

Appendix 2

**Practice Note 1 and
Practice Note 2 (interim)**

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

PRACTICE NOTE 1

Introduction

This practice note:

- (i) sets out the underlying principles that the committee applies to the task of scrutinising bills and legislative instruments for human rights compatibility in accordance with the *Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011*; and
- (ii) gives guidance on the committee's expectations with regard to information that should be provided in statements of compatibility.

The committee's approach to human rights scrutiny

- The committee views its human rights scrutiny tasks as primarily preventive in nature and directed at minimising risks of new legislation giving rise to breaches of human rights in practice. The committee also considers it has an educative role, which includes raising awareness of legislation that promotes human rights.
- Consistent with the approaches adopted by other human rights committees in other jurisdictions, the committee will test legislation for its potential to be incompatible with human rights, rather than considering whether particular legislative provisions could be open to a human rights compatible interpretation. In other words, the starting point for the committee is whether the legislation could be applied in ways which would breach human rights and not whether

a consistent meaning may be found through the application of statutory interpretation principles.

- The committee considers that the inclusion of adequate human rights safeguards in the legislation will often be essential to the development of human rights compatible legislation and practice. The inclusion of safeguards is to ensure a proper guarantee of human rights in practice. The committee observes that human rights case-law has also established that the existence of adequate safeguards will often go directly to the issue of whether the legislation in question is compatible. Safeguards are therefore neither ancillary to compatibility and nor are they merely 'best practice' add-ons.
- The committee considers that, where relevant and appropriate, the views of human rights treaty bodies and international and comparative human rights jurisprudence can be useful sources for understanding the nature and scope of the human rights defined in the *Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011*.
- The committee notes that previously settled drafting conventions and guides are not determinative of human rights compatibility and may now need to be re-assessed for the purposes of developing human rights compatible legislation and practice.

The committee's expectations for statements of compatibility

- The committee views statements of compatibility as essential to the consideration

of human rights in the legislative process. It is also the starting point of the committee's consideration of a bill or legislative instrument.

- The committee expects statements to read as stand-alone documents. The committee relies on the statement to provide sufficient information about the purpose and effect of the proposed legislation, the operation of its individual provisions and how these may impact on human rights. While there is no prescribed form for statements under the *Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011*, the committee has found the templates¹ provided by the Attorney-General's Department to be useful models to follow.
- The committee expects statements to contain an assessment of whether the proposed legislation is compatible with human rights. The committee expects statements to set out the necessary information in a way that allows it to undertake its scrutiny tasks efficiently. Without this information, it is often difficult to identify provisions which

may raise human rights concerns in the time available.

- In line with the steps set out in the assessment tool flowchart² (and related guidance) developed by the Attorney-General's Department, the committee would prefer for statements to provide information that addresses the following three criteria where a bill or legislative instrument limits human rights:
 1. whether and how the limitation is aimed at achieving a legitimate objective;
 2. whether and how there is a rational connection between the limitation and the objective; and
 3. whether and how the limitation is proportionate to that objective.
- If no rights are engaged, the committee expects that reasons should be given, where possible, to support that conclusion. This is particularly important where such a conclusion may not be self-evident from the description of the objective provided in the statement of compatibility.

SEPTEMBER 2012

1 <http://www.ag.gov.au/Humanrightsandantidiscrimination/Pages/Statements-of-Compatibility-templates.aspx>

2 <http://www.ag.gov.au/Humanrightsandantidiscrimination/Pages/Tool-for-assessing-human-rights-compatibility.aspx>

For further information please contact:

**Parliamentary Joint Committee
on Human Rights**

Tel. (02) 6277 3823 • Fax. (02) 6277 5767

Email: human.rights@aph.gov.au

PO Box 6100, Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

PRACTICE NOTE 2 (INTERIM)

CIVIL PENALTIES

Introduction

1.1 This interim practice note:

- sets out the human rights compatibility issues to which the committee considers the use of civil penalty provisions gives rise; and
- provides guidance on the committee's expectations regarding the type of information that should be provided in statements of compatibility.

1.2 The committee acknowledges that civil penalty provisions raise complex human rights issues and that the implications for existing practice are potentially significant. The committee has therefore decided to provide its initial views on these matters in the form of an interim practice note and looks forward to working constructively with Ministers and departments to further refine its guidance on these issues.

Civil penalty provisions

1.3 The committee notes that many bills and existing statutes contain civil penalty provisions. These are generally prohibitions on particular forms of conduct that give rise to liability for a 'civil penalty' enforceable by a court.¹ These penalties are pecuniary, and do not include the possibility of imprisonment. They are stated to be 'civil' in nature and do not constitute criminal offences under Australian law. Therefore, applications for a civil penalty order are dealt with in accordance with the rules and procedures that apply in relation to civil matters.

1.4 These provisions often form part of a regulatory regime which provides for a graduated series of sanctions, including infringement notices, injunctions, enforceable

undertakings, civil penalties and criminal offences. The committee appreciates that these schemes are intended to provide regulators with the flexibility to use sanctions that are appropriate to and likely to be most effective in the circumstances of individual cases.

Human rights implications

1.5 Civil penalty provisions may engage the criminal process rights under articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).² These articles set out specific guarantees that apply to proceedings involving the determination of 'criminal charges' and to persons who have been convicted of a 'criminal offence', and provide protection against the imposition of retrospective criminal liability.³

1.6 The term 'criminal' has an 'autonomous' meaning in human rights law. In other words, a penalty or other sanction may be 'criminal' for the purposes of the ICCPR even if it is considered to be 'civil' under Australian domestic law. Accordingly, when a provision imposes a civil penalty, an assessment is required of whether it amounts to a 'criminal' penalty for the purposes of the ICCPR.⁴

The definition of 'criminal' in human rights law

1.7 There are three criteria for assessing whether a penalty is 'criminal' for the purposes of human rights law:

- a) *The classification of the penalty in domestic law*: If a penalty is labelled as 'criminal' in domestic law, this classification is considered

determinative for the purposes of human rights law, irrespective of its nature or severity. However, if a penalty is classified as ‘non-criminal’ in domestic law, this is never determinative and requires its nature and severity to be also assessed.

- b) *The nature of the penalty*: A criminal penalty is deterrent or punitive in nature. Non-criminal sanctions are generally aimed at objectives that are protective, preventive, compensatory, reparatory, disciplinary or regulatory in nature.
- c) *The severity of the penalty*: The severity of the penalty involves looking at the maximum penalty provided for by the relevant legislation. The actual penalty imposed may also be relevant but does not detract from the importance of what was initially at stake. Deprivation of liberty is a typical criminal penalty; however, fines and pecuniary penalties may also be deemed ‘criminal’ if they involve sufficiently significant amounts but the decisive element is likely to be their purpose, ie, criterion (b), rather than the amount per se.

1.8 Where a penalty is designated as ‘civil’ under domestic law, it may nonetheless be classified as ‘criminal’ under human rights law if either the nature of the penalty or the severity of the penalty is such as to make it criminal. In cases where neither the nature of the civil penalty nor its severity are separately such as to make the penalty ‘criminal’, their cumulative effect may be sufficient to allow classification of the penalty as ‘criminal’.

When is a civil penalty provision ‘criminal’?

1.9 Many civil penalty provisions have common features. However, as each provision or set of provisions is embedded in a different

statutory scheme, an individual assessment of each provision in its own legislative context is necessary.

1.10 In light of the criteria described in paragraph 1.9 above, the committee will have regard to the following matters when assessing whether a particular civil penalty provision is ‘criminal’ for the purposes of human rights law.

a) *Classification of the penalty under domestic law*

1.11 As noted in paragraph 1.9(a) above, the classification of a civil penalty as ‘civil’ under Australian domestic law will be of minimal importance in deciding whether it is criminal for the purposes of human rights law. Accordingly, the committee will in general place little weight on the fact that a penalty is described as civil, is made explicitly subject to the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to civil matters, and has none of the consequences such as conviction that are associated with conviction for a criminal offence under Australian law.

b) *The nature of the penalty*

1.12 The committee considers that a civil penalty provision is more likely to be considered ‘criminal’ in nature if it contains the following features:

- the penalty is punitive or deterrent in nature, irrespective of its severity;
- the proceedings are instituted by a public authority with statutory powers of enforcement;⁵
- a finding of culpability precedes the imposition of a penalty; and
- the penalty applies to the public in general instead of being directed at regulating members of a specific group (the latter being more likely to be viewed as ‘disciplinary’ rather than as ‘criminal’).

c) The severity of the penalty

1.13 In assessing whether a pecuniary penalty is sufficiently severe to amount to a ‘criminal’ penalty, the committee will have regard to:

- the amount of the pecuniary penalty that may be imposed under the relevant legislation;
- the nature of the industry or sector being regulated and relative size of the pecuniary penalties and the fines that may be imposed;
- whether the maximum amount of the pecuniary penalty that may be imposed under the civil penalty provision is higher than the penalty that may be imposed for a corresponding criminal offence; and
- whether the pecuniary penalty imposed by the civil penalty provision carries a sanction of imprisonment for non-payment.

The consequences of a conclusion that a civil penalty is ‘criminal’

1.14 If a civil penalty is assessed to be ‘criminal’ for the purposes of human rights law, this does not mean that it must be turned into a criminal offence in domestic law. Human rights law does not stand in the way of decriminalization. Instead, it simply means that the civil penalty provision in question must be shown to be consistent with the criminal process guarantees set out in article 14 and article 15 of the ICCPR.

1.15 If a civil penalty is characterised as not being ‘criminal’, the criminal process guarantees in articles 14 and 15 will not apply. However, such provisions must still comply with the right to a fair hearing before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal contained in article 14(1) of the ICCPR.

The committee’s expectations for statements of compatibility

1.16 As set out in its *Practice Note 1*, the committee views sufficiently detailed

statements of compatibility as essential for the effective consideration of the human rights compatibility of bills and legislative instruments. The committee expects statements for proposed legislation which includes civil penalty provisions, or which draws on existing legislative civil penalty regimes, to address the issues set out in this interim practice note.

1.17 In particular, the statement of compatibility should:

- explain whether the civil penalty provisions should be considered to be ‘criminal’ for the purposes of human rights law, taking into account the criteria set out above; and
- if so, explain whether the provisions are consistent with the criminal process rights in article 14 and article 15 of the ICCPR, including providing justifications for any limitations of these rights.⁶

1.18 The key criminal process rights that have arisen in the committee’s scrutiny of civil penalty provisions are set out briefly below. The committee, however, notes that the other criminal process guarantees in articles 14 and 15 may also be relevant to civil penalties that are viewed as ‘criminal’ and should be addressed in the statement of compatibility where appropriate.

Right to be presumed innocent

1.19 Article 14(2) of the ICCPR provides that a person is entitled to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. This requires that the case against the person be demonstrated on the criminal standard of proof, that is, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The standard of proof applicable in civil penalty proceedings is the civil standard of proof, requiring proof on the balance of probabilities. **In cases where a civil penalty is considered ‘criminal’, the statement of compatibility should explain how the application of the civil standard of proof for such proceedings is compatible with article 14(2) of the ICCPR.**

Right not to incriminate oneself

1.20 Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR provides that a person has the right ‘not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt’ in criminal proceedings. **Civil penalty provisions that are considered ‘criminal’ and which compel a person to provide incriminating information that may be used against them in the civil penalty proceedings should be appropriately justified in the statement of compatibility.⁷ If use and/or derivative use immunities are not made available, the statement of compatibility should explain why they have not been included.**

Right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence

1.21 Article 14(7) of the ICCPR provides that no one is to be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence of which she or he has already been finally convicted or acquitted. **If a civil penalty provision is considered to be ‘criminal’ and the related legislative scheme permits criminal proceedings to be brought against the person for substantially the same conduct, the statement of compatibility should explain how this is consistent with article 14(7) of the ICCPR.**

- 1 This approach is reflected in the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Bill 2012, which is intended to provide a standard set of regulatory powers which may be drawn on by other statutes.
- 2 The text of these articles is reproduced at the end of this interim practice note. See also UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32 (2007) on article 14 of the ICCPR.
- 3 Article 14(1) of the ICCPR also guarantees the right to a fair hearing in civil proceedings.
- 4 This practice note is focused on civil penalty provisions that impose a pecuniary penalty only. But the question of whether a sanction or penalty amounts to a ‘criminal’ penalty is a more general one and other ‘civil’ sanctions imposed under legislation may raise this issue as well.
- 5 In most, if not all, cases, proceedings in relation to the civil penalty provisions under discussion will be brought by public authorities.
- 6 That is, any limitations of rights must be for a legitimate objective and be reasonable, necessary and proportionate to that objective – for further information see *Practice Note 1*.
- 7 The committee notes that a separate question also arises as to whether testimony obtained under compulsion that has already been used in civil penalty proceedings (whether or not considered ‘criminal’) is consistent with right not to incriminate oneself in article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR if it is used in subsequent criminal proceedings.

For further information please contact:

**Parliamentary Joint Committee
on Human Rights**

Tel. (02) 6277 3823 • Fax. (02) 6277 5767

Email: human.rights@aph.gov.au

PO Box 6100, Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

1. Article 14

1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may

be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal

case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

- a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
- b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
- c) To be tried without undue delay;
- d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
- e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
- f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
- g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.

4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.

5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.

6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.

7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.

Article 15

1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.

2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.