BILLS DIGEST NO. 128, 2017–18              21 June 2018

Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018

Phillip Hawkins
Economics Section 

Date introduced: 24 May 2018

House: House of Representatives

Portfolio: Treasury

Commencement: Schedule 1, items 1 to 9, and Schedules 3 and 4 commence on the first 1 January, 1 April, 1 July or 1 October following Royal Assent.

Schedule 1, items 10 to 13 commence on 24 May 2018.

Schedule 2 commences on the day after Royal Assent.

Links: The links to the Bill, its Explanatory Memorandum and second reading speech can be found on the Bill’s home page, or through the Australian Parliament website.

When Bills have been passed and have received Royal Assent, they become Acts, which can be found at the Federal Register of Legislation website.

All hyperlinks in this Bills Digest are correct as at June 2018.

Purpose of the Bill

The Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018 (the Bill) makes numerous amendments to superannuation and related tax laws, including to encourage the recovery of unpaid Superannuation Guarantee (SG) by introducing a temporary amnesty from late payment penalties for employers who disclose that they have underpaid SG in the past.

The Bill complements measures proposed in the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Measures No. 4) Bill 2018 that seeks to strengthen the penalty regime for SG non-compliance.

Structure of the Bill

The Bill consists of four Schedules:

•       Schedule 1 proposes amendments to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997) and the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (SGAA) to introduce an amnesty from certain penalties for employers who inform the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) that they have a historic SG shortfall

•       Schedule 2 proposes amendments to the SGAA to allow employees who have multiple employers to opt out of receiving SG from an employer if that SG amount would push them above the concessional contributions cap

•       Schedule 3 proposes amendments to the ITAA97 to tighten the rules relating to non-arm’s length expenditure of superannuation funds and

•       Schedule 4 proposes amendments to the ITAA97, the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Tax Administration Act) and the Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 to, in certain circumstances, take account of limited recourse borrowing arrangements in superannuation funds when calculating an individual’s total superannuation balance.

Committee consideration

Senate Standing Committee on Economics

The Bill was referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Economics for inquiry and report by 18 June 2018. Details of the inquiry are at the Inquiry homepage. The Committee’s Final Report recommended passage of the Bill.[1] The Australian Labor Party (ALP) senators on the Committee disputed the need for the proposed amnesty in their dissenting report and recommended that Schedule 1 of the Bill be opposed.[2]

Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills

The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills (the Scrutiny Committee) considered the Bill in its Scrutiny Report of 20 June 2018.[3] The Scrutiny Committee raised questions in relation to merits review under the proposed amnesty. The views of the Scrutiny Committee are discussed in the Key Issues section for Schedule 1.

Policy position of non-government parties/independents

The ALP has indicated that it does not support the proposed amnesty for employers who have unpaid SG amounts, arguing that employers who have done the wrong thing should face penalties.[4] Labor introduced amendments into the House of Representatives to remove Schedule 1 from the Bill.[5] The proposed amendments were not supported by the House.[6] The dissenting report from ALP senators on the Senate Standing Committee on Economics indicates that the ALP does not oppose the remaining Schedules to the Bill.[7] However, the ALP’s policy position is that the prohibition on limited recourse borrowing arrangements (LRBA) should be reinstated.[8]

In debate of the Bill in the House of Representatives, the Greens’ Adam Bandt opposed the proposed SG amnesty, arguing:

We cannot allow the situation to continue where we treat underpayment of superannuation and underpayment of wages less importantly than breaches of other laws. It is time to beef up the enforcement of underpaying, in all its forms, in this country… It should be very, very quick, cheap and easy to enforce legal minimum standards in this country. But it's not. It's not, and that's why we're seeing billions of dollars a year in superannuation theft and in wage theft. The government should be bringing policies and legislation to this parliament that make it easier to enforce existing labour and superannuation laws.[9]

In the House of Representatives, Independent Andrew Wilkie supported the ALP’s proposed amendment to remove Schedule 1 from the Bill.[10] Independent Cathy McGowan opposed the ALP’s amendment.[11]

The policy position of other non-Government parties and independents is not known at the time of writing.

Position of major interest groups

The Senate Standing Committee on Economics inquiry received submissions from a number of stakeholders, notably on Schedule 1 of the Bill which introduces the proposed amnesty. These submissions are discussed below in the Key issues section for Schedule 1.

Financial implications

According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill these measures are expected to increase revenue by $134 million over the 2018–19 Budget forward estimates period.[12]

Treasury estimates that the proposed amnesty will result in an additional $230 million of SG being paid, over and above usual compliance activities, to around 50,000 employees.[13]

Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights

As required under Part 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), the Government has assessed the Bill’s compatibility with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of that Act. The Government considers that the Bill is compatible.[14]

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights considers that the Bill does not raise any human rights concerns.[15]

Schedule 1 – Superannuation Guarantee Amnesty

Background

The Bill introduces a one year amnesty period for employers that disclose to the Commissioner of Taxation (the Commissioner) that they have an outstanding unpaid SG amount for their employees (an ‘SG shortfall amount’). The amnesty provides relief from penalties that could otherwise be imposed on employers who fail to meet their SG obligations. The employer to which the amnesty is provided is still obliged to pay the SG shortfall amount (meaning that the employee still receives their superannuation) as well as an interest amount applied to the shortfall.

The Superannuation Guarantee (SG)

The SG is the amount that employers are required to contribute to the superannuation accounts of their employees.[16] It is currently set at 9.5 per cent of the employee’s ordinary time earnings (OTE) and is scheduled to progressively increase to 12 per cent by 2025–26.[17] An employer is required to make payments of SG amount to their employee’s superannuation fund at least quarterly.

Like salary and wages expenses, SG amounts paid by an employer are generally deductible expenses for income tax purposes.[18]

The Superannuation Guarantee Gap (SG Gap)

The SG Gap represents the difference between the amount of SG that employers are legally required to pay and the actual amount paid into employees’ superannuation funds.

The ATO has estimated that the SG Gap in 2014–15 was $2.85 billion, representing 5.2 per cent of the total SG payments that employers were required to make.[19]

The Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC)

If an employer has failed to pay their SG liability for the quarter on time then the employer may have to lodge a Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC) statement, or following an audit, the ATO may raise a SGC liability against that employer. The SGC amount is made up of:

•       the SG shortfall amount for the quarter, which is transferred by the ATO to the employee’s superannuation account

•       interest on the shortfall amount, currently charged at 10 per cent per annum, also paid to the employee’s superannuation account and

•       an administration fee of $20 (per employee, per quarter) paid to the ATO.[20]

Unlike SG amounts, SGC amounts are not deductible expenses for income tax purposes.[21]

In addition, penalties may apply to employers who do not meet their SG obligations. These penalties include:

•       the general interest charge, currently 8.96 per cent per annum, which is imposed if the SGC is not paid by the due date[22] and

•       penalties under Part 7 of the SGAA, of up to double the amount of SGC, including for failing to keep records and failing to lodge a SGC statement.[23]

In addition, the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Measures No. 4) Bill 2018, which is currently before the Parliament, would introduce increased penalties, including possible prison terms, for failing to comply with SG obligations.[24]

Key provisions

Relief provided by the amnesty

The granting of an amnesty provides employers relief from the following penalties:

•       section 26-95 of the ITAA97, which prevents the deduction of SGC penalties from assessable income for tax purposes does not apply, meaning that SGC amounts to which the amnesty applies are deductible (proposed subsection 26-95(2) of the ITAA97, at item 2 of Schedule 1 to the Bill)

•       the administration component of the SGC does not apply to the shortfall amount covered by the amnesty (proposed subsection 32(2) of the SGAA, at item 11 of Schedule 1) and

•       the employer is not liable for any Part 7 penalties for the shortfall quarter to which the amnesty applies (proposed section 60 of the SGAA, at item 12 of Schedule 1).[25]

However the amount of the SGC that is a SG shortfall amount or the interest on that shortfall amount is still payable by the employer to ensure that the employee still gets their full SG entitlement.[26]

The amnesty period

The amnesty period is the period of 12 months starting from 24 May 2018 (the day the Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives) (proposed subsection 74(3) of the SGAA, at item 13 of Schedule 1).

Qualifying for an amnesty

Item 13 inserts proposed section 74 into the SGAA to provide an amnesty in relation to historic shortfalls in a SG liability in a quarter (‘the shortfall quarter’). In order to qualify for an amnesty:

•       an employer must disclose to the Commissioner, during the amnesty period, that they have a ‘superannuation guarantee shortfall’ for a historic amount. The amount cannot have been previously disclosed to the Commissioner before the start of the amnesty period (proposed paragraph 74(1)(a) of the SGAA)

•       the amnesty period must have started after the end of the period 28 days following the end of the relevant shortfall quarter (proposed paragraph 74(1)(b) of the SGAA) and

•       the Commissioner has not, at any time before the disclosure, have informed the employer that the ATO is examining or intends to examine a SG shortfall amount for that shortfall quarter (proposed paragraph 74(1)(c) of the SGAA).

If the employer would have had an SG shortfall without the disclosure (for example, they have already been assessed as having such a shortfall) the amnesty only applies to the amount of additional SG shortfall that was declared by the employer in seeking the amnesty (proposed subsection 74(2) of the SGAA).

Ceasing to qualify for an amnesty

The Commissioner may notify an employer that they cease to qualify for an amnesty and are taken to have never qualified for an amnesty if:

•       the employer has not paid the SGC amount to which the amnesty applies on or by the day that the SGC becomes payable (proposed subparagraph 74(5)(a)(i) of the SGAA) and

•       has not entered into an arrangement with the Commissioner that includes payment of the outstanding SGC amount (proposed subparagraph 74(5)(a)(ii) of the SGAA) or

•       if the employer has entered into such an arrangement, has failed to comply with it (proposed paragraph 74(5)(b) of the SGAA).

The result of an amnesty no longer applying would be that penalties which would have applied but for the amnesty would again apply (as if the amnesty were never granted). The Explanatory Memorandum states that the Commissioner can unwind any benefits provided under the amnesty by amending the assessments of the employer, which could result in the employer owing the ATO an amount of tax.[27]

Key issues

Support for the amnesty

The submissions to the Senate Economics Committee Legislation inquiry into the Bill disagreed on the need for an amnesty.

Representatives of industry and employers, including the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), the Australian Industry Group (AIG), the Housing Industry Association, the Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman (ASBFEO) and the Council of Small Business Australia (COSBOA), support the amnesty.[28]

The ACCI argues that the amnesty is likely to increase the recovery of SG amounts as SGC penalties can mount up for employers and are a substantial disincentive to disclose an unpaid SG amount:

The proposed amnesty will improve the amount of missed contribution which is recovered over what is otherwise likely, and the Australian Chamber believes that it will make a significant improvement because most unrecovered missed contribution is from small businesses and the amnesty addresses the primary problem for recovery – the escalation of the debt and actual cost of full compliance.[29]

The ACCI also argues that while some non-compliance is wilful, the majority of circumstances are due to small business error or cash flow issues.[30] Likewise COSBOA argues that the cost of complying with SG requirements is particularly high for small business employers and there are valid reasons why a small business may make an SG contribution late:

Those employers who deliberately keep employees’ money are not likely to use the amnesty. These people are thankfully in the minority, the ATO estimates that some 95% of employers are compliant. The miscreants will be pursued through normal channels.

There are however plenty of valid reasons why an honest business person, the great majority, may not have payed [sic] their workers’ superannuation on time. They may have forgotten because they had a sick child or a personal health problem or some other pressing issue. Once forgotten then there is a real fear of the extraordinary fines that can be applied for not paying on time. The fines will run into thousands of dollars and potentially be enough to bankrupt an employer.[31]

The Australian Council of Trade Unions argued against the amnesty stating that employers should not be given a tax deduction for failing to pay an amount of superannuation that they are already obliged to pay:

This bill outlines a plan to forgive the employers who have illegally ripped off workers and offers them a tax deduction for the trouble of paying their original obligation. The fact that this amnesty is being considered reveals that the government has no plans to address superannuation theft prior to the bill's introduction.[32]

Merits review

The Scrutiny Committee questioned whether limited merits review would be available to consider the Commissioner’s decision to withdraw the amnesty from an employer. The Scrutiny Committee has sought further advice from the Minister as to whether these decisions by the Commissioner would be subject to merits review and if not, the reasons for excluding such decisions.[33]

Schedule 2 – Superannuation: employees with multiple employers

Background

The effect of the amendments in Schedule 2 would be to allow an individual with multiple employers to apply to the ATO to have an employer’s legal requirement to pay the SG amount waived if payment of the SG amount would put the individual above their annual concessional contributions cap, so long as at least one of their employers is contributing an SG amount.

Concessional contributions cap

The concessional contribution cap limits the amount of pre-tax contributions that can be made into an individual’s superannuation account that are taxable at a concessional tax rate of 15 per cent (whether they are compulsory SG contributions or pre-tax voluntary contributions). Amounts above the cap are treated as assessable income of the individual and are taxed at the individual’s marginal tax rate. The concessional contribution cap for 2018–19 is $25,000 per annum.[34]

Maximum superannuation earnings base

As discussed above, a person’s employer is obliged to make SG contributions to their employee’s superannuation account equal to 9.5 per cent of OTE. However, the SG only obliges the employer to pay superannuation on income of up to $54,303 per quarter (roughly $217,212 per annum[35]) in 2018–19. This is known as the ‘maximum superannuation contributions base’. This means that the amount of SG contributions an employer is obliged to make per quarter is capped at around $5,159 per quarter ($20,635 per annum). The maximum superannuation contributions base is indexed in line with Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings (AWOTE) each year.[36]

Key Provisions

The purpose of the amendments in Schedule 2 is to allow a person to opt out of having a proportion of their income paid into their superannuation account for their second (or subsequent) employer if those contributions would put them over their concessional contributions cap for the financial year.

The proposed amendments would allow an individual to apply to the Commissioner for a shortfall exemption certificate in relation to a specified employer and for a specified quarter (proposed subsection 19AB(1) of the SGAA, at item 2 of Schedule 2).

An employer that has been issued with a shortfall exemption certificate has a maximum superannuation contribution base for that employee of zero. In other words, the employer is not required to make SG payments to that employee’s superannuation account and will not incur a SG shortfall (proposed section 19AA of the SGAA, at item 2 of Schedule 2).

The Commissioner may issue an employer shortfall exemption certificate if he or she is satisfied that:

•       if the certificate were not issued then the employee would be likely to exceed their concessional contributions cap for the financial year (proposed paragraph 19AB(3)(a) of the SGAA)

•       If the certificate is issued then the person has at least one other employer that would have a SG shortfall if they did not make superannuation contributions for the benefit of the employee (proposed paragraph 19AB(3)(b) of the SGAA) and

•       it is appropriate, in the circumstances, to issue the certificate (proposed paragraph 19AB(3)(c) of the SGAA). In considering whether it is appropriate, the Commissioner must have regard to the effect that issuing the certificate would have on the individual’s concessional contributions for the year and any other matter they deem relevant (proposed subsection 19AB(6) of the SGAA).

The Commissioner must notify the person and their employer in writing of their decision to issue an employer shortfall exemption certificate (proposed subsection 19AC(1) of the SGAA). If the Commissioner decides not to issue the certificate then they must notify the applicant in writing (proposed subsection 19AC(3) of the SGAA). If the Commissioner does not give notice of their decision within 60 days, the application is taken to have been denied (proposed subsection 19AC(4) of the SGAA).

Item 3 of Schedule 2 provides that the amendments in Schedule 2 only apply in relation to quarters on or after 1 July 2018.

Part 2 of Schedule 2 amends the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act) to provide that decisions by the Commissioner on applications for the grant of a shortfall exemption certificate are not reviewable under the ADJR Act. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill states:

This amendment would align the judicial review processes available for a decision to issue or refuse to issue an employer shortfall exemption certificate with those available for other taxation decisions by the Commissioner. Taxpayers are provided with full review rights under Part IVC of the TAA 1953 which is a well-established and comprehensive review scheme for taxation decisions. Part IVC of the TAA 1953 review is equally as accessible and effective as review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.[37]

Schedule 3 – Non-arm’s length income of complying superannuation entities

Background

Non-arm’s length income

The non-arm’s length income (NALI) provisions are an existing anti-avoidance measure that seeks to prevent superannuation funds from entering into schemes which utilise non-commercial transactions to inflate the earnings of a superannuation fund in order to:

•       obtain a concessional tax rate of 15 per cent on those earnings, rather than the individual’s marginal tax rate or

•       in effect, make contributions to a superannuation fund that do not count towards the individual’s concessional and non-concessional contributions caps.[38]

Non-arm’s length income is defined at section 295-550 of the ITAA97. It is essentially income that is more than would have been derived had a transaction been conducted at arm’s length. An example of non-arm’s length income could include an inflated dividend paid to the superannuation fund by a private company that the superannuation fund holds shares in.

Key Provisions

Item 1 of Schedule 3 repeals and replaces the existing definition of NALI at subsection 295-550(1) of the ITAA1997 to ensure that there is no ambiguity that expenditures incurred by superannuation funds can also be NALI. The definition of NALI is extended to schemes that are entered into that result in a loss, outgoing or expenditure (incurred in producing assessable income) that is lower than would have been expected had a transaction been conducted at an arm’s length basis (proposed paragraph 295-550(1)(b) of the ITAA97). It also includes transactions where no loss, outgoing or expenditure has been incurred at all but would be expected to have been incurred if the transaction were conducted on an arm’s length basis (proposed paragraph 295-550(1)(c) of the ITAA97).

Item 2 of Schedule 3 repeals and replaces subsection 295-550(5) of the ITAA97 which applies NALI provisions to income derived by a superannuation fund as a beneficiary of a trust to which it has a fixed entitlement. The changes include non-arm’s length losses, outgoings and expenditures incurred in producing assessable income as NALI.

Item 3 of Schedule 3 adds proposed subsection 296-550(7) to the ITAA97 to clarify that the new provisions apply to losses, outgoings and expenditures whether they are of a capital nature or not.

Item 4 of Schedule 3 provides that the proposed amendments made in Schedule 3 apply to the 2018-19 income year and later income years.

Schedule 4 – Limited recourse borrowing arrangements

Background

Limited recourse borrowing arrangements

Generally speaking superannuation funds cannot borrow money to purchase investments.[39] However, regulated superannuation funds can borrow by entering into Limited Recourse Borrowing Arrangements (LRBA) with a third party.[40] LRBAs limit the lender’s rights to recover the funds under the LRBA to the assets purchased using those funds. The lender has no recourse to the other assets of the superannuation fund.[41]

Total superannuation balance

‘Total superannuation balance’ is defined in subsection 307-230(1) of the ITAA97 as, generally, the sum of:

•       the value of all superannuation benefits in the accumulation phase

•       the amount in the transfer balance account and

•       the amount of any ‘roll-over’ benefit which is not reflected in the person’s accumulation or transfer balance account.

A person’s total superannuation account balance is taken into account in determining, for example, the amount of an individual’s non-concessional contributions cap, the amount of unused concessional cap that individuals can carry-forward from prior financial years and in determining eligibility for the spouse tax offset.[42]

The proposed changes in Schedule 4 of the Bill change the definition of total superannuation balance so that in some circumstances LRBAs are taken into account when calculating the total superannuation balance for SMSFs. The measures are intended to ensure that LRBAs are not used to circumvent contributions caps.[43]

Key Provisions

Item 1 of Schedule 4 amends the definition of total superannuation balance at section 307-230 of the ITAA97 to include an ‘LRBA amount’ in certain circumstances.

Item 2 adds proposed subsection 307-231 which details the LRBA arrangements that count towards an individual’s total superannuation amount. Proposed subsection 307-231(1) states that an individual has an ‘LRBA amount’ if:

•       the superannuation provider has entered into a limited recourse borrowing arrangement

•       the amount of the LRBA has not been repaid at the time of working out the individual’s total superannuation balance

•       the assets that secure the LRBA support a superannuation interest of the individual (

•       the fund meets the criteria specified at proposed subsection 307-231(4), namely, it is a SMSF with less than five members and

•       either:

–      the person has satisfied a condition of release for their superannuation fund with a nil cashing restriction (either they have reached retirement or they are aged 65 or over) or

–      the lender under the LRBA is an associate of the superannuation provider.

Proposed subsections 307-231(2) and (3) provide that the amount by which a personal total superannuation balance can be increased by a LRBA is limited to the individual’s share of the interest in the assets that secure the LRBA.[44]

Part 2 of Schedule 2 amends the Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 to provide that the amendments in Schedule 4 only apply to new borrowings entered into on or after 1 July 2018. The amendments also do not apply to an amount of an LRBA that is refinanced after 1 July 2018 if it is secured by the same assets as the old borrowing and is not greater than the balance of the old borrowing.

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[1].              Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018 [Provisions], The Senate, Canberra, 18 June 2018, p. 15.

[2].              Ibid., pp. 17 and 24.

[3].              Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Scrutiny digest, 6, 2018, The Senate, Canberra, 20 June 2018, pp. 48–49.

[4].              C Bowen (Shadow Treasurer), Liberal Party gives 26 year penalty holiday including ... tax deduction for superannuation theft!, media release, 29 May 2018.

[5].              C Bowen, Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018 - amendments to be moved by the Opposition, House of Representatives, 20 June 2018.

[6].              Australia, House of Representatives, ‘Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018’, Votes and proceedings, HVP, 119, 2017–18, 20 June 2018, pp. 1621–22.

[7].              Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018 [Provisions], op. cit., p. 23.

[8].              Senate Standing Committee on Economics, op. cit. p. 20.

[9].              A Bandt, ‘Second reading speech: Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018’, House of Representatives, Debates, 20 June 2018, p. 27

[10].              Australia, House of Representatives, ‘Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018’, Votes and proceedings, op. cit., pp. 1621–22.

[11].              Ibid.

[12].              Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018, pp. 3–5.

[13].              Mr Robert Jeremenko, Evidence to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018, 12 June 2018, p. 30.

[14].              The Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights can be found at page 51 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill.

[15].              Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Human rights scrutiny report, 5, 2018, 19 June 2018, p. 54.

[16].              Australian Taxation Office (ATO), ‘Super for employers’, ATO website.

[17].              Section 19 of the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992.

[18].              ATO, ‘Super for employers -claiming a tax deduction’, ATO website.

[19].              ATO, ‘Superannuation guarantee gap’, ATO website.

[20].              ATO, ‘The super guarantee charge (SGC)’, ATO website.

[21].              Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018, p. 8.

[22].              ATO, ‘Penalties, amendments and objections’, ATO website; ATO, ‘General interest charge (GIC) rates’, ATO website.

[23].              Part 7 of the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992.

[24].              Parliament of Australia, ‘Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Measures No. 4) Bill 2018 homepage’, Australian Parliament website; Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018 [Provisions], op. cit., p. 3.

[25].              Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018, p. 10.

[26].              Ibid., p. 14.

[27].              Ibid.

[28].              See Submissions to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018.

[29].              Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Submission to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018 [submission no. 8], June 2018, p. 3.

[30].              Ibid., p. 9.

[31].              Council of Small Business Australia (COSBOA), Submission to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018 [submission no. 11], 8 June 2018, p. 1.

[32].              J Mitchell (Workers' Capital Organising Officer, Australian Council of Trade Unions), Evidence to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018,
12 June 2018, p. 9. See also: Australian Council of Trade Unions, Submission to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018 [submission no. 3], 6 June 2018.

[33].              Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Scrutiny digest, 6, 2018, the Senate, 20 June 2018, pp. 48–49.

[34].              ATO, ‘Concessional contributions cap’, ATO website.

[35].              Assuming a consistent spread of income throughout the year.

[36].              ATO, ‘Maximum super contributions base’, ATO website.

[37].              Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018, p. 30.

[38].              Ibid., p. 31.

[39].              Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, section 67.

[40].              Ibid., section 67A.

[41].              K Swoboda and L Nielson, Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (2015 Measures No. 2) Bill 2015, Bills Digest, 19,
2015–16, 7 September 2015, p. 8.

[42].              Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018, p. 44.

[43].              K O’Dwyer (Minister for Revenue and Financial Services, Minister for Women and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Public Service), Consultation on Superannuation Taxation Integrity Measures, media release, 11 January 2018.

[44].              Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Superannuation Measures No. 1) Bill 2018, p. 45.