

## 2. LAND 17 Phase 1B/C

- 2.1 The Department of Defence (Defence) seeks approval from the Committee to proceed with the proposed LAND 17 Phase 1B/C infrastructure project, which aims to:
- Provide the infrastructure needed to support the introduction into service of a range of new ammunition, artillery command, fire control equipment and training systems acquired under LAND 17 Phase 1B/C; and
  - Increase the operational effectiveness of Australian Defence Force personnel through the introduction of modern equipment and more realistic training.<sup>1</sup>
- 2.2 This project forms part of a wider Defence project, the LAND 17 Capability Project. LAND 17 aims to provide the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with a new suite of ammunition, artillery and fire control systems, through the introduction of the new M777A2 Lightweight Howitzer (LTH), and the facilities required to support its introduction and prepare the ADF to use it.<sup>2</sup>
- 2.3 Land 17 Phase 1A was referred to the Committee on 12 October 2011, with the Committee tabling its report on 14 February 2012.<sup>3</sup> The works to be undertaken as part of LAND 17 Phase 1B/C are proposed to occur at eight locations around Australia:
- Gallipoli Barracks, Enoggera, Queensland;
  - Lavarack Barracks, Townsville, Queensland;
  - Robertson Barracks, Darwin, Northern Territory;
  - Bridges Barracks, Puckapunyal, Victoria;
  - Campbell Barracks, Perth, Western Australia;
  - Holsworthy Barracks, Holsworthy, New South Wales;
  - RAAF Base Williamtown, Williamtown, New South Wales; and
  - Proof and Experimental Establishment (P&EE), Port Wakefield, South Australia.<sup>4</sup>
- 2.4 The proposal was referred to the Committee on 20 October 2016.

### Conduct of the inquiry

- 2.5 Following referral, the inquiry was publicised on the Committee web page, and via a media release.

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1*, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1*, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, *Report 1/2012*, Canberra, 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1*, pp. 7-8.

- 2.6 The Committee received three submissions to the inquiry, and four supplementary submissions, three of which were confidential and detailed the project costs. A list of submissions can be found at Appendix A.
- 2.7 The Committee received a briefing from Defence and conducted public and in camera hearings on 25 November 2016. A transcript of the public hearing is available on the Committee web page.

### **Need for the works**

- 2.8 Defence submitted that the introduction of the new M777A2s impacts how existing units are supported to maintain, sustain and train in the use of the M777A2s. According to Defence, Phase 1B/C of LAND 17 addressed those deficiencies in existing training, sustainment and maintenance:
- Sustainment. The new M777A2 capability is supported by a new vehicle fleet and associated equipment. The new LAND 121 vehicle fleet is required to be operated and stored in locations to support the manoeuvre of the new M777A2 capability. As such, vehicle shelters for storage and hardstand for movements are deficient in some locations.
  - Maintenance. The new M777A2 capability is required to be maintained in a different manner to that of the replaced system. Accordingly, maintenance locations and arrangements for storing spare parts are inadequate in some locations.
  - Train. Simulation is a key component to allow all ADP units to train in the most effective and efficient manner. Continuing advances in technology have seen a surge in the effectiveness of simulation to augment field training which is incrementally more expensive, inefficient and difficult to achieve based on unit proximity to available ranges. A simulation system is required to further enhance this capability and, as such, a dedicated facility for ADF units does not exist.<sup>5</sup>
- 2.9 Given that the ADF has not been required to deploy artillery since the end of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War in 1972, Defence discussed the need to maintain such a capability, stating that artillery is an important component of force protection. That is, it enables the ADF's land forces to maintain an independent capacity to direct fire on a particular location without needing to rely on either the Navy or Air Force.<sup>6</sup>
- 2.10 When questioned on the need for simulation facilities at the public hearing, Defence stated that the simulation capability trains the ADF's land forces to coordinate long range fire across Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as allowing ADF personnel to coordinate long range fire with Australia's allies while conducting operations together.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>6</sup> Colonel Joanne Whittaker, Director, Combat Support Program, Department of Defence, *Transcript of evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Colonel Joanne Whittaker, Director, Combat Support Program, Department of Defence, *Transcript of evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 7.

2.11 When the Committee reviewed Phase 1A of the LAND 17 capability project in 2011-2012, it was not anticipated that Phase 1B would be the subject of scrutiny by the Committee.<sup>8</sup>

2.12 When questioned on why it had subsequently been necessary to refer Phase 1B to the Committee for inquiry, Defence stated that:

Ultimately, for Phase 1B, when the Committee last considered this project for the digital terminal control systems (DTCS) aspects of it in 2011, at that stage there was a very immature appreciation of what the simulation facilities would be. Subsequent to the Committee hearing this in 2011, the materiel solution for the simulation facilities has matured to the extent that we now have it. As part of the employment of the DTCS in line with the proposed simulation facilities, it has matured to the stage where we actually do require facilities to support Phase 1B and the DTCS.<sup>9</sup>

2.13 The Committee is satisfied that the need for the work exists.

### Scope of the works

2.14 The proposed scope of the works is detailed in Submission 1: Defence.

2.15 The proposed works to be undertaken encompass four types of infrastructure. These are:

- Joint Fires Observers (JFO)/Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Simulator Facility. This facility will accommodate the JFO/JTAC simulator equipment. The facility will consist of a purpose designed simulator room with associated control room, storage spaces, services areas, class room, kitchenette and ablutions.
- Upgraded and new Repair Parts Stores (RPS). RPS will allow the Army units to accommodate the additional stores being provided under LAND 17 Phase 1B/C that will be controlled by RPS personnel.
- Shelters. Shelters will allow for the storage of new equipment such vehicles, LTH, ammunition modules and their associated stores.
- Hardstand. Hardstand will allow for heavy trailers, vehicle flat racks and associated circulation area to support vehicle and equipment movement.<sup>10</sup>

2.16 The proposed works are intended to be delivered using a mix of new construction and refurbished facilities. Defence outlined the proposed works that would be undertaken at the eight locations:

- Gallipoli Barracks:
  - JFO/JTAC simulator facility;
  - RPS facility with areas for administration, pallet breakdown, storage, ablution, and ammunition shelter;

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<sup>8</sup> Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, *Report 1/2012*, Canberra, 2012, p. 39.

<sup>9</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1*, p. 7; Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 1.

- Hardstand for flat racks to be stored and loaded/unloaded from Integrated Land Handling System (ILHS) vehicles; and
- Cages for secure storage of vehicle equipment.
- Lavarack Barracks:
  - JFO/JTAC simulator facility;
  - RPS facility with areas for administration, pallet breakdown, and storage;
  - Shelters for Protected Mobility Vehicles (PMV);
  - Shelter for ammunition module storage; and
  - Hardstand for trailers, flat racks and vehicle circulation.
- Robertson Barracks:
  - JFO/JTAC simulator facility;
  - RPS facility with areas for administration, pallet breakdown and storage;
  - Shelter for ILHS vehicles, LTH and ammunition storage module; and
  - Hardstand for trailers, flat racks and vehicle circulation.
- Bridges Barracks:
  - JFO/JTAC simulator facility;
  - Shelter for ILHS vehicles and ammunition storage module;
  - Hardstand for trailers, flat racks and vehicle circulation;
  - A replacement open training shelter; and
  - Enlarged cages for LHT-related equipment storage.
- Campbell Barracks: a JFO/JTAC simulator facility.
- Holsworthy Barracks: a JFO/JTAC simulator facility.
- RAAF Base Williamtown: a JFO/JTAC simulator facility.
- [Port Wakefield]: a gun shelter designed to accommodate an LTH.<sup>11</sup>

2.17 The Committee finds that the proposed scope of works is suitable for the works to meet its purpose.

### **Cost of the works**

2.18 The total out-turned cost for this project is estimated at \$57.1 million, excluding GST, which includes the cost of construction, management and design fees, furniture, information communications technology, fitting and equipment, contingencies and an escalation allowance.<sup>12</sup>

2.19 The Committee received a confidential supplementary submission detailing the project costs and held an in-camera hearing with Defence on the project costs.

2.20 The Committee is satisfied that the costings for the project provided to it have been adequately assessed by the proponent agency.

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<sup>11</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1*, pp. 16-18.

<sup>12</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1*, p. 24.

## Project issues

### *Contamination*

2.21 During the inquiry, the Committee received a submission from Ms Meryl Swanson MP, Member for Paterson, focused on the potential for contamination issues at RAAF Base Williamtown.

2.22 Ms Swanson raised the potential impact of per and poly-fluoro alkyl substances (PFAS) contamination arising from the use of firefighting foam in and around RAAF Base Williamtown. In particular, Ms Swanson noted that:

Despite Defence efforts, there is considerable distrust in the community about the length of time taken for investigations since the announcement of contamination, and the delay in making information public, both before and after the contamination was announced.<sup>13</sup>

2.23 Furthermore, Ms Swanson stated that the potential for PFAS contamination had significantly impacted some of her constituents:

Despite health warnings that focused on the ingestion pathways of contaminated water and soil, the community is now calling for air testing, as blood testing of residents has shown elevated levels of PFAS even in people who have taken the strictest precautions.

There has also been a documented drop in property values in the area, with advice from the New South Wales Valuer General to residents that the land values have been reduced by 15 per cent in the past year. Port Stephens Council notified that it had adjusted rates accordingly.<sup>14</sup>

2.24 While not supportive of calls to halt any future development at RAAF Base Williamtown until the PFAS contamination has been stopped, Ms Swanson stated:

I would seek to make sure the expansion of the base does not exacerbate the leaching of PFAS from the base, and that earthworks do not contribute to dust pollution.<sup>15</sup>

2.25 Ms Swanson also expressed concern about the impact of PFAS on the health employees and contractors involved in the proposed works at RAAF Base Williamtown, saying:

I would seek to ensure that employees and contractors on the base are not adversely affected by PFAS contamination. I would urge they be made fully aware of the health risks, and be protected as best they can from exposure. I would urge that PFAS blood testing of employees and contractors take place, and that air monitoring take place on the base as part of a broader air monitoring program in the area.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ms Meryl Swanson MP, *Submission 2*, p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> Ms Meryl Swanson MP, *Submission 2*, p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> Ms Meryl Swanson MP, *Submission 2*, p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Ms Meryl Swanson MP, *Submission 2*, p. 4.

- 2.26 At the public hearing, Defence detailed the contamination assessment undertaken for this project:

In relation to contamination, as part of all our projects in development, we undertake contamination assessments, so this was done for this project across all sites. The approach to those assessments is that there was a review and study done of Defence's existing contaminated sites register, which is also available to the public. We looked at the standing or existing consultant reports into contamination, and we also undertook borehole sampling across all the sites. For the contaminants, it was not just PFAS, although that is a critical aspect of contamination and a particularly contemporary issue. We also check for heavy metals, hydrocarbons, asbestos and polychlorinated biphenyls.<sup>17</sup>

- 2.27 Defence told the Committee that the results of the contamination assessment found that PFAS contamination of the groundwater at RAAF Williamtown was below the acceptable levels set out in Defence Contamination Directive No. 8.<sup>18</sup>

- 2.28 The relatively low levels of PFAS contamination notwithstanding, Defence told the Committee that:

For each of those projects – and for all the projects that we do – contamination management plans will be developed as part of the construction environmental management plan, which is a responsibility of the contractor. I note for this project that, because of the procurement methodology and because we still do not have parliamentary approval, we do not have a head contractor identified, but as part of the contract requirements, the successful contractor will be required to develop a construction environment management plan.<sup>19</sup>

- 2.29 Defence explained the key features of these contamination management plans:

The key part of those contamination management plans will be that there will have to be a sampling and analysis plan in place before any works are conducted on the sites to confirm or deny the presence of any of those contaminants. If we find PFAS contaminated soil and it is below Defence Contamination Directive No. 8 residential criteria, we are allowed to reuse on site if we have a requirement for additional fill material to be used elsewhere on site; or, subject to a specific state environmental protection agency requirement, we can apply to have that material taken off site to be stored and/or treated at a licensed facility. The requirements for that, though, are very different in each of the states with what the environmental protection authorities require of us to get approval to do that. If the material is above residential criteria, we will stockpile the

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<sup>17</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 4; Department of Defence, *Defence Contamination Directive #8*, September 2016, <<http://www.defence.gov.au/estatemangement/governance/Policy/Environment/Contamination/Toolbox.asp>>, accessed 27 January 2017.

<sup>19</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 4.

material on site. It will be encapsulated and controlled, particularly for things like leachates. So, if we have PFAS contaminated material in the stockpile, it will be covered from the top to ensure that any rain that comes in does not leach through that, pick up the PFAS contaminants and put it into the ground. There will be a leachate control on the bottom of that stockpiled material. The intention is that they are not permanent stockpiles; they are semi-permanent stockpiles and, at some stage, through Defence's new PFAS task force, which is investigating how to remediate contaminated material, once a solution is found for that, the intention is that that will be remediated off base.<sup>20</sup>

2.30 In the case of water contamination, Defence told the Committee:

In accordance with the Defence Contamination Directive No. 8, if we find water that is [meets the criteria] and we have to de-water on a construction site, or with the management of stormwater, there is not additional requirement for that. However, if we find PFAS contamination in water above the safe drinking water criteria, then it is either stored and then transport off site, depending upon the volume of the water, or removed off site to a licensed facility, or we will capture it, treat the water and reinject it in the environment. We are doing exactly that at the New Air Combat Capability Facilities Project at RAAF Base Williamtown, where we have two large-sized water treatment plants on site, basically because of the amount of de-watering that we are having to do for the construction.<sup>21</sup>

2.31 In light of the community's frustration with 'what they perceive to be Defence's inability to just stop the contamination', Defence told the Committee that the 'government is absolutely committed to identifying where contamination has occurred', and is 'working with experts both in Australia and internationally and with the communities to identify ways to manage and contain that contamination'.<sup>22</sup>

2.32 Defence outlined some of the broader efforts to effectively address PFAS contamination:

Cognisant of all those frustrations and concerns from the community, Defence has established a PFAS task force to manage or commence a national program to review the estate and investigate and implement a comprehensive approach to manage the impacts resulting from the use of the legacy firefighting foam containing PFAS. Those investigations are evidence based, and they are going to be carried out in accordance with the National Environment Protection (Assessment of Site Contamination) Measure by expert and independent environmental consultants.<sup>23</sup>

2.33 In addition to these initiatives, Defence noted that it was also engaged in inter-departmental efforts to investigate the extent and impact of PFAS contamination:

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<sup>20</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 4.

<sup>22</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 5.

Defence is also actively engaged at the moment in an interdepartmental government committee led by the Department of Health, which has been established to examine this issue at the federal level. The government is also investing \$55 million from the existing Defence budget to look to manage, contain and remediate PFAS contamination at those Defence bases. This includes a voluntary blood-testing program for residents living in the investigation areas at Williamtown and Oakey. Also, an epidemiological study that will look at potential patterns causing the health effects in communities exposed to the elevated levels of PFAS is being undertaken. Dedicated mental health and counselling services in affected communities are being established, and the appointment of dedicated community liaison officers at Williamtown and Oakey is also being established.

2.34 Ms Swanson also raised the issue of consultation in relation to contamination at RAAF Base Williamtown. Ms Swanson stated:

I would seek to ensure that key stakeholders are kept fully informed about works on the base and any impact. While the New South Wales Department of Premier and Cabinet did set up an Elected Representatives Group (ERG) in regard to the PFAS contamination issue, involving state and federal elected members and state and federal departments, these meetings have often been unable to answer questions we have asked, and been organised at difficult times including parliamentary sitting days.<sup>24</sup>

2.35 Additionally, Ms Swanson argued that better communication with the community was required 'given the level of distrust that is currently felt'. Ms Swanson stated that:

A Community Reference Group was set up, similar to the ERG mentioned above, and members expressed to me their frustration at not having questions answered fully and promptly.<sup>25</sup>

2.36 Ms Swanson concluded that an 'improved process' was required for the proposed works as RAAF Base Williamtown, 'especially as the community will consider this work will likely impact the PFAS contamination'.<sup>26</sup>

2.37 Defence told the Committee that it has been making efforts towards engaging with the Williamtown community on the issue of contamination, and on proposed construction more generally. Specifically, Defence told the Committee it has:

- attended community reference group meetings at Williamtown to provide information on projects at the base;
- established an epidemiological study into the health effects on communities exposed to elevated levels of PFAS;
- committed to establishing dedicated counselling services for affected communities like Williamtown; and
- undertaken to appoint a community liaison officer for Williamtown.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Ms Meryl Swanson MP, *Submission 2*, p. 3

<sup>25</sup> Ms Meryl Swanson MP, *Submission 2*, p. 3

<sup>26</sup> Ms Meryl Swanson MP, *Submission 2*, p. 3



*Committee comment*

- 2.38 The Committee considers its role in scrutinising the effect proposed works have on existing contamination issues very seriously. It is clear that the issues relating to contamination that were raised by Ms Swanson have had a detrimental impact on the Williamstown community, and it is only natural there would be concerns about construction potentially exacerbating pre-existing contamination.
- 2.39 Defence provided the Committee with a satisfactory explanation of how contamination issues will be managed. The Committee is pleased that Defence have general directives in place with regard to contamination, and that it also has a PFAS specific initiative in place in conjunction with the Department of Health. The Committee considers it appropriate that this initiative focuses on the potential health impacts on local residents at Williamstown and provides support for the mental health effects of the contamination, as well as the physical health effects.
- 2.40 In addition to these general efforts by Defence to deal with the contamination at the sites of the proposed works, the Committee notes that contamination management plans will form part of the environmental management plans put in place by the head contractor. The Committee is satisfied that this is a robust method of managing site contamination, given that the need for these plans forms a part of the contract requirements.
- 2.41 Not only does this evidence demonstrate a clear desire to prevent further contamination, it also demonstrates that Defence has taken steps at multiple levels to prevent construction exacerbating existing contamination issues. Directives exist at the national level that apply to all Defence facilities, specific initiatives are pursued – across government departments where necessary – in relation to specific types of contaminants, and environmental management plans form part of the requirements for contractors issued with the request for tender for LAND 17 Phase 1B/C in particular.
- 2.42 Based on the evidence presented by Defence, the Committee is satisfied that Defence is cognisant of the potential for construction works to worsen existing PFAS contamination at the proposed work sites at RAAF Base Williamstown, Puckapunyal and Lavarack Barracks. Indeed, the Committee is of the view that Defence has been proactive in determining the extent of contamination not only of PFAS, but a range of other potential contaminants before tender documents were issued. The evidence presented by Defence indicates that a wide-ranging approach to containing the impact of contamination is in place, and that the safety and health of Defence personnel and local residents is the key aim of these efforts.
- 2.43 However, it is clear from the evidence presented by Ms Swanson that the residents living near RAAF Base Williamstown are not satisfied with Defence's efforts at community consultation on the issue of PFAS contamination. While the Committee acknowledges Defence on the progress it has made in improving its consultation process on this issue, feedback from the community makes it clear that further refinement is necessary.

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<sup>27</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 5.

## Recommendation 1

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- 2.44 The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence continue to refine its community consultation process on the issue of per and poly-fluoro alkyl substance contamination at RAAF Base Williamtown and other locations where contamination could impact the local community.**

### *Traffic concerns*

- 2.45 During the Committee's review of Phase 1A of LAND 17, traffic in the areas surrounding Gallipoli Barracks at Enoggera was one of the key issues examined.<sup>28</sup>

- 2.46 During that inquiry, the Committee found that local residents felt considerable frustration and distress as a result of the impact of traffic from Gallipoli Barracks flowing through residential streets.<sup>29</sup>

- 2.47 With regard to construction-related traffic, Defence told the Committee the number of large vehicles entering the base to deliver construction materials will increase, but that steps will be taken to mitigate its impact on nearby residents.<sup>30</sup> In addition, Defence noted:

Prior to construction commencing, Defence will hold community consultation sessions as required to articulate the proposed site and traffic management procedures. This will allow the community to provide feedback on any issues regarding perceived impact by the construction.<sup>31</sup>

- 2.48 The consultation session for LAND 17 Phase1B/C Gallipoli Barracks took place on 9 November 2016, and was attended by 30 local residents. One of the issues raised was the impact the proposed construction would have on traffic in surrounding areas.<sup>32</sup>

- 2.49 In a submission to this inquiry, Ms Mary Harbeck, President of the Gallipoli Precinct Action Group (GPAG) stated:

While it is evident that effort has been made by Defence to address a number of issues since the appointment of the Community Liaison Officer, there has been no real resolution. It is the GPAG Committee's concern that once the PWC avert their eyes from Gallipoli Barracks the old familiar habits of unresponsiveness to voiced concerns will return.<sup>33</sup>

- 2.50 In regard to construction-related traffic, Ms Harbeck told the Committee that Defence's submission had not 'considered the impact that noise, dust and fumes associated with construction' would have on local residents. Further, Ms Harbeck stated:

Noise is particularly problematic when heavy vehicles wait on the residential street or in the entry lanes to the base close to residential

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<sup>28</sup> Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, *Report 1/2012*, Canberra, 2012, pp. 47-53.

<sup>29</sup> Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, *Report 1/2012*, Canberra, 2012, p. 52.

<sup>30</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1*, p. 19.

<sup>31</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1*, p. 19.

<sup>32</sup> Department of Defence, *Submission 1.1*, Annex E.

<sup>33</sup> GPAG, *Submission 3*, p. 4.

housing, leaving their engines running as passes are secured and directions received.<sup>34</sup>

2.51 Ms Harbeck and GPAG also expressed concern about the lack of a site manager for another project currently being undertaken at Gallipoli Barracks, and that the project contact was via email. Ms Harbeck questioned how issues could be addressed immediately in these circumstances, and stated her expectation that LAND 17 would be dealt with in the same way.<sup>35</sup>

2.52 When questioned on the appointment of a site manager, Defence told the Committee that while there was no site manager at present:

Once we have a contractor on site, there will be a point of contact for that contractor. But at the moment the lines of communication from the community into anything to do with the base have already been established, and those are through the community liaison officer, a reservist colonel who works directly to the commander of the 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade as a senior ADF officer. The community has contact details, both inside and outside standard hours, for that base liaison officer to address any concerns that the community may have.<sup>36</sup>

2.53 While Ms Harbeck stated that GPAG 'applauded the appointment of a community liaison officer', the concerns of local residents have not been resolved.<sup>37</sup>

2.54 Ms Harbeck noted that a range of traffic control mechanisms were in place for Gallipoli Barracks, including Defence traffic management plans, base standing orders, and Brisbane City Council traffic directives. Nonetheless, Ms Harbeck told the Committee that 'the issue for residents is non-compliance' by personnel at Gallipoli Barracks with the various mechanisms in place.<sup>38</sup>

2.55 In regard to this non-compliance, Mr Harbeck stated:

Disappointingly the main perpetrators are ADF personnel. This belligerent attitude is also reflected in other inappropriate behaviour witnessed by the local community – aggressive driving, speeding, verbal abuse, drunken and lewd behaviour, and the continued attempts to smuggle persons into Gallipoli Barracks via the boots or cargo areas of private vehicles.<sup>39</sup>

2.56 Defence told the Committee that the management of traffic issues relating to construction will form part of the contractual requirements of the contractor:

In addition to the construction environmental management plans, with the safety plans there will be a traffic management plans that will have to be prepared by the contractor. That has to be approved by Defence through [the] project team. [The] project team will coordinate with the base at

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<sup>34</sup> GPAG, *Submission 3*, p. 2.

<sup>35</sup> Gallipoli Precinct Action Group, *Submission 3*, p. 2.

<sup>36</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 6.

<sup>37</sup> Gallipoli Precinct Action Group, *Submission 3*, p. 1.

<sup>38</sup> GPAG, *Submission 3*, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup> GPAG, *Submission 3*, p. 4.

Enoggera Barracks through both the senior ADF officer, who is the commander of the 7<sup>th</sup> combat brigade, and the base service manager.<sup>40</sup>

- 2.57 Additionally, Defence reported that an additional gate had been established on Samford Road, adjacent to Gallipoli Barracks, which commenced operation in June 2015. According to Defence, this provides 'an additional control measure for the base to assist in how we manage the traffic'.<sup>41</sup>
- 2.58 Nonetheless, Defence acknowledged the ongoing concerns voiced by GPAG, and told the Committee that:

In addition to the establishment of the Samford Road gate, there is also ongoing assessment and consultation with the community in relation to the management of opening times of the various gates that we have around Enoggera to try to find the best balance of how we manage traffic coming into and out of the base.<sup>42</sup>

### *Committee comment*

- 2.59 The impact traffic at Gallipoli Barracks has on the local community is a longstanding issue, and has been considered by the Committee in relation to a number of Defence projects. It was raised in 2009 during the Committee's consideration of the Enhanced Land Force 2 project, in 2012 during the inquiry into LAND 17 Phase 1A, and in 2013 during the inquiry into the redevelopment of Defence housing at Samford Road.<sup>43</sup>
- 2.60 The impact construction has on local communities is an important facet of the Committee's consideration of proposed public works projects. The Committee therefore acknowledges the frustration felt by the community around Gallipoli Barracks over the perceived lack of action by Defence over traffic issues since previous instances where this issue was raised with the Committee.
- 2.61 The Committee notes that some of the concerns raised by Ms Harbeck relate directly to proposed construction at Gallipoli Barracks. It is encouraging to note that Defence has taken steps to directly address the concerns relating to construction traffic, and that it intends to take further steps once it is able to go to tender. The Committee also hopes that ongoing community consultation by Defence will ease the concerns of local residents.
- 2.62 The Committee is less encouraged by Ms Harbeck's evidence that the traffic management mechanisms currently in place are often not adhered to by personnel entering and leaving the base. It is the Committee's view that it is not sufficient for Defence to simply approve the traffic management plan developed by the contractors. Once Defence has approved the contractor's traffic management plan, Defence needs to take steps to actively monitor the extent to which the plan is observed, and take concrete action against non-compliant drivers when it is not.

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<sup>40</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, pp. 5-6.

<sup>41</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 6.

<sup>42</sup> Brigadier Noel Beutel, Department of Defence, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 November 2016, p. 6.

<sup>43</sup> Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, *Report 1/2012* and *Report 7/2009: Referrals made August to October 2009*.

- 2.63 Some of the traffic concerns raised by Ms Harbeck do not relate to the proposed construction, in particular the aggressive driving and other forms of inappropriate and in some cases potentially illegal behaviour. While such behaviour by ADF personnel is disappointing and certainly requires addressing as a matter of priority, it is unrelated to the proposed construction works currently under consideration and therefore beyond the scope of this inquiry.
- 2.64 Nonetheless, the Committee would encourage Defence to consult with the Queensland Police to ensure that any staff or contractors who have breached either base standing orders or Queensland traffic laws in the vicinity of the base are brought to the attention of Defence so that action may be taken. The Committee made similar comments in regard to traffic management at Gallipoli Barracks in 2012.<sup>44</sup>
- 2.65 The Committee urges Defence to continue working towards addressing this issue and ensuring compliance with the various traffic control mechanisms already in place. Furthermore, the Committee encourages Defence to consider establishing education programs for personnel working at Gallipoli Barracks, to ensure that the base population is better informed about the need to comply traffic control mechanisms in place, the impact that non-compliance can have on the local community and the reputational effects this can have for Defence.

### **Final Committee comment**

- 2.66 Based on both the public and confidential material Defence provided, the Committee is satisfied that the project has merit in terms of need, scope and cost.
- 2.67 Having regard to its role and responsibilities contained in the *Public Works Committee Act 1969*, the Committee is of the view that this project signifies value for money for the Commonwealth and constitutes a project which is for purpose, having regard to the established need.

### **Recommendation 2**

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- 2.68 **The Committee recommends that the House of Representatives resolve, pursuant to Section 18(7) of the *Public Works Committee Act 1969*, that it is expedient to carry out the following proposed work: LAND 17 Phase 1B/C – construction and upgrade of indirect fire support facilities.**
- 2.69 Proponent agencies must notify the Committee of any changes to the project scope, time, cost, function or design. The Committee also requires that a post-implementation report be provided within three months of project completion. A report template can be found on the Committee's website.

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<sup>44</sup> Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, *Report 1/2012*, p. 53.