

to the committee,

The rest of Australia woke up to discover what it's like to be Tasmanian. Such service outages are typical whenever the Basslink gets burnt out but with effects of extreme network congestion. You can call but it's unintelligible. The only customers that are spared are the Telstra Business tier customers due to some dodgy backroom dealing that gifted government owned fibre exclusively for Telstra's use that mostly sits there as dark fibre. The competitive investment spruiked by Telstra's spin doctors is similarly, federally subsidies that allows Telstra to remain in a dominant position and offer the highest priced plans.

I pay \$14/month for mobile service through an Optus reseller. Telstra's comparative plans are at least three times the cost. Telstra has superior blackspot coverage and rural coverage but the price is prohibitive. Telecommunications providers operate on a basis of availability. Price differences aren't just a matter of magical equivalency of product or service + brand presence. Even the bank that pays the army has a netbanking system with a few hours of planned outages every week for maintenance. I would be happy with the phone system falling over once a month for that price point. The compensation is built into that price structure.

Melbourne's train system collapsing was due to the brilliant decision making process resulting in the use of the infrastructure intended for sharing cat pictures as the backbone of their train signalling infrastructure. Of all possible systems a train network is the simplest to deploy signalling infrastructure. The land is reserved and the trains must follow the tracks. There are so many options available for signalling from piggybacking data signals over the electric lines to simple radio repeaters. Quite frankly business has been sucked into the misinformed overpromotion of IoT solutions especially concerning critical infrastructure. Trains need dedicated hardened signalling infrastructure.

There were suggestions put forward by government that some customers couldn't call 000. The underlying standards for the way that emergency service calls are routed are such that a sim is not even required. If there was some issue with call routing then this would require an immediate referral to the standards authorities to revise those standards because it would have global implications for all GSM and derivative networks.

The catastrophic failure of the network would suggest a networking authentication server issue that could be remediated through implementing distributed transactions. This would harden critical telecommunications infrastructure but complicate auditing and surveillance(phone tapping). This would be a national security issue requiring consideration but I assume the end result would simply be that burning down the telephone exchange would be seen as preferable to any loss of control.

In regards to, "the establishment of alternative contact arrangements for affected government services," I would suggest a moratorium on all government grants and subsidies to Telstra until such time as they are willing to come to the table to discuss reasonable peering, roaming and failover arrangements for government services. Let them know that you expect a public benefit from free money other than freakonomic blue chip pumping.

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