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Ref. Customs Amendment (Banning Goods Produced by Uyghur Forced Labour) Bill 2020

My name is Dr Anna Hayes and I am an Australian academic with a research focus on human insecurity in China and more specifically, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

I submit to the Parliament that it **MUST** pass the bill-- Customs Amendment (Banning Goods Produced by Uyghur Forced Labour) Bill 2020 for the following reasons:

1) Creeping Genocide:

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) is experiencing a creeping genocide, which includes forced labour as one of its features. With between 1-2 million Uyghurs and other non-Han ethnic groups incarcerated in concentration camps across the region, and the deployment of some former detainees into forced labour in factories both inside of Xinjiang and across the People's Republic of China, the situation in Xinjiang has become increasingly dire.¹

While Beijing has stated the purpose of the camps is 'vocational training', in 2018 the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) characterised their purpose as 'political re-education', citing evidence of multiple human rights violations including sleep deprivation, inadequate clothing for conditions, violence, sexual abuse, other forms of abuse, and detention-related deaths.² Accounts by former detainees repeatedly verify these allegations.³

Via its diplomatic corps, Beijing and its supporters have frequently claimed such assessments are based on 'unconfirmed information', 'distortions' or Western media 'hypocrisy'.⁴ Beijing's Foreign Ministry spokespersons frequently characterise questions about the camps as 'fake news' or 'slandorous lies'.⁵ However, the Parliament should note that many of the accounts on both the camps and forced labour in Xinjiang come from: internally distributed Chinese government sources; Chinese media reports; the testimony of Uyghurs and members of the Uyghur diaspora; nationals of other countries who have been wrongfully detained by Chinese authorities and later released, usually Kazakhs; foreign nationals married to Uyghurs who have disappeared into the

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camps; and eye-witness accounts from scholars and journalists. Moreover, the Chinese state is leaking. In November 2019, more than 400 internal Chinese documents were leaked. In January 2021, another massive database leak has occurred. It contains official reports and information on surveillance capacities.⁶

Multiple government sources have identified the purpose of the camps as ‘re-education’ and ‘wash[ing] clean the brains’ of internees.⁷ Internal official documents on the camps have identified the internees as being in a state of ‘involuntary internment’, despite portrayals in official propaganda that Uyghurs ‘voluntarily’ attend such centres.⁸

During the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Uyghurs were subjected to state violence. Ethnicity and religion were singled out as both ‘obstacles to progress’ and ‘backwards custom’ resulting in targeted ethnic violence against the minority nationalities.⁹ In his assessment of these time periods, Bovingdon concluded Beijing was attempting to forcefully assimilate the Uyghurs into Han Chinese culture. He also concluded such attempts demonstrated the extreme lengths to which the Chinese state would go in ‘correcting’ the perceived ‘deviant’ and ‘backwards’ Uyghur.¹⁰ Those attempts pale in comparison to what is currently unfolding in Xinjiang.

2) **Global War on Terror and Islamophobia:**

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) had a significant influence on Beijing’s contemporary attitudes towards the Uyghurs.¹¹ The GWOT was used by Beijing to recast Uyghurs as a ‘terrorist collective’ with a ‘guilty-until-proven-innocent status’.¹² Furthermore, Beijing now wrongly recasts any act of grievance or resistance by the Uyghurs as ‘act[s] of terror’, closing avenues for Uyghurs to air legitimate grievances.¹³

Beijing is also showing rising levels of Islamophobia. Prior distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Uyghurs have disappeared and the Chinese Communist Party now identifies religion (Islam) as an aggressor. This has contributed to widespread, arbitrary and extra-judicial detention of Xinjiang’s Muslim minorities via pre-emptive policing.¹⁴ Pre-emptive policing became increasingly indiscriminate post-2001, was particularly pronounced following the July unrest in Urumqi in 2009, and has involved mass roundups of Uyghurs into arbitrary, extra-judicial detention.¹⁵ Pre-emptive policing has conflated Uyghur culture and Islamic identity with separatism and terrorism, resulting in an over-reaction by the state to legitimate acts of grievance. It has also resulted in a framing of all Uyghurs as potential separatists and terrorists.¹⁶

In 2014, Xi Jinping declared a ‘People’s War’ against terrorism, with Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities the primary targets. He declared terrorists should become ‘like rats scurrying across a street, with everybody shouting “beat them”’.¹⁷ Currently, the domain knowledge of the Chinese state is that Uyghurs are terrorists, dangerous, an enemy within, and that they are inferior to their Han counterparts.

Zenz has argued Beijing now sees large scale detention as the ‘cure’ for deviant behaviour by Uyghurs.¹⁸ A Han official cited in Zenz’s analysis attempted to rationalise the concentration camps by explaining their role in the re-education of Uyghurs. He stated: ‘You can’t uproot all the weeds hidden among the crops. ... You need to spray chemicals to kill them all. ... Re-educating these people is like spraying chemicals on the crops, that is why it is a general re-education, not limited to a few people’.¹⁹ Concentration camps are one of a range of structural elements of genocide aimed at ‘destroying and reorganising social relations’.²⁰ Their use in Xinjiang must be recognised as part of a genocidal process.

3) Breaches of Religious Freedoms:

In September 2017, Beijing revised Constitutional regulations on religious affairs with the changes taking effect in February 2018. Officially, the changes sought to ‘maintain religious and social harmony and regulate the management of religious affairs’.²¹ In practice, the constitutional changes precipitated government efforts to Sinicise religions such as Islam. In Xinjiang the constitutional changes resulted in intensified controls over mosques, Imams and Muslims.

Across Xinjiang, at least 15 significant mosques have been demolished (documented via satellite imagery), and another 31 mosques and 2 shrines show signs of serious damage to buildings and infrastructure.²² Uyghur graveyards have also been desecrated.²³ For mosques that remain intact, there has been a process of removal of Islamic symbols such as the crescent and dome.²⁴

According to two academics who travelled to Xinjiang in December 2018, remaining mosques were padlocked, denying entry to local Muslims. Those that remained open were abandoned because entry to the mosque automatically identified the individual as being a ‘religious person’, which constituted grounds for detention.²⁵

4) Surveillance:

High-tech surveillance is now a feature of daily life in Xinjiang. Surveillance methods include face and voice recognition, iris scanners, DNA sampling and 3D identification imagery of Uyghurs.²⁶ There has been a proliferation of security checkpoints, facial scanners, and smartphone searches by authorities.²⁷ More than 7,000 newly built police stations now dominate the region.²⁸

Following the 2016 appointment of Chen Quanguo as Xinjiang Party Chief, repression greatly increased. His previous appointment was in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, where he increased surveillance, control and the repression of the Tibetan population.²⁹ Surveillance spending received a significant boost following Chen’s appointment.

In 2015, Beijing spent US\$27 million for the whole year on surveillance in Xinjiang. Total spending for 2017 had increased to US\$9.1 billion (mainly on technology-based surveillance).³⁰ There are now over 35,000 cameras monitoring mosques, schools, streets and concentration camps.³¹

5) Forced Labour:

Beijing’s ‘Great Kashgar Dream’ seeks to transform Kashgar into a ‘centre of gravity’ in China’s economic arteries that extend throughout Central Asia and the Middle East.³² Plans for Kashgar include the ‘nine major bases’ and ‘one central city’ approach, with Kashgar the central city and the nine major bases including: textiles; large-scale metallurgical industrial base; petrochemical base; a processing base for agricultural and sideline products; export commodity processing and manufacturing base for neighbouring countries; halal food production and supply base for Muslim countries; a building materials base for neighbouring countries; a trade logistics base; as well as regional tourism.³³

The rapid development of Kashgar also included the ‘zero-24’ policy. The ‘zero’ referred to a zero-employment family, which meant that no family member in that household had employment. The ‘zero-24’ policy sought to put at least one family member of the household into employment within 24 hours.³⁴ While not unique to Xinjiang, this strategy is integral to the forced labour of Uyghurs across Xinjiang due to its coercive top-down approach to force Uyghurs to employment.

Sectors using forced Uyghur labour are linked to the nine industrial bases identified as part of the Great Kashgar Dream. Forced Uyghur labour has been linked to companies such as ‘Apple, BMW, Gap, Huawei, Nike, Samsung, Sony and Volkswagen’.³⁵ Forced labourers in these factories live under constant surveillance in segregated dormitories, they are prevented from enacting their religious faith, they are required to attend Mandarin and ideological instruction outside of work hours, and they are assigned minders meaning freedom of movement is severely constrained.³⁶

Forced Uyghur labour has increasingly become part of the global supply chain. A number of the concentration camps across Xinjiang are now co-located with factories.³⁷ Due to rising labour costs in other parts of China, which has pushed some manufacturing to Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Chinese factories in other parts of China are now relocating their operations to Xinjiang, attracted to lower labour costs. Byler has argued state development goals now seek to have 1 out of 11 textile jobs located in Xinjiang by 2023.³⁸

6) **Detained Uyghurs:**

While Beijing asserts detained Uyghurs are ‘dangerous extremists’, the global #MeTooUyghur campaign has demonstrated that the official discourse is false. With the growing number of disappearing loved ones, Twitter became a site of growing transnational awareness. In addition, the #MeTooUyghur campaign began to generate lists of the missing. One list compiled in January 2019 identified that more than 221 academics, University heads, cultural figures, musicians, journalists, authors, folklorists and other custodians of Uyghur culture have been disappeared.³⁹

Other lists identify that the ranks of the disappeared include prominent businesspeople, pregnant women and mothers of young children, housewives, even retired civil servants who spent years working for the Chinese Communist Party.⁴⁰

Moreover, the CECC reported the incarceration of citizens from other states in such camps, predominantly citizens of Kazakhstan.⁴¹ In 2018, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade confirmed Australian citizens had been incarcerated in the camps while visiting relatives in Xinjiang.⁴²

7) **Child Removal – The Uyghur Stolen Generation:**

The large incarceration of adult Uyghurs has seen Uyghur children being sent to orphanages and entering boarding school facilities.⁴³ Zenz has located numerous reports evidencing the massive expansion of boarding facilities at all levels for the children of the detained.⁴⁴ Reports he located online identified that children from so-called ‘double detained parents’ became a significant issue for authorities from 2017, and a massive expansion of boarding facilities occurred alongside the expansion of detention facilities.⁴⁵

Inter-generational separation of children, such as that currently unfolding in Xinjiang, is a technique of cultural genocide.⁴⁶ It seeks to destroy the undesirable minority culture, assimilating the children into the majority culture.

Government propaganda on removed Uyghur children purports that the Party is more suitable to care for the children than their own parents.⁴⁷ This is a justification that has long been used by colonial authorities against dispossessed peoples the world over, including in Australia.⁴⁸

The violence also extends to limiting reproduction among the Muslim minorities. Zenz reported that between 2015 and 2018, birth rates in the largest two Uyghur prefectures in Xinjiang fell by 85 percent.⁴⁹ In addition, one Uyghur region recorded a near-zero birth rate and by 2018, 80 percent of Uyghur women in some areas had undergone invasive mandatory birth control

measures including forced sterilization and IUD insertion.⁵⁰ Former detainees have confirmed Zenz's accounts, and have also identified rape as systemic in the camps.⁵¹

8) **Missing Academics:**

Many academics based outside of China personally know Uyghur scholars who have been disappeared into detention or who have been forced to flee China. For example, Professor Rahile Dawut, a world-renowned ethnographer at the Xinjiang University in Urumqi, disappeared in December 2017. Her whereabouts remain unknown and Xinjiang scholars globally are on record stating their concerns over her sudden and unexplained disappearance.⁵²

Since the detention, trial and sentencing of Professor Ilham Tohti, Uyghur scholars have been particularly vulnerable to detention.⁵³ Some Uyghur scholars now live outside of China. They too have raised concern over the whereabouts of family members still in Xinjiang.⁵⁴

Professor Tashpolat Tiyap is another high-profile academic who went missing. Professor Tiyap, a Uyghur scientist and former President of the Xinjiang University, disappeared in April 2017. He was later sentenced to death, with a two-year reprieve. He was accused of being a 'two faced person' and 'poisoning students minds' because he set a textbook with 'too much Uyghur content'.⁵⁵ His colleagues at the American Association of Geographers penned an open letter to Xi Jinping, calling for his urgent intervention in this case. More than 1300 scientists from 50 countries signed the letter. Professor Tiyap's fate remains unknown. His death sentence demonstrates execution sits alongside disappearances.

In a private conversation, two Xinjiang scholars (with established in-country track records), who managed to travel to Xinjiang as recently as the end of 2018, reported to me that whole neighbourhoods are mostly devoid of people, with locks on the doors of Uyghur homes. These scholars noted life in Uyghur neighbourhoods was totally transformed. Remaining Uyghurs in the neighbourhoods they visited avoided eye contact, were silent, and did not even speak or acknowledge other Uyghurs when passing. One scholar reported to me that 'the silence was unnerving'. However, the silence was interjected by broadcast propaganda calling on Uyghurs to 'Love the Country' and to 'Follow the Party'.

9) **Uyghur-Australians – Palpable trauma:**

All my Uyghur friends have family members who have disappeared. I have noted a deep state of distress and helplessness among my Uyghur friends. They report anxiety, depression, restlessness and inability to stay focused on daily tasks.

A Uyghur male reported to me that since learning his family members had disappeared, and realising the scale of the disappearances, he had become deeply distressed and is now showing significant behavioural changes. He noted he had become easily stressed and was now short-tempered with his wife and daughter. He had never been like this before and he was ashamed of how his trauma was manifesting. His wife and daughter acknowledged his behavioural changes, expressing their deep concern about his state of mind, fearful that his depression and trauma may make him vulnerable to health issues or even suicide.

The Uyghur-Australian community is in a deep state of trauma and anxiety. Every Uyghur-Australian I have met has family and friends missing back home in Xinjiang. When giving seminars, conference papers and public talks on these issues, on a number of occasions I have observed Uyghur-Australians break down in tears or show other signs of distress. This is palpable trauma.

10) Silence from the Muslim World:

Beijing has co-opted Middle East and North African (MENA) states into its unfolding crackdown in Xinjiang in order to legitimise its actions. By maintaining that the actions inside the camps are de-extremification and vocational skills acquisition, Beijing has attempted to ‘create a plausible and palatable counter-narrative...for consumption by China’s key trading partners in the Muslim world and beyond’, particularly states with sizeable Muslim populations who should be concerned by the scale of religious oppression occurring against fellow Muslims in Xinjiang.⁵⁶ Beijing uses the MENA states to downplay or mischaracterise what is unfolding in Xinjiang.

In his assessment of why MENA states have been supportive of Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang, Hassanein identified five key factors driving complicity. He argued:

- i) Arab states in particular are operating on a principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states in order to avoid similar scrutiny inside of their state borders where they are committing their own human rights abuses.
- ii) Some of the MENA states supporting Beijing also fear political Islam and separatism within their own states. Therefore, by falsely framing the narrative as being centred on eliminating political Islam and counteracting separatist movements, Beijing has convinced such states to support its current policies.
- iii) MENA states are staying silent due to their desires for continued economic development via the Belt and Road Initiative.
- iv) Although there may be internal disquiet over the religious suppression of fellow Muslims, the public face is one of silence and support in order to keep other economic lines flowing between themselves and China.
- v) Finally, MENA states increasingly believe that China is too big to challenge and this further limits their capacity to speak out against China.⁵⁷

Not all in the Muslim world are staying silent. In 2018, an editorial titled ‘Chinese Muslims want to fast like you too’ was published in the Urdu language version of *Dawn*, Pakistan’s leading and most widely circulated newspaper.⁵⁸ After outlining the unfolding Uyghur crisis in Xinjiang, the editorial explained why Arabic states were mostly silent. It concluded: ‘Many Muslim countries are indebted to the Chinese, and any verbal opposition or action on the Uighur issue can hamper their financial gains from China’.⁵⁹

Similarly, Qatar’s newspaper, *The Gulf Times*, regularly reports on developments in Xinjiang. In 2018 it ran a story identifying that at least 38 Pakistani men had been separated from their Uyghur wives and children after they were swept up into the detention camps.⁶⁰ Moreover, it identified at least another 300 Pakistani men whose Uyghur wives and children had gone missing while in Xinjiang. The men were compiling their own disappeared lists and were lobbying the Khan government to assist them in getting their wives freed. Pakistan’s Defence website even reprinted the story on its official site under its ‘current events’ section.⁶¹

In July 2019, 22 states signed a letter to the president of the United Nations Human Rights Council condemning the arbitrary detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and resultant human rights violations. The letter called on China to uphold its obligations as a member of the UN Human Rights Council and its own national laws on freedom of religion.⁶² Signatories of the letter included a range of mostly European states, many of which were extra-regional middle powers. Australia was one of those signatories.⁶³ In response to this letter, Beijing mobilised 37 states to write a second letter, defending China’s record in Xinjiang. Many of the signatory states for the second letter were BRI partner states, including a number of Muslim-majority states.⁶⁴

MENA deference to China and complicity on Xinjiang is obvious given many of the same states that signed Beijing’s letter to the UN, recently supported strong statements condemning Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya people.⁶⁵

11) Concluding statements:

States like Australia must act to end the creeping genocide and forced labour in Xinjiang. We must follow in the steps of past Prime Ministers such as Malcolm Fraser and Bob Hawke – leaders who acted decisively in the face of oppression and gross human rights abuses.

What is unfolding in Xinjiang is the largest detention of an ethnic group since the Holocaust. We must act and this Bill is an important measure that will increase pressure on Beijing to cease these actions. It will also encourage other states to follow suit. Beijing will not reverse its current course without continued scrutiny, pressure and hits to its financial bottom-line. Actions such as these will also force change within global companies that are using Xinjiang’s forced labour as part of their supply chain.

This Bill should prompt a review of Australia-China relations, and other human rights violations such as those occurring in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Hong Kong also warrant further attention. Their inclusion in an amendment to the proposed Bill is also strongly recommended. I also suggest extending the Bill to include ‘services’, making it ‘goods and services’.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a submission.

Dr Anna Hayes 3 February 2021

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⁴⁴ Children in such centres range from just a few weeks old right through to primary school aged children. In other instances, older children are reported to be taking care of their much younger siblings. For example, a 'Becoming Family' team visiting Aksu Prefecture reported they had given 'consolation gifts' to poor households in the region. One household was a double detention household. The gift recipient was an 18 year male who was forced to care for his three younger siblings due to their parent's detention. The Becoming Family team encouraged him to 'face the problem squarely', to 'not follow the evil, old path of his parents', and to 'work hard and be a good person, and always follow the Party. The Party and the country will not forget you'. They even trotted out the standard trope of 'the lives of peasants are getting better day by day'. This approach indicates the Party is attempting a re-education of the general population of a scale not seen since the Cultural Revolution. See: Zenz, Adrian 2019, 'Break Their Roots: Evidence for China's Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang', *Journal of Political Risk*, Vol. 7, no. 7, accessed 1 October 2019, <http://www.jpolarisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/> and 163.com 2018, 'Like! This group of great children in Hotan use the power of art to promote the study of national language and characters', 3 January, accessed 1 October 2019, <https://3g.163.com/dy/article/D78J6F690514E09F.html> and National Forestry and Grassland Bureau Propaganda Center 2017, 'The third batch of visiting relatives of the Forestry Department made a solid progress in the "Six One" activities, and the effect was obvious', 6 November, accessed 1 October 2019, <http://xinjiangzm.lmzmcn.com/coohome/coserver.aspx?uid=xinjiangzm&aid=E596A84E52EA496AB775DED C78313C40&clid=9&t=24>.

⁴⁵ Radio Free Asia 2017, 'Children of Detained Uyghurs face "Terrible Conditions" in Overcrowded Xinjiang Orphanages', 18 October, accessed 24 January 2019, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/children-10182017144425.html>.

⁴⁶ Tatz, Colin 2001, 'Confronting Australian genocide', *Aboriginal History*, Vol. 25, pp. 16-36.

⁴⁷ Zenz 2019, 'Break Their Roots'.

⁴⁸ See: Bird, Carmel (ed) 1998, *The Stolen Children: Their Stories*, Random House, Milsons Point; Broome, Richard 2010, *Aboriginal Australians: A history since 1788*, 4th edn, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest; and McGrath, Ann (ed) 1995, *Contested Ground: Australian Aborigines under the British Crown*, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest.

⁴⁹ Zenz, Adrian 2020, 'Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention: The CCP's Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birth Rates in Xinjiang', *China Brief*, Vol. 20, Issue 12, 15 July, accessed 1 February 2020, <https://jamestown.org/program/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birth-rates-in-xinjiang/>.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Hill, Matthew, Campanale, David & Gunter, Joel 2021, "'Their goal is to destroy everyone": Uighur camp detainees allege systemic rape', *BBC*, 3 February, accessed 3 February 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071>.

⁵² See: Byler, Darren 2018, 'The Disappearance of Rahile Dawut: a vanished professor remembered by students and colleagues', *China Channel*, 2 November, accessed 1 February 2021, <https://chinachannel.org/2018/11/02/dawut-dawut/>; Buckley, Chris & Ramzy, Austin 2018, 'Star Scholar disappears as Crackdown Engulfs Western China', *The New York Times*, 10 August, accessed 1 February 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-rahile-dawut.html> and Byler, Darren 2020, 'Three Years of Silence: Professor Dawut named honorary professor', *SupChina*, 14 December, accessed 1 February 2021, <https://supchina.com/2020/12/14/three-years-of-silence-rahile-dawut-named-honorary-professor/>.

⁵³ *The Economist* 2020, 'Walk on by; Human rights in Xinjiang', 27 June, accessed 1 February 2021, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A627621497/AONE?u=james_cook&sid=AONE&xid=0e5bec80.

⁵⁴ Personal communication with the author.

⁵⁵ Mattacic, Catherine 2019, 'There's no hope for the rest of us. Uyghur scientists swept up into China's massive detentions', *Science*, 10 October, accessed 1 February 2021, <https://www.sciencemag.org.elibrary.jcu.edu.au/news/2019/10/there-s-no-hope-rest-us-uyghur-scientists-swept-china-s-massive-detentions>.

⁵⁶ Leibold 2019, 'The Spectre of Insecurity'.

⁵⁷ Hassanein, Haisam 2019, 'Arab states give China a pass on Uyghur crackdown', *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 26 August, accessed 1 October, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/arab-states-give-china-a-pass-on-uyghur-crackdown>.

⁵⁸ Zakaria, Rafia 2019, 'Chinese Muslims want to fast like you too', *Dawn*, 8 May, accessed 1 October 2019, <https://www.dawnnews.tv/news/1102909/>.

⁵⁹ The article stated: 'With each passing day, hour and minute, Pakistan is becoming more and more indebted to Chinese loans, Chinese-made infrastructure and technology. This is probably why the voice of the Uighurs is not voiced [inside Pakistan] and the problems they are facing are not found anywhere in the country, and it is happening in a region that is geographically close to where freedom of religion and independence are concerned. These are serious violations'. Source: Zakaria 2019, 'Chinese Muslims'.

⁶⁰ Shephard, Christian & Wen, Philip 2018, 'China's big mistake: Pakistanis lobby to free wives trapped in Xinjiang', *The Gulf Times*, 26 September, accessed 1 October 2019, <https://www2.gulf-times.com/story/607379/Pakistanis-lobby-to-free-wives-trapped-in-Xinjiang>.

⁶¹ Pakistan Defence 2018, 'China's big mistake: Pakistanis lobby to free wives trapped in Xinjiang', *Pakistan Defence Forum*, 26 September, accessed 29 September 2019, <https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/chinas-big-mistake-pakistanis-lobby-to-free-wives-trapped-in-xinjiang.578903/>.

⁶² The letter stated: 'We call on China to uphold its national laws and international obligations and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion or belief, in Xinjiang and across China. We call also on China to refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uighurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang'. A PDF version of the first letter can be accessed from Putz, Catherine 2019, 'Which Countries Are For or Against China's Xinjiang Policies?', *The Diplomat*, 15 July, accessed 1 September 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/which-countries-are-for-or-against-chinas-xinjiang-policies/>.

⁶³ Signatory states of the first letter included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Notable absentees from either letter included the United States, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia.

⁶⁴ Signatory states of the second letter included: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Kuwait, Lao, Myanmar, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

⁶⁵ Human Rights Council Forty-second session 9–27 September 2019 Agenda item 2 Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 26 September 2019 42/3. Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, accessed 15 November 2019, https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?b=10&c=125&t=11.