## Home Ownership Inquiry – Supplementary Submission

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This supplementary submission contains lending side solutions that could improve home ownership

- 1. Neutral Lending to Investors in either all or existing property Or
- 2. Where negative gearing is retained, align investor loan capacity with Owner Occupiers by
  - a. Applying losses to after tax income to <u>size</u> the loan, but investors still retain full deductibility
  - b. Investors are moved to Principal and Interest Loans and serviced by after tax income to <u>size</u> the loan. This could help improve the stability issues raised from the financial system inquiry.
    - i. Or <u>sized</u> as P & I, but investors can opt for interest only.

## Neutral Lending for Investors

Neutral Gearing in the media and to my understanding is about quarantining losses and applying them to future gains. This is a tax orientated change.

My design for neutral lending, is about retaining deductions applied to income, but capping lending into existing housing for investors, and then calculating a deposit above the neutral level to direct investors into new supply where negative gearing still applies.

Appendix C provides a detailed data series from 1998 to 2015 of median sales and median rents for a select number of areas of NSW. It includes the Inner, Middle and Outer Circle of Sydney, and regional NSW such as Newcastle/Illawarra, and Bathurst/Orange.

In Appendix C, I have calculated the deposit required above the neutral level for each geographical area over that 17 year period. The neutral level (shown in Appendix A) is calculated as the yearly rent x inverse of the interest rate at that time in history using RBA records. i.e. 5% is a x20 multiplier. Hence a weekly rent of \$400 / week would calculate a neutral level of \$416,000.

The neutral level being where the rent being paid is the same as the interest only component. Meaning at a 0% deposit, it is very attractive for someone to purchase the property they are renting.

At the committee hearing I discussed that if there was a move to neutral lending, i.e. *my assumption is that lending is capped to the neutral level*, that calculation of the neutral level would help differentiate the deposit requirement between different housing markets across the country. And it does as shown in Appendix C. This would address the affordable housing inquiries issue that a fixed 30% similar to New Zealand's would not be appropriate.

Appendix C highlights as of December 2014, for houses, that inner and middle Sydney needs a 51-56% deposit, outer Sydney is 41%, Newcastle/Illawarra is 29%, and Bathurst a 21% deposit.

In Sydney it would be very unattractive for investors to buy a house with a 50% deposit. Hence investor lending could be pushed into new supply where a deposit of say 5% is required, leaving owner occupiers to drive the market for existing housing.

Whereas in Bathurst, the deposit is 21%, so the investor may feel the difference between 21% and 5% is small enough that investing in existing property is preferred. But if excess investors entered the market and drove up prices relative to rents, the deposit would increase to a point that dis-incentivises investors.

Any fear that rising rents may occur, the neutral level will rise, and the deposit requirement will fall, incentivising investors back into the market. (Equal and opposite reactions are built into the design).

Overall the design of neutral lending is a macro prudential tool that links prices and rents together far more tightly, with the spread between prices and rents set by the interest rate.

Neutral lending in my opinion would attenuate the boom and bust cycle, thus improving stability.

### Aligning Investors with Owner Occupiers

If negative gearing is to continue,

#### Recommendation

- To ensure an even playing field between investors and owner occupiers, the **Sizing** of the loan needs to be treated the same i.e.
  - a. Losses are applied to after tax income to determine maximum loan size.
  - b. Investors are moved to Principal and Interest loans and serviced by after tax income to <u>size</u> the loan.
    - i. Or <u>sized</u> as P & I, but investors can opt for interest only

These changes are small, simple, incremental, and they are from the lending side rather than the tax side. It also means that investors and owner occupiers are equalised to the same lending capacity, and investors new and existing retain full deductibility. i.e. No change to negative gearing.

#### Loan Sizing - Comparison of Investor versus Owner Occupier

Investors can be lent more than an identical owner occupier for negatively geared investments. A sample calculation is found in Appendix B.

The Appendix B calculation assumes that two investors rent to each other both with identical income, property price, rental price and use interest only loans, thus gaining the tax deductions. This is then compared to an owner occupier with the same income buying the same house with the same price and using a principal and interest loan.

The following table is a summary of the three tax rates I have used to calculate the extra loan value an investor can get over and above an owner occupier calculated from Appendix B. The data used is from Appendix C that includes the middle circle of Sydney median house (\$1.1m), median rent (\$550 p/w) and interest rate of 5.5%. A minimum deposit of 20% is used, and maintenance costs are 20% of gross rent.

Individuals Tax Rate Investor loan value % Same, but investor greater than an Identical converts after tax Owner Occupier for principal cash flow of negatively geared owner occupier to gross investments income to service a larger loan 32.5 % +25% n/a 37.0 % +31% +70% 47.0 % +46% +93%

Depreciation and land tax have been ignored.

There are four key points that advantage investors over owner occupiers for negatively geared investments. These are as follows:

- The more negative the cash flow, the higher the tax refund for investors thus increasing their loan size, meaning owner occupiers are further disadvantaged.
- Higher tax rates increase the disadvantage to owner occupiers.
- Investors can convert net income for principal loan reduction into gross income to service interest on a larger interest only loan.
- The maximum loan size of an interest only loan is larger than a principal and interest loan (See table below). This disadvantage to owner occupiers is exacerbated with falling interest rates.

# If the principal that owner occupiers should not be disadvantaged, this is not being met.

The example in Appendix B, shows that when investor losses are applied to gross income, the investor can increase their maximum lending capacity by 31%. And when the principal loan component is re-converted to gross income to service a higher loan, the investor has a combined 70% larger loan capacity than an owner occupier.

But when the losses are applied to the after tax income of the investor (column 3, Appendix B), the net income of both investor and owner occupier are the same.

Hence when assessing a loan for an investor, losses should be assessed against after tax income, and the loan is assessed as principal and interest.

For the example in Appendix B, this reduces the investor loan capacity by about 41% (i.e.1.70 reduced to 1.00). Or in other words, the investor had a maximum loan capacity of \$1.5M but is reduced to \$880,000 to align with the owner occupier's maximum capacity.

## Principal and Interest Loan

Moving investors (both positive and negatively geared) to a principal and interest loan not only maintains the loan size equivalent to an owner occupier, but also increases savings with each monthly repayment on top of the deposit when the property is purchased.

In addition, housing investment has been called out by the Financial System Inquiry as a stability problem, hence including the principal in the investor loan may assist this.

Hence there are two benefits.

The following table shows a simple calculation of a principal and interest loan over 30 years at different interest rates. Note that as interest rates fall, by retaining the principal component the loan size does not increase with the inverse of the interest rate as it does for interest only. In fact as interest rates fall, the principal component increases for the first year payment. The principal component can be increased by reducing the length of the loan e.g. to 25 years.

Principal a	nd Interest	Componen	ts for \$100,000	Loan size with a Servicing Capacity of \$5000 per year						
					\$5,000	\$5,000				
	Firs	st Year Pay	ments		Loan S					
Interest				Principal as a %			Loan Size			
Rate	Interest	Principal	Total	of Total Loan	Interest Only	P&I	Reduction			
1%	\$987	\$2,873	\$3,860	74%	\$500,000	\$129,534	74%			
2%	\$1,978	\$2,458	\$4,436	55%	\$250,000	\$112,714	55%			
3%	\$2,971	\$2,088	\$5,059	41%	\$166,667	\$98,834	41%			
4%	\$3,968	\$1,761 \$5,729		31%	\$125,000	\$87,275	30%			
5%	\$4,966	\$1,475	\$6,441	23%	\$100,000	\$77,628	22%			
6%	\$5,964	\$1,189	\$7,153	17%	\$83,333	\$69,901	16%			
7%	\$6,962	\$903	\$7,865	11%	\$71,429	\$63,573	11%			
8%	\$7,970	\$835	\$8,805	9%	\$62,500	\$56,786	9%			
9%	\$8,972	\$683	\$9,655	7%	\$55,556	\$51,787	7%			
10%	\$9,975	\$556	\$10,531	5%	\$50,000	\$47,479	5%			

### Deductions for Owners occupier loans

On the 7 August during the committee hearing, deductions for owner occupiers was discussed as an option.

Moving to say a 50% deduction for both home owners and investors is thought to even the playing field. i.e. owner occupier mortgage repayments after tax may become cheaper than renting. So there is an incentive to buy.

Or something where the deduction moves from interest rate changes. i.e. under high interest rates, there's a need for investors to keep rents down, but under low interest rates there's a need for investors to back off, and let owner occupiers drive the market to increase home ownership.


Based on the Appendix B calculator, applying 50% of losses to gross income for both owner occupier and investor, I could not get symmetry.

## My thoughts

- This may have the same effect as the first home owners grant. Vendors will just increase prices and possibly rents at the same time if they can.
- Does this thinking include maintenance costs, not just interest costs for deductibility
- Owner occupiers (10 million of them, would need to keep records for tax purposes)
- Will they borrow more to do up the house, meaning less savings for retirement, and which are not means tested.
- Do we place a capital gains tax on the principal residence.
- The tax system loses its progressiveness because higher incomes are making larger deductions on the family home.
- Changing deductions when interest rate movement increases complexity.
- Investors can still get a larger loan (+22% bigger when 5% Interest Rate) as they don't pay down the principal component of the loan. Hence owner occupiers are still disadvantaged. This disadvantage is further exacerbated when interest rates fall.

Personally, my recommendations that come from the lending side, (either neutral lending or sizing of investor loans as P&I) appear to be simpler, retain all of the current tax design and appear to provide an even playing field to ensure that owner occupiers are not disadvantaged.

Appendix A – Using the Parramatta LGA data set from the first submission



## Appendix B

"Loan Sizing" Comparison	of In	vestors v	ersus Owner Occupier			
37 % Tax Rate						
Rent and Buy Investment Property			Owner Occupier			Rent and Buy Investment Propert Losses Applied to Net Income
le se e	ć	4 4 00 000	lite and a	ć	4 400 000	
ome	\$	1,100,000 20%	Home Deposit	\$	1,100,000 20%	Home
eposit	\$	20%	Deposit	Ś	20%	Deposit Deposit
oan	\$ \$	880,000	Loan	\$ \$	880,000	Loan
nterest	Ş	5.5%	Interest	Ş	5.5%	Interest
Repayments (I/O)	\$	48,400	Repayments (I/O)	\$	48,400	Repayments (I/O)
	Ŷ	-0,-00	Principal	\$	11,854	
laintenance \$/week (20% of rent)	\$	110				Maintenance \$/week (20% of rent)
aintenance \$/year	\$	5,720.00				Maintenance \$/year
	Ŷ	5,720100				mantenance of year
ent \$/week	\$	550				Rent \$/week
ent / year	\$	28,600				Rent / year
let Yield		2.1%		_		
DSS	-\$	25,520				
Gross Income	\$	140,000	Gross Income	\$	140,000	Gross Income
et Taxable Income	\$	114,480	Net Taxable Income	\$	140,000	Net Taxable Income
ax Rate %	Ś	37%	Tau	Ś	37%	Те
ax et Income	\$ \$	30,304 84,176	Tax Net Income	\$ \$	39,747 100,253	Tax Net Income
lincome	Ş	84,176	Net income	Ş	100,253	Net income
ent \$/week	\$	550	Maintenance \$/week (20% of rent)	\$	110	Rent \$/week
ent / year	\$	28,600	Maintenance \$/year	\$	5,720	Rent / year
			Repayments	\$	48,400	
						Loss
et Income Before Principal	Ś	55,576	Net Income Before Principal	\$	46,133	Net Income
incipal Component	\$	-	Principal Component	\$	11,854	
et Income After Principal	Ś	55,576	Net Income After Principal	\$	34,279	
et Difference before Principal	Ť	22,210		1	2 .,_/3	Net Difference (Net Income)
nvestor over Owner Occ)	\$	9,442				(Investor over Owner Occ)
onverted to Gross Income						Net Difference (Gross Income)
nvestor over Owner Occ)	\$	14,988				(Investor over Owner Occ)
ktra Loan Size	\$	272,508				Extra Loan Size
vtra Loan Sizo		31.0%				Extra Loan Size
xtra Loan Size		31.0%				Extra Loan Size
ame but includes Principal						
nvestor over Owner Occ)	\$	21,296				
onverted to Gross Income						
nvestor over Owner Occ)	\$	33,804				
xtra Loan Size	\$	614,615				
inter Lana Cha		<b>CO 0</b>				
xtra Loan Size		69.8%				

Com	parison	of Depos	sit Requ	ired for Neut	al Gear	ing		Appendix	C										
Data from Housing NSW - Quartely Sales and Rent Reports					Supplementry Su	bmission to the	Home Ownersh	ip Inquiry											
					_			Chris Moore											
		Legend for I	Deposit	< 0%				Individual Aug-15	;										
				0-20%															
				20-35%															
				>35 %															
				Non Strata (H	nuses)														
Report Re	eference			Non Strata (II	Jusesy			_									Bathurst + Orar	lge	
Rent	Sales			Sydney - Inne	Circle			Sydney - Midd	dle Circle		Sydney - Outer	Circle		Newcastle+Illa	warra		Bathurst	-8-	
		RBA Std		-,,	1	De	eposit		1	Deposit	-,,	1	Deposit		1	Deposit			Deposit
		VarInterest Rate	Date	Non-Strata Media Price	n 3 Bed Med Rent		ove eutral	Non-Strata Median Price	3 Bed Median Rent	above Neutral	Non-Strata Median Price	3 Bed Median Rent	above Neutral	Non-Strata Mediar Price	a Bed Median Rent	above Neutral	Non-Strata Median Price	3 Bed Median Rent	above Neutral
No35		10.50%		na	\$	320		na	\$ 240		na	\$ 180		na	na		na	\$ 160	)
No39	<u> </u>	7.50%		na	\$	350		na	\$ 250		na	\$ 185		na	na		na	\$ 160	
No43 No47	No44 No48	6.70% 6.50%		\$ 390,00 \$ 430,00		358 365	29% 32%	\$ 290,000 \$ 320,000			\$ 183,000 \$ 196,000			\$ 142,000 \$ 151,000			\$ 128,000 \$ 130,000	\$ 165 \$ 165	
N047 N051	N048 N052	7.30%	5 31/03/1999 5 31/03/2000	\$ 430,00		420	32%	\$ 320,000	\$ 265		\$ 196,000			\$ 157,000			\$ 130,000	\$ 165 \$ 165	
No55	No56	7.30%		\$ 500,00		430	39%	\$ 358,000			\$ 249,000			\$ 168,000			\$ 137,000	\$ 175	
No59	No60	6.05%	31/03/2002	\$ 605,00	0\$	425	40%	\$ 440,000	\$ 300	41%	\$ 295,000	\$ 220	36%	\$ 207,000	) \$ 185	5 <b>23%</b>	\$ 150,000	\$ 180	-3
No63	No64	6.55%		\$ 709,00		430	52%	\$ 550,000	\$ 295		\$ 360,000			\$ 265,000			\$ 170,000	\$ 180	
No67	No68 No72	7.05%		\$ 784,00 \$ 734,00		440 450	59%	\$ 620,000 \$ 560,000	\$ 310 \$ 320		\$ 416,000 \$ 400,000			\$ 330,000 \$ 325,000			\$ 241,000 \$ 263.000	\$ 200 \$ 210	_
No71 No75	N072 N076	7.30%	5 31/03/2005 5 31/03/2006	\$ 734,00		450	56% 54%	\$ 548,000			\$ 400,000			\$ 325,000			\$ 263,000	\$ 210	
No79	No80	8.05%	5 31/03/2007	\$ 795,00		525	57%	\$ 557,000	\$ 350		\$ 387,000			\$ 328,000			\$ 275,000	\$ 230	
V083	No84	9.35%	31/03/2008	\$ 910,00		600	63%	\$ 590,000			\$ 400,000			\$ 345,000		55%	\$ 265,000	\$ 240	
No87	No88	5.85%		\$ 820,00		650	30%	\$ 550,000			\$ 380,000			\$ 330,000			\$ 255,000		
No91	No92	6.90%		\$ 1,128,00		660	56%	\$ 715,000			\$ 449,000			\$ 375,000			\$ 305,000		
No95 No99	No96 No100	7.80%		\$ 1,070,00 \$ 1,035,00		720 750	55% 49%	\$ 723,000 \$ 750,000	\$ 500 \$ 500		\$ 445,000 \$ 468,000			\$ 380,000 \$ 395,000			\$ 296,000 \$ 305,000		
No103	No100 No104	6.45%		\$ 1,113,00		790	49%	\$ 750,000	\$ 500		\$ 488,000			\$ 395,00			\$ 305,000		
No107	No104	5.95%	5 31/03/2013 5 31/03/2014	\$ 1,360,00		800	49%	\$ 935,000	\$ 550		\$ 550,000			\$ 430,000			\$ 335,000		
No110	No111	5.95%	31/12/2014	\$ 1,470,00	0\$	823	51%	\$ 1,100,000	\$ 550	56%	\$ 625,000	\$ 420	41%	\$ 455,000	) \$ 370	) 29%	\$ 342,000	\$ 310	21
				Strata (Units)															
Referenc	1																Bathurst + Orar	ige	
Rent	Sales			Sydney - Inne	Circle			Sydney - Mido	dle Circle		Sydney - Outer	Circle		Newcastle+Illa	warra		Bathurst		
		RBA Std VarInterest					eposit ove	Strata Median		Deposit above			Deposit above			Deposit above			Deposit above
		Rate		Strata Median Pri	e 2 Bed Rent		eutral	Price	2 Bed Rent	Neutral	Strata Median Price	2 Bed Rent	Neutral	Strata Median Price	e 2 Bed Rent	Neutral	Strata Median Price	2 Bed Rent	Neutral
	1	10.50%	31/03/1996	na	\$	250		na	\$ 175		na	\$ 160		na	na		na	\$ 128	3
		7.50%	31/03/1997	na	\$	260		na	\$ 185		na	\$ 170		na	na		na	\$ 125	
No43	No44	6.70%		\$ 270,00		280	20%	\$ 187,000	\$ 190		\$ 174,000			\$ 135,000	-		na	\$ 130	
No47	No48 No52	6.50% 7.30%		\$ 288,00 \$ 318,00		295 325	18%	\$ 203,000 \$ 228,000	\$ 200 \$ 215		\$ 178,000 \$ 200,000			\$ 134,000 \$ 146,000			\$ 109,000 \$ 103,000	\$ 130 \$ 130	
No51 No55	N052 N056	7.30%		\$ 318,00		325	27%	\$ 228,000	\$ 215		\$ 200,000			\$ 146,000			\$ 103,000	\$ 130 \$ 135	
No59	No60	6.05%		\$ 388,00		340	25%	\$ 292,000			\$ 255,000			\$ 180,000			\$ 98,000	\$ 140	
No63	No64		31/03/2003	\$ 412,00		350	33%	\$ 330,000			\$ 305,000			\$ 245,000			\$ 134,000	\$ 140	17
No67	No68	7.05%		\$ 450,00		350	43%	\$ 350,000			\$ 332,000			\$ 293,000			\$ 157,000	\$ 155	_
No71	No72		31/03/2005	\$ 455,00		360	44%	\$ 350,000			\$ 336,000			\$ 290,000			\$ 181,000		
No75 No79	No76 No80	7.30%		\$ 440,00 \$ 450,00		380 410	38% 41%	\$ 352,000 \$ 345,000			\$ 330,000 \$ 316,000			\$ 296,000 \$ 286,000	-		\$ 170,000 \$ 185,000	\$ 170 \$ 170	
	No84	9.35%		\$ 485,00		410	41%	\$ 360,000			\$ 325,000			\$ 300,000			\$ 175,000		
		5.85%		\$ 470,00		500	5%	\$ 365,000			\$ 320,000			\$ 290,000			\$ 195,000		_
No83	No88	5.65/6				520	30%	ć 120.000	\$ 380		\$ 356,000	\$ 340		\$ 325,000			\$ 190,000		
No83 No87 No91	No92	6.90%		\$ 560,00				\$ 420,000											
No83 No87 No91 No95	No92 No96	6.90% 7.80%	31/03/2011	\$ 560,00	0\$	560	33%	\$ 439,000	\$ 400	39%	\$ 370,000	\$ 360		\$ 329,000	) \$ 285	5 42%	\$ 223,000	\$ 208	
No83 No87 No91 No95 No99	No92 No96 No100	6.90% 7.80% 7.40%	5 31/03/2011 5 31/03/2012	\$ 560,00	0 \$ 0 \$	560 585	33% 31%	\$ 439,000 \$ 462,000	\$ 400 \$ 420	39% 36%	\$ 370,000 \$ 365,000	\$ 360 \$ 370	29%	\$ 329,000 \$ 328,000	) \$ 285 ) \$ 300	5 42% 0 36%	\$ 223,000 \$ 215,000	\$ 208 \$ 230	) 25
No83 No87 No91 No95	No92 No96	6.90% 7.80%	<ul> <li>31/03/2011</li> <li>31/03/2012</li> <li>31/03/2013</li> </ul>	\$ 560,00	0 \$ 0 \$ 0 \$	560	33%	\$ 439,000	\$ 400 \$ 420 \$ 430	39%           36%           29%	\$ 370,000	\$ 360 \$ 370 \$ 380	29% 22%	\$ 329,000	0     \$     285       0     \$     300       0     \$     315	5     42%       0     36%       5     23%	\$ 223,000	\$ 208 \$ 230 \$ 240	) 25 ) 12