



AUSTRALIAN
COUNCIL
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

**ACFID submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade References Committee's
*Inquiry into the Implications of Climate Change for
Australia's National Security***

August 2017

Introduction

ACFID welcomes the opportunity to provide a submission on the implications of climate change for Australia's national security.

This submission should be read as a general statement on how best to understand the risks posed by climate change to national and human security in Australia's region, as well a set of focused statements responding to Points One, Two and Four of the Inquiry's Terms of Reference. This submission discusses:

- The long-term risks generated by climate change, and how these risks should be understood;
- Australia's capacity for effective humanitarian responses to the increased scale and frequency of disasters caused by climate change;
- The need for Australia's security agencies to foster stronger, cross-sectoral partnerships in tackling risks generated by climate change, particularly with civil society, ACFID's field of expertise; and
- The essential role of Australia's aid program, mobilising additional private finance for building community resilience, and adaptivity in the face of the risks generated by climate change, with a special emphasis on small and vulnerable Pacific nations.

We would be happy to provide additional clarity on any of the recommendations contained within this submission. Follow up requests should be directed to Marc Purcell, CEO, ACFID.

Summary of Recommendations

1. The Australian Government should develop an evidence base to inform its scenario mapping around conflict, displacement, and migration.
2. The Australian Government should adopt a human security approach that emphasises the needs of vulnerable people in the Indo Pacific region and not only the needs of the state.
3. Australia should support Indo Pacific communities to diversify their livelihoods, develop new and inclusive approaches to property and tenure, and move with dignity where required.
4. The Australian Government should adopt a model that, instead of placing the security sector at the centre of its responses to climate change, enables cross-sector partnerships including NGOs.
5. The Australian Government should increase funding for Disaster Risk Reduction to at least 5 per cent of its international aid budget.
6. The Australian Government should increase Australia's contribution to international climate finance. Australia's total contribution of public and private funds should reach at least AUD \$3.2 billion a year by 2020. Around 60 per cent should support climate change adaptation work.
7. The Australian Government should develop and implement a comprehensive climate change strategy for Australia's aid program, focussed on building community resilience and adaptation.
8. Australia should invest in a grants program for NGOs working with climate change-affected communities in the Indo Pacific, incorporating the gains produced by the CBCCAG program.
9. The Australian Government should enable NGOs and Indo Pacific communities to access private finance from the GCF and other sources, including by supporting preparedness activities.

About ACFID

Founded in 1965, ACFID is a national peak body uniting Australia's not-for-profit international aid and development organisations to strengthen their collective impact for a just, equitable and sustainable world. We provide leadership to the international aid and development sector in Australia, and represent and promote the collective views and interests of our membership.

ACFID administers a sector Code of Conduct, a voluntary, self-regulatory code of good practice that aims to improve international development outcomes and increase stakeholder trust by enhancing the transparency and accountability of signatory organisations.

ACFID currently has 129 members and 15 affiliates operating in more than 100 developing countries. The total revenue raised by ACFID's membership from all sources amounted to \$1.66 billion in 2015-16, \$921 million of which was raised from 1.64 million individual Australians. In revenue terms, ACFID's members comprise 87 per cent of Australia's aid and development NGO sector. Members range from large Australian multi-sectoral organisations that are linked to international federations of NGOs, to agencies with specialised thematic expertise and smaller community based groups, with a mix of secular and faith-based organisations. A list of ACFID member organisations is at Annex 1.

Australian NGOs contribute to Australia's public diplomacy and their staff and volunteers are the human face of Australia's values, interests and influence in the places where they work. As civil society grows increasingly adept at addressing the structural and symptomatic elements of poverty and inequality, the work of Australian NGOs has diversified to include many more touchpoints with Australian Government policies. These policies include those related to Australia's climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts, and its humanitarian responses to climate-related disasters, around the world.

ACFID, Climate Change and Humanitarian Action

ACFID member agencies are actively involved in climate change mitigation and adaptation work for positive development outcomes in developing countries, alongside their high-profile role in coordinating humanitarian responses to climate-related disasters, including in Nepal after the earthquake (2015) and Vanuatu after Cyclone Pam (2015).

ACFID is also directly involved in demonstrating leadership on developing partnerships for development impact, and in mobilising private sector finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation work. Last year, ACFID hosted and coordinated three round tables on climate finance bringing together aid and development NGOs, DFAT and private sector representatives.

ACFID convenes an active Climate Change Community of Practice which brings together fifteen of its members working in the arena of climate change and development, and ACFID has consulted with this Community of Practice in developing this submission. NGOs included in this consultation consist of Action Aid Australia, WWF Australia, WaterAid Australia, Oxfam Australia, Australian Red Cross, CARE Australia, Union Aid Abroad – APHEDA, Save the Children Australia and Plan International Australia.

Background

Responding to the risks generated by climate change will require states to think and work in new ways if they are to retain their capacity to secure ongoing stability and prosperity for their populations, along with those of their partners and allies, and indeed those of humanity as an organised global community. The challenges this community faces cannot be avoided, prevented or “combated” by the security sector, or by expanding the size and operational scope of traditional military forces. Instead, we need to broaden our concept of security to include that of individuals and communities in Australia and across the Indo Pacific, and the extent to which they live free from fear, violence and poverty. This freedom should encompass the freedom to live with dignity against the range of threats arising from environmental degradation, and its social, economic, political and cultural effects.

For these reasons, ACFID views the risks engendered by climate change as a set of “human security” challenges for Australia, its region and the globe, and not as a threat that can be addressed within traditional national security frameworks. Further, all Australian responses to climate risks faced internationally should uphold Australia’s international human rights obligations. ACFID argues that climate risks are best ameliorated by Australian leadership in supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts through its international aid program, within a comprehensive climate change strategy guiding Australian efforts at home and abroad. This strategy should include a “partnerships” approach that brings together not only the government and the security sector with its affiliated satellites such as think tanks and foundations, but that integrates the knowledge, experience and ongoing work of civil society organisations.

1. The threats and long-term risks posed by climate change to national and international security, including those canvassed in the report by the United States Department of Defense (DoD)

The DoD report reflects the national security view as developed in the United States, where public debate about climate change – like in Australia – is characterised by fierce public contestation about the type and level of response required. The response adopted by the US Department of Agriculture, for example, has included instructing staff to avoid using the term “climate change” altogether.¹

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, the security sector is actively mapping worst-case scenarios, placing its agencies at the centre of the nation’s response, as the DoD paper does. The Australian Department of Defence also issued a White Paper in 2016, which explicitly addresses climate change as an important

¹ Oliver Milman, “US Federal Department is Censoring Use of Term ‘Climate Change’, emails reveal”, *The Guardian Australia Edition* (Sydney: The Guardian, 8 August 2017)
<https://www.theguardian.com/info/2013/may/26/contact-guardian-australia>

non-traditional security risk.² Both the DoD report and the Defence White Paper argue that climate change is a “present security threat, not strictly a long-term risk.”³

Climate change is a threat multiplier that can exacerbate a range of existing and emerging risks to national and international security, including those identified in the DoD report. These are:

- a. More frequent and severe natural disasters, and the devastation that results;
- b. More movement by so-called “climate migrants”. These migrants are people displaced by environmental degradation, and largely move within their national borders, although in some cases, they may also move beyond them; and
- c. The possibility of more, and more protracted, conflicts over basic resources. These conflicts are more likely to arise within states, although in some cases, they may also arise between them.

These risks are associated with recurring floods, droughts and higher temperatures that increase the strain on fragile states and vulnerable populations by dampening economic activity and burdening public health. Such conditions can push migrants into growing cities around the world, with negative effects on critical urban infrastructures. They will likely also require responses by security agencies, personnel and assets – primarily in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief – while sea level rises and temperature changes put these units, personnel and assets at greater risk of loss or damage.⁴

National Security: A Warning

Recommendation 1: The Australian Government should develop an evidence base to inform its scenario mapping around conflict, displacement and migration.

It is reasonable that the security sector evaluates risks arising from climate change, including with reference to worst-case scenarios. Against strong political resistance to evidence-based responses, however, such scenarios – including their projections of up to 200 million climate refugees fleeing international armed conflict⁵ – can take hold in the public imagination, with potential flow-on effects on policy-making. Yet such numbers and assumptions are not evidence-based and lack methodological rigour, leaving a vast speculative gap between what we genuinely know and some of the assumptions informing our thinking.⁶ It is essential to recognise that these scenarios reflect *potential* climate futures, not certainties, and to resist allowing them to lead us beyond our existing evidence base, into a wholesale securitisation of the climate change discussion.

² Department of Defence (Australia), "Defence White Paper," (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016).

³ Department of Defense (United States), "National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate," (Washington: Department of Defense, 2015).

⁴ Department of Defense (United States), "National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate," (Washington: Department of Defense, 2015).

⁵ See Francois Gemenne, "One Good Reason to Speak of "Climate Refugees", " *Forced Migration Review* 49 (2015); Solomon M. Hsiang and Marshall Burke, "Climate, Conflict, and Social Stability: What Does the Evidence Say?," *Climatic Change* 123 (2014); Jon Barnett, "Security and Climate Change," *Global Environmental Change* 13, no. 1 (2003).

⁶ Francois Gemenne, "Why the Numbers Don't Add Up: A Review of Estimates and Predictions of People Displaced by Environmental Changes," *Global Environmental Change* 21, no. Supplement 1 (2011).

There can be considerable additional risk involved in making national security decisions based on such scenarios without building an appropriate evidence base to test them against. Allowing our responses to be determined by such scenarios risks further securitising our engagement with Indo Pacific states by framing our neighbours, regional allies and trading partners as climate threats.⁷ Approaching climate change in this manner “flips” our risk analysis so that vulnerable communities in Australia’s own region are framed as risks to our national security. Such framings can draw attention away from the need for long-term, strategic work on climate mitigation, adaptation and resilience across the Indo Pacific and around the world, aimed at reducing the likelihood that these scenarios will come true.

The Human Security View

Recommendation 2: The Australian Government should adopt a human security approach that emphasises the needs of vulnerable people in the Indo Pacific region and not only the needs of the state.

Recommendation 3: Australia should support Indo Pacific communities to diversify their livelihoods, develop new and inclusive approaches to property and tenure, and move with dignity where required.

ACFID urges the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee to consider that there are competing frameworks around how to understand the risks generated by climate change. Broadly, these frameworks are the “national security” view, which puts the state and the security sector at the centre of its analysis, and the “human security” view, which places the wellbeing of individuals and communities in this position instead.

The Human Security Initiative has defined “human security” as “a people-centred approach for resolving inequalities that affect security.”⁸ First socialised in the 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program, the human security approach shifts the political focus from states and their security to “the existential threats faced by millions of individuals around the world,” including poverty, food insecurity, environmental degradation, political repression, and ill-health. It also broadens the security focus to include development goals, so that individuals and communities can enjoy secure access to services that meet their needs.⁹

Climate change is already disrupting the capacity of individuals and communities to enjoy lives of liberty and dignity, with secure access to food, water, shelter, peace and sustainable development. The effects of this disruption are not equally shared and are exacerbated by a range of factors that heighten vulnerability. For the world’s vulnerable, the effects on climate change on agricultural production, food, water and energy supplies, and critical urban infrastructures can force them into precarious livelihoods in which their access to legal, political and property rights can also begin to fail.¹⁰ The Internal

⁷ Sanjay Chaturvedi and Timothy Doyle, “Geopolitics of Climate Change and Australia’s “Re-Engagement” With Asia: Discourses of Fear and Cartographic Anxieties,” *Australian Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2010); Barnett, “Security and Climate Change.”

⁸ Human Security Initiative, “Definition of Human Security,” <http://www.humansecurityinitiative.org/definition-human-security>.

⁹ Shaun Breslin and George Christou, “Has the Human Security Agenda Come of Age? Definitions, Discourses and Debates”, in *Journal of Contemporary Politics* 21, no. 1 (2015).

¹⁰ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). “Human Security,” in *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*, Chapter 12 (Geneva: IPCC, 2014); Louise Crabtree, “Can Property Survive the Great

Displacement Monitoring Centre has estimated that more than 19.2 million people were displaced by natural disasters in 113 countries in 2015.¹¹ Such internally displaced people are vulnerable to further harm, suffering negative impacts to their individual and social well-being, including unemployment, lack of access to social and natural resources, and increased health problems.¹²

The poorest and most marginalised groups within society including women, children, people with disabilities, indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, which will exacerbate poverty and disadvantage where it already exists, create new pockets of poverty and increase inequality within and across communities and generations.¹³ Those in the developing world will feel these impacts most – a 2010 World Bank report estimated that developing nations will bear 75 to 80 per cent of the costs of damages caused by climate change.¹⁴

Many of Australia's neighbours in the Indo Pacific are particularly vulnerable to the impact of sea level rises, and for Pacific nations such as Tuvalu, Kiribati and Micronesia, climate change is already a genuine existential threat with the capacity to diminish their livelihoods and even erase their states' territorial footprints.¹⁵ For many communities in these nations, the prospect of international migration is likely to begin to loom large in their thinking, although evidence to date shows that most households do not wish to migrate except as a last resort. Nevertheless, relocation will be necessary for some communities, and Australia must support strategies for safe and dignified mobility for these communities.

Such factors – and the capacity for risks generated by climate change to harm the vulnerable – must be kept firmly in view in any assessment of the security implications of climate change, not only the perceived risks to the Australian state and/or its security sector. ACFID recommends the FADT committee recognise the human security impacts of climate change on the world's vulnerable.

Climate Transition?," *The Conversation*, <https://theconversation.com/can-property-survive-the-great-climate-transition-80672>; Eric Klinenberg, "Climate Change: Adaptation, Mitigation and Critical Infrastructures," *Public Culture* 28, no. 2 (2016).

¹¹ Alexandra Bilak, Gabriel Cardona-Fox, Justin Ginnett et al, "GRID 2016: Global Report on Internal Displacement" (Geneva, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2016) <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2016/2016-global-report-internal-displacement-IDMC.pdf>

¹² See Admiral Chris Barrie (Ret.) and Will Steffen, "Be Prepared: Climate Change, Security and Australia's Defence Force" (Sydney: Climate Council of Australia, 2015).

¹³ Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), "Tackling Climate Change and Promoting Sustainable Development: An Action Plan for Australia's International Engagement" (Canberra: ACFID 2015) https://acfid.asn.au/sites/site.acfid/files/resource_document/Tackling-climate-change-and-promoting-sustainable-development-final.pdf

¹⁴ The World Bank, "World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change" (Washington: World Bank Group 2010) <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/5287678-1226014527953/WDR10-Full-Text.pdf>

¹⁵ Barnett, "Security and Climate Change".

Climate Migration and Inequality

In some cases, climate change will become one more push factor in international migration, especially for people with the resources to access existing official migration pathways.¹⁶ Those who cannot access such pathways run the risk of becoming trapped in place, unable to recover from the impact on their livelihoods.¹⁷ Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in 2008, for example, killed more than 130,000 people – unable to move due to poverty and livelihood pressures, along with their isolation, meaning access to humanitarian assistance was limited.¹⁸

Resilience and Adaptivity Matter for Human Security

Resilient, adaptive communities appear less likely to erupt into violent conflict in conditions of environmental degradation, whether contested resources are scarce or abundant. Where conflicts have recently occurred, including in Darfur, Syria and Iraq, climate change is amplifying the effects of existing exploitation and inequality.¹⁹ Strengthening factors that contribute to cooperative adaptation is likely to prove more fruitful than preparing for conflict. In relation to displacement and migration, too, prioritising community resilience and adaptivity can reduce the likelihood that migrants are rejected by receiving communities. Where migration does lead to conflict, it is more likely to do so in states where political and institutional responses to migration place old and new residents on a conflictual footing.²⁰

Disasters and their Impacts

The Indo Pacific is the most disaster-prone region in the world, affecting communities and states alike. In 2015, there were 346 reported disasters affecting 98.6 million people worldwide, killing 22,773 people, and costing USD \$66.5 billion in economic damages. Of these disasters, 152 were in Asia, 22 were in Oceania, and 56 were in Africa. Asia has experienced the highest number of fatalities from its disasters, accounting for 71.8 per cent of all deaths from disasters globally. As the World Bank points out, such disasters have a “crushing impact” on the world’s poor, who are twice as likely to work in sectors highly susceptible to extreme weather events. The interaction between extreme weather and extreme poverty can produce devastating consequences, including \$520 billion in consumption losses and more than 26 million people pushed into poverty every year. These people have little access to support to recover and rebuild, and in Guatemala after Tropical Storm Agatha in 2010, for example, the number of people in poverty skyrocketed, increasing by 14 per cent.

¹⁶ Barnett, “Security and Climate Change.”

¹⁷ Barrie & Steffen, “Be Prepared”.

¹⁸ See Admiral Chris Barrie (Ret.) and Will Steffen, “Be Prepared: Climate Change, Security and Australia’s Defence Force” (Sydney: Climate Council of Australia, 2015).

¹⁹ Gemenne, “One Good Reason”, Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffman, “Beyond Scarcity: Rethinking Water, Climate Change and Conflict in the Sudans”, in *Global Environmental Change* 29 (2014); Hsiang & Burke, “Climate, Conflict, and Social Stability”, Barnett, “Security and Climate Change”.

²⁰ Gemenne, “One Good Reason”, Hsiang & Burke, “Climate, Conflict, and Social Stability”, Barnett, “Security and Climate Change”.

2. The role of both humanitarian and military responses in addressing climate change and the means by which these responses are implemented

Recommendation 4: The Australian Government should adopt a model that, instead of placing the security sector at the centre of its responses to climate change, enables cross-sector partnerships including NGOs.

Australia's humanitarian responses to climate change and its associated disaster risks should continue to reflect a partnership approach between government, NGOs and communities, grounded in a human security framework. A component of Australia's investment in such responses in the Indo Pacific to date has focused on fostering participatory and community-based approaches to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and disaster risk management. ACFID welcomes this work, which has helped to build the evidence base demonstrating the effectiveness of DRR at the community level, and increased accountability through community participation in planning, policy development and decision-making.

Much of this work has been implemented through NGO humanitarian action funded by mechanisms such as the Humanitarian Partnership Agreement and the Australian NGO Cooperation Program. This investment has allowed Australian agencies to innovate, pilot replicable models, build partnerships, strengthen national policy frameworks and contribute to improved reach at community, regional and national levels. Lessons learned from this approach have special value for small Pacific nations, which experience significantly large per capita losses from disasters, but are frequently poorly resourced and lack capacity to address the frequent crises they face. Unfortunately, these nations frequently receive less attention on the global stage due to their small populations and relative isolation.

Regardless of the extent of forward planning, however, when disasters strike, they can be devastating. The partnership approach can also enable "building back better" in communities that are devastated by disasters, restoring access to homes and livelihoods in a manner that avoids recreating previous vulnerabilities and exposing communities to repeated devastation from future disasters.²¹ This approach has developed via lessons learned since the reconstruction of Aceh, Indonesia, following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. The approach allows for localised replication in other locations, and Australia's investment of 2-3 per cent of the aid budget in DRR has seen Australia help communities in Pakistan build back better after the 2010 floods.²²

The partnership approach outlined by ACFID is cost-effective, as member NGOs CARE Australia, Oxfam Australia and Save the Children Australia have demonstrated that investing in prevention and resilience is central to reducing risks, and is far more cost effective than responding after disaster strikes.²³ Disasters can have a devastating impact on development, reversing progress on poverty reduction and

²¹ UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (UN WCDRR) "Issue Brief – Reconstructing After Disasters: Build Back Better" (Sendai: UN WCCRR, 2015) <http://www.wcdrr.org/uploads/Reconstructing-after-disasters-Build-back-better.pdf>

²² See AusAID (now Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), "Progress Report for the Disaster Risk Reduction Policy" (Canberra: AusAID, 2012) <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/publications/Documents/disaster-riskreduction-appr.pdf>

²³ Steffi Hamann, "Bridging the Gap: A Guide to Improving Humanitarian Practice to Support Long-term Food Security", (Care, Oxfam, PLAN and Save the Children, 2013) http://humanitariancoalition.ca/sites/default/files/basic-page/humanitarian_guide_2013.pdf

economic growth. In contrast, DRR programs are proven to protect long-term development gains, minimise economic losses and prevent damage to infrastructure.

DRR Finance

Recommendation 5: The Australian Government should increase funding for Disaster Risk Reduction to at least 5 per cent of its international aid budget.

Despite the known impacts of climate-related disasters on the poor and vulnerable across the Indo Pacific, DRR finance remains a small fraction of international aid finance, and remains unpredictable and activity-focused, rather than focusing on comprehensive disaster risk management. Australia's level of DRR investment, for example, has for the past six years stayed largely static at two to three percent of the aid budget – which is shrinking overall. Compounding this problem, DRR funding has often not been sufficiently or consistently tracked, making it more difficult to identify DRR finance allocations and the outcomes of this investment.

One approach to financing responses to disasters consists of popularising climate and disaster risk insurance as an attractive solution. While recognising the benefits of insurance, we believe that it must not be treated as a panacea, to the exclusion of other initiatives to reduce disaster risk and address root causes of vulnerability. Similarly, our agencies have concerns about the equity and availability of climate and disaster risk insurance for people living in poverty, and the lack of meaningfully inclusive and evidence-based debate about this topic globally and nationally. We recommend the Australian Government recognises the advantages and limitations of insurance, while adopting approaches that are evidence-based, and inclusive of the perspectives of the poorest communities, as well as women leaders.

In contrast, investments in communities' resilience and adaptivity have been shown to have a range of positive economic impacts. The World Bank has found that early warning systems, financial services, social safety nets, and environmental conservation plans help the poor and vulnerable directly.²⁴

The Australian Government should commit to improve tracking, reporting and transparency of DRR financing and DRR allocations, and support processes to improve international tracking of DRR finance. We also encourage Australia to strengthen its own commitment, and encourage other actors to allocate 5 per cent of ODA specifically for DRR initiatives.

²⁴ World Bank, "Unbreakable: Building the Resilience of the Poor in the Face of Natural Disasters" (Washington: World Bank Group, 2017)
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25335/9781464810039.pdf>

Partnerships and Typhoon Haiyan

Some of the evidence base generated by this work to date relates to preparations for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, in which communities supported by established, local DRR programs initiated preparedness activities ahead of Haiyan's impact. Based on established contingency plans and evacuation drills, local leaders warned communities to start emergency preparations and pre-emptively evacuate populations.²⁵ Community preparedness for Haiyan was also assisted by effective Filipino early warning and response systems, which Australia has supported in recent years, meaning that approximately 800,000 people were evacuated from coastal areas prior to the typhoon making landfall.²⁶

Partnerships in the Sendai Framework

A partnerships approach is also recommended by the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 – a voluntary, non-binding agreement endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly after the 2015 Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR). This framework explicitly recognises that diverse stakeholders hold vital perspectives on Sendai implementation, including NGOs and communities (with a focus on women, children and youth, people with disabilities and the elderly), the private sector and research/scientific institutions. Section V of the Sendai Framework explicitly encourages governments to engage with non-state stakeholders in implementing the framework at all levels.²⁷

The active inclusion of NGOs is critical to ensure comprehensive analysis of disaster risks, promote accountability, foster local leadership in building resilience and maximise their capabilities and support in building resilience. In addition to its multi-sector approach, the Sendai Framework recognises the need for investment at the local level, where disaster impacts are felt most acutely, and not only at the national level, where security agency collaborations are most likely to interact.²⁸ Australia's planning for DRR, including under Sendai, should also be integrated with its approach to the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement, commitments under the World Humanitarian Summit, and regional frameworks including the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific, to address underlying risk drivers and build community resilience.

²⁵ Assessments and evaluations undertaken by ACFID member CARE Australia after Typhoon Haiyan included community visits supported under DRR activities funded by the European Union between 2007 and 2013, including the recently completed Scale Up, Build Up (SUBU) project. Communities visited noted that they had initiated preparedness and contingency actions on receiving the Haiyan warning – for example, the municipality of Saint Bernard evacuated more than 8,000 people. Local leaders described by people were warned to start emergency preparations such as packing important items and evacuating to safe areas. For more information, refer to Scale Up, Build Up (SUBU) External Evaluation Preliminary Findings (presentation, available on request).

²⁶ See, for example, "Sitrep preparations for Typhoon 'Yolanda' (Haiyan) (National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council, 2013) <http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1125/update%20Sitrep%20no.3%20re%20preparations%20for%20ty%20yolanda.pdf>

²⁷ United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), "Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction" (Geneva: UNISDR 2015) <http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework>

²⁸ ACFID, "Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction. ACFID Disaster Risk Reduction Community of Practice Recommendations to the Australian Government" (Canberra, ACFID 2017) (available on request).

3. The capacity and preparedness of Australia's relevant national security agencies to respond to climate change risks in our region

UN guidelines for humanitarian and military professionals dealing with civil-military matters maintain that military assets should be used only as a last resort in responding to natural disasters. Nevertheless, in many countries, especially in the Indo Pacific, the military has become the “first resort” when disaster strikes.

The Australian Civil-Military Centre has found that there are fewer political tensions in civil-military relations at times of “natural” disaster compared with conflict settings, where serious tensions between civilian and military agencies usually arise. In many sudden-onset disasters, there is a perception that the military can deploy its standing forces more quickly than humanitarian agencies can mobilise sufficient financial and human resources to respond.

Yet the time that elapses in mobilising an international response will mean that local responders will be first on the scene. Australia's security agencies must understand that most lives saved are the result of local efforts, often by communities themselves rather than government, the military or civil society organisations. The need to build local capacity in disaster response is therefore an essential role for Australian agencies with a stake in effective humanitarian responses, including building the capacity of local and national police forces.

The role of military forces is most needed and accepted in supporting local actors during the response phase after a humanitarian disaster. Local and national authorities, however, should not be excluded from coordination mechanisms, nor should local capacity of state authority be undermined by international military responses. Other agencies, too, should continue their support for regional early-warning systems and regional response mechanisms. The Australian Defence Force has built up a strong body of experience working in collaboration with other defence forces, aid agencies and NGOs, and the projected increase in frequency of its involvement with humanitarian relief efforts will increase the pressure on the ADF to further improve its capacity to do so.²⁹

Exercises like Talisman Sabre 2017 highlight the importance of preparedness in responding to humanitarian crisis during conflict. Similar civil (including NGOs)-military-police exercises in responding to humanitarian crisis resulting from climate change will enhance inter-agency cooperation, particularly in complex emergencies.

²⁹ Elizabeth Ferris, “Future Directions in Civil-Military Responses to Natural Disasters” (Canberra: Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2012) <https://www.acmc.gov.au/publications/future-directions-in-civil-military-responses-to-natural-disasters/>

4. The role of Australia's overseas development assistance in climate change mitigation and adaptation more broadly

Breaking the link between climate change and the worst-case scenarios currently informing security sector risk analyses will require Australia to scale up its investment in global community resilience and capacity for adaptation, with a special emphasis on small and vulnerable Pacific Island nations.

This investment is best directed through a growing Australian international aid program, including new public money directly targeting climate change, and efforts to engage the private sector to attract additional investment. Such an approach is in keeping with the longstanding global goal of mobilising USD \$100 billion in climate finance for developing countries by 2020, as reaffirmed in Australia's 2015 commitments under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).³⁰

Parties to the Paris Agreement have acknowledged that finance flowing to mitigation (avoiding emissions) should be balanced by finance flowing to adaptation (building resilience to impacts). Analysis by Oxfam, however, suggests that on average only USD \$4-8bn went specifically to climate change adaptation in 2013-2014,³¹ a figure which falls far short of the cost of climate change adaptation in developing countries, which is projected to range from USD \$140-300bn a year by 2030, and USD \$280-500bn a year by 2050.³²

Australia's Commitments

Recommendation 6: The Australian Government should increase Australia's contribution to international climate finance. Australia's total contribution of public and private funds should reach at least AUD \$3.2 billion a year by 2020. Around 60 per cent should support climate change adaptation work.

Recommendation 7: The Australian Government should develop and implement a comprehensive climate change strategy for Australia's aid program, focussed on building community resilience and adaptation.

Australia's financial pledge to date consists of \$1 billion over five years from its existing (declining) aid budget (2015-2020), including \$200 million over four years allocated to the Green Climate Fund (GCF),³³

³⁰ The Paris Agreement has established a global commitment by nations to limit global warming below 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. The Agreement is the world's first universal framework for tackling climate change, laying the basis for a coordinated approach to facilitating investment, developing technologies and building capabilities for a zero-carbon global economy. See DFAT, "Climate Finance Roadmap to US\$100 Billion" (Canberra: DFAT, 2017) <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/climate-change/pages/climate-finance-roadmap-to-us100-billion.aspx>

³¹ Oxfam, "Climate Finance Shadow Report" (Oxford: Oxfam International, 2016) https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-climate-finance-shadow-report-031116-en.pdf

³² Department of the Environment and Energy (DEE), "Australia's Second Biennial Report" (Canberra: DEE, 2015) <http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/publications/australias-second-biennial-report>

³³ DFAT, "Australia's Support for Other Countries", (Canberra: DFAT, 2017) <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/climate-change/Pages/australias-support-for-other-countries.aspx>

representing only 0.3 per cent of global finance flows. Australia has also announced a 2030 target of reducing emissions by 26-28 per cent below 2005 levels as its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the Paris Agreement.³⁴

Australia should do more as part of this global effort by setting targets for deep emissions reductions, and by playing a fair and cooperative role with international peers. Australia should set targets to reduce its national greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 per cent below 2000 levels by 2025 and at least 60 per cent by 2030, and make a clear commitment to achieving zero emissions well before mid-century – backed by a comprehensive national strategy to take this forward, including in its international efforts.

This strategy should integrate Australia's commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – which establish climate change mitigation and adaptation as a dedicated goal as well as integrating the issue across all its other goals. It should also increase Australia's contribution to international finance flows to 2.4 per cent of the shared USD \$100 billion commitment – approximately AUD \$3.2 billion by 2020.³⁵ ACFID acknowledges that DFAT is currently developing such a strategy, in addition to a new Pacific Climate Change Program, and looks forward to their announcement. ACFID also calls for the balance between mitigation and adaptation funding to be restored, and recommends that 60 per cent of Australia's public climate spend be directed towards adaptation work to redress the existing imbalance.

Simplifying Access to Finance

Recommendation 8: Australia should invest in a grants program for NGOs working with climate change-affected communities in the Indo Pacific, incorporating the gains produced by the CBCCAG program.

Recommendation 9: The Australian Government should enable NGOs and Indo Pacific communities to access private finance from the GCF and other sources, including by supporting preparedness activities.

Many Pacific Island nations continue to face challenges in accessing funding through the Green Climate Fund, and the accreditation process is emerging as a roadblock for NGOs, requiring significant resources. ACFID calls on the Australian Government to assist in simplifying procedures for accessing funding through the GCF, and notes that their present complexity favours major private sector actors, including other banks, and not NGOs or their partner Indo Pacific communities.³⁶

To boost preparedness and inform new approaches to blended finance in the NGO sector, ACFID has hosted a series of three climate finance round tables in 2016, in partnership with DFAT, member NGOs and private sector entities. According to our calculations, around \$672 million of Australia's \$1 billion

³⁴ DFAT, "Australia's Climate Action", (Canberra: DFAT, 2017) <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/climate-change/Pages/australias-climate-action.aspx>

³⁵ Frank Jotzo, Jonathan Pickering and Peter J. Wood, "Fulfilling Australia's International Climate Finance Commitments: Which Sources of Financing are Promising and How Much Could They Raise?" (Canberra: Centre for Climate Economics and Policy, Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, 2011) http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/resources/anu_financingoptionspaper_october2011.pdf

³⁶ Mantoe Phakati, "UN Climate Fund Criticised for Accrediting Growing List of Private Banks", *Climate Change News* (Climate Home, 10 July 2017) <http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/07/10/green-climate-fund-criticised-accrediting-private-banks/>

commitment remains unprogrammed, and ACFID urges that future programming under this commitment support the efforts of NGOs to leverage additional sources of private finance.

Australia must also continue to provide finance and other resources to developing countries through bilateral assistance. This funding must be new and additional to Australia's ODA budget, to avoid the diversion of funds for delivering on other poverty alleviation programs. Australia must ensure that all elements of its contribution to international climate finance are geared towards meeting the needs of least developed countries, women, youth and other vulnerable groups.

Community-Based Climate Change Action Grants (CBCCAG)

The Australian aid and development sector has supported successful community adaptation and resilience work in the past, funded by our international aid program including through the Community-Based Climate Change Action Grants (CBCCAG) program.

The CBCCAG program was piloted as part of Australia's \$599 million "fast start" commitment from the 2010-2011 to 2012-2013 financial years, with a funding allocation of \$16.9 million over three years. CBCCAG funded a range of projects in Southeast Asia and the Pacific – including The Philippines, Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu – managed by several lead international NGOs whose Australian affiliates are ACFID members, including Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children, Act for Peace, Live & Learn and PLAN. With this regional focus, the program worked across locations and communities that were already experiencing acute climate impacts, and with others in which there was more opportunity to avert acute outcomes. The program was evaluated in 2016 by an independent consultant, and found to have made strong, positive advances because it worked at complementary scales. Some projects were designed with a tight, local focus, while others worked at a much larger scale in terms of numbers of people reached. Knowledge and skills were built and education materials successfully tailored to their audiences, while scientific knowledge and technical expertise were successfully connected with forms of local knowledge. Strategies for ongoing awareness raising were also developed.

CBCCAG represented a set of major achievements in climate change adaptation work, enabled by successful partnerships and consortia between NGOs, with other sectors, and with local partners. The evaluating consultant recommended at the end of the program's cycle that it should continue to generate more, longer-lasting outcomes.³⁷ Unfortunately, the program was discontinued regardless. ACFID calls on the Australian Government to resume this successful program or draw lessons learned from into the design of new programs, both across the Indo Pacific and more specifically, in the design of its Pacific Climate Change Program – currently in its design stage.

³⁷ Kate Duggan, "Independent Evaluation of the Community-Based Climate Change Adaptation Grants Program – Main Evaluation Report" (Canberra: Griffin NRM, 2016), available on request.

Annex 1: List of ACFID Members

ACC International Relief
Act for Peace – NCCA
ActionAid Australia
Action on Poverty
Adara Development Australia
ADRA Australia
Adventure Fund Global
Afghan Australian Development Organisation
Anglican Aid
Anglican Board of Mission
Anglican Overseas Aid
Anglican Relief and Development Fund Australia
Asia Pacific Journalism Centre
Asian Aid Organisation
Assisi Aid Projects
Australasian Society for HIV Medicine
Australia for UNHCR
Australia Hope International Inc.
Australian Business Volunteers
Australian Doctors for Africa
Australian Doctors International
Australian Himalayan Foundation
Australian Lutheran World Service
Australian Marist Solidarity Ltd
Australian Medical Aid Foundation
Australian Mercy
Australian Red Cross
Australian Respiratory Council
AVI
Beyond the Orphanage
Birthing Kit Foundation (Australia)
Brien Holden Vision Institute Foundation
Bright Futures Child Aid and Development Fund (Australia)
Burnet Institute
Business for Millennium Development
CARE Australia
Caritas Australia
CBM Australia
ChildFund Australia
CLAN (Caring and Living as Neighbours)
Credit Union Foundation Australia
Daughters of Our Lady of the Sacred Heart
Overseas Aid Fund
Diaspora Action Australia
Diplomacy Training Program
Door of Hope Australia Inc.
Edmund Rice Foundation (Australia)
EDO NSW
Engineers without Borders
Every Home Global Concern
Family Planning New South Wales
Fairtrade Australia New Zealand
Food Water Shelter
Foresight (Overseas Aid and Prevention of Blindness)
Fred Hollows Foundation, The
Global Development Group
Global Mission Partners
Good Return
Good Shepherd Services
Grameen Foundation Australia
Habitat for Humanity Australia
Hagar Australia
HealthServe Australia
Heilala
Hope Global
Hunger Project Australia, The
International Christian Aid and Relief Enterprises
International Needs Australia
International Nepal Fellowship (Aust) Ltd
International RiverFoundation
International Women's Development Agency
Interplast Australia & New Zealand
Islamic Relief Australia
KTF (Kokoda Track Foundation)
Kyeema Foundation
Lasallian Foundation
Leprosy Mission Australia, The
Live & Learn Environmental Education

Love Mercy Foundation	Transform Aid International (incorporating
Mahboba's Promise Australia	Baptist World Aid)
Marie Stopes International Australia	UNICEF Australia
Marist Mission Centre	Union Aid Abroad - APHEDA
Mary MacKillop International	UnitingWorld
Mary Ward International Australia	WaterAid Australia
Mercy Works Ltd.	World Vision Australia
Mission World Aid Inc.	WWF-Australia
MIT Group Foundation	YWAM Medical Ships
Motivation Australia	
Murdoch Children's Research Institute	
MAA International	
Nusa Tenggara Association Inc.	
Oaktree Foundation	
Opportunity International Australia	
Our Rainbow House	
Oxfam Australia	
Palmera Projects	
Partner Housing	
Partners in Aid	
Partners Relief and Development Australia	
People with Disability Australia	
PLAN International Australia	
Quaker Service Australia	
RedR Australia	
Reledev Australia	
RESULTS International (Australia)	
Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Ophthalmologists	
Royal Australasian College of Surgeons	
Salesian Missions	
Salvation Army (NSW Property Trust)	
Save the Children Australia	
Service Fellowship International Inc.	
School for Life Foundation	
SeeBeyondBorders	
Sight For All	
So They Can	
Sport Matters	
Surf Aid International	
Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation Australia	
TEAR Australia	