

Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy



Ensuring Tasmania's Biosecurity Future

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The Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee is a whole of government group, with representatives from the:

- » Department of Primary Industries and Water
- » Department of Premier and Cabinet
- » Department of Police and Emergency Management
- » Department of Health and Human Services
- » Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources
- » Department of Tourism, Arts and the Environment

This document sets out the Tasmanian Biosecurity strategy to implement the Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy.

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Facsimile: 03 6424 5142

ISBN 10: 0 7246 6429 7

ISBN 13: 9780 7246 64290

Prepared by the Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee

November 2006

Photography

Front cover - Peter Whyte, Lynn Broos, Graeme Harrington, Back cover - Ami Lockett, DPIW Image Library, Roger Lovell, Page 1 - Peter Whyte, Lynn Broos, Graeme Harrington, Page 4, 15, 23, 26, 29 - Lynn Broos, Page 13 - DPIW Image Library, Page 17, 20 - Graeme Harrington, Page 19 - Nick Osborne, Page 25 - Justine Shaw, Page 28 - Andrew Laird, Page 30 - Craig Smith

Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Foreword | 5 |
| Overview of the Biosecurity Strategy | 6 |
| Introduction | 8 |
| Scope of the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy | 11 |
| Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy Outcomes and Actions | 12 |
| Policy, Planning and Legislation | 12 |
| 1. Policy and Planning | 13 |
| 2. Roles and Responsibilities | 15 |
| 3. Legislation | 17 |
| 4. Plans of Relevance to Biosecurity | 19 |
| Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery | 20 |
| 5. Risk Analysis | 20 |
| 6. The Quarantine Barrier | 23 |
| 7. Surveillance & Monitoring | 25 |
| 8. Emergency Preparedness & Response | 26 |
| Capacity | 28 |
| 9. Partnerships | 28 |
| 10. Training and Education | 29 |
| 11. Communication | 30 |
| Review and Evaluate | 31 |
| Bibliography | 32 |
| Websites | 33 |
| Acknowledgements | 34 |
| Acronyms | 35 |
| Glossary | 36 |
| Appendix A: Tasmanian Government Policy on Biosecurity | 37 |
| Appendix B: The Tasmanian Biosecurity System | 41 |
| Appendix C: Extract from Primary Industries Ministerial Council Regulations (1-3) on Quarantine | 43 |
| Appendix D: Gorrie Review Recommendations | 45 |
| Appendix E: AusBIOSEC | 48 |
| Appendix F: The Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee | 51 |



Foreword

Tasmania's biosecurity system is at the very core of the Tasmanian Brand as our natural environmental values and quality produce relies upon our relative freedom from pests, diseases and weeds. Tasmania's natural island advantage has given us a head start in maintaining a relatively pest, disease and weed-free status. This status allows us to trade in markets closed to others, reduces production costs and sets us apart as a natural and quality producer and destination.

The Government recognises the importance of maintaining this status and so has developed a robust policy (Appendix A) for Tasmania's biosecurity, which relies upon science-based assessment of our ever-changing risk environment. This policy accepts that we can not maintain Tasmania as an island fortress with zero risk but it does recognise that we manage biosecurity risks down to a very low level.

This strategy advises how we will go about achieving our policy objectives within an efficient and integrated framework of action. The strategy builds on the recommendations of the 2004 Gorrie review of our quarantine system. It is based on the foundation set by the resolution of the Primary Industries Ministerial Council in 2002 which clearly recognises our right to manage our unique biosecurity status legitimately within our national and international obligations.

The Government's commitment to achieving our biosecurity policy objectives through this implementation strategy is demonstrated through the recent allocation of substantial additional resources to our biosecurity system. The strategy cannot succeed however through that investment alone as biosecurity is a shared responsibility for the entire community requiring community support.

I look forward to that continued community support to make this strategy a success.

David Llewellyn MHA
Minister
Primary Industries and Water
December 2006

Overview of the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy

The purpose of the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy is to achieve our biosecurity policy objective which is “protect and enhance Tasmania’s biosecurity status for the benefit of Tasmania’s industries, environment and public well-being, health, amenity, and safety.”

The means to achieve this are:

Policy, Planning and Legislation

Policy & Planning

A co-ordinated and co-operative whole-of-Government approach ensuring effective policy and planning underpin Tasmanian biosecurity and that aligns with other state, national and international plans and policies.

Roles & Responsibilities

Awareness and acceptance by all stakeholders of their roles and responsibilities to protect and enhance Tasmania’s biosecurity as set out in this strategy.

Legislation

Comprehensive and complementary State legislation that effectively protects and enhances Tasmania’s biosecurity status.

Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery

Risk Analysis

Enhanced biosecurity decision-making processes based on scientific risk analysis principles consistent with Tasmania's Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP) and with national and international trade obligations.

The Quarantine Barrier

Effective risk-based border protection from pest disease, and weed incursions that pose a biosecurity threat to the State.

Surveillance & Monitoring

Surveillance and monitoring programs that provide sufficient probability of detection of new pests diseases, and weeds and that demonstrate freedom from certain pests, diseases, and weeds.

Preparedness, Response and Recovery: Demonstrated preparedness, response and recovery capacity appropriate to biosecurity risks.

Capacity

Partnerships

Stakeholders effectively engage in partnerships with Government to manage biosecurity risks.

Training & Education

Biosecurity stakeholders understand how to maximise Tasmania's biosecurity status and ensure that threats are minimised and mitigated.

Communication

Community awareness of biosecurity and confidence in the capability and effectiveness of the Tasmanian biosecurity system.

Introduction

What is biosecurity

Biosecurity is the protection of industries, the environment and public well-being, health, amenity and safety from the negative impacts of pests, diseases, and weeds. The economic activities that benefit from good biosecurity include, but are not limited to, our primary industries. Biosecurity deals with the development of systems and processes to underpin quarantine efforts. In Tasmania, this includes Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). It also incorporates how we respond to biological incursions. The biosecurity system (Appendix B) encompasses all the quarantine functions delivered at the barrier, actions taken pre-barrier and covers other functions undertaken outside and beyond the barrier. These other functions include education and awareness, surveillance, emergency preparedness and response and also the management of existing pests, diseases, weeds and invasive species in the State. The system is supported by scientifically based risk analysis, technology, policy framework and legislative regimes, and well trained and equipped personnel.

Continual improvement

Tasmania has long had a focus on State biosecurity and maintaining the value of our island advantage. The Gorrie Review commissioned to investigate Tasmania's quarantine and biosecurity system in 2004 found that the biosecurity and quarantine system in Tasmania is sound, effective and capably delivered. However, biosecurity systems need to constantly evolve by adapting to changing world situations. Tasmania's systems and approaches to biosecurity must continue to be enhanced to match the changing conditions. New and emerging issues include increased visitation, continued freeing of world trade, diseases occurring overseas (including foot and mouth, avian influenza and mad cow disease), bioterrorism threats and the potential impacts of biotechnological developments such as genetic modification. The opportunity is to build on the strengths and capabilities of the current system to meet new and emerging issues. This is being achieved, in part, by enhancing the structure of the biosecurity delivery mechanisms in Tasmania, by ensuring they are supported by appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks; by updated technology and training; by good communications and by ensuring a strong underpinning of scientific knowledge. A strategic approach to biosecurity is the optimal way to continue these improvements into the future.

A strategic approach to biosecurity

This document outlines a strategic approach to biosecurity that addresses the need to not only maintain Tasmania's current high biosecurity status but also to ensure direct benefits to the State as a result of this status. The Strategy is based on the seven elements of the Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy (Appendix A). Its implementation is seen as the most effective and efficient way to achieve the objective of our biosecurity policy which is to protect and enhance Tasmania's biosecurity status for the benefit of Tasmania's industries, environment, and public well-being, health, amenity and safety.

Tasmanian biosecurity commitments and requirements

Tasmania has international obligations it must honour in developing and delivering its biosecurity system. State and Federal Government policy and national agreements also must be taken into account. These include resolutions of the Primary Industries Ministerial Council (PIMC) and the Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council (NRMMC).

i) International Biosecurity Commitments

Actions in the Strategy are consistent with requirements as specified in international agreements and instruments under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In particular this includes the WTO Sanitary and PhytoSanitary (SPS) agreement, and the IMO International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships Ballast Water and Sediments.

ii) National Biosecurity Commitments

The Strategy actions assist the State to fulfil its obligations under National animal and plant cost-sharing agreements in relation to emergency animal disease¹ and plant pest incursions² and marine pest incursions.³ It also supports obligations under resolutions by PIMC⁴ and NRMMC. The NRMMC resolutions in relation to marine pests are formalised in the Marine Pest Inter Government Agreement (IGA). The Strategy also contributes to national objectives and targets for biodiversity conservation⁵.

¹Emergency Animal Disease Response Deed
²Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed. ³Intergovernmental Agreement on the national System for the prevention and management of Marine Pest Incursions. ⁴Primary Industry Ministerial Council Resolution 1.3 (2 May 2002, Hobart, Tas). ⁵National Objectives and Targets for Biodiversity Conservation 2001-2005, (2001), Environment Australia, Canberra.

iii) State Biosecurity Commitments: The Tasmanian Government is committed to science-based protection of the biosecurity status of Tasmania's industries and environment and to the protection of public well-being, health, amenity and safety. Tasmania's management of biosecurity risks is in accord with national recognition of the need to address regional differences in pest status and risk for both international and domestic imports. (Appendix C)

The Tasmanian Government is also committed to meeting Tasmania Together benchmarks. Tasmania Together is a 20-year strategic plan based on the wishes of the people of Tasmania. Tasmania Together includes goals and benchmarks identified by the community. Biosecurity is directly linked to maintaining Tasmania's clean green image and to the sustainable use of natural resources in Tasmania Together. The biosecurity strategy will assist us to meet the Tasmania Together benchmarks that support these goals and underpin Tasmanian brand values.

Integral to the Government's commitment to biosecurity is its implementation of the recommendations made by Mr Geoff Gorrie in his review of the Tasmanian biosecurity system in 2004. Many actions outlined in this strategy implement recommendations in the Gorrie Review and others are designed to complement and extend those recommendations.

Scope of the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy

The Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy gives effect to the Government's policy on biosecurity at a State level.

Its scope includes actions that:

- » Maintain and enhance the biosecurity of Tasmania's primary and other industries (including forestry), environment and public well-being health, amenity and safety.
- » Address biosecurity threats that are animal pests and diseases (non-human but including zoonoses); plant diseases and pests; weeds, invasive species (terrestrial, freshwater, and marine) and also adverse effects of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs).
- » Relate to pre-barrier, barrier and post-barrier components of the biosecurity system.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy outcomes and actions

The Strategy proposes 11 outcomes to be addressed through 58 strategic actions to ensure an optimal and complete biosecurity system for Tasmania. Each outcome is listed along with background information, State biosecurity requirements and a table of strategic actions that need to be implemented to achieve the outcome. Actions denoted with a G code at the end of each sentence (eg. G1, G2, G7) are recommendations drawn directly from the Gorrie Review (Appendix D).

Policy, Planning and Legislation

The following sections outline the primary components of a comprehensive and integrated administrative and statutory framework for biosecurity in Tasmania.



1. Policy & Planning

Background

In the past, biosecurity activities in Tasmania have been largely attributed to the quarantine service. However, these activities are only a portion of the activities being undertaken in relation to biosecurity. Biosecurity implications spread across both the public and private sectors and across a range of Government agencies. For example, animal diseases that may infect humans (zoonoses) involve the Department of Primary Industries and Water (DPIW), Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), as well as emergency services such as Police and the State Emergency Service (SES). Invasive species incursions that impact forest industries may involve the Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources (DIER) but also have implications for other agencies such as DPIW, DTAE and Government business enterprises such as Forestry Tasmania. Strategic biosecurity approaches require policy and planning that complement the biosecurity activities of all organisations. This minimises conflict and improves the efficiency of the whole biosecurity system.

Policy frameworks

Biosecurity policy is set at many levels ranging from international policy (World Trade Organisation, International Maritime Organisation and other international bodies and agreements) through national policies (developed by the Australian Government's Biosecurity Australia) to State and local policies in relation to domestic quarantine, area freedom from pests, legislation, response preparedness and ongoing management and control. To ensure a sound biosecurity system at all levels it is important that all biosecurity policy is complementary. This does not mean that all biosecurity actions or requirements have to be identical across States but the principles of biosecurity policy development and implementation need to be the same. Though biosecurity policy is a complex area, policies that are transparent, consistent and science-based are defensible at an international level. The Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy and the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy reflect these requirements.

The Strategy is built on seven policy elements (Appendix A). This ensures the State's approach to biosecurity is consistent with the rest of Australia and the world while clearly identifying the basis for maintaining and improving on our high level of biosecurity in Tasmania. Tasmania participates in the biosecurity policy development process at a national level through its representation on relevant Government technical committees, Standing Committees and Ministerial Councils.

Outcome 1

A co-ordinated and co-operative whole-of-Government approach ensuring effective policy and planning underpins Tasmanian biosecurity, that aligns with other relevant state, national and international plans and policies.

Biosecurity matters are routinely discussed and addressed across all states/territories and in conjunction with the Australian Government. An example of this was in 2002 when state/territory and Australian Government leaders met in Hobart at the Primary Industries Ministerial Council⁶ and resolved to progress a consistent approach to biosecurity policy which recognises regional differences between States¹¹ with respect to pest status and biosecurity risk (Appendix C). Additionally, in April 2004 Tasmania entered into an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) on a National System for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pest Incursions through the Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » A biosecurity structure enabling a whole-of-Government approach to biosecurity policy and planning with co-ordinated operational/delivery mechanisms.
- » Clarification of existing biosecurity functions across Government agencies and establishment or enhancement of integrated approaches where necessary.
- » Identification and removal of duplication and gaps in biosecurity policy and planning.
- » Co-ordination of biosecurity activity across the whole-of-Government via the oversight of the Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee (TBC) (Appendix F).

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|--|
| 1.1 | Identify all areas of Government that should provide input to Tasmanian biosecurity arrangements and ensure that these agencies are part of the development of policy and operational arrangements. |
| 1.2 | Clarify current biosecurity protocols across the Tasmanian Government and where necessary establish appropriate protocols. |
| 1.3 | Enhance and extend the use of work directions and instructions in the form of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). (G7) |
| 1.4 | Develop a SOP review program to maintain currency, progress operational improvement and identify new and emerging SOP requirements. (G7) |
| 1.5 | Develop clear biosecurity prosecution/compliance/enforcement policies. (G11) |
| 1.6 | Develop consistent policies and plans for preparing for and responding to pests, diseases and weed incursions. |
| 1.7 | Establish and maintain formalised working groups of operational and policy officers from within the biosecurity system to work collaboratively on regulatory instruments and the development and implementation of policy, including the preparation of work directions and instructions. (G6) |

⁶Primary Industry Ministerial council (PIMC) Resolution 1.3 "Enhanced Partnership between States/Territories and the Commonwealth - CEO's working Group on Quarantine. ¹¹Particularly important for Tasmania's strong biosecurity focus due to geographical isolation advantages, development of its primary industries and protection of its environment.



2. Roles & Responsibilities

Background

All Tasmanians and visitors to Tasmania have a role to play in protecting the biosecurity status of Tasmania.

- » Importers must be aware of, and comply with, quarantine regulations.
- » Travelling Tasmanians and visitors to the State have a responsibility to abide by Tasmania's quarantine laws and declare items of quarantine concern or dispose of those items before they enter the State.
- » Transport industries, such as the commercial shipping industry, have a responsibility to comply with quarantine regulations and adopt sound hygiene procedures.
- » Tourism operators and providers need to be aware of and abide by quarantine regulations and be responsible in addressing biosecurity issues in the conduct of their business.
- » Primary producers and merchants of animals and plants in Tasmania have a very important role to play in surveillance and monitoring. They must be sufficiently aware so as to advise the appropriate authorities of anything unusual and to manage biosecurity risks on properties.
- » Environmental land managers have a responsibility to be vigilant and report anything unusual, or of concern, and to manage biosecurity risks on properties.
- » Private animal health providers and crop advisers have a responsibility to report anything unusual they may come across in the animals and crops they visit as part of their daily business.

Government has a responsibility to raise awareness and provide sufficient information so stakeholders are able to identify the unusual and know how to report it. Government also has a responsibility to involve all stakeholders in the biosecurity process especially the implementation of this Strategy. All sections of Government must work together to address biosecurity matters in an informed and educated way so as to ensure maximum efficiencies are maintained and the State's biosecurity status is protected.

Outcome 2

Awareness and acceptance by all stakeholders of their roles and responsibilities in protecting and enhancing Tasmania's biosecurity, and meeting the strategy objectives.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » Defined roles and responsibilities for all biosecurity stakeholders especially in relation to biosecurity policy, planning and operational delivery.
- » Recognition and acceptance by all stakeholders (Government and non-Government) of their responsibilities in protecting Tasmania's biosecurity status.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|--|
| 2.1 | Maintain the Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee for the development of policy advice to the Tasmanian Government and to oversee the implementation of a strategic approach to biosecurity in Tasmania. (G1, G2) |
| 2.2 | Identify all Biosecurity stakeholders in Tasmania and their roles and responsibilities. |
| 2.3 | Provide technical advice to stakeholders on issues of biosecurity importance to the state and address specific biosecurity issues via industry/Government-based working groups. |
| 2.4 | Ensure all stakeholders (government and non-government) are aware of, and able to exercise, their biosecurity responsibilities. |



3. Legislation

Background

Several pieces of legislation (many with accompanying regulations) impact on biosecurity capacity and the delivery of an effective biosecurity system.

The following Statutes are most directly relevant in Tasmania.

State

- » *Plant Quarantine Act 1997*
- » *Animal Health Act 1995*
- » *Seeds Act 1985*
- » *Weed Management Act 1999*
- » *Inland Fisheries Act 1995*
- » *Animal Welfare Act 1993*
- » *Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (Control of Use) Act 1995*
- » *Gene Technology Act 2001*
- » *Nature Conservation Act 2002*
- » *Vermin Control Act 2000*
- » *Biological Control Act 1985*
- » *Living Marine Resource Management Act 1995*
- » *Genetically Modified Organisms Control Act 2004*
- » *Police Powers (Public Safety) Act 2005*
- » *Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994*

Commonwealth

- » *Quarantine Act 1908*

Outcome 3

Comprehensive and complementary State legislation that effectively protects and enhances Tasmania's biosecurity status.

Tasmania’s emergency management legislation, the *Emergency Services Act 1976*, provides a framework for a whole-of-Government approach to planning, preparedness, operational coordination and community participation in an emergency response.

Compliance and investigation activities in DPIW are covered by an overarching compliance and enforcement policy. Investigative activities are currently conducted according to the relevant individual legislative instrument but consistent with this policy.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » Comprehensive, complementary, and current State legislation that both protects and enhances Tasmania’s biosecurity.
- » A forward plan of legislative development if additional legislation or legislative amendment needs are identified.
- » A review of all existing legislation that contributes to the biosecurity system in Tasmania.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|---|
| 3.1 | Review current legislation associated with biosecurity and if necessary, amend to ensure it is consistent with the Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy and this Strategy and in accordance with a prioritised legislative amendment program. (G13) |
| 3.2 | Develop State legislation consistent with the management requirements for ballast water taken up within Australia to minimise the risk of translocating introduced marine pests into Tasmanian waters. |
| 3.3 | Investigate existing legislative capacity to undertake biosecurity decisions in the national interest. |
| 3.4 | Establish a whole-of-government compliance, enforcement and prosecution policy for biosecurity related matters. (G 11, G 12) |



4. Plans of Relevance to Biosecurity

Background

Biosecurity issues extend across a wide range of environments and commodities and range over both the public and private sectors. Current biosecurity activities are governed by diverse plans, strategies, programs and laws. It is important when developing a whole-of-Government strategic approach to identify all the elements of the current system and wherever possible build on them. This requires identifying all these different elements, assessing how effective they are and determining how they can complement a whole-of-Government biosecurity system. Many of these are well known and serve as important supports for the Strategy. Nationally, a Government working group is developing an Australian Biosecurity System (Appendix D); it is important that the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy complement national biosecurity system principles.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » A biosecurity system built on complementary and interactive supporting plans and strategies.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|--|
| 4.1 | Evaluate the international/national policy framework and establish mechanisms to integrate our biosecurity arrangements with relevant networks, monitor for change and foster collaborative relations. |
| 4.2 | Maintain a high level of consistency and complementarity between State policy, the Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy and Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy and national and international policy. |
| 4.3 | Ensure those responsible for regional/local/sector plans within Tasmania are aware of State plans and their roles/responsibilities in biosecurity. |

Outcome 4

All Tasmanian plans and strategies relevant to the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy are identified and arrangements in place to ensure these plans and strategies deliver optimal biosecurity outcomes consistent with the Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy and the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy. All National and International plans and strategies relevant to the Strategy are identified and arrangements in place to address any gaps or inconsistencies between the Strategy and these plans and strategies.



Outcome 5

Enhanced biosecurity decision making processes based on scientific risk assessment principles consistent with Tasmania's ALOP, national and international trade obligations.

Prevention, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery

The following sections outline the primary components to ensure excellence in prevention, preparedness and response to biosecurity threats and incursions, and subsequent recovery.

5. Risk Analysis

Background

A biosecurity Risk Analysis⁷ Framework (RAF) is an essential component of an effective biosecurity system.

International Agreements

An important component of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) arrangements is the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. This agreement requires countries to adopt the least trade restrictive quarantine barriers possible, but provides member countries with a right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary to protect human, plant and animal life or health in their jurisdiction. This is provided such measures are scientifically based, non-discriminatory and consistently applied. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments provides guidelines for ballast water management including guidelines on ballast water risk assessment. Arrangements to manage ballast water under the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy must be consistent with the IMO Convention. Additionally Tasmania's ballast water management arrangements must be consistent with existing and future State and Federal Government regulations and provide industry with a single point of contact for all information about their ballast water management obligations. To achieve this consistency, ballast water management arrangements are being developed by a committee consisting of all States, the Northern Territory, Australian Government, industry and environmental stakeholders. The committee is known as the National Introduced Marine Pest Coordination Group (NIMPCG).

⁷Risk analysis=risk assessment + risk management+risk communication.

Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP)

The importance and validity of Australia having a single national ALOP was recognised by members of the Primary Industries Ministerial Council in 2002. The ALOP provides a consistent basis against which to measure the biosecurity risks of certain activities. The Australian Government's ALOP is stated as "a high or very conservative level of protection aimed at reducing risk to very low levels, while not based on a zero risk approach." Tasmania considers this an acceptable over-arching statement and the Tasmanian Government has determined an ALOP, consistent with the Australian Government's ALOP but with more specific meaning and more quantifiable measures of risk. The ALOP is probably the single most important policy statement in relation to implementing a biosecurity system because all biosecurity activities must be consistent with underpinning the ALOP. In addition, a defined ALOP and how decisions are based in relation to that ALOP are necessary to satisfy the requirements of the SPS Agreement ensuring that Tasmania as a state of Australia's Federation is meeting its WTO obligations. The decision-making process that underpins that ALOP must be scientifically based, transparent and consistent. Also of importance to Tasmania with respect to the setting of an ALOP is the recognition by all states/territories and the Australian Government of regional differences in pest status and regional differences in biosecurity risks. Thus quarantine measures can vary across States subject to regional differences but these must not be arbitrary and must satisfy the transparency, consistency and science-based requirements.

Risk Analysis

Risk assessment, management and communication underpin any biosecurity system. Consistent, transparent and repeatable processes that illustrate the decision-making process and, where possible, employ semi-quantitative techniques of risk assessment are considered a minimum requirement for an internationally acceptable biosecurity system. Also essential are feedback mechanisms to improve and update risk analysis models.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » Transparent and consistent biosecurity decision making process consistent with international obligations.
- » Decision-making based on Tasmania's ALOP using contemporary scientific risk analysis methods.
- » Process to enable clear priority determination of eradication/management activities based on optimal environment, economic and social benefits for Tasmania.

- » Optimum use of computer tools enabling timely, clear and documented risk-based decisions.
- » A system able to model risks and assess suitability of risk mitigation measures where risks are identified, with feedback mechanisms to improve model operation.
- » A virtual Bioresecurity Risk Analysis Unit located within the Tasmanian Government and led by DPIW.
- » Broad community understanding of risk, ALOP and bioresecurity risk decision making process used by the Tasmanian Government.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|--|
| 5.1 | Develop a scientifically-based risk analysis framework to identify, assess, communicate and prioritise potential biological threats to Tasmania. (G3) |
| 5.2 | Establish a virtual network of risk assessors across TBC member agencies using the developed scientifically based risk analysis process. |
| 5.3 | Investigate the applications that pre-barrier certification can have in mitigating risks associated with imported products. |
| 5.4 | Establish criteria to better assess incursion eradication/management priorities based on environment, social and economic values in Tasmania. |
| 5.5 | Ensure that arrangements are developed in close consultation with other Tasmanian agencies to, where appropriate, provide a whole-of-government position on bioresecurity risk analysis decisions. |
| 5.6 | Establish partnerships with the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service; the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; Office of the Gene Technology Regulator, Department of Environment and Heritage and Bioresecurity Australia on international agreements, negotiations and protocols on bioresecurity matters of importance to Tasmania. |
| 5.7 | Assess current capacity, skills and processes to undertake risk analysis in Tasmania. |
| 5.8 | Investigate the feasibility of a permitted plant list for all viable plant material imported into Tasmania. |
| 5.9 | Establish access to, or develop, a State/National expertise database to provide appropriate bioresecurity expertise to help assess potential bioresecurity risks to Tasmania. |
| 5.10 | Develop a bioresecurity threat prediction capability including inventories and develop a relevant body of knowledge and risk analysis procedures for potential threats and recent incursions. |



6. The Quarantine Barrier

Background

Quarantine refers to the activities conducted at the border to prevent entry of biosecurity threats. Quarantine Tasmania is State-based and responsible for the quarantine barrier controls at all of the points of entry into Tasmania. It includes the clearance of passengers, cargo, mail, plants/plant products, animals/animal products, aircraft and ship-waste. These clearance/inspection activities are supported by a team of quarantine officers and the use of detector dogs located at various points of entry throughout the state. Inspections and surveillance are undertaken to ensure compliance with legislation such as the *Plant Quarantine Act 1997* and the *Animal Health Act 1995*. Quarantine Tasmania also administers the *Inland Fisheries Act 1996*, *Gene Technology Act 2001* and *Nature Conservation Act 1997* at the barrier. Quarantine Tasmania delivers not only State services but also works with Federal Government programs. The most notable of these is the range of duties undertaken by Quarantine Tasmania to ensure that no pests, diseases or weeds are introduced to the Australian Antarctic bases: Mawson, Davis and Casey. This role is considered particularly important by the Australian Antarctic Division and is a high priority for the State Government. In addition, Quarantine Tasmania undertakes activities on behalf of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service in relation to international trade.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » High profile and effective quarantine activities that provide appropriate risk-based levels of protection for the State from biosecurity threats.
- » Best practice tools and processes to complement other State biosecurity system activities.
- » Appropriate tools and infrastructure to handle illegal imports/quarantine risk materials detected at the barrier.

Outcome 6

Effective risk-based border protection from pest, disease and weed incursions that pose a biosecurity threat to the State.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|---|
| 6.1 | Use of x-ray and other technology in the Tasmanian context to strengthen the system of detection of pests, diseases and weeds. (G10) |
| 6.2 | Create a 'virtual' investigation team consisting of officers with more specific skills in investigation procedures and processes. (G12) |
| 6.3 | Review risk assessments, resource allocations and effectiveness assessments for barrier services. |
| 6.4 | Implement prevention measures outlined in the Inter-Governmental Agreement on a National System for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pest Incursions. |
| 6.5 | Support effective Quarantine Tasmania operations in relation to Australian Antarctic bases and sub-Antarctic islands. |
| 6.6 | Oversee the application of a consistent risk analysis framework in accordance with accepted scientific risk analysis process to determine risk profiles applicable to Tasmania (G3) |



7. Surveillance & Monitoring

Background

Tasmania as an island state with natural geographic barriers has the potential to prevent many potential biosecurity threats being realised. An essential component is being aware well in advance of the possibility of threats. This strategy addresses this in part through the establishment of scanning mechanisms through national and international networks that flag the potential of biosecurity incursions at an early stage. The collection of evidence in relation to Tasmania's biosecurity status to support key primary industry development initiatives such as SMART Farming, is an important component of the strategy. The strategy extends beyond maintaining and enhancing our biosecurity status to building on it for the economic, environmental and social benefit of Tasmania.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » An advanced integrated early warning system for plant pests, weeds, diseases, animals and invasive species based on a combination of field surveillance and technological assessments.
- » Contemporary diagnostic tools and facilities to support both surveillance and response activities.
- » A biosecurity expertise database enabling rapid access to specialist expertise to assist surveillance activities and assess potential biosecurity risks.
- » Sharing of information and knowledge on biosecurity issues between stakeholders.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|---|
| 7.1 | Identify and allocate resource requirements and provide technical/professional support, for monitoring and surveillance activities in Tasmania consistent with strategic requirements. (G9) |
| 7.2 | Design and implement an advanced early warning system for significant biological incursions. |
| 7.3 | Develop a surveillance and early detection system for weeds and strengthen the capacity to detect new weeds. |
| 7.4 | Maintain animal disease surveillance strategies through contracted veterinary surveillance programs. |

Outcome 7

Surveillance and monitoring programs in place to provide sufficient probability of detection of new pests and demonstrate freedom.



Outcome 8

Demonstrated preparedness and response capacity appropriate to biosecurity risks.

8. Emergency Preparedness & Response

Background

The key to maintaining a high biosecurity status is readiness and having clear systems in place to both exclude and manage processes that threaten Tasmania's biosecurity. Biosecurity issues nationally, and internationally, will continue to change. Tasmanian biosecurity systems need to be capable of responding appropriately. The Tasmanian Government through DPIW has an emergency management capability developed through its role as the lead response agency for emergency animal and plant diseases, and marine pest outbreaks. Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) Preparedness mechanisms have been well established in Tasmania. There is a need to develop matching Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) preparedness plans as identified in the Gorrie Report. Emergency response arrangements for introduced marine pest emergencies are currently being reviewed by the Consultative Committee on Introduced Marine Pest Emergencies (CCIMPE).

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » Formalised cost-sharing arrangements at a National level in the event of an EPP incident.
- » Continued participation of Tasmania in EAD and marine pest cost-sharing arrangements.
- » A State Emergency Plant Pest response plan consistent with PLANTPLAN.
- » Co-ordinated EAD, EPP, EMPPPlan and weed incursion response plans.
- » Trained and appropriately skilled response personnel (Government and non-Government) with clearly defined and understood roles in the event of a biosecurity emergency.
- » A continuous program of training for response personnel across a broad range of biosecurity incidents.
- » Clear linkages and partnerships with other emergency response groups/plans.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|---|
| 8.1 | Maintain and expand Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) and Marine Pest response capabilities in Tasmania. |
| 8.2 | Develop and implement an Emergency Plant Pest and Disease response plan in Tasmania (G8). |
| 8.3 | Finalise the national marine Emergency Marine Pest Plan. |
| 8.4 | Identify existing response plans and mechanisms in Tasmania eg. weed incursion response plans, and ensuring that they are co-ordinated. |
| 8.5 | As part of the implementation of a plant emergency response plan, conduct a simulation exercise to develop and test the skills of officers within the biosecurity system in this area. |
| 8.6 | Develop a calendar of training and simulation exercises (animals/plants/weeds) with established and updated training materials and activities. (G17) |
| 8.7 | Assess State Government laboratory capacity and investigate whole-of-government biosecurity applications/opportunities across all laboratories and equipment for all types of biosecurity emergency. (G21) |
| 8.8 | Develop generic response plans for animals, pests and diseases identified as low, medium and high risk. |
| 8.9 | Prepare a contingency plan package including response plans for serious new weeds, hygiene and disposal protocols for high priority sites, incursion management checklists and templates and affected owner assistance protocols. |
| 8.10 | Devise an information management system that incorporates analysis of data requirements and procedures for handling information relating to preparedness and response activities. |
| 8.11 | Develop stakeholder specific best practice guidelines for weed prevention |



Capacity

The following sections outline the primary components to increase capacity of all stakeholders ensuring their commitment, sharing of responsibilities and undertaking of co-operative actions to optimise Tasmania's biosecurity system.

Outcome 9

Relevant stakeholders effectively engaged in partnerships with Government to manage biosecurity risks.

9. Partnerships


Background

Further to the importance of defining roles and responsibilities, formal recognition of biosecurity stakeholders and development of constructive partnerships is essential. Biosecurity issues generally impact on a range of stakeholders. Partnership approaches to developing preventative and responsive mechanisms can have significant benefits to all involved. Some formal partnerships exist already, eg. Biosecurity Technical Group (BTG) industry/ Government working groups and Biosecurity and Emergency Preparedness Program (BEPP) Steering committee. A range of informal partnerships have also been established.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » Formalised partnerships of stakeholders (Government and non-Government) involved in biosecurity system implementation to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|---|
| 9.1 | Engage biosecurity stakeholders in Tasmania in constructive partnerships that maximise and enhance delivery of biosecurity outcomes. |
| 9.2 | Develop and implement communication networks and protocols across the relevant branches/divisions amongst the Government agencies concerned with delivering biosecurity. (G5) |
| 9.3 | Identify possible working partnerships that enhance efficiency and delivery of biosecurity requirements in Tasmania. |



10. Training & Education

Background

Biosecurity is of such importance to Tasmania that it is essential to ensure appropriate training and awareness activities are provided to all involved. These range from skills-based training for specific roles and functions needed in the event of a biosecurity emergency through to community understanding of biosecurity decision-making processes.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » A formal and accredited training program for providers of biosecurity-related services.
- » A range of accessible educational and training material readily available.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|---|
| 10.1 | All relevant areas of DPIW to be provided with a threshold level of training in the conduct of investigations, the regulatory instruments of the State's biosecurity system and the application of good administrative decision making practices. (G14) |
| 10.2 | Establish training and education programs for industry partners and other relevant stakeholders. |
| 10.3 | Encourage and ensure personnel directly involved in biosecurity operations (assessment, on-ground, policy and planning) have access to relevant professional development opportunities. (G16) |

Outcome 10

Biosecurity stakeholders understand how to maximise Tasmania's biosecurity status and ensure the threats of biosecurity risks are minimised and mitigated.



Outcome 11

Community awareness of biosecurity and confidence in the capability and effectiveness of the Tasmanian biosecurity system.

11. Communication

Background

Communication programs are seen by the Tasmanian Government as making an essential contribution to prevention by raising awareness of biosecurity amongst stakeholders, the broader community and visitors to Tasmania. Both Quarantine Services and the Emergency Animal Disease program have been operating successful awareness programs for many years. These programs have included presentations to various sectors of industry and the community and displays and distribution of appropriate literature through avenues including regional agricultural shows, clearing sales and livestock sales. There is potential to build on such programs and expand communications across all facets of biosecurity.

Tasmanian Biosecurity Requirements

- » Even greater awareness of biosecurity issues in the general community.
- » Targeted communications programs for industry and other stakeholder groups, with particular emphasis on priority groups (such as small holders/ hobby farmers).
- » Consolidating all biosecurity information on a biosecurity website in Tasmania to provide public access to all relevant information on biosecurity issues as well as training/educational material.
- » Identified, trained and credible spokespeople to act as the public face of biosecurity in Tasmania delivering consistent biosecurity messages.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|---|
| 11.1 | Develop and implement a biosecurity communications program specifically designed to raise the awareness of the Tasmanian community as to the importance of biosecurity and its maintenance. (G18) |

Review & Evaluate

The development and maintenance of an effective biosecurity system is an on-going process. Effective biosecurity approaches are built on the principle of continual improvement. Undertaking a strategic approach to the development and maintenance of a biosecurity system is effective but the strategic approaches used also require ongoing review.

| Action No. | Strategic Action |
|------------|---|
| RE 1 | Through the business planning process introduce consistent monitoring procedures, develop and report on performance targets across the whole biosecurity system. These measures should stem from the relevant branch business plans and extend into measures of individual performance. (G 15, 16,19, 20) |
| RE 2 | Review the Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy three years after its implementation. |

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www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au

Biosecurity New Zealand

www.biosecurity.govt.nz

AQUAVETPLAN

www.affa.gov.au/aquavetplan

Acknowledgments

Many People and organizations contributed to the development of this strategy. In particular the Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee would like to thank the following individuals and organisations for their assistance:

Dr Steven Harris (DPIW)

Mr Andrew Cooney (DPIW)

Mr Christian Goninon (DPIW)

Dr Rod Andrewartha (DPIW)

Mr Barry Calderbank (DPIW)

Dr Alice Morris (DPIW)

Mrs Cindy Hanson (DPIW)

Mr Don Sandman (TDIA)

Mr Alan Haig (DPIW)

Ms Sandra Potter (AAD-DEH)

Dr Dick Bashford (Forestry Tasmania)

Dr Tim Wardlaw (Forestry Tasmania)

Acronyms

AAD: Australian Antarctic Division
ALOP: Appropriate Level of Protection
BTG: Biosecurity Technical Group
CPPPO: Chief Plant Protection Officer
CVO: Chief Veterinary Officer
DEH: Department of Environment and Heritage
DHHS: Department of Health and Human Services
DIER: Department of Infrastructure, Energy, and Resources
DPAC: Department of Premier and Cabinet
DPIW: Department of Primary Industries & Water
DPEM: Department of Police and Emergency Management
DTAE: Department of Tourism, Arts, and Environment
EADRA: Emergency Animal Disease Response Arrangements
EPPRD: Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
GMO: Genetically Modified Organism
IGA: Inter-Governmental Agreement
IMO: International Marine Organisation
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
NIMPCG: National Introduced Marine Pest Co-ordination Group
NRMMC: Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council
PIMC: Primary Industries Ministerial Council
PISC: Primary Industries Standing Committee
RAF: Risk Analysis Framework
SPS: Sanitary PhytoSanitary Agreement
TBC: Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee
TDIA: Tasmanian Dairy Industry Authority
WTO: World Trade Organisation

Glossary

Appropriate Level of Protection

In the context of international agreements, the Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP) defines a WTO member's accepted level of risk in the context of international trade. Risks associated with imports for example are subsequently assessed against the ALOP. Where risks are deemed not to satisfy ALOP, mitigation measures would be imposed to the point where the ALOP is reached. If risk cannot be mitigated to the level of the ALOP, the activity (import) is deemed unacceptable. Tasmania's ALOP is set at a 'very low risk' level.

Biosecurity

Biosecurity is the protection of industries, the environment and public well-being, health, amenity and safety from the negative impacts of pests, diseases, and weeds.

Gorrie Review

A government initiated review of the health of Tasmania's biosecurity and quarantine system conducted in 2004 by Mr Geoff Gorrie. The review found Tasmania's biosecurity system to be healthy and identified a series of recommendations for ongoing development and improvement of the system. The Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy incorporates implementation of the recommendations.

Phytosanitary Measure

Any legislation, regulation or official procedure with the purpose of preventing or minimising the introduction and/or spread of plant quarantine pests.

Risk Analysis

Refers to the consistent application of a process of assessing the risk of an activity/situation, determining if the risk can be managed (mitigated) to an acceptable level, and communicating the results of the risk assessment and possible mitigation measures. In the Tasmanian biosecurity system this is undertaken using the Tasmanian Biosecurity Risk Analysis Framework.

Standard Operating Procedures

Formal set of documented procedures designed to ensure consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness across an organisation in undertaking a range of activities.

Zoonoses

Diseases of animals, such as rabies or psittacosis, that can be transmitted to humans.

Appendices

Appendix A

Tasmanian Government Policy on Biosecurity

Tasmania's biosecurity policy objective is "to protect and enhance Tasmania's biosecurity status for the benefit of Tasmania's industries, environment and public well-being, health, amenity, and safety."

This policy objective is to be realised through the effective adoption of the following seven policy elements. The policy objective and these elements form the Tasmanian Biosecurity Policy.

1. Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP)

Tasmania's ALOP is set at a 'very low level of risk'. Each World Trade Organisation (WTO) member country determines its own ALOP. The ALOP is applied through the setting of sanitary and phytosanitary measures on imports. These measures must be scientifically based, transparent and consistently applied. The varying levels of risk are illustrated (Table 1) in a risk estimation matrix based on the likelihood of an event occurring and the consequences if it occurs (Level of Risk = Likelihood x Consequence). This matrix forms the basis of biosecurity risk assessments to determine if the risk (either unmitigated or managed) would meet Tasmania's ALOP. The Australian Government's ALOP is stated as *"a high or very conservative level of protection aimed at reducing risk to very low levels, while not based on a zero risk approach."* Similarly, Tasmania recognises that zero risk is not possible and a managed approach to risk is practical and desirable. The Australian Government's ALOP statement is considered acceptable as an over-arching statement provided that it is suitably qualified so as to avoid arbitrary interpretation and outcomes. The Tasmanian Government has determined an ALOP that is consistent with the Commonwealth's ALOP. In practical terms:

Tasmania’s appropriate level of protection (ALOP) is a high or very conservative level of protection aimed at reducing risk to very low levels, while not based on a zero risk approach.

Tasmania’s ALOP requires that for any disease/pest, one of three criteria must be met before the unrestricted importation of a commodity will be permitted:

- » The disease/pest must be assessed by the hazard identification step in the biosecurity decision-making process as **not** being a disease/pest of concern; OR
- » The “risk estimate” for the disease /pest in association with a particular commodity must result in a “very low risk” (acceptable without additional risk management) or lower on the risk evaluation matrix (Table 1); OR
- » “Risk management measures” are implemented to reduce the “risk estimate” for the disease/pest associated with a particular commodity so that it results in a “very low risk” or lower on the risk evaluation matrix (Table 1).

Table 1.
 Risk Estimation Matrix (adapted from *Biosecurity Australia’s* risk estimation matrix) Light shaded boxes satisfy Tasmania’s ALOP requirements.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| likelihood of entry, establishment & spread | high likelihood | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk | High risk | Extreme risk |
| | moderate | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk | High risk | Extreme risk |
| | low | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk | High risk |
| | very low | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk |
| | extremely low | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk |
| | negligible likelihood | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk |
| | negligible impact | very low | low | moderate | high | extreme impact | |
| | consequences of entry, establishment & spread | | | | | | |

2. Least Restrictive Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements

The Tasmanian Government applies a range of sanitary and phytosanitary measures that are the least trade-restrictive measures available that will satisfy our ALOP. This approach is consistent with our international obligations.

3. Science-Based Risk Analysis

The Tasmanian Government's biosecurity decision making is founded on a scientific-based risk analysis framework consistent with Tasmania's (ALOP). The fundamental basis of biosecurity activity in Tasmania is to protect our biosecurity status by minimising risk, maximising trade, and maintaining environmental safety. Tasmanian biosecurity decisions and subsequent quarantine measures and/or management are based on processes that employ a combination of qualitative and quantitative risk assessments based on expert opinion, published information and risk assessment models. Methodology is applied consistently and in a transparent manner. This forms the Tasmanian Biosecurity Risk Analysis Framework.

4. Risk-Based Resource Allocation

In assessing, and responding to biosecurity risks, the Tasmanian Government recognises that resources should be allocated according to risk. Thus resources for pre-barrier, barrier and post-barrier services are allocated to achieve the greatest reduction in the highest priority risks.

5. Cost: Benefit Decision Making on Control and Eradication

The Tasmanian Government bases its decisions on the control and eradication of pests, diseases, and weeds on cost:benefit considerations. Public resources therefore are only allocated to the control and eradication programs that provide the most cost-effective benefit for the community.

6. Whole-of-Government Approach to Biosecurity

The Tasmanian Government recognises that the maintenance and enhancement of Tasmania's biosecurity status can be effectively addressed only with a whole-of-Government strategic approach. Progressing this approach is the prime responsibility of the Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee.

7. Shared responsibilities

The Tasmanian Government has a leadership role in biosecurity but a strong and active biosecurity system is a shared responsibility of Government, the Tasmanian community, the corporate sector and visitors to Tasmania. All levels of Government, public sector agencies, primary producers, importers, exporters, transport industries, environmental managers (State and private), non-Government organisations, service providers, tourism operators, visitors to Tasmania, and the Tasmanian community have a role to play. Our relative freedom from the pests, diseases, and weeds that occur elsewhere helps make Tasmania a good place to live. It also is a great advantage when it comes to marketing our primary produce both in Australia and overseas. Recognising this, all who benefit from Tasmania's biosecurity status should share in the resourcing and management of Tasmania's biosecurity system.

Appendix B

The Tasmanian Biosecurity System

The State's biosecurity system can be seen as a continuum with three key parts: the prebarrier, barrier and post barrier components. The biosecurity continuum encompasses prevention, interception, detection and management of incursions using a scientifically based risk analysis framework. It includes communication, education and awareness programs, quarantine functions, monitoring, surveillance, emergency preparedness, response and recovery programs, and management of existing incursions. These operate within appropriate policy and legislative frameworks.

Biosecurity issues are of increasing importance to Tasmania to protect our primary industries, environment and public health, amenity and safety. Risks associated with increased trade and changing trade arrangements, increased tourism and travel and potential bioterrorist activities have to be identified and effectively managed.

The strengthening of Free Trade Agreements and progressive elimination of tariffs under World Trade Organisation (WTO) arrangements are leading to increased potential for a range of plant and animal products to be exported throughout the world. Increased movement of such products increases the risk of movement of pests, diseases and weeds that may not be present in Tasmania. Increased movement of people through growth in the Tasmanian tourism industry and changing patterns of employment and human movement also increases the risk of biosecurity incidents. At the same time the risk of bioterrorist activities cannot be ignored.

All these risks require management and mitigation where necessary. Biosecurity by its very nature is concerned with addressing risk. There is no possibility of achieving a "zero risk" system therefore those risks have to be identified and managed to reduce the likelihood of occurrence.

Though Tasmania's biosecurity system is not based on an unrealistic "fortress concept", the Tasmanian Government places a very strong emphasis on prevention at the barrier and exclusion of biosecurity risks. Risk mitigation external to Tasmania's borders is preferred. Tasmania's biosecurity approach then is one of 'very low risk' and one where risks are actively managed or mitigated with priority given to prevention.

The system facilitates trade and tourism whilst managing and mitigating risks associated with those movements. The system actively takes advantage of Tasmania's biosecurity status for the environmental, social and economic benefit of the State.

This is a resource-demanding process necessitating continuous analysis of a wide range of risks including pest incursion responses within the state, operational delivery of quarantine services at the barrier and even addressing biosecurity risks in relation to movements between Tasmania and the Australian Antarctic Territory and sub-Antarctic islands.

Appendix C

Extract from Primary Industries Ministerial Council Resolutions (1.3) on Quarantine

2 May 2002, Hobart

Council noted:

- i) States and territories commitment to address inter-state trade measure inconsistencies using the SPS Agreement as a benchmark; and
- ii) The agreed position of all jurisdictions regarding the definition of Australia's ALOP, the recognition of regional differences in pest status, regional differences in risk and the agreed approach to addressing these differences in import risk analysis through early and comprehensive co-operation.

Council agreed that:

- i) Negotiations in relation to domestic trade/quarantine are best addressed over time within existing Primary Industries Standing Committee (PISC) committees;
- ii) SPS measures applied to an international or domestic import into a region should be consistent with the associated risk and pest status of the region. Any variation of those import measures between regions/states would need to be based on a scientific analysis of quarantine risk and be supported by domestic movement controls;
- iii) There are significant impediments to imposing supervised region/inter-state movement controls in areas without natural barriers. Geographic barriers allow for supervised movement controls to be put in place for Western Australia and Tasmania but for the rest of Australia, supervised movement controls are more difficult to develop and implement, although there are some successful examples eg. the tri-state fruit fly exclusion zone;
- iv) The Commonwealth is committed to addressing regional differences in pest status and risk and consequent SPS measurement as part of import risk analysis;

- v) The work done to date on the policy framework surrounding ALOP including practical guidelines for risk analysis which illustrates the concept by way of a risk estimation matrix adequately meets Australia's present needs and further work on this definition is not a PISC priority;
- vi) The MOU adequately defines the obligations of Commonwealth/states/territories under SPS agreement. The MOU does not define the recently developed partnership approach. The MOU should be augmented by an exchange of letters between Ministers to reflect the mutual obligations under the agreed approach;
- vii) Reflections on a national approach to surveillance and monitoring as raised in the discussion paper prepared by the Chief Plant Protection Officer (CPPO), and perspectives for a co-ordinated approach to addressing them should first be sought from all jurisdictions. The office of the CPPO agreed to seek and co-ordinate responses and report back to the Senior Officers Team as soon as practicable; and
- viii) The Senior Officers Team become an ad hoc Working group to address unresolved and emerging issues on quarantine policy matters identified via the CEO-level discussions. The Senior Officers Team may also provide a useful supplementary forum for consultation between Biosecurity Australia and states/territories on IRA matters.

Appendix D

Gorrie Review Recommendations

Each recommendation is followed by related strategy action number.

1. The Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee (TBC) should be the centre of developing policy advice to the State Government on biosecurity in Tasmania to ensure continuity and consistency in the development and implementation of biosecurity policy in the State (2.1).
2. The TBC should, as a matter of priority, determine a strategic policy for biosecurity in Tasmania and present this to Government (2.1).
3. The Committee oversee the application of a consistent risk assessment/ risk management process for determining biosecurity risks to Tasmania, in accordance with accepted scientific risk assessment/risk management processes, to determine the risk profiles applicable to Tasmania (5.1, 6.6).
4. Given the enhanced role of the Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee, consideration can be given to departmental structures to improve the delivery of biosecurity functions within the Department.
5. An integral component of a Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy should include relevant actions to develop and implement communication networks and protocols across the relevant branches of the biosecurity system to strengthen the integration of activities amongst the branches of the Department concerned with delivering biosecurity (9.2).
6. Establish and maintain formalised working groups comprised of operational and policy officers from within the biosecurity system to work collaboratively on the formulation of regulatory instruments and the development and implementation of policy including the preparation and review of work directions and instructions (1.7).
7. Enhance and extend the use of work directions and instructions in the form of Standard Operating Procedures written in plain English and subject to regular review as mechanisms to ensure that policy and regulatory requirements are communicated appropriately to officers at the operational level (1.3, 1.4).
8. The Department should continue to participate in and develop a Plant Emergency Response Plan (8.2).

9. The allocation of specific resources, together with technical and professional support, to the implementation of monitoring and surveillance activities will build on the capabilities of Tasmania's biosecurity system (7.1).
10. An evaluation of the potential to use x-ray and other technology in the Tasmanian context to strengthen the system of detection of pests, diseases and weeds should be undertaken (6.1).
11. In order to provide a direction to the system and those officers who implement the State's biosecurity and quarantine regime, develop and enunciate a prosecution/compliance/enforcement policy (1.5, 3.4).
12. Create a "virtual" investigation team consisting of officers with more specific skills in investigation procedures and processes (6.2).
13. Undertake a review of the consistency and appropriateness of the legislative and associated regulatory arrangements that support Tasmania's biosecurity system. Where necessary amendments or the implementation of new legislation should be undertaken to ensure consistency and, where appropriate, to reduce multiplicity. This task should be overseen by the Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee and involve liaison and consultation between relevant personnel from both the operational and policy areas of Tasmania's biosecurity system (3.1).
14. All relevant areas of the Department be provided with a threshold level of training in the conduct of investigations, the regulatory instruments of the State's biosecurity system, and the application of good administrative decision making practices (10.1).
15. Forward succession planning and the recruitment and training of staff not only in the operational areas of quarantine services but also in the field of scientific expertise across the spectrum of biosecurity including diagnostic services should be integrated into the Department's business planning processes (RE 1).
16. Professional development should continue to keep officers across the biosecurity system abreast of emerging threats and new technologies (RE 1, 10.3).

17. The Department should consider, as part of the implementation of a plant emergency response plan, conducting a simulation exercise to develop and test the skills of officers within the biosecurity system in this area (8.6).
18. Enhance and supplement the current level of specific awareness and public education campaigns (11.1).
19. Through the business planning process introduce consistent monitoring procedures through developing and reporting on performance targets across the whole biosecurity system, stemming from the relevant branch business plans extending into measures of individual performance (RE 1).
20. That current process for employees' performance evaluation be applied across the relevant branches involved in delivering biosecurity (RE 1).
21. To ensure an optimal diagnostic service to support Tasmania's biosecurity system, a reordering of priorities, together with an examination of the budgetary allocation to the Branch and the effectiveness and efficiency of the current level of service it provides, is recommended (8.7).

Appendix E

Natural Resource Management and Primary Industries Standing Committees' Steering Group for an Australian Biosecurity System Primary Production and the Environment

Extracts reproduced with permission

The Australian Biosecurity System for Primary Production and the Environment (AusBIOSEC) covers all invasive plants, animals, and diseases of the terrestrial, freshwater and marine environments, which impact on primary industries, the natural and the built environments. AusBIOSEC interfaces with public health in relation to zoonotic diseases (diseases that can be passed from animals to humans), public amenity, food safety and security, and where quarantine biosecurity measures are involved.

AusBIOSEC is being enhanced to establish an overarching policy framework for greater national collaboration on biosecurity issues both within and across jurisdictions and with key stakeholders in the primary production and environment sectors. It brings together all activities in this area being undertaken by the Australian Government, States and Territories, as well as industry, landholders and other key stakeholders. It builds on specific industry - and pest - based strategies, legislation and operational procedures already in place for primary industries, and draws on these to establish arrangements for the environment sector.

The Natural Resource Management and Primary Industries Ministerial Councils (NRMMC and PIMC) have agreed that the enhancement of AusBIOSEC will achieve the following key improvements:

- » An agreed national whole of government approach to biosecurity delivery across the primary production and environment sectors;

Membership of the joint Steering Group is from primary industries, environment and natural resource management agencies from all jurisdictions and the CSIRO and includes a representative from the Health Ministers' Council as an observer. The Steering Group also includes representation from NRMSC and PISC sectoral committees.

- » An Australian Government secretariat has been established jointly in the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the Department of Environment and Heritage to service the joint Steering Group and its working groups.
- » Three working groups have been established to: (1) progress cost-sharing and decision-making models; (2) identify and address priority risks across sectors to national biosecurity management; and (3) identify and address institutional and inter-jurisdictional issues for implementing enhanced arrangements under AusBIOSEC.

At their meetings in April 2006, Ministerial Councils considered the joint Steering Group's report, agreed to by Standing Committees, on the progress made on enhancing AusBIOSEC. Councils:

- » agreed that pre-agreed, and capped, national cost sharing arrangements are fundamental to timely and effective responses to biosecurity events;
- » noted that effective national biosecurity arrangements are in place for the primary production sector, but few arrangements exist for managing invasive species with environmental impacts;
- » endorsed progress in developing national arrangements for managing a biosecurity event, such as a new incursion, where there are predominantly environmental impacts;

- » endorsed in-principle a preferred national cost-sharing option for the public good component of a biosecurity event, noting that New South Wales and the ACT reserved their position on whether State and Territory shares should be population based where a risk-based approach is not possible; and
- » requested that the joint NRMSC/PISC Steering Group report in November 2006 on progress in the development of AusBIOSEC, and agreed to consider the content of a possible Intergovernmental Agreement for implementation of AusBIOSEC.

The Steering Group and its Working Groups are progressing these priority issues with a view to reporting developments to the next meeting of the Standing Committees in October 2006.

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June 2006

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Appendix F

The Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee

The Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee (TBC) comprises representatives from the Department of Primary Industries and Water (DPIW), Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources, (DIER), Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPAC), Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Department of Police and Emergency Management (DPEM), and the Department of Tourism, Arts and Environment (DTAE).

Terms of Reference

- » Develop a biosecurity policy for Tasmania within the context of international, national and State obligations.
- » Provide strategic leadership in the development of a biosecurity strategy to give effect to that policy.
- » Oversight the implementation of the strategy ensuring that the system is fully integrated and risk based.
- » Oversight the operation of relevant committees concerned with biosecurity issues and ensure that duplication does not occur.

Scope

Biosecurity issues (pre barrier/barrier/post barrier):

- » plant and animal pests/diseases/disease agents (excluding non-zoonotic human diseases)
- » GMOs (within the framework of the Government's GMO policy)
- » weeds
- » invasive species

Effects on

- » primary industries, including forestry
- » environment
- » public health
- » public safety

Functions

- » Provide co-ordinated, strategic risk based advice on biosecurity issues to the Secretary, Department of Primary Industries and Water, Minister for Primary Industries and Water, and other Ministers as appropriate.
- » Develop policies and protocols to enable the establishment of scientific risk based systems to prevent the introduction, and ensure eradication or effective management of pests, disease, disease agents and weeds that jeopardise animal, plant, environment and human health.
- » Set the policy direction for and oversight the scientific processes related to incidents of biosecurity concern, including strategies to deal with invasive species either established or newly introduced.
- » Develop scientific capacity to assist market maintenance and access opportunities for Tasmania's primary industries by underpinning Tasmania's claims to relative pest and disease free status.
- » Address infrastructure issues including options for funding biosecurity services.

