

This article was downloaded by: [Professor Dennis Rumley]

On: 13 June 2012, At: 06:52

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Journal of the Indian Ocean Region

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rior20>

'Securing' the Indian Ocean? Competing regional security constructions

Dennis Rumley^a, Timothy Doyle^{b c} & Sanjay Chaturvedi^d

^a University of Western Australia

^b University of Adelaide

^c University of Keele, UK

^d Panjab University, Chandigarh, India

Available online: 13 Jun 2012

To cite this article: Dennis Rumley, Timothy Doyle & Sanjay Chaturvedi (2012): 'Securing' the Indian Ocean? Competing regional security constructions, *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 8:1, 1-20

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2012.683623>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

‘Securing’ the Indian Ocean? Competing regional security constructions

Dennis Rumley^{a*}, Timothy Doyle^{b,c} and Sanjay Chaturvedi^d

^aUniversity of Western Australia; ^bUniversity of Adelaide; ^cUniversity of Keele, UK; ^dPanjab University, Chandigarh, India

(Received 28 December 2011; final version received 14 February 2012)

Dictated and driven to a significant extent by the changing dynamics of the knowledge–power equation, regional constructions are devised and propagated for a range of purposes – describing economic success, structuring a set of relationships, reproducing a particular vision of (in)security or organising a specific function, such as to maximise economic cooperation, to minimise insecurity or to fashion a particular form of security architecture. It is argued that there are three competing regional constructions for security (currently in circulation) in the Indian Ocean Region, emanating largely from Australia, the United States and India – an Indian Ocean-wide concept, an East Indian Ocean construct and an Indo-Pacific concept. It is suggested that there exists an overriding narrative in favour of an ‘Indo-Pacific’ construction at the expense of Indian Ocean concepts. As a result, it is concluded that the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) will remain relatively weak for the foreseeable future and that, unless there is a concerted attempt to involve China in a new maritime security regime, the discourse and practices of regional security might become the preserve of an Indo-Pacific alliance comprising Australia, India, the United States and other East Asian states, including Japan.

Keywords: security; Indian Ocean; regional construction; Indo-Pacific

[Thought] soars up into the abstract space of the visible, the geometric. The architect who designs, the planner who draws up master-plans, see their ‘objects’, buildings and neighborhoods from on high, and from afar ... They pass from the ‘lived’ to the abstract in order to project that abstraction onto the level of the lived. (Lefebvre cited in Gregory 1994, p. 168)

1. Introduction

As the ‘Asian century’ unfolds, an inevitable fall out of an *interregnum* – ‘a new stable order has not been established but significant elements of the old order remain in place’ (Sørensen 2006, p. 343) – appears to be a sense of disorientation and cartographic anxiety on the part of foreign policy establishments as well as strategic-defence communities in different parts of the globe. A frantic search for new maps that could assist the ongoing pursuit of new ‘strategic’ partnerships and alliances to be forged among ‘like-minded’ state and non-state actors in pursuit of security is well under way in the Indian Ocean; where, according to some analysts, ‘global power dynamics will be revealed’ (Kaplan 2010, p. 13).

*Corresponding author. Email: rumley8@gmail.com

Rather exploratory in nature, this paper aims at critically assessing the ‘new’ mappings of the Indian Ocean space(s) by the intellectuals and institutions of statecraft (Ó Tuathail 2006, pp. 8–9). Using insights from critical geopolitics, we show how these mental maps and geopolitical visions converge, compete, and in some cases even collide, while reconfiguring the inside/outside of the Indian Ocean Region. We further show how each one of them tends to portray and promote the most desirable ‘future’ of the Indian Ocean Region.

A geopolitical vision has been defined by Dijkink (1996, p. 11) as ‘any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and other places, invoking feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy’. It is important to note, especially for the purposes of this paper, that there may be several, even competing, geopolitical visions within a state, upheld by various institutions of statecraft.

Another key point that we wish to highlight in this paper is that, owing to the nature of regional geopolitical change and regional security challenges, the content of the regional security debate and responses in Australia is primarily a reflection of three competing security constructions of the Indian Ocean Region. The first is an all-embracing concept of an *Indian Ocean Region*, comprising up to 51 states at its largest scale to the presently 19 states at the scale of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). The second is a scaled-down version of the first into the *East Indian Ocean*. The third and largest in area is an *Indo-Pacific concept* that emphasises the pre-eminence of regional naval power and which ensures that India (along with Indonesia, Japan and the United States, among others) potentially plays a central policing role not only within the Indian Ocean Region.

Since these three regional security constructions are competing, there has been some degree of polarisation of perspectives in relation to the nature of security and on the part of the various protagonists (Table 1). For example, a narrative based on an Indian Ocean Region security construction tends to be perpetuated by liberal practitioners and commentators concerned primarily with non-traditional security issues, and with the cooperative use of diplomacy and smart power in a regional community context. On the other hand, the dominant narrative based on an Indo-Pacific Region security construction tends to be propagated by conservative practitioners and commentators concerned principally with the use of collective

Table 1. Competing Indian Ocean Region security constructions: polarising perspectives.

Indian Ocean Region	Indo-Pacific Region
Diplomacy	Traditional security
Optimists	Pessimists
Soft power	Hard power
Regionalists	Nationalists
Foreign affairs departments	Defence departments/consultants
Liberal political parties	Conservative political parties
Liberal think-tanks	Conservative think-tanks
Liberal commentators	Conservative commentators

traditional security and hard power directed either overtly or covertly towards individual states, and more particularly, towards China.

There are also important exceptions to the rule. There are subservient interpretations of the Indo-Pacific concept that are, on the contrary, very much inclusive of China (such as that used by the newly-created University of Adelaide's Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre, IPGRC), but it must be said that this more inclusive map is not the dominant geopolitical construction currently being solicited and espoused. On the contrary, we argue here that there is an overriding narrative at work that seeks to de-emphasise an Indian Ocean Regional security construction while at the same time attempting to propagate a view in favour of a more US-centric/China exclusive Indo-Pacific regional security construction. Furthermore, it is a matter of opinion as to whose interests are being furthered by the propagation and perpetuation of any one of these regional constructions in association with particular 'century myths' (including America's Pacific Century, Asian Century, Asia-Pacific Century and Indo-Pacific Century).

2. The Indian Ocean as a regional security construction: critical geopolitical perspectives

It is useful to emphasise, as critical geopolitical perspectives do, especially for the purposes of this paper, that 'futures' are neither given nor inevitable. At best, they are visualised, framed, anticipated, debated, pursued and/or avoided. According to Ó Tuathail (1992, p. 439):

The focus of critical geopolitics is on exposing the plays of power involved in grand geopolitical schemes. . . . Fundamental to this process is the power of certain national security elites to represent the nature and defining of dilemmas of international politics in particular ways. . . . These representational practices of national security intellectuals generate particular 'scripts' in international politics concerning places, peoples and issues. Such 'scripts' then become part of the means by which [great power] hegemony is exercised in the international system.

While one commentator has argued that 'the Indian Ocean itself is much over-rated as an entity of strategic importance' (R. Smith 2011), the twenty-first century has seen a strategic reassessment of the global geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean Region. This is as a result of a changed set of perceptions on the part of regional and extra-regional states.

In the United States, for example:

The United States has a substantial interest in the stability of the Indian Ocean region as a whole . . . Ensuring *open access* to the Indian Ocean will require a more integrated approach to the region across military and civilian organizations. (US Department of Defense 2010, p. 60 – emphasis added.)

The United States has been undergoing a reassessment of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region in recent years owing in part to the growth in a range of non-traditional threats and since the growing economic and military importance of

both China and India in the region challenges US dominance in the region. Indeed, it has been asserted that:

the Indian Ocean may be the essential place to contemplate the future of US power. (Kaplan 2010, p. xiv)

Only by seeking at every opportunity to identify its struggles with those of the larger Indian Ocean world can American power finally be preserved. (Kaplan 2010, p. 323)

In Australia, the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper argued that the Indian Ocean will have a much greater geostrategic significance in the period to 2030 and will join the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to Australian defence planning and maritime strategy (Commonwealth of Australia 2009, p. 37). Furthermore, the former Australian Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, argued that the Indian Ocean is in need of a regional organisation to match its growing influence (Rudd 2011). The changing strategic context in the Indian Ocean Region has caused one prominent commentator to suggest that the geopolitical importance of Australia itself has fundamentally shifted from what he describes as a 'strategic backwater' to a situation where Australia is now at 'the southern tier of the focus of the global political system' (Beazley 2009).

Regional definition

The definition of the Indian Ocean Region itself, of course, is contested. As John Agnew (2000, p. 107) has put it so succinctly, regions 'are not simply bounded spaces on a map but complex mixes of representational projection and material functional inter-relationships'. Thus, from a formal perspective, the Indian Ocean Region could be defined as comprising those states that border directly onto the Indian Ocean itself – that is, the littoral states or rim of the Indian Ocean. From a functional point of view, on the other hand, we could define the Indian Ocean Region as comprising those 19 states that currently belong to and participate in the IOR-ARC.

However, a broader functional definition would include all of those littoral Indian Ocean states that have an interest in the maximisation of the Ocean's security (broadly defined). The common formal and functional criterion is, of course, a border on and an interest in the Ocean itself. In the case of the latter criterion we could therefore include states associated with the tributary waters to the Indian Ocean as well as those land-locked states for which transit to and from the sea is primarily oriented towards the Indian Ocean. Using this broadest regional construction, we can identify a total of 51 states (Table 2), 28 of which are Indian Ocean Rim states, plus a further 10 that are coastal states of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, together with an additional 13 Indian Ocean land-locked states (Bouchard and Crumplin 2010, pp. 34–35).

One view of a preferred regional security construction is that it be built around this Indian Ocean Region. This view argues that strategic reassessments of the Indian Ocean Region and associated security challenges are contributing to the development of a new collective Indian Ocean security paradigm built on maritime regionalism. Such a maritime regionalism paradigm is primarily designed to facilitate confidence building and to deal effectively with a wide range of so-called

Table 2. The 51 states of the Indian Ocean Region.

Indian Ocean Rim states		Other coastal states of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf	Indian Ocean land-locked states
Australia	Mozambique	Bahrain	Afghanistan
Bangladesh	Oman	Egypt	Bhutan
Burma (Myanmar)	Pakistan	Eritrea	Botswana
Comoros	Seychelles	Iraq	Burundi
Djibouti	Singapore	Israel	Ethiopia
France ^a	Somalia	Jordan	Lesotho
Kenya	South Africa	Kuwait	Malawi
India	Sri Lanka	Qatar	Nepal
Indonesia	Tanzania	Saudi Arabia	Rwanda
Iran	Thailand	Sudan	Swaziland
Madagascar	Timor-Leste		Uganda
Malaysia	United Arab		Zambia
Maldives	Emirates		Zimbabwe
Mauritius	UK ^a		
	Yemen		

^aFor France and the UK: because of their island territories.

Source: Bouchard and Crumplin (2010), p. 35.

‘non-traditional’ security challenges. This is especially the case for ‘non-state threats’, such as piracy and terrorism, as well as other ‘non-traditional’ or transnational security threats associated with the use of the Ocean, such as maritime security matters, environmental security issues and the nature of economic exploitation both in and below the Ocean itself.

It has also been argued that a single organisational mechanism – the IOR-ARC – which is already in place, is in the process of being revived, is chaired by India and with Australia as the vice-chair, is a potential vehicle to facilitate the broadening of its original trade and investment agenda to include a number of common security threats (Bateman and Bergin 2010, p. 47). There are at least five key interrelated elements of this maritime regionalism paradigm that should be noted here:

- (1) It is Ocean-based – the Ocean is central – issues associated with the use of the Ocean are critical considerations – around the edge; across; on, in and under.
- (2) It is an holistic security paradigm – takes into consideration the notion that security is a multidimensional concept – military, economic, environmental, human and political – ‘the oneness of the sea’ (Panikkar 1945, p. 18).
- (3) It is less contrived and more ‘natural’ in that it is based around an ecological concept of the Indian Ocean and its various interactions.
- (4) It is a concept that is much more people-centred – it ensures that the voices of Indian Ocean peoples and communities have more of a say in their human security.
- (5) It is a concept that implies a much greater degree of regional cooperation to collectively solve common problems rather than a concept that is solely state-based and grounded primarily in competition.

At the IOR-ARC meeting in Bangalore in November 2011, Australia canvassed a number of priority areas for dialogue and cooperation in addition to trade and investment facilitation, including fisheries management, maritime security, resource and energy security, disaster management and science cooperation, including ocean science, food security and climate change adaptation (Rudd 2011).

Limitations of the Indian Ocean regional security construction

One of the most basic sets of limitations with the use of the pre-existing IOR-ARC mechanism for security purposes is that it lacks coherence, identity and resources. Certainly, it can be said that, after 14 years of its existence, the IOR-ARC still remains a concept. At the Bangalore IOR-ARC meeting in November 2011, former Australian Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, in a discussion over the possibility of considering renaming the IOR-ARC to something like 'Indian Ocean Community', made the point that, as soon as he talked to US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, about the IOR-ARC, 'she immediately steered the conversation to Baghdad' (Rumley 2012).

The membership of the IOR-ARC is also a debatable issue. For example, apart from the current 19-state member structure, the IOR-ARC also contains five 'non-regional' Dialogue Partners – China, Egypt, France, Japan and the UK. It is arguable that, given this list of states and given the strategic interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean Region, it too might well be a serious candidate for Dialogue Partnership. However, there are at least two main sets of obstacles to this scenario, assuming indeed that the United States might even consider such a direction. The first is that the IOR-ARC is a consensus-based organisation and thus application for membership change can be forestalled by any member state. Iran, for example, has used the IOR-ARC as one of its few mechanisms to facilitate regional cooperation (Morady 2011) and would probably deny US membership given the consensus nature of the organisation. The second is that, to date, while the IOR-ARC has purported to be an economic cooperation group, any widening of its agenda is likely to perpetuate a collective interest only in 'non-traditional' security interests (Doyle 2005, 2011). Involvement of the United States in IOR-ARC would probably be seen by some member states as a likely move in the direction of traditional military security concerns, an issue long regarded as being 'off-limits' in the organisation.

While some analysts might quibble about an organisation-based definition of the Indian Ocean Region, there is little dispute over the assertion that the region is highly diverse from a political, demographic, economic, environmental and strategic viewpoint. Thus, from a narrow statist perspective, the Indian Ocean Region is neither a 'single strategic entity' (R. Smith 2011), nor is it a 'clear and coherent geopolitical system'. Dealing with traditional security questions within such a regional framework thus tends to defy internal logic.

In any event, state-based security relationships tend to be organised at a sub-regional system level – for example, Southern Africa, Persian Gulf, South Asia and Southeast Asia – and it is at this scale that there exists among states the most effective level of regional cooperation and economic integration (Bouchard and Crumplin 2010, p. 42). Nevertheless, there are many Ocean-wide security issues of both regional and global significance deserving of further regional analysis

and policy development. Clearly, as noted earlier, the renewed interest of the United States in the Indian Ocean Region has been prompted in part owing to the growing economic and military importance of both China and India in the region that challenges US dominance. Indeed, it has been noted that the US response to the challenges to the rise of China has been for the United States to strengthen traditional alliances and to forge new partnerships (Curtis *et al.* 2011, p. 14).

From what has been said earlier, facilitating US involvement in maritime security issues in particular, requires a new regional construction. However, the United States Unified Command Structure divides the Indian Ocean Region between US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and US Pacific Command (USPACOM). It has been suggested that this division has resulted in a 'fragmented' security organisation structure as far as the US approach to the IOR is concerned (Hastings 2011). Of course, existing managerial structures remain extremely important, as they match bureaucratic structures. Often changes in overall strategic direction are not made simply because bureaucratic and departmental structures are pre-existing and well-entrenched, rather than being indicative of either an acceptance or a rejection of new institutional architecture reflective of power shifts and new regional constellations (Doyle 2011).

Regions, then, are not just collections of nation-states – they also reflect different constellations of domestic interests and institutions within states. In this vein, more innovative theorisation of regions and regionalisms (what Jayasuriya calls spatially based 'regulatory regionalism') challenges traditional and exclusively nation-state-based conceptions of regions. Changes in the scales of governance reflect the changed circumstances of new interests. For example, regional networks exist in contesting bureaucratic agencies, communities, academies and NGO sectors, and they often pre-date and inform the more formal state-centric attempts to construct regions. In this vein, the concept of regionalism has too long been captured by a certain 'methodological nationalism' (Jayasuriya 2008).

In any event, it has been suggested that the Indian Ocean Region is too large and diverse to enable an overarching security arrangement. Furthermore, the security diversity among Indian Ocean states militates against close and effective cooperation. As one commentator put it:

In the end the Indian Ocean region is too vast and diverse to lend itself to a single over-arching institutional framework in the near term. Instead of obsessing with an architectural design for the Indian Ocean, the region could build upon the ideas of the Australian foreign minister Kevin Rudd for 'incremental advance' through 'functional cooperation'. Central to the creation of a *pan-regional identity in the Indian Ocean* is an active and enduring collaboration between India, Australia and other like-minded countries in the littoral. (Raja Mohan 2011b – our emphasis.)

This view essentially renders as irrelevant any security architecture built solely on the Indian Ocean as defined earlier, but the solution that is offered by some analysts is the adherence to a regional security architecture that is even larger in extent – the Indo-Pacific Region.

3. The East Indian Ocean

A second competing regional security construction centres on the East Indian Ocean (EIO). We have been reminded recently that: 'Australia often forgets that it's a

three-ocean country'. Thus, while Australia has had a unified policy framework for the Pacific Ocean, such an approach is lacking for the Indian Ocean as a whole (Bateman and Bergin 2010, p. 33). However, a *full* Australian engagement in an Indian Ocean-wide set of security initiatives is subject to the constraint of what has been described as the problem of 'territorial overstretch'. That is, the challenge of attempting to undertake too much engagement across too great a span of territory on too many issues (Rumley 2012, p. 103).

Since Australia's 'geographical reach is limited', resource limitations and the need therefore to give some concrete focus to programmes in order to maximise a likely successful outcome, a more limited regional security construction might be preferred to begin with. Thus, while not neglecting the rest of the Indian Ocean Region, Australia, it is argued, should focus first on the geographically closer EIO sub-region to enable practical cooperation and constructive dialogue (Bateman and Bergin 2010, pp. 45–47). A closer initial Australian focus on the EIO could lead to the development of a wide range of practical policy outcomes (Table 3).

Four of the key areas that might be developed include the establishment of a dialogue with India and Indonesia on the possible creation of a forum for the EIO (Bateman and Bergin 2010, p. 5). Furthermore, it is argued that, although the EIO is a part of the primary operating environment for the Australian Defence Force, there is a need to increase its presence in the region (Bateman and Bergin 2010, p. 33). As Bateman and Bergin point out, the western Indian Ocean is better organised for cooperative marine science research and thus there is considerable scope to enhance marine science and ocean management initiatives in the EIO (Bateman and Bergin 2010, p. 43). Fourth, to facilitate some of the scientific research for such an initiative, as well as to recreate a social science research focus, there is a need to develop a new Indian Ocean Studies Centre (Table 3). Perhaps this could be based on pre-existing research strengths in the two Australian Indian Ocean states, Western Australia and South Australia.

Table 3. Towards an Australian Indian Ocean policy.

1.	Australia to increase its strategic presence in the IOR
2.	Need for greater regional cooperation and dialogue using the IOR-ARC on areas of common interest, including disaster management, scientific research, Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), illegal trafficking, fisheries and offshore infrastructure security
3.	Need for a new International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR); need for India and Australia EIO dialogue
4.	Enhanced bilateral relations with India, Indonesia, South Africa and France
5.	Greater energy cooperation
6.	Australia should host a future Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
7.	Promotion of greater and better maritime information exchange
8.	Need for greater study on maritime policing and patrol
9.	More regular air and surface patrols around Cocos Islands
10.	Development of broad principles of ocean management
11.	Audit of current marine research in Indian Ocean
12.	Western Australia Government should establish a portfolio of IOR affairs
13.	Increased Australian Defence Force presence along the west coast of Australia
14.	Creation of a new Indian Ocean Studies Centre at Western Australia University

Source: Bateman and Bergin 2010, pp. 46–61.
IOR-ARC, Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation

4. The Indo-Pacific region

A third regional security construction is that of the Indo-Pacific region, a concept that has re-entered the security debate this decade after a lengthy absence. Some commentators appear to take it for granted that we have now entered the ‘Indo-Pacific century’ (Medcalf 2012, p. 13). Proponents exert us to believe that its emergence is both ‘irresistible’ (Wesley 2011) and ‘inevitable’ (Raja Mohan 2011b). Strangely, however, the term is often used and taken as a self-evident ‘given’, but is rarely defined (for example, Wesley 2011). Nonetheless, we are assured that the Asia-Pacific (also not defined) era died in 2011 and was replaced with the Indo-Pacific era (we are not sure, however, whether it was buried or cremated – no doubt its ghost will haunt us for a while yet). It is claimed by conservative Australian journalist Greg Sheridan that the sixtieth anniversary Ausmin meeting in San Francisco in September 2011 marked the ‘pivot point’ at which both Australia and the United States began to ‘redefine their region not as the Asia-Pacific, but as the Indo-Pacific’ (Sheridan 2011a).

Perhaps not surprisingly in this rhetorical debate, the Indo-Pacific construction itself is contested. As touched upon, the University of Adelaide’s *Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre* defines the Indo-Pacific as the ‘region spanning the Western Pacific Ocean to the Western Indian Ocean along the eastern coast of Africa’ (IPGRC 2011). The Indo-Pacific has also been defined as ‘the areas of the Indian Ocean and the West Pacific’ (Curtis *et al.* 2011, p. 1). Furthermore, it has been defined as ‘an emerging Asian strategic system that encompasses both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, defined in part by the geographically expanding interests and reach of China and India, and the continued strategic role and presence of the United States in both’ (Medcalf, Heinrichs and Jones 2011, p. 56).

One research report from the conservative think-tank, the American Enterprise Institute, appears to believe that all regions are both ‘coherent’ and ‘arbitrary’ (Auslin 2010, p. 7). To Auslin, the Indo-Pacific region comprises:

the entire continental and maritime region stretching from the eastern edges of Siberia southward in a vast arc, encompassing Japan, the Korean peninsula, mainland China, mainland and archipelagic Southeast Asia and Oceania, and India. Drawing the Indo-Pacific’s borders is an arbitrary matter, but excluding maritime and land areas west of India preserves a largely coherent geographic region

the reality is that the Indo-Pacific has always been an interlinked realm, connected by land, air, and sea lines of communication. Its history is one of constant exchange of peoples, goods, and ideas, as well as one of conflict.

In sum, the Indo-Pacific is a (vaguely defined) region that extends the Indian Ocean Region concept eastwards through Southeast Asia and north through the Pacific Ocean, a vast swathe of ocean.

Statements by informed commentators over the apparent death of the Asia-Pacific regional construction are especially interesting when one considers them in the context of the most recent statement on Australian security – the 2009 Defence White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia 2009). According to this document:

Australia has an enduring strategic interest in the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean. (Commonwealth of Australia 2009, p. 12)

Interestingly, the Indo-Pacific is also often regarded as a biogeographic region of the Earth's seas, comprising the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean, the western and central Pacific Ocean, and the seas connecting the two in the general area of Indonesia. As such it has been sub-divided into three 'realms' – the Western Indo-Pacific, the Central Indo-Pacific and the Eastern Indo-Pacific (Spalding *et al.* 2007). This concept re-emerged in the policy domain in 1948 with the creation of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council, which, perhaps ironically in the context of the present argument, was transformed into the Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission in 1994.

The argument is put that the Indian Ocean cannot be geopolitically differentiated from the Pacific and thus we need to employ a new concept. Furthermore, increasing economic and trade linkages – a process of *regionalisation* – necessitates, it is suggested, the construction of an Indo-Pacific *regionalism*. In addition, it appears that one of the practical security aims of the re-introduction of this regional construction is to attempt to shift the centre of gravity of Indian and Australian security concerns away from the Indian Ocean and towards the South China Sea as a part of a burden-sharing strategy with the United States. It is thus, in part, an attempt by the United States both to engage India and Australia (and others) while simultaneously being a mechanism for facilitating its hegemonic transition. At the same time, as aforesaid, it also enables the global structure (and regulatory regionalism) of the US military command structure to remain intact – that is, it corresponds to the USPACOM noted above.

Traditional geopolitical antecedents

The first recorded reference to the Indo-Pacific concept can be found in the writings of German geopolitician, Karl Haushofer, in the 1920s (Haushofer 2002). Sigmund Neumann (1943, p. 281) made this point about Haushofer's perspective:

By no mere accident, the founder of the geopolitical school started his career not as a professional academician but on staff service for the army. In this capacity he had been sent on a military mission to Japan. His years in the Far East awakened in him a lasting sentiment for Japan and the greatest interest in the Indo-Pacific area. His observations and experiences there developed all the leitmotifs of his dynamic political theory, which in 1924 found full expression in his *Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean*. Yet long before the First World War he had conceived the idea that '*whoever could make an alliance with that part of the globe [the Indo-Pacific area] with its rich resources and could rule the rest of the world*'. (Our emphasis.)

As is well known among geopoliticians, the writings of Haushofer and others provided a rationale for the expansion of Nazi Germany by means of the use of a biological analogy as a model for the territorial growth of the state. The state was regarded as an organism that expands and grows and is in competition with neighbouring organisms for space. In the case of the state, it was argued that the state expanded to occupy its 'natural' boundaries in order to control its 'living space' (or *lebensraum*). As states expanded to occupy their living spaces, inevitably they were in conflict at the peripheries where territorial control was contested as neighbouring states (organisms) attempted to expand. It has been suggested in the twenty-first century that, 'resource shortages may drive those countries which are worst affected by scarcity to seek "lebensraum" elsewhere in the world' (Porritt 2011, p. 8).

German geopolitical writers in the 1930s devised a global model of world order and proposed a tripartite division of the world into large *pan regions*. A pan region is defined as ‘a large functional area linking core states to resource peripheries and cutting across latitudinally distributed environmental zones’ (O’Loughlin and Van der Wusten 1990). These pan regions were ‘natural spheres of interests’ and, in the case of the Indo-Pacific case, Japan was portrayed as the core state with the remainder as the periphery and engaged in the supply of food and raw materials. As it happens, the geographical delimitation of the Indo-Pacific Region corresponds with the Asia-Pacific pan region identified in the 1930s.

Indian geopolitical imperatives and discursive displacements?

Traditional geopolitical writings highlight a number of other geopolitical imperatives. For example, India’s pioneer geopolitician, K.M. Panikkar, argued more than 60 years ago that, since India’s future was dependent on the Indian Ocean, then ‘the Indian Ocean must therefore remain truly Indian’. Furthermore, as he pointed out: ‘A true appreciation of Indian historical forces will show beyond doubt, that whoever controls the Indian Ocean has India at its mercy’ (Panikkar 1945, pp. 84–85). Furthermore, as Mahan is reputed to have said in an interview with an Italian journalist: ‘Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia’ (Roy-Chaudhury 1995, p. 199).

In an effort to maintain Ocean stability and security, Panikkar favoured a cooperative endeavour within which India’s primary role would be ‘to guard the steel ring created by Singapore, Ceylon, Mauritius and Socotra’ (Panikkar 1945, p. 95), a large oceanic triangle encompassing Diego Garcia. Panikkar predicted a resurgence in Chinese maritime lebensraum:

It was only the existence of the naval power of the SriVijayas that prevented the Chinese from establishing their authority in the Indonesian Archipelago and as the Portuguese appear soon after the breakdown of Sri Vijaya, the southward expansion of China over oceanic space was shut out. The movement towards the south which is indicated by the significant demography of the area, may, and in all probability will, be reflected in the naval policy of resurgent China. (Panikkar 1945, pp. 85–86)

Any southward projection of Chinese power is in part associated with a traditional model of the perceived Chinese sphere of influence (Ginsberg 1968). Furthermore, the possibility of the expansion of Chinese naval power south is clearly not only associated with accessing the potential resources wealth under the South China Sea, but is directly related to Chinese interests in maintaining secure access to energy and other resources through the Indian Ocean Region.

It has been argued that the rise of India is in the process of producing a new geopolitical configuration, resulting in a transition from an Asia-Pacific to an Indo-Pacific construction, seemingly both imagined *and* real (Raja Mohan 2011a):

As India became a trading nation, like China before it, *it was inevitable* that Delhi’s national security policy would acquire a new maritime focus. The new reliance on the sea for importing ever-growing quantities of energy and mineral resources, and for exporting its products to widely dispersed global markets, meant *India would naturally* turn towards building a blue water navy. (Raja Mohan 2011b – our emphasis.)

Although India's ambitions are to project as a major naval power, for the time being at least, it is likely that there will remain a good deal of reliance on the United States in the Indian Ocean Region to provide a 'collective good' – that is a stable region (Pant 2012, p. 112). Nonetheless, the struggle for influence and power between India and China is likely to continue to mould 'India's naval posture as well as the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean region in the coming years' (Pant 2012, p. 127).

It is argued, however, that there are at least three new *imperatives* that are in the process of redefining the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region. First is the view that security problems in East Asian waters need to be visualised within a broader framework of the Indo-Pacific. Second is the relative decline of the United States as the principal security provider in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans for the foreseeable future. Third is the emergence of India as a maritime power, and rather than acting alone, its need to build coalitions with states possessing common interests (Raja Mohan 2011b). India is not only required to 'look east'; it is required to look 'further east', even to the 'far east'.

The foreword to India's Maritime Military strategy (2007), written by Admiral Suresh Mehta, begins with the following quote from the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Manmohan Singh: 'India's growing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca ... India has exploited the fluidities of the emerging world order to forge new links through a combination of diplomatic repositioning, economic resurgence and military firmness' (India's Maritime Strategy 2007, p. iii). Writing four years later, Ambassador Shyam Saran (2011), former Foreign Secretary of India, was rather emphatic in his acknowledgement that:

Over the past year, the term 'Indo-Pacific' has gained currency in strategic discourse in India. From a geopolitical perspective it represents the inclusion of the Western Pacific within the range of India's security interests, thus stretching beyond the traditional focus on the Indian Ocean theatre. It is a logical corollary to India's Look East policy having graduated to an Engage East policy. The fastest growing component of India's external economic relations is its engagement with ASEAN, China and Japan and, more lately, Australia. This has resulted in a growing density of maritime traffic through the Indian Ocean and radiating all along the Western Pacific littoral. These have created a seamless stretch of ocean space linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In another sense, it is also a reflection of the concept of the Asia-Pacific, which hitherto excluded India, expanding westwards to encompass the subcontinent as its integral part. *As India's regional and global profile increases, it will inevitably gravitate towards the centre of this expanded geopolitical and geo-economic space. The concept of an Indo-Pacific theatre fits in neatly with this evolving trend.* (Emphasis added.)

According to Shyam Saran, China asking India to keep its hands off South China Sea was well in line with the expected consequences of, and reactions to, India extending its geostrategic worldview to encompass the Pacific (ibid.), whereas most Southeast Asian countries and Japan appear quite positive towards a 'larger presence of Indian naval assets in the region' (ibid.). He further goes on to argue that, 'If the ongoing upgrade of India–Australia ties endures, then it is likely that the stretch of ocean which lies between the two countries will become a shared responsibility along with Indonesia' (ibid.). For Shyam Saran, the use of the term 'Indo-Pacific' by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seems to suggest that a new and 'integrated theatre', spanning the Pacific and the Indian oceans, has emerged and 'this is an

explicit and significant reflection of the growing strategic convergence between the two countries with respect to the region' (ibid.).

Shyam Saran takes special note of 'a categorical American acknowledgement that the Asia-Pacific fully encompasses the Indian subcontinent' and feels that it accurately describes how India perceives its role in the region (ibid.). Saran 'would not exclude China, but it will have to decide whether it is ready to embrace an inclusive approach to dealing with the new challenges or insists on an exclusionary strategy, based on a narrow definition of its own security interests' (ibid.).

Saran concludes his engagement with the evolving discourse on the 'Indo-Pacific' with the comment that 'the US, which has avoided the use of the term 'Indian subcontinent' in favour of the more politically correct 'South Asia', has reverted to the earlier formulation' (ibid.). In his view this is neither accidental nor random. On the contrary, it underlines his

argument that while South Asia is divided into several independent and sovereign entities, the region is a single geopolitical unit by virtue of history, geography and cultural affinity. As the largest state in the region, India's security perspective necessarily transcends these political boundaries. In that sense, the term Indian subcontinent reflects a living reality and not a throw back to some outdated colonial artifice. That the US is belatedly acknowledging this reality is a good sign. (Ibid.).

The reconceptualisation of South Asia as the 'Indian Subcontinent' within the emerging geopolitical discourse of the 'Indo-Pacific', and its underlying geopolitical visions, are likely to provoke reactions from India's neighbours sooner rather than later. They might accentuate the geopolitical anxieties, bordering on fear, in some quarters over India's intentions to dominate its immediate neighbourhood, and even bypass it, while reaching out to the 'extended neighbourhood'.

The United States and the Indo-Pacific

It has been argued, however, that the United States does not have a coherent geopolitical vision of the Indian Ocean Region and that the allocation of political and military resources makes it difficult for the United States to make a credible commitment to the security of the Indian Ocean Region as a whole. There are three principal reasons for this. First, to the extent that the United States has an alliance structure in the Indian Ocean Region, it is composed of the residual relationships from other strategically important regions, thus decreasing its ability to be turned to the security of the Indian Ocean Region. Second, while the US Department of Defense rhetorically recognises the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean Region, there is no single US military command structure dedicated to the Indian Ocean Region, as noted earlier. Third, the military forces that are pre-positioned in the region are not insignificant, but are ill-suited for making the necessary commitments to the region as a whole. This spatial distribution of resources has implications for the ability of the United States to make a credible claim that the Indian Ocean Region as a whole is at the core of its interests (Hastings 2011).

The new imperative of shifting from an Indian Ocean to an Indo-Pacific regional security construction is driven in part by concerns over possible Chinese naval expansionism and by a concern over the use of Chinese naval power both in the

Indian Ocean *and* in the South China Sea. From a US perspective, effectively managing these concerns requires the cooperation not only of India, but also of Australia, Indonesia, Japan and other states that possess similar concerns. Further, the role of the United States as a coalition builder is portrayed as benign since its role is one of regional stabilisation and counterbalance.

There are clear benefits, however, that will accrue to the coalition partners. Overall, India is given the green light to pursue a policy of maritime expansionism as a counterbalance to Chinese maritime lebensraum (Abe 2010). India, from what has been said above, thus 'secures' its future. Japan and other East and Southeast Asian states are reassured by this new posture and by the confirmation of a benign Indian naval potential. Australia gains, it is argued, because it will obtain a US presence in a remote region that is of national economic significance and which is thus a potential subject of future threat. Furthermore, from an overall regional geopolitical perspective, as a result of this strategy, the coalition will effect a closer monitoring and potential control over the eastern exits and entrances of Indian Ocean access routes. The end result of all of the above is clearly of *global* geopolitical significance.

This may in part help to explain not only why the United States has adopted the Indo-Pacific regional security conception but also the vigorous manner in which it has seemingly been propagated and hence accepted by numerous sympathetic analysts. Some commentators have suggested, for example, that the concept has not only been 'pushed', but has also been strenuously adopted and widely propagated by like-minded think-tanks, analysts and newspaper reporters. Seemingly, the dominant, conservative and US-centric Indo-Pacific regional security construction not only places China in a 'corner' (Shukla 2011), but also facilitates long-term responses to regional conflict in a way that is likely to maximise the prospects for regional and global stability.

Some implications for Australia

The Indo-Pacific construction has been dormant in Australian discourse until this decade, apart from during the 1950s when reference was made to the 'Indo-Pacific Dominions' in a discussion of decolonisation (Cumpton 1956), and again during the 1970s in a discussion over regional security. In the case of the latter it was argued that Australian security would be 'safeguarded' in a four-power 'Indo-Pacific balance' comprising China, Japan, the United States and the USSR (Gelber 1971, p. 307).

The renewed interest in an Indo-Pacific construction on the part of the United States clearly has some basic implications for the long-term future of United States–Australia security relations. In an op-ed piece in *Foreign Policy* in October 2011, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, declared:

We are also expanding our alliance with Australia *from a Pacific partnership to an Indo-Pacific one*, and indeed a global partnership. From cyber security to Afghanistan to the Arab Awakening to strengthening regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Australia's counsel and commitment have been indispensable. And in Southeast Asia, we are renewing and strengthening our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, increasing, for example, the number of ship visits to the Philippines and working to ensure the successful training of Filipino counterterrorism forces through our Joint Special

Operations Task Force in Mindanao. In Thailand – our oldest treaty partner in Asia – we are working to establish a hub of regional humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in the region. (Emphasis added.)

As a result of US President Barack Obama's visit to Australia in November 2011, one Australian journalist concluded:

Obama wants to lead America into an *Indo-Pacific 21st century*. Happily, he may well lead Australia there as well. (Sheridan 2011b – emphasis added.)

From an Australian perspective, however, to some degree, the move away from an Indian Ocean and towards an Indo-Pacific security construction has reignited the basic trilateral geopolitical tension faced by Australia's external linkages – that culturally, Australia identifies primarily with Europe; that economically, Australia's strongest links are with Asia, and especially China; and, that militarily and politically, Australia is seen to follow the United States (Rumley 2007, p. 137).

In addition, as former Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating, has stated, the overall shift that was announced in the Australian Parliament by US President Barack Obama raises the spectre of 'recreating bipolarity' (Keating 2011). Any attempt to create a situation that is perceived as some kind of 'nascent Chinese containment' strategy inevitably runs the risk of facilitating a view of the beginning of a new regional Cold War. Such an outcome is not in Australia's long-term interest.

Secondly, the way in which this policy shift was delivered and received has raised questions in the minds of some key trading partners and others as to the formerly unassailable Australian role as a middle power with an intermediary role, developed so well during Gareth Evans's watch as Australian Foreign Minister. For China, arguably, the seemingly irrelevant rhetoric of 'containment' has been replaced with the rhetoric of 'counterbalance'. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the Chinese reaction to the Indo-Pacific conception has been somewhat negative. An early reaction was to announce naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean since the Obama initiative was seen as intruding into its sphere of influence (*The Australian* 2011). Furthermore, General Luo Yuan, of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences is quoted as saying:

The United States is making much of its 'return to Asia', has been positioning pieces and forces of China's periphery and the intent is very clear – this is aimed at China, to contain China. (Garnaut 2011)

However, other commentators believe that the increased US presence in Australia neither undermines Australian security, nor will it have a negative long-term impact on China–Australia relations. Rather than being aimed at China – some 4000 kilometres from Darwin – the principal purpose is seen to be to contribute to Southeast Asian security and stability through 'enhanced engagement' (Dibb 2011).

Enhanced engagement has also been proposed in terms of creating a formal trilateral dialogue among Australia, India and the United States that would be designed to face common security challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region (Curtis *et al.* 2011). These would include:

- strengthening maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region and helping to maintain freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific;

- improving defence capabilities in space and ballistic missile defence;
- counterterrorism measures;
- coordination of non-proliferation policy;
- supporting and promoting democracy, human rights and good governance.

As the trilateral think-tank report argued:

A U.S.–Australia–India trilateral dialogue would go a long way toward addressing near-term priorities even as it promotes an order in the Indo-Pacific that is conducive to economic and political stability, security, continued free and open trade, and democratic governance. (Curtis *et al.* 2011, p. 19.)

5. Towards a more inclusive regional security construction

One of the more important dimensions of contested regionalism is that of inclusivity or exclusivity – that is, whether the scale or the type of regionalism includes or excludes certain states, and, in addition, whether the type of regionalism is in full accord with or conflicts in some way with state/non-state goals. This dimension of contested regionalism can be seen to operate in practice from at least two perspectives – that is, from the viewpoint of the state wishing to be included, and, second, from the perspective of the state or states wishing to implement exclusion. In either case, inclusion in or membership of regional constructions or organisations can be used as a mechanism for creating or reconstituting some form of regional identity (Rumley 2005).

Regional inclusiveness is absent in two major regional groupings. For example, as mentioned earlier, the United States is not a member of IOR-ARC. In the case of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping, India is not a member. On the other hand, the 18-member (ASEAN +8 – Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States) East Asia Summit ‘is a regional leaders’ forum for strategic dialogue and cooperation on key challenges facing the East Asian region’ (DFAT 2011). It has been argued that, as the East Asia Summit is both inclusive and integrative (that is, it is a forum to consider a wide range of regional security interests), it is highly likely that it will become the basis of a new Indo-Pacific Community (IPC) and that it:

Seems destined to become a regular event and thus the policy-guiding core of any future East Asian or Indo-Pacific community. (Richardson 2005, p. 351)

Furthermore, such an *inclusive* group has the potential to be ‘a buffer against instability and a magnet for investment and progress’ (Richardson 2005, p. 365). Such a concept appears to be qualitatively different from the Indo-Pacific concept currently being contemplated by the United States and India since Richardson’s IPC is a construction that includes China.

Despite Richardson and the aforementioned University of Adelaide’s Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre including the Peoples Republic of China in its depiction of the Indo-Pacific, the way in which it has been portrayed by most commentators and state actors in Australia, India and the United States, and the way it has been perceived as a result in China, clearly indicates that, in practice, the current Indo-Pacific regional construction is *exclusive* and is thus directed towards

China itself. As a result, the propagation of this concept in its present portrayal may well have unintended negative consequences that may lead to an increase in regional instability. Furthermore, while the proposal for a Trilateral Australia–India–USA dialogue notes that ‘Australia depends heavily on sea traffic through the Indo-Pacific region’ (Curtis *et al.* 2011, p. 4), it is self-evidently not in China’s interests to disrupt that trade in any serious manner given the undoubted mutual importance of Australia–China trade. Inclusiveness is more likely to build long-term trust and to reduce regional tensions. For example, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has suggested that Australia should conduct military exercises with China as a means of attempting to defuse any tension arising from the proposed stationing of 2500 marines in Northern Australia.

6. Conclusion and implications

To a degree, like too much of contemporary international relations commentary, it is a matter of opinion as to whose interests are being furthered by the propagation and perpetuation of certain ‘century myths’ and by reproducing particular regional security constructions. One of the several limitations of the debate on this fundamentally important issue is that too many conclusions are based on too little analysis, sometimes driven by undeclared ideological orientations. Also, too much emphasis is placed on states acting as homogenous entities, when the regulatory regionalism of given bureaucratic departments within states is also driving conflicting regional constellations.

The undoubted strength and influence of the Indo-Pacific regional security construction has some important implications for our other two Indian Ocean proposals – IOR-ARC and EIO. It is likely that the former will disappear slowly, that attempts to revive it will be fraught, and that it will remain relatively weak and at a low level with minimal functions and few measurable outcomes. Any potential security function that IOR-ARC might consider undertaking will probably take place in other forums. For example, some Ocean-based cooperation may be implemented that later develops into other organisations. IOR-ARC, in effect, will engage in little, if any, traditional or maritime security cooperation.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that, owing to a range of pressures from within India, Australia and the United States, it is essential for both India and Australia to control and preside over the demise of Indian Ocean regionalism as conceptualised earlier in this paper. In contrast, the prospects for EIO cooperation along the lines discussed earlier in the paper and conceptualised by Bateman and Bergin (Table 3) remain relatively bright, if only because the EIO is congruent with USPACOM.

The Indo-Pacific construction, which is strongly supported by realists, conservative commentators and others (Table 1), will probably perpetuate the view that the consideration of security issues within IOR-ARC continues to remain ‘off limits’. The Indo-Pacific will thus become the main organising concept for regional (maritime) security. As the Australian Minister of Defence, Stephen Smith, has pointed out:

Australia is looking increasingly to the Indian Ocean as a region of critical strategic importance. So significant is India’s rise that *the notion of the Indo-Pacific as*

a substantial strategic concept is starting to gain traction. India's rise as a world power is at the forefront of Australia's foreign and strategic policy, as is the need to preserve maritime security in the Indian Ocean. India and Australia, with the two most significant and advanced navies of the Indian Ocean rim countries, are natural security partners in the Indo-Pacific region. (S. Smith 2011 – emphasis added.)

Obviously, if this Indo-Pacific regional model continues to 'gain traction', as Smith suggests, then, at the very least, it is paramount that those subservient voices arguing for China's inclusion in this new Indo-Pac mapping exercise become more vociferous.

India and Australia have just taken over as the chair and vice-chair of IOR-ARC at a critical juncture of the evolution of Indian Ocean regionalism. The future is difficult to predict, especially when it comes to a diverse and complex region such as the Indian Ocean. Our analysis has shown how various alternative *futures* for the Indian Ocean are being imagined, debated and pursued at present and 'how various practices of power acquire their own distinctive geographies' (Chaturvedi and Painter 2007, p. 391). Who or what is being 'secured' by these competing geopolitical visions is hard to tell owing to the calculated ambiguity inherent in each one of them. As Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks (2005, p. 26) point out, the 'very fundamentals of the concept are open to question: who or what are the objects or referents of security; what provides security; and for whom is the security intended: individuals, groups, nations, states, regions, the world – or intangibles such as values?'

References

- Abe, S. (2010), 'Ex-Japan PM says China eyeing nazi-type lebensraum', 19 October. Available at http://www.expressindia.com/story_print.php?storyId=699541, accessed 25 December 2010.
- Agnew, J. (2000), 'From the political economy of regions to regional political economy', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 101–110.
- Auslin, M. (2010), *Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons: Toward a Regional Strategy*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Bateman, S. and Bergin, A. (2010), *Our Western Front: Australia and the Indian Ocean*. Barton, ACT: ASPI.
- Beazley, K. (2009), 'Geopolitical power in the Indian Ocean', radio interview by Geraldine Doogue with Kim Beazley and Robert Kaplan. Available at <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/saturdayextra/stories>, accessed 1 January 2011.
- Bouchard, C. and Crumplin, W. (2010), 'Neglected no longer: the Indian Ocean at the forefront of world geopolitics and global geostrategy', *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, Vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 26–51.
- Chaturvedi, S. and Painter, J. (2007), 'Whose world, whose order? Spatiality, geopolitics, and the limits of the world order concept', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 375–395.
- Clinton, H.R. (2011), 'America's Pacific century', *Foreign Policy Magazine*, 11 October. Available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/175215.htm>, accessed 5 February 2011.
- Commonwealth of Australia (2009), *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*. Defence White Paper. Canberra: Department of Defence.
- Cumpton, I.M. (1956), 'Consolidation by conference?', *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 61–64.

- Curtis, L., Lohman, W., Medcalf, R., Powell, L., Rajagopalan, R.P. and Shearer, A. (2011), *Shared Goals, Converging Interests: A Plan for US-Australia-India Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific*. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation.
- DFAT (2011), Available at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/asean/eas/index.html> – accessed 16 December 2011.
- Dibb, P. (2011), ‘US build-up no threat to peace’, *The Australian*, 15 November, p. 12.
- Dijkink, F.W. (1996), *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain*. London: Routledge.
- Doyle, T. (2005), ‘The Indian Ocean as the *Nuclear Ocean*: environmental security dimensions of nuclear power’, in D. Rumley and S. Chaturvedi, eds., *Energy Security and the Indian Ocean Region*. Delhi: South Asian Publishers, pp. 230–252.
- Doyle, T. (2011), ‘Building Indian Ocean regionalisms: an agenda for IORG research’, in V. Sakhuja, ed., *Reinvigorating IOR-ARC*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, pp. 1–17.
- Franklin, M. (2011), ‘The future belongs to the free’, *The Australian*, 18 November, p. 1.
- Garnaut, J. (2011), ‘Aussie troops join Chinese in exercise’, *The West Australian*, 30 November, p. 48.
- Gelber, H.G. (1971), ‘Nuclear arms and the Pacific’, *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 295–308.
- Ginsberg, N. (1968), ‘On the Chinese perception of a World Order’, in Tsou Tang, ed., *China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 57–71.
- Gregory, D. (1994), *Geographical Imaginations*. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Hastings, J. (2011), ‘The fractured geopolitics of the United States in the Indian Ocean Region’, *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, Vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 183–199.
- Haushofer, K. (2002), *An English Translation of Major General Karl Ernst Haushofer's Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean and Studies in the Relationship Between Geography and History*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.
- India's Maritime Military Strategy (2007), *Freedom to Use the Seas*. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defense (Navy), Government of India. Available at http://indiannavy.nic.in/maritime_strat.pdf, accessed 3 March 2011.
- IPGRC (2011), The Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre, University of Adelaide. Available at <http://www.adelaide.edu.au/indo-pacific-governance/>, accessed 1 April 2011.
- Jayasuriya, K. (2008), ‘Regionalising the state: political topography of regulatory regionalism’, *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 21–35.
- Kaplan, R. (2010), *Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*. New York: Random House.
- Keating, P. (2011), ‘Paul Keating welcomes the rise of China’, *Lateline*, ABC Television, 23 November. Available at <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2011/s3374642.htm>, accessed 25 November 2011.
- Medcalf, R. (2012), ‘Unselfish giants? Understanding China and India as security providers’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 1–13.
- Medcalf, R., Heinrichs, R. and Jones, J. (2011), *Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia*. Sydney: Lowy.
- Morady, F. (2011), ‘Iran's ambitious for regional supremacy: the great powers, geopolitics and energy resources’, *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, Vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 75–84.
- Neumann, S. (1943), ‘Fashions in space’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 276–288.
- O'Loughlin, J. and Van der Wusten, H. (1990), ‘Political geography of panregions’, *Geographical Review*, Vol. 80, no. 1, pp. 1–20.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (1992), ‘The Bush Administration and the “3rd” of the Cold War: a critical geopolitics of US foreign policy in 1989’, *Geoforum*, Vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 437–452.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (2006), ‘Thinking critically about geopolitics’, in G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, eds., *The Geopolitics Reader*. London: Routledge, pp. 55–64.
- Panikkar, K.M. (1945), *India and the Indian Ocean: an Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History*. London: Allen and Unwin.

- Pant, H. (2012), 'India's growing naval power: Indian Ocean in focus', in G. Till and P.C. Bratton, eds., *Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific: The Triumph of Neptune?* Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 111–129.
- Porritt, J. (2011), 'Scarcity and sustainability in utopia', *Insights*, Vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 1–17.
- Raja Mohan, C. (2011a), 'Panel debate: India, Asia and the Indian Ocean', Australia India Institute Conference, 'The Reluctant Superpower: Understanding India and its Aspirations', 22 September, University of Melbourne.
- Raja Mohan, C. (2011b), 'India and Australia: maritime partners in the Indo-Pacific', *The Asialink Essays*, Vol. 3, no. 7, pp. 1–4.
- Richardson, M. (2005), 'Australia–Southeast Asia relations and the East Asia Summit', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 351–365.
- Richmond, O. and Franks, J. (2005), 'Human security and the War on Terror', in F. Dodds and T. Pippard, eds., *Human and Environment Security: an Agenda Change*. London: Earthscan, pp. 20–35.
- Roy-Chaudhury, R. (1995), *Sea Power and Indian Security*. London: Brassey's.
- Rudd, K. (2011), 'The Indian Ocean: in need of a regional organisation to match its growing influence', *The Hindu* newspaper, op-ed piece, 14 November. Available at <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2627557.ece>, accessed 16 November 2011.
- Rumley, D. (2005), 'The geopolitics of Asia-Pacific regionalism in the 21st century', *The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies*, Vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 3–25.
- Rumley, D. (2007), 'Australia's regional security challenges: a geopolitical perspective', in D. Rumley and D. Gopal, eds., *Globalisation and Regional Security: India and Australia*. Delhi: Shipra, pp. 133–157.
- Rumley, D. (2012), 'Refloating IOR-ARC: Australian perspectives', in V. Sakhuja, ed., *Reinvigorating IOR-ARC*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, pp. 87–105.
- Saran, S. (2011), 'Mapping the Indo-Pacific', *Indian Express*, 29 October 2011. Available at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mapping-the-indopacific/867004/0>, accessed 26 January 2012.
- Sheridan, G. (2011a), 'New Australia–US push deals India in to Pacific', *The Australian*, 17 September. Available at <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/new-australia-us-push-deals-india-in-to-pacific/story-e6frg76f-1226139302534>, accessed 20 September 2011.
- Sheridan, G. (2011b), 'America shows us the way in Asia again', *The Australian*, 17 November, p. 14.
- Shukla, A. (2011), 'China in a corner at the East Asian Summit', 19 November. Available at <http://www.indian-military.org/news-archives/indian-army-news/1819-china-in-a-corner-at-the-east-asia-summit.html>, accessed 1 December 2011.
- Smith, R. (2011), 'History, geography and security – evolving dialogue in the Indo-Pacific', presentation to 'In the Zone', held at the University of Western Australia, 10 March.
- Smith, S. (2011), 'Australia and India building the strategic partnership', speech to the Asia Society, Mumbai, 9 December.
- Sørensen, G. (2006), 'What kind of world order? The international system in the new millennium', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 343–363.
- Spalding, M.D. et al. (2007), 'Marine ecoregions of the world: a bioregionalization of coastal and shelf areas', *Bioscience*, Vol. 57, no. 7, pp. 573–583.
- The Australian* (2011), 'US focus on Asia is good for all, including China', Editorial, 17 November, p. 15.
- The West Australian* (2011), 'China's guns to blaze after Obama's Pacific campaign', 25 November, p. 30.
- US Department of Defense (2010), *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, DC.
- Wesley, M. (2011), 'Irresistible rise of the Indo-Pacific', *The Australian*, 4 May. Available at <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/arts/irresistible-rise-of-the-indo-pacific/story-e6frg8nf-1226047014015>, accessed 4 July 2011.