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Australian Government

Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation

ASIO submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security

Review of the ASIO Amendment Bill 2020

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Introduction

1. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation welcomes the opportunity to provide a submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) Review of the ASIO Amendment Bill 2020. This complements the Home Affairs portfolio submission, with ASIO's submission focusing on the operational implications and case studies to demonstrate the application of the legislation.
2. The proposed Bill has been considered against the rapidly evolving security environment, where there are unprecedented levels of espionage and foreign interference and the terrorist threat remains unacceptably high. This is reflected in the three counter-terrorism disruptions in the past year—two cases motivated by Islamist extremism, and one by extreme right-wing ideology. ASIO considers that this Bill represents a balanced and proportionate tool to help manage evolving national security threats. The Bill repeals ASIO's more intrusive detention powers and replaces them with a less intrusive compulsory questioning framework. ASIO already has the power to conduct compulsory interviews with suspected terrorists; allowing us to conduct compulsory interviews to investigate threats of espionage and foreign interference will provide a substantial capability enhancement to safeguard Australia's national security. The new framework also enables ASIO to collect intelligence quickly and in high-threat environments, which will enable us to remain agile against the evolving security environment.
3. Since May 2015, one terrorist attack and three disruptions have involved teenagers under the age of 18. Further, terrorist propaganda—designed to radicalise, recruit and inspire terrorist attacks—will continue to be available to and may resonate with Australia-based extremists (including minors). Within this context, it is important that ASIO's security intelligence tools, which enable us to access valuable and accurate security intelligence, reflect this reality. ASIO has ensured that a number of safeguards have been included in the framework to enable us to appropriately question minors, including that a minor may only be questioned in the presence of a lawyer.
4. The current provisions establishing questioning warrants are subject to a sunset clause and are due to expire on 7 September 2020. Over the past five years, these warrants have been the subject of a 2016 review by the former Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), the Hon. Roger Gyles AO QC; and the 2017 PJCIS review of ASIO's questioning and detention powers. The PJCIS review led to the amendments to the compulsory questioning framework that are in the proposed Bill.
5. The proposal for internally authorised tracking devices will bring ASIO's authorisation procedures into line with those of our Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) partners, ensuring greater interoperability and a seamless ability to divide surveillance responsibilities across JCTT members. It will also help ASIO in balancing the need to maintain physical surveillance of investigative targets with the need to protect our surveillance officers from physical threats. This is particularly the case in the current security environment, in which threats can manifest extremely quickly.

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6. This submission provides an overview of the security environment in which ASIO operates—including changes that require a revised compulsory questioning framework—and seeks to inform the committee on how the Bill will provide ASIO with an ability to collect intelligence quickly in high-threat environments, why it is required and how it will be used within a framework of stringent oversight and accountability. The submission is divided into four parts:
- **Part 1**—The security environment
 - **Part 2**—The updated compulsory questioning framework in the current security environment
 - **Part 3**—The requirement for internally authorised tracking devices
 - **Part 4**—Safeguards and oversight.

Role of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

7. ASIO is Australia's national security service. Our purpose is to protect Australia and Australians from serious security threats. We do this through intelligence collection and assessment, and the provision of advice to the Australian Government, law enforcement, government agencies and industry.
8. ASIO's work is anticipatory in nature. We seek to identify, investigate and assess potential security threats and work with domestic and international security partners to prevent harm from occurring.
9. ASIO's key strategic priorities are:
- countering terrorism and the promotion of communal violence;
 - countering espionage and foreign interference;
 - countering serious threats to Australia's border integrity; and
 - providing protective security advice to governments and industry.
10. We harness our expertise in security, unique intelligence collection capabilities, strong national and international partnerships, and all-source intelligence analysis capabilities to provide trusted, actionable advice which enables practical and proportionate management of threats.

Part 1—The security environment

Politically motivated violence

11. The general terrorism threat level for Australia remains at **PROBABLE**—credible intelligence, assessed to represent a plausible scenario, indicates an intention and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia.
12. The threat of terrorism in Australia is likely to remain elevated at this unacceptably high level for the foreseeable future. A complex variety of factors influence the domestic security environment, including offshore groups, aspirational and prevented travellers to conflict zones, and possible returnees from Syria and Iraq.
- We anticipate terrorist attacks will continue to be planned in Australia over the next five years. Readily available weapons and relatively simple tactics will remain the more likely features of a terrorist attack here.

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- Over the next five years, it is possible some Australian citizens currently in the Syria and Iraq conflict zone will return to Australia. Those who do may present a long-term threat.
 - The threat from the extreme right wing in Australia has increased in recent years (although the principal source of the terrorist threat remains Sunni Islamist extremism), and we remain concerned about the possibility of individuals being radicalised to an extreme right-wing ideology and committing acts of terrorism.
 - The number of Islamist extremists incarcerated will continue to rise over the next five years—especially if Australian citizens return from the conflict zone. This increases the potential for other prisoners to be exposed to an Islamist extremist ideology, and opportunities for radicalisation.
 - The number of terrorism offenders scheduled for release from Australian prisons will increase over the next five years. These individuals may be held in a position of greater standing among their peers following release, which could be leveraged to recruit others towards an ideology supportive of violence.
 - Terrorist propaganda—designed to radicalise, recruit and inspire terrorist attacks—will continue to be available and to resonate with Australia-based extremists.
 - While extremist use of encrypted communications platforms is reflective of use among the wider Australian public, we can expect Australia-based extremists to exploit these platforms to securely connect with like-minded individuals domestically and offshore, making it increasingly difficult to detect and disrupt attack planning.
13. Regardless of the different vectors and threats, ASIO's role in countering terrorism remains critical. ASIO together with our law enforcement partners have disrupted 18 counter-terrorism plots in the past five years. To date, 85 people have been convicted of terrorism by Australian courts.
14. Within this complex and elevated security environment, it is important that ASIO has a range of investigative and operational tools, including legislated powers, that it is able to deploy quickly and safely when required to protect Australia and Australians from terrorism.

Minors engaged in politically motivated violence

15. Minors continue to be involved in attacks and attack planning. One of the seven terrorist attacks conducted in Australia since 2014 was carried out by a young person of school age, and three of the disrupted plots have involved minors.
16. ASIO is particularly concerned that vulnerable and impressionable young people will continue to be at risk of being ensnared in the streams of hate being spread across the internet by extremists of every ideology.
- Islamist extremist groups and supporters continue to disseminate propaganda designed to radicalise, recruit and inspire terrorist attacks in the West, including in Australia. The approach to propaganda of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) set the standard among Islamist extremists, but right-wing extremists will also continue to produce internet-savvy, sophisticated messaging.

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- Extreme right-wing online forums proliferate on the internet and attract international memberships, including from Australians. These online forums share and promote extremist right-wing ideologies and encourage and justify acts of violence. We expect such groups will remain an enduring threat, making more use of online propaganda to spread their messages of hate.

Case study 1—Real case studies involving minors

Since May 2015, three major terrorist attacks involving teenagers under the age of 18 have been disrupted by law enforcement, with critical security intelligence being provided by ASIO. One minor has undertaken an attack.

In May 2015, a male aged 17 was arrested in Melbourne after he was identified as being in contact with Australian Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) members in Syria, who were encouraging him to undertake terrorist attacks in Australia. He later pleaded guilty to one count of acts in preparation for a terrorism offence.

In October 2015, a 15-year-old male conducted a terrorist attack, murdering New South Wales Police employee Curtis Cheng.

In April 2016, a 16-year-old male was arrested and charged with one count of acts in preparation for a terrorist offence after he sought firearms and explosives to support an intention to conduct an Anzac Day attack.

In October 2016, two 16-year-olds were arrested by counter-terrorism police after they were observed entering a Sydney gun shop and purchasing two bayonets. One of the teens was located with a note linking their anticipated actions to ISIL. Both were charged with acts done in preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act, and membership of a terrorist organisation.

Espionage and foreign interference

17. Foreign interference is an enduring and increasingly complex feature of the security landscape in Australia. ASIO investigations have identified foreign interference operations directed at decision-makers in government and industry, the media, members of diaspora communities and commercial investment decision-makers.
18. Australia continues to be a target of espionage and foreign interference—activities that can harm Australia's interests by undermining its national security and sovereignty; damaging its reputation and relationships; degrading its diplomatic and trade relations; inflicting substantial economic damage; compromising nationally vital assets, defence capabilities and critical infrastructure; and threatening the safety of Australians.
19. Australia's national security and economic growth are at risk from foreign states seeking to advance their strategic and economic interests at our nation's expense. Foreign intelligence services continue to seek access to privileged and classified information. Australia's research and development of innovative technologies and its military modernisation program are attractive targets for espionage by foreign states seeking to gain an advantage to the detriment of Australia's security and prosperity.
20. ASIO continues to observe foreign states seeking to monitor and control the activities, opinions and decisions of sections of the Australian community in a way that impinges on freedom of speech, association and action. If left unchecked, such interference enables foreign states to exercise power and influence in a way that undermines Australia's sovereignty and confidence in the integrity of its system of government.

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21. Foreign intelligence services also seek to exploit Australia's businesses for intelligence purposes. That threat will persist across critical infrastructure, industries that hold large amounts of personal data, and emerging sectors with unique intellectual property that could provide an economic or strategic edge. With respect to foreign investment, ASIO is keenly aware of the importance of such to Australia's economic prosperity and fully supports the need to balance national security with broader national interest considerations.
22. We judge that foreign interference to promote outcomes that favour the interests of foreign states in *competition* with Australian interests—as opposed to decisions that are complementary or neutral to Australian interests—poses a serious harm. Such outcomes may be sought throughout all aspects of Australian society and across all sectors.
23. The threats posed today by espionage and foreign interference operate at a scale, breadth and ambition that has not previously been seen in Australia. Espionage and foreign interference are affecting parts of the Australian community previously untouched by such threats, even during the Cold War. There are more foreign intelligence officers and their proxies operating in Australia now than at the height of the Cold War, and many of them have the requisite level of capability, the intent and the persistence to cause significant harm to our national security.

Part 2—The updated compulsory questioning framework in the current security environment

24. Within the complex and elevated security environment, it is important that ASIO has a range of investigative and operational tools, including legislated powers, that it is able to deploy when required to protect Australia and Australians from terrorism and espionage and foreign interference.
25. The proposed amendments to the compulsory questioning framework update the power in a way that reflects changes in the security environment since the compulsory questioning power was introduced in 2003. The Bill repeals ASIO's more intrusive detention powers and replaces them with a less intrusive compulsory questioning framework. The extension of the existing questioning power to those as young as 14 who are the target of a politically motivated violence investigation—with appropriate safeguards—reflects a shift in the security environment since 2003 that has seen younger and younger people involved in extremist activities. The extension of the power to make it available for ASIO's counter-espionage and interference investigations reflects the growing need to address such threats.

Politically motivated violence

26. It is important to note that ASIO has only used this compulsory questioning power sparingly since its inception. ASIO has executed 16 questioning warrants since 2003, with the last questioning warrant being in use in 2010. Since 2010, the use of questioning warrants has been considered in the conduct of specific operations on a small number of occasions.
27. There are a number of reasons for this, including but not limited to:
- the use of compulsory questioning would move ASIO's investigation from a covert intelligence collection space to an overt space, and this may not always be the preferred outcome; and

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- ASIO's preference to always use the least intrusive intelligence collection method may have led to other intelligence avenues being progressed.
28. ASIO's use of compulsory questioning powers will remain carefully considered and proportionate. However, the power is still required in the complex and challenging security environment.

Case study 2—Real case study involving minors

A network of associates, a number of whom are under 16 years of age, support overseas Islamist extremist groups and terrorism. ASIO assesses that the (adult-age) leader of the group has expressed his intent to conduct a suicide attack—and that other group members (all minors) separately expressed support for a terrorist attack. ASIO assesses an unidentified number of group members may be involved in an imminent onshore terrorist attack. All members of the group—including those under 16 years of age—are subjects of ASIO investigation in relation to politically motivated violence. However, law enforcement agencies have advised that activities of individuals in the group do not reach the threshold for counter-terrorism offences.

The updated compulsory questioning framework would allow ASIO to interview the under-16-year-olds and seek insights into the minors' intent and capability, as well as that of the group and adult leadership figure.

Case study 3—Real case study on compulsory questioning framework

In early 2018, an Australia-based extremist was providing information to enhance the technical capability of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which presented a potential risk to coalition forces in Syria. The sensitive nature by which the subject's engagement with a Syria-based ISIL operative was identified made it difficult to use the intelligence. ASIO interviews of the subject, in addition to search warrants at the subject's home, were conducted, but the subject was deceptive and dishonest.

The updated compulsory questioning framework would provide an opportunity to interview the subject in a context where ASIO could use sensitive reporting in a manner which limited its potential compromise, hold the subject accountable if they provided false or misleading information, inform ASIO's assessment of the threat posed, and address outstanding information requirements around unconfirmed reporting involving the subject.

Espionage and foreign interference

29. ASIO's role is predictive and anticipatory, and we work to identify and provide insight into those supporting, encouraging, considering or conducting espionage and foreign interference. Because of the obfuscated nature of espionage operations, identifying those working for or on behalf of hostile foreign intelligence services may require compulsory questioning of individuals assessed to have privileged and unique knowledge. Unique security intelligence derived from compulsory questioning will provide critical guidance to ASIO counter-espionage investigations and inform Australian Government responses to foster an environment more resistant to foreign interference.

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Case study 4—Hypothetical case study on foreign interference

In a hypothetical example, ASIO has highly sensitive reporting to suggest an Australian intelligence officer has been recruited by a foreign intelligence service. Initial ASIO investigation identifies a match with the Australian intelligence officer described; however, no other information is available to corroborate the reporting.

A questioning warrant would assist ASIO to corroborate the reporting quickly and provide a unique opportunity to collect valuable information about the travel, finances and associations of the Australian intelligence officer.

The increased compulsion provided by a questioning warrant would be likely to result in the collection of greater information—noting the intelligence officer would have high-level security awareness and some knowledge of ASIO modus operandi.

Part 3—The requirement for internally authorised tracking devices

30. ASIO considers that amendments to surveillance device powers are necessary because the existing framework does not facilitate the expeditious deployment of tracking capabilities. This presents a significant shortcoming in ASIO's physical surveillance capabilities and impedes the interoperability of ASIO and law enforcement.
31. While ASIO is not a law enforcement agency, the counter-terrorism environment and ASIO's contribution to counter-terrorism operations have changed to require a greater need for tracking capabilities to be deployed more quickly. There has been an increasing trend towards individuals acting alone, or in small groups, using weapons that are straightforward to acquire and tactics that are straightforward to employ. This has resulted in a reduced time frame from detection of attack planning to execution. Therefore, ASIO needs to be in a position to deploy tracking capabilities quickly, with internal authorisation, in line with the ability of ASIO's partner law enforcement agencies to quickly deploy internally authorised tracking capabilities.
32. Such an ability would improve ASIO's interoperability within the JCTT by providing a standard capability across JCTT agencies. It would also allow ASIO to rapidly take steps to distance its surveillance officers from physical threats without losing contact with surveillance targets.

Case study 5—Real case study where an internally authorised tracking device would have assisted

In July 2017, an Australian citizen failed in an attempt to place an improvised explosive device aboard a flight departing Australia for Abu Dhabi. The initial reporting about this plot led to the immediate deployment of physical surveillance against multiple individuals suspected of involvement. In the initial hours of this investigation, one of the few investigative tools available to ASIO and law enforcement was physical surveillance.

Australian authorities were not yet aware of the location of the device, the viability of the device, whether there were other devices, or which of the individuals under surveillance were involved. If ASIO had been conducting surveillance against an individual with a live improvised explosive device within their vehicle, there was no lawful ability to place an internally authorised tracking devices on the target vehicle to maintain coverage of the vehicle. ASIO would have needed to pursue an emergency warrant under section 29 of the *Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979*, which would have required the Director-General to prepare and send a warrant request to the Attorney-General before the

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power to issue the warrant was enlivened. Any loss of coverage of the individuals involved could have had potentially catastrophic consequences.

ASIO's ability to internally authorise a tracking device would have brought ASIO's scope to deploy a tracking device into line with other Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) members, noting that this was a large-scale scenario, and multiple surveillance targets had been assigned across different JCTT agencies.

33. When dealing with potentially violent individuals, partner law enforcement agencies place an increased reliance on capabilities such as tracking devices to mitigate the significant physical risk. Law enforcement partners are empowered, via section 39 of the *Surveillance Devices Act 2004*, to use internally authorised tracking devices to support physical surveillance operations. The power to immediately deploy tracking devices could allow ASIO to undertake its physical surveillance activities in a more effective manner and with reduced risk to the physical safety of staff.

Case study 6—Real case study indicating how internally authorised tracking devices provide tactical flexibility

In October 2016, ASIO conducted surveillance against two 16-year-old males, peripheral to a group assessed to be planning a terrorist attack in Australia. During an ASIO surveillance shift against these individuals, ASIO surveillance followed the individuals into a gun shop and identified the individuals purchasing a knife. ASIO urgently attempted to coordinate an armed police response so as to interdict the targets prior to any potential attack. Police arrested the pair and discovered a note pledging allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—suggesting they were imminently planning to undertake a terrorist attack. Both of these individuals were subsequently found guilty of a terrorism offence. One of the individuals was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment. The other individual is yet to be sentenced.

In these circumstances, ASIO's reliance on physical surveillance (rather than the tactical application of a tracking device) results in a heightened risk that ASIO is unable to subsequently identify the location of the targets before law enforcement interdiction teams arrive. ASIO surveillance is therefore forced to maintain close physical proximity to targets, placing their safety at unnecessary risk.

ASIO's ability to internally authorise a tracking device would enable ASIO to use technology to complement our physical surveillance. This would mean that, if physical surveillance is lost (for example, to protect the physical safety of the surveillance staff or members of the public), ASIO and law enforcement partners have the ability to safely and reliably locate the individuals involved.

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Part 4—Safeguards and oversight

34. ASIO must act lawfully, in line with the provisions of the ASIO Act and other relevant legislation and ministerial guidance.
35. ASIO is accountable to the Attorney-General and the Minister for Home Affairs and subject to independent oversight and scrutiny, including by the Parliament and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, who has powers comparable to those of a standing Royal Commission. This is to provide assurance that ASIO acts independently and lawfully and properly discharges its functions.
36. ASIO has significant powers under law, but our application of these powers is proportionate to the security threat or matter at hand.

Compulsory questioning powers—questioning of minors

37. ASIO considers that, in certain circumstances, valuable, accurate security intelligence can be collected from young persons. However, ASIO would only be permitted to seek a compulsory questioning warrant for minors aged 14 to 18 years if the minor were themselves the target of an ASIO investigation in relation to politically motivated violence.
38. The Bill retains the numerous existing safeguards and the various reporting requirements contained in the current questioning framework and retains and updates provisions permitting the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to be present at questioning and apprehension and to raise concerns with the prescribed authority, who may then suspend questioning. The Bill also adds additional safeguards to the questioning power, such as clarifying the subject's right to legal representation and requiring the Attorney-General to consider the best interests of the subject where the warrant is to be issued in relation to a minor. The Bill will also ensure a subject has the right to make a complaint to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and the Commonwealth Ombudsman or relevant complaints agency in relation to the conduct of ASIO or police officers.
39. In addition to strengthening a minor's access to legal representation and consistent with the findings of the PJCIS, the new framework will introduce a new 'best interests of the child' test. This will require the Attorney-General to consider the best interests of the child before issuing the warrant. In considering the best interests of the child, the Attorney-General must consider:
- the age, maturity, sex and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the person;
 - the physical and mental health of the person;
 - the benefit to the person of having a meaningful relationship with the person's family and friends;
 - the right of the person to receive an education;
 - the right of the person to practise the person's religion; and
 - any other matter the Attorney-General considers relevant.

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Arrangements for prevention of access to a particular lawyer and provision of lawyers

40. The prescribed authority currently has the power to prevent a subject contacting a particular lawyer of choice. While this power is currently limited to subjects in detention, ASIO considers this power is still critical to ensuring the integrity of the compulsory questioning process under a reformed framework which does not provide for detention.
41. Where the circumstances relating to the lawyer require it, the power will continue to ensure that the subject through their lawyer cannot alert another person to ASIO's investigation or cause the destruction, damage or alteration of records or things that may be requested for production. The power does not prevent the subject having access to legal representation. Rather, it removes a subject's ability to contact a particular lawyer of choice in appropriate security-relevant circumstances. Where prevented from contacting a particular lawyer, the subject will still be able to contact another lawyer of their choice.
42. ASIO acknowledges that, where a subject is not required to appear for immediate questioning, the subject may have already contacted a lawyer whom the prescribed authority may subsequently prevent from being involved in the questioning process. However, prior to questioning commencing, the subject will have limited knowledge of the security matters in relation to which ASIO may seek to question them. The risk of prejudice to security is heightened in circumstances where such a lawyer is present for the questioning of the subject, given operational information may be disclosed.

Case study 7—Hypothetical case study involving prevention of access to particular lawyer

A particular lawyer is known to represent multiple persons involved in an ASIO security investigation, including the subject of the questioning warrant. ASIO has information to indicate the lawyer has previously shared information between his clients who are the subject of ASIO investigations.

In this situation, ASIO would provide the prescribed authority with the relevant information and seek to have the prescribed authority issue a direction preventing the subject from having further contact with the lawyer, including preventing the lawyer being present during questioning. If the prescribed authority were satisfied further contact with the lawyer may result in a person being alerted to ASIO's investigation, or the destruction, damage or alteration of records or things required for production, the prescribed authority would give the direction preventing this conduct from occurring. The subject could then contact another lawyer of choice, and questioning would proceed in the presence of that lawyer.

43. Under the new framework and consistent with the 2017 findings of the PJCIS, a minor may only be questioned in the presence of a lawyer. As in the existing framework, the prescribed authority may also prevent a subject's (adult or minor) contact with a particular lawyer where satisfied the contact with the lawyer may result in the tip-off of others to ASIO's investigation or cause security-relevant records or things for production to be destroyed. This does not prevent the subject from contacting an alternative lawyer.

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44. Where the subject has been required to appear for questioning immediately (and consequently may have been apprehended) under the new framework, the prescribed authority must appoint a lawyer to represent the subject. This ensures the subject is represented appropriately, while also ensuring that questioning can proceed immediately as intended without the need for a break which would provide the subject with an opportunity to abscond, tip off others to ASIO's investigation or cause the destruction of security-relevant records or things. A minor will also have a lawyer appointed to them by the prescribed authority, where the prescribed authority considers they have had a reasonable period of time for a lawyer of choice to attend and they have failed to do so.
45. The Bill retains the existing requirement for a minor to be questioned in the presence of their parent, guardian or another person able to represent their interests, such as their lawyer ('minor's representative'). Where the minor has been required to appear for questioning immediately (and consequently may have been apprehended) under the new framework, the prescribed authority must appoint the minor's lawyer to act as the minor's representative until the minor's representative of choice (for example, a parent) attends. In other circumstances where the minor appears without a minor's representative, the prescribed authority has the discretion to defer questioning for a reasonable period to enable the minor's representative of choice to appear, or, if satisfied the minor has already had a reasonable period, proceed with questioning with the lawyer acting as the minor's representative.

Internally authorised tracking devices

46. There will be external oversight of ASIO's use of tracking devices under internal authorisation via a range of mechanisms. In addition to ASIO's existing oversight mechanisms, ASIO will be obliged to:
- establish and maintain a detailed register of requests for internal authorisations, including information concerning the ASIO employee or affiliate who made the request, the authorising officer, the security matter and duration of the authorisation;
 - provide a detailed report to the Attorney-General regarding the execution of all internal authorisations, including the extent to which the authorisation assisted ASIO in carrying out its functions; and
 - include statistics regarding internal authorisations in ASIO's annual report.
47. Additionally, ASIO will still need to obtain a warrant to place a tracking device if it is necessary to enter premises or interfere with the interior of a vehicle in order to do so.

Conclusion

48. ASIO supports the ASIO Amendment Bill 2020 as it will provide additional operational tools that can be deployed quickly in high-threat environments to protect Australia and Australians from terrorism and foreign interference.
49. As security threats evolve, ASIO's ability to respond must also evolve. The Bill represents a balanced and proportionate response to evolving security threats. The Bill repeals ASIO's more intrusive detention powers and replaces them with a less intrusive compulsory questioning framework.