

Primary Industry Biosecurity Action Alliance

Biosecurity For Our Future

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Introduction

On Wednesday 14th April 2010 a group of Primary Industry representatives met to discuss the direction of biosecurity within Tasmania. The reason for the meeting was due to the concerns that various industry sectors have in relation to current quarantine services and the threat of reduced services in the future. As a result of the meeting it was decided to officially form the Primary Industry Biosecurity Action Alliance (PIBAA).

The Alliance represents a diverse group of primary producers from agriculture, aquaculture, fisheries, nursery and horticulture. Although issues of interest within biosecurity and quarantine are varied the key concerns for the group remain focused on ensuring the State Government has a continued commitment to maintaining and strengthening biosecurity to protect primary industries and the states economy.

Tasmanian food is one of the best ambassadors for our state not only nationally but globally. Reducing our biosecurity would potentially risk many of the state's global icons – abalone, cherries, salmon, wine, cheese, honey - to name a few. Investing in biosecurity is minimal insurance compared to the global and national capacity these products have.

The primary industry sector is concerned that many of the decisions that the State Government make in relation to biosecurity are done without consultation with industry and that risks, priorities and strategies in relation to biosecurity are seemingly undertaken in isolation of industry input.

The primary industry sector is also disappointed that although the biosecurity issue is raised repeatedly with government by all primary industry sectors it is ignored and failure to adequately allocate financial resources to biosecurity consistently occurs. Too often the cost of biosecurity is attributed to one sector (fruit fly- fruit industry, phylloxera- wine industry etc), where as in reality the cost of barrier control needs to be attributed to all industries as well as the greater community in relation to fire ants and other potential "community" pests and diseases.

Although much emphasis is put on the importance of biosecurity in maintaining mainland and global markets, the internal costs of non- trade barrier pests[1], diseases and weeds are just as important. The introduction of new pests and diseases will add millions of dollars to production costs in an effort to control the introduced pests. For example, the introduction of noxious weeds in imported stock feeds will add substantial production costs to primary producers in controlling such weed pests and these costs will be passed on through the supply to chain to livestock producers, seed producers, racing industry etc.

The primary industry sector is concerned at the significant amounts of money being invested in irrigation schemes to develop Tasmania into the "Food Bowl" of the nation

[1] Definition of pests for this purpose refers to any unwanted or destructive insect, animal or weed that reduces the productivity of crops, livestock, other primary food sources or agriculture in general etc

whilst funds are being reduced to protect the States primary producers from pest, weed and disease incursions. Good biosecurity is insurance to ensure the long term viability of state primary producers and ultimately maintaining the brand image of Tasmania.

In 2007-2009 the DPIWE Corporate Plan[2] identified the following corporate priorities:

- Improving the national and international competitiveness of the Tasmanian primary industry sector
- Building and protecting our Tasmanian brand credentials in key markets
- Prevent the incursion of pest, weed and diseases

Interestingly the 2004-2007 DPIWE Corporate Plan identified the following two corporate priorities which are have been omitted from the 2007-2009 Plan. Does this change in strategy indicate that the Department no longer sees these items as priorities or do they believe these priorities have already been successfully addresses?

- Improve emergency response procedures to an outbreak of an exotic disease
- Reduce the impact of existing pests, weeds and diseases on Tasmania's industries and environment

The question needs to asked: What is DPIPWE's 2010 and beyond corporate priority to quarantine and biosecurity and at what point does the budgetary restraints on the department affect their commitment to the corporate priorities?

The internal review of Tasmanian quarantine and biosecurity, conducted by Geoff Gorrie[3] in 2004 quotes:

"A biosecurity system assists Tasmania's primary industry exporters to meet the requirements of their markets. Indeed access to international markets would be severely impacted without an effective biosecurity regime.

The Department through the State of Growth initiative is seeking to facilitate the increase in Tasmania's primary industry and value adding sectors' contribution to the Tasmanian economy.

The State's biosecurity system is an important component in ensuring that the State's primary producers achieve these outcomes." (See Appendix C for 21 Recommendations of the Gorrie Review)

Although the primary industry sector is exceptionally concerned about the current direction of the State Governments commitment to quarantine and biosecurity the general public should also be made aware of the significant down stream affects that pest, weed and disease incursions will have on the states economy. The home gardener, recreational

[2] 2007-2009 DPIWE Tasmanian State Government Corporate Strategic Plan
[3] Review of Quarantine Systems and Biosecurity Management, Geoff Gorrie, August 2004

fisherman and even some tourism operators in the state also rely on the protection of the states biosecurity. The State Government also has an obligation to maintain many biosecurity services for the greater community benefit to protect against pests such fire ants etc.

The primary industry sector has an approximate farm gate value of 1.5 billion, is a significant employer within the state and compliments the brand image of Tasmania across national and global markets from which other industries and sectors leverage their marketing. If the State Government is committed to primary industry within the state then it must review its funding priorities for biosecurity and quarantine and embrace the following 22 Recommendations of PIBAA.

Commitment to Tasmania Together[4]

A decline in the states biosecurity services and obligations, and the potential negative affects on the Tasmanian community contravenes the commitment the State Government has made to the **Tasmania Together** Strategy. These potential contraventions refer to the following Tasmania Together Goals and Benchmarks:

Goal 1, Standard 1: Ensure that all Tasmanians have the economic capacity to enjoy a reasonable standard of living and access to basic services.

Goal 5, Standard 2: Tasmania will have viable rural communities

Goal 9, Standard 1: Increase the number of secure, flexible and well-paid jobs

Goal 10, Standard 2: Enhance Tasmania's business operating environment in the international context

Goal 10, Standard 3: Increase the rate of economic growth

Goal 10, Standard 4: Foster a culture of enterprise

Goal 10, Standard 6: Increase business confidence

Goal 10, Standard 8: Promote our island advantages including our "clean green" image, natural resources, location and people.

Goal 11, Standard 3: Value and protect our biodiversity

Goal 12, Standard 2: Improve soil, air and water quality

Goal 12, Standard 3: Reduce reliance on chemical use by primary, secondary and tertiary industry and the domestic sector.

[4] Tasmania Together 2006

Significance of Strong Biosecurity

Employment

The Tasmanian primary industry sector, related processing and manufacturing is estimated to account for over 10% of the total state employment. With the addition of flow-on employment through service providers and associated community employment it is estimated that approximately 1 in 5 people in Tasmania are employed through primary industries either directly or indirectly[5].

Furthermore a substantial amount of the employment occurs in rural and regional Tasmania and is responsible for the ongoing survival and sustainability of many of the cities and towns.

Maintenance of Industry

The viability, or even existence, of some industries relies on maintaining the current area freedom of various pests and diseases.

a. Currently many primary industries are only marginally competitive in the national and global market due to our high costs of production (including freight) compared to our competitors. The introduction of a commercially significant pest or disease could cause costs of production to increase to a significant level and therefore the industry may no longer remain commercially viable.
b. The introduction of diseases such as Abalone Viral Ganglioneuritis, Queensland Fruit Fly, Varroa or Phyloxera could potentially cause significant losses to the industry with disastrous flow on affects to the greater community with the loss of significant jobs and income into the state.
c. Currently Tasmania has access to several key export markets that neither mainland Australia or in some cases our major competitors have access to due to area freedom from particular pests and diseases. The introduction of particular pests and diseases would potentially close access to several key export markets which would not only have ramifications for the Tasmanian industry but also the national industry as export product would need to be re-directed into national markets.

Maintenance of Brand Image

As mentioned previously the costs of production within Australia, combined with significant freight costs already disadvantages many Tasmanian primary producers. However Tasmanian product is much sought after across the globe in particular in niche markets where we can leverage our Tasmanian brand image to obtain a price premium above our competitors to offset our higher production costs.

[5] The Contribution of Agriculture to the Tasmanian Economy, Davey & Maynard, 2005

Core to the fundamental brand image is the perception that Tasmania has a pristine environment and that pest and disease pressure is low due to the island nature of our state. Across Asia, Europe and other key global markets the consumer imagines blue skies, unadulterated waterways, rolling pastures, pristine beaches and iconic world heritage areas.

Whilst the final consumers may have more romantic visions of our state, the importers, agents and wholesalers which industry deals with are more astute and validation of our claims is critical. Chemical usage, environmental stewardship, testing and monitoring, adoption of QA and EMS are core to the background of marketing and promotion of the "clean/green" image.

Occupational Health and Safety

With the introduction of most pest and diseases comes the likelihood of the greater use of chemicals for eradication or control. The use of any chemical within the workplace is associated with a greater risk to worker health and safety due to the inherent nature of most workplace chemicals. Reduction of chemical usage in the workplace has been a strategic objective for most primary industries within the state. Increasing exposure to potentially harmful chemicals is not a desirable outcome for any industry and therefore reducing or eliminating pest and disease pressure is paramount.

Industry Compliance and Perception

As stated previously with the introduction of most pest and diseases comes the likelihood of the greater use of chemicals for eradication or control. The use of chemicals within agriculture is becoming less acceptable within the broader community especially in peri-urban regions of Tasmania such as the Huon Valley, Tamar Valley and Mersey area.

Although most of the chemicals applied in agriculture are very safe, and always used under strict APVMA approval, there is always a sense of concern within the community when they see chemicals being applied. All industries wish to reduce chemical inputs into any environment as part of their corporate environmental stewardship responsibility but also to reduce any angst with the urban community. With the potential of greater regulation in relation to chemical usage within the state it is also another reason to minimise chemical applications within the industry.

The use of chemicals and their affect on our waterways is also an extremely sensitive issue within the state.

Investment Risk

Biosecurity remains the highest risk to ongoing development and expansion within most primary industries and in the most part a significant portion of the risk is the responsibility of the state government to maintain area freedom from pests and diseases. Whilst preventing the introduction of pests and diseases into the state is the highest priority the

establishment of effective and operational emergency plans to contain and eradicate pests and diseases is also paramount. As biosecurity is eroded so is the confidence of investors and industry alike to continue to commit investing significant funds into the state for further expansion and development.

Agri-Tourism

As already highlighted Tasmania is a niche producer on the world stage, and even within Australia Tasmania is identified as an area of regional differentiation - made more identifiable by our island status. The national and global perception of the states "clean & green" image attracts tourists to visit the state to enjoy our food, beverages and other iconic Tasmanian produce. Whether borne out of necessity (financial survival through diversification) or through creativity (value-adding/niche marketing etc) many primary producers have embraced agri-tourism and in some instances are an integral component of their short and long term business strategies. Some industries such as the wine industry have a strong focus on shed door sales whilst the wine industry along with many other industries (seafood, olives, fruit, diary, honey etc) have expanded into cafes, restaurants, retail outlets, accommodation and "farm experiences"/interpretation centres.

This sector of tourism within Tasmania has expanded significantly in recent years and employs a substantial number of employees, particularly in regional areas. The key to the success of these enterprises is the image and quality of product being produced and the ability to link the consumer direct with the producer.

Organics

The demand for organic produce and processed product has increased significantly across the globe over the last decade. The production of organic produce can be significantly more expensive than conventional agriculture and the greater the pressure from pests and diseases the greater the costs of production. Tasmania, with area freedom from significant commercial pests and diseases has seen the development of a strong niche organic market for national and international markets.

The forecast for organic production continues to be positive, particularly in Asia, and will rely on reduced pressure from pests and diseases.

PIBAA Recommendations

Recommendation One: *Formal Recognition of Regional Differentiation*

For many years the Tasmanian government and industry sectors, both terrestrial and marine based, have requested the Australian Government, that Tasmania be granted the status of be regionally differentiated due to its geographic isolation, key quarantine and biosecurity advantages, recognized internationally and nationally, all linked to the Tasmanian Brand and current export markets and a comparative advantage as we currently have into Japan and Korea for cherries as an example.

As yet these requests have gone unheeded by the Australian Government and Tasmania is used as a pawn in World Trade Organization talks whenever countries want to import their products into Australia. This occurred with the importation of fresh salmon products(that are still not allowed into the State) and similar campaigns have been pushed in relation to the possible importation of apples from New Zealand and now China into Australia and Tasmania.

With our more stringent ALOP requirements, GMO free status currently up until 2014 and our quarantine status of being fruit fly free, for example, it is vital that the Tasmanian Government in a tripartite approach both at State and Federal level, lobby and continue to push for Tasmania to be granted regional differentiation status for current, short and long term market opportunities, to maintain the “Tasmanian” brand and for future, export growth potential. This is an opportunity not to be lost.

PIBAA recommends that the Tasmanian Premier write to the Prime Minister on this matter so when the new Federal Biosecurity Bill is debated, that an amendment be made to ensure Tasmania is formally, recognized as a region of differentiation in relation to biosecurity and quarantine matters due to its special circumstances and geographic isolation.

Recommendation Two: *Ongoing AQIS Service Provision by Quarantine Tasmania*

Tasmania is the only remaining state or region of Australia where the provision of AQIS services to agricultural exporters and responsibility for management of Australia's boarder and post boarder quarantine surveillance is conducted by a state agency. Quarantine Tasmania holds responsibility for AQIS services in Tasmania under a Memorandum between the Australian Government's Department of Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries and the Tasmanian Government.

This unique arrangement provides many advantages to Tasmania including:

- International confidence in Tasmania's boarder control and surveillance at all ports of entry for both national and international passengers and freight is enhanced by Quarantine Tasmania's arrangement with AQIS.

- Improved international market access for Tasmanian products compared to other regions of Australia due to recognition of Quarantine Tasmania as a nationally accredited quarantine agency with year round monitoring and surveillance programs to protect Tasmania's area free status from several pests and diseases of concern in international markets.
- Flexibility in the number of trained staff that can be deployed on any given day to undertake AQIS responsibilities, particularly on days of peak seasonal activity requiring multiple AQIS inspections and certification to satisfy quarantine protocols in certain international markets.
- The high level of AQIS service in Tasmania is unparallel in any other region of Australia.
- Cohesion between the national and state quarantine effort is unique in Tasmania due to the closer relationship created through the Memorandum.
- The Tasmanian community and international markets have a higher level of confidence in the protection of Tasmania's biosecurity whilst Quarantine Tasmania conducts international boarder control within the state compared to the likely alternative of one or two permanent AQIS staff positioned in Tasmania to manage the entire international boarder surveillance and export certification role.
- Current arrangements ensure that policy, strategy and management within Tasmania are benefitting the Tasmanian industry and not part of a strategy driven from another district or area i.e Victoria, where priorities and strategies could be vastly different.

These are just a few of the many reasons why the Tasmanian Government should make every effort to maintain the current arrangement for the provision of AQIS services through Quarantine Tasmania. The

Recommendation Three: *Formation of Primary Industry Biosecurity Consultative Committee*

The 7th Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy[6] element is that of "Shared Responsibilities" which is duly reflected in the Biosecurity Strategy Outcomes[7]: 9 (Relevant stakeholders effectively engaged in partnerships with Government to manage biosecurity risks), 10 (Biosecurity Stakeholders understand how to maximise Tasmania's biosecurity status and ensure the threats of biosecurity risks are minimised and mitigated) and 11 (Community awareness of biosecurity and confidence in the capability and effectiveness of the Tasmanian biosecurity system).

PIBAA acknowledge that the Tasmanian Biosecurity Council has been formed (one of the outcomes of the Gorrie Report) but if 'Shared Responsibility' is core to the successful implementation of the Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy then it is PIBAA's belief that a Primary Industry Biosecurity Consultative Committee should be established. The Committee would be independently chaired by a person nominated by the Primary Industry sectors on the committee and would consist of representative from the different sectors within Primary

[6] See Appendix A
[7] See Appendix B

Industry as well as representatives from DPIPWE, DED, a representative from the Primary Industry Minister's Office and other relevant organisations such as TIAR or UTAS.

The responsibilities of the group could include reviews of biosecurity legislation, certification programs, biosecurity risks and addressing the 22 Recommendations in PIBAA document (2010).

The involvement of industry is also paramount when defining degrees of risk and the response to managing the risks. Some industries rely on the importation of product to maintain their business but at the same time realise that there is a balance between implementing rigorous inspection regimes (at a high cost to Quarantine and industry) versus the potential for importing a pest or disease of high risk. Hence it is important to have dialogue with industry to ensure that there is a balance and a sense of commercial reality in decision making.

Consultation with industry is also critical in ensuring that all risks are identified and addresses appropriately. PIBAA is concerned that the interests of minority groups and non-commercial enterprises are guiding policy to the detriment of commercial industry and stakeholders. The formation of the Primary Industry Biosecurity Consultative Committee would ensure that risks adversely affecting the sector are addressed appropriately.

Recommendation Four: *Review of Incoming Commercial Freight Inspection Services*

Commercial freight is imported into the state on a daily basis by sea, air and through the postal system. Freight can be containerised, in bulk, loose consignments or in small units via the postal system and is subject to a wide range of possible quarantine checks at the various barriers. The bulk of freight imported into the state comes in via containers and once unloaded can be distributed to all regions of the state – both urban and rural.

The commercial freight system carries a variety of high quarantine risk commodities including fresh fruit and vegetables, nursery stock, grain, stock/fish feed, used machinery and containers. Contamination risks can not only occur with the contents of the containers but also due to soil adhering to the base of containers.

Some freight can be cleared prior to dispatch using pre-clearance systems whilst other freight requires inspection upon arrival. It is understood that it is commercially not viable to check all incoming freight due to time pressures and cost restraints however commercial freight potentially carries the greatest quarantine threat.

Freight entering the state needs to be cleared quickly and efficiently to ensure financial impositions are not put on importers or freight companies. Some industries and businesses readily acknowledge the balance between quickly clearing potentially high risk product for retail versus the necessity to have thorough checks and balances to ensure potential pests and diseases do not enter the state which could cause significant financial losses.

Due to the sometimes complex nature of freight distribution with the use of sub-contractors etc there is also an ignorance of the responsibility of some parties in relation to the importation of some freight items. And in a minority of cases it is recognised that the non-declaration of high risk freight occurs due to the costs and inconveniences that occurs. A well resourced quarantine inspection service dedicated to incoming freight is important to ensure that deliberate breaches of state quarantine and unintentional breaches of state quarantine to not occur.

Incoming freight inspections can be undertaken effectively as long as adequate resources are allocated to ensure an effective inspection regime is maintained to reduce risk to an acceptable level to industry. Currently there is limited or non-existent consultation with industry to assess what levels of inspection are acceptable.

It is also deemed that the introduction of electronic freight systems and electronic pre-clearance may also mean that freight clearance could be undertaken more efficiently whilst also reducing the risks and also potentially increasing the percentage of freight subject to border scrutiny. The adoption of quality assurance systems or Approved Arrangements which would allow companies to clear their own freight could also be investigated.

Industry would also encourage a review of penalties for those in breach of deliberating contravening quarantine import requirements.

Non-commercial freight

With the rapid uptake of E-bay and on line shopping the movement of high risk product through the postal, courier or air freight system has increased significantly in recent years. Although many national distributors may be aware of the quarantine restriction many of the overseas suppliers would not. Plant materials, seeds, food stuffs and other high risk products are regularly introduced into Tasmania. These products can be distributed throughout all the regions of the state and in quite isolated areas of the state and therefore pose a high risk.

A review of the non-commercial importation of product needs to occur to ensure the risks associated with this are addressed and that appropriate resources are allocated. Currently this area of incoming freight could pose the highest risk to not only primary industry but also in relation to other unwanted pests and diseases which pose a threat to the greater community.

Recommendation Five: *Review the policies in relation to the importation of commercial product.*

In some instances the importation of product occurs on a regular basis through established systems. Whether it be plants, laboratory samples, food products or other items, there can

be more efficient methods of clearing imported products without compromising risk to the states biosecurity systems.

The adoption of AA's (see Recommendation 16) could allow (with modification) the importing business to undertake authorized inspections by their own trained staff and reduce costs as well as reducing the burden on Quarantine Tasmania staff. This would save considerable costs, reduce reliance of Quarantine Tasmania staff and ensure the level of inspection was fully compliant to the risk profiles of commodities and in some instances may increase the current sampling ratios of imports i.e grain. There would also be greater flexibility and also reduce delays in handling incoming product.

The import of commercial products needs to be assessed to ensure risk is reduced but efficiencies are increased and must be done in consultation with industry.

Recommendation Six: *Review of Incoming Passenger Inspection Services*

Currently several methods of screening incoming passengers for biosecurity risks are utilised in Tasmania including x-ray machines, detector dogs and Quarantine Tasmania staff undertaking general surveillance and detailed inspections. A large percentage of passengers entering the state are unaware of the biosecurity protocols which exist, particularly interstate and overseas visitors. And unfortunately many locals who are aware of the quarantine requirements in the state don't believe that a small plant cutting, a tray of mangoes, or some fresh fish smuggled into the state will make any difference.

Regardless of the intent, the risk from incoming passengers either by air, cruise ship, passenger ferry or other itinerant vessel is significant and they provide a real and viable pathway for many pests and diseases to enter the state.

In many instances the quarantine inspection process is the first point for many people entering the state and therefore it is important that the process is managed effectively. Currently the design of airport arrival areas allow passengers to enter the state without undergoing full scrutiny due to there not being clearly designated processing channels. There is also concern that a protracted inspection process will cause discontent and negative connotations for people visiting the state.

On any flight into the state one can observe that potentially only a small percentage of passengers are actually scrutinised regardless of whether a Quarantine Officer is present or not. Of further concern is the number of passenger cars which are checked upon arrival into Devonport on the two Spirit of Tasmania's. Currently only random checks are carried out on what is classified as "high risk" vehicles and yet the most innocuous looking vehicle may harbour fishing or diving gear, dirty farm boots, fresh fruit, seeds, plant cuttings and a multitude of other high risk items.

PIBAA also wishes that quarantine and biosecurity authorities in Tasmania are more authoritative with domestic airlines and passenger vessels that use high risk produce items in their food service i.e apples. Whilst resources go into protecting our biosecurity at incoming passenger points it is compounded when passengers keep food items to eat at a later stage and bring them into the state. It is also important that the airlines and passenger vessels continue to reinforce the quarantine messages upon arrival into Tasmania.

The introduction of a passenger declaration card as outlined in Recommendation Seven should be considered as part of the review of incoming passengers.

Recommendation Seven: *Investigate the Introduction of Incoming Passenger Declaration Cards*

The use of incoming passenger declaration cards has been well established and accepted at entry points into Australia. The passenger cards clearly assist all incoming passengers on acceptable and non acceptable plant, animal and aquatic related products which can be brought into Australia. Failing to declare material or making a false declaration incurs an enforceable penalty.

Currently the incoming passenger vessels into Tasmania warn passengers on the quarantine requirements however many people ignore the warnings, do not understand the warnings, and in some instances the warning is not issued. In some cases, passengers have a good understanding of the common biosecurity risks such as fruit but are unaware of less known biosecurity risks. A completion of an Incoming Passenger Declaration will formalise the system and clearly define a breach as the passenger has to sign a declaration stating that they do not have prohibited items on their possession.

Passenger Declaration cards also have the ability to streamline incoming passenger processing by providing a quick scanning system which allows a quick exit for those without any biosecurity risks to exit via a “green” channel. Those passengers which indicate a risk on their card would go through a “red” channel and have contact with a Quarantine Official to process the risk and take appropriate action. This system would also mean that 100% of passengers are screened on each flight where as currently the system does not meet this standard.

The use of the incoming passenger card is also an excellent way of educating visitors and locals on the importance of biosecurity to the state. It will also help enforce quarantine breaches as ignorance cannot be cited for a reason to bring unwanted material into the state.

Although it can be cited that passengers (particularly air passengers) are low risk due to the volume of product that could enter the state they are also the highest risk group due to their potential ignorance of quarantine issues and diversity of risk profile compared to those importing product commercially. With the potential numbers of passengers set to increase

into the future it is important that a) passenger inspections continue to minimise import risks and b) more effective methods of passenger processing be implemented to cope with increasing numbers.

The introduction of Passenger Declaration Cards will potentially require trials and modifications before a successful model is found.

Recommendation Eight: *Maintenance of ongoing trapping and surveillance programs*

Surveys and monitoring offer benefits beyond improved risk assessment as they provide information about the effectiveness of controls and make earlier detection of pests and diseases more probable.

Trapping and surveillance programs are of assistance to the Tasmania's primary industries by fulfilling its national and international obligations (WTO[8] & IMO[9]). Under the international phytosanitary agreement member countries are required to establish scientifically that they are free of specific pests and diseases.

Failure to scientifically validate pest and disease data can mean Tasmanian product cannot be exported to various countries which potentially has serious commercial implications. Furthermore failure to validate area freedom of certain pests and diseases within the state also means that Tasmania cannot block entry of certain products based on the risk introducing particular pests and diseases.

The cost of eradication of an unwanted pest or disease can be significant, especially when compared to the annual cost of targeted trapping and surveillance programs. Data collected from the Tasmanian trapping and surveillance programs underpins the states internationally acknowledged disease-free and "clean & green" status.

The trapping programs also provide the scientific data that is required to support the states quarantine legislation. It is a common occurrence for a state, territory or overseas country to ask for the technical data that is required to support Tasmania's endorsements on Phytosanitary Certification.

When overseas quarantine delegations visit the state they audit our trapping and surveillance programs to ensure they meet their import and protocol requirements. Currently the Tasmanian Government conducts 23 trapping and surveillance activities for a variety of purposes, commercial and community, and for both national and international compliance. Other trapping and surveillance programs are undertaken by industry and individuals to fulfill trade obligations.

The Gorrie Report in 2004 stated:

[8] World Trade Organisation , particularly the Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreement (SPS)
[9] International Marine Organisation , particularly International Convention for the Control & Management of Ships Ballast Water & Sediments.

"Monitoring and surveillance not only assist in the prevention and management of those biosecurity risks but also underpin certification of Tasmania pest and disease free status in produce that is exported to the mainland and overseas.

The continuing compilation of information on Tasmania's pest, disease and weed status through monitoring and surveillance activities is vital to improving and strengthening decision making in terms of risk assessment/risk management strategies for pest, disease and weed incursions."

Recommendation Nine: *Development of further strategic pest and disease monitoring programs*

Monitoring and trapping of pests and diseases is integral to ensure quick detection and identification occurs. Currently there are numerous sources of potential pest and disease carriers such as ballast water, aquarium imports, animals, grains etc. PIBAA recommends the introduction of strategic sampling and monitoring of such imports into the state. Sampling will not only allow early detection but also allow the historical data to be collated for future reference.

Furthermore countries are continuously reviewing their import requirements based on new scientific data, re-assessment of risks and other factors. Whilst in some cases the import requirements are reduced, in other cases the import requirements become more difficult to the point where the addition of new pests of concern can affectively close access to a country for particular commodities.

Intelligence is critical to ensure that potential changes to import requirements are known by industry so that necessary action can occur. In some cases access to the market will require verification that particular pests or diseases do not occur in particular regions which could involve trapping or surveillance activities. Verifying that a particular pest or disease is not endemic to a region can require several years of verification activities. It is important that industries are aware of potential threats to market access and possible courses of action can be discussed between government and industry to ensure market access is not inhibited.

Recommendation Ten: *Review Emergency Preparedness/Response Plans*

Although it is recognised that many potential biosecurity emergencies would be covered by national emergency plans (i.e AUSVET and PHA) Tasmania has unique area freedom from many pests and diseases which are currently endemic (or near endemic) on mainland Australia. It is also well known that due to the island nature of Tasmania, a serious biosecurity threat on mainland Australia, if identified early enough, may likely be prevented from spreading to Tasmania.

It is for these reasons that it is imperative that team of emergency response staff, industry representatives and other key stakeholders be educated on the emergency response process if/when such situations that may occur in the future.

According to the Biosecurity Emergency Preparedness Program (2006-2008) 150 DPIPWE staff have been identified for emergency response roles. PIBAA would like the current numbers of employed staff within the department which are trained to respond to a biosecurity to be identified and reviewed. It is also unknown how many staff from other relevant government departments are currently familiar with Emergency Preparedness Plans (i.e DHHS, DEDTA, DIER, DPAC and DPEM). It is also of importance to identify and familiarise all key stakeholders within industry sectors and educate them on emergency response plans.

With the diminished size of the Primary Industry Department and the removal of extension roles which were the key link between government and industry it is particularly important that the roles and responsibilities of all parties be clearly defined.

It is also highly probable that databases of primary producers by commodity are no longer maintained by State Government and that is some cases the information is also no longer collated by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Although some peak bodies would maintain data bases of members other peak bodies would not have the human or financial resources to maintain such information and the State Government should ensure that funding be allocated to peak bodies for data collation to ensure all databases are current and relevant. In the event of an incursion or outbreak it is critical that access to industry (and recreational) databases be undertaken quickly so that communication to stakeholders occurs in a timely manner.

As detailed previously the recreational and hobby sectors are high-risk sectors whether it be recreational fishermen, pet owners or home gardeners to name a few. PIBAA would seek expansion of registration systems to ensure that some of the high risk non-commercial sectors are isolated and can be easily communicated with if the need arises.

The review of all Emergency Response Plans should occur on regular basis (every 3-5 years depending on risk) with government employees and stakeholder charged with the responsibility of implementation such plans also being trained and refreshed on a similar rotation. At a minimum the key contact people for each response plan should be updated annually with contact numbers, emails etc. Potentially a threshold trigger to undertake re-training could also be set when the number of trained personal still within key positions drops below a certain percentage.

As part of the process all emergency permits in relation to chemical registrations should also be updated and able to be submitted to the APVMA upon detection or outbreak of a serious pest or disease.

Recommendation Eleven: *Implementation of Simulated Emergency Response Plans*

Emergency Response Plans are of minimal benefit if there not the trained personnel able to initiate the response plans at all levels of government and industry. Simulation trials need to be undertaken to ensure the plans are effective when activated and that all persons responsible down the supply chain know their roles and responsibilities.

Simulation trials need to be undertaken on a regular basis with the key persons within government, industry and key stakeholders participating. As per Recommendation 8, in many instances Tasmania has a unique area freedom from certain pests and diseases which means that the skills base to initiate responses would be unique to Tasmania.

It is recognised that many government staff have participated in national simulation trials and have undertaken training in the event of an incursion (i.e fruit fly outbreaks in Victoria and South Australia) but industry, on the whole, has not participated in such activities. As already indicated the decline in DPIPWE staff and services has weakened the links between industry and government to the point where industry peak bodies are now ultimately the responsible entity.

Recommendation Twelve*: Independent Report into the Cost/Benefit of Area Freedom from Pests and Diseases on Tasmanian Economy*

The current system of funding allocation appears to be focused on cost to government rather than benefit to industry and the flow on affects to the greater Tasmanian community. There needs to be debate as to whether science or economics should be the basis of decision making and that the full flow-on affects from breaches in quarantine and biosecurity are considered when budgets are allocated. As discussed previously, the matter of biosecurity should be seen as insurance to guarantee the future of Tasmania's primary industries as well as for the greater good of the Tasmanian community.

PIBAA seeks the State Government to appoint independent auditors to assess the cost/benefit of providing strong biosecurity versus the affects on the Tasmanian economy if an incursion of a serious pest or disease occurs. The review should also focus on the significance of ALOP's from a state and national perspective which should reinforce the argument highlighted Recommendation One.

Recommendation Thirteen: *Development of Compensation Policy/Guidelines in the event of an outbreak of a serious pest or disease in the state*

The State Government needs to address the issue of a serious pest incursion in respect to compensation as well as costs associated with an incursion. Currently the State Government has committed multi-millions of dollars to eradicating foxes in the state however there does not appear to be any guidelines or models associated with the expenditure. At what point

does the strategy switch from being an eradication strategy to a control strategy to the point of accepting the pest as endemic within the state?

There needs to be clearly defined guidelines in the event of a pest incursion as an ad-hoc attitude to the issue leaves industry in a vulnerable position. Upon a serious pest incursion all resources will be aimed at eradication/control and the issue of costs or compensation will be left to be battled out after the event which is not a desirable outcome. At what point to the State Government walk away from assisting the eradication or control of a pest or disease? Are all the costs borne by the State Government or by industry? At what point is the State Government liable for the incursion if due diligence in respect to maintaining border controls is found to be negligible?

These are serious issues and need to be addressed prior to the event to ensure that all parties are aware of the consequences of a serious pest incursion.

Recommendation Fourteen: *Development of "On-Farm" biosecurity strategy*

On-farm biosecurity can be undertaken in various ways; monitoring and surveillance, farm hygiene, effective reporting/recording systems, awareness and education. On-farm biosecurity can also form the first, vitally important stage of early detection of pests and disease incursions. Early detection of incursions will greatly improve the chances of successful eradication or control and ultimately save significant amounts of human and financial resources. On-farm biosecurity is also another important step in the post barrier role of quarantine within the state.

There are many generic "on-farm" biosecurity guidelines available, and in some cases there are organization specific and industry specific "on-farm" biosecurity guidelines however the development of a holistic strategy specifically for the Tasmanian industry is required. This strategy would not only identify guidelines for on-farm biosecurity but also incorporate an education campaign, on-farm biosecurity kit and communication strategy.

Ideally any on-farm biosecurity strategy should be complimentary to existing on-farm systems whether they be quality assurance schemes, environmental management systems, occupational health and safety systems or other industry "best practice" guidelines. The introduction of on-farm biosecurity should also be supported through all tiers of government from local council through to Federal government and, where industry support occurs, mandatory compliance through legislation should be implemented.

Compliance to the biosecurity "on-farm" policies may also sought across the community to ensure that recreational, hobby and other like sectors also adhere to the guidelines as these groups may potentially be the highest risk sectors in relation to strong biosecurity within the state.

The education campaign would encompass producers/employers, employees, contractors, consultants, customers, freight contractors, and other "on-farm" visitors, including recreational visitors (hunters, fishermen etc), commercial visitors (Aurora, local councl etc) and tourists/locals visiting farm gate and pick-your-own operations.

The communications strategy would be focused on awareness; understanding the importance of quarantine and the control of unwanted pests and diseases and the affects that pest incursions have not only our area freedom status but also our clean-green image.

Unified signage, symbols, policy and a consistent message through a communications strategy across multiple industries will assist in ensuring the importance of on-farm biosecurity is widely recognised across all sectors of the industry and general public.

Recommendation Fifteen: *Formation of Primary Industry Climate Change Research into Pest and Disease Dynamics*

It is well recognised that with a changing climate the dynamics of various pests and diseases will change and their ability to cause significant commercial damage may be more likely. As well the modified Tasmanian environment could become more hospitable for various pests and diseases which currently cannot survive in the state.

Research and modeling needs to be undertaken to understand which pests and diseases will become commercially significant and which pests and diseases may establish if introduced into the state. This includes the full gamut of pests including weeds, animals, insects etc.

A comprehensive gap analysis needs to be undertaken to identify the areas of concern. Upon identifying particular threats, risk profiles should be undertaken to manage the commercial significance of the pest or disease in the future. Once undertaken and prioritised, industry and government need to implement appropriate R &D activities to respond to these potential threats.

Recommendation Sixteen: *Strengthened Commitment to Public Awareness Campaign*

As referenced earlier the implementation of the state's biosecurity is a responsibility between all stakeholders including the general public. In fact, many of the activities undertaken in Tasmania are for the wellbeing of Tasmanian residents, whether it be the prevention of potential human diseases entering (i,e swine flu, hydatids) or even domestic pests such as fire ants.

Public awareness at pre-barrier, barrier and post barrier is important to prevent the entry of unwanted pests and diseases but also to allow a quick response to detections or outbreaks of introduced pests and diseases. The importance of public awareness has been highlighted with the public interception of potential fruit fly maggots in fruit purchased from retail outlets in recent years.

As mentioned in Recommendation Four the rapid uptake of E-bay and on line shopping is posing a high risk to the pest and disease status of Tasmania. It is critically important that the public are aware of what products can be introduced into the state and what procedures need to occur to import, in many cases what appear seemingly harmless, products into the state.

Recommendation Seventeen: *Audit of current biosecurity procedures in relation to Refuse and Garbage Disposal*

The disposal and treatment of refuse from high-medium risk sources needs to be audited to reassess the level of risk as well as the method of disposal. Tasmania is surrounded by water and by its nature has a large number of vessels and aircraft visiting the state bringing refuse. The refuse on board boats and planes may have originated from mainland Australia but also from other countries as in the case of cruise ships, commercial boats/ships and research vessels. Some of the refuse is returned to Tasmania from ecology sensitive environments such as Antarctica and other off-shore islands where all rubbish needs to be removed. In some instances the food provided to these islands is also sourced from other countries once again highlighting the risk of refuse disposal.

The disposal of high risk product such as imported fruit, aquarium waste, laboratory waste, passenger vessels refuse etc also needs to be fully examined to ensure that risks are minimised. A waste and refuse disposal policy should include a stronger public awareness campaign, establishment on-site biosecurity policy and increased signage at all ports of entry.

The scope of the refuse disposal audit needs to include:

- Medical centres
- Laboratories
- High-risk product from commercial establishments i.e pet shops, aquariums, supermarkets etc
- Commercial fishing vessels
- Commercial research vessels
- Cruise ships & passenger vessels
- Itinerant yachts and recreational/pleasure vessels
- Waste from outlying islands and stations (i.e. Macquarie Is and Antarctic)

Recommendation Eighteen: *Facilitate greater uptake of Approved Arrangements (AA) and other relevant certification schemes. Including AA's to recognised between states.*

Approved Arrangements, a quality assurance system managed by AQIS (Australian Quarantine and Inspection Services) allow industry to undertake certain duties normally carried out by AQIS staff. The State Government, through Quarantine Tasmania should

encourage the uptake of AA's within the state which would facilitate greater export opportunities.

Furthermore the State Government should negotiate the acceptance of AA's for protocols between states where particular quarantine barriers occur.

Recommendation Nineteen: *Full Implementation of electronic systems and databases within Quarantine Branch at a interstate and intrastate level.*

Many processes and operations within the Quarantine branch are manually processed and data stored as paper files. Collation and retrieval of data for documentary purposes is cumbersome and time consuming and in many instances the paperwork is handled multiple times.

To ensure full effectiveness of the border protection system including full computerized recording of all commercial freight movements a electronic database needs to be implemented. Documentation between states should also be fully electronic and login systems should be utilized to reduce paperwork and increase the efficiency of the import/export process.

An electronic system would also reduce the potential for human error, reduce the costs associated with a manual system and ensure data was available in a timely manner.

An electronic system would also have the potential to isolate high risk product and streamline the effectiveness of commercial freight imports.

Recommendation Twenty : *Maintenance of Post Entry Quarantine Station*

Only one post entry plant quarantine station exists in Tasmania and is located in Kingston. The station performs a range of services for industry on a fee for service basis. Post entry quarantine stations are used as a buffer against the entry of pests and diseases which may exist in the country-of-origin of the imported plant material.

Plant material may be held in post entry quarantine for a period anywhere between 14 days and several years and during that time the plants under go pest and disease screening, particularly for those pests and diseases which may not appear evident at the time of importation. During this process the staff also has duty-of-care of the plants and may also be responsible for multiplication of plants for commercial purposes.

The duty-of-care often involves handling plant material potentially worth significant amounts of money and a substantial investment on the part of the owners of the material. To maximise profit and ensure the best outcomes for plant multiplication and survival occur it is recommended that arrangements occur which allow the plant owner to tend for their own plants in the restricted environment or at the least have a considerable input into the maintenance of the plant material.

The Kingston station is a high-medium security establishment and has an essential role in the future development of the Tasmanian horticultural industry. New varietal strains, introduced crops and a range of other plant material are cleared through the Kingston station on a regular basis. The screening of imported plants and genetic breeding material for pests and diseases provides Tasmania with the opportunity to keep ahead of it's competitors with new varieties and products by importing new breeding material. The station also provides Tasmania with a level of quarantine security that prevents the introduction of potentially devastating pests and diseases from overseas.

Maintenance of the station is critical to the future development of the Tasmanian horticultural industry particularly as many plant breeders and nurseries are seeing Tasmania as the centre of plant breeding for mainland Australia for both amenity and production horticulture.

Recommendation Twenty One: *Review all fee-for-service activities and look at the potential options to tender or subcontract services to commercial operators or discharge responsibility to 3rd parties (under set guidelines/compliance requirements so as not to threaten integrity).*

Throughout the globe government services are being discharged to commercial providers who can deliver services more cost effectively without compromising the integrity. Even in Australia AQIS is currently reviewing all fee-for-service activities and options to deliver these services more cost effectively.

PIBAA requests that DPIPWE review all fee-for-service activities and look at options for other service providers to potentially deliver the services. In countries such as New Zealand most of the quarantine and biosecurity services have been discharged to independent entities. In some cases service providers include local councils and other specific regional service providers.

With our high costs of production compared to our international competitors, as well as our high costs of freight compared to many mainland producers it is vitally important that all costs be minimised. It is important that any change of service provision does not compromise the integrity of our international obligations nor minimise the service delivery.

Recommendation Twenty Two: *Review quarantine and biosecurity on King Island and Flinders Island.*

Currently King Is and Flinders Is could be viewed as a weak link in the maintenance of our quarantine status. Quarantine services on both the islands are restricted and largely limited to self regulation and public awareness.

With direct services between the islands and mainland Australia and Tasmania the risk of the islands being the transit point of pests and diseases is quite high, especially with mobile diseases such as Varroa.

Of concern, is that the quarantine services to the islands could potentially be seen as the weak link in maintaining our biosecurity credibility with international countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

Conclusion

The importance of biosecurity to the Tasmanian economy cannot be disputed, with the primary industry sector, tourism sector, recreational sector and general community reliant on a strong quarantine and biosecurity system within the state.

The continued provision of biosecurity services within the state should at the minimum be seen as insurance for the industries that rely on the current pest and disease status in Tasmania. Investment in irrigation schemes or infrastructure will not be maximised if pest and disease incursions continue to occur, as the costs to industry will reduce our competitiveness at a national and international scale.

The significance of strong biosecurity to Tasmania is fundamental to the long term strategies of this state. The primary industry sector is aligned with the future vision of the state being a producer of premium, high-quality product for national and international markets – this cannot be attained if the biosecurity funding in the state is not given the financial priority it requires.

Furthermore PIBAA request that all increases in funding and service provisions for quarantine , as well as allocations of funds for reviews as outlined in this document be funded through additional Treasury funding and outside the current DPIPWE budget.

As one of the leading employers of the state and the backbone of many rural and regional communities it is fundamental that the primary industry sector be supported through strong biosecurity policy. Furthermore, a biosecurity policy that is developed in consultation with industry to ensure that the risks, strategies and outcomes are beneficial and workable to the primary industry sector.

Appendix A:

Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy – 7 Policy Elements

1. Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP)
2. Least Restrictive Sanitary & Phytosanitary Requirements
3. Science-Based Risk Analysis
4. Risk-Based Resource Allocation
5. Cost:Benefit Decision Making on Control & Eradication
6. Whole-of-Government Approach to Biosecurity
7. Shared Responsibility

Appendix B:

Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy Outcomes

1. A co-ordinated and co-operative whole-of-government approach ensuring effective policy and planning underpins Tasmanian biosecurity that aligns with other relevant state, national and international plans and policies.
2. Awareness and acceptance by all stakeholders of their roles and responsibilities in protecting and enhancing Tasmania's biosecurity, and meeting the strategy objectives.
3. Comprehensive and complimentary State legislation that effectively protects and enhances Tasmania's biosecurity status.
4. All Tasmanian plans and strategies relevant to the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy are identified and arrangements in place to ensure these plans and strategies deliver optimal biosecurity outcomes consistent with the Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy and the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy. All National and International plans and strategies, relevant to the Strategy are identified and arrangements in place to address any gaps or inconsistencies between the Strategy and these plans and strategies.
5. Enhanced biosecurity decision making processes based on scientific risk assessment principles consistent with Tasmania's ALOP, national and international trade obligations.
6. Effective risk-based border protection from pest, disease and weed incursions that pose a biosecurity threat to the State.
7. Surveillance and monitoring programs in place to provide sufficient probability of detection of new pests and demonstrate freedom.
8. Demonstrated preparedness and response capacity appropriate to biosecurity risks.
9. Relevant stakeholders effectively engaged in partnerships with Government to manage biosecurity risks.
10. Biosecurity Stakeholders understand how to maximise Tasmania's biosecurity status and ensure the threats of biosecurity risks are minimised and mitigated.
11. Community awareness of biosecurity and confidence in the capability and effectiveness of the Tasmanian biosecurity system

Appendix C:

Review of Quarantine Systems and Biosecurity Management, Geoff Gorrie, August 2004

(The Gorrie review on Tasmania's quarantine and biosecurity system was commissioned by the State Government and was principally an internal review)

Recommendations:

1. The Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee (TBC) should be centre of developing policy advice to the State Government on biosecurity in Tasmania to ensure continuity and consistency in the development and implementation of biosecurity in the State.
2. The TB should, as a matter of priority, determine a strategic policy for biosecurity in Tasmania and present this to Government.
3. The TBC should oversee the application of a consistent risk assessment/risk management process for determining biosecurity risks to Tasmania, in accordance with accepted scientific risk assessment/risk management processes, to determine the risk profiles applicable to Tasmania.
4. Given the enhanced role of the TBC consideration can be given to Departmental structures to improve the delivery of biosecurity functions within the Department
5. An integral component of a Tasmanian biosecurity strategy should include relevant actions to develop and implement communications networks and protocols across the relevant branches of the biosecurity system to strengthen the integration of activities amongst the branches of the Department concerned with the delivering biosecurity.
6. Establish and maintain formalised working groups comprised of operational and policy officers from within the biosecurity system to work collaboratively on the formulation of regulatory instruments and the development and implementation of policy including the preparation and review of work directions and instructions.
7. Enhance and extend the use of work directions and instructions in the form of Standard operating Procedures written in plain English and subject to regular review as mechanisms to ensure that policy and regulatory requirements are communicated appropriately to officers at the operational level.
8. The Department should continue to participate in and develop a Plant Emergency Response Plan.
9. The allocation of specific resources, together with technical and professional support, to the implementation of monitoring and surveillance activities will build on the capabilities of Tasmania's biosecurity system.
10. An evaluation of the potential to use x-ray and other technology in the Tasmanian context to strengthen the system of detection of pests, diseases and weeds should be undertaken.

11. In order to provide a direction to the system and those officers who implement the State's biosecurity and quarantine regime, develop and enunciate a prosecution/compliance/enforcement policy.
12. Create a "virtual" investigation team consisting of officers with more specific skills in investigation procedures and processes.
13. Undertake a review of the consistency and appropriateness of the legislative and associated regulatory arrangements that support Tasmania's biosecurity system. Where necessary amendments or the implementation of new legislation should be undertaken to ensure consistency and, where appropriate, to reduce multiplicity. This task should be overseen by the TBC and involve liaison and consultation between relevant personnel from both the operational and policy areas of Tasmania's biosecurity system.
14. All relevant areas of the Department be provided with a threshold level of training in the conduct of investigations, the regulatory instruments of the State's biosecurity system and the application of good administrative decision making practices
15. Forward succession planning and the recruitment and training of staff not only in the operational area of quarantine services but also in the field of scientific expertise across the spectrum of biosecurity including diagnostic services should be integrated into the Department's business planning processes.
16. Professional development should continue to keep officers across the biosecurity system abreast of emerging threats and new technologies.
17. The department should consider, as part of the implementation of a plant emergency response plan, conducting a simulation exercise to develop and test the skills of officers within the biosecurity system in this area.
18. Enhance and supplement the current level of specific awareness and public education campaigns.
19. Through the business planning process introduce consistent monitoring procedures through developing and reporting on performance targets across the whole biosecurity system, stemming from the relevant branch business plans extending into measures of individual performance.
20. Current processes for employees performance evaluation should be applied across the relevant branches involved in delivering biosecurity.
21. To ensure an optimal diagnostic service to support Tasmania's biosecurity system, a reordering of priorities, together with an examination of the budgetary allocation to the Branch and the effectiveness and efficiency of the current level of service it provides, is recommended.

Appendix D:

	2006-07 Food Industry Score Card Tasmania	
	Farm Gate Value	Packed & Processed Value
	Value in Millions	
Wine	$ 13	$ 21
Beef	$ 166	$ 240
Other Livestock	$ 37	$ 55
Sheep	$ 59	$ 70
Dairy	$ 234	$ 319
Apples	$ 38	$ 40
Stonefruit	$ 15	$ 18
Other Hort	$ 14	$ 35
Potatoes	$ 83	$ 92
Onions	$ 31	$ 20
Carrots	$ 23	$ 39
Other Veg	$ 44	$ 92
Lobsters	$ 61	$ 72
Abalone	$ 112	$ 132
Oysters	$ 16	$ 20
Salmon	$ 278	$ 361
Other Seafood	$ 20	$ 32
	$ 1,244	**$ 1,658**

Gross Value of Agricultural Production 2008-09 Tasmania	**$m**
Cereals	21.6
Other Field Crops - oilseeds, legumes, hay, nursery	97.6
Other field crops - poppies, pyrethrum & Essential Oils	95
Wool	57.6
Eggs	9.2
Total	**281**
Source ABS Value of Agricultural Commodities Cat No 7503.0	

Appendix E:

Organisational Members:

Wine Industry Tasmania (WIT)

Tasmanian Abalone Council (TAC)

Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association (TFGA)

Fruit Growers Tasmania (FGT)

Agricultural Contractors of Tasmania (AGT)

Tasmanian Island Pork Alliance Inc (TIPA)

Tasmanian Crop Pollination Association (TCPA)

Tasmanian Salmonid Growers Association (TSGA)

Nursery and Garden Industry TAS

Tasracing Pty Ltd

Tasmanian Seafood Industry Council (TSIC)

Tasmanian Agricultural Productivity Group (TAPG)

Hop Products Australia

Poppy Growers Tasmania Inc (PGT)

Primary Employers Tasmania (PET)

Corporate Members:

Antico International

Aussie Cherries Ltd

Roberts Ltd

Amcor Fibre Packaging

APPENDIX F:

SUMMARY PIBAA RECCOMMENDATIONS:

Recommendation One: *Formal Recognition of Regional Differentiation*

Recommendation Two: *Ongoing AQIS Service Provision by Quarantine Tasmania*

Recommendation Three: *Formation of Primary Industry Biosecurity Consultative Committee*

Recommendation Four: *Review of Incoming Commercial Freight Inspection Services*

Recommendation Five: *Review the policies in relation to the importation of commercial product*

Recommendation Six: *Review of Incoming Passenger Inspection Services*

Recommendation Seven: *Investigate the Introduction of Incoming Passenger Declaration Cards*

Recommendation Eight: *Maintenance of ongoing trapping and surveillance programs*

Recommendation Nine: *Development of further strategic pest and disease monitoring programs*

Recommendation Ten: *Review Emergency Preparedness/Response Plans*

Recommendation Eleven: *Implementation of Simulated Emergency Response Plans*

Recommendation Twelve: *Independent Report into the Cost/Benefit of Area Freedom from Pests and Diseases on Tasmanian Economy*

Recommendation Thirteen: *Development of Compensation Policy/Guidelines in the event of an outbreak of a serious pest or disease in the state*

Recommendation Fourteen: *Development of "On-Farm" biosecurity strategy*

Recommendation Fifteen: *Formation of Primary Industry Climate Change Research into Pest and Disease Dynamics*

Recommendation Sixteen: *Strengthened Commitment to Public Awareness Campaign*

Recommendation Seventeen: *Audit of current biosecurity procedures in relation to Refuse and Garbage Disposal*

Recommendation Eighteen: *Facilitate greater uptake of Approved Arrangements (AA) and other relevant certification schemes. Including AA's to recognised between states.*

Recommendation Nineteen: *Full Implementation of electronic systems and databases within Quarantine Branch at a interstate and intrastate level.*

Recommendation Twenty: *Maintenance of Post Entry Quarantine Station*

Recommendation Twenty One: *Review all fee-for-service activities and look at the potential options to tender or subcontract services to commercial operators or discharge responsibility to 3rd parties (under set guidelines/compliance requirements so as not to threaten integrity).*

Recommendation Twenty Two: *Review quarantine and biosecurity on King Island and Flinders Island.*

APPENDIX G:

ALOP	Appropriate Level of Protection
AQIS	Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
GMO	Genetically Modified Organism

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