Home Parliamentary Business Committees Senate Committees Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Completed inquiries and reports Completed Inquiries pre1996 Visits to Australia by nuclear powered or armed vessels: Contingency planning for the accidental release of ionizing radiation

Visits to Australia by nuclear powered or armed vessels: Contingency planning for the accidental release of ionizing radiation

Tabled 1989

ISBN 0 644 08026 4

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PREFACE - (PDF format)
Membership of the committee
Terms of reference
List of recommendations
Glossary

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION - (PDF format)
Arguments for and against Visits
Origin of the Reference
Conduct of the Inquiry
Advisers
Overseas Witnesses
Reason for a Detailed Report

CHAPTER 2 - PRESENT POSITION AND ISSUES CONSIDERED - (PDF format)
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABLE VESSELS
- Presence of Nuclear Weapons
- Current Contingency Planning
NUCLEAR POWERED VESSELS
- Introduction
- Ports Visited
- Lifting of 1971 Moratorium
- The Reference Accident
- Federal Government Conditions of Entry
- Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear)
- Approval of Berths and Anchorages
- Radiation Monitoring
- Responsibility for Port Safety Organisation
- State and Territorv Port Safetv Oraanisations
- Port Safety Plans
ISSUES CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE
- Types of Visiting Nuclear Powered Vessels
- Only Current Planning Considered
- Nuclear Weapons Capable Vessels
- Territorial Waters
- Purpose of Visits
- Planning for Visits in Peacetime
- Arrangement of Remainder of Report

CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR ACCIDENTS - ASSESSING THE RISKS - (PDF format)
Need to Evaluate the Reference Accident
Not All Risks Necessitate Contingency Planning
A More Serious Case as a Reference Accident
Assessment Methodology
Inability to Quantify the Accident Risks
Significance of Lack of Quantitative Risk Assessment
Wider Significance of Lack of Information
Information Available to the Committee - Conclusions
Difficulties in Assessing Accident Consequences
Onus of Proof

CHAPTER 4 - NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANT - Part A (PDF format) - Part B (PDF format)
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRESSURISED WATER REACTORS
- Basic Features
- Radiation Hazards
- Accidental Release of Fission Products to the Atmosphere
- Release of Radioactive Wastes
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NAVAL AND LAND-BASED REACTORS
- Introduction
- Lack of Independent Safety Evaluation
- Highly Enriched Fuel
- Higher Inventory of Fission Products
- Lack of Adequate Containment
- Strength of the Reactor Pressure Vessel
- Emergency Core Cooling System
- Diversity and Redundancy
- Rapid and Frequent Changes in Power Requirements
- Degree of Operator Control
- Age of Vessels and Design
- Collision Risks
- Effects of Capsizing
- Storage of Hazardous Substances near the Reactor
FACTORS TENDING TO MAKE NAVAL REACTORS SAFER
CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 5 - NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP SAFETY RECORD - (PDF format)
Risk Assessment Based on Historical Data
The Safety Record - Official Views
The Safety Record - Other Views
Loss of USS Thresher and USS Scorpion
Alleged British Accidents
Accidents Involving Radioactive Wastes
Relevance of the Soviet Accident Record
Non-Nuclear Mishaps to Nuclear Powered Warships
Accidents to Land-Based Reactors
Conclusions

CHAPTER 6 - VISITS BY NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS: ARRANGMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES - (PDF format)
INTRODUCTION
UNITED KINGDOM
- Requirement for Plans
- Scope of the Liverpool Plan
- References to Uncontained Accidents
- Comparison of Monitoring Arrangements
UNITED STATES
- Absence of Plans?
- Environmental Monitorina
- Bar on Visits to Some Cities
OTHER COUNTRIES
- Nuclear Powered Warships
- Nuclear Powered Merchant Ships
CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 7 - ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF THE REFERENCE ACCIDENT - (PDF format)
INTRODUCTION
ANSTO'S ASSESSMENT
- Need to Revise the Original Assessment?
- ANSTO'S Methodology
- Conservatism of the Assessment
- A More Realistic Assessment?
EVALUATION OF ANSTO'S ASSESSMENT
- Logical Probabilities
- Views in Submissions
- Completeness
MATTERS RELATING TO ACCIDENT LIKELIHOOD
- Introduction
- Fire or Weapon Accidents
- Sabotage and Terrorism
- Hydrogen or Steam Explosions
- Melt Through to the Sea
- Human Error
- Collisions
- Grounding
- Assessment Applicable to All Visiting Warship Types?
- Conclusions on Accident Likelihood
MATTERS RELATING TO ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES
- Introduction
- The Source Term
- Focus on Iodine
- Omission of Other Radionuclides
- Reactor Size Used in ANSTO's Assessment
- Conclusions on Source Terms
- Atmospheric Dispersion and Population Exposure
- Allowance for Countermeasures
EFFECTS OF POPULATION EXPOSURE
- Introduction
- International Chanaes to Reference Levels
- Exposure As Low As-Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 8 - CURRENT PLANNING - GENERAL ISSUES - (PDF format)
DISCHARGE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
REACTOR ACCIDENTS -ADEQUACY OF CURRENT CONDITIONS OF ENTRY
- Introduction
- Purpose of Visits
- Liability, Indemnity and Assurances
- Controls on Navigation
- Vessel Removal
- Operating Safety Organisation
EXTENT OF THE NEED FOR ACCIDENT PLANS
- Introduction
- Ports and Anchorages for which Arrangements are Required
- Emergency Planning Zones - Basic Features
- Zone Sizes - 'Standard' Zones
- Zone Sizes - 'Non-Standard' Zones
- Appropriateness of the Zone Sizes
- Extent of Planning Required
REMOTE ANCHORAGES
- Criteria
- Adequacy of the Criteria
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS
CURRENCY OF BERTH AND ANCHORAGE APPROVALS
AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT PLANNING
- Availability of the Plans
- Availability of Information Relating to Accidents and Planning
- Distribution of Information Leaflets
- Reporting on Environmental Monitoring
MONITORING TO PROVIDE ACCIDENT NOTIFICATION
- Introduction
- Basic Methods
- Obstructions Between the Vessel and the Monitor
- Effect of Biological Shielding
- Distance Between Vessel and Monitor
- False Alarms
OTHER MONITORING
- Monitoring for Airborne Contamination
- Calibration of Instruments
- Thermoluminescent Dosemeters
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

CHAPTER 9 - CRITICISMS OF CURRENT PLANS - PART I - Part A (PDF format) - Part B (PDF format)
FORMAT OF PLANS
- Introduction
- Same Standard as for Non-Nuclear Accident Planning
- Degree of Detail Required
- Style and Length of Plans
- Relationship to Other Documents
- Lack of Standard Format
PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT
VESSEL REMOVAL
- Appropriateness of the Removal Option
- The Removal Decision
- Types of Vessels to be Towed
- Preparing the Vessel for Removal
- Time Allowed for Removal - 'Standard' Berths
- Time Allowed for Removal - 'Non-Standard' Berths
- Availability of Towing Vessel
- Action Following Removal
EVACUATION
- Introduction
- Western Australia
- Brisbane
- Darwin
- Hobart
- Jervis Bay
- Other Ports
USE OF STABLE IODINE AS A PROPHYLACTIC
- Introduction
- Role of Stable Iodine
- Health Benefits and Risks
- Distribution Issues
- Use of Alternative Protective Measures
- Distribution Plans in Western Australia
- Emergency Workers and Evacuees from Zone 1
- Duration of Administration of Stable Iodine
- Provisions for Stable Iodine in Australian Plans

CHAPTER 10 - CRITICISMS OF CURRENT PLANS - PART II - (PDF format)
SHELTERING
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES
ZONE 3 COUNTERMEASURES
REDUCING THE HAZARD AT SOURCE
EXERCISES
- Introduction
- Scope
- Frequency
GENERAL PREPAREDNESS
DECONTAMINATION
- Introduction
- Decontamination of Persons
- Other Decontamination
ROLE OF FIREFIGHTERS
- Introduction
- Decontamination Role
- Firefighting Role
PUBLIC INFORMATION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT
- Introduction
- Provisions in the Plans
FOREIGN COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT IN ACCIDENT RESPONSE
- Introduction
- Appropriateness of the Current Planning Demarcation
- Potential for Conflict between Uncoordinated Plans?
- Possible Overlap in Monitoring Arrangements
COMPENSATION ISSUES
- Introduction
- Present Provisions
- Proposed Changes

CHAPTER 11 - NUCLEAR WEAPONS - BACKGROUND - Part A (PDF format) - Part B (PDF format)
NEED FOR SAFETY PLANS
- Differing Views
- The Committee's Methodology
- Information Available to the Committee
TYPES AND NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABOARD WARSHIPS
- Weapon Types
- Number of Weapons on Each Visiting Warship
- Nuclear Weapons Capable and Nuclear Weapons Certified
- Age of the Weapons
POTENTIAL HAZARDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- Nuclear Detonation
- Plutonium Hazards
- Non-Radiological Hazards
SAFETY FEATURES
- Safety Design
- Points Made in Submissions
- Safe Storage Regulations
- Magazine Safety
- Effect on Magazine Safety of Dry-Docking the Vessel
- Personnel Reliability
THE ACCIDENT RECORD
- Introduction
- United States Definitions
- Absence of Accidental Nuclear Detonations
- United States - Less Serious Accidents
- United States - Incidents
- British Accident Record
- Conclusions Based on Accident Records

CHAPTER 12 - NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT SCENARIOS - (PDF format)
INTRODUCTION
RISK OF NUCLEAR DETONATION
- Views in Submissions
- Official Views
- Effect of Nuclear Reactor Accident
- Conclusions - Nuclear Detonation
ACCIDENT CAUSING DISPERSAL OF PLUTONIUM PARTICLES
- Introduction
- Effect of Fire
- Effect of Conventional Explosion
- Committee‘s Focus on Accident Likelihood
- Possible Scenarios
- Collision
- Collision - Committee‘s Conclusion
- Fire
- Fire - Committee’s Conclusion
- Effect of a Reactor Accident
- Accident during Weapon Transfer
- Conclusions - Plutonium Dispersal Accidents
OTHER ACCIDENTS
GENERAL CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 13 - NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENTS - OTHER MATTERS - (PDF format)
TERRORIST ATTACK
- Introduction
- History
- Possible Motives
- Possible Methods
- Possible Consequences
- Conclusions
WEAPON ACCIDENT PLANNING IN OTHER COUNTRIES
- General Plans
- The New York Nuclear Weapon Accident Draft Plan
- Nuclear Capable Warship Bans in United States Ports
- Conclusions
OTHER ISSUES
- Scope of Contingency Plans
- Notification of Accidents
- Control at the Scene of an Accident
- Conclusions

APPENDICES - (PDF format)
APPENDIX 1 - INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANISATIONS WHO MADE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS TO THE COMMITTEE
APPENDIX 2 - WITNESSES WNO APPEARED AT PUBLIC HEARINGS
APPENDIX 3 - VISITS TO AUSTRALIAN PORTS BY NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS - 1976-1988
APPENDIX 4 - BACKGROUND NOTE ON COXPENSATION ISSUES PREPARED BY THE COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT BY SENATOR HAMER - (PDF format)

DISSENT BY SENATOR DUNN - (PDF format)
Appendices - Part A (PDF format) - Part B (PDF format)