Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association

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March 2014

Committee Secretary

Senate Standing Committees

Economics Legislative Committee Parliament House

Rural and Regional Transport Committee

Submission for consideration by the Committee regarding Qantas Sale Act

Requested information from the Economics Hearing of 18th March 2013 relevant for both committees.

Preamble

During questioning on the evening of 18 March 2013, the ALAEA were asked to supply further particulars for some matters that were discussed.

Survey

At both hearings the ALAEA verbalised the view of Pilots and Engineers who had responded to an Aviation Industry survey. 1% of Qantas Pilots and 1% of Qantas Engineers responded that they trust the people running the company. A copy of the survey is attached as appendix 19.

Qantas Claims

We note that Qantas have provided a series of responses to some parts of our primary submission. They have provided no evidence, broadly reject claims as being "scaremongering" and often fall back on CASA as the supporting authority who have approved particular facilities or actions. They are simply relying on Senators to trust what they say without any substantiation. In light of evidence that only 1% of Qantas Pilots and Engineers have any trust in management, the committee may consider asking Qantas to validate some of their claims.

We have made it clear through two hearings that we consider CASA too close to Qantas to a point that they are prepared to make untrue public comments in order to sweep problems under the carpet. We don't consider their approval of any facility or work practices a true or tested measure of safety.

1. Changes to Licenced Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (LAME) oversight of offshore checks.

> *All maintenance on Qantas aircraft that is conducted at overseas facilities is done to Qantas' high standards and at facilities approved by CASA.*
> *Qantas analysed in detail the utility of having large teams of LAME's overseeing maintenance performed outside of Australia. That analysis concluded that their presence does not improve quality: issues post-check performed at overseas maintenance facilities before and after the LAME team was reduced were compared with the checks performed in-house, and it was found that there is no statistical difference of quality.*
> *Today, Qantas sends teams of employees from our Engineering division to oversee heavy maintenance conducted outside Australia, including senior managers and support staff.*

No evidence has been provided by Qantas to support these statements. We have provided evidence that many mistakes occur in offshore facilities; up to 600 on one aircraft (the list is available in our office if required by the committee members).

We have provided evidence that CASA have audited facilities at the same time as Qantas internal audit teams. CASA did not find anything wrong whilst Qantas themselves found countless errors. This demonstrates to us that the CASA auditors are not able to audit these facilities properly.

The teams Qantas send away have been reduced from 9-13 with 2-6 LAMEs providing full oversight to overseas maintenance crews to 4 with no LAMEs and only partial maintenance oversight by "project managers" who may not even be Engineers. The 600 errors found the ST Aero 737 would never have been picked up with the new 4 person (no LAME) support team.

In consultation with the ALAEA in 2008 Qantas developed a comprehensive Customer Inspection Requirements process to "protect Qantas' interests with respect to the performance and Quality of external MROs." This was as a direct result of ongoing Quality issues in SIAEC, Malaysia and Haeco. Qantas has been systematically dismantling this critical oversight.

2. LAME/ Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (AME) ratio.

> *The assertion that the ratios of licenced vs non-licenced engineers for maintenance providers in Asia are "inadequate and dangerous" is preposterous. These facilities are all approved by CASA and our own statistical analysis noted above supports the current structures. In addition, large foreign airlines perform all their maintenance at these facilities and are monitored by foreign regulators, such as the FAA*.

The ALAEA presented evidence to the committee (refer appendix 16) that maintenance was being undertaken on Qantas aircraft with no appropriately licenced LAMEs present. This practice is illegal and should be policed by CASA.

We recommend the committee approach CASA to find out whether they were informed by Qantas that aircraft VH-TJX in April 2010 was at times being worked without any appropriate licence cover and what actions CASA took to correct the illegal practice.

We also recommend that the committee request Qantas supply their "own statistical analysis" referred to in their submission.

3. SIAEC D Checks from 2006.

a. **Qantas internal audit reports.**

> *The normal Qantas quality assurance oversight reports from 2006 highlighted a number of areas requiring improvement, as virtually every quality assurance report does. All areas were subsequently and adequately addressed. CASA also undertook an audit during March 2007 and found that SIAEC were compliant with CASA requirements.*

CASA always find Qantas compliant, even when Qantas' own audit teams don't. In 2006 their lead Auditor did not find one single inadequacy with the facility and the way it did work (See appendix 3).

At the same time Qantas aircraft VH-OJQ was in the facility (the restrained report we have recommended the committees gain access to). The Qantas auditor found so many problems with the facility that he noted –

> *"This Audit has served to clearly demonstrate that the previously highlighted quality issues have not been effectively addressed. The general quality trend appears to be heading in a negative direction with numerous deficiencies considered to be of a serious nature."*
>
> *"Qantas management must consider whether the risks of continued usage of this supplier are acceptable to Qantas"*

The evidence shows that issues identified in early 2006 Audit reports of the Singapore facility were not adequately addressed. This information is contained in reports known to and written by Qantas. Qantas are misleading the committees by falsely saying that these issues were adequately addressed.

We recommend the committee gain access to the VH-OJQ 2006 Qantas internal report and approach CASA to find out why they had not found one problem at the facility over the same period.

b. **Floor path lighting issues.**

The ALAEA asserts that a questionable repair was performed on the floor path lighting and that this was carried out at SIAEC because the floor path lighting has to be removed to accomplish the under-floor inspection items. There is no evidence that this was repaired at SIAEC and is strenuously denied by them. In any event, Qantas has comprehensive checks and processes to ensure any path lighting work is performed appropriately.

The fact that questionable repairs were performed is not in doubt. Qantas Engineering Executive David Cox made public comments at the time about the errors occurring in Singapore. Qantas blamed Singapore at the time, now they are indicating that there is no evidence that the problem was caused in Singapore. It's like the carbon tax, they support it one day and blame it for all their problems the next, depending on which party they are seeking favours from.

We recommend the committee seek copies of Qantas' own investigations in relation to wires stapled and found on various 747-400 aircraft in early 2007. Mr Cox's statements appear below.

Poor Qantas repairs spark grounding call

BY: BY STEVE CREEDY, AVIATION WRITER

FROM: THE AUSTRALIAN

7 YEARS AGO JULY 17, 2007 12:00AM

THE discovery of crudely stapled wires on a Qantas jumbo jet has sparked calls by the airline's engineers for an end to its offshore maintenance program and the grounding of all planes recently worked on overseas.

The problem was uncovered last week in the emergency floor-lighting system of a Qantas Boeing 747-400 that underwent a heavy maintenance check at Singapore Airlines Engineering Company (SIAEC) last year.

The plane was also the subject of a damning Qantas audit, as revealed in *The Australian* in March, that raised doubts about the standard of maintenance carried out on the airline's planes overseas.

The audit found problems in areas such as flight control cables and floor panels and with inspection documentation, but apparently missed the stapled wiring in two locations on the jet.

Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association federal secretary Steve Purvinas said the latest discovery came when engineers doing a routine check found some of the emergency lighting was no longer working.

"They found the problem was a couple staples had been put through that were were no longer doing their job," Mr Purvinas said. "They thought, `What the hell is going on here?', and they went down the track and found some more. Eventually (they) had to check the whole plane."

Mr Purvinas said the union had hundreds of photographs of the staples and estimated they had been used at least 30 times on the aircraft.

He said any problem with wiring was a worry because of the potential fire hazard and all wiring fixes done overseas should be reviewed before aircraft were allowed to continue flying. "Certainly, any Qantas aircraft that has been up in Asia should have, particularly, that emergency lighting wiring checked."

Qantas head of engineering David Cox said the use of staples was unacceptable. Qantas staff had picked up on the practice as it was happening in October and had told Singapore to eliminate it.

"But clearly there were two instances on the aeroplane that were not corrected," he said.

"Now we've discovered those, they have been corrected. And we will certainly be revisiting the issue with Singapore vigorously, as we would with any quality pick-up we had with those providers."

Mr Cox urged Qantas workers who found safety problems on its aircraft to report them immediately. He said SIAEC was a first-rate provider and that all organisations, in Australia or not, had issues from time to time.

"The key thing is we're remorseless in dealing with those issues and we'll continue to be remorseless," he said.

Civil Aviation Safety Authority spokesman Peter Gibson said there were no plans to ground Qantas aircraft and that CASA was satisfied with maintenance standards in Singapore.

He said CASA had conducted an SIAEC audit in March.

4. CASA Surveillance in overseas facilities.

CASA have conducted onsite audits of each facility prior to awarding a CASR 145 approval. CASA has established a set of regulations and standards, which are harmonized with international standards and has developed mutual audit processes with other authorities. The overseas maintenance facilities that we are using have many large airline customers and are very regularly monitored and audited by multiple regulatory agencies as well as by the airline.

Refer to Paragraph 3a. The best indicator of this is the snapshot in time of CASA auditors looking at "procedures" and manuals vs Qantas auditors and engineers looking at the actual work being performed and the quality of that work. Same place, same time – completely different assessments.

In 2011 the US FAA found that Lufthansa Technics in Manila had repeated difficulties in meeting US regulations and standards that had been occurring since at least 2008. The US Transportation Department Office of Inspector General launched an investigation of the FAA's oversight of maintenance performed for US passenger airlines by outside contractors, including oversight of overseas repair stations. A copy of a news article outlining the details is included as appendix 20.

5. STAero 737 Checks Nov 09 to Sept 10.

The Qantas 737 checks were accompanied by a very large team of Qantas LAMEs who raised many observations to familiarise the STAero staff with Qantas' requirements.
It should be noted that Virgin Australia and many large foreign carriers like FedEx and Delta send a large portion of their wide body fleets to STAero.

This statement is staggering in its flippant dismissal of serious airworthiness issues as "observations to familiarise the STAero staff with Qantas' requirements" If it is only a Qantas requirement that things such as structural corrosion be rectified; rusty control cables be replaced; cracked floorbeams are rectified; flight controls are rigged properly; metal shavings are not left in wiring; wiring is secured properly; wire connectors are secured correctly etc, one can only wonder of what STAero staff think is the normal requirements for other customer aircraft.

Without the "very large team of Qantas LAMEs" these things would never have been found. Qantas no longer send very large teams of LAMEs to accompany offshore checks, in fact they send none.

6. SASCO Nov 2008.

Each error was detected through our normal check processes, each thoroughly investigated by SASCO and corrective measures put in place.

On this aircraft the flap couplings disconnected on a commercial flight as they had not been secured in the manner they were legally required to be. If Qantas consider flight controls disconnecting in flight as a "normal check process" we doubt that they understand aviation or take safety seriously.

7. HAECO October 2008.

The ALAEA submission is incorrect, misleading and unnecessarily alarming.
The submission incorrectly states that "a number of the mount bolts on three engines were found to have the washers installed upside down". In fact the report raised at the time by QE staff

indicate that only one engine had three (out of eight) washers upside down. More recent analysis concludes, in fact, that there were no washers incorrectly installed.
In any event, inverted washer installation is a minor issue, not affecting the airworthiness of the aircraft. The washer material is softer than the adjacent bolt and would not jeopardise the integrity of the bolt. Inverted washers have been discovered on occasion throughout the industry and there is no record of this causing a bolt failure. The aircraft and engine manufacturers are aware of these findings and have not expressed a concern.

We are surprised that Qantas has made the claim that a "more recent analysis concludes that, in fact, there were no washers incorrectly installed" The only inference that can be taken from this is that Qantas are now claiming that the highly trained and qualified Qantas Engineers were either mistaken or are lying about the manner in which the three engines on the 747 had been installed as per appendix 14 of our submission to the economics committee.

We recommend the committee seek a copy of the "more recent analysis" and ask Qantas to provide more detail on what prompted a newer analysis.

A photo of one of these bolts appears below. If the correct number and size washers are not installed, the bolt will be too long and the nut will tighten when the tread of the bolt meets the non-threaded area known as the shank. The nut will not be tightening the engine to the engine mount, it will just flop around because the nut is thread bound.

(15) In sequence, tighten the forward and the aft engine mount nuts and bolts (TASK 70-51-00-912-034-D00):

(a) Tighten the aft engine mount bolts to a torque of 5100.0-5500.0 Pound-inches (2313.3-2494.8 Newton-meters).

(b) Tighten the forward engine mount nuts to a torque of 4600.0-5000.0 Pound-inches (2086.5-2268.0 Newton-meters).

NOTE: To tighten the forward mount nuts, hold the bolt head with a 1-1/16 inch box-end wrench (from the engine removal and installation tool kit), and tighten the nut. Get access to the forward mounts through the forward mount access doors.

(c) Make sure that the nuts and the bolts tighten to the engine mount and not the shank of the bolt.

1) If you find end play in the engine mount fasteners, replace the bolt with a shorter one or install a washer.

2) Make sure that the shorter bolt goes fully through the nut.

3) Do a check again of the self-lock function of the nut as you install the fastener.

4) Make sure that you apply the correct installation torque.

The washer installation instructions in the Boeing manuals is covered by a standard 'Note', not 'Warning' or 'Caution', which is the OEM's standard if the item is really that important.

We note the Boeing installation procedure for a Rolls Royce engine has a specific instruction (not a note) to install the bolts with special washers. There is an accompanying note for the installer to use countersunk washers below the head. Standard practice is that the countersink is ALWAYS installed against the bolt head.

(d) Lubricate the engine mount bolts with the D00006 Never-Seez NSBT-8N compound .

(e) Loosely install the forward and the aft engine mount bolts with the special washers and nuts.

NOTE: **On the forward engine mount, the flat washers are installed adjacent to the nuts. On the forward and the aft engine mounts, the countersunk washers are installed below the bolt head. The countersink in the washer is installed adjacent to the bolt head.**

1) Make sure that you fully engage with the nut threads.

(f) Make sure that the bolts do not bind in the interface between the washers and the engine mounts.

We are concerned now that Qantas think that installation practices which don't state "Warning" or "Caution" are not really important. Not all tasks have a "Warning" "Caution "or even a "Note" but this does not mean that the manufacturer considers the instructions to be optional aren't as they aren't "really important".

Below is an example of a "Note" that we consider to be important whilst carrying out an important task.

- 747 Wheel assembly installation – The note says BMS 3-33 Grease is not approved and should not be used (but obviously that's not important)

(1) Do the steps that follow to install the tire and wheel assembly:

NOTE: **Aeroshell 22 is the preferred grease to use for application per steps (4) and (5) below. BMS 3–33 is not approved and SHOULD NOT be used in these applications.**

Qantas' logic in this situation is that as it is only a "Note", the Non-approved grease can be used. We suspect the committee will be able to determine whether the use of non-approved materials is really important or not.

The submission also claims that on the other engines on the same aircraft a number of bolts had one washer installed under the nut, in lieu of two washers. The Boeing manual only requires one washer at this location and the Qantas task card indicates that two may be used, if required.

The Engineering reports show that on numerous engines in multiple locations, only one washer was used. The Qantas (supported by CASA) claim that it is ok by Boeing to use one washer is correct. What they don't state is that if one washer is to be used, it is a different part number and size to the ones fitted to the aircraft in question.

The ALAEA also claims that the issue should have been reported as a Service Difficulty Report (SDR). After discussing the situation and our analysis with CASA, we both concluded that the issue did not meet the definition of a SDR and as such it was agreed that no SDR needed to be filed. The ATSB also agreed with this assessment. (As evidenced in the material submitted by the ALAEA, Appendix 4)

The ALAEA suggestion that this issue could have resulted in the loss of the aircraft is ridiculous

We are also astounded that Qantas' attitude to the correct installation of a high strength bolt holding on an engine is that it's not that important. Service Difficulty Reports are designed specifically track trends in maintenance issues and also to alert operators and maintenance staff to be on the lookout for maintenance issues that may be unusual. The incorrect installation of engine mount bolts is a classic example of an item that should be included. If the fault could have caused a structural failure it is required to be reported. At the time of the discovery the advice from the engineers on the ground was that the engines had been installed in such a manner that bolt shearing was possible if not rectified.

Qantas were required to formally report the situation and did not. Aircraft that have "dropped" engines before have been lost such as El Al flight 1862 Amsterdam 1992. The engine in this case dropped due to a faulty fuse pin and as a result, the 747 freighter crashed into an apartment building killing the 4 aircraft occupants and 39 people on the ground. If Qantas considered safety their number one priority the engine mount problem would have been reported instead of swept aside as a "ridiculous" matter, maybe a more important aim for them was to avoid publicity.

8. HAECO VH-EBX June 2008.

The aircraft defect was unrelated to the maintenance check activity requested by Qantas and required additional Qantas parts to be shipped. After extensive troubleshooting, Qantas decided to ferry the aircraft home where parts and free hangar space was available.

This aircraft had had work done on the flap system that required that system to be independently inspected and operationally checked by two licenced engineers. The defect that was reported by the flight crew should have been discovered during the independent inspections. Several major components were replaced at HAECO. But they were unable to rectify the problem. If additional parts were required we would expect the HAECO facility in Hong Kong to hold sufficient parts to repair aircraft defects.

9. Manila -2007.

This is an issue now appropriately dealt with by the Flight Crew pre-flight check to ensure a correct valve position.

The submission claimed that 21 aircraft checks completed at Manila had task card discrepancies.
The task card discrepancies were relatively minor issues consistent with those routinely found within the industry.

To emphasise the nature of the deficiencies that have emerged following aircraft maintenance in LHTP we are attaching a summary report to the ALAEA, and a copy of a Qantas defects listing report that supports that summary from a Qantas engineer that was involved in the extensive aircraft rectification work required after a Qantas A380 aircraft returned from maintenance in June 2012. Refer appendix 21. The summary paints a vivid picture of the lack of care and attention to the Qantas aircraft. If that aircraft had been returned to service following the check carried out in Manila Qantas would have lost repeat business from many passengers. The nature of some of the defects could have caused injury to passengers or crew. The report also raises serious issues about the standard of the electrical work carried out by LHTP.

10. Kuala Lumpur.

Qantas requires specific training for all MROs conducting strip and repaint work on Qantas aircraft. In addition, a QE representative is on site to monitor sharp tools usage. MAS has specifically denied the ALAEA claims about the use of sharp tools. In any event, to indicate the stale character of much of the ALAEA claims, MAS has not maintained Qantas aircraft since 2007. We note that Virgin Australia continues to use MAS for some of its 737 work.

The committee should consider some of the points raised here and previously by Qantas. They say that all the facilities they use are approved by aviation regulators and are equal to or better than Qantas' own people, yet, they require specific training for MROs conducting strip and repaint work, with a Qantas representative required to monitor sharp tool usage.

Why would they need to do this? Surely a properly regulated facility would not engage in these work practices. It seems as though Qantas does not trust these facilities to carry out the work they are paid to do to the standard they are required to meet.

In relation to Qantas' claim that they have not had an aircraft maintained at MAS since 2007, Qantas sent correspondence to the ALAEA date 30 May 2008 that refers to "The B737-400 check in progress at MAS that should be completed in June 2008" A copy of that letter and an excerpt from the Aircraft Maintenance Services Agreement between Qantas and MAS signed and dated 24th April 2008 is attached at Appendix 22. Qantas have again made unsubstantiated statements that have turned out to be false and misleading.

11. Scribe Line Inspections.

The submission reported on AD mandated scribe line inspections at ST Aero and MAS. It was alleged that both organisations were not carrying out the inspections correctly and appeared to lack appropriate skills to use the laser measuring device. The report alleges that a damaged tool was used to perform measurements and were therefor inaccurate.

The aircraft inspections highlighted to CASA by the ALAEA were not Qantas aircraft. We note from the report that both CASA and EASA are satisfied that no aircraft is currently operating without having had the appropriate inspections carried out.

As Qantas have not been involved in the investigation Qantas are not qualified to make comment. Qantas summation that both EASA and CASA are satisfied that "no aircraft is currently operating" is a misrepresentation of the ALAEA's submission.

The ALAEA submission said;

Both EASA and CASA have completed their investigations into the allegations with CASA's response being that no aircraft was returned to service without being inspected. EASA will not provide the results of their inspection except to state that "corrective actions have been taken".

EASA's response does not detail what corrective actions they required to be put in place. These actions may have involved recalling aircraft for reinspection.

Furthermore, from the perusal of documents obtained under Freedom of Information provisions and the response by CASA in relation to those documents the ALAEA is not convinced that the aircraft that underwent inspections at STAero were properly inspected and STAero and CASA are resisting release

of the documents that would prove that it had been. CASA states that *"it was reported to CASA that no aircraft was inspected with a defective SDMS Laser Measurement Module".* It seems as though CASA have taken them at their word. A copy of the CASA correspondence is included as appendix 23.

The comprehensive evidence that was supplied to the ALAEA that was the subject of the request for CASA to investigate STAero, strongly suggests that a defective Laser unit was used. The ALAEA offered to supply that evidence to CASA, but CASA carried out their investigation without it.

12. Staff Allocation in Overseas Facilities.

> *During verbal submissions the ALAEA claimed that it is usual for an airline who sponsors the facility to send the most experienced teams to their own aircraft with less experienced teams working on customer aircraft.*
> *This is pure nonsense. Offshore maintenance work is conducted by professional maintenance and repair organisations. Their business model requires that they service all customers equally. For example, STAero – cited by Mr Purvinas as an "A team/B team" organisation – is an independent entity, having no association with any airline, much less a "sponsoring airline". It is fanciful to suggest that they have a "sponsoring airline", or that they have, much less use, varying teams of "more experienced" and "less experienced" engineers.*

This matter was dealt with in the body of our submission to the Economics committee where evidence was provided (appendix 16) of facilities so lacking of qualified staff working on Qantas aircraft that appropriately licenced persons were not even present.

We thank both Committees for taking the time the review our submissions and question us at hearings.

Steve Purvinas

ALAEA

Federal Secretary

Appendix 19 19

AUSTRALIAN AVIATION INDUSTRY

EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT SURVEY 2013

Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association

INTRODUCTION



Employee groups with measurable input to survey:

- Alliance
- Air New Zealand
- AMSA
- AirServices
- Bristow
- CASA
- Cathay
- CHC
- Cobham
- Emirates
- Forstaff
- Jetstar
- JHAS
- Network
- Qantas
- Qantaslink
- REX
- SkyTrans
- Skywest
- Virgin

Executive Summary

The Australian Aviation Industry Employee Engagement Survey was conducted over the first half of 2013 in order to obtain the views of employees in the Australian Aviation Industry on various aspects of their employment and working conditions.

Survey Monkey was used to conduct the Employee Engagement survey to ensure the confidentiality of responses.

Employees were asked a total of 54 questions using a 5 point rating scale.

Results have been aggregated to provide the Australian Aviation Industry with an understanding of where employees think their employer is performing well, and where they feel that improvements are necessary.



Survey Objectives

Following the release of Qantas Airways' Employee Survey, the Australian Aviation Industry Employee Engagement Survey was commissioned to obtain more detailed feedback from employees and management about general workplace satisfaction indicators within the industry.

Outcomes

An Overall Survey Score is calculated for each group by averaging responses across all survey items and converting the most positive answer to represent 100% potential with the most negative answer allocated 0%.

INTRODUCTION

Survey Methodology

Employees and management were invited to complete the survey online.

The survey was compiled under a licence available on the Surveymonkey.com website and a link was provided. The questions were modelled on existing airline/aircraft industry employment surveys. This ensured the data was complied based on similar subject matter enabling valid comparisons by those who may be interested in using the information.

Survey Groupings

The survey questions were aimed at gathering employee's opinions on how they felt about the management of the company and how employees were treated. The scores were then compiled to give an overall rating for each company on overall employee engagement. Whilst some surveys may be wholly about "employee engagement", the survey used was delivered to get a broader picture more relevant to the aviation industry of employees opinions. From the survey questions asked, the results were grouped by relevance under the following headings:

- Communication
- Safety
- Perception
- Management
- Individual

5 tips for employee engagement:

1. Management must articulate a clear vision to all employees.
2. Employees should be encouraged to communicate openly and influence the company's vision through their input.
3. Direct managers should foster healthy relationships with their employees.
4. Management should continuously demonstrate that employees have an impact on their work environment.
5. Managers should show employees that they are valued as true contributors, giving them a sense of empowerment.

SURVEY GROUPINGS

Engaged employees work with passion and feel a profound connection to their company. They drive innovation and move the organisation.

Employees who are not engaged are essentially "checked out". They're sleepwalking through their work day, putting time – not energy or passion – into their work.

Actively disengaged employees aren't just unhappy at work: they're busy acting out their unhappiness. Every day these workers undermine what their engaged co-workers accomplish.

Source: Adapted from "Engaged employees inspire company innovation." (2006, October 2012). Gallup Management Journal.

Survey Grouping

Communication – This grouping refers to the employee's opinion of the effectiveness of company management's communication in both directions, informing employees of developments and listening to opinions of staff. Questions in this group covered:

- Providing staff a clear sense of direction
- Sharing team goals into clear responsibilities for the employee
- Recognition for a job well done
- Building teamwork
- Making the effort to listen to the opinions of employees
- Keeping employees informed about matters affecting them
- Encouraging employees to come up with solutions to work-related problems
- Acting on previous surveys and feedback

Perception – This grouping refers to the employee's overall perception of the company they work for. The questions related to the employee's loyalty and commitment to the brand. Questions covered:

- Belief in the goals and objectives of the Company
- Support for the Company vision
- Pride to work with, and in, the Company
- Employee's perception of the Company's quality of products
- Employee's perception of the Company's brand image
- Employee's perception of the Company's prospects of improvement

SURVEY GROUPINGS

Survey grouping

Management – This grouping refers to the employee's views of the Company's management performance. For example:

- Employee's belief that senior management are taking the Company in the right direction
- Employee's trust in the people running the Company
- Employee's belief that senior management make decisions promptly
- Senior management's performance in providing leadership
- Senior management's performance in managing change
- Senior management's performance overall

Individual – This grouping refers to the employee's view of their opportunities in the Company and how they fit in. For example:

- Confidence that they can achieve their personal career objectives within the Company
- Getting along well with work colleagues
- Knowing about possible career paths within the Company
- Management making adequate use of recognition, other than money, to encourage good performance
- Recommending their Company as a good place to work
- Commitment by extra effort beyond what is required to help the Company succeed
- Employee's satisfaction with remuneration level

69% of Air Services Australia employees think that management put profits before safety and 41% see deliberate violations of standard operating procedures.

24% of Qantaslink employees think that management provides a clear sense of direction.

60% of Qantas managers think the company will get worse in the next 12 months.

56% of CASA employees think that CASA do not learn from safety incidents.

60% of Ramp staff think they are fairly paid for what they do.

SURVEY GROUPINGS

79% of CHC employees think management are doing a poor job at leadership.

23% of Bristow employees have trust in people running the company.

73% of Air New Zealand staff have trust in people running the company.



93% of Virgin Flight attendants think the company is being taken in the right direction.

Survey grouping

Safety – This grouping refers to the employees opinion of the effectiveness of company management in delivering the safest aviation safety outcomes for staff and passengers. Questions covered:

- Obstacles at work to the employee doing their job well
- Employee's ability to sustain the level of energy needed to perform work
- Employee being sufficiently informed about company's organisational behaviours of Safety, Service, Innovation, and Integrity

- Management providing the tools and resources for employees to achieve excellent performance
- Employee being concerned by pressure at work
- The employees being comfortable reporting safety concerns
- Management taking corrective action when safety concerns are raised
- Management setting a good safety example
- Evidence of deliberate violations of standard operating procedures
- Employees belief that the Company learns from safety incidents
- Employees belief that people are treated fairly after being involved in a safety incident

RESULTS

Interpreting the results

To interpret the score for each variable, the following factors should be considered:



Overall Survey Score
Absolute / Mean Scores
Internal Benchmarks
Comparative Analysis

Overall Survey Scores

An overall Survey Score is calculated for each group by averaging responses across the survey items and converting the result into a score out of 100%. This enables high level comparisons across groups. More detailed analysis of individual items within the survey should be undertaken to more fully understand the performance of the individual groups.

Satisfaction ratings

Where quoted, satisfied % are based on the number of tend to agree and agree responses.

Comparative Analysis

Demographic breakdowns can often be a rich source of information and are particularly effective tool. Comparing demographic breakdown scores to the overall average can highlight differences of opinion across the respondent pool.

Absolute / Mean Scores

To determine the absolute mean score for each item, a mean (average) score is calculated for each statement.

This is achieved by giving each rating a number (disagree = 1 point, tend to disagree = 2 points, not sure = 3 points, tend to agree = 4 points, agree = 5 points), adding up the response values for each statement and dividing the total by the number of responses.



RESULTS

Employee question response	Qantas Engineers	Virgin Engineers	Qantas Pilots	Virgin Pilots
Think their company is a good place to work	10%	58%	5%	73%
Support the vision for which the company stands	9%	80%	4%	89%
Trust the people running the company	1%	38%	1%	54%
Feel uncomfortable reporting safety violations	25%	24%	22%	15%
See deliberate breaches of standard procedures	34%	13%	10%	9%
Think the company put profit before safety	56%	28%	63%	26%
Think they are paid well for what they do	68%	87%	80%	59%
Think the company will improve in the next 12 months	3%	84%	3%	91%

RESULTS

Participant profile

Over 2200 Employees participated in the survey and came from a wide cross section of Industry Employees including:

- Pilots
- Engineers
- Flight Attendants
- Ramp Service Staff
- Customer Services Staff
- Support Staff and;
- Managers



Age



Length of service

Age and Service

- Approximately 16% of the workforce are over 55s, who are entering the "potential retirement" demographic. This may indicate that within the next 10 years based on current industry growth predictions, and unless there is a downturn, at least 16% of the workforce may need to be replaced.
- Approximately 50% of employees who answered the survey have more than 10 years service with their employer and 28% have greater than 20. This indicates a relatively highly experienced workforce.

Gender



RESULTS

AMSA

- 140 staff
- Line maintenance services
- Founded 1992

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

2.8 out of **10**

Airservices Australia (Air Traffic Control)

- Over 3,000 staff
- Civil Aviation Authority
- Founded 1985

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

4.5 out of **10**

Communicating with staff



RESULTS

Communicating with staff



Bristow

- 374 staff
- Mostly Oil and Gas services
- Founded 1967
- 34 Helicopters

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

5.7 out of **10**

CASA

- Over 800 staff
- Air safety regulation
- Founded 1995

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

3.7 out of **10**

RESULTS

Alliance Overall Engagement		
Communication	53.4%	dn 24
Safety	72.0%	dn 16
Perception	72.2%	dn 26
Management	70.3%	dn 20
Individual	70.2%	dn 18
Total	**68.0%**	dn 20

Air NZ Overall Engagement		
Communication	73.7%	**new**
Safety	91.9%	---
Perception	94.5%	---
Management	82.5%	---
Individual	91.6%	---
Total	**87.9%**	---

AMSA Overall Engagement		
Communication	15.6%	**new**
Safety	30.6%	---
Perception	12.6%	---
Management	8.5%	---
Individual	28.3%	---
Total	**21.3%**	**---**

ASA Overall Engagement		
Communication	14.4%	**new**
Safety	35.8%	---
Perception	23.2%	---
Management	5.6%	---
Individual	48.9%	---
Total	**27.5%**	**---**

Bristow Overall Engagement		
Communication	39.1%	up 9
Safety	55.7%	up 7
Perception	84.3%	up 27
Management	33.8%	up 11
Individual	63.6%	up 6
Total	**54.1%**	**up 10**

RESULTS

CASA Overall Engagement		
Communication	42.7%	**new**
Safety	42.0%	---
Perception	37.2%	---
Management	21.5%	---
Individual	55.1%	---
Total	**40.8%**	**---**

Cathay Overall Engagement		
Communication	20.6%	**new**
Safety	57.3%	---
Perception	73.0%	---
Management	25.6%	---
Individual	48.0%	---
Total	**46.2%**	**---**

CHC Overall Engagement		
Communication	22.0%	dn 19
Safety	50.9%	dn 12
Perception	33.2%	dn 30
Management	6.2%	dn 16
Individual	45.1%	dn 23
Total	**34.3%**	**dn 19**

Cobham Overall Engagement		
Communication	55.8%	dn 11
Safety	80.8%	dn 1
Perception	75.6%	dn 10
Management	50.4%	dn 18
Individual	75.5%	dn 4
Total	**70.6%**	**dn 6**

Emirates Overall Engagement		
Communication	39.3%	**new**
Safety	61.3%	---
Perception	98.3%	---
Management	75.6%	---
Individual	71.4%	---
Total	**66.9%**	**---**

RESULTS

Forstaff Overall Engagement		
Communication	20.2%	dn 10
Safety	46.0%	dn 14
Perception	18.5%	dn 16
Management	10.1%	dn 9
Individual	43.1%	dn 7
Total	**31.0%**	**dn 13**

Jetstar Overall Engagement		
Communication	24.3%	up 9
Safety	42.4%	up 12
Perception	24.3%	up 7
Management	20.5%	up 10
Individual	44.9%	up 4
Total	**33.5%**	**up 10**

JHAS Overall Engagement		
Communication	24.4%	up 7
Safety	52.7%	up 6
Perception	31.4%	up 7
Management	19.2%	up 13
Individual	46.2%	dn 1
Total	**37.9%**	**up 7**

Network Overall Engagement		
Communication	54.6%	**new**
Safety	71.5%	---
Perception	81.3%	---
Management	65.7%	---
Individual	71.5%	---
Total	**69.3%**	**---**

Qantas Overall Engagement		
Communication	19.6%	up 2
Safety	48.7%	dn 1
Perception	29.1%	up 7
Management	8.7%	up 3
Individual	47.3%	dn 1
Total	**33.6%**	**up 2**

RESULTS

Qantaslink Overall Engagement	
Communication	35.1% up 15
Safety	63.6% up 16
Perception	63.1% up 23
Management	36.6% up 19
Individual	57.6% up 12
Total	**53.4% up 16**

REX Overall Engagement	
Communication	34.7% up 12
Safety	69.3% up 21
Perception	58.0% up 21
Management	35.9% up 16
Individual	65.1% up 15
Total	**56.3% up 17**

SkyTrans Overall Engagement	
Communication	64.1% **new**
Safety	65.9% ---
Perception	78.6% ---
Management	50.0% ---
Individual	77.1% ---
Total	**67.1% ---**

Skywest Overall Engagement	
Communication	45.0% up 1
Safety	69.7% up 11
Perception	91.0% up 23
Management	42.5% up 2
Individual	79.0% up 5
Total	**67.1% up 9**

Virgin Overall Engagement	
Communication	46.2% dn 11
Safety	68.3% dn 8
Perception	88.8% dn 6
Management	69.9% dn 10
Individual	67.0% dn 8
Total	**67.5% dn 10**

RESULTS

Cathay Pacific



- Regular public services
- Founded 1946
- 135 Fleet

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

6.6 out of **10**

CHC Helicopters

- 325 staff
- Emergency, Oil and Gas
- Founded 1969
- 38 Helicopters

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

4.1 out of **10**

Individual within the Company



RESULTS

Individual within the Company



Cobham Aviation Services Australia (National Jet)



- 1600 staff
- FIFO, Wet Lease, Customs
- Founded 1989
- 33 Aircraft

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

6.8 out of **10**

Emirates

- Over 50,00 staff globally
- Regular public services
- Founded 1985
- 207 aircraft

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

8.7 out of **10**

RESULTS

Forstaff

- 307 staff
- Aircraft Maintenance
- Founded 1998
- Mostly Qantas contracts

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

2.4 out of **10**

Jetstar Airways

- 4200 staff
- Regular public services
- Founded 2003
- 65 aircraft

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends -

3.6 out of **10**

Perception of company



RESULTS

Perception of company



John Holland Aviation

- 3000 staff
- Maintenance
- Founded 2007
- Mostly Virgin, Jetstar, Tiger

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

3.3 out of **10**

Network Aviation

- Regular public services
- Founded 1998
- 19 Fleet

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

6.8 out of **10**

RESULTS

Qantas Airways



- 27000 staff
- Regular public services
- Founded 1920
- 140 Aircraft

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends -

4.7 out of **10**

Qantaslink

- Part of Qantas's 27000 staff
- Regular public services
- Founded 2002
- 58 Aircraft

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

6.5 out of **10**

View of management



RESULTS

View of management



Regional Express (REX)

- 1000 staff
- Regular public services
- Founded 2002
- 48 Aircraft

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

6.0 out of **10**

Skytrans

- Regular public services
- Founded 1980
- 12 Aircraft

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

6.6 out of **10**

RESULTS

Skywest

- 600 staff
- Regular public services
- Founded 1963
- 18 Aircraft

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

8.7 out of **10**

Virgin Australia

- 8000 staff
- Regular public services
- Founded 2000
- 93 Aircraft

Staff likelihood of recommending services to family or friends –

8.2 out of **10**

Safety



RESULTS

Safety



Overall engagement order

Air NZ	87.90%	new
Cobham	70.60%	dn 6
Network	69.30%	new
Alliance	68.00%	dn 20
Virgin	67.50%	dn 10
Skytrans	67.10%	new
Skywest	67.10%	up 9
Emirates	66.90%	new
REX	56.30%	up 17
Bristow	54.10%	up 10
Qantaslink	53.40%	up 16
Cathay	46.20%	new
CASA	40.80%	new
JHAS	37.90%	up 7
CHC	34.30%	dn 19
Qantas	33.60%	up 2
Jetstar	33.50%	up 10
Forstaff	31.00%	dn 13
ASA	27.50%	new
AMSA	21.30%	new

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Appendix 20

20

Latest Stories
Mine revenue scheme seen out by 1

Home > Global Nation > Headlines > US aviation inspections fault Philippine repair station

US aviation inspections fault Philippine repair station

Associated Press
5:26 pm | Wednesday, June 22nd, 2011

WASHINGTON—A repair station in the Philippines that services planes for nearly 50 airlines around the world has shown a pattern of stubborn problems that safety experts say underscore concerns about the airline industry's outsourcing of maintenance to facilities in developing countries.

The Federal Aviation Administration inspections of Lufthansa Technik Philippines in Manila said the facility had repeated difficulties in following US regulations on matters ranging from record-keeping to calibrating tools used to make repairs. The records, which cover inspections from 2008 through last month, also cite recurring problems with training workers to FAA standards and unfamiliarity by in-house inspectors at Lufthansa Technik, a subsidiary of Lufthansa Airlines, with US regulations.

Lufthansa Technik's "quality assurance department demonstrated an inability to effectively audit the repair station for compliance with all aspects of (US regulations), specifically, appropriate facilities, tools/equipment, personnel and training requirements," according to an inspection in May.

A 2009 inspection noted that two in-house inspectors were unfamiliar with FAA aircraft maintenance regulations. The inspectors had recently received four hours of training in the regulations, but weren't tested for their knowledge afterward, it said.

The same inspection noted that "throughout the repair station numerous personnel are not aware of which airline they are providing maintenance for" and which country's regulations applied.

The reports show problems scattered throughout the facility rather than in one department, which indicates the problems are systemic, said John Goglia, a former National Transportation Safety Board member and an expert on aircraft maintenance. The result, he said, is an erosion of the margin of safety.

"As they expand into Third World countries to take advantage of the labor rates and lower costs these problems keep coming back because you just don't have the people infrastructure," Goglia said. "How many trained people do you think there are the Philippines, in Malaysia and in Indonesia? They are expanding a big operation with a relatively thin technical workforce."

The Manila facility employs 2,800 aircraft mechanics and other employees. It's certified by the FAA and aviation authorities from 20 nations to perform maintenance work ranging from routine repairs to major overhauls, according to Lufthansa Technik. The company recently began construction of a new hangar so that Airbus A380s — the world's largest airliner capable of seating up to 853 passengers — can be serviced at the facility.

The records were obtained from the FAA through a Freedom of Information Act request by a labor union, Unite Here, which represents employees of Lufthansa's catering subsidiary in North America, SkyChef. The union and the airline are in contract negotiations.

"None of the mentioned FAA audit findings had significant impact on safety and reliability of aircraft and components," Lufthansa Technik said in a statement.

"Each finding has been treated as an opportunity to enhance the existing system, as it is an industry standard to deal with findings from internal and external audits," the statement said. "Corrective actions have always been implemented and accepted by the FAA."

However, the report on last month's inspection said numerous problems cited in an August 2010 inspection still had not been corrected. "An acceptable corrective plan has been submitted, but due to recent failures, an on-site follow-up inspection ... is required," it said.

Bill Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation, an industry-supported group that promotes aviation safety worldwide, said the inspections indicate Lufthansa Technik Philippines has a problem with quality control, but he cautioned against making more general judgments about offshore aircraft repair stations.

"It's a huge leap to suggest this is representative of all foreign repair stations," Voss said. "I'm not sure offshore equals bad."

The FAA said in a statement that it holds foreign repair facilities to the same standards as US facilities. Repair facilities that don't meet those standards can lose their certification. The FAA has certified Lufthansa Technik Philippines for repairs since 2000.

The Transportation Department Office of Inspector General announced in December it has launched an investigation of the FAA's oversight of maintenance performed for US passenger airlines by outside contractors, including oversight of overseas repair stations.

A 2008 report by the inspector general said nine big US airlines farm out aircraft maintenance at twice the rate of four years earlier and hire outside contractors for more than 70 percent of major work. While most of the outsourced work is still done in the US, often at nonunion repair shops, more than one-quarter of the repairs are done overseas, it said.

A bill backed by House Democrats that would have required the FAA to step up inspections of foreign repair stations from once a year to twice a year died last year. It was opposed by the European Union, which threatened to cut back on planes its airlines send to repair facilities in the US.

Lufthansa, one of the world's largest airlines, owns 51 percent of Lufthansa Technik Philippines, while the Philippine MacroAsia Corp. owns 49 percent.

The only US carrier that sends planes to Lufthansa Technik Philippines for major maintenance work is Hawaiian Airlines, which flies to destinations in the Western United States, the Pacific and Asia. Lufthansa, Swiss Air, Qantas, LAN, Philippine Airlines, Cathay Pacific, Vietnam Airlines, Gulf Air, Kuwait Airways and Jet Airways are among some of the other airlines that use the facility for major work.

Other Stories:







Appendix 21

VH-OQD Post Manila Reconfig Summary.

VH-OQD, first A380 into Lufthansa Phillipines, first time many of local workforce has worked on A380, first A380 from any operator to have major Cabin reconfiged and we place it in somebody elses hands?

OQD returned from Manila on 15June was to only transit for approx 2 days, ended up staying extra 5 days, till 22 June. Total of 7 days in Sydney post reconfig to allow QF engineers to sought out the mess.

CABIN LOG DEFECTS from return sector (with no passengers but vigilient crew). From sequence 588 to 629 = 41 incoming defects logged. Way in excess of normal. Summary of significant issues / defects -

Major First Class Seat & Suite faults and defects. These included Suite / Seat Electric operational defects effecting recline, legrests, privacy dividers and video monitors. Seat manual release cables and 16g LOCKs NOT engaging.
At least 10 of the 14 FIRST CLASS seats had defects. A major modification was carried out by B/E aerospace (Seat manufacture) in Manila involving replacement of major wiring harnesses. There was NO qualified oversight of this contractors work as Lufthansa is NOT responsible for Qantas's contractor and as NO LAMEs were present these QUALITY issues were NOT captured and resolved in Manila when the contractor should have been made responsible to fix them. Similar problems were encountered in the Frankfurt 'C' checks but were identifed by QF LAMEs and B/E was made to fix defects before aircraft left.

Major First Class Cabin and Toilet automatic Electric Window Shades malfunctions. eg Right hand cabin shades stuck half way down, unable to operate.

Numerous Business class seat issues.

Trolley Cart Lift defect.

Toilet water heater having no power / HOT water. Engineering Authority required to cover defect.

TECH LOG DEFECTS from return sector. From sequence 513 to 528 = 15 incoming defects, again way in excess from the norm. Summary of significant issues / defects -

Flight Crew to Ground communication defect.

Fuel Tank pump faults x 2, both on MEL's.

Staircase lighting defects x 2, both on MELs.

Major Cabin Intercommunication Data System (CIDS) wiring and software faults causing various Cabin functionality issues. This required an Engineering Authority to authorise various changes to Standard Cabin System functionality.

Wiring was found broken / damaged at a rear of Flight Attendant Panel (FAP) resulting in loss of numerous parts of Cabin system. Significant wiring repair required to rectify.

Flight Crew 'Flight Operations Domain', Laptop defect as a result of major system modification in Manila.

Curtain rails NOT secured. Found to be held in place by self tapping screws (unapproved parts !)

Check 2 Work Package. An average Check 2 work package would on a very bad day maybe have 30 - 50 work lines. This MXI Work package for the 7 days (5 unscheduled) numbered approx 167. A summary of some of the extra problems found include -

7 x Ceiling light faults. Again defects that require an MEL to allow dispatch.
Galley Cooling indication faults.
Numerous Reconfig related issues.

OQD's defered defects stood at approx 90 before it went into MAnila, it came out with approx 133.

There is NO way this aircraft could have gone near entering service within a couple of days of its return. The Cabin, especially our Premium FIRST and Business Class cabins were no where near the Expected state.

Manila also carried out Major Wing Rib crack inspections and replacements. For unknown (and questionable) reasons 2 x QF LAMEs were, at the last moment sent over to apparently 'gain some shared learnings', and have a look at repairs. On there arrival in Manila the repairs had been completed and they were unable to access or inspect the Fuel Tank / Wing repairs at all. They definatly got the feeling that they were not wanted in the facility.

Many Form 500's have been raised by LAMEs regarding the defects and state of the aircraft on its return. No answers have been received.

Another thing to keep in mind, if we did have appropriate LAME support during this MAint Visit in Manila we could have actually got more work done and made better use of the 40 days ground time, which again would have been a saving to QF.

Hope you can use some of this, i hope i have captured most of the issues. Many LAMEs who have worked closely on this aircraft have assisted with valuable contributions.

Aircraft ↓ Date ↓

Fault Name	Fault ID	Aircraft	Inventory	Fault Status	Fault Severity	Found on Date	Logbook Reference	Assigned To Work Package
*** TSR *** RTL 516 - ECAM ENG 1 BLEED OFF	T000JNK6	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	36 - PNEUMATIC	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	TOQD150612516	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** RTL 517 - GRND COMMS INOP	T000JNK8	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	23-00 - COMMUNICATIONS - GENERAL	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	TOQD150612517	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** RTL 518 - AIPS FLASH WHEN TALKING TO GROUND.	T000JNK9	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	23-00 - COMMUNICATIONS - GENERAL	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	TOQD150612518	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** RTL 519 - CAPTS LAP TOP FLT OPS FAULT	T000JNKA	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	46-25 - ONBOARD INFORMATION SYSTEM (OIS) - FLIGHT CREW APPLICATION	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	TOQD150612519	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** RTL 520 - NO COMPANY BOOKMARK IN FOCT (4.1.1)	T000JNKB	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	46-33-22-1000-H-S - SYS SLOT - HOST/SOFTWARE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	TOQD150612520	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** P/N 568-1-30760-101 *** DEM T00841 1 RTL 521 - FUEL R OUTR TK PMP FAULT	T000JNKC	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	28-26 - WING TRANSFER SYSTEM	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	TOQD150612521	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** RTL 522 - GEAR PINS FITTED FOR A/C TOW	T000JNKE	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	09-10 - TOWING	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	TOQD150612522	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026, ABH01
*** P/N D964-220-001 *** MEL 33-20-09A RTL 523 NIC DEM R98636 3 FWD STAIRCASE O/H LIGHT ON R/H SIDE PINK.	T000JMUB	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	33-20 - CABIN	CERT	MEL	2012-06-15	TOQD150612523	VH-OQD WEEKLY 03JUL12 SYD QF012 ABH01 ***ENGCH4****
*** P/N D964-233-001 *** MEL 33-20-09A RTL 524 NIC DEM R98644 3 FWD STAIRCASE UPPER AFT R/H LIGHT INOP (FIN713LG5)	T000JMW4	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	33-20 - CABIN	CERT	MEL	2012-06-15	TOQD150612524	VH-OQD WEEKLY 03JUL12 SYD QF012 ABH01 ***ENGCH4****
*** P/N 380ABN0RMALL0ADMEDIA *** RTL 525 N/S 17-06-12 DEM R98138_5 BLANK 380 MEDIA MISSING FROM CD STOWAGE COMPARTMENT IN COCKPIT	T000JMTA	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	05-00 - TIME LIMITS - MAINTENANCE CHECKS - GENERAL	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-15	TOQD150612525	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** RCL 526 *** P/N 568-1-30759-102 *** DEM T01855 1...RTL 526 FUEL FEED TK 1 STBY PUMP FAULT - ECAM MSG - MEL 28-26-07	T000JPP3	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	28-26 - WING TRANSFER SYSTEM	CERT	MEL	2012-06-15	TOQD150612526	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** LU45 FAUCET U/S (NO POWER)	T000JQEZ	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	38-10 - POTABLE	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-15	TOQD150612527	VH-OQD CHECK2 20JUN12 LAX QF011 CRO05
*** TSR *** PRE DEPT, CURTAIN RAILS NOT SECURED.*** NIC DEM T10859 AND P/O RAISED***	T000JQF3	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-26 - CURTAINS AND PARTITIONS/ELECTRICAL CLASS DIVIDERS	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-15	TOQD150612528	VH-OQD WEEKLY 03JUL12 SYD QF012 ABH01 ***ENGCH4****
RTL 529AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN ECAM MSG 'L/G CTR 2 FAULT'	T000JQWL	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	32-31 - NORMAL EXTENSION AND RETRACTION	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	TOQD200612529	***RTL 529***AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN ECAM MSG 'L/G CTR 2 FAULT'
RTL 530A/C PREFUELLED WITH JET A 42500KGS UPLIFTED.FREEZE POINT -40 DEG C	T000JQWX	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	28-25 - REFUEL/DEFUEL SYSTEM	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-20	TOQD200612530	VH-OQD WEEKLY 22JUN12 LAX QF011 ABH01
RTL 531LANDING GEAR PINS FITTED	T000JQWY	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	10-11 - PARKING	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	TOQD200612531	VH-OQD CHECK2 20JUN12 LAX QF011 CRO05
PRIOR TO DEPARTURE CHILLERS GM2,5,6,9 GU01,04,07,14 WILL NOT POWER UP	T000JR43	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	21-59 - SUPPLEMENTAL COOLING	CERT	MEL	2012-06-20	TOQD200612532	VH-OQD CHECK2 21JUN12 SYD QF012 CRO05
*** TSR *** MEL 73-25-01A RTL 533 AFTER LANDING ENG 2 MINOR FAULT	T000JRWR	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	73 - ENGINE FUEL AND CONTROL	CERT	MEL	2012-06-21	TOQD210612533	VH-OQD CHECK2 25JUN12 LAX QF011 DRO39
DME	T000JRWS	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	31-60 - CONTROL AND DISPLAY SYSTEM (CDS)	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	TOQD210612534	DME
*** TSR *** RTL 535 GEAR PINS FITTED FOR TOW	T000JRX2	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	09-10 - TOWING	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	TOQD210612535	*** TSR *** RTL 535 GEAR PINS FITTED FOR TOW

OQD CABIN + TECH LOG DEFECTS

15 JUN — 21 JUN

ON DECK SYD AFTER RECON.

Aircraft :

Date

Fault Name	Fault ID	Aircraft	Inventory	Fault Status	Fault Severity	Found on Date	Logbook Reference	Assigned To Work Package
TSR SEAT 1A MONITOR WONT DEPLOY.	T000JNAF	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612586	***TSR*** SEAT 1A MONITOR WONT DEPLOY.
TSR SEAT 4D NIL AUDIO.	T000JNAL	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612587	***TSR*** SEAT 4D NIL AUDIO.
*** P/N SP22389300 *** ***DEM T00894 9 *** RCL 591 - SEAT 4F MONITOR FAILS TO MOVE ELECTRICALLY	T000JMUN	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-15	COQD150612591	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** RCL 594- 20F DIVIDER OPERATION U/S	T000JNTC	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-20 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612594	*** TSR *** RCL 594- 20F DIVIDER OPERATION U/S
*** TSR *** RCL 595- IFE SCREEN JAMMED-DOES NOT EXTRACT	T000JNTH	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-20 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612595	*** TSR *** RCL 595- IFE SCREEN JAMMED-DOES NOT EXTRACT
*** TSR *** RCL 596- REPLACEMENT OF LIGHT GLOBE FOR SIDE READING LAMP REQUIRED- LIGHT GLOBE HAS BLOWN AT 18B	T000JNTK	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-20 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612596	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** P/N SP2238916 *** RCL 597 - PRIVACY SCREEN INOP - 2A DEM T00289	T000JNSQ	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-15	COQD150612597	VH-OQD WEEKLY 03JUL12 SYD QF012 ABH01 ***ENGCH4****
*** TSR *** RCL 598- FIRST CLASS CABIN - RHS WINDOW SHADES ARE STUCK MIDWAY	T000JNTM	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-20 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612598	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** RCL 599- THE CEILING ABOVE M1RA AND M1R JUMPSEATS- THE RUBBER IS WEARING	T000JNTN	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-13 - LININGS AND FURNISHINGS	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612599	*** TSR *** RCL 599- THE CEILING ABOVE M1RA AND M1R JUMPSEATS- THE RUBBER IS WEARING
*** TSR *** RCL 600 - 52B RECLINE BUTTON INOP.	T000JN43	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612600	*** TSR *** RCL 600 - 52B RECLINE BUTTON INOP.
TSR NO IFE.	T000JNAN	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612601	***TSR*** NO IFE.
*** TSR *** RCL 602 - 53A/B & 55B SEAT RECLINE VERY DIFFICULT - SEAT IS VERY STIFF TO MOVE.	T000JN45	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612602	*** TSR *** RCL 602 - 53A/B & 55B SEAT RECLINE VERY DIFFICULT - SEAT IS VERY STIFF TO MOVE.
TSR NO READING LIGHT FUNCTION FROM HANDSET.	T000JNB5	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612603	***TSR*** NO READING LIGHT FUNCTION FROM HANDSET.
CL SEQ 604 SEATS 64A/C, 69A, 70A & 71A RECLINING FUNCTION INOP	T000JMZB	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612604	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
TSR IFE HANDSET CORD BROKEN.	T000JNB9	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-24 - SEAT EQUIPMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612605	***TSR*** IFE HANDSET CORD BROKEN.
*** TSR *** RCL 606 - MD AFT GALLEY STOWAGE 704 LATCH NEEDS TIGHTENING.	T000JN47	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-31 - MAIN DECK GALLEYS	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612606	*** TSR *** RCL 606 - MD AFT GALLEY STOWAGE 704 LATCH NEEDS TIGHTENING.
TSR HANDSET INOP.	T000JNBB	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-24 - SEAT EQUIPMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612607	***TSR*** HANDSET INOP.
*** TSR *** RCL 608 - MD AFT GALLEY OVEN UNDER STOWAGE 908 - SCREEN FADED DIFFICULT TO READ.	T000JN4A	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-36 - GALLEY ELECTRICAL INSERT EQUIPMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612608	*** TSR *** RCL 608 - MD AFT GALLEY OVEN UNDER STOWAGE 908 - SCREEN FADED DIFFICULT TO READ.
NIL Entry	T000JN4C	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	99-99 - NIL & NOTED ONLY	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612609	NIL Entry
*** P/N SP2238916 *** RCL 610 - PAX SEAT DIFFICULT TO RETRACT. FRON SCREEN DIVIDER INOP DEM T00290	T000JNSP	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-15	COQD150612610	VH-OQD WEEKLY 03JUL12 SYD QF012 ABH01 ***ENGCH4****
*** TSR *** 4K MONITOR & PRIVACY DIVIDER INOP	T000JMUF	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612611	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
M/D AFT GALLEY LHS CURTAIN PRESS STUDS WORN.	T000JNGV	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-26 - CURTAINS AND PARTITIONS/ELECTRICAL CLASS DIVIDERS	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612612	M/D AFT GALLEY LHS CURTAIN PRESS STUDS WORN.
*** TSR *** RCL 613- IFE SYSTEM SEAT 21J HAS BLUE PED POWER LIGHT "ON"	T000JNTQ	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-20 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612613	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** TSR *** RCL 614 IFE		AIRBUS	25-20 - PASSENGER			2012-		*** TSR *** RCL 614 IFE

*** TSR *** RCL 615- IFE SYSTEM SEATS 33JK HAS BLUE PED POWER LIGHT ON	T000JNTT	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-20 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612615	*** TSR *** RCL 615- IFE SYSTEM SEATS 33JK HAS BLUE PED POWER LIGHT ON
*** TSR *** RCL 616 IFE SYSTEM SEAT 25K HAS BLUE PED POWER LIGHT ON	T000JNTW	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-20 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612616	*** TSR *** RCL 616 IFE SYSTEM SEAT 25K HAS BLUE PED POWER LIGHT ON
TSR MAINT ENTRY IFE MEDIA LOAD FOR JUNE 2012 REQUIRED.	T000JNBG	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612617	***TSR*** MAINT ENTRY IFE MEDIA LOAD FOR JUNE 2012 REQUIRED.
TSR MAINT ENTRY SEAT 2A LCD MONITOR NIL DISPLAY.	T000JNBL	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-24 - SEAT EQUIPMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612619	***TSR*** MAINT ENTRY SEAT 2A LCD MONITOR NIL DISPLAY.
*** TSR *** MAINT ENTRY IFE ZONE 3	T000JQED	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612620	*** TSR *** MAINT ENTRY IFE ZONE 3
*** TSR *** PRE DEPARTURE CHECK	T000JQEH	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612621	*** TSR *** PRE DEPARTURE CHECK
*** TSR *** REFER HOLD ITEM SEQ 592 SEAT 4K MONITOR.	T000JQET	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612622	*** TSR *** REFER HOLD ITEM SEQ 592 SEAT 4K MONITOR.
*** TSR *** MAINT ENTRY SEAT 1A MONITOR	T000JQF4	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-15	COQD150612623	*** TSR *** MAINT ENTRY SEAT 1A MONITOR
*** TSR *** RCL 618- SEATS 62ABC READING LIGHT/ CALL LIGHT NIL CONTROL FROM H/S	T000JNTY	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-20 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-16	COQD160612618	VH-OQD CHECK2 15JUN12 SYD QF6026 ABH01
*** RCL 626 *** OVEN 2 IN J/C GALLEY SCREEN FROZEN UNABLE TO TURN OFF.	T000JQWG	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-36 - GALLEY ELECTRICAL INSERT EQUIPMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	COQD200612626	*** RCL 626 *** OVEN 2 IN J/C GALLEY SCREEN FROZEN UNABLE TO TURN OFF.
*** RCL 627 *** CHILLER IN U602 LEAKING WATER. CARPET WET IN CABIN TO 17F.	T000JQWQ	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	21-59 - SUPPLEMENTAL COOLING	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	COQD200612627	*** RCL 627 *** CHILLER IN U602 LEAKING WATER. CARPET WET IN CABIN TO 17F.
RCL 629U2L CURTAIN ROD ,CURTAIN REMOVED BY ENGINEERS IN SYD.CURTAIN NOW STOWED IN U/D AFT STOWAGE LHS NEXT TO CREW REST SEATS	T000JQXH	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-20 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	COQD200612629	***RCL 629***U2L CURTAIN ROD ,CURTAIN REMOVED BY ENGINEERS IN SYD.CURTAIN NOW STOWED IN U/D AFT STOWAGE LHS NEXT TO CREW REST SEATS
*** RCL 630 *** 61F REQUIRES SEAT COVER CHANGE DUE ALCOHOL SPILLAGE.	T000JQWU	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	COQD200612630	*** RCL 630 *** 61F REQUIRES SEAT COVER CHANGE DUE ALCOHOL SPILLAGE.
RCL 2A & 2F 2 RESETS DO TO FROZEN SCREEN , 2ND RESETS SUCCESSFUL	T000JQZF	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	COQD200612631	***RCL*** 2A & 2F 2 RESETS DO TO FROZEN SCREEN , 2ND RESETS SUCCESSFUL
*** P/N 5980402101300 *** RCL 632 - LU45 FAUCET NOT HEATING AWAITING EA FROM D. CHADWICK	T000JQWZ	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	38-12 - DISTRIBUTION	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-20	COQD200612632	VH-OQD WEEKLY 03JUL12 SYD QF012 ABH01 ***ENGCH4****
RCLPMR TO REPLACE SPMS TO MOD UPGRADE TO MOD "H" SEATS 1K,2F,2K,,3A	T000JQZQ	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	COQD200612633	***RCL***PMR TO REPLACE SPMS TO MOD UPGRADE TO MOD "H" SEATS 1K,2F,2K,,3A
RCL IFE EXTENDED TURN CHECK REQUIRED	T000JQZX	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	COQD200612634	***RCL*** IFE EXTENDED TURN CHECK REQUIRED
TSR SWEEP FINDING FOUND HANDSET NIL POWER AT SEAT 3F	T000JR0E	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-20	COQD200612635	VH-OQD WEEKLY 22JUN12 LAX QF011 ABH01
RCLSEAT 3F HANDSET INOP	T000JR4K	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	COQD200612636	***RCL***SEAT 3F HANDSET INOP
RCLIFE PRE-DEPARTURE CHECK	T000JR4N	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-20	COQD200612637	***RCL***IFE PRE-DEPARTURE CHECK
LAV WINDOW CONTROL	T000JRJ0	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25 - EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-21	COQD210612638	VH-OQD WEEKLY 03JUL12 SYD QF012 ABH01 ***ENGCH4****
LAV DOOR	T000JRJ1	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25 - EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612639	LAV DOOR
IFE	T000JRJ5	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	31 - INDICATING/RECORDING SYSTEMS	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612640	IFE
TRAY TABLES	T000JRJ7	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25 - EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612641	TRAY TABLES
WATER BOILER	T000JRJ9	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-36 - GALLEY ELECTRICAL INSERT EQUIPMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612642	WATER BOILER
		AIRBUS				2012-		

CARPET	T000JRJD	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-28 - FLOOR COVERING	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612644	CARPET
CTR CONTROL	T000JRJF	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	46 - INFORMATION SYSTEMS	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612645	CTR CONTROL
IFE	T000JRJH	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44 - CABIN SYSTEMS	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612646	IFE
EXPRESSO	T000JRJK	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-36 - GALLEY ELECTRICAL INSERT EQUIPMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612647	EXPRESSO
IFE	T000JRLV	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44 - CABIN SYSTEMS	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612648	IFE
SEAT POWER	T000JRM3	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	25-21 - PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEAT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612649	SEAT POWER
IFE	T000JRME	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44 - CABIN SYSTEMS	CERT	MINOR	2012-06-21	COQD210612650	VH-OQD WEEKLY 22JUN12 LAX QF011 ABH01
IFE	T000JRW3	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-24 - SEAT EQUIPMENT	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612651	IFE
IFE	T000JRWA	AIRBUS A380-840 - VH-OQD	44-20 - IFE	CERT	UNKNOWN	2012-06-21	COQD210612652	IFE

QANTAS Qantas Engineering

30 May 2008

Mr Wayne Vasta
Assistant Federal Secretary
ALAEA
25 Stoney Creek Road
Bexley NSW 2207
Fax number: 9554 9644

RECEIVED
- 6 JUN 2008
BY:.....

Dear Wayne

Re: **Maintenance Check Outsourcing Forecast 2008**

Further to previous correspondence and discussions, including our meeting of 30 May 2008, regarding the aircraft maintenance check outsource schedule for this year.

The maintenance plan to date has been acquitted broadly as previously advised:

- The three B737-800 checks have now been completed by JHAS.
- The B737-400 check is in progress at MAS and should be completed in June 2008.
- The B767 check has been completed at SASCO and the second remains planned for August – October 2008 in HAECO.
- The B747-400 check has been completed at SIAEC in March 2008.
- The A330 checks were accomplished between LTP and HAECO during March/April 2008.
- The remaining small B743 checks through to fleet disposal are progressing and have been allocated to HAECO.
- The remaining A330s checks for 2008 remain outsourced pending resolution of the EBA. These checks will be split between HAECO and LTP.

As discussed at our meeting, the B747 fuselage Tension Tie AD continues to be a major risk for the program. Inspection findings on our dedicated maintenance line have extended check durations and continue to place pressure on our ability to complete this work within the aircraft funding provided by the airline. We are actively managing this risk to try and avoid any further outsource. The supplier for the previously advised outsource of a B744 D check (arising from the impact of the Pacific Premium Economy reconfiguration programme) in around August / September 2008 and the B744 D check driven by the Tension Tie program in around October / November 2008 will be HAECO.

QANTAS Qantas Engineering

The previously advised B737-400 SC2 being outsourced in July/August 2008, as a result of extended B737 fleet turn times has not yet been allocated to a supplier. At our last meeting I identified some risk of a second B737-400 SC2 to be outsourced as a result of the B767 Body Station 955 findings in Brisbane resulting in significant check duration extensions of two aircraft. This has now resulted in a B737-400 SC2 that was planned into Brisbane being replanned into Tullamarine and has resulted in an additional outsource in the July 2008 timeframe. The supplier is to be confirmed.

With the reduced capacity and increasing demand in Tullamarine for our Line operations, five B738 modification (predominantly) events will be outsourced to John Holland Aviation Services from June 2008. This will allow Heavy Maintenance Tullamarine to make available to ACS approx 30-40 people to assist with daily line operations.

Excluding aircraft repaints and other similar special lay-ups, such as disposals, we anticipate that this now represents the programme for 2008, subject as always to the usual influences that can affect aircraft maintenance demand and forecasting.

It is Qantas' intention to oversight the outsourced checks with the usual team, and we will confirm details once the suppliers are selected and team arrangements have been made.

Yours sincerely

David Hyland
GGM HM

Qantas Airways Limited
SAB2/3 Qantas Jet Base
Qantas Drive
Mascot NSW 2020
Tel: 02 9691 7202
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c.c. Adrian Verkerk Group General Manager E&M Qantas Airways, Sydney
Mr James Morley, Industrial Relations Manager, Qantas, Sydney
Mr Dennis Ratcliffe, Head of People, Qantas, Sydney
Mr Ian Wolfe, Manager Commercial and Planning, Qantas, Sydney
Mr Michael Brown, GM HM Victoria and Technical Training, MELSC
Mr John Vincent GGM Q&R, SAB1/5, Sydney
Mr Brent Earnshaw, GM HM, Qantas, BNE 03/1

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SERVICES AGREEMENT

Agreement No. INT-AME- 2008 009353

AGREEMENT dated 24th April 2008 between:

QANTAS: **QANTAS AIRWAYS LIMITED** (ABN 16 009 661 901) of Qantas Centre, Building A, Level 9, 203 Coward Street, Mascot, New South Wales, 2020, Australia, hereinafter referred to as **'Qantas'**.

SUPPLIER: **MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM BERHAD** address at 3rd Floor, Administration Building 1, Complex A, Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Airport, 47200 Subang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia , hereinafter referred to as **'Supplier'**.

INTRODUCTION

Qantas has requested and the Supplier has agreed to carry out aircraft maintenance services on the Aircraft and Equipment, owned, leased or operated by Qantas on the terms and conditions and for the consideration set out in this Agreement.

AGREEMENT

1 DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION

1.1 In this Agreement:

'Action Documents' means all Engineering Instructions (EIs) and Special Instructions (SIs) issued by Qantas.

'Additional Services' means those services authorised in writing by Qantas that the Supplier performs in addition to the Services covered by the Work Pack (including Non-Routine work).

'Additional Services Form' means the document detailing Additional Services to be performed by the Supplier in the form set out in **Schedule 8**.

'Aids to Production' means expendable items used in the performance of the Services such as gloves, tape, paper materials, drill bits, brushes and files, rags, and similar items that are not parts, items or materials incorporated on the Aircraft.

'Aircraft' means the aircraft specified in **Schedule 7** (Delivery and Re-Delivery) as may be varied by Qantas subject to Supplier's consent in accordance with **clause 5.1**.

SCHEDULE 7 DELIVERY AND RE-DELIVERY

Aircraft	Worksc ope	Estimated Delivery Date	Estimated Re-Delivery Date	Aircraft Flyaway Date	TAT (Days)
B737 VH-TJU	HM-1 Check	30 April 2008	30 May 2008	31 May 2008	30

Appendix 23 23

Australian Government

Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Legal Services Division

TRIM Ref: F13/3990

24 October 2013

Mr Stephen Re
Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association

By email: trustee1@alaea.asn.au

Dear Mr Re,

INTERNAL REVIEW - FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

I refer to your letter dated 24 September 2013 seeking internal review of a decision made by an officer of CASA on 26 August 2013, that certain documents or parts of documents were exempt documents pursuant to the *Freedom of Information Act 1975* (the Act).

Background

By email dated 14 June 2013, you sought access to documents under the Act relating to investigations carried out by CASA in relation to FAA AD mandated fuselage scribe line inspections conducted at:

1. ST Aerospace Engineering Pty Ltd (ST Aerospace) between 1 September 2012 and 14 June 2013; and

2. Malaysian Airlines Berhad (MAS) maintenance facilities between 1 September 2012 and 14 June 2013.

CASA identified 167 pages of documents relevant to your request, which fell into the following categories:

A. Correspondence between CASA and ALAEA, and internal correspondence between CASA officers;

B. Correspondence between CASA and ST Aerospace;

C. Correspondence between CASA and STTR;

D. Correspondence between CASA and MAS; and

E. Surveillance Report dated 2 July 2013 – MAS– Audit dates 22 and 26 April 2013.

Consultation

CASA consulted third parties in relation to the release of documents. By emails dated 2 August 2013, 16 August 2013 and 23 August 2013, ST Aerospace objected to the release of documents.

Internal review submissions

In your letter of 24 September 2013, you made the following submissions:

> Ms Smith-Roberts holds that some of the documents identified as within the scope of my request are exempt as they contain commercially valuable information, could be reasonably expected to adversely affect the business affairs of people, could reasonably be affected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth, could reasonably be expected to adversely affect the proper conduct of the operations of an agency and/or could unreasonably disclose personal information.
>
> In response to these decisions I would like to highlight the decision and reasoning in Wayne Vasta and Michael McKinnon v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2010] AATA 499 ("Vasta decision") a decision of senior Member Taylor SC of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In that decision Mr Vasta and Mr McKinnon sought access to a number of documents from CASA including audits of CASA-approved maintenance facilities in other jurisdictions and related to Australian-registered aircraft undergoing maintenance in other jurisdictions.
>
> Whilst I appreciate the Act has been subject to some amendment since the Vasta decision, I would submit that Ms Smith-Roberts' in relation to my request is inconsistent with that of Senior Member Taylor in the Vasta decision. Indeed, in the Vasta decision CASA (and some of the organisations involved in the documents sought) raised similar concerns to those which Ms Smith-Roberts has cited in declaring documents that I requested access to. In the Vasta decision Member Taylor SC found that, considering CASA's strong investigative and regulatory powers, the apprehension that disclosure may adversely affect the supply of information from aircraft maintenance organisations to CASA was a concern that was largely unfounded. Further, Senior Member Taylor SC also held that it would generally be in the commercial interest of aircraft maintainers, as opposed to adversely affecting such interests, to disclose documentation demonstrating regulatory compliance. For example Member Taylor SC held that, in many circumstances, such disclosure would assist the organisations in maintaining maintenance standards and regulatory compliance and such information may, for example, be disclosed in the normal course of business such as when 'tendering' for work from potential customers.
>
> In relation to the exemption due to unreasonable disclosure about personal information about any person I note that any unique personal information could be removed from the documents, potentially enabling them to be disclosed. I understand this is provided for under the Act, and was also relevant in the Vasta decision (see [127]).

Internal review decision

As detailed below, I have made a decision, a summary of which is set out in the table below:

No	Name	Date of document	Pages	Original decision	Internal review decision
1	Russell Hextor, STTR letter to ST Aerospace attaches 6 photographs	7 June 2012	24	Exempt in full	**Exempt in full**
2	Russell Hextor, Hextronics Pty Ltd Report	11 March 2012	12	Exempt in full	**Exempt in full**
3	Email ST Aerospace to CASA officer Barry Laws attaching letter	14 March 2013	30	Exempt in full	**Release, other than:**

	dated 14 March with attachments: a) Letter dated 6 March to CASA b) Calibration Review c) Training records d) STTR SDMS Laser Measurement Module User Manual (Manual).				**(a) names of persons who attended training courses from 6 pages(in this respect you have not sought the names of persons, so no decision on internal review was required to be made).** **(b) STTR Manual**
3	Email from STA to CASA	2 April 2013	1	Exempt in full	**Release**
4	Letter – STTR, attaching a) Appendix A – Part of the Manual; b) Appendix B – SDMS Training Course – Basic Syllabus Structure	6 March 2013	5	Exempt in full	**Release, other than one page, namely appendix A – extract of the Manual.**
5	Email from ST Aerospace to CASA officer Harding re Test Equipment: Laser Measurement System Inspect Cam Model SDMS Serial No. 1197.	11 January 2013	2 of 5	Part of one page of email exempt	**Release**
6	Remote Vision Solutions – Certificate of Attendance	3 July 2008	1	Name of person attending course exempt	**You have not sought the names of persons, so no decision on internal review was required to be made.**
7	Email from STTR Director to ST Aerospace re Scribe line inspection and measuring equipment reports dated 11 March and 7 June 2012	25 March 2013	1 of 6	Part of one page of email exempt	**Exempt**
8	Email from STTR to ST Aerospace	6 March 2013	4 of 6	Part of one page of email exempt	**Exempt, as describes personal information about Mr Hexter of STTR unrelated to any maintenance issue**

Documents disclosing trade secrets or commercially valuable information.

Section 47(1) of the Act provides that a document is an exempt document if its disclosure would reveal, (a) trade secrets; or (b) information having a commercial value that would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed.

The Manual of STTR has commercial value and is subject to copyright protection. Release of the manual might destroy or diminish that commercial value. I therefore make a decision documents numbered 3(d) and 4 in the above table are exempt documents under s.47(1)(b) of the Act.

Conditional exemption - business affairs

Section 47G(1) of the Act states:

> **47G Public interest conditional exemptions—business**
>
> (1) A document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under this Act would disclose information concerning a person in respect of his or her business or professional affairs or concerning the business, commercial or financial affairs of an organisation or undertaking, in a case in which the disclosure of the information:
>
> (a) would, or could reasonably be expected to, unreasonably affect that person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs or that organisation or undertaking in respect of its lawful business, commercial or financial affairs; or ...

ST Aerospace submitted to CASA:

> Specifically, the information concerns STA Engineering's services provided to its customers and its conduct (including its procedures and processes) in connection with equipment maintenance.
>
> Aside from those matters outlined in section 3.2 above, disclosure of this information may adversely affect STA Engineering's business due to:
> (a) any damage (including reputational) which may arise out of any unfounded allegations concerning STA Engineering's services and use of certain equipment;
> (b) any damages (both pecuniary as well as to business relationships) STA Engineering may suffer based on any alleged breaches of confidence by its customer and/or supplier as outlined in section 3.1 above.
>
> Public interest
> The documents concern matters which relate to STA Engineering, its customer and supplier. STA Engineering's dealings with CASA are confidential between STA Engineering and CASA. There is no broad public interest with respect to such private and sensitive matters.

I consider the release of documents numbered 1, 2 and 7 in the above table would, or could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the business affairs of ST Aerospace, because they are critical of ST Aerospace's maintenance practices and publication of those practices may harm its business affairs.

Section 31B of the Act provides that a document is exempt if it is conditionally exempt under Division 3, and access to the document would also, on balance, be contrary to the public interest for the purposes of s.11A(5) of the Act. I have decided that it would be contrary to the public interest to release the documents because whilst there is a public interest in the public knowing the standard of performance of a maintenance organisation which performs maintenance on Australian aircraft, there is also a public interest in not harming such an organisations business affairs. In this case, whilst the documents are critical of maintenance practices, it was reported to CASA that no aircraft was inspected with a defective SDMS Laser Measurement Module. Accordingly, I have decided documents numbered 1, 2 and 7 in the above table are exempt documents.

Conditional exemption - personal information

Section 47F of the Act provides that a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about any person. Your application for internal review modified the scope of your request by stating that names of persons were not sought.

Document numbered 8 is an email from Mr Hexter of STTR to ST Aerospace. Part of it describes medical personal information about himself otherwise unrelated to any issue connected with his email. I consider this is information which is conditionally exempt under s.47F of the Act, on the grounds that any disclosure of it would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information. I consider that the release of this information would be an unreasonable disclosure of personal information, as it relates to medical information unrelated to the scope of your request for access.

Section 31B of the Act provides that a document is exempt if it is conditionally exempt under Division 3, and access to the document would also, on balance, be contrary to the public interest for the purposes of s.11A(5) of the Act. I have decided that it is not in the public interest to release this personal information to you, as it is medically related. Accordingly, I have decided part of document 8 is an exempt document.

Release of documents

ST Aerospace has been notified of my decision as an affected third party. The documents that I consider are not exempt documents will be released to you when it's review rights are exhausted or not exercised, as required by the Act. ST Aerospace may seek review by the Australian Information Commissioner within 30 days.

Review by the Australian Information Commissioner

Under section 54L of the Act you may apply to the Australian Information Commissioner to review my decision. An application for review by the Information Commissioner must be made in writing within 60 days of the date of this letter, and be lodged in one of the following ways:

online:	https://forms.australia.gov.au/forms/oaic/foi-review/
email:	enquiries@oaic.gov.au
post:	GPO Box 2999, Canberra ACT 2601
in person:	Level 3, 175 Pitt Street, Sydney NSW

More information about Information Commissioner review is available on the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner website. Go to www.oaic.gov.au/foi-portal/review_complaints.html#foi_merit_reviews.

Yours sincerely

Adam Anastasi
General Counsel
Legal Services Division
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Ph: 02 6217 1040
Fax: 02 6217 1607