



## Response to Question on Notice

### PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE AUSTRALIAN COMMISSION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEGRITY *Integrity of Australia's border arrangements*

Australian National Audit Office

#### GENERAL COMMENTS

Nil

#### SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON NOTICE

**Question 1** (*Page 4 Proof Committee Hansard*)

**Senator BILYK:** In regard to policing at Australia's international airports, you did a report, No. 23 of 2013-14, and you found that:

The organisational arrangements in place at airports are sound, with a clear command structure at each airport headed by an Airport Police Commander.

Obviously that didn't include Hobart?

**Mr Morris:** I would have to take that on notice, sorry.

**Senator BILYK:** Well, there are no AFP at Hobart airport. I'm presuming we're talking about AFP here.

**Mr Morris:** Yes.

**CHAIR:** Can we clarify that, because some of the issue seems to be the coordination between, in the past, different jurisdictions at an operational level. Can you clarify whether the airport police commander is AFP or the state police office?

**Question 2** (*Pages 5 and 6 Proof Committee Hansard*)

**CHAIR:**

- (a) Can you outline for the committee the problems you identified with that system [the Movement Alert System], in both its initial and follow-up audits?
- (b) Were these deficiencies serious enough to make the list ineffective as a means of tracking individuals who pose immigration or national security risks?
- (c) Have those concerns now been properly addressed?

#### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE

##### Question 1

At the time of the audit, the AFP had an establishment of 27 at Hobart. The ANAO [audit report](#) (No.23 2013-14 *Policing at Australian International Airports*) was tabled on 13 March 2014. The AFP presence at Hobart was withdrawn in May 2014 (see Tasmania Police [media release](#)), with the Tasmania Police subsequently providing the policing service for the airport site.

## Question 2

- (a) Prior to asking QON 2(a), the Chair stated that ‘Previous audits concluded it was conceptually sound but that: ... the lack of strategic or management planning for the database and the poor quality of the data contained within it, particularly its ‘completeness, quality and currency’, compromised the system’s effectiveness. ... Also: Movement Alert List system quality assurance and performance and management reporting arrangements were highlighted as requiring attention, as were the procedures governing the listing of Australian citizens on the Movement Alert List. That’s pretty damning when you think that that’s the list we rely on around the country to be identifying people of concern’.

These quotes were of findings made in the original 2008 audit and reported in the follow-up audit in its summary of the findings of the initial ANAO audit of the Movement Alert List to provide context. The conclusions of the follow-up audit in 2013 were that:

- The Central Movement Alert List works effectively at an operational processing level.
  - Centralised data input had seen the overall data quality of the Central Movement Alert List improve and around 92 per cent of records met Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s (DIBP’s) minimum data standards.
  - System updates had delivered improved technical functionality and the DIBP’s centralised data matching expertise, together with upgraded data matching rules, provided a high degree of data matching accuracy.
  - DIBP has developed close and effective relationships with key stakeholders.
- DIBP’s strategic management arrangements for the Central Movement Alert List still required development.
  - There had been no strategic planning undertaken to guide the future direction of the Central Movement Alert List nor was there a clearly stated strategic objective for the Central Movement Alert List. Whole-of-government discussions had taken place in recent years to develop an integrated border security alert capability, through the establishment of a National Targeting Centre that would have ramifications for the operation of the Central Movement Alert List.
  - DIBP needs to consider how it will manage the Central Movement Alert List in the years ahead for its own immigration purposes. In particular, technological advances in biometrics now make identification of individuals less dependent on biodata and intelligence gathering.
- Given the centrality of the Central Movement Alert List information, there is a compelling case for the department to provide a stronger focus on its strategic positioning, in particular the Central Movement Alert List data ownership and quality control and performance reporting. The ANAO made four recommendations aimed at strengthening DIBP’s management of the Central Movement Alert List.

- (b) The follow-up audit did not indicate that the list was ineffective as a means of tracking individuals who pose immigration or national security risks. As outlined above, it found that the system worked well at an operational level. However, the report also stated that ‘until DIBP develops cost effective arrangements to measure the Central Movement Alert List’s outcomes and its impact on visa and citizenship decisions, the department will not be in a position to report on the system’s outcomes and its contribution to Australia’s border security arrangements’. Accordingly, Recommendation 4 was that ‘to better demonstrate the Central Movement Alert List’s contribution to Australia’s border security arrangements, ... DIBP investigates cost effective options for periodically identifying and reporting on those instances where the Central Movement Alert List data has been influential in visa and citizenship decisions.’ DIBP agreed the recommendation. The ANAO has not followed up the implementation of this recommendation.
- (c) As explained by Ms Jackson at the hearing, the ANAO is ‘not in a position to follow-up with the department about whether or not the concerns that were raised in the [follow-up] report are now properly addressed. We would have to do an audit or follow-up audit’.