with or without its current contingency allowance, the SRF-West Priority Works Budget of \$738.1, has not been fully costed. It is evident in the SRF-West Priority Works, “Executive Summary,” Section 7 that states: ‘there will be ongoing operating costs as a result of the works.’”

PWC, how can the SRF-West Priority Works possibly meet the PWCM’s Terms of Reference? How can you approve the SRF-West Priority Works against the whole-of-life costs, when the AG-D does not even know what the actual estimated costs are for the AUKUS Infrastructure Projects, and there ongoing costs?

Particularly, when the SRF-West state that: “There will be ongoing operating costs as a result of the works” beyond contingency costs. PWC, am I missing something? Especially, as under the PWCM, Sections 2.53, 2.54, 2.57, and 2.58, there are strict guidelines to ensure the Priority Works can be met within their estimates! Seriously, PWC SRF-West it is unlikely to meet the PWCM’s whole-of-life costs. Although on closer scrutiny perhaps I should just focus on “(or, life-cycle), rather than whole-of-life costs, in Section 2.53.

Alarming, It appears that the whole-of-life cost within the PWCM, does not apply to any nuclear or radiated waste damage of People, Sentient Life or adjoining Civilian Property. It is not considered in the PWCM. The PMCM at Section 2.53, confirms my analysis:

“The committee has an expectation that whole-of-life costing analysis is part of any decision to pursue public works and is utilised in any comparative study regarding options considered in relation to the works (i.e. whether to build new or renovate existing facilities).”

Another shudder for me to recover from, which reminds me of the lack of responsible governance illustrated in the “Inquiry into International armed conflict decision making.”²² Especially, as I assume that the broader Australian Community are unaware of its significant impacts that inhibit democratic examination by the Parliament of the Federal Cabinet’s Defence decision-making regimes. In the case of the decisions relating to the AUKUS Pillar 1, enhanced security partnership, SRF-West, and the SRF-West Priority Works was not required to discuss their decision, with the WA State Government ‘under Section 51 (vi)’,²³ of the Australian Constitution.

²² Parliament of Australia, “Inquiry into International armed conflict decision making,” Parliamentary Joint Committee, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, March 2023, Canberra, pp.iii-110

²³ Ibid at Contestability and Consensus, *A bipartisan approach to more effective parliamentary engagement with Defence*, p.7

Safety and Security for the People that live across Perth and Peel, and more broadly across WA, and Australia:

I have repeated information from Part 1, in Part 2 of my submission, to further clarify some other matters that will assist the PWC in identifying the significant impacts of AUKUS SRF-West Priority Works and their inability to meet the PWCM requirements. While the PWC, appears to have a firm focus on the SRF-West Priority Works' financial costings, they must be cost-effective.

Nevertheless, in WA meeting Infrastructure Project costs are rarely met. In fact, unachievable due to costing omissions, general inadequacies relating to supply delays, an overcompensating for unexpected increased costs, underestimating the time required to complete the works, and inflationary contract cost way beyond any appropriate factual contingency costs. Therefore, PWC I suggest you do a rigorous and comprehensive comparative analysis, of SRF-West's Priority Works, at Garden Island, against their prior and current Infrastructure Project costs. Contracts already paid out, and then analysed them, against the WA Government's METRONET costs across Perth and Peel.

Further the PWCM whole-of-life costs omit direct existential threats to the People of Perth and Peel. The Australian Government-Defence (AG-D) has not provided holistic costings to provide for the safety and security of People, and all sentient life across Perth and Peel, and WA, and across Australia, when SRF-North, South, and East are developed under the AUKUS Pillar 1, enhanced security partnership.

It does bother me, what SRF-West dismisses and omits, it raises questions challenging the safety and security of the people that live across Perth and Peel, WA, and Australia. Along with being mindful of the existential threats that the AUKUS enhanced security partnership presents to our neighbours, such as, an Indo-Pacific Region being smothered by the negative effects of the AUKUS enhanced security partnership. One that will diminish human rights, peace, and security as does the sentiments entwining their way through this Submission.

I am concerned that I do not have *all* the AUKUS enhanced security partnership agreements, treaty-s, legislation, bills, or unwritten agreements. It is quite difficult to write these submissions without all the relevant classified and unclassified documents required to understand why the Australian Government of the Day asserts that becoming a nuclear powered and/or nuclear armed nation state is to the advantage of the People of Australia, and our neighbouring Nation States.

****I do note that in the SRF-West Priority Works Submission to the PWC under Relevant Legislation, Codes and Standards, are addressed in Section 30. (a-w). Unfortunately, I was unable to access and download all this information.

Australian Legislation, Treaties and the AUKUS SRF-West and the AUKUS SRF-West Priority Works:

Treaties that I consider to be anti-peace, are listed below, as they do not mandate a defensive ADF; instead, they increase the lethality of the ADFs. Quite often ADF behaviour is **offensive, provocative, reckless, and increasingly aggressive**. Particularly, in the Seas surrounding China within their Exclusive Economic Zone, or close to North Korea, or when shadowing Russia, throughout the Indo-Pacific Region. *Is any nation-state in the West, capable of reflecting on their own threatening behaviour; seriously, there is little deference between, the opposing sides.* It is hastening the destabilisation of the Indo-Pacific. It intensifies the likelihood of a U.S. military and economic force posture decline between the U.S.-China with an entrenched focus on a conflict over Taiwan. Along with other related border disputes in the Indo-Pacific.

The USINDOPACOM, Command and Control over the U.S. Force Posture Initiatives across Australia:

Australia allows the U.S. to increase their power over all military domains, across Australia. The expansion of numerous U.S. “Foreign Military Bases” across the Indo-Pacific is unsettling neighbours, this fact is apparently ignored in Australia. The U.S. and UK, SRF-West, HMAS *Stirling* Naval Base, on Meeandip-Garden Island, is an example, of this unrealistic dominance over a “Sovereign Australia,”²⁴ which needs to be terminated by the Federal Australian Government’s War Cabinet, if Australia intends to live peacefully with all our neighbours.

One that supports the Indo-Pacific Nation States, so we all can continue to move towards a series of non-aligned States, or in Australia’s case, a “Permanent Non-Nuclear Armed Neutrality for Australia.”

Rather than an **AUKUS Enhanced Security Partnership, and the U.S. and Australian Force Posture Initiatives, negative reliance on the:**

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra: The Force Posture Agreement between the Government of Australia, and the Government of the United States of America, (Sydney, 12 August 2014), [2014] ATNIF 24.

The National Interest Analysis [2014] ATNIA 19 with attachment on consultation), The Forced Posture Agreement between the Government of Australia, and the Government of the United States of America (Sydney, 12 August 2014), [2014] AINIA 24, National Interest Analysis. Category 1, Treaty Summary Page.

The Introduction of the H.R.3939 AUKUS Undersea Defence Act to the U.S. Congress:

Sponsor: Rep, Meeks, Gregory W [D-NY-5] was introduced to the House on 6/9/2023.

This Act was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case considering for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

“Bill H.R 3939 may be cited as the AUKAS Undersea Defence Act ...

Sec. 2. FINDINGS. ...

(4) Pillar 1 of the AUKUS partnership aims to provide Australia with a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability while upholding the highest non-proliferation standards.

(5) In support of this Pillar 1 goal the United States and the United Kingdom plan to increase port visits to Australia of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines then begin forward rotations of such submarines to Australia at Submarine Rotational Force – West.

(6) In support of these goals, the United States will transfer Virginia-class submarines to Australia to bolster its critical undersea capabilities and enhance its undersea presence in the Indo Pacific region. ...

²⁴ Australian Government, Defence AUKUS Trilateral Statement, 22 March 2024, pp.1-3.; White House, Fact Sheet, Trilateral Australia-UK-US partnership on Nuclear Powered Submarines, March 13, 2023: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-release/2023...pp.1-7>

Sec. 3. Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States submarine security activities. ...

(3) Waiver of certification requirement—the requirement for the Chief of Navy operations to make a certification under section 8678 of title 10, United States Code, shall not apply to a transfer under this subsection. ...

(6) Applicability of existing law to transfer special, nuclear material, and utilization facilities for military applications ...

(b) Repair and Refurbishment of AUKUS Submarines—Section 8680 of title 10, United States Code, is amended- ...

“(e) Repair and Refurbishment of certain submarines—(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Secretary of the Navy shall determine the appropriate shipyard in the United States, Australia or the United Kingdom to perform any repair or refurbishment of the United States submarine involved in submarine security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (in this section referred to as ‘AUKUS’).

(2) Repair or refurbishment described in paragraph (1) may be carried out by personnel of the United States, United Kingdom, or Australia in accordance with the international arrangements governing AUKUS submarine security activities.” ...

SEC, 4 Acceptance Authority—The Secretary of defence may accept from the government of Australia contributions of money made by the Government of Australia for use by the Department of Defense in support of non-nuclear related aspects of submarine security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (in this section referred to as ‘AUKUS’) ...

SEC. 5. Australia, United Kingdom, and United States Submarine Security Training

(a) In GENERAL—The President may transfer or authorise the export of defense services to the Government of Australia under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) that may also be directly exported to Australian private-sector personnel to support the development of the Australian submarine industrial base necessary for submarine security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (in this section referred to as AUKUS), including in cases in which such private-sector personnel are not officers, employees, or agents of the government of Australia. ...”

There is one summary for H.R.3939. Bill summaries authorised by CRS.

“The Bill authorizes the Department of Defence (DOD) to sell Australia up to two Virginia-class attack submarines under the Australia-United Kingdom-United States security partnership agreement (AUKUS). The bill authorizes DOD to transfer the submarines from existing Navy inventories. The bill also

- applies existing law to the transfer under this bill of special nuclear material related to submarine reactors.
- authorizes the Navy to determine the appropriate shipyard in any of the AUKUS countries for repair of U.S. Navy submarines.
- a submarine security activities account to accept payments from Australia for non-nuclear related aspects of submarine security activities, and

- authorizes the President to transfer defence services to Australia to develop the Australian submarine industrial base for AUKUS activities.”²⁵

Series of Congressional Research Service Reports (CRS Reports), and associated officials, with applicable quotes that reflect on the problematic nature of the SRF-West Priority Works from 2023, to early 2027:

The CRS Reports discuss in a bipartisan manner, the status of the AUKUS, enhanced security partnership, along with the wicked problem of sustaining U.S. Defense Production and Supply, across all Military Domains; it is required reading to assist the PWC, under the PWCM, identify the ‘Purpose of the Works’ alluded to in the SRF-West Priority Works Submission, for example:

1. Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Pillar 1 Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 2024, Congressional Research Service, <http://crsreport.congress.gov>, RL 32418, pp.1-51.
2. Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-class Submarine Programme and AUKUS Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress. December 21, 2023, Congressional Research Service, <https://crsreports.com.gov>, RL 32418, pp. 1-102; along with an intense **focus on**, pp.66-73: Legislative Activity Regarding Proposed Sale of Virginia-class Boats under AUKUS agreement ¹³³, May 2023 DOD Legislative Package Relating to AUKUS agreement; and Appendix A., B., C., D., E., and F., pp.74-104;
3. Congressional Research Service, U.S. Defence Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress, June 6, 2023, Congressional Research Service, <http://crsreports.congress.gov>, R47589, pp1-51
4. Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, December 21, 2022, Congressional Research Service, <http://crsreports.congress.gov>, RL 32418, pp.1-47.
5. Statement of Admiral John C. AQUILINO, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture, 20 March 2024, UNCLASSIFIED, as of 18 March 2024, pp.1-43.
6. Statement of Vice Admiral John WOLFE, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on FY 2025 Budget Requests for Nuclear Forces and Atomic Energy Defence Activities 22 May 2024, pp.1-12
7. President Biden, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, pp.1-25
8. President Trump, Joint Publication 3-72 Nuclear Operations 11 June 2019, Chapters 1-6, Appendix A-D, Glossary...
9. NNSA, B61-12 Life Extension Program, November 2021, energy.gov/nnsa, pp.1-2; President Biden, Immediate Release, Fact Sheet on B61 Variant Development, October 27, 2023, B61-13, pp.1-2.

²⁵ H.R. 3939 118th Congress (2023-2024). AUKUS Undersea Defense Act. There is one summary for H.R.3939. Bill Summaries are authorised by CRS. Introduce to the House (06/09/2023), Sponsor: Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. [D-NY-5], pp.1-15.

10. Congressional Research Service, IN FOCUS, Nuclear-Armed Sea-launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N), May 31, 2024, pp.1-3
11. Congressional Research Service, IN FOCUS, US Indo-Pacific Command, (INDOPACOM), March 5, 2024, pp.1-3
12. Congressional Research Service, IN FOCUS, Defence Prime: Strategic Nuclear Forces, Updated February 2, 2023, pp.1-3.

SRF-West Priority Works - Purpose of the Works:

Aim of the Project

8. *The aim of the Project is to provide critical facilities and infrastructure required at HMAS Stirling to support the initial establishment of the Submarine Rotational Force - West in 2027. ...*

Need for the Project:

Apparently, the Australia's strategic environment has deteriorated more rapidly than anticipated:

10. *The need for a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability has arisen as Australia's strategic environment has deteriorated more rapidly than anticipated. The Indo-Pacific region is now the centre of strategic competition. The technological edge enjoyed by Australia and our allies is narrowing. As a three-ocean nation dependent on seaborne international trade, Australia requires cutting-edge naval capabilities.*

The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan:

11. *The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan identified the need for Australia to invest in high-end capabilities that bolster our deterrence and better prepare us to respond in the event of conflict in our region. In response, Australia outlined a commitment to developing a more capable military force that allows us to continue to help shape the region's future trajectory and strengthens our ability to work with regional partners in support of stability and security. In particular, the review reaffirmed that a future submarine capability would be critical to our defence strategy, albeit at that stage a conventional submarine was envisaged. Department of Defence — Submarine Rotational Force—West, Priority Works, HMAS Stirling, Western Australia.*

AUKUS Nuclear Powered Submarine Pathway ('Optimal Pathway'):

12. *On 21 September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced the establishment of an enhanced trilateral security partnership called 'AUKUS'. Under AUKUS there are two related lines of effort – acquisition of a Nuclear-Powered Submarine capability and other Advanced Capabilities. The AUKUS Nuclear Powered Submarine Pathway ('Optimal Pathway'), trilaterally announced by Australia, UK and US in March 2023, confirmed Australia's commitment to establishing a conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine capability at the earliest possible date.*

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review, had structural assistance of the United States:

13. *The 2023 Defence Strategic Review reaffirmed the need to develop a nuclear-powered submarine capability by including 'investing in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS partnership' as the first of its six priorities for action.*

This document was produced with the assistance of the U.S., by Dr. Mara Karlin who was sent to Australia to ensure the interoperability and interchangeability between the Parties, under the AUKUS, enhanced security partnership, July 5, 2023:

Department of Defence Spokesman Lieutenant Colonel David Herndon provided the following readout pertaining to Dr Mara Kalin's visit to Australia on July 1. It was indeed an extensive six day program across Australia, for example, Dr Karlin engaged in discussions, centred around Australia's Defence Strategic Review and the US National Defence Strategy.

After all these documents are required to be interoperable and interchangeable to ensure that the USINDOPACOM Command and the USPACOM, Control Commanders can ensure the security and stability, of U.S. interests across the Indo-Pacific Region. Australian ministerial officials discussed the ‘regional security environment, force posture, and the future trajectory of the Aukus trilateral security pact’, for example:

“In Perth, her visit to HMAS Stirling - a key logistical and operational support base for role Australian ships, submarines, and aircraft - offered unique perspectives on the AUKUS trilateral security pact. The base recently hosted the USS Asheville Los-Angeles class fast attack submarine for a combined exercise.

Dr Karlin also toured a submarine training facility and met with local defence leaders to discuss progress on various initiatives under the historic AUKUS agreement.”²⁶

The CRS, June 12, 2024, pp.25-6, further explains this widely unknown fact concerning AUKUS Pillar 1 enhanced security partners, and thus the viability of the SRF-West Priority Works, they are skittish, under:

“Whether to implement certain elements of AUKUS Pillar 1...

In comparing the potential benefits, cost, and risks of these elements of Pillar 1 with the potential benefits, cost, and risks of the division-of-labor alternative, key factors that Congress may consider include, but are not necessarily limited to the following;

- **deterrents and warfighting cost effectiveness**-cost relative to resulting deterrents and warfighting capability;
- **technology security**-the potential impact on the risk of China, Russia, or some other country gaining access to U.S. submarine or naval nuclear propulsion technology; and
- **risk of accident and public accessibility of US navy nuclear powered ships**-the risk of an accident involving an Australian-owned SSN that might call into question for third party observers the safety of all U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships and thereby affect U.S. public support for operating U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships and/or the ability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships to make port calls around the world.

Of the three factors listed above, the first is one is typically involved in considering the merits of defence programs, while the second and third arose in connection with the Congress's consideration of the merits of a project that Canada began in 1987 and cancelled in 1989 to acquire a force of 10-12 UK- or French-made SSN's (see **Appendix G** and **Appendix I**).⁵⁴²⁷...

- “The enabling legislation for Pillar 1 that was included in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R.2670/P.L. 118-31 of December 22, 2023) includes a provision (...1352(d)(2) that provides a waiver for certification to be made by the Chief of Naval Operations under 10 U.S.C.8678. The text of 10 U.S.C. 8678 is as follows:
...8678. Chief of Naval Operations: certification required for disposal of combat vessels. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no combat vessel of the Navy may be sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of unless the Chief of Naval Operations certifies that it is not essential to the defense of the United States.”²⁸

²⁶ United States of America, Readout of Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Dr. Mara Karlin visit to Australia, July 5, 2023, pp1-2

²⁷ CRS, June 12, 2024, pp.25-6

²⁸ Ibid at CRS, June 12, 2024, p.33

PWCM – What does not constitute a public work? Section 1.38 Also specifically, a ‘work’ does not include: a work proposed to be carried out by or for the Commonwealth by way of assistance to an overseas country.

These paragraphs below are of concern, when contrasted to the “Agreement between the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information, (Canberra, 22 November 2021), Entry into force for Australia, 8 February 2022, Australian Treaty Series [2022] ATS 4, concerning:

Article IX, Final Provisions ... Agreement shall remain in force until December 31, 2023, and shall automatically extend for additional periods of six months each, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement. Any party may, by giving at least six months written notice to the other Parties, terminate this Agreement.”

Naturally, I search for the new “Agreement”, especially as I had already been reading, for some time, various Congressional Research Service Reports, that the U.S. Congress were considering regarding the “**Merits of Proposed Pillar 1 Compared to U.S.-Australian Division of Labor**,” that includes a “**Summary of Some Key Factors**”, pp. 28-48, in the “**Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, December 21, 2023, pp.1-104.**

Interestingly, this was the length of the document supplied to the Federal Parliament, on 1 January 2024. This Congressional Research Service Document is unclassified and is a public document in America. It is a public document in Australia. **PWC** why isn't it a public document in the Australian Federal Parliament? I was unable to download this document, other than to access a nebulous reference to it through the Parliamentary Library Catalogue:

PWC Please Note: I am disgusted with the Australian Government-Defence, Submarine Rotational Force-West Priority Works HMAS *Stirling*, WA, Statement of Evidence to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, June 2024.

I demand that this document be withdrawn, and that a new document be written by the Australian Government-Defence representing the factual position of AUKUS Pillar 1, and it's \$368 billion-dollar, enhanced security partnership.

Submarine Rotational Force – West, Priority Works, HMAS Stirling, Western Australia, estimated cost of this stage is 738.1 million, under:

“Purpose of the Works

The aim of the Project:

8 ***The aim of the project is to provide critical facilities and infrastructure required at HMAS Stirling to support the initial establishment of the Submarine Rotational Force - West in 2027.***

PWC: Why hide the fact that the Australian Government Defence have capitulated on the initial AUKUS Pillar 1 enhanced security partnership. Along with not stating that the \$8 billion dollars being spent at the HMAS *Stirling*, Submarine Rotational Force-West, Australian Naval Base, which is financial supported

by the Australian Taxpayers. Is now a Foreign Military Naval Base, that the Australian Taxpayer is financially supporting, without their knowledge or consent.

I assume that the Australian Government's WAR CABINET, decided to withhold this information from the Australian Public because of "public work", as defined in the PWCM, cannot approve the Submarine Rotational Force - West Priority Works, under:

What does not constitute a public work?

Section 1.38 Also specifically, a 'work' does not include

... a work proposed to be carried out by or for the Commonwealth by way of assistance to an overseas country. (p.8)."

The United States and the United Kingdom are an 'Overseas Country', and I assume as such, SRF-West Priority Works, are not a public work.

I should imagine that the Australian Government has not had time to change the legislation, and/or the PWC Procedure Manual, that people like me, have been fine tooth combing, for almost a month.

I do realise that the Australian Government's War Cabinet, under its Conventional War Powers can just use their "prerogative powers" under the Australian Constitution. Nevertheless, I don't even think the Opposition Leader, Peter Dutton, would be able to explain to the Australian Public, this level of governmental deceit; it's not a decision that should have been excluded from Australian Citizens; it is now, \$368 Billion Dollars of Australian Discontent!

AUKUS was meant to be supplying the Australian Navy with conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines. That was definitely without my consent.

Nevertheless, you have told the Australian Public that it was going to cost them \$368 billion to provide AUSTRALIA with a AUKUS Pillar 1 enhanced security partnership. I sincerely hope that my analysis of this situation is incorrect.

It is obvious that this matter requires the PWC to explain their part in this debacle. We have people sleeping on the streets, in the freezing cold, we have mothers, children, fathers, uncles, aunties, family members, in distress across Australia. People can't afford to pay rent, their mortgages, or buy healthy food. What are the Parliamentarians doing about this notion?

The fact, that. this Australian Government can give two overseas countries \$368 billion, to allegedly defend Australia, with their nuclear powered and nuclear armed submarines and no doubt their warships, is an anathema. This U.S. proposed "Alternative division of labor" defence project is a mystical fantasy, that offer Australia an opportunity to flying future B-21s, with their Air Force Nuclear Weapons, to deter and deny the PRC, Russia, North Korea, Iran, an anyone else the U.S. and UK desires, is the greatest lapse of democratic western values that also breaks open their fanciful, International Rules Based Order, that has ever been perpetrated against Australian citizens.

As stated above, I so hope I've made a mistake, nevertheless, regardless of what I have said above, the \$368 billion budgeted for AUKUS Pillar 1 must be redirected to social and welfare expenditure that would improve the lifestyles and wellbeing of people across Australia.

Meanwhile, send me a copy of the new agreement please!

I chose not to choose passages from the Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2023, document relating to the AUKUS Submarine Proposal, and the Background and Issues that have obviously infuriated Congress. Therefore, PWC just download it for yourself from the Congressional Research Services, in the United States of America.

- “Prior to the 2040s, Pillar 1 as currently structured will contribute to deterrence and warfighting capability primarily via the positional advantage of operating Virginia-class boats from Australia, which is something can be done without selling boats to Australia. Operating up to 12 U.S. Navy Virginia Class boats from Australia-the four boats that are to be operated there under Pillar 1’ SRF-West arrangement, plus up to eight additional U.S. Navy Virginia-class boats would send a strong signal of U.S.-Australian alliance solidarity and resolve, in part because it would make Australia second only to Japan in terms of numbers of U.S. Navy forward-homeported or forward-operating ships.[n.72] Australian shipyards could perform maintenance, overhaul, and repair on the up-to-eight additional Navy boats, as currently planned under Pillar 1 for the four Virginia Class boats that are to operate out of Australia as part of SRF-West.”²⁹
- The costs for Australia of Pillar 1 could reduce, perhaps significantly, funding within Australia’s military budget for other Australian military capabilities, particularly if SSM acquisition, operation, and maintenance costs turn out to be higher than expected. If this were to occur, there could be a net negative impact on Australia’s overall military capabilities for deterring potential Chinese aggression.^{73”³⁰}

PWC, I object to the SRF-West’s Application currently before you, for so many reasons, including the collective financial cost of the numerous Infrastructure Projects at HMAS Stirling, particularly from 2023. The Government of the Day has not informed the PUBLIC what the SRF-West Priority Works, Proposed is, I assume it is the:

Alternative AUKUS Pillar 1 Project - the U.S.-Australia Division of Labor:

“An alternative to Pillar 1 as currently structured would be a U.S.-Australia military division of labor which U.S. SSNs would perform both U.S. and Australian SSN missions while Australia invested in military capabilities for performing non-SSN missions for both Australia and the United states. Such as U.S.-Australia military division of labor might be broadly similar to military divisions of labor that exist between the United States and some or all of its NATO or other allies for naval capabilities such as aircraft carriers, SSNs, large surface combatants, and amphibious ships, and for non-naval capabilities such as (to name only some examples) nuclear weapons, space assets, and ISR capabilities.”

Under a U.S.-Australia military division of labor for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions

- The forward rotations of U.S. and UK SSNs to Australia planned under Pillar 1-SRF-West-would still be implemented;
- Up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be built, and instead of three to five being sold to Australia, these additional boats would instead be retained in U.S Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the five U.S. and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia under Pillar 1 as SRF-West; and
- Australia, instead of using funds to purchase, build, operate, and maintain its own SSNs, would instead invest those funds in other military capabilities-such as, for example, long-range anti-ship

²⁹ CRS, June 12, 2024, p.33

³⁰ CRS, June 12, 2024, p.33

missiles, drones, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft-so as to create an Australian capacity for performing non-SSN military missions for both Australia and the United states.⁴⁶

The United States of America and the United Kingdom's
Australian Submarine Rotational Force – West – Nuclear-Powered, and in-the-near-future
Nuclear Armed Submarines and Warships an Overseas Country Naval Base

At Meeandip-Garden Island-HMAS *Stirling*, AUKUS SRF-West - a Forward Homeported UK-US
Naval Base, to launch U.S. & UK missions across the USINDOPACOM
Under the Command of Admiral Paparo, and the USPACOM Control of Admiral Steven Koehler,
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

I assume these decisions are under current negotiation between the AUKUS Partners. I did understand though that the agreed AUKUS Submarine Rotational Force - West Forward Naval Base, was an U.S., 'ironclad' surety, a previously confirmed agreement, under AUKUS Pillar 1.

If, however, significant sections of the AUKUS Pillar 1 Pact are altered or rejected by Congress, does this mean that the PWC must refer the "Submarine Rotational Force – West, Priority Works, HMAS Stirling, Statement of Evidence to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works" (the Statement) back to the Australian Government?

Proposed Facility Solution:

21. ***Defence undertook comprehensive master planning, site investigations, stakeholder consultation, whole of life cost analysis and designed development to establish the capital facilities and infrastructure works required to address the project need.***

22. ***The scope of the project is a product of a detailed assessment of essential requirements to establish the facilities and infrastructure required by the Submarine Rotational Force - West in 2027, and an analysis of the capacity of the existing facilities an infrastructure to meet these requirements. ... A further critical consideration is the requirement to maintain current surface fleet and Collins class submarine operations. The Surface Fleet Review has highlighted changes to the surface fleet which will be considered as the implementation is progressed. Supporting US and UK nuclear powered submarine visits during the delivery phase also requires coordination between port services and construction.***

The SRF-West Priority Works Sections 21-22, are quite amusing and not cost-effective seriously **PWC: "supporting the U.S. and UK nuclear-powered and their nuclear-armed capable submarine visits during the delivery phase [or from early 2027] also requires coordination between port services and construction."**

It requires so much more than that, Australia is not a foolish Nation-State, we have the capacity to be peace-makers in the Indo-Pacific.

Thus, the rejection of the U.S. and UK proposal under AUKUS SRF-West, port visits, rotations, or forward homeported contingencies must be rejected.

Neither Nation-State can protect Australia from their near peer military and economic competitors:

The U.S has flaunted their lack of support for U.N. agreements, treaties, conventions and the UN Charter, as they are the ultimate Lethal Nuclear Weapon States.

Anyway, the U.S. did share their nuclear propulsion technology with the UK and France, both UNSC and NATO Members, who have mismanaged their own Military, and Economic advantages, along with their Civil Nuclear Powered Plant's contaminating their Countries. In the case of the UK, they have seriously endangered their people, through having numerous accidents and nuclear incidents, that have contaminated their Country, their Ports, along with their nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed Submarines laying in waste, to contaminated to be dismantled; all supplied and controlled (still) by the U.S. nuclear-powered propulsion technology.

The Canadians were offered a similar nuclear propulsion technology opportunity to what the AUSTRALIAN'S have pushed for under Morrison and Albanese Governments with the U.S. under the AUKUS Pillar 1, enhanced security partnership.

The U.S. rejected Canadian bid and offered an Alternative division-of-labor military industrial complex deal. It obviously made Canada feel that they were in an extra-special partnership with the U.S. with "an exclusive an ITAR status.³¹" that Australia is now chasing. In fact, it is a form of servitude, and a loss of sovereignty, that endangers their population, and all forms of sentient life.

Interesting now it appears that the U.S. and UK only needed an SRF-West future home port, for example:

"CRS, June 12, 2024, page 34 states:

- It would be more cost-effective to pursue a US-Australia division of labor for SSN missions and non-SSN missions.⁷⁴ Such a division of labour would follow the general model of military divisions of labor that exist between the United States and some or all of its NATO and other allies for naval capabilities such as aircraft carriers, SSNs, large surface combatants, and amphibious ships, and for non-naval capabilities such as (to name only some examples) nuclear weapons, space assets, and ISR capabilities. Pillar 1 would result in parallel SSN-related investments in the United States and Australia comparable to parallel investments in certain military capabilities among NATO countries that have been criticized by some observers for their collective inefficiencies."⁷⁵

My word are they joking?

Australia has bought numerous F-35As from the DSCA, Major Arms Sales from the U.S., and I assume the U.S. is quite capable of offering us a similar opportunity to that of other NATO states where the USINDOPACOM Command in the Indo-Pacific would control the uploading of low-yield nuclear kiloton ranges, of their proposed B61-12 nuclear-armed missiles, along with setting their targets, so our RAAF, Pilots do not have to make this sort of decision, along with the Australian Government, in the F-35As we own, alas but controlled by the U.S. Command on the Ground-Underground or from their USS Aircraft Carriers.

Further, I understand that France, Germany, Italy, and Poland, have been offered by the U.S., on 11 July 2024, "Long-Ranged S.M - 6 Tomahawk Cruise Missile along with the development of Hyper-sonics for

³¹ William Greenwalt and Tom Corben, "Breaking the Barriers: Reforming US Export Controls to Release the Potential of AUKUS;" United States Study Centre at the University of Sydney, May 2023, pp.1-56 oh

their new NATO pending assault, or denial and/or alleged deterrence along their NATO Borders, with Russia.

Therefore, PWC the SRF-West, and SRF-West Priority of Works under the Scope of Project Works, PCWM terms of reference at Section 24, and the three projects element under the Maritime Infrastructure, Optional Facilities and Maintenance and Sustainment Facilities, to boost the Submarine Rotational Force - West nuclear facilities and support for the United States of America, and the United Kingdom; absolutely amazing WA takes all the nuclear contamination risks!

Nuclear Safety:

26. ***Nuclear safety will be the paramount consideration in all aspects of operating and maintaining a nuclear-powered submarine capability. A nuclear safety case is being developed by the Australian Submarine Agency that will address all aspects of the nuclear-powered submarine lifecycle. A separate safety case will be developed to provide the basis for a site licence that will detail the regulations, conditions or restrictions that will ensure Western Australia nuclear-related functions at HMAS Stirling are conducted safely.***

The safety case strategy is being developed through close collaboration between industry experts, the Australian Submarine Agency, and the Department of Defence to ensure the approach is in line with relevant international good practice and the needs of the Commonwealth.

Interestingly, this Congressional Research Services Report, “Navy Virginia-Class and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 2024,” has presented a direct challenge on the standing of the AUKUS, enhanced security partnership.

Asserting that the “Australian Nuclear Safety Case” management practices, and their “relevant international good practice” procedures, at SRF-West may not be up to U.S. Nuclear Safety Standards.

In fact, the U.S. Navy, Nuclear Propulsion Technology, is under question, due to lack of security, nuclear management expertise, and repetitive cyber-attacks against Australia’s Government Departments and Agencies, in this CRS Report, June,12, 2024, for example:

Technology Security - CRS:

“Arguments to technology security include the following:

- Chinese cyber and other espionage in the past reportedly has been successful on multiple occasions in acquiring U.S. military information and technology, [n.76] including information relating to undersea warfare, A June 8, 2021, press report about China’s acquisition of undersea warfare technology state that ‘China fields increasingly advanced and ‘smart’ technologies, including torpedoes, mines, and UUVs [unmanned underwater vehicles]. As highlighted by the case of Qin Shuren, at least some of these advances are being made with the help of U.S. technology. Sometimes the technology is purchased on the open market and other times it is gained through illicit means that range from cyber theft to old-fashioned espionage and smuggling.”[n.77] In 2018, Chinese hackers reportedly stole a large amount of unclassified but sensitive information relating to undersea warfare from the U.S. contractor working for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Newport, RI.[n.78] Some observers have expressed concern about the cybersecurity readiness of defense contractors.[n.79]

- Notwithstanding Australia’s capability for, and commitment to, protecting U.S. submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology, sharing this technology with another country, particularly in an era of advanced and persistent computer hacking threats, would increase the attack surface, meaning the number of potential digital and physical entry points that China, Russia, or some other country could attempt to penetrate to gain access to that technology.[n.80] In this instance, the addition to the attack surface could include not only Australian government organisations, but Australian contractors and subcontractors involved in Pillar 1 efforts.
- Hackers linked to China reportedly are highly active in attempting to penetrate Australian government and contractor computers. [n.81] A March 1, 2023, press report stated that “Chinese hackers ‘significantly increased’ attacks on Australian government, industry and education after AUKUS nuclear submarine pact came under the crosshairs of the world’s most prolific espionage operation, according to cyber security experts.” The article quoted a senior employee of the cybersecurity company CrowdStrike as stating that AUKUS agreement “has been in the crosshairs of Australia’s cybersecurity adversaries since it was announced.”⁸²

Risk of Accident - CRS

Arguments relating to the risk of an accident include the following:

- While the Australian Navy is a fully professional force that would operate and maintain its Virginia-class boats in a manner fully adhering to the U.S. Navy’s strict and exacting safety, quality-control, and accountability standards for submarines and nuclear-powered ships, selling Virginia-class boats to Australia or building for Australia AUKUS SSNs that incorporate U.S. naval propulsion technology would unavoidably make another country (Australia) responsible for preventing an accident with an SSN that might call into question for third-party observers the safety of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships.
- The second variation of a U.S.-Australian division of labour outlined earlier—the variation under which U.S. SSNs perform Australian SSN missions indefinitely—would keep all U.S.-made SSNs under the control of the U.S. Navy, which has a proven record extending back to 1954 “⁸³ of safety operating its nuclear-powered ships.”³² (pp.32-36)

PWC: it is essential to reflect again on the U.S. concerns about “selling Virginia-class boats to Australia or building for Australia AUKUS SSNs that incorporate U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology would unavoidably make another country (Australia) responsible for preventing an accident with an SSN that might call into question for third-party observers the safety of U.S. navy nuclear powered ships.”³³

What an amazing U.S. Statement! I concur with numerous CRS Reports, of this nature because if Australia and its ASA do lack the ability to manage nuclear safety throughout its development phase, and beyond, at the SRF-West the Priority Works must be cancelled.

Therefore, SRF-West cannot possibly meet their PWCM Requirements of their SRF-West Priority Works.

The Australian Naval Nuclear-Power Safety Regulator has not been established as of 17 July 2024.

³² Congressional Research Services, Navy Virginia Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 2024: <http://crsreports.congress.gov> RL32418, pp.32-36

³³ Congressional Research Services Report, Navy Virginia-Class and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 2024, Congressional Research Services <http://crsreports.congress.gov> RL.32418, p.36

Consequentially, the maintenance, service and repairs of U.S. and UK, SSNs Nuclear-Powered Submarines, along with the storage of their Nuclear and Radiated Waste, in the future purpose built CIF must be cancelled. PWC please understand the significance of the U.S. Members of the Congress.

Oh, along with the fact, that in the House of Representative and Senate in the United States of America's Congress that their Parliamentarians, and Committee Members have access to so much more than Australian Parliamentarians. It's a serious matter! Particularly as Section 2 of SRF-West has not been does complied with the PWCM:

27. *Initially, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (ARPANS) Act 1998 and Regulations 2018 will provide the regulatory framework for nuclear safety and radiological protection requirements. Included in the Regulations are several Codes of Practice that must be complied with once a licence is obtained. The Government will also establish a new independent statutory regulator, the Australian Naval Nuclear-Power Safety Regulator. This new regulator will have the functions and powers necessary to regulate the nuclear safety and radiological protection across the lifecycle of the nuclear-powered submarine capability to protect both people and the environment and will be responsible for issuing the site licence and ensuring ongoing compliance with the regulatory framework. These regulatory powers and functions will extend to facilities and infrastructure directly supporting or associated with supporting and maintaining the nuclear-powered submarine capability to ensure that nuclear safety is suitably managed.*

Section 27 of the SRF-West Priority Works is failing, along with section 28:

28. *The facilities and infrastructure requirements for the Submarine Rotational Force - West have been divided into two categories in accordance with guidance from experienced nuclear professionals. This Project addresses the first category, licensed facilities, and comprises facilities and infrastructure subject to nuclear regulatory consideration, approval and licensing. Defence will need to ensure that these facilities meet the stringent requirements to achieve regulatory approval and licensing. Qualified, experienced nuclear safety designers and assurance professionals will be engaged to provide Defence with full support for the design and construction of these facilities and infrastructure. ...*

****PWC, the Australian Government-Defence has thus far, not amended the legislation required, to amend the ARPANS Act and regulations. ARPANSA cannot breach other related acts in Australia along with the International Agreements, such as the NPT,³⁴ and IAEA.

****Issuing an ASA licence, under the ARPANS Act and Regulations, to hasten the early 2027 U.S. deadline for all SRF-West Infrastructure, is difficult enough, without usurping the Act, to build the CIF, let alone operate it, at SRF-West.

The second category, non-licensed facilities, comprises facilities and infrastructure that will not be subject to nuclear regulatory approvals and licensing, and have been exempted from referral to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works. The design and construction of these facilities can be delivered using Defence's established design and construction contracting strategies.

³⁴ **Australia does not want to breach the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):**
[www.dfat.gov.au > asno > nuclear-non-proliferation](http://www.dfat.gov.au/asno/nuclear-non-proliferation)

Land and Zoning:

32. *They proposed developments are consistent with uses prescribed in the HMAS Stirling Zone Plan an Estate Base Plan, and the Defence this Estate Principles of Development.*

Structure:

34. *The proposed structures will be designed according to the local geotechnical profile and structural loads. New structures will be designed to comply with all relevant Australian Standards, the National Construction Code and Defence Design Guidelines. Additional criticality requirements apply to the structural design of licensed facilities an infrastructure based on the relevant international good practise and International Atomic Agency Guidelines.*

Section 35 of “**Structure**” must be examined critically as this section asserts that relevant international good practise an International Atomic Agency guidance have applied to the licensed facilities:

35. *Footing systems will vary from piled foundations to concrete slabs on ground, according to the facilities function and height. Superstructures will comprise steel or concrete frames.*

Maritime Engineering

44. *The low watermark, and tide and tidal plain data for Fremantle has been adopted for all maritime engineering designs. This approach aligns with previous projects involving the provision of maritime engineering at HMAS Stirling. The characteristics of the Virginia, Astute and Collins Class submarines primary design vessels have provided the basis for selecting a suitable fendering system and dredging requirements.*

Climate Change Considerations:

50. *Western Australian Planning Commission’s statement of planning policy number 2.6 state coastal planning policy guidance for mean sea level changes has been adopted as a basis for design for the facilities an infrastructure proposed in the Project.*

Environmental Sustainability

57. *Defence is committed to ecologically sustainable development and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. While assuring nuclear safety, security and Fire Protection requirements are paramount objectives, adopting cost effective ecologically sustainable development will also be a key objective in the design and development of the proposed works.*

Thank you, SRS -West, for the measures you are addressing under environmental sustainability, such as:

- a. *energy targets,*
- b. *measures to reduce energy and water use,*
- c. *reuse of existing structures,*
- d. *demolition and disposal of existing structures, and*
- e. *renewable energy.*

However, the SRF-West, is illustrating their **moral bankruptcy** regarding the sentiments related to environmental sustainability, in an era of extreme weather events and climate change escalation, overall, your assertions are shallow, in fact, shameful.

The SRF-West assessment of what encompasses, environmental sustainability, from a strictly public works perspective is evidence of an SRF-West Priority Works, lack of ability to preserve protect or honour the sentient life within their military naval base.

It is alarming as I am not quite sure how the SRF-West and its applicable priority works, could ever understand the needs required to do an environmentally sustainable comparative analysis, and rigorous whole-of-life costing of the Priority Works Infrastructure Project.

I have already noted in the PWC Procedure Manual, Version 9. 6. December 2022, “Definition of what does not constitute a public work?”

1.37 A work is not a ‘public work’ if it is not being undertaken by or for the Commonwealth. This is considered a ‘private’ work, i.e. a work undertaken by and for the private or non-government section.

1.38 Also specifically, a ‘work’ does not include:

- ***the production of, or anything done in relation to, intangible things;***

Nevertheless, there appears to be a conflict on what does not constitute a public work when you refer, fact, that the SRF-West Priority Works are being prepared for the US and UK Nuclear-powered, and Nuclear-Armed Navies in a possible U.S.-China conflict or crisis, in the Defence of Taiwan.

If I was the Australian Defence Minister I would contemplate the legal meaning of the following clause, under section 1.38:

Especially as it is likely that the AUKUS enhanced security partnership, may be altered or cancelled under the terms of their treaty, as addressed above.

- ***a work proposed to be carried out by or for the Commonwealth by way of assistance to an overseas country.***

Potential Impacts:

58. Defence has conducted rigorous assessments to identify potential environmental and local community impacts and propose suitable mitigation measures. These include:

- Visual Impacts. There are no potential visual impacts to the local community. All works will be designed to minimise the aesthetic impact to the natural environment.***
- Noise Impacts. There will be no material noise impacts to local communities. The selection of mechanical plant and the location and design of plant rooms will minimise noise impacts on nearby Defence facilities. Noise impacts on the nearby little penguin colonies and other sensitive natural environments will be monitored prior to and during construction.***
- Managing Contamination Impacts. The work will intersect with known and potential areas of contamination. Excavated contaminated soil and dredged marine sediments will be managed in accordance with Defence policy and procedures to minimise the potential impacts to the natural***

environment. Targeted contamination assessments are being undertaken to determine management measures to be implemented during construction.

- d. Managing Per- and Poly-fluoroalkyl Substances Impacts. The work will intersect with known and potential areas of per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contamination. Excavated contaminated soil and dredged marine sediments will be managed in accordance with Defence policy and procedures to minimise the potential impacts to the natural environment. Targeted contamination assessments are being undertaken to determine management measures to be implemented during construction.*
- e. Managing Fauna and Flora Impacts.*

Managing Heritage Impacts:

PWC: Please contact Iva Haywood-Jackson and Bella Bropho, who are both Directors of the Wadlemup-Rottneest Island Deaths Aboriginal Corporation. along with the other Directors of this Aboriginal Corporation.

They are all Nyungah Knowledge Holders of merit, that abide by the Nyungah Lore, Culture, Knowledge, Historical Knowledge, Nyungah Indigenous Environmental Sustainability of all areas of their past, present, and known future, on, above and below, their Nyungah Country, as your information addressed below is incorrect:

- f. Managing Heritage Impacts. There will be no material impacts to historic heritage or natural heritage values on Garden Island. The proposed works have been sighted away from known historic heritage items and places and the majority of works are located outside of the Commonwealth heritage listed natural heritage value area. Although it is anticipated that there will be no or low material impacts to indigenous heritage values, engagement with traditional owners of Garden Island, the Whadjuk and Gnaala Karla Booja peoples, is ongoing to confirm the impact to tangible and intangible values associated with the work.*

Section 59:

Defence has agreed an approach to assessment under the EPBC Act with the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water. The project will be referred to the Minister for the Environment and Water under the EPBC Act for the following elements that may significantly impact the environment.

- a. Maritime intrusive activities. Project elements and activities that intersect with the seafloor and marine environment such as piling, dredging and dredge disposal.*
- b. Controlled Industrial Facility. The development and operation of control industrial facility and its associated radioactive waste management activities.*

Concluding Remarks and an important personal suggestion to the PWC Independent Parliamentarians:

Surely as we all live in the Indo-Pacific peacefully, assisting each other where possible. In a region where many countries are non-aligned, and others able to negotiate directly with China, and/or their other neighbours. Regarding many significant matters across the Indo-Pacific such as “Border Disputes,” over-

fishing significant areas of all oceans and seas, sea-level-rise, extreme weather events, Climate Change, the necessity of Trade with China, each other, along with numerous other challenges.

We do have mechanisms that deal with these issues in our Region, for example, ASEAN, APEC, and the Pacific Island Forum. We are already in a region, that can live and cooperate with each other peacefully.

There is already a United Nation Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, December 1983, under the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

It is important to note, that the Indo-Pacific Region has an opportunity to become either non-aligned non-nuclear armed neutral nation state, or a “Permanent Non-Nuclear Armed Neutrality, for each nation state,” in our region. With this notion in mind, I will now address how to ensure a peaceful outcome in the Indo-Pacific Region. One that will endeavour to be inclusive through “Trade”³⁵ and does have the ability to agree to live in Pacific and Indian Ocean Zones of Peace.

AUKUS SRF – WEST, AND SRF - WEST PRIORITY WORKS:

READING MATERIAL to assist in an understanding of the complexities and the problematic nature of the AUKUS SRF-West Pillar 1 enhanced security partnership:

SRF-West, SRF-West Priority Works, and their compliance with the PWCM, along with its Terms of Reference requirements, that are integral to the “Committees responsibility and processes” represent both tangible and intangible things that allow the PWC to disapprove of or approve with in:

Australia:

Australian Government, Australian Submarine Agency, “Australian Submarine Agency, Corporate Plan 2023-27”, Commonwealth of Australia 2023, ASA / www.asa.gov.au, pp.1-22

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Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, Bills Digest No. 32 2023-24, 14 February 2024, “Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 [and] Australia Naval Nuclear Powered Safety (Transitional Provisions Bill) 2023”, pp.1-44

National Press Club, Minister for Defence Industry: Pat Conroy - National Press Club Address, 28 November 2023; The Hon Pat Conroy MP: Minister for Defence Industry, Minister for International Development and the Pacific, pp.1-33:

United States of America:

Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Pillar 1 Project: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 2024, Congressional Research Service, <http://crsrreport.congress.gov>, RL 32418, pp.1-51.

Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia-class Submarine Programme and AUKUS Submarine Program: Background an Issues for Congress. December 21, 2023, Congressional Research Service, <https://crsreports.com.gov>, RL 32418, pp. 1-102; along with an intense **focus on**, pp.66-73: Legislative Activity Regarding Proposed Sale of Virginia-class Boats under AUKUS agreement ¹³³, May 2023 DOD Legislative Package Relating to AUKUS agreement; and Appendix A., B., C., D., E., and F., pp,74-104. Congressional Research Service, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, December 21, 2022, Congressional Research Service, <http://crsreports.congress.gov>, RL 32418, pp.1-47.

Statement of Admiral John C. AQUILINO, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture, 20 March 2024, UNCLASSIFIED, as of 18 March 2024, pp.1-43.

This statement of the prior USINDOPACOM Commander, actually illustrates why Australian Neutrality as a Permanent Non-Nuclear Armed Nation State is the essential pathway for Australia. If we want to avert from the credulous path of the AUKUS enhanced security partnership.

The Admiral's voice is harsh, direct, and honest, for example, "**1) Distributed Force Posture** A distributed force posture that is persistently forward-based, West of the IDL, makes U.S. forces more effective, responsive, and survivable. (p.2)". PWC please read this Statement:

We "must recognise that the most dangerous national security challenges are evolving faster than our current government processes allow us to address them", it is a *fait accompli* that:

"The complexity of the threats we face requires the U.S. to mobilise the whole of government and use all elements of national power to counter revisionist powers and their proxies committed to overturning the rules based order for the benefit of themselves and at the expense of everyone else. However, we must recognise that the most dangerous national security challenges are evolving faster than our current government processes allow us to address them. Each of our three major state threats in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) - the People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) – are taking unprecedented actions to challenge international norms and advance authoritarianism. These emphasis adversarial regimes are increasingly interconnected, which is evident in Xi and Putin's direct declaration of a "no limits friendship" ... Nevertheless, ***the PRC is the only country that has the capability, capacity, and intent to upend the international order.*** Even amid slowing economic growth, the PRC continues aggressive military buildup, modernization, and coercive gray-zone operations. All indications point to the PLA meeting President Xi Jinping's directive to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027." (pp.1-2).

USINDOPACOM – PRC:

If you understand President Biden's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review you will understand that the prior, USINDOPACOM, Admiral Aquilino, and his 2024 replacement Admiral Paparo, the new 2024, Commander of USINDOPACOM. Admiral Stephen T. Koehler is the newly appointed U.S. PACOM, Commander, of the Pacific Fleet. The lethality of their Commands requires that, if required, they must hit the PRC "hard, without warning" to all their like-minded Partners, Allies, and the PRC. U.S. Allies,

Partners, and the PRC are currently under an existential threat directly from the United States; as President Biden regularly states the U.S. has reached its Inflection Point.

The USINDOPACOM mantra is to preserve peace and security throughout the Indo-Pacific, and if you cannot preserve peace, hit hard without notice and fight-to-win.

The Israeli and the United States – The Middle East:

The U.S. will not fight fair or abide by their Rules of War. Surely PWC you can understand that the US continues to directly support the genocide occurring in Palestine. In fact, the US is unable to negotiate with Israel to stop their War against HAMAS, and Palestine, the U.S. and Israel have an Ironclad agreement similar to China and Russia, and the Israelis will not refrain from Attacking Lebanon.

U.S. – NATO – Ukraine and RUSSIA

The U.S. underlying support for Ukraine is the same U.S. Policy used a couple of Decades ago in Afghanistan, against Russia. To keep Russia busy, to financially strangle Russia. To ensure that the US remains Militarily Superior, and Economically Dominant. The U.S. has had some success in achieving this nebulous aim against Russia. However, luckily for Russia, China is able to pacify Putin's temper.

Further, the new Russian Nuclear-powered and Nuclear-armed submarines are superior to that of the U.S.

Surely, Western States must eventually, understand what the Global South, the Small Island States of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Southeast Asia, NZ, and China, are all aware that the internal politics of the United States of America and a pending President Trump-presidency, with a Vice President, who has fought in U.S. Wars, that at last, America will pull back, and leave others to clean up their global political and economic derision.

AUSTRALIA:

The only purpose that Australia now performs is to keep the US Homeland Safe, by taking all direct attacks, at the junction of the Indian, Southern and Pacific Oceans and the Coral Sea. Along with allowing the UK and the U.S., two Overseas Countries to use our Military Bases, particularly our Naval Bases, as Forward homeported nuclear powered and in the case of a China conflict nuclear armed submarines to launch their attack on the PRC from Australia.

Thus, disregarding the PWCM's legal and required provisions: For example, Sections 1.22, 1.38, 2.53, and:

Section 2.54: This section should provide a summary of the whole of life costing analysis. In considering whole of life costing, the committee required that, at a minimum, the following are considered;

- capital costs;
- life-time operating costs;
- life-time maintenance costs;
- asset disposal costs; and
- summary of the assumptions that underpin the analysis model.

PWC Please Note: that while the PWCM focus is purely on whether the SRF-West Priority Works pass a rigorous comparative analysis of their cost-effectiveness. It also requires that there be a confidence-public value directly relating to the whole of life costs and in particular their life-cycle. Unfortunately, for AUKUS SRF-West Priority Works that premise cannot be realised.

Australia and the United States:

Will Australia ever understand that allowing the US Forward Homeport at AUKUS SRF-West it is a fatal mistake, if Biden retains the Presidency. I am unsure if the Australian Government understands that a limited nuclear war cannot be survived. In 2023, President Biden commissioned the B61-13 mega kiloton nuclear weapon. As stated previously in this submission, Australia has bought many F-35s via the DSCA's major arms sales of the United States.

Further, as directed by President Biden, as Commander of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, that the United States of America, will request that Australia carry the B6-12s in a U.S.-China conflict or crisis, over Taiwan. For two reasons, firstly the U.S. will consider the fact, that the US has retained the ITAR intellectual property, over these now owned Australian RAAF Airforce Planes. Repairs on this aircraft, will become difficult, if the U.S. cancels their contractual arrangements with Australian Companies, currently providing parts for these planes.

Secondly, when Australia said no to the U.S. expressing their sovereign rights not to carrying nuclear weapons on their future Virginia Attack Class Submarines, along with attesting that Australia would not breach their NPT, the United States just cancelled the contract.

These scenarios will now threaten they proposed U.S. and an Australian division of labor contracts. The AUKUS Pillar 1, failed enhanced security partnership, leaves Australia without the ability to militarily defend itself.

This is the very reason why I am suggesting and immediate application to the United nations to commence the process to become a "Permanent Non-Nuclear Armed Neutrality for Australia." This decision would immediately separate Australia from the USA, and the West; and providing that China and Russia are capable of keeping their agreements on the use of nuclear weapons on states that will not allow nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapon manufacturing to occur in their nation state. It might allow Australia the opportunity of living in peace, within our exclusive economic zone and across our States and Territories.

The purpose of the F35A is to carry the B6-12s, in NATO at least seven nation states, will be allowed, under US Command to fly their F-35s with B61-12s, a low yield nuclear weapon, where the nuclear kiloton, is dialled up from a U.S. Ground Base, in Germany, with the U.S. also choosing the target.

I am not sure why Australia did not realise that asking the United States to sell their Defective Virginia Attack Class Submarine to Australia, that it could have had any other negative outcome, then the one that is being processed by the United States in its Congress in 2024-2025.

PWC, I will repeat this for your benefit, so that you can understand that as a PWC Committee Member, you are required to do a rigorous comparative analysis, independently and factually, reading all the documents that are integral to my Submission, and then judge my plea for peace, along with doing your own independent research from across the field. If you can achieve your requirements under the PWCM and as a Parliamentarian, in an Australian Parliament you will be able to secure, protect, an inhibit the United States from using Australia, as they have used, for example:

- Iraq
- Afghanistan excluding
- Libya
- Syria
- Russia
- Ukraine

- Palestine,
- China,
- NZ suspended from the ANZUS Treaty in the 1980s;
- along with threatening and excluding various other nation states if they did not comply with an American request.

This is just to name a few, of their military and economic conquests, under the 2008 Financial Crisis, across NATO countries, and in the Southeast Asian region. Seriously, we won't even go over to South America.

AUKUS enhanced security partnership

Nevertheless, the AUKUS enhanced security partnership and the U.S alternative division of labor proposal of the United States of America to Australia in 2023-2024, if accepted by an Australian Government of the day, then Australia will breach the NPT Treaty.

Our F-35s will be able to carry-four-six B61-12 low-yield nuclear weapons, with the US choosing the kiloton of each nuclear missile and its target.

And they will allow Australia to fly their B-21, fully loaded, from RAAF Tindal, in the Northern Territory.

I just wanted the Parliamentarians of the PWC to understand how accurate and well-read you will need to be when you assess, the Submarine Rotational Force - West Priority Works, HMAS *Stirling*, Western Australia, along with the in intangible merits of responsible governance, to ascertain the validity of this Australian Government, and its Department of Defence.

Alas, it appears that the Australian Submarine Agency will have to reconsider and build a modern version of the Collin Class Conventionally-Armed Submarine in Australia. It will make me happy, and it will bring back fond memories of my father, who was a production planner of Australian Submarines, at Cockatoo Docks Engineering in Sydney Harbour. Nevertheless, the Australian Submarine Agency, and the Australian Government-Defence need to understand that their Statement of Evidence presented to the PWC, and thus, the Australian public required mutual respect, trust, integrity, and understanding of the decency of the Australian public; and one that requires its Parliamentarians to honour If you want Australia to remain a civil society. There certainly isn't much left of that in the United States of America.

A Plea for Peace:

I have many thousands of pages of official documents that I could refer to the PWC. I have over 14 years of University Study, at a medium to high Tertiary Level, commencing in 2000, with a B. Laws, BA: Politics and International Relations, BA: Aboriginal and Islander Studies, MU; Master of Teaching, Secondary, ND; and a Master of International Affairs and Security, MU.

No doubt your level of education, is also quite high, however, I noted in my last Master of International Affairs and Security that few students read across the field; therefore, I do assume that's why Australian Governments of the Day, are so badly advised on Climate Change, Human Rights, Development, Policy, Security, Social and Welfare requirements of a cohesive and inclusive Australian Civil Society.

Let's try it together!

Anyway, back to Admiral Aquilino:

The Section 1302 Report submitted to the Congressional Committee, in March 2024, takes about 10 months for to research and produce, this significant document will be declassified and released. Admiral Aquilino's Report to the Congressional Committee, is being investigated and will be presented back to Congress for further review. The Admiral like many other U.S. Senior retiring military officers has been under extreme pressure throughout their military service, therefore, they seem to want their work to live on long past them.

Nevertheless, I still find it difficult to understand how these officers can command areas that in in the Admiral's case. cover the whole of the Pacific Ocean, and most of the Indian Ocean, with some 375,000 military personnel, serving across all military domains, with the full knowledge, that it may be their decision to press the nuclear button in a conflict or crises, that directly effects the United States of America, in the regions they Command. The ANZUS treaty does not mean that America would come to Australia's aid and even if they did their production, supply along with numerous defective military problems inhibits their ability to win in areas, where their supply chains are vulnerable, just like the INDOPACOM.

The PWC requires this report due out at the end of 2024, or early 2025. So please do not finish your reviews, public consultations, etc until you read this Report.

The U.S., Australia, NATO, the West are out-of-time, under the Davidson Window. The lack effective standards and materials to produce, supply and to create enhance Military Production is depleting their Military Forces ability to produce weaponry across all military domains. The United states requires a World War starting with a conventional defence to stimulate the legislative right to command corporations across America and the U.S. Defense Production Act, to make America great again.

To counter this foolish quest of the United states it's imperative that Australia declares a "permanent non-nuclear armed neutrality for Australia." Thus, removing all Foreign Military Bases, and their service personnel and military apparatus from Australia, it must be completed before early 2027.

Pursuant to Section 1302 of the F.Y. 2024 NDAA, this Committee was provided USINDOPACOM's resourcing requirements needed to deter the PRC:

"When I became the commander, I established **Seize the Initiative** as USINDOPACOM's approach to implement the National Defence Strategy (NDS) with a focus on deterring our adversaries by challenging the Joint Force to *think, act, and operate differently* and synchronizing four lines of effort in the near-, mid-, and long-term. While some progress has been made, the risk we assume is high and trending in the wrong direction, specific pacifically due to delayed delivery of military construction, advanced capabilities, and resources to persistently project and maintain forces west of the International Date Line (IDL).

Pursuant to Section 1302 of the F.Y. 2024 NDAA, this Committee was provided USINDOPACOM's resourcing requirements needed to deter the PRC. The content posture statement and the 1302 Report has been provided to the Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. **More than ever, USINDOPACOM needs your support to deliver the sustainable solution outlined in my opinion Independent Assessment.**

Without a credible deterrent, China, Russia, and other revisionist powers will be emboldened to take action to counter U.S. interest. This testimony focuses on how *Seize the Initiative* enables the U.S. to deter conflict while reassuring our allies and partners.”³⁶

Truly PWC, this statement makes me shudder, the 1302 Report will be published in late 2024 or early 2025. The PWC must reject the Priority Works at SRF-West. When the 1302 Report and its companions are released, please read them in full. Conduct your own, individual rigorous comparative analysis and well defined research so you can verify the important of its contents to Australia. Then have a bloody good debate amongst each other regardless of your partisan or bipartisanship characteristics.

The U.S. scenario, addressed in Admiral John say AQUILINO’s Statement is absolutely, no different, to those of China and Russia’s and their unconditional agreement. It is evident that United States of America does not reflect or *seize the initiative* in the pursue of peace.

Under the USINDOPACOM, and USPACOM Control, or that of their Controlled NATO, 32 State across the Alliance. Further, the AUKUS enhanced security partnership, and in general, the 55 Western Nation States, that line up with the United States of America, to preserve Western dominance, over all the other Nation States is abhorrent and must end. We have one earth and we one people and it’s time for humanity to understand that concept.

The thought that the United States of America believes they have the right in the INDOOPACOM to hit China, without notice, just because China’s economic prowess in 2020, momentary surpass that of the US economic power. The arms race between the US and China must cease.

Australia as a permanently non-nuclear armed neutral state could hold peace talks between these agitated parties. It’s obvious from what the Admiral is discussing, in this 1302 statement that the United States of America, no longer has to ability to defend America or anyone else.

China loves to trade; I suggest that trading be our way to peace. Instead of a U.S. Hegemony, we now encourage a US-China shared hegemony, or if they were sensible nation states. neither would claim this mantle.

Further, it’s time for Australia, and the West, to understand that it is imperative that we live in peace and harmony, across in the USINDOPACOM.

Minister for Defence Industry, Pat Conroy, National Press Club Address, 28 November 2023:

I watched this program I was interested in certain phrases throughout the address that shone some hope the Albanese government might concentrate on a constitutional imperative, to protect and secure, Australian sovereignty.

For example, I enjoyed the language represented in these three sentences:

“To shape a peaceful and stable region, Australia must play its part in deterring aggression and coercion.

We must be able to deter conflict before it begins, and certainly before it reaches our shores.

³⁶ Unclassified as of 18 March 2024, Statement of Admiral, John C, AQUILINO, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture, 20 March 24, p.2; Please note: Admiral Aquilino retired in April 2024, Admiral

That means investing in military capabilities that will discourage anyone from taking actions against our interests.” (p.5)

I also agreed that Australia should have a strong defence capability of its own. I immediately considered a Permanent Non-Nuclear Armed Neutrality for Australia. An Australia that does not threaten or coerce another nation state. An Australia that trades fairly with all our neighbours. An Australia that protects its exclusive economic zone, one that does-not breach these laws of neutrality by joining in, or with or independently attacking another nation state. Under the provisions of the United Nations, honouring the international laws of neutrality.

As I was concerned by any aggressive or coercive responses from our neighbours, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, who In the case of the United States, will lament the loss of a Group of a sensitive treaties, such as, ANZUS, AUKUS, along with the U.S Force Posture initiatives, that covers an all military domain, that includes munitions storage, major fuel storage, Pine Gap, North-west Cape, RAAF Tindal, where B-52 Bombers, and the proposed U.S. B-21’s of the U.S. Air Force, heavy laden military armed planes visit, and/or are forward homeported in the Northern Territory.

Australian sovereignty requires the removal of all foreign military apparatus and personnel from Australia.

Australia is a trading nation, living in a trading zone, surrounded by non-aligned and neutral states, that can negotiate disputes amongst each other, along with talking frankly to those that interfere with their exclusive economic zones.

I certainly would express my gratitude to Australian Government of the Day, who would continue to protect and maintain Australian Sovereignty and our Security, in a permanently non-nuclear armed, and neutral Australia, with a voluntary non-nuclear-armed ADF, protecting Australians, from the edge of our exclusive economic zone, across Australia, and its Territories.

In fact, Minister Conroy states on page eight of his transcript, that, “[w]e have the third largest exclusive economic zone on the planet.

We need to be able to deny adversaries in our northern approaches we need to patrol and protect sea trade routes within this economic zone.”

And my final words are we need to live in peace together.

Part 2: Recommendations to the PWC:

Recommendation 1

1.22 the stated purpose of the proposed work and its suitability for that purpose:

Recommendation 2

1.22 the need for, and advisability of, the work

Recommendation 3

1.22 the cost effectiveness of the proposal

Recommendation 4

1.22 the current and prospective public value of the work

Recommendation 5

1.38 a work proposed to be carried out by or for the Commonwealth by way of assistance to an overseas country

Recommendation 6

Whole of life costing analysis

2.54 lifetime maintenance costs

Recommendation 7

Whole-of-life costing analysis

2.54 summary of the assumption that underpin the analysis model

Recommendation 8

2.57 In assessing whole of life costs, the Committee will take into consideration the design stage as well as the confidence level attached to the project.

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Postscript:

My apologies for not being able to complete this Submission to the PWC.

It is raining in the Darling Ranges of Perth Hills, and this means that my NBN coverage will soon crash.

I hope to meet you at a public hearing in Perth, soon.

In anticipation that the bureaucrats reading this 59 page submission, do not just place it in the Reject or Accept Pile; away From the view of the PWC Parliamentarians, who I recommend should actually read it ...

Parliamentarians of Australia, you're welcome to provide me with direct challenges to anything I've written in this submission that you can prove is incorrect or misleading. Neither of those points formed any part of my reasons for writing this submission.

It has been a pleasure to attempt this submission in hope that HMAS *Stirling* remains an Australian Sovereign Defensive Naval Base without overseas countries and there nuclear powered and possibly nuclear armed defence forces in Forward Homeported or Rotational or just bloody visiting, our sovereign Nyungah Sacred and Significant Homeland.

Meanwhile, everyone's welcome if they come in peace.