



# Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission

Inquiry into the adequacy of aviation  
and maritime security measures to  
combat serious and organised crime



## FOREWORD

The Australian Federal Police Association (AFPA) strives to enhance the operational capability of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) through representing its people, the law enforcement professionals themselves.

Although the AFPA has industrial coverage of all AFP employees, our role is greater than mere industrial representation.

We have an obligation to ensure that the AFP operates to the best of its capabilities and can effectively protect Australia from criminal attack. This is an obligation not just to our members, but to the Australian people.

The AFPA would like to thank the Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission for inviting us to make a written submission to your *Inquiry into the adequacy of aviation and maritime security measures to combat serious and organised crime*.



The AFPA has advocated for significant reform of policing at the 11 CTFR Airports for over a decade. In 2000 we first raised concerns in our submission to the Senate Legal & Constitutional Reference Committee: *Inquiry into the management arrangements and adequacy of funding of the AFP and NCA*.

In September 2005 Sir John Wheeler tabled his report: *An independent review of airport security and policing for the Government of Australia*. Since that time the AFPA has raised concerns in relation to the failure of Government to fully implement a number of his Recommendations. We have also challenged the effectiveness of the Unified Policing Model which was formed in response to his report.

The AFPA welcomes the recent Federal Government announcement that it accepts the findings and Recommendations of the Federal Audit of Policing Capabilities Report by Mr Roger Beale AO which, in particular, rejects the Unified Policing Model and advocates its replacement with 'an *'All In' model under which the Commonwealth accepts the responsibility of funding and staffing nationally coordinated airport security and policing services, noting that this will likely take several years before being fully operational*'. This is consistent with the Recommendations made by the AFPA to various inquiries.

The AFPA believes that there are further opportunities to enhance & consolidate the current aviation and maritime security measures in order to better combat serious and organised crime impacting on Australian borders. We look forward to the outcomes of your inquiry.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jon Hunt-Sharman". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Jon Hunt-Sharman  
National President  
Australian Federal Police Association

## **The methods used by serious and organised criminal groups to infiltrate Australia's airports and ports, and the extent of infiltration**

The AFPA is aware of a number of AFP operations that have identified corrupt or criminal elements involved in the movement of goods at international and domestic airports and maritime ports. AFP operations have identified corrupt officials such as DIAC and AC&BPS officers, organised criminal groups within airline baggage and cargo porters, aircrew and indeed persons working at s77G and s79 Customs Act depots and warehouses. Organised crime syndicates identify vulnerabilities in border security and exploit them.

### ***Vulnerability of the Voluntary Declaration Procedure at International Airports***

The AFPA is concerned that the introduction of the voluntary 'Declare' or 'Nothing to declare' process at Australian Airports by AC&BPS has increased the ability for organised crime to utilise 'mules' to transport narcotics and other illicit goods through the customs barrier undetected.

AC&BPS use profiling to increase the likelihood of detecting criminal activity. Organised crime take counter measures to avoid such detection.

A simple example is that it is unlikely that a business man flying to NZ for a two day business trip will be profiled for a search of his luggage. On the other hand, a person arriving on the same flight from NZ who has actually transferred to that flight from a flight from Argentina is likely to have their luggage searched for illicit drugs such as cocaine.

As such, an organised crime syndicate could organise to have the business man not pick up his luggage from the carousel but knowingly pick up the luggage of the other person, which contains cocaine. That is, the two passengers' knowingly swap their aircraft hold luggage.

The business man has a high probability of walking straight through the 'Nothing to declare' line without being intercepted by authorities. In this scenario there are in fact two mules, one to export the cocaine from Argentina, transiting through NZ and the other, to import the cocaine through the Australian border.

The Bali 9 demonstrates that organised crime were willing to send 9 'mules' from Bali to Australia. How many would have got through the voluntary 'Declare' had there not been AFP intelligence in relation to the intended importations. Mathematically, if 8 were caught and 1 gets through the criminal syndicate would break even. The reality is that 8 are likely to get through and 1 caught, providing the criminal syndicate with substantial illegal gain.

A recent example, in Sydney in February 2009 a Cambodian woman was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment for organising seven couriers to import 1184.4 grams of pure heroin from Cambodia. The heroin was concealed internally.

The 'Declare' or 'Nothing to declare' process may increase passenger movement through Customs, it may deter the honest passenger from doing a dishonest thing, but does it facilitate organised crime importing drugs using their 'mules'?

The AFPA believes there should be enough resources to enable screening/searching of all international passenger luggage.

## Recommendation

**That Australian Customs and Border Protection Service be adequately resourced (advanced scanning equipment and staffing) to enable screening/searching of all international passengers luggage.**

### *Criminal elements in non government employment at airports and ports*

The AFPA is aware of past AFP operations in which criminal groups have infiltrated airport security by obtaining legitimate jobs working airside, or within restricted zones. Vulnerable employment roles include airline baggage and cargo porters, aircrew, cleaners and caterers.

#### *Criminal elements – Aircrew*

Previous AFP operations have identified an organised crime modus operandi of aircrew travelling from overseas bringing illicit drugs into the airside area through such methods as body packs or concealed in their passenger luggage.

For example:

In August 2004 a South African steward was caught with more than \$5 million worth of heroin concealed in his luggage.

In September 2005 a South African flight attendant was charged with trying to smuggle 1kg of cocaine into Australia. A baggage search revealed he was carrying a leather-bound document holder with concealed compartments on either side.

#### *Criminal elements – Cleaners, Caterers, Airside staff*

There is evidence that prior to the Customs Barrier a simple methodology used is where the illicit drugs are left in a location airside, such as a sanitary bin in a toilet. The illicit drugs are then collected by corrupt cleaners, caterers, airside staff etc.

For example:

In September 2009 the AFP alleged in Court that members of a cocaine smuggling syndicate infiltrated Sydney Airport to conduct a series of cocaine importations. The AFP operation culminated in several arrests exposing the gaping holes that still exist in the nation's aviation security, particularly the issuing of ASIC and lack of adequate search procedures in relation Airport employees entering and leaving airside.

The syndicate was operating back to the mid 1990s. In 1996, Kevin Geraghty became the target of an AFP operation. The AFP identified that he was part of a criminal syndicate sourcing cocaine from Colombia and smuggling it into Sydney via Los Angeles. His modus operandi was simple but effective: couriers would strap packs of cocaine onto their bodies and, via a flight from Los Angeles to Sydney, stash it in the plane's rubbish bins. At Sydney International Airport associates of Geraghty would pick up the plane's refuse, along with the cocaine. In 2000 Geraghty was sentenced to 25 years' jail for drug importations but the methodology was continued by his criminal associates.

In September 2009, one of the men arrested over the **one-kilogram** cocaine importation was Wayne Williams, a criminal associate of Geraghty. Williams is a former employee of Gate Gourmet, the airline catering company that employed Jose Alquillera and Mathew Hay,

who were also arrested in connection with the one-kilogram importation. Another man, Craig Nicholson, used to be a manager at Gate Gourmet and is also alleged to be a major player in the criminal syndicate.

The men allegedly were part of a plan to smuggle cocaine on to a plane in Los Angeles, where it would be hidden and later retrieved by catering staff in Sydney.

### *Criminal elements – Airline Baggage Handlers, Cargo Porters*

Previous AFP operations have identified a reluctance of Airlines to fully cooperate or indeed refer matters involving airline staff to police. There is a strong corporate view that the closer the employee is to getting the aircraft off the ground the more likely they will not be reported to police or prosecuted due to the risk of industrial action impacting on significant airline revenue. That is, it is more likely to see a referral for criminal charges in relation to a check-in counter employee or an administration clerk than a referral relating to airline baggage handlers and cargo porters, aircrew, airline engineers etc. As such, these employment types are vulnerable to organised crime.

For example, there is no requirement for airlines to report to police cargo theft or passenger baggage theft occurring airside. Stolen or lost goods are covered under insurance so matters of large scale theft of high value cargo often remain unreported to police and law enforcement authorities.

There have been a number of periodic AFP operations in relation to Airline Baggage Handlers and Cargo Porters. There appears to be a systemic course of conduct with the AFP performing major operations in the 80s, 90s, and indeed in late 2000.

For example, in 2009 AFP Operation Precipice was a Perth Joint Airport Investigation Team investigation into narcotics trafficking by a Darwin Airport Qantas baggage handler and associated criminal syndicate. The investigation identified the trafficking of MDMA between Perth and Darwin. A total of six offenders were arrested and convicted in relation to drug possession and trafficking charges.

The offenders received custodial sentences of between 18 months and four and a half years. Over **two kilograms** of cocaine and 10,500 ecstasy tablets were seized during the investigation.

Corrupt airline porters have the significant advantage at a number of international airports of being able to intercept international passenger baggage or cargo and divert it into domestic luggage or cargo to avoid customs procedures.

The AFPA finds it hard to accept that organised crime gangs working as airline porters would limit their criminality and not look at various lucrative illegal activities such as facilitating organised criminal activities such as avoidance of duty/taxes, the importation of prohibited goods, such as illicit drugs and their chemical precursors, major theft and indeed money laundering.

### *Criminal elements – Sea ports, freight depots, transport & logistics staff*

Although the AFPA has limited knowledge in relation to non government employees working at sea ports, freight depots, and in transport and logistics, there have been a number of AFP operations that have involved shipping containers containing large quantities of prohibited goods such as illicit drugs. There is evidence of organised crime infiltrating these legitimate businesses operating within the import and export environment.

For example in 2004, an Australian organised crime syndicate organised a \$40 million MDMA importation through Port Botany. It is alleged that the crime syndicate enlisted a stevedore and the manager of a transport company to locate, track and remove the shipping container from the port secure area prior to Customs clearance procedures. Security guards were also suspected of being involved.

For example, in 2008 AFP Operation Scenery targeted theft in the aviation freight industry in Brisbane, and resulted in prosecutions against offenders working inside the industry. Additionally, it identified a number of vulnerabilities within the airfreight sector which have been passed on to industry to help them improve their business practices.

The AFPA is unaware of the extent of criminality within the maritime ports due to the lack of AFP presence. This in itself a significant concern as intelligence and investigations have been adhoc and response driven rather than there being intelligence led policing of maritime ports.

Even so, the AFPA is aware that intelligence indicates that private sector maritime employees have been linked to organised crime syndicates.

### ***Corrupt elements in government employment at Airports & Ports***

There is ample evidence through State and Federal law enforcement investigations, Commissions of Inquiry and State and Federal Integrity Commissions such as ACLEI, ICAC, OPI, and QJC etc that organised crime syndicates infiltrate public sector agencies and corrupt public officials at all levels of Government in Australia.

The AFPA is particularly concerned about the infiltration of, and corruption within, Government agencies working at our borders.

For example, in 2003 a 52-year-old immigration officer appeared in a Sydney court charged over an alleged immigration scam.

The man allegedly took bribes in return for the fraudulent granting of visas for some Korean nationals. He was charged with three offences - receiving bribes, abuse of public office and unlawfully disclosing information.

In June 2008 a former immigration officer was jailed for accepting luxury holidays in exchange for approving Australian citizenships during the period 1996 to 2000.

David John Moon, a second-tier senior officer in the Immigration Department's Sydney office, was paid in business class holidays by an associate, George Ling, to grant 110 approvals for illegal Chinese immigrants.

Between 1996 and 2000 Ling spent about \$119,000 on overseas trips for Moon, including travel for his family to New York, Las Vegas, Orlando, Los Angeles and Hong Kong. He paid for Moon's accommodation, business class air fares and gave him travellers' cheques worth up to \$US10,000.

It is alleged that at least 40 Chinese families paid Ling between \$US10,000 and \$US100,000 for each citizenship application Moon granted.

Moon admitted two counts of trying to defraud the Commonwealth.

Two days after Ling was interviewed, he fled the country, withdrawing \$384,000 from a business account he shared with Moon. Ling was extradited to Australia from the US in 2006.

Moon resigned from his job in 2000 after the investigation began.

Judge Charteris said together, the partners had charged illegal immigrants about \$900,000.

Accounting for the delayed investigation, Judge Charteris sentenced Moon to 18 months prison with a non-parole period of nine months.

In 2009 an employee of the AC&BPS was successfully prosecuted for accessing restricted data without authorisation.

Corruption of border officials and staff working within restricted border areas must be seen as a given and must be addressed through unique and robust integrity measures normally reserved for policing and national security personnel.

Border security is a national security issue and employees working in such environments need to be subject to robust integrity measures to minimise corrupt and criminal activity.

In a number of previous submissions to various Parliamentary Joint Committees, since the late 90's until the recent Federal Audit of Policing Capabilities (the Beale Review) the AFPA has argued that Government officials involved in the prevention, detection and investigation of border crime, particularly importation of illicit drugs and precursors, prohibited weapons, people smuggling etc are operating in high corruption-risk environment.

The AFPA has vigorously argued that anticorruption measures similar to those applied to the AFP should be applied to employees of Border agencies such as AC&BPS, DIAC etc. Indeed the AFPA believes such measures should extend to all Commonwealth law enforcement agencies and law enforcement sections within Commonwealth agencies generally.

### ***Fighting border corruption by expanding ACLEI jurisdiction***

There are currently provisions for the compulsory reporting of suspected incidences of corruption within all Commonwealth agencies undertaking law enforcement roles under s19 of the *Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006* (Cth).

Although s19 allows such reporting, currently ACLEI jurisdiction is limited to the AFP and the ACC. It does not include other law enforcement agencies that operate in Australia's airports and ports.

In contrast, New South Wales Government agencies, regardless of whether they have law enforcement sections, must report corruption matters to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) under s11 of the *Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988* (NSW).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> 11 Duty to notify Commission of possible corrupt conduct

(1) This section applies to the following persons:

- (a) the Ombudsman,
- (b) the Commissioner of Police,
- (c) the principal officer of a public authority,
- (d) an officer who constitutes a public authority,

To fight organised crime at Australia's borders it is essential that all employees of government agencies operating at the border are compelled to uncover corruption; especially those working within the AC&BPS.

The Australian Public Service Code of Conduct<sup>2</sup> states 'an APS employee must behave honestly and with integrity in the course of APS employment' yet there are only a few integrity regimens to proactively ensure that this code is being upheld.

The AFPA believes that ACLEI's jurisdiction should be expanded to include high corruption risk agencies such as those operating in the aviation and maritime security environment.

### **Recommendation**

**Compulsory reporting of possible corrupt conduct to ACLEI should be mandatory for all Commonwealth agencies, not just those with law enforcement capabilities. ACLEI should conduct inquiries/hearings or where appropriate, forward those corruption referrals to the AFP for investigation.**

### **Recommendation**

**ACLEI's jurisdiction should be expanded to include high corruption-risk agencies such as those operating in the aviation and maritime security environment.**

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(e) a Minister of the Crown.

(2) A person to whom this section applies is under a duty to report to the Commission any matter that the person suspects on reasonable grounds concerns or may concern corrupt conduct.

(2A) Despite subsection (2), the Commissioner of Police is not under a duty to report to the Commission any matter that concerns or may concern corrupt conduct of a police officer or administrative officer (within the meaning of the *Police Integrity Commission Act 1996*) unless the Commissioner of Police suspects on reasonable grounds that the matter also concerns or may concern corrupt conduct of another public official.

(2B) Despite subsection (2), the Commissioner for the New South Wales Crime Commission (*the Crime Commissioner*) is not under a duty to report to the Commission any matter that concerns or may concern corrupt conduct of a Crime Commission officer (within the meaning of the *Police Integrity Commission Act 1996*) unless the Crime Commissioner suspects on reasonable grounds that the matter also concerns or may concern corrupt conduct of another public official.

<sup>2</sup> *Australian Public Service Act 1999*, s13.



### *Fighting border corruption by expanding the AFP Integrity framework*

The AFPA fully embraces the highest levels of integrity for AFP employees. The AFP Integrity framework is the most comprehensive of all Australian Police Forces and the Australian Public Service. It includes:

- a. initial and then regular security clearance processes
- b. Initial and regular financial disclosure of assets and debts
- c. random and targeted drug testing (currently 100% of the workforce is tested per annum)
- d. random and targeted alcohol testing
- e. critical Incident drug and alcohol testing
- f. loss of superannuation as a result of corruption offence
- g. subject to criminal sanction for failing to answer or misleading a PRS Investigator whilst under direction, provided under section 40VE of the AFP Act
- h. subject to the AFP Confidant Network
- i. requirement to provide a body sample under Direction
- j. compulsory DNA testing (currently in development)
- k. the integrity/governance framework which includes:
  - Commissioners Order 2 (Mandatory reporting)
  - Fraud Control and Anti Corruption Plan
  - Security Plan
  - Internal Audit Program
- l. subject to the Commonwealth Ombudsman including self-initiated investigations.
- m. subject to the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) where 'ACLEI' investigators can access coercive and other powers used in law enforcement, such as telephone interception, electronic surveillance, undercover and controlled operations, search warrants, and passport confiscation. Special ACLEI powers include: the power to enter the premises of a law enforcement agency without prior warning to carry on an investigation and seize articles; and the power to apply to a judge for the arrest of a person refusing or attempting to evade giving evidence.'
- n. subject to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement.
- o. and of course, members of the AFP are subject to criminal sanctions.

The AFP is also currently developing an integrity testing/entrapment program for use on its employees.<sup>3</sup>

The AFPA is concerned that employees from various law enforcement agencies or law enforcement sections within agencies are only subject to the *Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)* and are not subject to the stringent integrity framework of the AFP.

It is in the interest of the law enforcement community and the Commonwealth to minimise infiltration of law enforcement employees by organised crime. This requires proactive integrity and anticorruption strategies.

As AFP Police Officers, it is unacceptable that other Commonwealth law enforcement employees have access to valuable criminal intelligence and ongoing Police investigations but are not subject to an integrity framework similar to the AFP.

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<sup>3</sup> Chris Steel, 'ACLEI and Anti-Corruption Strategies', *AUSPOL Journal* (2) (Melbourne: Austral, September 2009) 26 – 34.

The AFPA believes that the best way to resolve this issue is to employ staff from various law enforcement agencies or law enforcement sections within agencies, under the AFP Act so that they are subject to the stringent AFP integrity framework.

There is successful precedent with the former Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence and the current AFP International Deployment Group arrangements.

Similarly, the AFP works on an ongoing basis in joint operations with various Commonwealth agencies and State and Territory Police such as the Joint Aviation Intelligence Team (JAIT) and Joint Aviation Investigation Group (JAIG) etc. All members of these joint-operations should be subject to the more stringent integrity regime of the AFP in order to ensure the investigations are not compromised through infiltration by corrupt public service staff. This could be achieved by seconding task force personnel from those Commonwealth agencies to the AFP for the duration of the taskforce period.

The AFPA believes that the safety and security of AFP employees must not be compromised as a result of sharing intelligence and operational details with Commonwealth employees not subject to stringent integrity and anticorruption measures. Any breach of security of AFP operations places our members in extreme danger and obviously compromises the AFPs successes at combating organised crime.

### **Recommendation**

**To ensure a stringent and seamless integrity framework, employees of Commonwealth law enforcement agencies and law enforcement sections of agencies, should be seconded under the AFP Act similar to the AFP International Deployment Group (IDG) and the former Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI).**

### **Recommendation**

**Where there are AFP ‘standing’ joint operations with various Commonwealth agencies and State and Territory Police such as the Joint Aviation Intelligence Team (JAIT) and Joint Aviation Investigation Group (JAIG) etc, all non police members of these joint-operations should be subject to the more stringent integrity regime under the AFP Act by seconding task force personnel from those Commonwealth agencies to the AFP for the duration of the taskforce period.**

### ***Fighting border corruption by enacting an illicit enrichment offence***

In light of the Constitutional constraints facing the Commonwealth, the AFPA believes that the Commonwealth should enact an ‘illicit enrichment’ offence into Australian law in relation to public officials. This is recommended by the *United Nations Convention Against Corruption*<sup>4</sup> to which Australia is a party, and which would be supported under s51 (xxix) of the Constitution.

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<sup>4</sup> United Nations Convention Against Corruption, done at New York on 31 October 2003 [2006] ATS 2;

Article 20 of the *United Nations Convention Against Corruption* encourages participating parties to the Convention to consider creating an 'illicit enrichment' offence for public officials:

*Article 20. Illicit enrichment*

Subject to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, illicit enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.

The AFPA sees this law as an important tool in the fight against organised crime at our borders. Illicit enrichment is essentially an 'unexplained wealth offence'.

While the offence for bribery of a Commonwealth public official under s141.1 of the *Criminal Code* currently exists, illicit enrichment provides investigators with a charge where s141.1 bribery is not possible to prove on the facts, but where there is evidence of 'unexplained wealth'.

The penalties for illicit enrichment, as a lesser offence, would not be as harsh as the offence of bribery, for which the penalties are going to be increased in *Crimes Legislation (Serious and Organised Crime) Bill No.2 2009*.

Moreover, Unexplained Wealth provisions in the *Proceeds of Crime Act 2002* if amended under the *Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Bill 2009* could be used in conjunction with illicit enrichment to seize those unlawful assets held by public officials where there is reasonable grounds to suspect that that they have been illicitly enriched.

Therefore, such a package of reforms would ensure that deterrence also occurs through the confiscation of criminal proceeds emanating from illicit enrichment, as well as Bribery, providing the Commonwealth with a more comprehensive approach to anti-corruption and related organised crime, particularly in relation to those public officials working at our maritime ports and airports.

## **Recommendation**

**An illicit enrichment offence for public officials should be proposed as recommended in Art. 20 of the *United Nations Convention Against Corruption*.**

### ***Fighting border crime and corruption by enacting an offence of recruiting persons to engage in criminal activity***

There is no specific higher level offence for recruiting people to engage in criminal activity. Commonwealth legislation is grossly inadequate in addressing this insidious behaviour. This deficiency needs to be addressed in Commonwealth legislation.

In the June 2009 Government Report to the ACT Legislative Assembly, authorised by the ACT Attorney General Simon Corbell MLA, the authors considered the inclusion of a provision for Recruiting persons to engage in criminal activity based on Section 351A of *Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)*.

Importantly, the Government Report found 'the Territory would benefit from consideration of the inclusion of a legislative amendment to criminalise...recruiting people to carry out, or assist in carrying out, criminal activities'.<sup>5</sup>

There are provisions in the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth), Division 270- Slavery, sexual servitude and deceptive recruiting; and Division 271 – Trafficking in person and debt bondage. However, servitude and debt bondage equally applies to drug addicts recruited to participate in narcotic importations, or vulnerable people, including public officials, who are recruited for other offences such as for disclosure of information, fraud on the Commonwealth, organised criminal activity, terrorism, theft etc.

A recruitment offence is also important for the protection of juveniles. For example, there is no specific offence of recruiting the 'Bali Nine' teenagers.

The AFPA believes that the recruiter should be subject to an additional charge beyond the substantive offence to deter this insidious strategy utilised by organised crime.

### **Recommendation**

**The *Criminal Code (Cth)* should be immediately amended to include a provision for Recruiting persons to engage in criminal activity based on Section 351A of Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) or similar to Division 270 and 271 of the *Criminal Code (Cth)*.**

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<sup>5</sup> Department of Justice and Community Safety, *Government Report to the ACT Legislative Assembly: serious organised crime groups and activities* (ACT Government: Canberra 2009) 44.

## The range of criminal activity currently occurring at Australia's airports and ports, including but not limited to:

- **the importation of illicit drugs, firearms, and prohibited items**
- **tariff avoidance**
- **people trafficking and people smuggling**
- **money laundering**
- **air cargo and maritime cargo theft**

### *The importation of illicit drugs, firearms, and prohibited items*

The AFPA believes that there is no doubt that the importations of commercial quantities of illicit drugs and precursor drugs through the use of airline passengers, their baggage and air cargo is systemic and is currently an effective modus operandi for organised crime syndicates. For example:

On 10 July 2007, **5.7 kilograms** of cocaine was detected on an aircraft, from the United States of America (US) to Sydney.

On 2 December 2007, **16.6 kilograms** of crystal methylamphetamine was detected in marble table tops, consigned as air cargo from Canada to Sydney.

On 11 December 2007, **105 kilograms** of pseudoephedrine powder detected in 212 bags of coffee in air cargo from Cambodia to Sydney.

In January 2009, **13 kilograms** of heroin was seized in Sydney. Three men were arrested.

On 10 January 2008, **7.8 kilograms** of cocaine powder was detected in unaccompanied baggage, in Sydney.

On 25 February 2008 **3.2 kilograms** of heroin was detected concealed in the false bottom of a suitcase carried by an air passenger from India to Sydney.

On 21 June 2008, **2.6 kilograms** of heroin was detected concealed in a hollow book in air cargo from Afghanistan to Sydney

On 17 June 2008, **2.5 kilograms** of heroin was detected concealed in dresses in air cargo from Afghanistan to Sydney.

In October 2008, **6.2 kilograms** of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine was seized in Adelaide after being imported from India concealed within five plastic barrels. One man was arrested.

On 15 January 2009 **2 kilograms** of cocaine was detected concealed inside two suitcases, carried by an air passenger from Los Angeles to Sydney.

On 16 March 2009, **2 kilograms** of Crystal Methamphetamine (Ice) was detected concealed inside a suitcase carried by an air passenger from Canada to Sydney.

On 28 March 2009, **2 kilograms** of heroin was detected concealed inside a suitcase carried by an air passenger from Penang to Sydney.


In March 2009, **20 kilograms** of heroin was seized in Melbourne after being imported as air cargo from Pakistan secreted within rugs. Two men were arrested.

In May 2009, **8 kilograms** of cocaine was seized in Brisbane after being imported from the United States of America secreted within Disney chocolate boxes. Two men were arrested.


On 28 October 2009, **4 kilograms** of cocaine was detected concealed inside a suitcase carried by an air passenger from a flight originating from California via Argentina and New Zealand to Sydney.

On 21 November 2009, **5.5 kilograms** of heroin was detected concealed inside mah-jong playing tiles carried by an air passenger from a flight from Vietnam to Sydney. It has a conservative estimated street value of approximately \$1.25 Million.

Interestingly, compared to other illicit drug types organised crime syndicates modus operandi for heroin importations seem to favour passenger (internals & luggage) and air cargo over other forms such as sea cargo. This is demonstrated in the below charts based on the ACC Illicit Drug Data Report 2007-2008.



## Weight of Heroin Detected at Australian Borders as proportion of total




Unfortunately the level of organised criminal activity at maritime ports is an unknown. The AFPA believes that this is due to the lack of AFP prevention, detection and investigation capacity at maritime ports.


That being said, AFP operations involving maritime ports, which have normally been based on external intelligence such as criminal informants or overseas criminal intelligence, has led to the detection of large commercial quantities of illicit drugs and precursor drugs concealed in cargo within shipping containers. The reality is that one successful importation of illicit drugs through a shipping container provides a massive quantity of illicit drugs and therefore massive profit for the organised crime syndicate.

The AFPA view is supported by the recent ACC Illicit Drug Data Report 2007-08 that established that sea cargo only accounts for one per cent of the 627 cocaine seizures at the Australian border during the period—but at the same time, sea cargo accounted for over 80 per cent of the approximately 650 kg of cocaine that was seized at the border.

### Cocaine Detections at Australian Borders as proportion of total



### Weight of Cocaine Detected at Australian Borders as proportion of total



The AFPA suspects that importation of illicit drugs and precursors through maritime ports is likely to be significantly higher; however the current law enforcement arrangements are inadequate in relation to prevention, detection and investigation of such organised crime.

For example in 2007, AFP operation Inca resulted in the world's largest seizure of MDMA with **4.4 tonnes**, or almost 15 million pills, being detected in a shipping container. This led to 30 people being charged in Australia and one person charged in Belgium, and the dismantling of an alleged international drug ring.



The seizure had a street value of approximately \$440 million and would have caused more than \$1.3 billion in harm to the Australian community in health and social costs.

The operation moved to resolution on 8 August 2008 after a further **150 kilograms** of cocaine was identified in a shipping container allegedly destined for syndicate members in Melbourne. Resolution activities were conducted simultaneously across four Australian states as well as in the Netherlands and Belgium. The individuals arrested were also charged with conspiracy to import a further six tonnes of pseudoephedrine.

Some other examples of AFP operations involving Australian maritime ports include:

On the 9 August 2007, **40 kilograms** of MDMA powder detected on sea crew, from Mauritius to Sydney.

On 11 December 2007, **20 kilograms** of crystal methylamphetamine detected in candles, consigned as sea cargo from Canada to Sydney.

On 17 January 2008, **28 kilograms** of amphetamine powder detected in a granite pillar consigned as sea cargo from Lithuania to Sydney

On 26 February 2008, **24.9 kilograms** of heroin was detected concealed in the tops of chests of drawers in sea cargo from Indonesia to Sydney. This was the largest single detection of heroin since 2004–05

On 4 March 2008, **250 kilograms** of cocaine detected in a sea cargo consignment from China to Sydney, concealed in Chinese tea,

On 5 May 2008, **27 kilograms** of cocaine powder detected in sea cargo from Canada to Sydney

On 5 May 2008, **27 kilograms** of crystal methylamphetamine detected in three spa baths, consigned as sea cargo from Canada to Sydney

On 26 May 2008, **12.5 kilograms** of crystal methylamphetamine detected in the false sides and bottoms of suitcases, consigned as sea cargo from Canada to Sydney.

On 5 June 2008, **124 kilograms** of cocaine detected in a sea cargo consignment from Canada to Melbourne.

On 5 June 2008, **121 kilograms** of MDMA tablets found concealed in foot spas, inside a sea cargo container sent from Canada to Melbourne. This shipment also contained cocaine and crystal methylamphetamine.

On 5 June 2008, **66 kilograms** of crystal methylamphetamine detected in foot spas consigned as sea cargo from Canada to Melbourne.

In July 2008, **848 kilograms** of pseudoephedrine was seized in Sydney after being imported from Thailand. Three men were arrested.

In August 2008, **662 kilograms** of pseudoephedrine, concealed within cardboard boxes purporting to contain fruit juice, was seized in Sydney after being imported from Thailand. Four men were arrested.

In September 2008, **98.67 kilograms** of cocaine was seized in Sydney after being imported from Panama concealed within bags of green coffee beans.

In November 2008, **80 kilograms** of methamphetamine was seized in Sydney after being imported from Hong Kong concealed within packages of rubber gloves. Three men were arrested.

In November 2008, **64.6 kilograms** of cocaine was seized in Los Angeles, having originated in Mexico and intended for Melbourne. The cocaine was concealed within concrete cylinders. One woman and two men were arrested.

In December 2008, **9.98 kilograms** of cocaine was seized in Sydney having arrived from Mexico via Panama concealed inside forklift batteries. The drugs seized as a result of this operation have an approximate street value of more than \$2.45 million.

In January 2009, **144 kilograms** of cocaine was seized in Sydney after being imported from Mexico concealed within steel die casts. Three men were arrested.

In February 2009, **26 kilograms** of methamphetamine was seized in Sydney after being imported from Hong Kong. One man was arrested.

In March 2009, **21.7 kilograms** of methamphetamine was seized in Sydney after being imported from Canada secreted within a foosball table. One man was arrested.

In April 2009, **9 kilograms** of cocaine was seized in Sydney after being imported from Canada secreted within wheel rims. One man was arrested.

In May 2009, **70 kilograms** of pseudoephedrine was seized in Sydney concealed in a shipping container. One man was arrested.

In June 2009, **1.3 tonnes** of a precursor chemical was seized in Sydney concealed in drums in a shipping container. Six men were arrested.

In June 2009, **200 kilograms** of pseudoephedrine and more than **1.8 tonnes** of precursor material were seized at the Customs and Border Protection Examination Facility at Port Botany, concealed within a consignment from China. This amount of pseudoephedrine has the potential to make in excess of 150 kilograms of methamphetamine with a street value exceeding \$15 million.


In July 2009, **144 kilograms** of cocaine was seized in Sydney concealed in six steel die casts, weighing approximately four tonnes each in a shipping container. Three Mexican nationals were arrested. The cocaine is estimated to be worth \$31.6 million on Australia's streets.

Weaknesses in Port security is best demonstrated by the fact that one of the most knowledgeable law enforcement officers in Australia in relation to border crime, Deputy Director NSW Crime Commission, Mr Mark Standen, allegedly organised a **300 kilograms** of pseudoephedrine importation to be concealed in a container of rice into Australia. He has been allegedly corrupted by a transnational organised crime syndicate. He has also been charged with perverting the course of justice.


In August 2009, the magistrate found that there was enough evidence to suggest that Standen had used his position to make inquiries about which shipments customs was investigating and that he was using his position in order to either frustrate or deflect a prosecution. Clearly Standen allegedly saw a weakness existing in maritime security that could be exploited by organised crime.

As can be seen from the below charts, AFPA analysis of the Illicit Drug Data Report 2007-08 supports our view when comparing the number of detections versus quantity seized for the other major drug types, again demonstrating that in relation to quantity seized, sea cargo is clearly the major distribution source for Cocaine, ATS and MDMA. Yet there are no permanent police attached to the maritime ports, no AFP Uniform Police, no AFP Joint Maritime Intelligence Group, no AFP Joint Maritime Investigation Team, no AFP Protective Service Officers performing CTFR or Uniform Protection of this critical infrastructure.


**ATS (excluding MDMA) Detection at Australian Borders as proportion of total**




**Weight of ATS (Excluding MDMA) Detected at Australian Borders as proportion of total**



### MDMA Detection at Australian Borders as proportion of total



### Weight of MDMA Detected at Australian Borders as proportion of total



The AFPA also believe that large quantities of illegal firearms are being imported into Australia. This is evidenced by the weapons found in Australia during various raids such as the recent raids on Outlaw Motor Cycle Gangs. These prohibited weapons are not made in Australia but are legitimate weapons manufactured overseas and illegally imported in to Australia.

Prohibited weapons are clearly a Commonwealth responsibility which directly impact on State & Territories in the form of armed robberies, violent crimes, murder and the subsequent costs in relation to law enforcement, health and public perception of safety and security.

The AFPA finds it somewhat disturbing that prohibited weapons are not the direct responsibility of the AFP as is the case with illicit drugs and precursors. At the Commonwealth level Counter Terrorism is the direct responsibility of the AFP yet prohibited weapons, including explosives remain the responsibility of AC&BPS with no legislative requirement to refer the matter to the AFP.

### *Tariff avoidance*

Although smuggling can involve any commodity it appears that cigarettes and tobacco smuggling is prevalent due to the high taxes imposed on legitimate products. Smugglers attempt to bring into Australia cigarettes and tobacco that are typically produced in unregulated factories that may not meet hygiene standards and do not contain mandatory health warnings, making the goods a greater risk to the community but a great source of illicit profit for organised crime.

In 2007 Customs foiled some 40 separate attempts to smuggle cigarettes and tobacco into Australia, mostly in sea cargo containers through Port Botany in Sydney. Up to 95 million cigarettes and 236 tonnes of tobacco were seized, amounting to attempts to evade revenue in excess of \$100 million.

In 2008, Customs again intercepted some 40 separate attempts to smuggle cigarettes and tobacco into Australia, most of which were imported via sea cargo containers. More than 62 million cigarette sticks and 110 tonnes of tobacco were seized. Total revenue evaded was in excess of \$55 million.

The cigarettes and tobacco were falsely declared as a variety of items including glazed ceramic tiles, plastic kitchenware, bottles of mineral water and ground coffee.

In 2008, the largest tobacco seizure was intercepted in Sydney and contained over 19.8 tonnes of tobacco smuggled from the Philippines. The largest cigarette seizure was also intercepted in Sydney and consisted of more than 9.2 million cigarettes smuggled from China.

In 2008, 10 people were arrested and 11 investigations were successfully prosecuted in court, resulting in individuals being convicted on 40 counts for tobacco smuggling, with penalties and court costs in excess of \$9.8 million imposed.

In January 2009 Customs officers at the Fremantle Container Examination Facility selected a container from United Arab Emirates for inspection. When officers unpacked the container they detected 24 kilograms of undeclared molasses flavoured tobacco.

The tobacco was found in six boxes labelled as tomato paste and randomly distributed throughout the cargo container. Each box contained eight 500 gram satchels of the tobacco.

Customs investigators carried out search and seizure warrants in Malaga, Marangaroo and Mirrabooka where they found another 16 kilograms of flavoured tobacco as well as evidentiary material.

In January 2009 a sea cargo container from the Philippines was x-rayed at the Container Examination Facility in Sydney. The container was bound for an address in Caringbah and was described as containing 'sporting goods'.

X-ray examinations showed anomalies in the container. The contents of the container were examined and approximately 10 million cigarettes were allegedly found concealed inside.

In January 2009 a sea cargo container from the United Arab Emirates, destined for an address in Auburn, arrived at the Customs Container Examination Facility in Sydney. X-ray examinations of the 40-foot container revealed anomalies and showed an inconsistency with the description of the contents of the container, said to be 'charcoal'.

A physical examination of the container was subsequently conducted and Customs officers located cartons of molasses tobacco, concealed beneath rows of cartons containing charcoal.

A second 40-foot container from the consignment arrived and Customs officers located more molasses tobacco, also concealed beneath rows of charcoal.

In total, 1,562 cartons of molasses tobacco with an approximate weight of 11,600 kilograms were found. This represents an attempt to evade \$4,059,466.40 of revenue.

In April 2009 a sea cargo container from China was x-rayed at the Container Examination Facility in Sydney. The image showed inconsistencies within 25 mattresses which were subsequently selected for closer examination. Approximately 1,975 cartons were found inside the mattresses containing a total of 395,000 cigarettes.

In July 2009, Customs arrested four men over an attempt to smuggle more than 4.8 tonnes of tobacco into Australia from Lebanon concealed within plastic tubs.

It is obvious by the regular smuggling in cargo containers of tobacco products that organised crime groups have evaluated that this modus operandi is effective despite the potential risk of the container being x-rayed at one of the Container Examination Facilities. It must be assumed that losses through detection are clearly offset by successful smuggling activities.

### ***People trafficking and people smuggling***

The AFPA has little knowledge of the range of criminal activity currently occurring at Australia's airports and ports in relation to people trafficking and people smuggling. That being said, a recent arrest of a woman on 26 October 2009 by the AFP, demonstrates the modus operandi used in that case.

A 24-year-old Victorian woman was charged for identity crime and migration fraud following a joint investigation involving the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC).

The Identity Security Strike Team (ISST), a multi-agency taskforce comprising members of the AFP, DIAC, the ACC and AC&BPS, commenced the investigation in October 2008.

The AFP seized a number of items, including computers and client records. It will be alleged that fake documents provided by the business are subsequently being used by international students to support applications for skilled migration to Australia.

The woman has been charged with offences against the Migration Act 1958, Criminal Code Act 1995 and Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) relating to the production and distribution of fake documents, and their use in skilled migration applications.

As mentioned earlier, there have been a number of DIAC officers found guilty of corrupt conduct and it is obvious that this is a high corruption risk employment type where organised crime target DIAC employees for people trafficking and people smuggling activities.

### ***Money laundering***

Over 280 money laundering incidents were reported to the AFP in 2008.

The AFPA has little knowledge of the range of criminal activity currently occurring at Australia's airports and ports, in relation to money laundering.

Part 4 of the *Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006* (AML/CTF Act) and the *Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988* (FTR Act) requires persons to report cross-border movements of physical currency and bearer negotiable instruments.

The AFPA is aware that Australian currency is regularly smuggled in and out of the country by passengers. For example:

On 23 December 2008, Customs and Border Protection officers at Perth Airport found over \$187,000 concealed in a man's luggage when he entered the country.

The AFP seized the undeclared currency and charged the man with failure to declare excess currency, contrary to section 53 of the *Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006*.

The maximum penalty for this offence is two years imprisonment or a \$55,000 fine.

On 15 December 2009, two Australian men were arrested at Darwin Airport for attempting to smuggle a large amount of undeclared Australian currency out of the country.

During a baggage examination Customs and Border Protection officers found the men was allegedly concealing a large amount of Australian currency amounting to \$205,857.

The men were charged with not declaring the movement of more than \$10,000 in cash out of Australia, contrary to section 53 of the *Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act*.

The maximum penalty for this offence is two years imprisonment and or a fine of \$55,000.

### ***Air cargo and maritime cargo theft***

The AFPA believes that there is ample AFP evidence to demonstrate that there are organised criminal syndicates, including airline baggage handlers and cargo porters, systemically involved in air cargo and air passenger baggage theft and that prevention, detection and investigation is inhibited due to commercial imperatives of the airline companies.

Again the AFPA suspects that maritime port cargo theft is likely to be significant but that the current law enforcement arrangements are inadequate in relation to prevention, detection and investigation of such organised crime. As such it cannot currently be quantified.

Obviously very historical data such as the Painters & Dockers Royal Commission substantiated high levels of organised criminal activity but there has been little law enforcement visibility in relation to criminality at maritime ports since that time.



**The effectiveness of the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) and Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) schemes; including the process of issuing ASICs and MSICs, the monitoring of cards issued and the storage of, and sharing of, ASIC and MSIC information between appropriate law enforcement agencies**

The AFPA has significant concerns in relation to the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) scheme. Again the AFPA suspects that Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) is likely to have similar deficiencies but that the current law enforcement arrangements are inadequate in relation to prevention, detection and investigation of such abuses of the MSIC so the level of criminality cannot be quantified.

The Attorney General’s department AusCheck section administers the ASIC and MSIC records and coordinates the background checks for the issuing of the cards.

To assist the Committee the AFPA has presented a comparison of the two processes in relation to the issuing of ASIC and MSIC.

*Comparison of background check for an ASIC V MSIC*

<i>ASIC</i>	<i>MSIC</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A criminal records check undertaken by the Australian Federal Police, which is used to determine if an applicant has an adverse criminal record;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A criminal records check undertaken by the Australian Federal Police, which is used to determine if an applicant has an adverse criminal record;</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A security assessment conducted by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO);</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A security assessment conducted by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO);</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An unlawful non-citizen check conducted by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If the applicant is not an Australian citizen, confirmation that the applicant has a right to work in Australia.</li> </ul>

As can be seen from the above table, the process of assessing the background check has been harmonised in relation to ASIC and MSIC since AusCheck has coordinated the process.

### Comparison of the definition of an adverse criminal record for ASIC V MSIC

ASIC	MSIC
The person has been convicted of:  (a) an aviation-security-relevant offence and sentenced to imprisonment; or	The person has been convicted of:  Maritime-security-relevant offence (MSRO) and sentenced to imprisonment (including a suspended sentence, periodic detention, home-based detention, and detention until the rising of the court).
(b) two or more aviation-security-relevant offences (with no imprisonment) one of which was received within 12 months of the criminal history check.	
Note offences in red show lack of consistency between ASIC and MSIC requirements	

### Definition of adverse criminal record to be harmonised across SICs

From the above table the definition of an adverse criminal record has not been harmonized in relation to ASIC and MSIC.

To ensure clarity and harmonization between the Security Identification Cards (SICs) it would seem appropriate that the ASIC criteria (a) *an aviation-security-relevant offence and sentenced to imprisonment*; is clarified by including the words: *(including a suspended sentence, periodic detention, home-based detention, and detention until the rising of the court)*.

### Recommendation

That the definition of adverse criminal record for ASIC be amended with the addition of the words: *(including a suspended sentence, periodic detention, home-based detention, and detention until the rising of the court)*, to ensure harmonisation of the SICs.

***Definition of adverse criminal record must include where a person is sentenced for two or more security-relevant offences (with no imprisonment).***

The AFPA is concerned that figures provided by the Department of Transport reveal that about 10 per cent of the 33,644 people who have applied for an ASIC since October 2009 have been convicted of a crime. Of those, only 148 have been denied an ASIC.

The situation is worse in relation to the MSIC. Since October 2009, about 20 per cent of the 12,552 maritime workers who have applied for a card had a criminal record, but only 41 of those were denied a MSIC.

The AFPA believes that the current definition of an *adverse criminal record* under the SICs is too limited in scope and this is reflected in the large number of approved applicants having criminal records.

The AFPA is particularly concerned that the definition of *adverse criminal record* for the issuing of MSIC is even 'softer' than ASIC.

ASIC recognises that an *adverse criminal record* also constitutes *two or more aviation-security-relevant offences (with no imprisonment) one of which was received within 12 months of the criminal history check*.

The current definition of *adverse criminal record* under MSIC fails to include where no imprisonment was imposed. This fails to recognise custom and practice of the Courts limiting custodial sentences for a range of factors.

The AFPA is aware of many police investigations into serious criminal activity where fines are imposed by the Courts in preference to custodial sentencing, including suspended sentences. This has occurred in significant fraud cases, tax evasion cases, tariff avoidance cases and numerous other seemingly victim-less crime.

The AFPA believes that definition of *adverse criminal offence* for MSIC must include where a person is convicted for two or more security-relevant offences (with no imprisonment).

In saying this, the AFPA is concerned that under the current definition for ASIC, one of the ***aviation-security-relevant offences (with no imprisonment)*** has to be ***received within 12 months of the criminal history check***. Such a limitation seems too generous and places airports at serious risk of infiltration by serious and organised crime syndicates.

## **Recommendation**

**That the definition of adverse criminal record for ASIC be amended with the deletion of the words [*one of which was received within 12 months of the criminal history check*] and that this amended definition be replicated for MSIC to ensure harmonization of the SICs.**

### ***Definition of adverse criminal record must include negative Criminal Intelligence Assessment***

The current definition of an *adverse criminal record* does not capture persons charged with security-relevant offences who were not successfully convicted or persons suspected of committing such offences based on criminal intelligence holdings. The simple fact is that being not found guilty does not automatically equate to being innocent. The standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt is difficult to achieve for the prosecution and of course that is appropriate. However there are many issues that cause a finding of not guilty. For example, witnesses failing to appear, legal technicalities, poor witnesses, exclusion of vital evidence, jurisdictional issues, etc.

For example, in September 2009 a successful operation conducted by the AFP concluded with the arrest of a number of members of a criminal syndicate for importation of cocaine.

The operation revealed that the Federal Government had granted unrestricted airport security passes to alleged members of a cocaine smuggling syndicate, despite police intelligence that showed the men had criminal connections and convictions.

The alleged syndicate is suspected to have used its infiltration of Sydney Airport to conduct a series of cocaine importations for over a decade.

#### **Recommendation**

**That there should be criminal intelligence checks of current and prospective SIC holders and that the AFP Commissioner must be satisfied, based on that intelligence, that the applicant or SIC holder is a 'fit and proper person'. If he or she is not satisfied an *adverse criminal record* is established.**

#### **Recommendation**

**That the definition of *adverse criminal record* for Security Identification Cards be amended to include:**

**'or c) a *negative Criminal Intelligence Assessment by the AFP Commissioner*'**

*Comparison of security-relevant offence for ASIC V MSIC*

<b>ASIC</b>	<b>MSIC</b>
An offence involving dishonesty	An offence mentioned in Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code. Note Offences for this item include treason, espionage and harming Australians.
An offence involving violence or a threat of violence	An offence involving the supply of goods (such as weapons or missiles) for a Weapons of Mass Destruction program as mentioned in the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995
An offence involving intentional damage to property or a threat of damage to property	An offence involving the hijacking or destruction of an aircraft or vessel
An offence constituted by the production, possession, supply, import or export of a substance that is: (a) a narcotic substance within the meaning of the Customs Act 1901; or (b) a drug, within the meaning of: (i) regulation 10 of the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958; or (ii) regulation 5 of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956	An offence involving treachery, sabotage, sedition, inciting mutiny, unlawful drilling, or destroying or damaging Commonwealth property, mentioned in Part II of the Crimes Act 1914
An offence, of a kind dealt with in Part II of the <i>Crimes Act 1914</i> , against the Government of: (a) the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or (b) a country or part of a country other than Australia	An offence involving interference with aviation, maritime transport infrastructure or an offshore facility, including carriage of dangerous goods on board an aircraft or ship, or endangering the security of an aerodrome, a port or an offshore facility
An offence against Part 2 of the <i>Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991</i>	An identity offence involving counterfeiting or falsification of identity documents, or assuming another individuals identity
An offence against Part 5.3 of the <i>Criminal Code</i>	Transnational crime involving money laundering, or another crime associated with organised crime or racketeering
An offence constituted by the production, possession, supply, import or export of explosives or explosive devices	People smuggling and related offences mentioned in Chapter 4, Division 73 of the Criminal Code
	An offence involving the importing, exporting, supply or production of weapons, explosives or a trafficable quantity of drugs.
Note offences in red show lack of consistency between ASIC and MSIC requirements	

It can be seen from the above table the definition of a *Security-relevant offence* has not been harmonized in relation to ASIC and MSIC.

### *Definition of Security-relevant offence to be harmonised across SICs*

To ensure clarity and harmonization between the SICs it would seem appropriate to amend the current definitions to ensure consistent application for both ASIC and MSIC.

That being said, the AFPA is concerned that the attempt to identify specific offences from numerous State, Territory and Federal legislation is problematic, particularly when trying to also capture like offences from international jurisdictions.

Furthermore, there is a risk that the definitions will fail to reflect contemporary legislation being introduced on an ongoing basis. For example, the current definitions fails to include offences within the newly enacted 'criminal organisation' legislations introduced in SA and NSW and being adopted in other States and Territories.

The AFPA believes an effective solution would be to replicate other Commonwealth legislation that has been developed to address serious and organised crime and national security issues.

### **Recommendation**

**A security relevant offence should be defined as 'an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a foreign indictable offence or a State offence that has a federal aspect'.**

### *Proof of Identity documents for SICs are fundamentally flawed*

To obtain SICs a person only needs to provide certified copies of a number of documents:

#### **A person needs to provide ONE of these primary identification documents:**

a valid copy of a birth certificate (issued by the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages in your state)  
a valid copy of a Citizenship or Naturalisation Certificate (issued by the Commonwealth Government)  
a valid passport (or a passport that has not been expired for more than two years)  
a valid passport proving citizenship of another country with a stamp showing you have the right to work in Australia (you may also need a letter from your embassy or consulate proving your passport is genuine).

#### **A person also needs to provide either:**

**ONE** secondary identification document such as:

a valid driver's license with your photograph  
a valid Government employee identification card  
a valid student identification card.

**OR TWO** tertiary identification documents such as:

bank or credit card statement in your name showing your address  
a signed statement by your employer or former employer  
a rates notice in your name showing your address.

Proof of Identity for SICs is fundamentally flawed as it relies on identity documents that are often forged for use by Organised Crime and other criminals and members of terrorist organisations.

The AFPA is concerned that there is clear evidence that identity crime is a significant problem in Australia and overseas yet the ASIC and MSIC application process relies on name based supporting evidence that can be forged, altered or stolen.

For example, in November 2003 the AFP multi-agency Identity Crime Task Force (ICTF) dismantled an identity fraud syndicate following the arrest in Sydney of two men allegedly involved in the manufacture of a vast range of false identity documents.

The list of identity documents included: 67 Medicare cards in various names; 29 banking cards in various names and from a range of banking institutions; approximately 20 passport photographs of various persons; a folder containing samples of Australian visas and suspected stolen original visas; 13 blank NSW RTA change of address labels; various forged immigration arrival stamps; 15 passports in various names from the UK, Indonesia and Australia; and seven Indonesian passports allegedly in various stages of alteration or tampering; and large amounts of banking documentation.

Furthermore, a computer allegedly containing banking-related documents in its software, a scanner, a digital camera and a printer were located, along with implements suspected of being used in the alteration of passports

In November 2004 The AFP ICTF charged two people in Sydney with the manufacture and possession of sophisticated forged ID documents in a major operation targeting organised identity crime syndicates.

Taskforce members seized a number of items used in the manufacture of false documents such as document templates and a laminating machine as well as a large number of allegedly forged documents.

The operation began in July when an Ashfield resident handed into local police a CD wallet found by the roadside. CDs in the wallet allegedly contained templates for the creation of false identity documents.

In July 2006 the AFP Identity Crime Task Force (ICTF) dismantled one of the country's largest identity crime syndicates following a six-month operation in NSW.

As part of 'Operation Hickey', police have laid 230 charges against nine men and one woman, aged between 20 and 41 years.

Two other men arrested during the operation were later deported to Malaysia, while another man was released pending further inquiries.

Operation Hickey was set up in January 2006 to investigate the manufacture of high quality counterfeit documents, including Medicare cards, passports, bank cards and driver's licences.

In 2008 a joint investigation between Victoria Police (Operation Balsam) and the AFP (Operation Tropical) uncovered a Sydney based, Asian-organised crime syndicate. This investigation identified a sophisticated and well organised national and multinational syndicate that managed the entire supply and distribution chains of their business enterprise.

This included the supply of stolen data, the manufacturing of fake credit cards and false identities in Sydney and Melbourne and the distribution of the cards and fake identities.

In 2009 the AFP Sydney Identity Security Strike Team carried out an investigation relating to an Indian and Pakistani identity crime syndicate operating primarily in Sydney between June 2007 and December 2008. The syndicate was engaged in the organised manufacture, supply and use of fraudulent identification documents.

Thirteen people were charged as a result of this operation and a total of 472 charges were laid. The investigation resulted in the seizure of numerous counterfeit credit cards, proof of identity cards and travel documents. Further, a considerable amount of equipment was seized which was used in the manufacture of counterfeit identity documents. Funds totalling \$126,000 were also seized as the suspected proceeds of crime.

### *SIC Certifying Officers list is vulnerable to organised crime*

The AFPA is concerned that there appears to be too many occupations able to certify copies of original documents for applicants for ASIC and MSIC. This list of occupations is extensive and without degrading some occupations one questions the probity that may occur in relation to non judiciary officers being able to certify such documents.

Occupations that would seem at risk would be ones often infiltrated by organised crime to facilitate their criminal activities such as:

- Bank officer with 5 or more continuous years of service
- Building society officer with 5 or more years of continuous service
- Credit union officer with 5 or more years of continuous service
- Fellow of the National Tax Accountants Association
- Finance company officer with 5 or more years of continuous service
- Member of the Association of Taxation and Management Accountants
- Member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants or the National Institute of Accountants
- Member of the Institute of Corporate Managers, Secretaries and Administrators

Occupations that would seem vulnerable to not providing enough probity would be:

- Chiropractor
- Dentist
- Medical Practitioner
- Nurse
- Pharmacist
- Physiotherapist
- Teacher employed on a full-time basis at a school or tertiary education institution
- Veterinary surgeon

### **Recommendation**

**That certification of copies of original documents is restricted to those professionals articulated for the purpose of obtaining an Australian Passport.**



### *Proof of Identity documents for SICs must be supported by unique identifier*

The AFPA contends that border security at airport and maritime ports are vulnerable to organised crime as a result of the named based criminal record checks for ASIC and MSIC that are validated by proof of identity documents that are so readily subject to forgery, alteration or theft.

The Australian Government's National Security Statement recognises organised crime and transnational crime as a national security threat along with terrorism. As such, security measures need to be adopted not just to protect critical infrastructure such as airports and ports from terrorist threat but also from organised crime.

The AFPA believes that current and prospective SIC holders should be required to provide a unique identifier such as an electronic finger print for the purpose of criminal history checks. This is the only way the Government can be certain that the person is not presenting a false identity to authorities. A number of occupations are required to provide unique identifiers such as finger prints including police, ADF, various government agencies, but also increasingly more private sector organisations.

If an employee wishes to work around critical infrastructure and in secure areas then the AFPA would argue that certain civil liberties need to be balanced against the public interest. Providing an electronic fingerprint or some other form of biometric identifier that is protected by privacy legislation, is not unreasonable under the circumstances.

The AFPA understands that the Department of Immigration And Citizenship is introducing biometric technology into some of its programs and processes including facial recognition and fingerprint matching technology.

Taking a whole of Government approach, there would be a great opportunity for AusCheck to collaborate with DIAC and Crimtrac to enable current and prospective SIC holders to have their fingerprint electronically scanned utilising DIAC programs and processes which will no doubt be available at airports and ports. Biometric technology held at AFP offices and State & Territory Police stations could also be utilised by current and prospective SIC holders for this purpose.

It would seem obvious that Crimtrac should have oversight of such strategies on behalf of the Commonwealth and that there is a great opportunity to roll out this technology in the issuing of ASIC and MSIC as a precursor to strengthening identification processes for non citizens entering Australia.

### **Recommendation**

**That current and prospective SIC holders be required to provide a unique identifier such as a fingerprint as a condition of being eligible to be a SIC holder.**

### *Lack of ongoing probity checks on SIC holders*

There is no ongoing probity checking done on SIC holders. If a holder is convicted of a criminal offence which may impact on his eligibility to hold an SIC, unless he advises his employer who then advises the issuing authority it is unlikely that his SIC would be rescinded or that the authorities would even be aware of his criminal transgressions. Similarly if a SIC holder is suspected of criminal offences, or associating with known criminal elements, there is no ongoing probity checks to link the individual back to being a SIC holder.

The AFPA believes that this problem could be easily addressed by having current and prospective SIC holder's details recorded on the National Police Reference System (NPRS). NPRS enables law enforcement personnel to access information about persons of interest from all jurisdictions and performs nationwide searches using name and/or other identifying information.

This is not a new suggestion; in September 2007 this Parliamentary Joint Committee considered this issue in its *Inquiry into the future impact of serious and organised crime on Australian society*. As a result it recommended that:

#### *Recommendation 17*

*8.25 The committee recommends that Crimtrac be funded to examine the legislative, administrative and technical aspects to allow the inclusion of additional datasets to the Minimum Nation-wide Person Profile; [now NPRS] particular consideration should be given to Aviation Security Identification Cards, Maritime Security Identification Cards, explosives licences and ammonium nitrate licences.*

#### **Recommendation**

**That current and prospective SIC holders details should be recorded on the National Police Reference System (NPRS) to enable ongoing probity checks on SIC holders.**

### *Back checking of current SIC holders*

The AFPA recognises that there is an enormous task in back checking current SIC holders if a number of AFPA Recommendations in relation to the issuing of SICs are accepted by the Parliamentary Joint Committee. That being said, that should not be a deterrent to addressing national security threats including organised crime and transnational crime through more stringent SIC criteria. A possible solution is AusCheck collaborating with Crimtrac in relation to the National Face Recognition Project.

The AFPA understands that AusCheck holds passport photographs of all current and potential SIC holders. There is the capacity to check those passport type photographs through the facial recognition system to compare with charge images, taken when charges are laid against an offender. This capability already exists in some jurisdictions.

For example, as part of the National Face Recognition Project the AFPA understands that a trial was conducted in Victoria comparing Victorian Driver licence photos to see if there were Driver licences in false names. The Face Recognition computer program identified a number of cases where there were multiple licences in false names. One individual had 40 licences in different names with the one photographic image.

### **Recommendation**

**That AusCheck collaborate with Crimtrac in relation to the National Face Recognition Project with a view to utilising the Face Recognition computer program to compare the photo records held on all current and potential SIC holders with police database photo images.**

## **The current administrative and law enforcement arrangements and information and intelligence sharing measures to manage the risk of serious and organised criminal activity at Australia's airports and ports**

### ***Administrative and law enforcement arrangements - Airports***

In September 2005 Sir John Wheeler tabled his report: *An independent review of airport security and policing for the Government of Australia*. Since that time the AFPA has raised concerns in relation to the failure of Government to fully implement a number of his Recommendations. We have also challenged the effectiveness of the Unified Policing Model which was formed in response to his report.

The AFPA welcomes the recent Federal Government announcement that it accepts the findings and Recommendations of the Federal Audit of Policing Capabilities Report by Mr Roger Beale AO which, in particular, rejects the Unified Policing Model and advocates its replacement with ‘an ‘All In’ model under which the Commonwealth accepts the responsibility of funding and staffing nationally coordinated airport security and policing services, noting that this will likely take several years before being fully operational’. This is consistent with the Recommendations made by the AFPA to various inquiries.

The AFPA believes that there are further opportunities to enhance & consolidate the current administrative and law enforcement arrangements within the aviation and maritime sector in order to better combat serious and organised crime impacting on Australian borders.

### ***Airport policing and the outcomes of the Federal Audit of Policing Capabilities.***

Aviation security, and in particular the policing of Australia’s principal airports, has been subject to various reviews and inquiries. Successive reviews have been critical of the complexity of the hybrid arrangements recommending either an ‘All Out’ approach in which the States/Territories accept responsibility for airport policing, or an ‘All In’ approach in which the Commonwealth provides an integrated airport policing capability.

The Wilkins Review of an incident at Sydney Airport found that police responded in a timely and professional manner, but nonetheless again found that the hybrid model is flawed.

The recent Audit by Roger Beale AO has also concluded, acknowledging it is a view not shared by a number of chief police officers, that the ‘All In’ model is likely to be more sustainable in the long run. In reaching this conclusion the Auditor had particular regard to Commonwealth international obligations, its broader responsibilities concerning the regulation of aviation and airports more generally, its legal capacity in relation to all Australia’s principal airports to put any issues of AFP powers beyond doubt, and the public expectation of consistently high standards and approaches to aviation security across the nation.

The Audit also concluded that an ‘All In’ model also represents significant cost savings to the Commonwealth.

Accordingly it has recommended the Commonwealth should vigorously pursue the replacement of the existing Unified Policing Model with an 'All In' model under which the Commonwealth accepts the responsibility of funding and staffing nationally coordinated airport security and policing services, noting that this will likely take several years before being fully operational. It should take any legislative action, or pursue the renegotiation of arrangements in a number of states and territories, to ensure that the powers of AFP members policing airports are clear and adequate to the task.

The Audit Report findings and Recommendations relating to airport security and policing are worth publishing to assist this Committee in forming its view on other issues being identified through this inquiry.

**Finding 7.2:**

*Currently policing at airports is carried out under a Commonwealth-State hybrid model where the Commonwealth provides Counter-Terrorism First Response, investigations and intelligence capabilities and the Airport Police Commander, while the States provide police members on secondment to the AFP as a uniformed police presence. The Commonwealth funds State members, and provides an additional on-cost. These arrangements are in place as a result of the COAG response to the Recommendations of the Wheeler Review into Aviation security in 2005.*

**Finding 7.3:**

*Currently, the AFP Aviation portfolio is funded via 10 lapsing appropriations. This fails to reflect the ongoing nature of Commonwealth responsibilities and the implausibility of any significant, sustained reduction in threat levels from terrorism or organised crime over the next decade. It also restricts the flexibility of the deployment of resources to meet threats within the aviation sector, or within the Security portfolio more broadly.*

**Finding 7.4:**

*Since its introduction, some States have been unwilling or unable to provide agreed policing numbers to maintain the Unified Policing Model at the levels of staffing agreed by COAG.*

**Finding 7.5:**

*The policing of airports raises difficult jurisdictional issues. The Commonwealth is responsible for aviation regulation generally and has specific international treaty obligations in relation to aviation security. Almost all international and major domestic airports are Commonwealth places. Airports are one of the loci of serious and organised transborder crimes. There is a national interest in a common approach to and standard of policing at airports, but it would be very expensive for the Commonwealth to develop a capability that could deal with every contingency that could arise at an airport without State assistance. Much of the crime at airports falls within State legal frameworks and has a close nexus with criminal activities in the community more broadly. State police forces have the capacity and responsibility under Commonwealth-State agreements, to respond to major violent crime or terrorism incidents at airports. The recent Wilkins Review of an incident at Sydney Airport found that police responded in a timely and professional manner, but nonetheless the hybrid model is flawed.*

**Finding 7.6:**

*Noting the nexus between airports and their local communities/environment, it is vital that clear arrangements enabling a) the transfer of information and b) full operational interoperability between Commonwealth airport police and local State/Territory police are maintained.*

*Recommendation 7.2:*

*The ongoing agreement between the Commonwealth and States to remain focused on incidents and crime types most relevant to their respective policing responsibilities should be maintained, with clear arrangements for the full operational interoperability between Commonwealth airport police and local State/Territory police.*

*Finding 7.7:*

*As found by successive reviews into the policing of major airports in Australia, there are considerable financial, cultural and industrial costs and difficulties, as well as efficiency losses, associated with Commonwealth-State hybrid policing models, such as the existing Unified Policing Model.*

*Finding 7.8:*

*Flexibility and service quality gains at airports may be achieved through the merging of Counter Terrorism First Response and airport policing services, with both functions performed by sworn police officers.*

*Recommendation 7.3:*

*Funding for all aspects of airport policing, including lapsing programs, should be rolled into the consolidated core Security program to provide greater certainty and flexibility.*

*Finding 7.9:*

*The provision of core airport policing and Counter Terrorism First Response services (that is staffing, command and control) by either a) the States ('All Out') or b) the Commonwealth ('All In') would be preferable to the existing State-Commonwealth hybrid model of airport policing.*

*Finding 7.10:*

*The Joint Airport Investigations Teams and Joint Airport Intelligence Groups are important facilitators of State-Commonwealth law enforcement coordination in the airport environment.*

*Recommendation 7.4:*

*The Joint Airport Investigations Team and Joint Airport Intelligence Group capabilities as per the current Unified Policing Model should be maintained, by deployment of members from local State/Territory police agencies in recognition of shared interests in the airport environment.*

*Finding 7.11:*

*A number of bilateral arrangements, in addition to obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, require Australia to maintain an Air Security Officer function. The effective deployment of Air Security Officers can only be coordinated at a national level due to the interstate and international nature of their work.*

*Finding 7.12:*

*Having particular regard to Commonwealth international obligations, its broader responsibilities concerning the regulation of aviation more generally, and the public expectation of consistently high standards and approaches to aviation security across the nation, the 'All In' model is likely to be more sustainable in the long run. The 'All In' model also represents significant cost savings to the Commonwealth.*

*Recommendation 7.5:*

*The Commonwealth should vigorously pursue the replacement of the existing Unified Policing Model with an 'All In' model under which the Commonwealth accepts the responsibility of funding and staffing nationally coordinated airport security and policing services, noting that this will likely take several years before being fully operational.*

*Recommendation 7.6:*

*Under the 'All In' model, the AFP should seek agreement from all State Police Commissioners to swear in AFP Airport Uniform Police members as special members of the State police forces and/or make any necessary legislative amendments to ensure that the powers of AFP members policing airports are clear and adequate to the task.*

*Recommendation 7.7:*

*The Audit supports the review by the AFP Aviation portfolio of the Counter Terrorism First Response function, which should expand analysis of the requirements, costs and benefits of potential delivery options*

*Recommendation 7.8:*

*Subject to findings of the Aviation review, the Audit gives its in-principle support for integration of Counter Terrorism First Response into the Airport Uniform Police. If supported by the review, the AFP should recruit additional police to perform this function, giving first priority to any existing AFP Protective Service Officers who are capable and interested in applying for the AFP base recruit course.*

The AFPA fully supports the findings and Recommendations of the Audit.

### ***Airport security and policing - Joint Airport Investigation Teams***

The establishment of Joint Airport Investigation teams (JAIT) in November 2005 created a specific investigations capacity with teams located at five major airports (Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney). The mission of the teams is to proactively target serious and organised criminality and trusted insiders such as aviation employees who exploit, or aim to exploit, infrastructure and security vulnerabilities at the 11 major airports.

The staffing model for the JAIT embodies the whole of government approach, with personnel being made up of 30 sworn AFP police officers, 10 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service officers and 10 state police officers from across Australia. The teams also rely on close liaison and cooperation with state and territory law enforcement, government agencies and the aviation industry.

In 2008–09, the JAIT were responsible for 75 apprehensions, resulting in 253 charges for a variety of offences including drug importations, theft, threats to aviation security and offences committed by airline or airport employees.

### ***Airport Security and Policing – Vulnerability in domestic Check-in processes.***

It is currently not an offence to travel on a domestic flight under a false name, assumed name or the name of another person. This poses a significant security risk as well as facilitating organised crime syndicate members to travel interstate without detection.

Airport security and policing would be significantly enhanced if it was an offence to travel on a domestic flight under a false or assumed name or the name of another person.

When one considers national security, aviation security and organised crime it seems conflicting that passport identity is checked against the ticket holder for international flights for border control but the Commonwealth is not interested in confirming the identity of persons crossing State borders.

Electronic check in machines now allows passengers to simply enter a reservation or frequent flyer number and receive their boarding pass. There is no requirement to show identification to a Customer Service Agent which was a security requirement prior to the introduction of the electronic check in machines. This removes an important layer of security where Customer Service Agents at check in would check the identity of the passenger. Many AFP operations have relied on this crucial evidence to substantiate travel by criminals. The AFP is now unable to substantiate, beyond reasonable doubt that a person is, was, or was not, on a domestic flight without alternative evidence.

An offence of this type would be particularly useful when post incident analysis has identified that an organised crime syndicate member has travelled under false or assumed name or the name of another person.

### **Recommendation**

**That an offence be inserted into the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth) that will make it an offence to travel on an aircraft flight under a false or assumed name or name of another person, without reasonable excuse; and**

**That a further offence be inserted into the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth) that will make it an offence for a person or organisation to assist a person to travel on an aircraft flight under a false or assumed name or name of another person, without reasonable excuse.**

### *Airport Security and Policing – Vulnerability in domestic screening processes.*

AFP operations have identified organised crime syndicates utilising domestic airline travel to transport illicit goods, in particular illicit drugs interstate. Currently there is no legal requirement for the screening of domestic aviation passengers, crew, baggage and freight.

Again when one considers national security, aviation security and organised crime it seems conflicting that there is screening of international passengers, crew, baggage and freight for border control but the Commonwealth is not interested in screening domestic aviation passengers, crew, baggage and freight crossing State borders.

### **Recommendation**

**Aviation legislation should be amended to create a legal requirement that there is screening of domestic aviation passengers, crew, baggage and freight.**

### *Information and Intelligence sharing measures - airports*

#### *Airport Intelligence Joint Working Group*

Under the chair of the AFP, the Airports Intelligence Joint Working Group is a management-level committee established to support the operational arrangements for information and intelligence-sharing.

The working group has brought about an improvement in relationships with government partners through the conduct of quarterly meetings and the sharing of knowledge.



The AFPA understands that the AFP and Australian Crime Commission have agreed to more closely align the Commission's Aviation Criminal Assessment Team and the AFP Aviation Intelligence Team. This alignment will assist in formulating agreed aviation intelligence collection priorities and the development of a suite of strategic measures in relation to aviation security and policing.

### ***Airport Intelligence- Joint Airport Intelligence Group***

The AFP Aviation function is supported by the Intelligence function, which provides both strategic and operational intelligence through the joint airport intelligence groups located at designated airports.

Each Joint Airport Intelligence Group has a core staff made up of AFP members, state or territory police and Australian Customs and Border Protection Service officers. The Australian Quarantine Inspection Service, the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship and the Office of Transport Security also second staff to these teams as necessary.

The JAIG maintain responsibility for providing intelligence products to inform the deployment of personnel and resources to counter general security threats or other aviation vulnerabilities. Additionally, each group provides operational intelligence support to the JAIT through target development and assessment of high-level criminality at airports. As part of this role the JAIG analyse the data obtained to identify trends and convergences in the aviation operating environment.

The JAIG are guided by agreed Intelligence Collection Plans and National Priorities for Aviation.

Operational and tactical support has also been provided which has led to a strengthening of the aviation security environment and the disruption of criminal activities. In addition, work completed at the strategic level in the assessment of risk has seen improved information-sharing and the establishment of processes with government and industry partners to monitor the aviation security environment.

### ***Administrative and law enforcement arrangements – Maritime Ports***

#### ***Maritime port policing and the Federal Audit of Policing Capabilities.***

In its submission to the Federal Audit of Police Capabilities in June 2009, the AFPA recommended that Policing and Counter Terrorist First Response at maritime ports should become the responsibility of the AFP under the AFPA's proposed Nationally Integrated Commonwealth Law Enforcement Model.<sup>6</sup>

On paper there are a number of federal, state and private sector authorities who jointly share responsibility for law enforcement and regulatory compliance within the maritime sector.

The major agencies with jurisdiction within the defined *maritime sector* are the AC&BPS, the AFP, relevant state/territory police, AQIS, DIAC, ASIO, AusCheck coordinating MSIC, port operators, and State maritime authorities.

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<sup>6</sup> Jon Hunt-Sharman and Chris Steel, (eds) 'Enforcing against risk: Report to the Federal Audit of Policing Capabilities', Australian Federal Police Association (Canberra: AFPA, 2009)112.

The reality is that in the maritime sector there is no permanent law enforcement presence. There is no AFP, no equivalent AFP CTFR, AFP Uniform Protection, AFP JAIT or AFP JAIG.

At best AC&BPS carries out random day and night patrols in all major ports, on foot, by car and on water, to provide a visible presence, deter illegal activity and gather information and intelligence about goods and people crossing the border. There is no permanent police presence to prevent, detect or investigate crime.

When consider the 2005 Wheeler review into Aviation it defies logic not to apply his same reasoning to the maritime sector. Sir John Wheeler made the point that:

Policing at an airport is a special skill for which all officers involved need to be appropriately trained so that they can deliver the full range of policing services. Such policing services are not confined to counter terrorism and the reactive investigation of so-called 'community policing' incidents. They should also include the proactive prevention, investigation and detection of serious, organised and volume crime and other offences, the maintenance of the peace, public reassurance, and ensuring public safety (with a particular emphasis on the capability to respond professionally to a major incident or emergency).

State Police have the responsibility of performing community policing tasks such as responding to reports of crime at both airports and ports specific to their area of policing. There is a view that State Police only respond in support of Commonwealth agencies. There is a strong view that the primary investigative and response function is the responsibility of the AFP and AC&BPS and where relevant the ACC. Sitting alongside this, is the view the protective security function is the responsibility of Australian Federal Police Protective Service Officers and private security firms on contract to various public and private organisations.

State Police appear not to view organised crime at Airports or Maritime Ports as their responsibility even though the Commonwealth may not have jurisdiction or where it does have jurisdiction, it has no permanent AFP or AC&BPS presence.

It appears that policing at maritime ports is carried out under a Commonwealth-State hybrid model where the Commonwealth provides a number of agencies such as AC&BPS, AQIS, DIAC, ASIO, AusCheck coordinating MSIC, and the AFP, all to varying degrees, while the States provide police members on a crime response bases. There is no permanent uniform police presence at maritime ports.

The AFPA believes that maritime security and policing is in far greater disarray than Airport security and policing and like the airports, will only be resolved with a decision for an 'all in Commonwealth security and policing model.

The policing of maritime ports raises difficult jurisdictional issues. The Commonwealth is responsible for border protection and has specific international treaty obligations in relation to transnational crime and organised crime. Maritime ports are a mixture of Commonwealth and State jurisdiction depending on whether it is declared a commonwealth place or not. Yet maritime ports are also the loci of serious and organised transborder crimes.

There is a national interest in a common approach to and standard of policing at maritime ports. The current arrangements of the hybrid model is flawed as no Government or indeed agency, is taking responsibility for maritime port security and policing.

The maritime sector does not have an aviation-type unified policing model. Therefore there is no permanent presence of the AFP police or AFP Protective Service Officers performing the CTFR function.

That being said, AFP Protective Service Officers do not just perform the CTFR function at airports. They also protect critical infrastructure yet the Commonwealth does not have AFP Protective Service Officers protecting maritime ports.

The AFP provides a range of Government appropriated and 'user pays' protective security services known as Uniform Protection. This includes diplomatic and consular missions, Commonwealth premises, nominated ADF infrastructures such as Pine Gap, Exmouth, Geraldton, Woomera, Russell Offices, and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) etc.

The AFPA believes that maritime ports are critical infrastructure and that the Federal Government, in consultation with State Governments, should replace the private security guard arrangements at maritime ports with AFP Protective Service Officers under a 'user pays' arrangement on national security grounds.

## **Recommendation**

**The Commonwealth should vigorously pursue the replacement of the existing Maritime security and policing arrangements with an 'All In' model under which the Commonwealth accepts the responsibility of funding and staffing nationally coordinated maritime port security and policing services, noting that this will require cooperation of the State and Territory Governments.**

### ***Maritime Port security and policing – Joint Maritime Investigation Teams***

The AFPA believes that the JAIT model has been successful at the eleven designated airports and should be replicated at the main maritime ports - but not in isolation.

The JAIT charter is to investigate organised crime in the aviation environment which means that JAIT does not get heavily involved in community policing practises at the Airports. The uniform police officers are the primary day to day source of information in the airport environments which is then fed to the JAIGs and JAITS.

Obviously JAIT members have their sources in the environment but do not tap into the daily activities and minor issues that arise. In reality, for the model to work effectively, the JAITS have to rely on working hand in hand with the JAIGs. If the two bodies are not co-located this then becomes very difficult with several impediments to the ready flow of intelligence.

The AFPA has been a long term advocate of establishing a JAIT style body at maritime ports as we believe that is probably the appropriate and most workable model.

### **Recommendation**

**The Commonwealth should vigorously pursue the establishment of a Joint Maritime Investigation Team (JMIT) with similar functions to the Joint Aviation Investigation Team (JAIT).**

### *Maritime Port security and policing – Joint Maritime Intelligence Group*

The proposed Joint Maritime Investigation Team (JMIT) would still need intelligence support but in the seaport environment, this could potentially be provided by AC&BPS as part of a joint intelligence group replicating the JAIG. Obviously sea traffic is not as heavy as air traffic so staffing would need to be commensurate with demand and close cooperation with AC&BPS.

### **Recommendation**

**The Commonwealth should vigorously pursue the establishment of a Joint Maritime Intelligence Group (JMIG) with similar functions to the Joint Aviation Intelligence Group (JAIG).**

### **Recommendation**

**The Commonwealth should vigorously pursue the provision of AFP services for both maritime security and policing utilising AFP Protective Service Officers for protective security of this critical infrastructure, AFP uniform police at passenger terminals and the AFP JAIT and JAIG model for organised crime investigations relating to the maritime ports.**

### *Information and Intelligence Sharing – Maritime Ports*

#### *Airport & Maritime Port security and policing – Gap in Federal Policing Capabilities*

The AFPA is concerned that there is a gap in federal policing capabilities in relation to the current division of responsibility of border crime. This gap has been caused by a historical decision implemented in 1979.

Prior to the formation of the Australian Federal Police, illicit drugs were the responsibility of the Australian Customs Service. Within its structure was the Narcotics Bureau.

In 1979, the Narcotics Bureau was abolished by the then Prime Minister after it was identified to have systemic corruption. The responsibility of illicit drug investigations was transferred to the newly formed Australian Federal Police.

It is interesting note the level of systemic corruption within the Australian Customs Narcotic Bureau. After extensive intelligence checks only some members of the Australian Customs Service Narcotics Bureau were transferred to the AFP. Others remained employed by the Australian Customs Service.

Many years later, the NSW Wood Royal Commission and the Harrison Inquiry identified a number of AFP employees as corrupt. Nearly all of those AFP members were from the former Australian Customs Service Narcotic Bureau. Indeed, the former Deputy Director of the NSW Crime Commission, Mr. Mark Standen, who is currently facing serious criminal charges, was also a member of the Australian Customs Service Narcotics Bureau.

The decision to transfer illicit drug investigations to the AFP came at a time when this crime type was a national security concern, if one is applying the current definition from the National Security Statement.

It is a historical oversight, when the current functions of the AFP and the current National Security Statement are considered, that the AFP does not conduct, or directly oversight, criminal investigations of all 'crime types' relating to the border. This includes importation of illicit firearms, prohibited weapons, explosives, etc., as transnational organised crime syndicates and terrorist organisations can, and do, illegally export and import various prohibited goods as part of financing their criminal networks.

The AFP is best placed, with its established International Network, to be responsible for all federal criminal law enforcement functions and should investigate and/or oversight border crime investigations such as drug trafficking, weapon trafficking, money laundering, identify fraud, terrorism and smuggling.

The AFPA believes that inappropriate compartmentalisation between Commonwealth agencies should be removed to ensure a seamless approach to investigating all border crime and that this should be the ultimate responsibility of the AFP Commissioner.

The AFPA also believes that the AFP must expand its investigative capacity offshore in the fight against Border Crime such as people smuggling and drug importations. This will require additional resources from Government as new organised crime transportation and supply routes are identified.

### **Recommendation**

**The AFP, with its established International Network, should be responsible for all federal criminal law enforcement functions and should investigate and/or oversight border crime investigations such as drug trafficking, weapon trafficking, money laundering, identify fraud, terrorism and smuggling.**

### **Recommendation**

**The Government should expand the role of the AFP Border & International to include responsibility for all federal criminal law enforcement functions, absorbing the criminal law enforcement functions of DIAC, AC&BPS, and other relevant agencies, with the AFP providing Police officers to those agencies on a 'user pay' basis based on both on operational and integrity grounds.**

***Airport & Maritime security and policing – Regular breach of protocol by AC&BPS- illicit Drugs***

The AFPA is aware of instances where the AC&BPS has breached protocol, in not reporting illicit drugs and precursor drugs found at airports within the prescribed period.

AC&BPS officers have been known to interrogate suspects prior to advising the AFP that they have a suspect in custody in relation to illicit drug importation or possession. This delay can jeopardise the AFPs ability to conduct a controlled operation and/or negatively impact on admissibility of evidence in any potential Court case.

It is unacceptable that this type of breach is occurring regularly. It compromises the ability of the AFP to investigate organised crime and transnational crime effectively.

**Recommendation**

**That the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission seek AFP and AC&BPS records in relation to the number of cases where AC&BPS has breached protocol in not reporting illicit drugs and precursor drugs found at airports within the prescribed period, with a view to recommending legislative amendment to strengthen reporting and referral requirements.**

### *Clarification and enhancement of the ACC role*

The AFPA believes that the Chief Executive Officer of the ACC should have responsibility for the oversight and coordination of all national criminal intelligence in addition to the internal functions of the ACC.

The AFPA believes that the ACC should not be a prosecutory agency but instead focus on supporting law enforcement and similar agencies through:

- *Strategic criminal intelligence*
  - providing National Strategic criminal intelligence reports on serious and organised crime to the National Security Advisor and the Commonwealth Government
  - providing Strategic criminal intelligence to assist Commonwealth agencies
  - providing Strategic criminal intelligence to assist State and Territory governments
  - providing Strategic criminal intelligence to assist the Australian public and private Industries
- *Operational criminal intelligence*
  - being the sole repository of national criminal intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.
  - oversight and enhance criminal intelligence collection and reporting by Commonwealth agencies
  - investigate and develop criminal intelligence target packages for action by law enforcement agencies
  - investigate and develop criminal intelligence target packages in relation to *'unexplained wealth'* for action by law enforcement agencies under relevant proceeds of crime and money laundering legislation.
- *ACC hearing powers*
  - utilise hearing powers to gather national criminal intelligence
  - utilise hearing powers to gather criminal intelligence in relation to stalled Police investigations into serious and organised crime
  - utilise hearing powers in relation to *'unexplained wealth'*

### **Recommendation**

**The establishment of the ACC as the central National Criminal Intelligence Agency responsible for national criminal intelligence functions (not limited to organised crime) with the ACC's role focusing on three main areas, those being:**

- **Strategic criminal intelligence**
- **Operational criminal intelligence**
- **ACC Hearing powers**

## *Clarification and enhancement of the AFP role*

### **Protection of the Australian Community from serious crime, organised crime and transnational crime**

The AFPA believes that the Commissioner of the AFP should have responsibility for the oversight and coordination of all Commonwealth criminal investigations in addition to the internal functions of the AFP. The AFPA believes that the AFP should be responsible for:

- *Strategic criminal trends impacting on Commonwealth*
  - Provide commonwealth Strategic crime reports on serious crime, organised crime and transnational crime to the National Security Advisor and the Commonwealth Government
  - Provide Strategic crime information to assist Commonwealth agencies
  - Exchange Strategic crime information with international law enforcement and the ACC
  
- *Criminal investigations impacting on the Commonwealth*
  - Be the sole repository of Commonwealth criminal intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination which will be shared with the ACC.
  - Oversight and responsible for enhancing crime reporting by Commonwealth agencies including the use of standard reporting systems such as PROMIS
  - Prevent, detect and Investigate crime impacting on the Commonwealth
  - Conduct and/or oversight Border crime Investigations
  - Conduct and/or oversight International crime Investigations
  - Conduct and/or oversight Economic crime Investigations
  - Conduct and/or oversight Environmental crime Investigations
  - Conduct and/or oversight Special crime Investigations
  - Conduct and/or oversight High Tech Crime Investigations
  - Conduct and/or oversight other Commonwealth agency criminal investigations
  - be the sole prosecutory agency for all serious crime, transnational crime and organised crime impacting on the Commonwealth
  
- *National Witness Protection Program*
  - Provide Witness protection to Australian citizens
  - Provide Witness protection for international partners
  
- *International Liaison Network*
  - Share criminal intelligence through the International Liaison network
  - Assist criminal investigations through the International Liaison Network
  - Develop trust from host nations including government and law enforcement
  - Address crime prior to it reaching Australian borders



## National Security

The AFPA believes that the Commissioner of the AFP should have responsibility for the oversight and coordination of the following National Security functions:

- Enhancing counter terrorism cooperation with international partners
- Protecting critical infrastructure
- Protecting key establishments, high officeholders and international dignitaries
- Aviation and Maritime Ports Counter Terrorism First Response (CTFR)
- Australian Bomb Data Centre
- Protective Security Coordination Centre
- Counter terrorism investigations

## Recommendation

**There needs to be clarification and enhancement of the roles of the ACC and the AFP (as outlined above). In particular the Chief Executive Officer of the ACC and the Commissioner of the AFP should respectively have oversight and coordination of all National and Commonwealth law enforcement efforts in relation to security and policing and report to the National Security Advisor on the success of those efforts.**

### *Airport & Maritime security and policing - Closed Circuit Television Monitoring (CCTV)*

The role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) at Australia's international airports has been the subject of intense scrutiny as a result of the shocking incident in which a man was killed at Sydney Airport on 22 March 2009. Political and media interest focussed on a number of issues arising from this tragic occurrence including Police response times, inter-agency coordination and Counter Terrorism First Response (CTFR) procedures. The Australian Federal Police Association supports such scrutiny where it will lead to more effective operating structures for AFP Police and AFP Protective Service Officers.

However, the AFPA also wishes to highlight the role of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) footage as a vital mechanism in the fight to secure Australia's airports & maritime ports. We believe that CCTV is an area that requires increased attention and resourcing.

On March 22 2009 at Sydney Airport, members of an Outlaw Motor Cycle Gang (OMCG) assailed a man as he attempted to leave the facility. His subsequent death, resulting from injuries received during this attack, prompted public outcry and the instigation of a review of the AFP's response to the incident conducted by Mr Roger Wilkins AO.

Whilst the review found that the AFP acted appropriately and in a timely manner in responding to the incident, it also highlighted a number of areas of concern including the role of CCTV within aviation security.

In particular, Mr Wilkins was forced to rely on CCTV footage provided by Qantas Airways Limited (Qantas) in assessing the incident. This is despite Recommendations arising from the Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia conducted by the Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler in 2005 (The Wheeler Report) that security-based CCTV capabilities be upgraded to include airport terminal areas.

The Wheeler Report 2005 comprehensively engaged with all facets of airport security including an emphasis on CCTV and the ways in which this capability may be enhanced into the future. It highlighted CCTV as a vital tool that is currently underutilised at Australia's CTFR airports and in need of improvement. The Report referred to issues including the under-staffing of monitoring centres, the large number of cameras in need of repair and the lack of regulated standards as key failings of the current system.

Furthermore, the various parties contributing to airport security and the operation and management of CCTV were deemed to have failed in terms of adequately sharing information and engaging in mutual assistance in order to decrease vulnerabilities. Many Recommendations were included in the Wheeler Report including a suggested upgrade from analogue to digital CCTV and the deployment of more cameras in order to ensure more comprehensive coverage. This was to be complemented by greater monitoring and enhanced cooperation between the various agencies that contribute to airport security. It can be presumed that CCTV was also a consideration in the ASIO security reviews conducted at a number of major airports in response to another Recommendation of the Wheeler Report.

The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit Report 409 – Developments in Aviation Security since the Committee's June 2004 *Report 400: Review of Aviation Security in Australia* (Report 409) supported many of the CCTV-related Recommendations arising from the Wheeler Report and included additional detail on potential areas of improvement. Report 409 focussed on two major areas – the different purposes for which various parties use CCTV and the different technologies in use. Whilst the Howard Government acted on the first of these concerns by charging the Australian Customs Service (Customs) with taking the lead in establishing an integrated approach to CCTV management, the incident at Sydney Airport casts doubt on the degree of progress that has occurred. Specifically, the reliance on footage provided by a commercial entity (Qantas) and the inability of CCTV systems to provide valuable real-time information during the incident reflects a weakness in the airport security framework. It must be questioned the degree to which previously identified issues such as the multitude of 'black spots' and the inadequate storing of archived footage have been addressed.

In August 2008, former Home Affairs Minister Bob Debus announced that Customs now has more than 1400 CCTV cameras in operation at Australia's CTFR airports. This includes an additional 200 cameras that have been installed in previously vulnerable areas thanks to an allocation of \$19.8 million announced by the Howard Government in 2005 in response to the Wheeler Review.

Whilst this expansion in capability has undoubtedly improved CCTV coverage in Australia's airports for AAC&BPSSS, it does not appear that this upgrade has been accompanied by measures to address the other concerns raised in the Wheeler Review and Report 409.

The Airports National Monitoring and Analysis Centre (ANMAC) located in Melbourne is a positive step toward improving monitoring of CCTV footage although it does not address the lack of integration between agencies such as the AFP and AC&BPS that continues to undermine aviation security and policing.

The AFPA is concerned that the deficiencies in CCTV identified in the Wheeler Review and highlighted in Report 409 and demonstrated by the incident at Sydney Airport, are placing at risk both the public and the AFP Police Officers and Protective Service Officers that form the core of our membership. With this in mind, the AFPA recently made several Recommendations to the Federal Audit of Policing Capabilities conducted by Mr Roger Beale AO that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of aviation security and the CTFR function. In its report titled Enforcing against Risk, the AFPA lobbied for a further upgrade of CCTV at Australia's 11 CTFR airports and the development of clear standards relating to the administration of CCTV. The Report also recommended that responsibility for the operation and monitoring of CCTV at Australia's airports should be shifted from AC&BPS to the AFP.

The AFP, being responsible for providing national security law enforcement on behalf of the Commonwealth and performing the policing and CTFR functions at the 11 designated airports, would be better suited to managing the CCTV capability and implementing the range of improvements that were identified in the Wheeler Review. Whilst AC&BPS is effective in performing its primary function of securing Australia's borders from illegal goods and activity, it is not equipped to adequately respond to the broad range of threats that could arise within aviation security and policing.

The incident at Sydney Airport has demonstrated that events posing a direct threat to both the public and airport infrastructure unfold quickly and require a rapid response from the organisation primarily responsible for Policing and CTFR: the AFP. On March 22, CCTV was not utilised at the time of the incident as a means of enhancing the effectiveness of the AFP response. If the AFP were to become responsible for CCTV there is a better chance that this capability could be used in real-time to respond to critical incidents as well as a useful tool in investigating criminal behaviour after the fact and of course as evidentiary material.

2010 is a critical year for aviation security and policing and one in which there are opportunities to address many of the vulnerabilities that exist at Australia's airports.

The Wheeler Review stated that CCTV is a vital tool in protecting Australia's airports from terrorist and criminal behaviour that will only increase in prominence in the future.

The same argument applies to the maritime ports in that CCTV is also a vital tool in protecting Australia's maritime ports from terrorist and criminal behaviour.

## Recommendation

### To improve efficiency and effectiveness of Airport & Maritime Port security and Policing:

- **The Government should fund a full upgrade of CCTV at the eleven (11) designated airports as a matter of urgency; and**
- **The Office of Transport Security, within the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government should ensure the development and adherence to standards governing airport security including CCTV monitors; and**
- **The AFP, being responsible for providing national security law enforcement on behalf of the Commonwealth and performing the Policing and CTFR function at the eleven (11) designated airports, should operate & monitor the CCTV for those CTFR airports; and**
- **The Government consider CCTV for designated maritime ports similar to the above arrangements adapted to the maritime environment.**

### *Airport & Maritime security and Policing – Automated Number Plate Recognition*

The AFPA believes that there is a strong argument for Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) capability at the eleven (11) designated airports and maritime ports. Airport and maritime security and policing would be greatly enhanced through access to ANPR. ANPR could be used for prevention, detection and investigation of organised crime and national security threats.

ANPR technology uses digital cameras and optical character recognition software to recognise and capture vehicle number plates. The technology is already being used in most State and Territories by Australian police jurisdictions, road transport and regulatory authorities. For airport and maritime security and policing, this relatively low cost option would assist the AFP and ACC, by providing instantaneous notification of vehicles of interest, persons of interest and identification of stolen and unregistered vehicles that are often used for criminal activity. ANPR would assist the AFP and ACC in the prevention, detection of offences, as well as post incident analysis to assist investigators.

The use ANPR, coupled with CCTV capabilities, would significantly improve airport security and policing at the eleven (11) designated airports.

Again, it would also seem logical that the use ANPR, coupled with CCTV capabilities, would significantly improve maritime security and policing at designated maritime ports.

## **Recommendation**

### **To improve efficiency and effectiveness of Airport & Maritime security and Policing:**

- **The Government should fund implementation of Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) at the eleven (11) designated airports as a matter of urgency; and**
- **The Office of Transport Security, within the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government should ensure the development and adherence to standards governing airport security including ANPR cameras; and**
- **The AFP, being responsible for providing national security law enforcement on behalf of the Commonwealth and performing the Policing and CTFR function at the eleven (11) designated airports, should operate & monitor the ANPR cameras for those CTFR airports; and**
- **The Government consider ANPR for designated maritime ports similar to the above arrangements but adapted to the maritime environment.**

## **The findings of the Australian Crime Commission's special intelligence operations into *Crime in the Transport Sector and Illegal Maritime Importation and Movement Methodologies*.**

The document is not a public document so the AFPA is unable to comment on the findings of the report however would be surprised that it does not validate concerns raised by the AFPA on behalf of our members.

### **Conclusion**

The AFPA believes that a number of significant improvements have already been made to Airport security and policing, largely as the result of the 2005 Wheeler Review. There have been a number of subsequent reviews and inquiries that have reinforced the outcomes and Recommendations of that review. However, there are still some important measures that can be introduced to improve upon the substantial work done by the Commonwealth and its agencies in protecting Australians from criminal attack.

Unfortunately maritime security and policing has been 'under the radar' due to the important focus on aviation security. The AFPA respectfully submits that the evidence presented in our submission demonstrates that it is time for maritime ports to receive equal attention from the Commonwealth in order to combat serious and organised crime in the maritime sector.

If the Committee require any clarification on this submission the AFPA would be happy to appear before it in relation to this important inquiry.

## Glossary of terms and shortened forms

Air Security Officer	ASO
Airport Uniform Police	AUP
Amphetamine-type stimulants	ATS
Attorney General's Department	AGD
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity	ACLEI
Australian Crime Commission	ACC
Australian Customs	Customs
Australian Customs & Border Protection Service	AC&BPS
Australian Defence Force	ADF
Aviation Security Identification Card	ASIC
Australian Federal Police	AFP
Australian Federal Police Association	AFPA
Australian Public Service	APS
Counter Terrorism First Response	CTFR
Department of Immigration & Citizenship	DIAC
Identity Crime Task Force	ICTF
Identity Security Strike Teams	ISST
Independent Commission Against Corruption	ICAC
Joint Airport Intelligence Group	JAIG
Joint Airport Investigation Teams	JAIT
Maritime Security Identification Card	MSIC
Methylemedioxymethamphetamine	MDMA
National Crime Authority	NCA
New Zealand	NZ
Office of Police Integrity	OPI
Parliamentary Joint Committee	PJC
Police Federation of Australia	PFA
Queensland Justice Commission	QPJ
Road & Traffic Authority	RTA
Security Identification Card	SIC
Unified Policing Model	UPM

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