Chapter 2

Looking south: Australia's interests and obligations

2.1        Australia has numerous reasons to pay attention to the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters. These include Australia's sovereignty and associated rights to resources in our Exclusive Economic Zones, security on our southern border, the impact of changes in the Southern Ocean on Australia's climate, and the existence of significant international search and rescue obligations.

2.2        But Australia is far from the only nation with strong Antarctic interests, and the international environment to our south is presently in a process of significant change, demanding this country's attention and response.

The strategic environment: peace, science and growing international interest

2.3        The Southern Ocean does not, in general terms, present a strategic threat to Australia. In its evidence to the committee, the Department of Defence confirmed the assessment made in Australia's most recent Defence White Paper, that Australia's national interests to our south were unlikely to be challenged in ways that might require a substantial military response over the next few decades.[1]

2.4        Among other things, the Antarctic Treaty expressly prohibits actions of a military nature in Antarctica, such as the establishment of military bases, weapons testing or military manoeuvres.[2] The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) observed that in ensuring that the region remained free from military competition or cooperation, this regime was advantageous to Australia's interests in particular, given our geographical proximity.[3]

2.5        In addition, the vast distances, remoteness from population centres, harsh environment and resulting paucity of human activity in the Southern Ocean make it an unlikely and inhospitable theatre for nationalist aspiration or armed conflict. No suggestion was made to the committee that any nation intended to undertake military activity in the Antarctic region or posed a military threat to Australia from the south.

2.6        The same factors which mitigate against strategic threat in the Southern Ocean, similarly limit the activities of our own defence force: the prohibition on militarisation imposed by the Antarctic Treaty, the unique demands of the Southern Ocean operating environment, and the lack of assessed risk compared to other national priorities.[4]

2.7        Nevertheless, in its evidence the Department of Defence noted that international activity and interest in the region was increasing, and Australia's interests could be challenged in future, 'especially if resources elsewhere become more scarce. It will remain important to monitor developments, and this is no small feat given the vastness and remoteness of Australia's maritime territory'.[5]

2.8        In their submission, Dr Sam Bateman from Wollongong University and Dr Anthony Bergin from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute agreed that despite a lack of military threat:

Protecting Australia's maritime sovereign interests and exercising jurisdiction over Australia's very large maritime domain constitutes one of the most challenging and fundamentally important of all security tasks confronting Australia in peacetime.[6]

2.9        Dr Tony Press told the committee that '[i]f there was going to be a dispute about resources [in the Antarctic region] at all, that would probably be about the marine environment and fisheries'.[7]

2.10      Dr Bergin and Dr Bateman observed that this challenge was particularly acute in the Southern Ocean, Antarctic waters and Australia's Macquarie Island and HIMI jurisdictions, given the vast distances and challenging sea conditions involved.[8]

Emerging players

2.11      Much has been written and said in recent years about the increasing interest of 'new players' in the Antarctic region. A number of emerging nations including China, India, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea are rapidly increasing their investments and activities in the region, giving rise to speculation about the nature of their interests, and concern about the declining influence of the traditional Antarctic powers.

2.12      In particular, the growing profile of China as an Antarctic actor was mentioned frequently to the committee. China joined the Antarctic Treaty in 1983, but its engagement was relatively modest until this century. In the last ten years China has significantly increased its investment in the Antarctic region, including more than doubling spending on Antarctic science and logistics, and building new bases on the continent itself, including in the Australian Antarctic Territory.[9]

2.13      Other nations have similarly, on varying scales, demonstrated a strongly growing interest in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic regions in recent years. The Republic of Korea has significantly increased its investment in Antarctic science, supplementing its long-standing engagement in high seas fisheries in the region with increasing interest in the exploration of potential biotechnology and polar marine products.[10] Malaysia, previously a vociferous critic of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 2011 and now aspires to Consultative Party status.[11] In 2009 Japan commissioned one of the biggest icebreakers operating in Antarctica.[12] Russia, India, China, France and Italy now have bases in the Australian Antarctic Territory.[13] Iran announced plans in 2013 to establish a permanent Antarctic base, with its navy stating that the base would support the country's interests as a maritime power.[14]

2.14      Various motivations have been imputed in the media and academic literature to the new players taking an interest in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica.  The most common is a perceived interest in establishing a foothold from which to exploit potential mineral resources in future, both on the Antarctic continent and under the Southern Ocean sea floor. For example, academic Anne-Marie Brady wrote in 2012 that Chinese-language debates about Antarctica 'are dominated by debates about resources and how China might gain its share'.[15] Interest among others including Russia and Ukraine in exploring the future mineral potential of Antarctica has been noted by academics, and even by Russia itself in Antarctic Treaty meetings.[16]

2.15      Under Article 7 of the Madrid Protocol, '[a]ny activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research', is prohibited. Provisions in Article 25 of the Protocol, however, which cover amendment of the treaty, open the possibility of reviewing its terms 50 years after its entry into force: that is, in 2048.

2.16      In the 20 Year Strategic Plan, Dr Tony Press sought to calm fears about these provisions being enacted to open up Antarctica to mining post-2048. The Plan indicated that under the legal provisions set out in the Madrid Protocol, it would be extremely difficult for any nation to garner the numbers necessary to lift the mining ban.[17] In addition, in his evidence to the committee, Dr Press classified it as 'very unlikely' that continental or seabed mineral resources would be physically or economically able to be exploited for many decades to come. 'The reality is that the minerals ban is going to be around for a very, very long time'.[18]

2.17      DFAT emphasised to the committee that, rather than seeing the interest of new states in the region as a threat, it welcomed their engagement, and regarded its ability to work with and positively influence other nations within the framework of the ATS as 'critical' to Australia's own national interests in the region:

We see this as not necessarily being a zero sum game at all, but a positive sum game, where all states that are parties to the Antarctic Treaty and the various other treaties that make up the Antarctic Treaty System, are committed to Antarctica as a zone of peace where there are no military activities and activities are directed towards cooperation in science and preservation and protection of the environment.[19]

2.18      One representative of private industry indicated that it was important that Australia engage positively with new stakeholders on regional issues, and not adopt a 'high moral ground' approach, recognising that there is a new international political framework emerging in the region, which needs to be handled sensitively.[20]

Australia's policy framework

2.19      Successive Australian governments have endorsed a policy framework for Australia's activities in the Antarctic region that rests upon six key principles:

• preservation of Australia's sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory, including adjacent offshore areas;
• taking advantage of the region's special opportunities for scientific research;
• protection of the Antarctic environment, with regard to its special qualities and importance for Australia;
• maintaining Antarctica as a region of peace, free from military or political conflict;
• being informed about and able to influence developments in the region; and
• deriving reasonable economic benefits from its living and non-living resources, excluding mining and oil-drilling.[21]

2.20      The 20 Year Strategic Plan reaffirmed these six principles (with one minor amendment) and recommended the addition of a seventh, 'support a strong and effective Antarctic Treaty System'.[22]

2.21      Indeed, DFAT reaffirmed the primacy of the ATS in Australia's approach to the region:

The ATS provides the international framework within which Australia pursues its sovereign, strategic, environmental and economic interests. The Government regards the ATS as the pre-eminent forum for managing all matters related to Antarctica. We maintain our influence through being active in Antarctic governance forums, ensuring a credible and robust presence on the ground, and through our contribution to Antarctic science and environmental protection. These activities support Australian interests and also protect and strengthen the contemporary relevance of the ATS and the norms embodied in its treaties.[23]

2.22      Others endorsed the value and importance of the ATS, including the Australian fishing industry, which noted in particular the importance of Australia's leadership role within CCAMLR.[24]

2.23      In this way, the Antarctic region is unique. National interests are protected, and influence maintained, not primarily through strategic capability or even economic weight, but through constructive international engagement and investment in diplomacy, science, environmental protection and operational presence.

2.24      Many submissions to the committee expressed concern that Australia's historical leadership in Antarctic and Southern Ocean affairs was in decline, as a result of reducing Australian investment and activity, at a time of significant, even exponential increase in that of other nations.

2.25      Dr Press told the committee that:

With regard to my discussions conducting the 20-year Antarctic strategic plan, inside government there is much more recognition of the importance of Australia's investment, however you look at it, and our engagement in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean than there was, say, 20 years ago.[25]

2.26      At the same time, Dr Press' assessment of Australia's present approach echoed the more sombre view expressed by many, in both the Plan and in his own evidence to the committee:

I think it is fair to say that Australia's standing in Antarctic affairs is eroding somewhat, because of historical under investment at a time when new players are starting to emerge on the Antarctic scene. The leadership that we have naturally assumed by our proximity to Antarctica in the Southern Ocean, by our history and by our experience in the region risks declining.[26]

Committee View

2.27      The argument about Australia's declining influence in Antarctica, and the resourcing and priorities for activities in specific areas to address this, are discussed further in the following chapters of this report. As a starting point, the committee welcomes the commissioning of the 20 Year Strategic Plan by the government, and the valuable and insightful analysis undertaken by Dr Press in the preparation of the Plan. Dr Press' reaffirmation of Australia's enduring interests in the Antarctic region and the articulation of key policy priorities provide a basis for the renewed and strengthened Antarctic engagement which is essential for the pursuit of Australia's interests in the Southern Ocean.

2.28      The committee also agrees with the assessment of Dr Press and others that the importance for Australia of robust engagement in the ATS can not be underestimated. The ATS is the foundation for continued peace and constructive activity in the region to our south. As such, it must also be regarded as a keystone in Australian foreign and strategic policy.

Recommendation 1

2.29      The committee recommends that the government reaffirms the primacy of the Antarctic Treaty System to Australia's sovereignty and national interests, and continues to support and resource Australia's robust engagement in Antarctic Treaty processes and fora in the pursuit and promotion of those interests.

2.30      The committee endorses the attitude of successive Australian governments in welcoming and engaging with all countries which choose to take a constructive interest in the Antarctic region under the terms of the ATS. In a changing strategic landscape in the Southern Ocean, global engagement with respect to that region is central, not peripheral, to Australia's national interest. Moreover, on Australia's southern border, diplomatic and practical engagement is the most important means of pursuing and protecting our interests.

2.31      As such, the committee believes that Antarctic discussions and engagement could and should be a more prominent item on the agenda for Australia's bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; not just in dedicated ATS meetings, but in places such as the United Nations and in bilateral meetings at leaders' and ministerial levels.

Recommendation 2

2.32      The committee recommends that Antarctic and Southern Ocean issues be a standing theme for Australian ministers and officials in relevant multilateral and bilateral diplomatic discussions, particularly those with our Asian neighbours, and that Australia continues to seek all possible opportunities for constructive, practical cooperation with other nations engaging in that region.

Search and Rescue

2.33      Australia holds responsibility under international law for search and rescue (SAR) in a very large area of ocean to our south.[27] Australia's SAR region covers one tenth of the earth's surface, including 8.5 million square kilometres of ocean below 60° South latitude.[28] This, naturally, presents significant challenges to a middle-sized country with limited maritime resources.

2.34      In its evidence to the committee, the Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies (IMAS) at the University of Tasmania expressed the view that there was potential for increasing pressure on Australia's SAR responsibilities in the coming years:

The established tourism industry to east Antarctica is small in comparison to other destinations on the Antarctic Peninsula. Nevertheless, a continuation or even a rise in tourism traffic, alongside increasing uncertainties about shipping hazards, such as fluctuating sea ice production – which we do not fully understand – and strengthening westerly winds, underscore that Australia's responsibilities in its extensive search and rescue zone will increase.[29]

2.35      Tourism to Antarctica has expanded significantly over recent decades, from 6700 people on 12 vessels in 1992-93 to around 36,000 on 33 commercial tour ships in the 2013-14 Antarctic summer, along with 18 private yachts. Most of these operated in the Antarctic Peninsula region, south of South America, and outside Australia's SAR region, while five tourist ships visited the Ross Sea and East Antarctica, carrying 1300 visitors. The vessels, and their passengers, represent a wide range of nations: Australians made up 13 per cent of the tourists last summer, with the United States contributing the most (30 per cent).[30]

2.36      Other maritime traffic in the Southern Ocean can pose special challenges such as illegal fishing vessels, which seek to avoid monitoring and evade detection. When they encounter trouble, therefore, response can be even more difficult.

2.37      A recent incident apparently involving such vessels starkly demonstrated the scale of the SAR challenge in the region. On 30 March 2014 the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) detected an emergency beacon in Australia's SAR region in the Southern Indian Ocean near Antarctica. AMSA was unable to contact the vessel and made a broadcast seeking other ships in the area, but the nearest vessel was over 1,800 kilometres away. AMSA then tasked a civil aircraft and a RAAF P3 Orion to locate the vessel. After flying for over five hours to reach the site, the aircraft sighted debris but no ship, nor signs of life. Weather conditions at the time, including sea temperatures below 2°C, were such that medical experts advised AMSA on 31 March that in the 24 hours since the emergency beacon was activated, 'even under the best circumstances, namely the crew abandoning ship into a dry life raft, there is no prospect of survival'. AMSA therefore abandoned the search.[31] It is believed that the ship concerned was an illegal fishing vessel, and later indications suggested that some or all of its crew may have been rescued by another illegal fishing vessel operating in the same area.[32]

2.38      Nevertheless, Dr Sam Bateman and Dr Anthony Bergin believed that this 'is an example of what may become more common in the future as fishing, particularly for krill, increases'. They noted that, if survivors had been cast adrift and sighted by the aircraft, no timely surface response would have been possible and it is 'highly questionable' whether their lives could have been saved.[33]

2.39      Mr Brad Groves from AMSA explained to the committee at its public hearing in Canberra that the vastness of the region prevented any single-provider solution, whether government or private. Instead, Australia mobilised SAR capacity through utilising 'vessels of opportunity' closest to, or appropriate for, the region of an incident. This may include vessels of the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD), Australian Defence Force (ADF) and commercial vessels in the area, as well as military or chartered aircraft.[34]

2.40      Australia has only one ice-capable vessel to respond to a SAR mission in icebound waters, the AAD's Aurora Australis. As such, all involved are conscious that any necessary response in the icy waters furthest south diverts that ship from its existing research and resupply responsibilities.[35] While the maritime assets of the ADF and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service can be and are used when needed for SAR, these have limited or no ability to operate in ice-bound regions of Antarctic waters.

2.41      The Department of Defence nevertheless plays quite a significant role in Australia's SAR missions when they occur, even though it admits that its own capabilities are limited, particularly to operate in the extreme environment of the Southern Ocean. This includes in particular the deployment of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aviation capacity to undertake searches: 'We recognise that there are a range of defence capabilities that are the only things that we possess in the country that are capable of meeting some of those requirements in the more remote extremes of that zone'.[36]

2.42      It should be noted that Australia is tasked to coordinate SAR within its area of responsibility, not to unilaterally conduct it. In evidence to the committee AMSA advised that Australia can, and frequently does, call upon the assets of other nations to assist in complex or remote SAR operations in the Southern Ocean. This often occurs in an ad hoc manner when the need arises to call upon (government or private) assets which may be proximate at the time an incident occurs. Australia has also concluded more formal bilateral arrangements for SAR cooperation with New Zealand and South Africa, who manage the SAR zones adjacent to Australia's.[37]

2.43      One such example discussed with the committee was the emergency experienced by a Russian-flagged tourist vessel, the Akademik Shokalskiy, which became entrapped in ice off East Antarctica in December 2013. Australia's response called upon vessels and personnel from France, China and the United States, in addition to its own (AAD) resources, to respond and ultimately evacuate the vessel's passengers, before a change in conditions eventually enabled the ship's crew to extract it from the ice in early January 2014.[38]

2.44      AMSA's overall view was that while increasing activity in the region and limited national resources were likely to pose ongoing challenges, Australia's present SAR arrangements were fundamentally sound, and had proven effective in responding to incidents in Antarctica.[39] Mr Brad Groves from AMSA pointed out at the committee's public hearing that, while SAR responsibilities undoubtedly placed a strain on Australian resources from time to time, 'if the Aurora Australis was on the other side of this equation, under those conventions we would be expecting other countries to assist us'.[40]

2.45      In its submission, AMSA referred to ongoing collaborative work within the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) to explore opportunities for strengthened cooperation and information-sharing between the five nations with SAR responsibility in the Antarctic: Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. AMSA emphasised the importance of continued work to maintain and enhance practical collaboration including web-based tools for real-time information sharing, and development of a best-practice and lessons learned facility.[41]

2.46      The need to undertake preventive action in terms of enforcing vessel safety standards, communications and awareness was also raised as relevant to the effective management of Australia's SAR responsibilities. AMSA advised the committee about negotiations within the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) toward developing a new Polar Code, in which Australia is playing a key role. The Polar Code would strengthen existing codes by setting safety and pollution standards for ships, including tourist vessels, operating in Antarctic (and Arctic) waters. The Code would include mandatory measures, and it was hoped would come into effect by 2017.[42]

2.47      Mr Groves attested to the importance of preventive work, given the challenges of SAR response:

From the authority's point of view, we work on a premise of making sure the event does not happen in the first place. The more effort we can focus in that area, hopefully the less effort we will need in a response. That polar code is still currently being worked on, but it is about making sure that ships have greater stability, greater subdivision, heightened operational practices and better environmental credentials when operating in that area. Certainly passenger ships are part and parcel of that.[43]

Committee view

2.48      The committee recognises the significant challenge, and demand, that Australia's search and rescue responsibilities place upon the nation. This can be seen as a cost of Australia's extensive interest in activity and sovereignty south of its shores, and as part of its responsibilities as a good global citizen. In both cases, it is a responsibility that must be taken seriously and fulfilled diligently, albeit at some cost to limited resources.

2.49      The committee welcomes the work being undertaken by AMSA to ensure maximum coordination and effectiveness in the conduct of Australia's SAR mandate, and the contribution made by other national agencies to meeting this need. The committee encourages AMSA to continue its efforts to maximise international cooperation toward best-practice approaches to SAR in the Southern Ocean, as well as to awareness and prevention activities toward making emergencies less likely to happen in the first place.

2.50      The committee acknowledges AMSA's recommendation that SAR needs be taken into account in Australia's consideration of future asset requirements for the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters.[44] In Chapter 5 of this report, the committee addresses Australia's overall maritime fleet and its management in respect of this country's Southern Ocean responsibilities, and makes recommendations for enhancing capacity in that regard. SAR is one area where the committee believes that examination of new approaches would yield notable benefits.

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