Chapter 4Movement restrictions, community engagement and learnings from Varroa Mite

4.1This chapter will discuss the 2022 Varroa mite incursion in NSW and the impacts or learnings this can have for the RIFA response. It will also discuss the community and public engagement of the RIFA response, along with the movement restrictions and compliance of these restrictions. The chapter will conclude with a list of recommendations from the committee for relevant parties of the RIFA response. The sections of this chapter are:

movement restrictions;

community awareness and stakeholder engagement;

learnings from varroa mite;

committee view; and

recommendations.

Movement restrictions

4.2RIFA have been characterised by submitters and witnesses as notorious ‘hitchhikers’, frequently attaching to organic materials and equipment that is moved across locations. RIFA can also ‘hitchhike’ or form rafts in flood-affected areas to ensure they survive and swim with the moving waters. Human assisted movement of RIFA through high-risk materials is the primary contributor to infestation spread outside the biosecurity zones.[1]

4.3Several recent RIFA detections resulted from the movement of carrier materials including to Minjerribah (North Stradbroke Island) and the interception of a RIFA queen in a pot plant shipment to Victoria. It is likely the Toowoomba and Tallebudgera detections were also imported in soil and hay. The Invasive Species Council submitted that new clusters in Morayfield and Burpengary likely occurred as a result of soil transferred to local development sites.[2]

4.4The committee was informed the recent NSW detections in Murwillumbah and Wardell are still being investigated by the NSW DPI to determine the specific materials and industry responsible. However, it has been confirmed these detections are related to the SEQ outbreak and are the result of human-assisted movement.[3]

4.5According to the NFAEP, one of the most important control measures for preventing RIFA spread is the implementation of movement controls on infested areas and high-risk materials. The Queensland Biosecurity Act 2014 (the Act) provides the legislative framework for biosecurity measures and the Biosecurity Regulation 2016 (the Regulation) sets out how the Act is implemented and applied, including movement controls for RIFA.[4]

4.6Currently, the Act designates RIFA as a category one restricted matter. The Regulation imposes restrictions and rules for movement, storage and disposal of soil, hay, manure, quarry products, turf, and potted plants within or outside the RIFA biosecurity zones.[5] The table below demonstrates the current movement restrictions and requirements in place as of 2 April 2024.

Source: Reproduced from NFAEP, Movement controls, undated, (accessed 2 April 2024).

4.7The RIFA biosecurity zones are updated monthly and demonstrate a five kilometre boundary from known infestations, rather than suburb boundaries as previously used. There are two RIFA biosecurity zones:

Zone 1 covers suburbs that have received or are scheduled to receive eradication treatment.

Zone 2 covers suburbs yet to receive eradication treatment.[6]

4.8In NSW, the Biosecurity Act 2015 and the Biosecurity Regulation 2017 have the power to issue emergency orders including declaration of control zones and movement restrictions for RIFA carrier materials.[7]

4.9On 7 March 2024, the NSW DPI implemented an emergency order, NSW Biosecurity (Fire Ant) Emergency Order (No. 3) 2024, which restricts movement of RIFA carrier materials into NSW from the Queensland RIFA biosecurity zones, and from the RIFA control areas in Murwillumbah and Wardell. The materials affected include mulch, compost, growing media, manure, soil, hay, straw, chaff, silage, potted plants, turf, agricultural equipment, earth moving equipment, sand, gravel, chitters, coal fines, coal stone, overburden, and decomposed granite.[8]

4.10Dr John Tracey, Deputy Director, General Biosecurity and Food Safety, NSW DPI, provided further detail to the committee on the requirements of the movement controls:

Our movement conditions require them to have a plant health certificate or an equivalent certificate for the various commodities that are brought in that are considered red imported fire ant materials. Under the order, if you bring any of those materials in from the two biosecurity zones within Queensland you require that certification. You are also required to submit a record of movement that says exactly where they go— Prior to Wardell we had that in place, and it has been invaluable in terms of getting trace-forward information and surveillance data and an ability to trace where things go. The various products have different requirements in terms of mitigations.[9]

4.11The requirements and mitigations of carrier materials across both Queensland and NSW differ based on the product or industry, however, many inquiry participants concurred that the costs of movement restrictions are considerable.[10]

4.12In its submission, the Queensland Cane Growers Organisation specified that annual costs to growers from movement requirements has grown to more than $130 per hectare, noting that the Rocky Point mill district has been a declared biosecurity area since 2005. Required activities include changes to raking and baling operations, limitations on how long baled hay can sit in fields, changes to storage requirements including significant upgrades to sheds, frequent chemical treatments around storage sheds and baiting across the farms.[11]

4.13An anonymous submitter further claimed that the requirements for moving restricted materials can cost commercial hay producers at least $1500 every three months for labour and materials to apply pesticides around storage sheds.[12]

4.14Mr McDonald, Greenlife Industry Australia Ltd, stated that the restrictions for carrier materials cost the nursery sector approximately $9 million per year in 2006. With the significant growth in the RIFA infestation area, from 40 000 hectares to 800000 hectares, Mr McDonald suggested it would now be costing the nursery industry $25 million per year to comply with the requirements and risk mitigation measures.[13]

4.15Dr Young argued in his submission that while many industry stakeholders are doing the right thing and complying with the requirements despite the financial disadvantage, there is concern that their competitors are not complying. Dr Young further stated that there is ‘an overall perception’ that some industries, such as nurseries, are being penalised more than others.[14]

4.16This sentiment was shared by many submitters, who have declared that the biosecurity control methods and restrictions for the movement of RIFA carrier materials is not based on risk and is unfairly restricting and impacting some industries, while not appropriately restricting others.[15]

4.17The Queensland Farmers Federation addressed a gap in policy for the movement of hay sharing that ‘many smaller producers advertising on sites [are] seemingly flying under the radar’ and increasing the risk of spreading RIFA. It explained that industry stakeholders are calling for clearer requirements for the movement of hay from RIFA regions to ensure it can be safely transferred, especially during periods of drought.[16]

4.18Additionally, submitters queried the level of restrictions, and subsequent lack of enforcement for the construction and housing development industry. Greenlife Industry Australia reflected on past detections and the lack of tracing to determine where RIFA were moved from:

From [Greenlife Industry Australia’s] observations, so many of the new detections driving the growth of the infestation area, via large leaps, have been on new housing, industrial developments, or road infrastructure projects. The most likely common carrier here is soil and soil moving equipment. If these detections had had closer scrutiny applied, we could have greater insight into this level of risk and more efficacious mitigation measures in place to reduce the threat.[17]

4.19AgForce Queensland called for a stronger focus and enforcement of restrictions on soil, building materials and machinery in the future, while the Invasive Species Council specifically suggested that an audit be undertaken on the movement of construction materials from SEQ to NSW in 2022 and 2023.[18]

4.20The committee heard about how compliance and enforcement of movement restrictions has been a continuous topic of concern for reviewers and auditors of the NFAEP, over the length of the response. Reportedly, a 2020 CSIRO study declared that there was ‘worrying non-compliance’ with movement restrictions and efforts to control movement had been ‘ad-hoc and administered poorly’.[19]

4.21These concerns were also shared by inquiry participants who expressed that current compliance mechanisms and monitoring are insufficient and irregularly checked. Mr Zipf provided an example to the committee, in which he says ‘I'm constrained in a way, but my neighbour, who lives on a couple of acres, can dig out five truckloads and send it wherever he wants‘ followed by stating that there are ‘no checks and balances’ in place.[20]

4.22Ms Callanan of AgForce Queensland called for ‘stronger compliance processes’ as compliance has been lacking for some industries that frequently move in and out of the biosecurity zones. Ms Callanan explained the situation as a combination of a ‘lack of awareness, lack of education, lack of compliance’ and a lack of checking mechanisms.[21]

4.23In its submission, the NSW Canegrowers Association highlighted the need for tighter border control points and for transporters of carrier materials be alerted to fines for breaches of protocols.[22]

4.24When questioned on the approach to compliance checking and enforcement, MrBacon asserted that both NSW DPI and the NFAEP follow up non-‍‍compliance, with actions taken accordingly to enforce compliance. He explained that a recent recommendation was adopted by the National Management Group in February 2024, to change the compliance strategy and include reporting of non-compliance and the responsible industries.[23]

4.25In relation to the recent 2023 incursions in northern NSW, Mr Bacon confirmed work has been undertaken to trace compliance and assess the movement of products to ascertain what may have led to the outbreak of RIFA, but it is not possible to identify a specific site or source industry at this time.[24]

4.26Dr Tracey confirmed that the NSW DPI works with the QLD DAF and the NSW Police through a cross-‍‍border taskforce to trace, audit and inspect ‘high-risk’ carriers. Alongside this also sits Operation Victor—a border activity assessing high-risk vehicles hauling RIFA carrier materials out of NSW—to ensure they are complying with biosecurity requirements. Operation Victor is reported to have had three rounds completed, with a 92 per cent compliance rate.[25]

Community awareness and stakeholder communication

4.27The Queensland Biosecurity Act 2014 designates that everyone, including individuals and organisations, has a general biosecurity obligation (GBO) to take all reasonable steps to prevent the spread of RIFA. This means all Queenslanders are legally required to report suspected sightings of RIFA within 24 hours of their discovery.[26]

4.28Despite this obligation, the committee heard how many community members, particularly in urban and city areas, are not aware of their GBO, the requirement to report or the movement restrictions that are placed on RIFA carrier materials. An anonymous submitter explained that this is in large part, due to a lack of public awareness activities and stakeholder communication from the NFAEP. The submitter stated:

Prior to late 2022, there was insufficient awareness and signage within the fire ant biosecurity zones and suburbs / regions of high risk to inform the general public of their general biosecurity obligation for managing fire ants. The departmental directive to move towards digital and online communication and move away from printed factsheets, letters, roadside signage created a major deficit in community awareness. General awareness across the wider community only commenced when fire ants started to invade the Gold Coast tourist strip in 2023 and media started to highlight the risk to tourism and the future Olympic Games.[27]

4.29Dr Young explained in his submission a situation in which a student discovered a RIFA nest at a Brisbane university but had subsequently not reported the discovery. He expressed that after raising this issue, more students indicated they had RIFA on their properties, but were not aware of their duty to report this. Dr Young declared that this lack of knowledge and awareness is ‘indicative of the lack of community buy-in’ and that it signals a failure in the program.[28]

4.30Councillor Vorster of the Logan City Council described the communication between the state led NFAEP, landowners and the local government as ‘diabolical’, while trying to ensure the local council upholds its GBO. CrVorster provided an example of an incursion at a local school, in which the NFAEP responded but did not notify the council to this incidence.[29]

4.31The lack of community awareness and stakeholder communication with residents and landholders, farmers, visitors, and local governments has been raised as a potential contributing factor to poorer eradication outcomes.[30] Professor Andrew claimed that ‘positive engagement and buy-in’ from the community is critical for ensuring eradication is successful.[31]

4.32Mr Thompson reflected on the successful eradication of RIFA in Western Australia. He explained that the response incorporated a ‘big publicity campaign’ that included community and stakeholder engagement, leaflets, and flyer distribution among other tactics. He followed by stating that while engagement is an additional expense, it can pay ‘big dividends’ in eradicating RIFA.[32]

4.33To achieve buy-in and general community awareness to address RIFA spread, it was widely suggested that there is an immediate need for a national communications and public education campaign that highlights the dangers of RIFA, stresses the importance of immediate action, and draws on the community to uphold their GBO.[33]

4.34Dr Tracey explained that the NSW DPI is already undertaking such activities with local councils, impacted business and the general community to increase understanding of RIFA and associated risks and requirements through information vans, drop-in centres and 1500 face-to-face visits. He also explained it has worked with the NSW Department of Education:

With more than 300 schools and more than 57 000 students engaged, it's a really important part of awareness and community ownership of what we're doing. We've undertaken targeted awareness campaigns over social media, reaching over 500 000 people. We have had letterbox drops and direct electronic mail for over 67 000 people in the community. They're all parts of trying to make sure that we do bring community with us here, so we have been using a variety of ways to connect there.[34]

4.35In its submission, AgForce Queensland supported the recent ‘pro-active approach’ of the Tweed Shire Council and NSW DPI in response to the late 2023 NSW outbreaks. It called for Queensland councils to make changes based on the NSW approach, including the establishment of up-to-date RIFA advice in important council notices such as rates and water, to increase community and landholder awareness and commitment.[35]

4.36Similarly, the NSW Canegrowers Association supported the current NSW DPI response but suggested that increased education was needed to bring the public along. Specifically, it called for the NFAEP develop and disseminate ‘staged-‍‍based resources’ such as rulers, stickers, and pens for school students that can also be taken home and repurposed as ‘family education’ material.[36]

4.37A dedicated school program was also proposed by the Invasive Species Council, which insisted governments must commit at least $10 million per year for public advertising, education, and engagement in the form of a campaign. It elaborated that the campaign should focus on increasing surveillance by the public, participation in treatment programs and awareness of biosecurity rules, but that it should not be carried out by a biosecurity agency:

Biosecurity agencies are not best placed to deliver the broad public engagement and education needed across all sectors of society and limited funding has been committed to this under the current program. A scaled-up campaign should use professional creative agencies to deliver high profile and high impact public advertising, including through billboards, letterboxing, media and to culturally diverse communities in south-east Queensland and northern NSW.[37]

4.38At a public hearing, Mr Bacon informed the committee that community and industry engagement is a key focus of the future work plan and the 2023–‍2027 Response Plan, with a new national communication strategy targeting stakeholders in areas of NFAEP operation.[38]

4.39In a supplementary submission, the NFAEP described this work as a ‘mass media campaign’, delivered across SEQ to promote awareness and understanding. The campaign will reportedly provide online training for residents, workplaces and pest managers targeting three key themes:

Look for, report, and treat RIFA—encourage stakeholders in target areas to check their properties for RIFA and, report and treat them to suppress ant populations.

Let our RIFA teams in—build community rapport to support the delivery of planned RIFA treatment and surveillance work.

Don’t spread RIFA—empower stakeholders so they can effectively comply with the RIFA biosecurity zones and associated material movement controls.[39]

4.40Table 4.2 below details the current stakeholder engagement undertaken by the NFAEP during the 2023–2024 financial year.[40]

Source: Reproduced from NFAEP, Submission 16.1, p. 5.

Learnings from Varroa mite

4.41A key term of reference of this inquiry is assessing the learnings of the 2022 NSW Varroa destructor (Varroa mite) incursion and response in relation to managing RIFA in Australia. As such, the committee heard from a range of stakeholders who have been involved in, or impacted by the Varroa mite outbreak and who have shared aspects that were handled well and should be implemented in the RIFA response, or aspects that should be learned from and avoided.

4.42The overarching sentiment from stakeholders claimed that the ‘failure to eradicate the Varroa mite has resulted in ongoing costs’ for business and industry, and it must serve as a reminder to prioritise eradication of RIFA to avoid similar long-term consequences.[41]

4.43Much like RIFA, the Varroa mite incursion relied heavily on movement restrictions to prevent spread of the mite, which some say should have been the most critical step that governments could have taken. Despite attempts to implement movement restrictions on bee hives in NSW, it was reported that routine allowances were made for some commercial and pollination hives to continue migrating, which many believe contradicted the movement controls and inevitably contributed to the failed eradication outcomes.[42]

4.44DAFF clarified that some industries rely on unique and varied hive movements for bee husbandry and to provide pollination services for crop production. It stated that interstate and long-distance movements of bees are needed as approximately 45 per cent of honey bee hives in Australia are based in NSW.[43]

4.45The committee heard that the opaque and inconsistent decision making was confusing for stakeholders and beekeepers, and led some to feel that it was a ‘double standard’, as stationary and residential beekeepers were required to euthanise their hives during this time. As a result of the inadequate and conflicting movement controls and advice, it has been speculated that illegal movement of hives had occurred, which ultimately led to a lack of delimitation of the outbreak.[44]

4.46The National Farmers Federation (NFF) submitted that both the RIFA and Varroa mite incursions demonstrate the need to adequately understand and control movement as quickly and thoroughly as possible, and changes must be made to the RIFA response to ensure RIFA remains eradicable. It explained that the spread of Varroa mite was expedited via movement of infected beehives and the RIFA incursion faces similar challenges, with reports indicating soil and mulch movements may have played a role in containment zone breaches.[45]

4.47NFF also compared both incursions in the way in which they were established, reportedly via international shipping routes, and the way in which they are now impacting the agricultural sector and the broader community. It explained that the Varroa mite and RIFA incursions demonstrate the overall need for risk creators to contribute more to biosecurity costs and called for changes to future biosecurity funding plans.[46]

4.48These views were echoed by Ms Callanan, AgForce Queensland, who stated that the ‘ultimate cause’ of the Varroa mite incursion was ‘inadequate resourcing for checking containerised imports’, like the RIFA arrival via shipping cargo. Ms Callanan claimed that ‘shipping containers are a constant and inadequately managed threat to our national biosecurity’.[47]

4.49Comparisons of the governance of the Varroa mite and RIFA responses were also drawn by other participants. Mr Daniel Le Feuvre, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Honey Bee Industry Council explained that the governance structure for the Varroa mite response was ‘significant and robust’ with no singular controlling entity, but instead 26 decision-making parties. He clarified there are several experts and industry peak bodies who consult and bring back information to inform decisions, stating that learnings can be taken from this process to improve into the future.[48]

4.50The South Australian Department of Primary Industries and Regions claimed that while ‘ultimately not successful in eradicating Varroa mite’, the process of the response allowed for ‘structured and transparent decision making’. It asserted that the new governance arrangements agreed for the RIFA response should provide similar benefits, and that Varroa mite highlighted the importanceof early,consistent, and ongoingengagementwithall stakeholders at thenationallevel.[49]

4.51Mr Le Feuvre argued that clear communication and community engagement ‘should not be underestimated’ when a response is trying to achieve eradication. He stated that if there is not public support for eradication programs, particularly in affected communities, ‘then non-compliance and undermining of the response’ will lead to and create failure.[50]

4.52Community Voice Australia claimed that the clarity and level of communication provided to some industry partners did not transfer to community members. It declared there was a ‘clear lack of responsibility and clarity on the decision-‍making process for community members’ who wanted further information and insight into the decisions and requirements of the Varroa mite response.[51]

4.53The Crop Pollination Association of Australia also criticised the engagement from the Varroa mite response, stating that communications were ‘poor’ and ‘very one way’. It emphasised that industry associations should have been more informed and involved in the response in not just discussions, but also across operations.[52]

4.54When discussing if NSW DPI has made any commitment to learn from the Varroa mite incursion, Dr Tracey confirmed that there is an active review assessing the traceability of hives. He stressed that this review and its outcomes will be important for all biosecurity responses by achieving a method of rapidly tracing movements.[53]

4.55Ms Saunders, DAFF, explained that lessons have been learned from the Varroa mite incursion regarding the importance of movement restrictions and effective engagement with stakeholders and communities. However, she explained that there are major differences between the two pests, including different biology, geographic spread patterns, and impacts and said that while learnings can and are drawn between different responses, it is often not possible to draw direct comparisons.[54]

Committee view

4.56The movement restrictions on RIFA carrier materials were often criticised as being unfairly disproportionate based on risk, where the agriculture sector are required to undertake rigorous processes despite minimal instances of RIFA transfer. In comparison, the committee heard frequently how industries such as construction and soil movement were less regulated, despite greater instances of moving RIFA.

4.57Based on the evidence provided and the two 2023 incursions in northern NSW, it is clear to the committee that the compliance and monitoring processes for the movement of RIFA carrier materials out of biosecurity zones are not sufficient to contain spread over the long-term. It also became evident that penalties for breaching restrictions are not well understood by residents, industry, risk creators or businesses, and appear to be enforced by authorities in a piecemeal and inconsistent way.

4.58Notwithstanding this, the committee was pleased to hear about the timely and highly effective response from the NSW DPI, the NFAEP and the Tweed Shire Council following the 2023 incursions. It was clear to the committee that the NSW DPI is taking RIFA seriously and has enacted changes to their movement restrictions and increased monitoring and compliance activity within its border control processes, to ensure that detections are contained and do not spread further.

4.59The committee urges the Queensland Government and the NFAEP to review their movement restrictions to ensure they are appropriate and measured based on risk, as well as reviewing their compliance and monitoring activities. It is understood increased activities are planned as part of the 2023–2027 plan, however, there has been no oversight or clarity into the progression of this, to date.

4.60Similarly, the committee was impressed with the level of public awareness and community engagement that the NSW DPI had undertaken prior to and following the 2023 incursions.

4.61In contrast, it was clear that nationally and within Queensland, communication with the public and with residents has been under funded and under resourced, with many witnesses claiming most people do not know and understand the risks associated with RIFA, or their obligation to report detections. Again, the committee is pleased to hear the NFAEP is undertaking a new public awareness campaign, however, it is not clear to what extent education and awareness is needed, and whether the current planned activities will suffice.

4.62The committee identifies an urgent need to increase stakeholder engagement and community education, and for this to be based upon a strategic and measured approach in order to assist the long-term eradication goal.

4.63In relation to Varroa mite, it was evident to the committee that the two incursions are significantly different in many ways, however, some of the critical determining factors for eradication exist within both. That is, movement controls and engagement with industry and the private sectors. Given the regrettable outcome of the Varroa mite incursion is that it is no longer eradicable, and that RIFA is a significantly more harmful pest, it is absolutely essential the same errors are not repeated.

4.64The committee is aware there is work ongoing within the NSW DPI to identify specific lessons from the Varroa mite incursion and is supportive of this work. However, it appears this might also be an area of importance to the Australian Government, and any work ongoing to consider the recent Varroa mite response may be limited. The committee encourages the Australian and Queensland Governments to review and identify the lessons learned from Varroa mite and apply them to the RIFA response.

4.65The committee recommends that the Australian Government, in conjunction with the Queensland Government, collaborate with affected councils within the biosecurity zones and neighbouring areas to ensure community members, residents, landholders and businesses are engaged and understand their General Biosecurity Obligation. This should incorporate community notices having a particular focus on identification, reporting and movement controls.

4.66The committee recommends that the Australian Government, in conjunction with state and territory governments:

Undertake an assessment of current public understanding and awareness of red imported fire ants, and their obligations.

Allocate additional funding and resources to undertake a national awareness campaign and achieve greater understanding. The campaign should focus on advertising, education, and engagement on a national approach, with higher resources apportioned according to the level of outbreak and risk.

4.67The committee recommends that the Australian Government, in conjunction with the Queensland and New South Wales Governments, work to increase compliance with movement controls, including increasing biosecurity spot checks at border crossings. As part of this, all governments should commit to releasing regular reports on identified breaches, including responsible industries and penalty outcomes.

4.68The committee recommends that the Australian Government conduct a review process of the Varroa mite incursion and response, in partnership with the New South Wales and Queensland state governments to identify and study tension points that also exist in the red imported fire ant response, with a view to actively adopt learnings and adjust the response plan accordingly.

Senator the Hon Matthew Canavan

Chair

Footnotes

[1]DAFF, Submission 24, p. 3; Invasive Species Council, Submission 54, p. 3.

[2]Invasive Species Council, Submission 54, p. 3.

[3]Mr Bacon, QLD DAF, Proof Committee Hansard, 4March2024, p. 73.

[4]NFAEP, Submission 16, p. 14.

[5]Brisbane City Council, Submission 15, p. 2; NFAEP, Movement controls guide, undated, www.fireants.org.au/treat/business-and-industry/movement-controls/movement-controls-guide (accessed 2 April 2024).

[6]NFAEP, Fire ant biosecurity zones, undated, www.fireants.org.au/stop-the-spread/fire-ant-biosecurity-zones (accessed 2April2024).

[7]NSW DPI, Biosecurity Regulation 2017, Emergency Orders (accessed 2April 2024), pp. [1­–2]; DrJohn Tracey, Deputy Director, General Biosecurity and Food Safety, NSW DPI, Proof Committee Hansard, 5March2024, p. 48.

[8]NSW DPI, Red imported fire ants (Solenopsis invicta), undated, www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/dpi/bfs/insect-pests/rifa (accessed 2April2024).

[9]Dr Tracey, NSW DPI, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024, p. 51.

[10]Mr Sloman, Cotton Australia and Queensland Farmers Federation, ProofCommittee Hansard, 4March 2024, p. 56; Dr Laurie Dowling, Policy Adviser, Queensland Farmers Federation, ProofCommittee Hansard, 4 March 2024, p. 56.

[11]Queensland Cane Growers Organisation, Submission 42, pp. [1–2].

[12]Name Withheld, Submission 7, p. 2.

[13]Mr McDonald, Greenlife Industry Australia Ltd, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024, p. 46.

[14]Dr Anthony Young, Submission 21, p. 5.

[15]See for example: Name Withheld, Submission 7, p. 1; Greenlife Industry Australia, Submission 45, p.5.

[16]Queensland Farmers Federation, Submission 40, p. [6].

[17]Greenlife Industry Australia, Submission 45, p. 5; Mayor Darren Power, Logan City Council, ProofCommittee Hansard, 4 March 2024, p. 49.

[18]AgForce Queensland, Submission 47, p. [3]; Invasive Species Council, Submission 54, p. 3.

[19]Dr Pam Swepson, Submission 62, p. 10; AEPMA, Submission 5.1, p. 7.

[20]Mr Zipf, Rocky Point District Cane Growers Organisation, Proof Committee Hansard, 4March 2024, p. 30.

[21]Ms Callanan, AgForce Queensland, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 March 2024, p. 30.

[22]New South Wales Cane Growers Association, Submission 25, p. 2.

[23]Mr Bacon, QLD DAF, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 March 2024, pp. 62, 73.

[24]Mr Bacon, QLD DAF, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 March 2024, p. 73.

[25]Dr Tracey, NSW DPI, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024, p. 48.

[26]AgForce Queensland, Submission 47, p [5]; Dr Pam Swepson, Submission 62, p. 9.

[27]Name Withheld, Submission 7, p. 4.

[28]Dr Anthony Young, Submission 21, pp. 2–3.

[29]Councillor Hermann Vorster, Division 11, Council of the City of Gold Coast, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 March 2024, p. 45.

[30]See for example: Mayor Christine (Chris) Cherry, Mayor, Tweed Shire Council, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 March 2024, p. 52; Mr Brian Scarsbrick AM, Director, Australian Wildlife Society, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024 p. 33; Invasive Species Council, Submission 54, p. 2.

[31]Professor Nigel Andrew, Submission 57, p. 2

[32]Mr Thompson, Invasive Species Council Conservation and Science Committee, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024, p. 42.

[33]City of Gold Coast, Submission 8, p. [1]; Name Withheld, Submission 36, p. [2]; Dr Scott-Orr, private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 March 2024, p. 41.

[34]Dr Tracey, NSW DPI, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024, p. 48.

[35]AgForce Queensland, Submission 47, p [6].

[36]NSW Cane Growers Association, Submission 25, p. 2.

[37]Invasive Species Council, Submission 54, p. 2.

[38]Mr Bacon, QLD DAF, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 March 2024, p. 61.

[39]NFAEP, Submission 16.1, pp. 2–3.

[40]NFAEP, Submission 16.1, pp. 2–3.

[41]Brindabella Bush Club, Submission 37, p. [2]; Professor Nigel Andrew, Submission 57, pp. 5–6.

[42]AEPMA, Submission 5, p. [1]; Mr Simon Mulvany, Founder, Save the Bees Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024, p. 26.

[43]DAFF, Submission 24, p. 10.

[44]Mr Mulvany, Save the Bees Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024, pp. 26–27; Associate Professor Susan Hester, Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis, University of Melbourne, ProofCommittee Hansard, 5 March 2024, p. 36.

[45]National Farmers Federation, Submission 46, p. 6.

[46]National Farmers Federation, Submission 46, p. 6.

[47]Ms Callanan, AgForce Queensland, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 March 2024, p. 23.

[48]Mr Daniel Le Feuvre, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Honey Bee Industry Council, ProofCommittee Hansard, 5 March 2024, p. 3.

[49]South Australian Department of Primary Industries and Regions, Submission 11, p. [4].

[50]Mr Le Feuvre, Australian Honey Bee Industry Council, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024, pp.1–2.

[51]Community Voice Australia, additional evidence, and correspondence with Minister Murray Watt (received 7 March 2024), p. [3].

[52]Crop Pollination Association of Australia Inc, Submission 26, pp. [1–2].

[53]Dr Tracey, NSW DPI, Proof Committee Hansard, 5 March 2024, p. 55.

[54]Ms Justine Saunders, Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity and Compliance Group, DAFF, Proof Committee Hansard, 18 March 2024, p. 23.