QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the Administration, Management and Objective of Australia's Overseas Development Programs in the Context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q1: Impact of Operations on Aid Programs

Senator Rhiannon asked on Monday, 3 December 2012:

Has an assessment been done regarding whether Australian military operations compromise Australian aid programs in Afghanistan? If so: (1) what conclusions have been reached? and (2) have the conclusions been put into action?

- (1) No. Defence and AusAID assess that such an assessment is unnecessary. The security issues in Uruzgan mean that Australian Defence Force (ADF) and International Security Assistance Force assistance is essential to allow AusAID and DFAT personnel to implement aid programs or conduct political engagement.
 - The ADF's involvement in Afghanistan, alongside that of DFAT and AusAID, is part of an integrated whole-of-government effort with inter-linked security, diplomatic and development objectives. Experience in fragile and conflict-affected states, such as the Solomon Islands, East Timor and Afghanistan, confirms the importance of coordination between development (AusAID), diplomacy (DFAT) and security (ADF and Australian Federal Police) efforts in helping states transition from conflict and fragility to stability and peace.
- (2) Not applicable.

Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the Administration, Management and Objective of Australia's Overseas Development Programs in the Context of the 'Transition Decade' – 3 December 2012

Q2: Protective Force requirements for the Malalai girls school in Tarin Kot

Senator Rhiannon asked on Monday 3 December 2012:

Are protective forces required to secure the Malalai girls school in Tarin Kot?

Response:

Decisions on the security of Afghan educational institutions are a matter for the Afghan Government and the provincial Government in Uruzgan. Defence understands that the Uruzgan Provincial Government provides armed guards on a 24 hour basis to secure the school. The Afghan National Security Forces also provide security to the school's immediate area.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q3: Strategic and developmental goals

AusAID has identified 6 strategic goals for its assistance to Afghanistan 2011–2012—Sustainable Economic Development (32%); Effective Governance (24%); cross cutting support to multisector Afghan national programs (15%); promoting opportunities for all (11%); humanitarian and disaster response (13%) and saving lives (5%) (submission 16, p. 23).

- (a) What are Defence's key strategic goals in Afghanistan?
- (b) How do they fit in with Australia's whole-of-government effort in Afghanistan?
- (c) How do they complement AusAID's goals?

- (a) The strategic objective which Australia is pursuing in Afghanistan is to ensure that terrorist groups are denied safe haven in Afghanistan and ensure it does not again become a safe haven for international terrorists. International terrorism emanating from Afghanistan poses a grave threat to the region, to the international community and to Australia's interests. A key priority for International Security Assistance Force partners in Afghanistan has been developing the capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces.
- (b) Australia's military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan are mutually reinforcing. Australia increased its civilian engagement in Afghanistan, including enhancing its diplomatic and civilian presence in Kabul. The increase recognised the importance of development assistance complementing security and also being the ultimate proof against conflict and instability in Afghanistan.
- (c) Defence complements AusAID's goals by working to ensure a secure environment for AusAID activities in Uruzgan.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the Administration, Management and Objective of Australia's Overseas Development Programs in the Context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q4: Strategic and developmental goals ODA:

In its submission, Defence states that: As Uruzgan province proceeds through transition, and Australia's commitment becomes more nationally focused, it is likely that the proportion of Defence assistance will increasingly shift to financial contributions to the development of the Afghan National Security Forces and some of these contributions may be eligible to be classified as ODA (submission 17, page [1]).

Could you explain in what way some of the financial contributions to the development of the Afghan National Security Forces may be eligible to be classified as ODA?

Response:

ODA-eligible activities are defined under OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines (Statistical Reporting Directives). ODA is defined as assistance provided to countries and territories on the DAC List (which includes Afghanistan) that are:

- (a) provided by official agencies, including governments, or by their executive agencies; and
- (b) each transaction is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.

The ODA eligibility of each activity is assessed on a case by case basis using the guidance provided by the OECD DAC outlined below.

Under the OECD DAC's guidelines ODA eligible security expenditure can include:

- (a) expenditure on police training in routine civil policing functions;
- (b) technical co-operation provided to government to improve civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure, including military budgets, as part of a public expenditure management programme;
- (c) assistance to civil society to enhance its competence and capacity to scrutinise the security system so that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance; and
- (d) security system reform.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q5: ADF's development assistance

Defence lists a number of projects undertaken by the PRT including the Tarin Kot waste management facility and the Malalai Girl's School in Tarin Kot.

- (a) Are you able to quantify the funds that went toward such projects?
- (b) As part of a whole-of-government contribution has any other agency on behalf of the ADF undertaken an evaluation of the projects?
- (c) Sustainability is an important consideration when planning and designing a project. To what extent did Defence take account of the ability of those taking over the facilities to operate and maintain them?
- (d) Are the projects listed in Defence's submission fully operational?

- (a) The original Defence submission to this Inquiry included individual project cost breakdowns by year. The funds that went towards ODA-eligible construction projects undertaken by Defence and, later, by the Provincial Reconstruction Team are fully detailed in Table 2 "ODA Eligible Individual Projects undertaken by Defence for Period 2006 2013" contained in that submission and subsequent amendments.
- (b) No other agency, external to Defence, has undertaken project evaluation on the individual projects listed.
- (c) Australian Defence Force (ADF) construction projects in Uruzgan province aim to improve the capacity of and access by the provincial government to the local population, to mentor the Afghan people and build capacity, and provide local communities with infrastructure to support their own development. Construction projects in local communities also build goodwill among the Afghan people. This contributes to creating a more robust Afghan society, resulting in a more stable security environment. Throughout the project planning and design process, significant attention is given on each project to ensure that they are appropriate to the environment. Longer term viability and sustainability of these projects are taken into consideration. Construction efforts are, wherever possible, undertaken using construction techniques suitable for local conditions, employing local contractors and using locally sourced materials.
 - (1) From 2006-2010, an ADF-led Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force, followed by the Mentoring Task Force, undertook a number of construction projects in Uruzgan province. Construction efforts during this time were

- delivered in consultation with the Netherlands-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a wide range of local stakeholders, represented by provincial government officials and members of the local community.
- (2) In August 2010, Australia assumed the lead of the Uruzgan PRT, giving further opportunity to progress construction projects in Uruzgan. The PRT efforts in Uruzgan are a whole of government effort, and the ADF works with DFAT and AusAID in the PRT to develop projects. Projects are developed in close consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, including Afghan and International Security Assistance Force partners, provincial and district administration leaders and local communities. Civilian and military advisers engage directly with the Afghan Government and community to enable the construction of roads, schools and other basic infrastructure to improve governance capacity and facilitate the delivery of basic services such as health and education to the Afghan people.
- (d) The following table indicates the functional status of Defence construction projects undertaken since 2006.

Table 1. ADF ODA-Eligible Project Status

Fully Operational	Partially Operational	Not Operational	No Information Available ¹	Total
12	3	2	31	48
25%	6%	4%	65%	100%

Note 1. For serials marked "no information available", these projects were operational at the time they were handed over to Afghanistan authorities and are now the responsibility of those authorities. A detailed response would require checking with district authorities, noting that Australian troops are no longer operating from Forward Operating Bases or Patrol Bases in Uruzgan Province and have consolidated their presence at the Multi-National Base Tarin Kot.

Additional detail of status by individual projects is provided at Table 2 below:

Table 2. ODA Eligible Individual Projects	Undertake	n by Defence for Period
2006-2013: Project Status as at 2 Jan 13	Informatio	n provided by JTF 633 PRT
	D	·

Ser	Projects/Expenditure Item	Purpose Category	Project Status ²
	(a)	(b)	(c)
l	Sedfidkar Flood Mitigation	Civil Works	No Information Available
2	Tarin Kot Waste Management	Civil Works	Fully Operational
3	Tarin Kot Waste Management Facility	Civil Works	Fully Operational
4	Tarin Kot Wells - various location	Civil Works	Partially Operational
5	Baluchi Community Project	Community	No Information Available
6	Chora Food Storage Cellars	Community	No Information Available
7	Rosie Khan Mosque	Community	No Information Available
8	Sorgh Morghab Mosque	Community	No Information Available
9	Sorkh Morghab Community Projects	Community	No Information Available
10	Radio Television Authority Rebuild	Community	Partially Operational
11	Afghan Health and Development Services Training Facility	Education	No Information Available
12	Malalai Girl's School	Education	No Information Available
13	Naway Waleh School	Education	No Information Available
14	Talani School	Education	No Information Available
15	Tarin Kot Boys High School	Education	Fully Operational
16	Tarin Kot Boys Primary School	Education	Fully Operational
17	Tarin Kot Boys School	Education	Fully Operational
18	Tarin Kot Girls School Expansion	Education	Partially Operational
19	Trade Training Centre	Education	Fully Operational
20	Womens Training Project	Education	No Information Available
21	Governor's Compound	Governance	No Information Available
22	Governor's Shura Building (including Governors Compound Rectification)	Governance	Fully Operational
23	Ministry of Energy & Water Compound	Governance	No Information Available
24	Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development Compound Refurbishment	Governance	No Information Available

Ser	Projects/Expenditure Item	Purpose Category	Project Status (2)
301	(a)	(b)	(c)
25	National Directorate of Security Compound	Governance	No Information Available
26	TK Prison Water Tower	Governance	No Information Available
27	Chora Clinical Health Centre Expansion	Health_	Fully Operational
28	Dorofshan Basic Health Care Centre	Health	No Information Available
29	Mirabad Basic Health Centre	Health	No Information Available
30	Sorkh Morghab Basic Health Centre	Health	No Information Available
31	Tarin Kot Hospital	Health	Fully Operational
32	Tarin Kot Hospital Doctors Accomodation	Health	Fully Operational
33	Yaklenga Health Centre	Health	No Information Available
34	Tarin Kot Solid Waste Containment Project	Health	Not Operational
35	Alexander Hill Bridge	Transport	No Information Available
36	Baluchi Crossing	Transport	No Information Available
37	Chutu II Bridge	Transport	No Information Available
38	Chutu Bridge repairs	Transport	No Information Available
39	Eastern Causeway	Transport	No Information Available
40	Irish Crossing Refurbishment	Transport	No Information Available
41	Kowtwal Crossing	Transport	No Information Available
42	Sajawul Crossing	Transport	Fully Operational
43	Sorkh Lez Crossing	Transport	No Information Available
44	Talani Crossing	Transport	No Information Available
45	Tarin Kot Roads	Transport	Fully Operational
46	Zabul Bridges	Transport	No Information Available
47	Route Whale East	Transport	Not Operational
48	Quick Impact Projects ¹	ha amanidad Onia	No Information Available

Note 1: No further breakdown of actual projects can be provided. Quick Impact Projects provide a short to medium term development effect at the local level. The aim of a Quick Impact Project is to provide funding for materials, labour and/or local national specialist advisors that benefit a wider group of people normally a village or community group. The stated goal is to provide entry into local communities, thereby facilitating closer engagement with key leaders and the community as a whole.

Note 2: For serials marked "no information available", these projects were operational at the time they were handed over to Afghanistan authorities. As Uruzgan province progresses through transition and ADF draw down continues, detailed information on all projects undertaken since 2006 is not easily available.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' – 3 December 2012

Q6: Understanding complexity of Afghan society

The 2012 August report published by the Feinstein International Center found that Uruzgan highlights the necessity of seeing powerholders in a more nuanced light—that is as agents who exist in a complex web of personal, social and official relationships, and who act on a calculus of best interests.

How does the ADF obtain such a critical insight?

Response:

The Australian Defence Force, through its partnership with the Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), maintains an active program of consultation with the Afghan community, government leaders and groups in Uruzgan province. Defence, and other Australian agencies in the PRT, work in close partnership with these communities and with security providers in the province to maintain a good understanding of the social and political environment in which we operate.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q7: Coordination with NGO's

The TLO Profile mentioned that some NGOs were frustrated with the unwillingness of international military forces to coordinate with NGOs.

Could you tell the committee about how Defence goes about ensuring that its work complements that of NGOs, of how it liaises and coordinates with NGOs?

Response:

The Australian Defence Force works within the Provincial Reconstruction Team, led by representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and AusAID, to develop and undertake projects in close consultation with a wide range of stakeholders. Stakeholders in Uruzgan include Afghan and International Security Assistance Force partners, provincial and district administration leaders, local communities, international organisations such as United Nations agencies and where appropriate, Non-Government Organisations.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q8: Likelihood aid will be used in corrupt ways

AID/WATCH suggested that military aid or the militarisation of aid increases the likelihood that aid will be used in corrupt ways, such as an incentive to extract information from locals.

- (1) To what extent do Defence personnel use the links they have established with local communities through their reconstruction work to obtain local intelligence?
- If so, do you see a problem with doing so—does such activity blur the lines between development assistance and combat activity?

- (1) A natural result of close relationships with communities that the Provincial Reconstruction Team has developed over time is that many of the local Afghans develop open and good relationships with Australian representatives, and choose to discuss the security environment. This is considered a collaborative partnership.
- (2) Defence does not perceive a problem. Defence's contribution to governance and development assistance in Uruzgan province helps to increase ADF and ISAF goodwill with the local Afghan people, improve capacity within the Provincial Government, and provide local communities with infrastructure and other support. Strengthening the capacity of the provincial and local government and improving Rule of Law and governance in the province helps create a more stable and secure environment.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' – 3 December 2012

Q9: Distortion in the distribution of aid towards regions experiencing conflict

Professor Maley noted that a 'moral hazard' problem can easily arise if developmental activity is designed to complement the efforts of the military, which are almost always concentrated in areas of perceived or potential insecurity. He observed: The risk is that areas in which ordinary Afghans have done their best to produce local security will be neglected by aid agencies, and that this will send the signal that the way in which to secure aid money is to generate local insecurity.

- (a) From your experience in Afghanistan is development assistance designed to complement the efforts of the military?
- (b) Based on your experience in Afghanistan, is it correct that the more insecure areas of Afghanistan receive a disproportionate amount of development activity because it is used to complement military efforts?
- (c) If so, do you see this as a 'moral hazard'?

Response:

(a) Development assistance is delivered across Afghanistan by a number of different actors, including by government and non-government agencies.

The safest and, in some cases, the only way to deliver assistance when security is poor is by working with or via military elements. It is important that people in insecure areas also benefit from development assistance.

Defence works in close collaboration with other government agencies in Uruzgan. Activities, including development projects undertaken by Defence, help to establish a permissive environment in which development and governance assistance delivered by other agencies can take effect. Without initial Defence assistance in non-permissive areas such as Uruzgan, other forms of development assistance would be difficult to implement. The delivery of construction by the Australian Defence Force through the Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction Team is intended to generate support for the Afghan and Provincial Government and assist it to extend its authority. This in turn helps bring stability and security to Uruzgan Province.

- (b) Defence is unable to comment on the proportionality of development activity provided to insecure areas. Defence acknowledges that inequitable delivery of aid across regions may occur. Defence is not, however, an aid agency and only provides development assistance or an adjunct to its military mission.
- (c) Refer to (b)

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q10: ANSF - Loyalties

Professor Maley noted that: ...there is very little evidence to suggest that developmental activity will win a political dividend for the Afghan government or its international backers. This is in part because Afghans quite rationally align themselves politically not on the basis of gratitude for what has been done for them in the past, but rather on the basis of what alignments are likely to protect their interests in the future.

- (a) Would you agree with this assessment that Afghans quite rationally align themselves politically not on the basis of gratitude for what has been done for them in the past, but rather on the basis of what alignments are likely to protect their interests in the future?
- (b) What implications does such an approach have for the ANSF?

Response:

(a) and (b)

Defence is unable to comment on the motivation of individual Afghans. The Australian Defence Force provides support to development assistance activities in good faith and to allow space for the Afghan Government to operate as the long-term provider of security, governance and economic development to the Afghan people. The Australia-Afghanistan Comprehensive Long-Term Partnership underlines the Australian commitment to supporting Afghanistan beyond 2014, through cooperation in the areas of security, trade and development, and building the capacity of Afghanistan's national institutions. Post-2014, the ADF will continue to support the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) through the provision of training and advisory support, including at the Afghan National Army (ANA) Officer Academy in Kabul. Australia will also consider a Special Forces contribution, under an appropriate mandate and will contribute US\$100 million annually for three years from 2015 as part of international efforts to sustain and support the ANSF beyond transition. Australia's commitment reflects our enduring interest in Afghanistan's long term security and stability and sends a strong signal to the people of Afghanistan, the Taliban and the region that the international community will not walk away from Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' – 3 December 2012

Q11: ANSF Ethnicities and Loyalties

Mr Bizhan, ANU, observed that political fragmentation and a lack of consensus after 2014 'may prove very challenging for the Afghan National Security Force, which are combined of different ethnicities'. Further that national and international actors need to be alert to the possibility of fragmentation within the security forces and they should take 'sensitive measures to reduce this risk' (submission 13, p. 5)¹.

- (a) Could you explain for the committee the nature and significance of the different ethnicities and loyalties in Afghanistan, their origins and how entrenched they are?
- (b) In your view what is the danger that the ANSF could fragment and support warlords—that the ANSF could fragment along tribal and patronage network lines.
- (c) Has Australia conducted its own evaluation of what is likely to happen after 2014?

- (a) Afghanistan has a diverse range of ethnic groups with a Pashtun majority predominantly in the south of the country and Tajiks and Uzbeks predominantly in the north. Other significant ethnic groupings include Hazaras, Aimaks, Turkmen and Baloch.
- (b) Through continued adequate military training and support of the international community, we expect the Afghan National Security Forces to be a confident and capable force to provide security for the Afghan people.

Also see, an ACFID study found that parts of Uruzgan are still under militia control and the loyalty of the militia to the Government is poor or non-existent. Phil Sparrow, *In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan*, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011.

(c) Defence conducts evaluations on possible scenarios that could occur in Uruzgan province after 2014 and these inform our planning processes. It would be unhelpful to speculate on what specific scenarios are likely to eventuate in Afghanistan post-2014. Country-wide assessments of Afghanistan undertaken by other International Security Assistance Force partners (such as the United States Department of Defense December 2012 Report to Congress on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan) also inform our own planning. As the Prime Minister said in her 31 October 2012 statement on Afghanistan to the House of Representatives, "we know that as Afghan forces increasingly take the lead through 2013, the Taliban will seek to test them. We know that not every valley or village in Uruzgan or Afghanistan will be peaceful or free from insurgency. There will be difficult days ahead..."

However, Australia is committed to support Afghanistan through to transition in December 2014 and beyond. Post-2014, the ADF will continue to support the development of the ANSF through the provision of training and advisory support, including at the Afghan National Army (ANA) Officer Academy in Kabul. Australia will also consider a Special Forces contribution, under an appropriate mandate and will contribute US\$100 million annually for three years from 2015 as part of international efforts to sustain and support the ANSF beyond transition.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the Administration, Management and Objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012 -

Q12 - ANSF Corruption

The recent report published by the Feinstein International Center noted that respondents to its research in Uruzgan observed that 'the ADF's direct and hands-on role in supervising infrastructure projects was very expensive, but resulted in higher quality structures and fewer allegations of corruption'.

- (a) Would you like to comment on this observation?
- (b) To what extent did the ADF contract out or sub-contract its projects—could you provide details?
- (c) Did the ADF use its projects as a means of employing and/or training local Afghans in building and construction skills?
- (d) How did the ADF managed problems with corruption?
- (e) What precautions did the ADF take to ensure that its projects did not play into local power dynamics by exacerbating resentment or rivalries between groups?
- (f) How does the ADF ensure local buy-in for their projects?

Response:

(a) The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is not an aid organisation. The costs of delivering and supporting development assistance in a difficult security environment such as Uruzgan province are significant.

Defence assesses that any projects that are designed, managed and delivered by the ADF exceed the typical quality of construction that is generally observed in the community. This is attributable to a number of factors, but the key reason is that local contractor trade training is usually limited. For example:

- i. the quality of local on site supervision is poor, and ADF delivered projects provide additional well trained supervision and oversight during both design and delivery phases;
- ii. safety on site is monitored by the Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction Team's (PRT) Managed Works Team (MWT) and, where deficiencies are identified, mentoring and training is provided; and
- iii. continual reinforcement is provided to the contractor that safety, quality and contract management is the responsibility of the contractor and PRT MWT hold them to account within the bounds of the contracts.

- (b) From 2006-2010, an ADF-led Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force, followed by a Mentoring Task Force, undertook a number of construction projects in Uruzgan province which utilised a mix of military trade specialist, locally employed labour and, as the security situation permitted, local contractors.
 - In August 2010, Australia assumed the lead of the Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction Team, giving further opportunity to progress construction projects in Uruzgan. Australian civilian and military advisers engage directly with the Afghan Government and community to enable the construction of roads, schools and other basic infrastructure. These efforts help to improve governance capacity and facilitate the delivery of basic service such as health and education to the Afghan people. Construction efforts are now, where possible, undertaken using construction techniques suitable for local conditions, employing local contractors and using locally sourced materials.
- (c) Construction efforts are, where possible, undertaken using construction techniques suitable for local conditions, employing local contractors and using locally sourced materials. In addition, the Trade Training School, previously run by the Mentoring Task Force and now by the Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction Team, has been conducting basic plumbing, carpentry, concreting and bricklaying courses since 2006.
 - An advanced construction workers course has been offered since July 2007, providing a greater depth of training in plumbing, carpentry, concreting and bricklaying as well as developing basic foreman skills. The overall aim is to build sustainable Afghan trade professions.
- (d) The Australian Government attaches great importance to reducing the levels of corruption and illegal activity in Uruzgan and promoting good governance and the Rule of Law. The PRT development activities focus on ensuring that development aid is used positively, in support of governance and security in the province.
- (e) The project consultation and development process is the mechanism through which the ADF obtains critical insight to enable the identification and prioritisation of suitable construction projects. Project selection takes into account the local power dynamics.
- (f) The project consultation and development process is the mechanism through which the ADF obtains critical insight to enable the identification and prioritisation of suitable construction projects. The Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) engages closely with local communities, community leaders and other stakeholders to make sure projects suit local conditions and fulfil local needs, which serves to bring communities in to the projects. The ADF works hard to achieve buy-in from the communities in the PRT's aid projects, as one of the Australian Government's key goals is to support the development and governance efforts of the local Afghan government.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q13: Evaluation and Reporting

Defence in its submission stated: The overall security situation, the relatively small scale of the individual projects undertaken by the Military Reconstruction and Task Force and ADF Managed Works Team and the time imperatives to consistently deliver immediate and visible benefits to local communities, militate against the conduct of formal cost/benefit evaluations (submission 17, p. [3]).

- a) Could you explain how Defence monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of its ODA work in Afghanistan?
- b) Has AusAID or DFAT, as the primary coordinator, undertaken such evaluations on behalf of Defence?
- c) How does Defence assess the effectiveness of the development assistance it provides in Afghanistan? How do you receive feedback from the local communities?

- a) Australian Defence Force (ADF) projects are assessed for fitness for purpose and construction standards. They are routinely evaluated for such, after completion. Lower level monitoring of reconstruction projects is undertaken by the ADF but the ADF does not independently evaluate the development impact of these projects.
- b) No.
- c) The ADF works with representatives from DFAT and AusAID within the Provincial Reconstruction Team to develop projects in continued and close consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, including Afghan and ISAF partners, provincial and district administration leaders and local communities. Civilian and military advisers engage directly with the Afghan Government, community leaders and local communities to enable the construction of roads, schools and other basic infrastructure, to improve governance capacity and facilitate the delivery of basic service such as health and education to the Afghan people. This mechanism ensures that project development and delivery is appropriate to the local situation and beneficial to both the community and provincial government.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q14: Report on Military construction effectiveness

Mr Poulter: ... There is also the issue that I flagged earlier about the effectiveness of the assistance that is given. If we look at the report on school building, sadly, those that have been constructed by military aid were found to be far more likely to be attacked than those built by NGOs or by the communities themselves. Is Defence aware of any such reports?

Response:

Defence is aware of one such report. The Care Australia submission dated 17 September 2012 to the Inquiry refers to a report "Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on education in Afghanistan", produced by CARE international for the World Bank in 2009 which generally refers to data between 2006-2008. The report does describe foreign military involvement (in particular Provincial Reconstruction Teams) as one of a range of factors that can increase the risk of a school being attacked or threatened. While Uruzgan was not one of the provinces studied for the production of the report, it does appear in some of the comparison tables within the report.

The following summary table indicates only three confirmed records of attacks on two Defence ODA-eligible construction projects undertaken since 2006.

Table 1. Project-related Attacks on ADF ODA-Eligible
Projects

Attacks	None	Unknown	Total
3	14	32	48
4%	29%	67%	100%

For serials marked "unknown", detailed information on all projects undertaken since 2006 is not easily available.

Additional detail by individual projects is provided at Table 2 below:

Table 2. ODA Eligible Individual Projects Undertaken by Defence for Period 2006-
2013: Insurgent Attacks as at 2 Jan 13 – Information provided by JTF 633 PRT

Ser	Projects/Expenditure Item	Purpose Category	Insurgent attacks 1
	(a)	(b)	(c)
1	Sedfidkar Flood Mitigation	Civil Works	Unknown
2	Tarin Kot Waste Management	Civil Works	None
3	Tarin Kot Waste Management Facility	Civil Works	None
4	Tarin Kot Wells - various location	Civil Works	2
5	Baluchi Community Project	Community	Unknown
6	Chora Food Storage Cellars	Community	Unknown
7	Rosie Khan Mosque	Community	Unknown
8	Sorgh Morghab Mosque	Community	Unknown
9	Sorkh Morghab Community Projects	Community	Unknown
10	Radio Television Authority Rebuild	Community	1
11	Afghan Health and Development Services Training Facility	Education	Unknown
12	Malalai Girl's School	Education	Unknown
13	Naway Waleh School	Education	Unknown
14	Talani School	Education	Unknown
15	Tarin Kot Boys High School	Education	None
16	Tarin Kot Boys Primary School	Education	None
17	Tarin Kot Boys School	Education	None
18	Tarin Kot Girls School Expansion	Education	Unknown
19	Trade Training Centre	Education	None
20	Womens Training Project	Education	Unknown
21	Governor's Compound	Governance	Unknown
22	Governor's Shura Building (including Governors Compound Rectification)	Governance	None
23	Ministry of Energy & Water Compound	Governance	Unknown
24	Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development Compound Refurbishment	Governance	Unknown

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Ser	Projects/Expenditure Item (a)	Purpose Category (b)	Insurgent attacks ¹ (c)	
	(4)	(0)		
25	National Directorate of Security Compound	Governance	Unknown	
26	TK Prison Water Tower	Governance	Unknown	
27	Chora Clinical Health Centre Expansion	Health	None	
28	Dorofshan Basic Health Care Centre	Health	Unknown	
29	Mirabad Basic Health Centre	Health	Unknown	
30	Sorkh Morghab Basic Health Centre	Health	Unknown	
31	Tarin Kot Hospital	Health	None	
32	Tarin Kot Hospital Doctors Accommodation	Health	None	
33	Yaklenga Health Centre	Health	Unknown	
34	Tarin Kot Solid Waste Containment Project	Health	None	
35	Alexander Hill Bridge	Transport	Unknown	
36	Baluchi Crossing	Transport	Unknown	
37	Chutu II Bridge	Transport	Unknown	
38	Chutu Bridge repairs	Transport	Unknown	
39	Eastern Causeway	Transport	Unknown	
40	Irish Crossing Refurbishment	Transport	Unknown	
41	Kowtwal Crossing	Transport	Unknown	
42	Sajawul Crossing	Transport	None	
43	Sorkh Lez Crossing	Transport	Unknown	
44	Talani Crossing	Transport	Unknown	
45	Tarin Kot Roads	Transport	None ²	
46	Zabul Bridges	Transport	Unknown	
		Transport	None	

Note 1: For serials marked "unknown" as Uruzgan province progresses through transition and ADF draw down continues, detailed information on all projects undertaken since 2006 is not easily available.

Note 2: A number of attacks have been recorded on the Tarin Kot Road (Serial 45), but none deemed to be project-related.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the Administration, Management and Objective of Australia's Overseas Development Programs in the Context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q15: Afghani workers associated with aid projects

Senator Rhiannon asked on Wednesday 19 December 2012:

- (1) Have you considered what measures need to be taken to ensure Afghanis and their families that have been associated through work or in other ways with Australian military are not victimised, tortured or killed when the Australian military leave Afghanistan?
- (2) What arrangements have been made for Afghani interpreters and other Afghanis who have worked with your department in Afghanistan to secure their safety when Australian troops are withdrawn?
- (3) What arrangement have been made for the families of these workers?

Response:

(1), (2) and (3)

As the Minister for Defence and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship announced on 13 December 2012, Australia will offer resettlement to Australia to eligible locally engaged Afghan employees at risk of harm due to their employment in support of Australia's mission in Afghanistan. The announced visa policy is aimed at those locally engaged Afghan employees at the greatest risk of harm as a consequence of the support they have provided to Australia's mission in Afghanistan. This reflects Australia's view of its moral obligation to current and former employees who have provided valuable support to Australia's efforts in Afghanistan.

The Government will offer at-risk Afghan employees, and their direct family members, the opportunity to resettle in Australia. Successful applicants will be resettled under Australia's Humanitarian Program, administered by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. They will have access to the same suite of resettlement services as any other humanitarian entrants, including accommodation support, basic assistance to set up a household, English language courses and help to access government, community and health services.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the administration, management and objective of Australia's overseas development programs in the context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q16: Advisers after troop withdrawal

Senator Rhiannon asked on Wednesday 19 December 2012:

- 1. Do you envisage that the advisers that remain in Afghanistan after the defence forces are withdrawn will assist with the Australian aid program in that country?
- 2. If so what programs will these advisers assist with?
- 3. In what areas will the advisers be based?
- 4. From when the government withdraws our defence forces and only Australian advisers remain in Afghanistan where will the Australian advisers to the Afghan police and army be based?
- 5. How many advisers will be from the Defence Forces?
- 6. How many advisers will be from the AFP?
- 7. How many military advisers be based in Uruzgan province?

Response:

(1-7) The Government has indicated that there will be a continuing role for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in Afghanistan post-2014. The ADF will continue to support the development of the ANSF through the provision of training and advisory support, including at the Afghan National Army (ANA) Officer Academy in Kabul. Australia will also consider a Special Forces contribution, under an appropriate mandate.

Any role for development advisers post-2014 is a matter for AusAID.

The role of any Australian police trainers and advisers to Afghanistan post-2014 should be addressed to the Australian Federal Police.

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE – COMMITTEES

Inquiry into the Administration, Management and Objective of Australia's Overseas Development Programs in the Context of the 'Transition Decade' - 3 December 2012

Q17: Security in Afghanistan

The Committee asked on 3 December 2012:

Professor Gordon, London School of Economics held doubts over whom the Afghan National Security Forces would be loyal to post 2014 and to the danger that the army could fragment and support warlords. He indicated that the realigning with some local power brokers—the old strongmen—fragmentation along tribal and patronage network lines was a real concern (oral evidence taken before the United Kingdom International Development Select Committee, 3 July 2012).

- (1) Has Australia conducted its own evaluation of what is likely to happen after 2014?
- (2) To what extent does the international community, including Australia as a donor country, understand the likely security situation that will emerge after 2014? Could you outline the various scenarios and the one that is most likely?

Response:

(1) Defence does conduct evaluations on possible scenarios that could occur in Uruzgan province after 2014 and these inform our planning processes. It would be unhelpful to speculate on what specific scenarios are likely to eventuate in Afghanistan after 2014.

Country-wide assessments of Afghanistan undertaken by other International Security Assistance Force partners (such as the United States Department of Defense December 2012 Report to Congress on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan) also inform our planning.

As the Prime Minister said in her 31 October 2012 statement on Afghanistan to the House of Representatives, "we know that as Afghan forces increasingly take the lead through 2013, the Taliban will seek to test them. We know that not every valley or village in Uruzgan or Afghanistan will be peaceful or free from insurgency. There will be difficult days ahead".

(2) It would be unhelpful to speculate on what specific scenarios are likely to eventuate in Afghanistan after 2014. Australia is, however, confident that the Afghan National Security Forces is being given the best opportunity to succeed, and through continued international support, will manage security in Afghanistan beyond 2014.