Appendix 3Committee views and recommendations from the first interim report
1.1This appendix contains the committee view and recommendations from the first interim report of the inquiry into Australia's preparedness to host Commonwealth, Olympic and Paralympic Games. The first interim report was tabled on 14 September 2023.
Chapter 1 – Introduction and background
Committee view
1.2The committee recognises that the Senate and its committees cannot compel current and former state and territory government ministers and officials to answer questions relating to their duties in these capacities.
1.3Despite this, the committee notes that state and territory governments are free to cooperate voluntarily with inquiries, including by providing documents and by making officials available as witnesses at hearings. Likewise, senators are free to ask a wide range of questions so that they may properly inquire into matters before the committee. With respect to this, the different approaches taken by the Queensland and Victorian Governments are illustrative. Regardless of the views that the Queensland Government may hold on the necessity of this inquiry, or its different views on the advocacy of some witnesses against some Olympics and Paralympics projects, the Queensland Government chose to participate, to make a submission, and to make its officials available. The committee appreciates this constructive engagement by the Queensland Government.
1.4In contrast, the Victorian Government not only did not engage in the inquiry, but, in the committee’s view, actively worked to hinder the engagement of other witnesses by expressing its broad position on protected evidence about a wide range of witnesses in its letter of 25 August 2023. The committee does not accept that either this or a lack of confirmed funding from the Australian Government constitutes ‘no involvement’ from the Australian Government, and that accordingly no scrutiny from the Australian Senate is warranted—noting the Victorian Government’s own documents make clear that it was expecting and seeking funding. Contrary to this, the decision not to cooperate was entirely the choice of the Victorian Government, and the committee considers it inconsistent with maintaining productive intergovernmental relations and assuring Australian Government support for future major event hosting bids.
1.5The committee was also dissatisfied by the engagement of EY in the course of the inquiry. EY partners were insufficiently forthcoming in answering the committee’s questions during their appearance at the 28 August 2023 hearing. Scrutiny of professional services firms—in receipt of billions of dollars of public funding from multiple levels of government—has never been higher than it is presently, including by Senate committees. Serious errors of judgement and criminal investigations have put professional services firms on notice that they have placed in jeopardy their commercial reputations and social licence to operate. EY should reflect very carefully whether its participation, in both the public and in camera sessions, met the high and rising standards expected of a recipient of public funding, in particular robust accountability for the use of this funding.
1.6In relation to EY’s evidence, the committee reiterates that the Senate has never accepted simple claims of legal professional privilege or commercial-in-confidence as grounds for a refusal to provide information. Simply stating these as reasons on their own is not sufficient. Witnesses must clearly articulate the harm that would result if certain information were disclosed to the committee, and/or made public. Despite multiple requests to do so on notice, EY had not provided this information to the committee at the time of writing.
1.7As outlined above, the power of parliamentary committees to conduct inquiries is enshrined in Australia’s constitution. Parliamentary inquiries provide critical information that Parliamentarians need to make decisions; they also provide opportunities for citizens to engage with, and provide input into, legislative and administrative decision-making.
1.8It is incumbent upon individuals and organisations to respect the Senate, and the role played by its committees, and to engage in good faith. The committee will consider further its response to the lack of cooperation of EY in subsequent reports.
Chapter 2 – Cancellation of the 2026 Commonwealth Games in Victoria
Committee view
1.9With some difficulty, the committee has been able to loosely determine the timeframe of the bidding process for, and cancellation of, the 2026 Commonwealth Games from various sources, including media releases, Victorian Government documents, witness evidence and media reporting. In doing so, the committee has established a reasonably clear picture of events leading up to the cancellation to date.
1.10However, to date the committee has not been able to produce a definitive timeline. Key questions remain unanswered, including the repeated revision of cost estimates, and contradictory evidence and statements about whether the Victorian Government first approached Commonwealth Games organising bodies or vice versa. While such questions are not as important as the impact of the cancellation, they nevertheless are an important factor in the committee forming its recommendations, and as a guide for how future Australian governments should approach the bid processes for major events.
1.11Only the Victorian Government, as the key party to every stage of the process, can provide an authoritative set of dates and causes for each event and issue, if such records exist. Its refusal to cooperate with the committee means that this inquiry has so far been unable to do so. The committee notes the equivalent inquiry into this matter, being undertaken by the Victorian Legislative Council’s Select Committee on the 2026 Commonwealth Games Bid, and urges the Victorian Government to cooperate with that inquiry so that the facts might be established beyond dispute for the public record.47
1.12Similarly, the committee notes and welcomes the audit by the Victorian Auditor-General into the cancellation. In particular, the committee welcomes the Auditor-General’s stated objective to determine the full costs of the Games, from bid to cancellation, and the quality of advice to government. Major sporting events—and the costs for hosting them—are universally relevant to all levels of Australian government. Therefore, the committee considers it imperative that a final and definitive account of the facts and figures of this cancellation be reached, by this or other inquiries and reviews.48
1.13Victoria’s international reputation has been called into question by this decision. The committee agrees with evidence that, to date, Victoria has enjoyed a strong and enviable reputation as a world-class destination for major sporting events; shown, as Mr Pakula put it, by Melbourne being the only city to host both a tennis Grand Slam and a Formula One Grand Prix. This is a position any Australian city would want to be in, and a position the Victorian Government should work to retain, given the sporting, cultural, social and economic benefits to Victoria and Australia.
1.14Such a reputation cannot be taken for granted, nor can the continued hosting of events, as shown when Melbourne itself obtained the Australian Grand Prix from Adelaide in 1996. An impact to Victoria’s reputation as a host for other events—whether current or prospective or both—would compound the impacts of the Commonwealth Games cancellation. This emerging situation should be rectified, and it is the responsibility of the Victorian Government to rectify it by providing confidence and assurances to major sports and event companies.
1.15In Chapter 3, the committee has further comments and recommendations on some issues canvassed in this chapter.
Chapter 3 – Impacts of the cancellation on rural and regional communities and sport Committee view and recommendations
Committee view
1.16The committee agrees with the evidence received to date demonstrating the significant socioeconomic and cultural impact the cancellation of the Commonwealth Games will have. Notwithstanding the Victorian Government’s alternative funding package, it is clear that the cancellation has thrown into doubt the delivery, or timeframe and scope of delivery, of needed sporting infrastructure, transport, and housing upgrades; the planned boosts to participation in elite and community sport; and the boost to economic activity and growth before, during and after the Games.
1.17As rural and regional communities recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, and manage challenges including affordable housing and cost of living concerns, the awarding of the Games was an opportunity for these communities to plan for, and look forward to, a future sporting and business event. This opportunity has been summarily taken away the same way it came about—with no consultation and no certainty.
1.18The impact has been compounded by the Victorian Government’s refusal to cooperate with the inquiry, limiting the committee’s ability to gather and consider evidence with respect to Games costings, stakeholder engagement and decision-making processes. The ramifications from the cancellation will outlast this inquiry and the 47th Parliament. Whether they are located in Victoria, Australia or overseas, councils, community groups, businesses and others that engage with the Victorian Government on major events must now prepare contingency arrangements in each instance.
1.19Though the decisions to bid for and cancel the Games were those of the Victorian Government, the committee rejects the assertion that the Senate has no competency to investigate these issues, or that state-run investigations are preferable. The Victorian Government’s own draft business case outlined its expectation of an Australian Government contribution of at least $205 million for capital expenditure. Further, in its 2022–23 Budget, the Victorian Government added a note below its $2.6 billion package for the Games that it ‘includes intended contributions from the Commonwealth Government and Local Governments’.
1.20As previously noted, the Victorian Government wrote to the Australian Government seeking $1.3 billion for the Commonwealth Games—half of the original funding package. This suggests that the Victorian Government expected, and was prepared to accept, funding for which the Senate would have oversight, but would not accept scrutiny of its decisions by the Senate.
1.21Further, this investigation has already placed on the public record the dismay and distress of many stakeholders at the cancellation, which may not have otherwise been aired. The passion and enthusiasm these stakeholders also feel for the Games, its athletes and staff, and sport generally has also been made clear.
1.22Similarly, the committee rejects the assertion that the Australian Government has no role or responsibility to play in mitigating the damage of the cancellation, and salvaging the Games. The international implications of this decision are relevant. When it comes to preserving Australia’s international reputation, the committee notes the Australian Government has already intervened in recent years—to cancel Victoria’s ‘Belt and Road’ agreement with the People’s Republic of China following passage of the Australia's Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020. In addition, the Australian Government retains power over visa issuance and major event security, which are key enablers for any successful international sporting event.
1.23The committee notes Australian Government contributions to bids and infrastructure for, and oversight of, recent international sport events, including:
$1.0 million in the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2017–18 and $4.0 million in Budget 2018–19 to support Australia’s bid for the 2023 FIFA Women’s World Cup, and $44.8 million in Budget October 2022–23 towards the event;
funding not published for the Rugby World Cups in 2027 and 2029; and
$10.0 million in Budget 2021–22 to support Queensland’s bid for the 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games, $24.7 million in Budget October 2022–23 for Olympics and Paralympics departmental resourcing, and $3.4 billion over 10 years in Budget 2023–24 for venue infrastructure.
1.24The Department of Health and Aged Care’s 2023–24 Portfolio Budget Statements also listed the 2026 Commonwealth Games in its planned performance result for the forward estimates, alongside other major international sporting events, and departmental officials at Senate Estimates confirmed their engagement and work with Victoria prior to the cancellation.
1.25These financial and policy contributions to the hosting of international sporting events have continued across changes of government. The committee considers this demonstrates a consensus regarding the important and ongoing role that the Australian Government plays in enabling such events.
1.26In this context, the committee was surprised and disappointed to observe the passive approach the Government appears to be taking in relation to the cancellation. While the abrupt cancellation of the 2026 Commonwealth Games is not the Australian Government's fault, the consequences affect Australia's reputation and therefore there is a role for the Australian Government to get active in trying to find a solution.
1.27The committee has not reached a view on which alternative cities could, or should, host a salvaged 2026 Commonwealth Games. However, the committee notes the willingness of the City of Gold Coast to engage in this process. This is a matter for the Australian Government to evaluate. However, given the constrained timeframe to salvage the Games, and concurrent fiscal and cost of living pressures, the committee endorses the principle that alternative options should maximise the use of existing sporting, transport and housing infrastructure across Australia.
1.28The committee has confidence in the willingness of other stakeholders to rise to the task of salvaging the Games, including community organisations, businesses and local governments. Such resilience was amply demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic—a challenge which was orders of magnitude greater than this one. This willingness was effectively articulated by Mr Michael Johnston of the Committee for Geelong, who called Geelong a ‘resilient city’ and a ‘pivot city’, which has ‘now pivoted quickly’ into maximising its infrastructure. The committee endorses this approach, and the Australian Government should adopt a similar one.
1.29The committee’s recommendation and preference is for the Games to be salvaged and held in Australia, and for regional communities to benefit from the Games. However, the committee acknowledges the significant evaluation, approval and preparatory work that will be needed in a compressed timeframe across levels of government. In recognition of this, should stakeholders be unable to agree on a realistic way to salvage the hosting of the Games, the Australian Government should prepare a supplementary funding package to further address the gaps and impacts to participating athletes and NSOs.
1.30The committee respects the sovereign right of the Victorian Government to both bid for and cancel the Commonwealth Games. However, in an era where international sporting events can significantly affect the international reputation of a country, the Australian Government must also be prepared to manage such cancellations, regardless of which party makes the decision. The Prime Minister stated on 20 July 2023 that the Australian Government was advised ‘just prior’ to the cancellation announcement. This apparently late timeframe should not occur again. The committee would have expected that state and territory governments would provide adequate notification as a matter of constructive intergovernmental relations and good policy, noting the crucial role that cooperation between jurisdictions plays in delivering major sporting events successfully.
1.31Given the Victorian Government apparently did not consider it necessary to provide the Australian Government with adequate warning, the committee considers the Australian Government should make its expectation for adequate warning clear as a condition of support for bids for future international sporting events. Just as state or territory governments retain their sovereign rights to bid for and cancel events, the Australian Government should insist on its right to be appropriately advised of cancellations, or major changes to events it is supporting.
1.32The committee notes the Victorian Government is resolving matters with the Commonwealth Games organising bodies in its $380 million settlement. While this resolves those contractual arrangements, the evidence the committee has heard thus far shows the many sporting bodies, businesses and communities that the cancellation took by surprise do not consider matters resolved. The Victorian Government should consider its $2 billion package, at a minimum, to represent ‘unfinished business’ with these stakeholders. These stakeholders are just as important as the organising bodies, and deserve a timely and fair resolution.
Chapter 4 – Brisbane 2032 Summer Olympics: The Gabba and Redland Whitewater Centre Committee view and recommendations
Committee view
1.33Hosting a major international event, such as the Olympic and Paralympic Games, inevitably creates an impost upon communities and residents. It also requires significant investment of public monies, and inevitable disagreements around how funding is spent. The committee appreciates the scale of the task that faces the Queensland Government, and appreciates its willingness to participate in this inquiry, in contrast to the Victorian Government.
1.34The committee is concerned, however, that the Queensland Government is making decisions that stand to have deep and long-lasting impacts on people’s lives and communities, without proper consultation. Evidence to this inquiry shows: decisions being made before community consultations take place; communities finding out critical information from media releases, instead of directly from the organisers; a failure on the part of the Queensland Government to establish formal consultation channels; and a concerning lack of transparency when it comes to providing access to evidence and information justifying the more controversial Games developments.
1.35It may also be unwise and inappropriate for the Government to insist that a redeveloped Gabba host the athletics for the Games. Affected stakeholders pointed out that the Gabba could be redeveloped in its current footprint without the need to demolish the East Brisbane State School or develop Raymond Park. State governments should not use major events as an excuse to fast-track already-planned urban development against the wishes of their citizens and local communities, and without due diligence.
1.36The Gabba redevelopment should be subject to the same requirements for consultation as any development proposal, and required to be based on a sound business case. The Queensland Government should be honest with Queenslanders about why this project is being undertaken.
1.37Relocating the students of the East Brisbane State School to a new school location outside of the catchment area—where children can no longer walk or ride to school—represents a permanently poor outcome for the affected community that will outlast the 2032 Games. The Queensland Government needs to sit down with the community and find a solution that is acceptable—keeping front of mind over a century of history being weighed against a single event.
1.38In relation to Raymond Park, the committee is sympathetic to the concerns of residents. The onus is on the Queensland Government to demonstrate why the athletics need to be held at the Gabba, as opposed to at an existing or alternative venue. If organisers believe the imposition on the park will indeed be for ‘months, not years’, they should be able to prove this to residents. If organisers believe the Park will be fully restored to park land, they should be able to provide compelling evidence and demonstrate accountability to allay community concerns.
1.39In line with this, the committee sought assurances from Ms Hook that she would personally meet with affected communities and consider their arguments and evidence in earnest—we expect this to be done.
1.40The committee was also concerned about the proposal to build an expensive Whitewater Centre at Redland. It appears the local council is divided on the plan, with the Mayor having to use her casting vote to secure the progress of the project. The committee is concerned that the Council may be misrepresenting the views of the community and may be exaggerating community demand for this facility, of which it is the originator and proponent. Residents are deeply concerned about impacts on the natural environment and the koala population in the area, along with the possibility that the facility will leave a legacy of debt for the council and its residents.
1.41The committee agrees that major development decisions—such as the decision to build a Whitewater Centre at Redland—should be subject to a robust business case, and that business case should be publicly available. The history of whitewater facilities built for previous Games suggests there is a high likelihood that the facility could become a drain on the community and public funds in the future. This evidence would suggest that Australia does not need, and cannot sustain, two whitewater facilities. Proponents of the project should be willing and able to provide detailed evidence of the benefits to the community and residents of the state. Failure to do so inevitably results in doubt and division.
1.42The Queensland Government should be working with the New South Wales Government to fully explore the possibility of holding the events at the Penrith Whitewater Centre. It is unclear if this option has been fully investigated. The committee would like to see a detailed analysis of the feasibility of using the existing Penrith facilities for the Games, instead of building a new facility at Redland.
1.43The committee would also like to see greater transparency around the conditions under which the Birkdale lands were sold to the Redland City Council. If there was an agreement that the environment be protected as a condition of the sale, this must be made public and must be honoured.
1.44The Queensland Government must also provide a detailed report which outlines its justification for using a refurbished Gabba for the athletics events, rather than utilising existing infrastructure, such as the Queensland Sport and Athletic Centre.
1.45With the Australian Government providing up to $3.435 billion toward venue infrastructure for Brisbane 2032, there is a role for the Commonwealth in ensuring value for money and responsible planning on the part of the Queensland Government. The ‘new norm’ approach to hosting the Games must be front-and-centre to all decisions made about venues and infrastructure development, and the ongoing needs of communities and the environment must not be sidelined.
1.46As a condition of providing funding towards the Games, the Australian Government must ensure the Queensland Government lives up to the assurances it gave in applying to host the Games; namely, that the Games would leave a positive legacy for Queensland and the nation. There may also be a role for the Australian Government in coordinating efforts to ensure existing infrastructure across Australia is fully utilised and no infrastructure projects go ahead that do not represent value-for-money for the communities who pay for them.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1
1.47The committee recommends that the Australian Government takes on a facilitation and coordination role in order to salvage the 2026 Commonwealth Games being held in Australia. Before the end of 2023, the Australian Government should:
establish an intergovernmental forum, through National Cabinet or a bespoke mechanism, bringing together representatives from all three levels of government, business associations and community groups, to examine options to salvage the Commonwealth Games;
direct the Departments of Health and Aged Care and Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts to produce low, medium and high funding options for the Australian Government that would enable the Commonwealth Games to be salvaged and hosted in 2026; and
subject to the above, and in coordination with any other relevant stakeholders, including Gold Coast City Council and other local governments, enter into discussions with Commonwealth Games Federation and Commonwealth Games Australia about prospects for hosting the Games, including a reduced or decentralised Games if necessary.
Recommendation 2
1.48If stakeholders cannot agree on an approach to salvage the Games, the committee recommends that the Australian Government develops a policy to address the missed opportunities and impacts from the cancellation of Victoria 2026. The policy, developed in consultation with National Sporting Organisations and National Sporting Organisations for People with Disability, should:
identify which sports and disciplines have been disproportionately impacted by the cancellation, for example those that were relying on 2026 as a pathway to the 2028 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles (LA 2028) and Brisbane 2032, or which have not yet featured at the Olympics and Paralympics (for example, netball);
enable paralympic athletes to access classification events internationally; and
address a shortfall in infrastructure which will not now be funded.
Recommendation 3
1.49The committee recommends that the Australian Government develops guidelines for future major sporting events which make Commonwealth funding, regulatory, policy and operational support conditional on state and territory governments being required to notify the Australian Government well in advance of cancelling, or making major changes to, a major sporting event for which hosting rights have been awarded.
Recommendation 4
1.50The committee recommends that the Australian Government encourages the Victorian Government to prioritise the delivery of its $2 billion alternative rural and regional funding package, including by publicly releasing full details on where funding will be allocated, what projects it will be allocated to, and accountable timeframes for delivery.
Recommendation 5
1.51The committee recommends the Australian Government works with the Queensland Government, affected communities and Olympics Games organising bodies to urgently review the decision to host Athletics events at the Gabba stadium and the associated plans to demolish the East Brisbane State School and temporarily remove community access to Raymond Park. The review should consider the feasibility of alternative options, including using existing infrastructure, and work to find a solution that is acceptable to these communities.
Recommendation 6
1.52If the result of a review of the Gabba stadium decision still requires the demolition of the East Brisbane School, the Queensland Government should work with the local community to build a new school in closer proximity to the existing school than the proposed Coorparoo school.
Recommendation 7
1.53The committee recommends the Australian Government works through an intergovernmental forum, such as National Cabinet, to explore the most cost-effective solution for hosting the canoe slalom events at the Brisbane 2032 Games. If it is feasible to host the events at the Penrith Whitewater Centre in New South Wales, including with refurbishments, this option should be prioritised over building a new facility.