



Electoral Commissioner

Our Ref: 13/997

Ms Siobhan Leyne
Inquiry Secretary
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
PO Box 6021
PARLIAMENT HOUSE ACT 2600

Dear Ms Leyne,

Inquiry into the 2013 federal election - Responses to Questions on Notice

This submission provides the Australian Electoral Commission's response to a number of requests for information taken as questions on notice (QoN) at the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters' (JSCEM) recent public hearings.

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In the submission 'AEC Response to ANAO Evidence from 6 February' the AEC has identified an inadvertent omission. It affects paragraph 6.1.7 (page 17) whereby the sentence, 'This research did not provide indications that there was any link between third-party use of electoral roll information and a disinclination for people to enrol to vote' should read, 'This research did not provide indications that there was any *substantive* link between third-party use of electoral roll information and a disinclination for people to enrol to vote.'

I also note your letter dated 7 July 2014 asking the AEC for further information on a series of various issues. We welcome the opportunity to respond to questions on these areas, and will be finalising a submission to the Committee for your consideration in advance of the hearings scheduled at the end of this month.

Yours sincerely

Tom Rogers
Acting Electoral Commissioner

23 July 2014

Responses to questions on notice from JSCEM Public Hearing held in Melbourne on 15 April 2014

1. Comparison of postal votes between the 2010 and 2013 federal elections

1.1. On page two of the transcript for the hearing of 15 April 2014, the Chair and Mr Griffin requested a comparison of postal votes from the 2010 and 2013 election broken down by electorate and state.

Mr GRIFFIN: And how does that 47 per cent [increase in postal voting is from 2010 to 2013] compare to other states?

[...]

CHAIR: It would be helpful if we got some electorate breakdowns on that in due course.

[...]

Mr Pope: I can do that. I will take that on notice and come back to you.

AEC Response

1.2. Table A.1 below contains the percentage increase in postal votes admitted for the House of Representatives by State during the 2010 and 2013 federal elections as published on the Virtual Tally Room.

Table A.1 Percentage increase by State in postal votes admitted for the House of Representatives from 2010 to 2013

State/Territory	Postal Votes admitted 2010	Postal Votes admitted 2013	Increase (%)
NSW	209 537	306 636	46.3
VIC	244 523	359 679	47.1
QLD	184 250	252 648	37.1
WA	62 302	94 898	52.3
SA	71 828	78 086	8.7
TAS	23 079	26 069	13.0
ACT	8 566	11 603	35.5
NT	3 291	4 011	21.9
Total	807 376	1 133 630	40.4

1.3. Table A.2 contains the percentage increase in postal votes admitted for the House of Representatives by division between the 2010 and 2013 federal elections as published on the Virtual Tally Room.

Table A.2 Percentage increase by division in postal votes admitted for the House of Representatives from 2010 to 2013

Division	2010	2013	Increase (%)
NSW			

Banks	4 883	7 312	49.7
Barton	4 435	6 025	35.9
Bennelong	6 198	8 632	39.3
Berowra	4 018	7 076	76.1
Blaxland	3 908	5 990	53.3
Bradfield	5 098	7 700	51.0
Calare	2 849	3 631	27.4
Charlton	4 771	6 829	43.1
Chifley	3 273	5 624	71.8
Cook	4 002	6 143	53.5
Cowper	4 246	4 395	3.5
Cunningham	4 879	6 513	33.5
Dobell	4 792	6 594	37.6
Eden-Monaro	5 371	7 043	31.1
Farrer	5 124	6 308	23.1
Fowler	3 125	5 856	87.4
Gilmore	4 694	5 687	21.2
Grayndler	3 446	6 050	75.6
Greenway	4 183	6 816	62.9
Hughes	3 966	5 925	49.4
Hume	3 924	5 906	50.5
Hunter	3 279	5 059	54.3
Kingsford Smith	4 175	7 590	81.8
_	4 251	5 891	38.6
Lindsay	4 119	4 343	5.4
Macarthur			50.7
Mackellar	3 471	5 232	
	3 877	6 609	70.5
Macquarie	4 519	6 414	41.9
McMahon	3 535	5 760	62.9
Mitchell	3 888	6 412	64.9
New England	4 050	5 048	24.6
Newcastle	4 742	6 980	47.2
North Sydney	4 484	7 901	76.2
Page	5 454	6 126	12.3
Parkes	4 763	6 114	28.4
Parramatta	5 225	8 512	62.9
Paterson	4 767	6 148	29.0
Reid	4 378	7 337	67.6
Richmond	5 160	5 907	14.5

Riverina	4 483	4 365	-2.6
Robertson	5 468	7 134	30.5
Shortland	5 495	7 369	34.1
Sydney	4 189	8 089	93.1
Throsby	3 455	5 804	68.0
Warringah	4 275	7 073	65.5
Watson	4 084	6 653	62.9
Wentworth	5 571	9 407	68.9
Werriwa	3 195	5 304	66.0
Total	209 537	306 636	46.3
VIC			
Aston	6 325	8 407	32.9
Ballarat	6 063	8 901	46.8
Batman	6 171	8 916	44.5
Bendigo	7 197	10 070	39.9
Bruce	6 375	10 127	58.9
Calwell	4 774	8 682	81.9
Casey	6 664	10 032	50.5
Chisholm	7 246	12 266	69.3
Corangamite	7 010	10 472	49.4
Corio	6 212	9 024	45.3
Deakin	7 213	11 294	56.6
Dunkley	7 347	11 484	56.3
Flinders	8 267	9 766	18.1
Gellibrand	7 560	9 417	24.6
Gippsland	3 346	4 551	36.0
Goldstein	7 364	10 276	39.5
Gorton	6 225	9 589	54.0
Higgins	7 757	11 160	43.9
Holt	8 295	10 788	30.1
Hotham	6 647	9 893	48.8
Indi	6 388	9 083	42.2
Isaacs	7 034	11 567	64.4
Jagajaga	6 644	10 124	52.4
Kooyong	6 661	11 181	67.9
La Trobe	7 970	11 465	43.9
Lalor	8 005	8 482	6.0
Mallee	4 630	6 132	32.4

Maribyrnong	5 531	11 128	101.2
McEwen	8 471	12 472	47.2
McMillan	5 996	8 188	36.6
Melbourne	5 916	10 387	75.6
Melbourne Ports	9 627	13 057	35.6
Menzies	6 494	10 664	64.2
Murray	4 733	5 441	15.0
Scullin	4 909	9 106	85.5
Wannon	5 767	6 762	17.3
Wills	5 689	9 325	63.9
Total	244 523	359 679	47.1
QLD			
Blair	5 875	8 083	37.6
Bonner	7 387	10 471	41.7
Bowman	6 501	8 118	24.9
Brisbane	5 853	9 665	65.1
Capricornia	6 142	8 062	31.3
Dawson	5 361	7 876	46.9
Dickson	6 354	8 449	33.0
Fadden	5 076	8 601	69.4
Fairfax	5 089	6 593	29.6
Fisher	4 912	6 725	36.9
Flynn	8 016	9 244	15.3
Forde	6 062	8 726	43.9
Griffith	6 207	9 357	50.7
Groom	7 110	9 699	36.4
Herbert	4 482	6 967	55.4
Hinkler	6 411	6 813	6.3
Kennedy	5 491	6 740	22.7
Leichhardt	4 423	5 588	26.3
Lilley	6 807	9 922	45.8
Longman	6 061	8 924	47.2
Maranoa	11 118	12 904	16.1
McPherson	4 875	7 628	56.5
Moncrieff	5 925	7 795	31.6
Moreton	6 634	9 054	36.5
Oxley	4 163	7 097	70.5
Petrie	6 674	8 581	28.6

Rankin	6 321	8 729	38.1
Ryan	6 615	8 897	34.5
Wide Bay	5 835	7 399	26.8
Wright	6 470	9 941	53.6
Total	184 250	252 648	37.1
Total	104 230	232 040	37.1
WA			
Brand	3 569	6 251	75.1
Canning	4 962	6 873	38.5
Cowan	4 341	5 843	34.6
Curtin	4 458	6 846	53.6
Durack	2 736	4 732	73.0
Forrest	2 921	5 158	76.6
Fremantle	4 887	6 785	38.8
Hasluck	5 068	6 900	36.1
Moore	3 427	5 892	71.9
O'Connor	3 421	5 653	65.2
Pearce	3 849	6 881	78.8
Perth	4 311	6 876	59.5
Stirling	5 267	7 051	33.9
Swan	5 145	6 556	27.4
Tangney	3 940	6 601	67.5
Total	62 302	94 898	52.3
Total	02 002	04 000	02.0
SA			
Adelaide	7 019	8 171	16.4
Barker	6 054	6 243	3.1
Boothby	7 058	8 115	15.0
Grey	6 380	7 098	11.3
Hindmarsh	6 948	8 177	17.7
Kingston	6 889	6 272	-9.0
Makin	5 924	6 381	7.7
Mayo	6 618	7 367	11.3
Port Adelaide	5 625	6 555	16.5
Sturt	7 320	7 643	4.4
Wakefield	5 993	6 064	1.2
Total	71 828	78 086	8.7
481	. 1 020	. 5 000	0.7
TAS			

Bass	5 173	4 938	-4.5
Braddon	4 225	4 224	0.0
Denison	4 371	6 144	40.6
Franklin	4 778	5 563	16.4
Lyons	4 532	5 200	14.7
Total	23 079	26 069	13.0
ACT			
Canberra	4 362	5 399	23.8
Fraser	4 204	6 204	47.6
Total	8 566	11 603	35.5
NT			
Lingiari	1 242	1 566	26.1
Solomon	2 049	2 445	19.3
Total	3 291	4 011	21.9
Total	807 376	1 133 630	40.4

2. Number of multi-divisional pre-poll voting centres in Victoria

2.1. On page four of the transcript, the Chair requested the number of multidivisional pre-poll centres in Victoria.

CHAIR: At how many places did [multi-Divisional pre-poll voting] occur, just off the top of your head?
[...]

Mr Pope: We had quite a number. I do not have that figure at my disposal.

CHAIR: Perhaps you can give that to us later.

AEC Response

2.2. For the 2013 federal election in Victoria, there were 23 pre-poll voting centres that serviced multiple Victorian divisions; they are listed in table A.3.

Table A.3 – Victorian multi-divisional pre-poll voting centres

No.	Locality	Address	Host division	Guest divisions
1	Boronia	Shops 6&7 Boronia Arcade 246 Dorset Rd Boronia 3155	Aston	La Trobe
2	Box Hill	Box Hill Town Hall Whitehorse Rd Box Hill 3128	Chisholm	Deakin Kooyong Menzies
3	Braybrook	Shop 9 227 Ballarat Rd Braybrook 3019	Maribyrnong	Gellibrand Gorton
4	Camberwell	693 Burke Rd Camberwell 3124	Kooyong	Higgins
5	Cheltenham	Presbyterian Church Hall 8 Park Rd Cheltenham 3192	Hotham	Goldstein Isaacs
6	Cranbourne	Old Shire Offices 160 Sladen St Cranbourne 3977	Holt	Flinders La Trobe
7	Dandenong North	Dandenong Stadium 270 Stud Rd Dandenong North 3175	Bruce	Holt Isaacs
8	Geelong	151 Yarra St Geelong 3220	Corio	Corangamite
9	Glenroy	806 Pascoe Vale Rd Glenroy 3046	Wills	Calwell
10	Greensborough	9-13 Flintoff St Greensborough 3088	Jagajaga	Scullin
11	Grovedale	Grovedale Community Centre 45 Heyers Rd Grovedale 3216	Corangamite	Corio
12	Heidelberg	37 Burgundy St Heidelberg 3084	Jagajaga	Menzies
13	Malvern	St George's Church Hall 296 Glenferrie Rd Malvern 3144	Higgins	Kooyong Melbourne Ports
14	Melbourne	Urban Workshop Conference Centre Rear 50 Lonsdale St Melbourne 3000	Melbourne	Melbourne Ports
15		Centrepoint Arcade Level 1, 271 Bourke St Melbourne 3000	Melbourne	Melbourne Ports
16		140 Queen St Melbourne 3000	Melbourne	Melbourne Ports
17	Melton	Melton Uniting Church 17 Yuille St Melton 3337	Gorton	Ballarat

18	Mill Park	2/16 The Link Mill Park 3082	Scullin	McEwen
19	Moonee Ponds	37 Hall St Moonee Ponds 3039	Maribyrnong	Melbourne Wills
20	Northcote	Northcote North Baptist Church Hall 542 High St Northcote 3070	Batman	Melbourne Wills
21	Oakleigh	Masonic Hall 150 Drummond St Oakleigh 3166	Chisholm	Goldstein Higgins Hotham
22	Ringwood	Ringwood (Maroondah) Masonic Centre 24 Warrandyte Rd Ringwood 3134	Deakin	Menzies Casey
23	St Albans	Shop 10 19 East Esplanade St Albans 3021	Maribyrnong	Calwell Gorton
24	Werribee	Werribee Masonic Centre 223 Watton St Werribee 3030	Lalor	Gellibrand

3. Maribyrnong Senate votes mixed with Melbourne Senate votes

3.1. On pages five and six of the transcript, Mr Griffin requested a report on how the Maribyrnong issue was resolved. Additionally, Senator O'Sullivan requested if the published results would be qualified and Senator Tillem requested information on whether the issue was identified in any manual.

Mr GRIFFIN: You put a figure of votes back into the Maribymong Senate count that equated to the number of ballot papers that you identified had gone from the Maribymong count, but you then did an arbitrary estimation around the question of how those people voted?

Mr Pope: Yes.

[...]

Mr GRIFFIN: How did you work that out?

[...]

Mr Pope: I can come back to you on those.

[...]

Senator O'SULLIVAN: As an extension, I would be interested to know—on notice—if you qualified the published figures, an asterisk down the bottom.

Mr Pope: Yes, I will have to have a look at that.

Senator TILLEM: Also... could you in your response identify whether this issue is covered in any of the operating procedures or manuals that you guys have?

Mr Pope: I will certainly have a look and come back to you.

AEC Response

- 3.2. The AEC would like to clarify that the ballot papers mixed in with the Division of Melbourne's Moonee Ponds pre-poll voting centre count were from not just from the Division of Maribyrnong (1000 ballots) but also from the Division of Wills (437 ballots).
- 3.3. Votes cast were proportionally allocated to the Divisions of Wills and Maribyrnong. To determine how the ballot papers would be divided, proportions were derived from how Moonee Ponds pre-poll voters voted for the three major parties in the House of Representatives. This was then applied to the Senate ballots involved.
- 3.4. The AEC has not qualified the published figures on the AEC's website but is reviewing the policy in relation to this.
- 3.5. The Election Procedures Manual does not contain troubleshooting information for situations where ballot papers are taken to the wrong divisional scrutiny centre. Part 13, subpart 2, item 7 provides information on discrepancies DROs have historically faced but it does not provide specific guidance on errors such as this. The AEC is developing new protocols and procedures which address the logistical complexities involved with the use of multi-divisional scrutiny centres.

4. Mislabelling of Lilydale PPVC Senate vote parcel

4.1. On page seven of the transcript, the Chair requested information regarding the mislabelling of a senate vote parcel from Lilydale PPVC.

Mr Pope: There were approximately 770 Senate ballot papers there that were not included. So, again, our checks and balances identified that the numbers were out much more than they should have been. All the paperwork and all the boxes were checked. Effectively, the bundle of ballot papers with the Lilydale pre-poll voting centre sorting sheet was located in a box labelled 'Doncaster East pre-poll voting centre'. Effectively what we have got here are votes taken from the Lilydale pre-poll voting centre being mislabelled as Doncaster East, and it took us a couple of days to identify that they had been missing.

CHAIR: Where would they have been mislabelled—in Lilydale? I can picture this very well, as you can imagine, standing outside that pre-poll centre. It is a very busy pre-poll centre, with people coming and voting. Were these Senate votes mislabelled there? I presume they must have been mislabelled.

Mr Pope: I am thinking it most likely happened at fresh scrutiny.

CHAIR: Would you be able to tell us? That was a pre-poll that was only taking Casey votes, as distinct from the one at Ringwood, which was taking Deakin and Casey. If you were voting in Lilydale, unless you were making a declaration vote—would you be able to come back to us on that?

Mr Pope: I will find out.

4.2. The incorrect packaging and mislabelling of 770 Senate ballot papers from the Lilydale pre-poll voting centre occurred during the first count of these votes at the scrutiny centre located at the Ringwood Masonic Hall on election night. There were several pre-poll voting centre counts undertaken at the location on the night.

5. Complaints to the Victorian State Office

5.1. At page ten of the transcript, Senator Kroger requested a list, by division, of the official complaints made to the Victorian State Office.

Senator KROGER: Okay. We do not need them now, but could we have a list of the complaints that you have received so that we get a sense of the nature of those complaints.

[...]

Yes, the nature of the complaints and the regions are actually a good idea too.

Mr Pope: Yes, I am happy to do that.

AEC Response

5.2. Table 4 lists the complaints received in Victoria during the 2013 federal election period.

Table A.4 – Complaints received in Victoria during the 2013 federal election

No.	Description	Division
1	Political advertising – possible breach of the Act	Deakin
2	Online Postal vote Application – the online form does not accommodate longer addresses	Melbourne
3	Enrolment applications for the blind – paper forms and online options not suitable	Melbourne Ports
4	Size of voting booths need to be larger to accommodate the Senate ballot paper	Division unknown (phone call)
	Changes to candidate requirements for Senate nominations – unfair and loaded against independent candidates	
5	Content of a television advertisement	Division unknown (phone call)
6	Elector was concerned someone was misusing her information after she received two text messages on her mobile phone about a postal vote application she had not applied for	Division unknown (email)
7	Senate group voting ticket for the Liberal Democrats in Victoria	Relates to the state not a division
8	Lack of privacy on the postal vote certificate envelope	Flinders
	Postal vote applied for by fellow householder not received	
9	Lodgement of group voting ticket for Senate in Victoria for the	Relates to the State not a

	Democrat Labour Party	division
10	Security and monitoring of ballot box at an early voting centre	Aston
11	Complaint about the method used to seal the ballot box in a polling place at Willaura Primary School	Wannon
12	Complexity of completing the postal vote certificate	Chisholm
	Objected to barbeques and sausage sizzles at polling places	
13	Queue and a long wait to vote at Laverton College in Bladin St	Lalor
14	Voter disapproved of the behaviour and work practices of a polling place staff member at the Toorak Uniting Church	Higgins
15	Voter complained about the behaviour of a polling official at Heathcote polling place	Bendigo
16	Voter complained about "How to Vote" information for the Senate given to voters by polling place staff at Mullauna College, Mitcham	Deakin
17	Complained about treatment by the Officer in Charge at the polling place at Preston East School	Batman
18	Complaint about the behaviour of Officer in Charge at the polling place located at 6 Dalny Rd Murrumbeena	Hotham
19	Wrong House of Representatives ballot papers handed to some voters at Carranballac College	Lalor
20	Ashwood College polling place considered unsafe and a fire risk due to renovations in progress	Chisholm
21	An absent voter received the wrong House of Representatives ballot paper at the polling place at the Montmorency Primary School	Jagajaga
	The voter considered the polling place staff intimidating	
22	There was not full wheelchair access at the Jackson Specialist School in St Albans	Maribyrnong
23	The pre-poll voting centre in Hall St, Moonee Ponds lacked access for wheelchairs and prams	Maribyrnong
24	Flemington polling place at the Mt Alexander College opened late and there was a long queue	Melbourne
25	A political advertisement appeared on a page for community news/events in the Brimbank Leader newspaper	Gellibrand
26	A polling place staff member complained about the behaviour of the Officer in Charge of procedures in the polling place at the Cranbourne Park Primary School after 6.00pm	Holt
27	Alleged early close of the polling place at Lowanna College Newborough	McMillan
28	Voter complained that his address was visible on the roll when he had sent a silent elector application to the AEC	Higgins
29	Voter was concerned that her partner [who was incarcerated at	Murray

	Dhurringile Prison] was told he did not need to vote	
30	Complaint about conditions at the Corio pre-poll voting centre and the long queue	Corio
31	Scrutineer reported irregularities in procedures and in count at Williamstown North polling place	Gellibrand
32	Voter was concerned there was insufficient information or explanation of below the line voting for the Senate and said polling place staff were encouraging voters to vote above the line	McEwen
33	Voter complaint about the date of birth and full name being displayed on the certified list	Ballarat
34	Polling place staff complained about the behaviour and attitude of the Officer in Charge of Wendouree North Polling place	Ballarat
35	Complaint about the party literature accompanying the postal vote application form	Gorton
36	Concern and confusion about postal vote applications from political parties	Casey
37	Concern about the lack of privacy associated with name, address, date of birth and signature being on the outside of the postal vote certificate envelope	Indi
38	Objection to receiving a postal vote application from political parties	Indi
39	Voter concerned about the two candidate preferred count conducted in the polling place on election night	Bendigo
40	Voter complaint about the preferential voting method used in our election	Flinders
41	Voter could not obtain group voting ticket information	Batman
	Complaint about the change of date of the election	
42	Concern about several issues pertaining to the polling process and management of polling places in the Division of Gellibrand	Gellibrand
	Concern also about counting procedures at the North Williamstown counting centre	
43	Voter complained about the lack of assistance/information he received about voting options	Division unknown (phone call)
	Complaint indicating the AEC is ill equipped to assist disabled voters	,
44	Voter claimed he was not offered a Senate ballot paper at the polling place located at the Strathdale Public Hall	Bendigo
	Voter alleged he was unable to make a complaint as there was no- one at the table of the Officer in Charge and no-one on the declaration table	
45	Caller complained about the attitude of a call centre operator	Division unknown (phone call)

46	Letter from a Member of the House of Representatives on behalf of some constituents who had complained about the pre-poll voting centre located at the Melbourne airport	Gippsland
47	A voter complained after received a letter from the Division of Indi advising him his postal vote did not count because his signature did not match AEC enrolment records	Indi
48	Accusation of the AEC employing a person who is/was politically active	Maribyrnong
49	Accusation of vote tampering on 7 September 2013	Kooyong

Responses to questions on notice from JSCEM Public Hearing held in Brisbane on 8 May 2014

1. Number of ballot papers not initialled in the Division of Fairfax and nationally

1.1. On page six of the transcript of 8 May 2014, Mr Griffin requested information regarding the number of ballot paper that were not initialled in the Division of Fairfax. Additionally, on page six of the transcript, Senator MacDonald requested statistics outlining the number of ballot papers cast nationwide that were not initialled.

Mr GRIFFIN: [...] what I am concerned about is the issue of authentication, that if you copy a ballot paper, at the end of the day you should still be in a situation where the responsible polling clerk initials the ballot as verification of a process which is part of an election. What was said to me, and I have no idea whether it is true, which is why I am asking, is that there were some hundreds, allegedly, of ballot papers which were not initialled. As I said, I can understand how that could happened—one here, one there—in the tumult of conducting a ballot on a day, but I am interested to know how many, whether there has been an attempt to ascertain how many and what explanation there might be if in fact there is a significant number.

Ms Bright: We would have to take that question on notice, Deputy Chair. [...]

Senator IAN MACDONALD: Mr Kitson, if it is a relatively easy task, perhaps you could give us a comment about the same issue Australia wide. Do you have statistics such that you can press a button and say that in each electorate there were, say, 55 that did not have signatures?

Mr Kitson: I doubt that there is a button that we could press. I am sure we could conduct some form of research that might establish that question, but it may well be a very intensive exercise. So perhaps I could take that on notice.

- 1.2. As the AEC noted in its primary submission and subsequent public hearings, the level of scrutiny associated with the initial count and re-count in the Division of Fairfax was unprecedented. The vast majority of disputed ballot papers were scrutinised for authenticity on multiple occasions; resulting in over 102 000 determinations being made personally by the Divisional Returning Officer (DRO) for Fairfax and the Australian Electoral Officer (AEO) Queensland (noting there were almost 90 000 ballots cast).
- 1.3. Determinations on ballot papers that were challenged by scrutineers during the initial distribution of preferences were made by the DRO for Fairfax. The scrutineers' challenges appeared to be largely independent of whether the ballot papers were initialled. Officers from the AEC's Legal and Compliance Branch at the counting centre in Maroochydore, including the Chief Legal Officer, observed that almost all of the ballot papers that were challenged had been initialled.
- 1.4. During the recount the DRO for Fairfax made determinations on 50 099 (56.2 per cent) ballot papers. Where the ruling was accepted by all

- scrutineers, the ballot papers were returned to the count. Ballot papers still in dispute were parcelled and forwarded to the AEO Queensland for determination.
- 1.5. The AEO Queensland made determinations on 43 942 (49.3 per cent) ballot papers. Regular updates of the number of ballot papers for each polling place being challenged, and ruled on were published to the AEC's website.
- 1.6. The determination of the total number of un-initialled ballot papers included in the scrutiny for the election in the Division of Fairfax, or for the whole country, is not available through the current systems and would require a prohibitive manual process, involving a physical re-examination of all ballot papers cast, to determine.

2. Number of ballot papers photocopied in the Doomadgee community

2.1. On page 13 of the transcript, Senator MacDonald requested the number of photocopied ballot papers used in the Doomadgee community.

Senator IAN MACDONALD: I would like you on notice to tell me how many photocopies there have been in Doomadgee over the last three or four elections.

Mr Fraser: I will endeavour to find that out.

Senator IAN MACDONALD: My impression is that they are there. Could I get you to double-check the information you have just given me, because I was there when we looked on the day after the election. We were actually shown a booklet of what I took to be—now, you may have an explanation—and what was told to me at the time were regular votes in Doomadgee which had not been used. Hence my very great interest in why there were photocopies when there were ballot papers still available.

Mr Fraser: Certainly.

Senator IAN MACDONALD: This was done two days after the election. I ask that you double-check that.

Mr Fraser: Absolutely.

- 2.2. For the 2004, 2007 and 2010 federal elections there were no ballot papers photocopied for the Doomadgee polling place. For the 2013 election there were 30 ballot papers photocopied at the Doomadgee polling place.
- 2.3. For the 2013 federal election the Doomadgee polling place was issued with 400 ordinary Division of Kennedy ballot papers, 25 open ordinary House of Representative ballot papers (open ballot papers are House of Representative ballot papers where there are no candidates listed on the ballot paper and is to be filled in by a polling official) and one Queensland declaration ballot paper pack (which contained 10 Division of Kennedy ballot papers).
- 2.4. The Doomadgee polling place issued a total of 417 Division of Kennedy votes. When the polling officials had nearly exhausted the 400 ordinary

Division of Kennedy ballot papers with which they were issued, they photocopied an additional 30 ballot papers to avoid the risk of transcription errors which can occur when manually completing blank ballot papers.

3. Number of days Indigenous Electoral Participation Program (IEPP) staff spent in the Division of Kennedy and in the city of Mt Isa

3.1. On page 15 of the transcript, Senator Faulkner requested the number of days IEPP staff had spent in Kennedy and Mt Isa since 1 January 2013.

Senator FAULKNER: I do not want to cut across Senator Macdonald or Mr Griffin's question. Could you to take on notice the number of staff days of the three staff in the IEPP in relation to two things: the number of staff days in the 18 months—take it from 1 January 2013—spent in Kennedy and the number of staff days spent in Mt Isa. I do not you to waste time on that but, to try and cut to the chase, I think it would be useful, given the other evidence we have, for us to understand that.

AEC Response

3.2. From 1 January until 20 May 2014, IEPP staff spent a total of 57 days in the Division of Kennedy. The corresponding total of days spent in Mount Isa during the same period was 39. The IEPP staff spent 18 days in the communities of Yarrabah, Innisfail, Gordonvale, Mareeba and Tablelands, Doomadgee, Mornington Island and Burketown.

4. Number of Queenslanders fined for failing to vote at the 2010 federal election

4.1. On page 15 of the transcript, Mr Griffin requested information on the number of individuals penalised in Queensland for failing to vote at the 2010 federal election by Division. Senator Faulkner followed with a request for a distinction to be made between the number of individuals contacted for failing to vote and those actually penalised.

Mr GRIFFIN: I am interested in getting any statistics that you might have—this might well be on notice—around the issue of the number of people fined in Queensland at the 2010 election. I know you will not have processed the 2013 situation yet. If you can answer any of this now it would be great. I would like figures for the number of people fined through Queensland with respect to the 2010 election—

Senator FAULKNER: By electorate.

Mr GRIFFIN: If it is possible to have it by electorate that would be very useful.

Ms Bright: We will take that on notice.

Senator FAULKNER: There are two elements to this aren't there? There are the actual fines and contact about fines. The subset would help. Contact regarding fines and then the actual fines, they are obviously very different statistics.

4.2. The number of 'Apparent Failure to Vote' first notices issued and number of penalties issued by division in Queensland for the 2010 federal election are contained in Table B.1 below.

Table B.1 – Apparent Failure to Vote Notices & penalties issued in Queensland for the 2010 federal election

Division	Number of Apparent Failure to Vote first notices issued	Number of penalties either paid up front or issued by a DRO*
Blair	3 385	382
Bonner	3 904	387
Bowman	3 668	407
Brisbane	4 646	529
Capricornia	3 902	638
Dawson	4 433	686
Dickson	2 697	371
Fadden	4 423	500
Fairfax	4 301	575
Fisher	3 649	520
Flynn	3 703	500
Forde	4 570	506
Griffith	5 237	517
Groom	3 338	373
Herbert	4 888	807
Hinkler	3 639	415
Kennedy	3 493	513
Leichhardt	6 353	836
Lilley	3 365	426
Longman	4 189	518
McPherson	4 696	602
Maranoa	3 767	496
Moncrieff	5 032	651
Moreton	3 861	455
Oxley	4 006	515
Petrie	3 924	435
Rankin	6 074	735
Ryan	3 438	410
Wide Bay	4 355	523
Wright	3 456	489

Totals 124 392 15 717

^{*}In Queensland 15,686 paid the administrative penalty of \$20. Another 31 non-voters were issued a penalty but failed to pay.

Responses to questions on notice from JSCEM Public Hearing held in Adelaide on 11 June 2014

1. Impact of Electronic Certified Lists (ECLs) on multiple voting in South Australia

1.1. On page three of the transcript of 11 June 2014, the Chair requested information relating to the impact ECLs had on multiple voting in South Australia.

CHAIR: Did you have any issues with those? Or more to the point, have you got any data on the reduced error rate of multiple voting, be it by error, or other cause? I am asking this because the evidence the AEC has given us out of Griffith was that it was far easier to identify a problem, for obvious reasons, on the spot.

Ms Witham: I do not have at hand the information about the impact on multiple voting; I would have to take that on notice.

AEC Response

1.2. The national ECL pilot project during the 2013 federal election involved limited use across six divisions in South Australia. Given the limited scale of the ECL pilot in SA, and the nature of the sites where they were used, there are no definitive conclusions regarding whether the ECLs might have had an impact on the number of multiple marks in SA.

Division	Polling place
Adelaide	Adelaide (Adelaide) - SUPERBOOTH
Adelaide	Adelaide ADELAIDE PPVC
Barker	Special Hospital Team 9
Grey	Remote Mobile Team 1
Grey	Remote Mobile Team 2
Grey	Remote Mobile Team 3
Hindmarsh	Adelaide Airport PPVC
Port Adelaide	Parafield Gardens Central
Wakefield	Special Hospital Team 1

2. Senate votes issued as declaration votes but counted as ordinary votes

- 2.1. On page four of the transcript Mr Griffin requested the following information regarding the 331 Senate ballots issued as declaration votes but counted as ordinary votes in South Australian divisions:
 - a) What were the affected polling booths?
 - b) What were the circumstances that led to the error at each polling booth?

c) What action was taken relating to the official(s) responsible?

Mr GRIFFIN: So the dec vote envelope only ended up having the House of Representatives ballot paper in it, and the Senate ballot paper was lodged like it was a normal, ordinary vote. What happened to the official responsible?

 $[\dots]$

Was this all at one booth?

[...]

Mr Kitson: We will endeavour to break those details down and provide them to the committee.

Mr GRIFFIN: The point I would make is that if this was happening across more than one polling booth then that raises other issues in general terms around the question of the level of training et cetera. If it was at one polling booth, then all the individuals involved, including the officer in charge, need to be dealt with.

AEC Response

Affected polling booths

- 2.2. The affected polling places, where Senate ballots issued as declaration votes but counted as Ordinary votes were:
 - Gawler East in the Division of Wakefield (involving 92 Senate ballot papers); and
 - Walkerville in the Division of Adelaide (involving 224 Senate ballot papers).
- 2.3. At the JSCEM hearing in Adelaide the AEC had claimed this incident also included 15 Senate ballot papers in the Birdwood polling place in the Division of Mayo. This alleged incident was misreported; the incident did not occur and therefore the total number of Senate ballot papers issued as declaration votes but counted as ordinary votes in SA was 316, and not 331.

Gawler East Polling Place - circumstances leading to the error

- 2.4. AEC records show that the Officer in Charge (OIC) and the two Declaration Vote Issuing Officers (DVIO) attended the relevant face-to-face training and each completed their online training.
- 2.5. During the setup of the polling place two ballot boxes were put on tables for the DVIO to put the declaration envelopes with completed ballot papers into once the elector had cast their declaration vote.
- 2.6. The OIC advises that during set up, the headers were put on the ballot boxes and there was one for the House of Representatives and one for the Senate.
- 2.7. According to the OIC's return a staff briefing was held before the polling place opened at 8am and included a reminder to the DVIOs to "advise"

- electors to return completed ballot papers for insertion in the declaration vote envelope".
- 2.8. The OIC's checklist for polling day confirms that the OIC completed three checks of the DVIO's operations at 8am, 10am and 1pm on polling day.
- 2.9. Despite this, the two DVIOs placed the House of Representatives ballot papers in the declaration envelopes and placed the envelopes in the ballot box on the declaration vote table, which had a House of Representatives header, and placed the Senate ballot papers in the other ballot box with the Senate header. This incorrect practice happened throughout the entire day.
- 2.10. The OIC has advised that at the conclusion of polling the DVIO "balanced and gave me the figures and then went to count ballot papers. The Senate ballot papers were added into the total count."
- 2.11. Later on polling night, after completing the count of the House of Representatives and Senate ballot papers, it became apparent to the OIC that the ordinary House of Representatives and ordinary Senate ballot paper total figures did not balance.
- 2.12. The OIC conducted a further count that delivered the same result. It was then that the OIC discovered that the declaration Senate ballot papers were included in the ordinary Senate count.
- 2.13. The OIC completed a report, placed it with the declaration envelopes, and made a short note in the OIC return.

Walkerville Polling Place - circumstances leading to the error

- 2.14. AEC records show that the OIC attended the relevant face-to-face training and completed the 'Issuing Declaration Votes' online training module. The DVIOs only partially completed all aspects of the required training modules.
- 2.15. It appears that during the setup of the polling place two ballot boxes were put on tables for the DVIOs to put the declaration envelopes with completed ballot papers into once the elector had cast their declaration ballot papers.
- 2.16. According to the OIC's return, a staff briefing was held before the polling place opened at 8am and included a reminder to the DVIOs to "advise electors to return completed ballot papers for insertion in the declaration vote envelope".
- 2.17. The OIC's checklist for polling day confirms that the OIC completed three checks of the declaration issuing officers operations at 8am, 10am and 1pm on polling day.
- 2.18. Despite this, the two DVIOs put the House of Representatives of Representatives ballot papers in the declaration vote envelopes and placed the envelopes in the ballot box on the declaration vote table. The loose Senate ballot papers were placed in another ballot box. This incorrect practice happened throughout the entire day.
- 2.19. The OIC was unaware that this incorrect process was being applied. This officer was a first time OIC and clearly did not fully comprehend the requirement for reconciling and balancing between House of

Representative votes and Senate votes issued at the polling place. Had this happened the error would have been picked up at the conclusion of the count on polling day.

2.20. The DRO first became aware on the Sunday or Monday after election day when staff were preparing for the declaration vote exchange. The apparent lack of thickness of completed declaration envelopes from this polling place provided a strong indication that Senate ballot papers were not sealed in the envelope. This was discovered within the first two days post polling day during the declaration vote exchange process.

Action taken relating to the official(s) responsible

- 2.21. Whilst the AEC cannot make public comment on identifiable individual's performance of their duties, it is AEC practice to consider past performance when considering subsequent employment.
- 2.22. No direct and immediate action could be taken in relation to the officers responsible as they only worked for the AEC on polling day and the error was not discovered by the relevant DRO until post polling day.

3. Referrals of apparent multiple voting in South Australia to the Australian Federal Police (AFP)

3.1. On page six of the transcript, Mr Griffin sought a comparison of apparent instances of multiple voting in South Australia that were referred to the AFP for the 2010 and 2013 federal elections.

Ms Witham: Thank you. In the 2013 federal election, 2,028 electors appear to have voted more than once. There were 1,800 for 2010; so it was a slight increase on that. Only three of these electors appear to have voted more than twice, and all three appear to have voted three times. After investigation, a total of 403 electors were referred to the AFP from South Australia.

CHAIR: That correlates with the evidence the commissioner gave in Senate estimates.

Mr GRIFFIN: How does that compare to referrals to the AFP after the 2010 election?

Ms Witham: I will take that on notice.

- 3.2. Following the 2013 federal election, details of 403 electors from South Australia were provided to the AEC National Office for consideration for referral to the AFP, compared to one such referral following the 2010 federal election.
- 3.3. This increase is a result of the AEC's revised approach to address instances of multiple voting as articulated by the Acting Electoral Commissioner most recently at Senate Estimates on 29 May 2014. The AEC has implemented a new way of working with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) whereby the AEC has provided the AFP with all cases from the 2013 federal election where an elector admitted multiple voting and all

cases where the elector has not responded, or provided adequate evidence, to confirm official error as the cause of the marks.

4. Enrolled electors under the age of 18 receiving political material

4.1. On page 12 of the transcript, Senator Xenophon seeks clarification as to whether enrolled electors under the age of 18 could be separated out from roll information provided to candidates or political parties so as to ensure minors do not receive political material.

Senator XENOPHON: That is a complaint I have had from constituents; they say they do not like their kids getting this material. So I just want to ask: could they be excluded from the roll, or could there be a separate roll in respect of that, logistically?

Ms Witham: I guess it is over to the recipients of the data. We provide the roll data that includes date of birth. As to how members of parliament are using that data—I assume that, yes, they could—

Senator XENOPHON: So presumably the data could be disaggregated so that the material only went to adults?

Mr Kitson: May I add some comment there? I think it would be possible to disaggregate it. It would require quite a separate roll product delivery to the members of parliament to whom we provide that service. I am sure it is technically feasible, but I would hesitate to commit to saying that it would be something we could—

Senator XENOPHON: Could you take that on notice, because that way I can respond to my constituents.

- 4.2. The AEC provides information contained on the Commonwealth electoral Rolls and certified lists of voters in accordance with section 90B of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (the 'Electoral Act').
- 4.3. The information contained on the Commonwealth electoral Rolls must be provided on an ongoing basis by the AEC to registered political parties, Senators and Members. This information is provided electronically in the Elector Information Access System (ELIAS). The ELIAS is a set of discs containing the relevant Roll data and an interface to allow access to this data. This data includes all electors on the relevant Roll, including individuals who are 16 and 17 years old. Date of birth is included and the data can be sorted, as well as exported (e.g. in to political party information systems).
- 4.4. Political parties can manipulate this data to generate their own products that may be fit for their purposes. The AEC has no control over what political parties send to voters. It is possible that mail was sent to 16 and 17 year olds who enrolled because a political party did not filter the data to exclude this group.
- 4.5. Also in accordance with circumstances specified in section 90B a Senator, Member or candidate for a House of Representatives election receives copies of certified lists of voters. The certified list of voters can be provided on paper or in electronic format. It includes only individuals who will be

18 years of age or older on polling day. Data for 17 year olds is only provided on the certified list where the elector will turn 18 years of age between the close of rolls and polling day.

5. Political party scrutineer presence with remote and mobile polling (RAMP) teams and polling places in the Northern Territory

5.1. On page 13 of the transcript, Senator Ian MacDonald sought information relating to which, if not all, which NT RAMP teams and polling places had political party scrutineers? Of those that had political party scrutineers, how many were there, and who were they representing?

Senator IAN MACDONALD: Do you have data on whether there were political party scrutineers on all or any teams? Can you tell me which teams and which booths had political party scrutineers?

Mr Pugsley: I can take that on notice and, obviously, if we are able to provide that level of detail, I will.

[...]

Senator IAN MACDONALD: ... you would have the data on whether there were one, two, three, four or five scrutineers and which parties they represented? [...]

Senator IAN MACDONALD: ... somewhere along the line you recorded which scrutineers were at which booths. Someone would have the detail of that somewhere?

Mr Pugsley: I will take that on notice. That should be the case.

AEC Response

5.2. Table C.2 contains the detail of the political party scrutineers recorded as present with the NT RAMP teams and polling places.

Table C.2 - Political party scrutineers present with the NT RAMP teams and polling places.

Team No#	Team Name/ region	No. of individual's scrutineer forms	Australian Labor Party (NT)	Country Liberals	Australia's First Nations Political
		TOTHIS			Party
1	Alice Springs North West	7	3	2	2
2	Alice Springs East	7	5	2	
3	Utopia 1	1	1		
4	Alice Springs South West	5	1	4	
7	Ramingining and communities	8	5	3	
11	Mataranka and communities	5	3	2	
12	Kakadu communities	3	2	1	
13	Nhulunbuy outstations	7	5	2	

14	Devil Marbles	3	3		
15	Ali Curung	4	4		
17	Timber Creek	3	2	1	
18	Cox Peninsula	2	2		
19	Katherine surrounds	9	3	6	
22	Gapuwiyak	8	4	4	
20	Borroloola surrounds	4	2	2	
21	Lajamanu and communities	1	1		
23	Barkly	4	3	1	
24	Papunya and communities	5	5		
25	Hermannsburg	2	1	1	
26	Ltyentye Apurte	5	2	1	2
27	Yuendumu	4	3	1	
32	Borroloola	2		2	
33	Groote Eylandt	4	2	2	
WA	Kintore	3	1	2	
WA	Docker	3	1	2	

6. Impact of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 amendments on to Indigenous participation and prisoner participation in the Northern Territory

6.1. On page 15 of the transcript, Mr Gray sought leave to provide AEC with written questions on notice.

Mr GRAY: Chair, with your indulgence, I would like to provide in a note to Robert a few questions about the impact of the closure of the rolls, prisoner voting and automatic enrolment. I do not think I need to take up the time of the committee to do that.

CHAIR: Absolutely.

6.2. The following is a summary of the provided note:

Impact of the Electoral Act changes 2010-2013 on enrolment and voting in the Northern Territory:

- Roll closure changes on indigenous enrolment.
- <u>Prisoner voting</u> (and enrolment changes): What was the net impact in 2013 on both vote numbers and enrolment in prisons?
- Automatic enrolment /indigenous voter education.

Formality of ballots in indigenous communities.

AEC Response

Roll closure changes on indigenous enrolment

- 6.3. The Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Enrolment and Prisoner Voting) Act 2011, which received assent on 25 May 2011, amended the Electoral Act and Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (the 'Referendum Act') to provide that the electoral roll closes seven days after the date of the writ for a federal election. This gave effect to the decision of the High Court in Rowe v Electoral Commissioner [2010] HCA 46. The High Court's decision on 6 August 2010 reinstated the previous legislative scheme where the date fixed for the close of the Rolls was the seventh day after the date of the writ for an election. This decision was handed down after the close of rolls for the 2010 election.
- 6.4. The AEC does not distinguish between enrolled electors who are indigenous or non-indigenous Australians and is therefore unable to comment on whether the change to the roll close provisions of the Electoral Act impacted indigenous electors.

Prisoner voting (and enrolment changes)

- 6.5. The Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Enrolment and Prisoner Voting) Act 2011, which received assent on 25 May 2011, amended the Electoral Act and the Referendum Act to prevent certain prisoners from voting at federal elections and provide that certain prisoners may remain on, or be added to, the electoral roll. This amendment gave effect to the High Court's decision on 30 August 2007 in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.
- 6.6. Because of systems design in place in the past, the AEC is not able to comment on the net impact of this legislative change on the number of enrolments for individuals resident in prisons.
- 6.7. For the 2013 federal election, information received from the NT Department of Justice was used to identify prisoners who were not entitled to vote, who were subsequently excluded from any certified list of voters. As a consequence, 93 electors in the NT were excluded from voting for the 2013 federal election.
- 6.8. At the 2010 and 2013 federal elections, voting services were provided at the Darwin and Alice Springs prison. The number of votes issued is as follows:

Table C.3 – Number of votes issued in NT prisons at the 2013 federal election

Location	Type of vote	No. votes issued in 2010	No. votes issued in 2013
Alice Springs Prison	Ordinary votes	204	103
	Declaration votes	2	9
	Total votes	206	112
Darwin Prison	Ordinary votes	10	6

Declaration votes	42	63
Total votes	52	69

- 6.9. The lower number of votes collected in 2013 at the Alice Springs Prison may be accounted for as follows:
 - Full day allocated to polling at Alice Springs Prison;
 - Polling team experienced delay in clearing security on entry, polling due to begin at 9.00am but did not begin until 10.00am;
 - Shortly after the commencement of polling there was an incident (not related to polling) that saw the prison locked down for nearly two hours.
 Polling staff were asked to wait in the prison kitchen until 12.00noon after which polling resumed;
 - Polling continued until 5.30pm (one hour later than scheduled finish);
 and
 - Plan was to poll in at least two locations in the prison including the remand section but the remand section could not be visited due to time constraints.

Direct enrolment & Indigenous voter education

- 6.10. As the direct enrolment and update process is dependent on the delivery of a letter of intent, the AEC excludes addresses from this process where the delivery of mail is known to be problematic. As a consequence, individuals who live in remote areas of Australia, including members of some indigenous communities, are not included in the direct enrolment and update process.
- 6.11. As noted at C6.4, the AEC does not distinguish between enrolled electors who are indigenous or non-indigenous Australians and is therefore unable to provide information on the impact of direct enrolment and update on indigenous electors.
- 6.12. Remote Area Mobile Polling (RAMP) has been in operation since 1984 to provide more accessible voter services to over 200 communities. This model was reviewed by the AEC's NT Office in 2011.
- 6.13. The thirty-five largest communities were a priority for consultation at the core of developing the new model. Consultation with communities and stakeholders by the NT IEPP team was undertaken over 2011-2013. Communication channels specific to each targeted community were identified and utilised. Polling schedules were designed to be flexible and the amount of time spent in these and smaller communities increased. Implementation was supported by collaborative partnerships with the Department of Human Services (DHS), the then Department for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA), the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and local shires. Voter Service teams were made up of DHS frontline service delivery staff, an AEC casual Technical Services Officer, and in many communities an Indigenous Voter Information Officer

- 6.14. Products tailored to remote indigenous audiences were developed to support key messaging of enrolment, voting and formality. These included 'Let's Talk Voting Business' and 'Making Your Vote Count' brochures and posters, which were suitable for a low literacy audience and designed to meet the style preferences of remote Indigenous electors.
- 6.15. To address high informality rates materials in language were developed, including a DVD for twelve key language groups across the NT. An easy English version was utilised for other communities. Remote Voter teams were supplied with a television and tablet to screen the information to electors before/during their entry to the polling booth.
- 6.16. In addition, the Voter Information Officer program, trialled nationally, was rolled out across remote NT. These were paid, casual positions, recruited from the community, provided assistance to AEC polling teams to find electors on the roll, formality assistance to electors, often in language, reminding voters when polling was occurring in their community and, when requested, assistance at the voting screen.
- 6.17. Polling schedules were redesigned and flexibility was built in to enable the AEC to be responsive to changes in community circumstances. Community and stakeholder recommendations about the best day and time for polling were taken into account in targeted communities. The length of time spent in communities was increased proportionate to the number of electors. This enabled electors more time to balance work, family and cultural commitments with the need to vote.
- 6.18. Delivery of the entire model, specifically work health and safety concerns and ensuring the provision of a culturally appropriate service, was supported by the AEC's collaborative partnerships with other federal government agencies
- 6.19. A formal collaborative partnership with DHS was developed. Beginning with enrolment drives and roll management activities it culminated in partnering with DHS to deliver voting services for the election. The agreement provided staff for the RAMP Teams, logistics management support and equipment, including the use of four wheel drive vehicles with safety equipment including: satellite navigation, satellite tracking devices, satellite phones and emergency beacons. Each RAMP Team consisted of two DHS frontline remote service delivery staff members, one of whom was Indigenous, supported by an AEC Technical Services Officer. The partnership aimed to minimise the remote health and safety risks and ensure the delivery of culturally appropriate services to Indigenous electors.
- 6.20. The partnership with FaHCSIA was informal in nature and involved an agreement to assist with marketing AEC messages, ensuring AEC electoral posters were up in communities and connecting with key community stakeholders so information could be fed back to AEC NT office.
- 6.21. A formal partnership with several shires across the NT was also developed to assist in filling some Voter Information Officer roles. The arrangements provided Voter Information Officers who had experience in

- explaining complex government policy in language to community members. It enhanced service delivery reliability and reduced the risk of political bias in engagement with Voter Information Officers.
- 6.22. Mainstream Media including ABC Radio, CAAMA and TEEBA facilitated voting service messages including daily schedules about when RAMP teams were visiting communities across the two week voter services period.
- 6.23. Coordination of all these activities was undertaken by the NT Office IEPP team including the following field visits between October 2012 and the 2013 federal election:

Table C.4 – AEC NT Office IEPP field trips October 2012 to September 2013

Number of Communities Visited	Total Days		Number of Staff		Total Staff days	
43		41		31		77

- 6.24. Further information about direct enrolment and update is available for all electors from the AEC's website at the following locations:
 - http://www.aec.gov.au/FAQs/Enrolment.htm; and
 - http://www.aec.gov.au/About AEC/Publications/Fact Sheets/direct.htm.

Formality of ballots in indigenous communities

6.25. The following table summarises the informality rates for the NT RAMP Teams at the 2013 federal election.

Table C.5 – Informality rates for the NT RAMP Teams at the 2013 federal election

VTR	2013 Votes taken by Remote team					
Team	Description	Formal Votes	Informal Votes	Total Votes	Informality %	VIOs (some communities only, where required or available)
1	Laramba and multiple sites	277	42	319	13.2	1
2	Atitjere and multiple sites	154	24	178	13.5	1
3	Ankerrapw and multiple sites	106	7	113	6.2	
4	Mutitjulu and multiple sites	443	45	488	9.2	3
5	Islands - Goulburn, Croker, Tiwi	659	66	725	9.1	6
6	Peppimenarti and multiple sites	461	107	568	18.8	3
7	Ramingining, Milingimbi and multiple sites	709	108	817	13.2	3

8	Maningrida Outstations	166	32	198	16.2	
9	Bulman and multiple sites	316	65	381	17.1	5
10	Kaltukatjara (Docker River) and Kintore	182	36	218	16.5	
11	Ngukurr and multiple sites	941	83	1024	8.1	5
12	Gunbalanya and multiple sites	446	91	537	16.0	4
13	Gunyangara and multiple sites	432	48	480	10.0	2
14	Wutunugurra and multiple sites	131	9	140	6.4	
15	Ali Curung and multiple sites	373	38	411	9.2	3
16	Ampilatwatja and multiple sites	308	16	324	4.9	3
17	Yarralin and multiple sites	253	30	283	10.0	2
18	Batchelor and multiple sites	440	31	471	6.6	
19	Beswick and multiple sites	579	43	622	6.9	
20	Adelaide River and multiple sites	302	15	317	4.7	1
21	Lajamanu and multiple sites	479	47	526	8.9	6
22	Gapuwiyak and multiple sites	380	52	432	12.0	4
23	Elliott and multiple sites	295	14	309	4.5	2
24	Papunya and multiple sites	276	22	298	7.4	2
25	Hermannsburg and multiple sites	366	33	399	8.3	2
26	Santa Teresa and multiple sites	358	67	425	15.8	5
27	Yuendumu and Alice Springs Prison	346	19	365	5.2	2
28	Wurrumiyanga	732	24	756	3.2	7
29	Wadeye	698	184	882	20.9	1
30	Galiwinku and multiple sites	670	39	709	5.5	4
31	Maningrida	638	75	713	10.5	4
32	Borroloola and multiple sites	440	31	471	6.6	1
33	Alyangula and multiple sites	613	85	698	12.2	1
34	Alpurrurulam	125	5	130	3.8	
	Total Remote/Mobile polling services	14 094	1 633	15 727	10.4	83

7. Ballot paper transport arrangements for the Division of Grey

7.1. On page 39 of the transcript, the Chair sought further information relating to the number and type of vehicles used to transport ballot papers in Port Lincoln.

CHAIR: Some of this you will have to take it on notice, but we would be very interested to know how many vehicles there were and whether they were closed vehicles...

AEC Response

7.2. One vehicle was used to transport ballot papers from Port Lincoln to Port Augusta. The vehicle used was a Mercedes Sprinter Van, which is fully enclosed.

8. Officer in Charge (OIC) turnover rate in Western Australia

8.1. On page 44 of the transcript, Senator Tillem sought information regarding the turnover rate of Officers in Charge (OICs) in Western Australia.

Senator TILLEM: Staff turnover—I will get to a certain point and you will understand line of questioning—is about 50 per cent. Of that turnover, what percentage of them are the OICs?

Ms Mitchell: I am sorry, Senator, I would have to take that on notice...

- 8.2. The following information relates to polling official turnover in Western Australia for the 2013 federal election:
 - a) 47 per cent of all polling officials employed at the 2013 federal election were employed at the 2010 federal election.
 - b) 58 per cent of OICs employed at the 2013 federal election were employed as OICs at the 2010 federal election.
 - c) 8 per cent of people employed for the 2010 federal election, but not employed at the 2013 federal election were OICs.
- 8.3. The following information relates to polling official turnover in Western Australia for the 2014 Western Australian Senate election:
 - a) 59 per cent of all polling officials at the 2014 Western Australia Senate election were employed at the 2013 federal election.
 - b) 68 per cent of OICs employed at the 2014 Western Australian Senate election were employed as OICs at the 2013 federal election.
 - c) 8 per cent of people employed for the 2013 federal election, but not employed at the 2014 Western Australian Senate election were OICs.
- 8.4. These figures are direct comparisons between the 2010, 2013 and 2014 elections for only staff that worked in Western Australia. It does not include

or make comparisons between staff that have worked in other states. Staff may have worked in multiple roles at one or more election.

9. Reasoning for determining how ballot papers are transported to a scrutiny centre

9.1. On page 11 of the transcript, Senator Tillem sought information on how transportation methods of ballot papers were determined.

Senator TILLEM: How do you decide—and I presume it is a decentralised decision on a state by state basis—what metrics do you use to determine whether you fly or drive ballot papers to the central point?

. . .

Ms Witham: I will. It does not happen in all country papers—if I could take that on notice.

AEC Response

9.2. Ot page 16 of the transcript, the following answer was provided:

CHAIR: Have we got an update for Senator Tillem?

Ms Witham: The threshold in terms of whether it is by air or by road is really around how quickly we can get the votes back to the office of the DRO ready for counting and, in particular, ready for the declaration of vote exchange, which happens on the Wednesday after polling day. So that is a judgement around that. In South Australia, across all divisions, the transportation of ballot papers is by road—with the exception of Grey, where a run is done by plane.

Senator TILLEM: Could you table that document for us?

- 9.3. There are procedures relating to the receipt of election material after an election however no documents explicitly set out the matrix or threshold used to determine whether ballot papers are transported via road or air in SA. As provided in the verbal response the key consideration, or threshold, is how quickly votes can be returned for the DRO for inclusion in the scrutiny and the declaration vote exchange.
- 9.4. This is one example of the range of ordinary decisions that are taken by an operational agency in the course of its normal business that require an assessment of risk, efficiency, cost effectiveness, and availability of resources. The responsibility and accountability for the outcome of these decisions rest with the State Managers, and they exercise their judgement cognisant of the above issues and other relevant factors.
- 10. Provision of information to candidates after 50 ballot papers were lost in Port Lincoln

10.1. On page 16 of the transcript, the Chair sought information on whether the local member or any candidates were informed of the loss of 50 ballot papers in Port Lincoln.

CHAIR: I want to go back to the 50 lost votes in Port Lincoln—and you pointed out that the AEC had mentioned this in the submission. I just want to be very clear in terms of the public discourse. At the time the votes were lost, who was informed—the local member and all the candidates in the count?

Ms Witham: I would have to take that part on notice.

10.2. At page 40 of the transcript, a verbal response was provided to the JSCEM.

Mr Kitson: ... It would appear that the candidates and none of the contestants were advised. Our internal chains of command advised jobs managers, officers in charge, the director of operations and the state manager. Certainly, that information would have been known within the AEC. But it is apparent to me at this point, that at no stage were any of the candidates, or other contestants or scrutineers alerted to the fact that this discrepancy had occurred.

- 10.3. AEC policy or procedure does not mandate that candidates are to be informed of every ballot paper discrepancy. However, it is the AEC's general practice to keep candidates informed of progress of the count and any important issues arising.
- 10.4. The AEC will re-examine its policy materials to determine how this expectation can best be reflected in policy and Returning Officer guidance materials.

Summary Evaluation Polling Official Training

1. Polling Official Training Evaluation

1.1. On page 25 of the transcript, from the public hearing on 6 February 2014 the Acting Electoral Commissioner undertook to provide the JSCEM with a copy of the training evaluation upon completion.

Mr Rogers: I do not think we have completed our evaluation of the training we provided for the last election, but we are doing that evaluation at the moment. I am also happy to provide that when we complete that evaluation.

AEC Response

- 1.2. The Executive Summary of the Evaluation Polling Official Training demonstrates the AEC's commitment to enhancing the learning and development framework for all AEC staff.
- 1.3. The Acting Electoral Commissioner reiterated to JSCEM at page 14 of the Hansard of the 12 March 2014 public hearing:

Mr Rogers: I think the second part of that is a much longer term issue about how we do our learning and development more broadly within our agency... We have just started developing a blueprint for learning and development... That will be a base level for a new learning and development system for the AEC which is more modern and also helps us address some of these cultural issues that were raised by Mr Keelty. Part of that must include in the long term a linked performance management system. We have a performance management system at the moment, but when you rebuild a learning and development structure you also need to examine the performance management process. We are going to be spending a lot of time in the long term looking at that very issue.

- 1.4. The evaluation process was the most methodical and comprehensive review of polling official training undertaken at the AEC and its qualitative and quantitative findings are directly informing the AEC's approach to training of staff into the future.
- 1.5. The Executive Summary of the Summary Evaluation Polling Official Training Report immediately follows.

Evaluation Report 2013 FE

Polling Official Training

Online Learning and Face to Face Workshops

June 2014

Executive Summary

In late 2013, the Learning and Development (L&D) Team developed a comprehensive and robust evaluation strategy which was implemented to analyse the training provided to Polling Officials across the 2013 federal election. Results will not only feed into a continuous improvement framework but will also be used for long-term trend analysis to cross compare future training events, whether operational or corporate.

The evaluation considers results across both the Home Based Training (Online Learning delivered through the AEC's Election Training System [ETS]) and the Face to Face (F2F) Workshops delivered by Divisional Returning Officers (and/or in some cases, other staff members of the Divisional Office).

Evaluation for this event consisted of comprehensive learner surveys distributed to 24957 Polling Officials of which 8170 responded. 150 'supervisor' surveys were sent to Divisional Returning Officers (DROs) of which 50 responded. The high response rates across both cohorts indicated that both learners and supervisors welcome the opportunity to provide feedback on the training they receive, and this, with continued dialogue with the network and ongoing training evaluation into the future, will ensure that improvements to the Polling Official training continuum occur in a best practice manner to improve the culture of training, its quality, assessment practices, content consistency and learner engagement.

Key findings

Some of the key findings that the evaluation data revealed are:

- The evaluation provided insight into what learners and supervisors value when it comes to the training service provided by the AEC. Both cohorts indicated that they consider the best aspects of online learning be the flexibility it offers for self-paced learning.
- Survey response rates were extremely high which demonstrates a high level of interest from Learners (Polling Officials) who are keen to express their views, be listened to, and to contribute to continuous improvement in training.
- The temporary election workforce at the 2013 federal election consisted largely of older females from an English-speaking background, who had worked at several elections in the past. This represents a potential risk in the form of an aging workforce which may exhibit a low level of diversity.

- Results indicated the growing need for simulation assessments which develop soft skills, applied to technical election scenarios.
- Declaration Vote Issuing Officers undertake less training than most of the other seven major roles, while being one of the largest groups of learners.
- In the analysis based on Australian Quality Training Framework Themes (AQTF), learner responses rated online learning higher than face-to-face workshops in all themes with the exception of Learner Engagement.
- In the analysis of training for election rated tasks, static polling teams rated online learning higher than face-to-face workshops, while regular and remote mobile polling teams expressed the opposite opinion.
- Consistently across the survey results and the associated analysis areas, supervisor scores
 were lower than those of the learners.
- Qualitative and quantitative data conflicted in relation to whether Supervisors (DROs) feel they
 have the presentation and facilitation skills to be able deliver a successful face to face training
 session.
- Both qualitative and quantitative data indicated that learners would welcome the opportunity for recognition of prior learning.
- Both supervisors and learners highlighted that Remote Localities, Mobile Polling and Packaging Material modules were least effective at preparing Polling Officials for the job.

Suggested areas for improvement

- The development of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for AEC Training will provide the ability
 to measure whether the training has had any impact on the organisation's overall results or
 enabled it to achieve its intended objective.
- Consideration could be given to building the competency and capability of the Polling Official workforce outside of the election period to sustain an already enthused workforce and develop a range of skills using a certification/accreditation process to recognise and reward.
- The introduction of simulation assessments, mapped to AEC core performance standards, to develop a resilient and confident workforce for elections.
- An analysis of results provides insight into avenues to redevelop online and face to face learning to achieve a greater balance between training content and developing the skills and attitudes to meet performance standards.
- Consideration for future elections could be given to better utilising Declaration Vote Issuing
 Officers by up-skilling them across other roles to create more opportunities to employ them
 various other roles.