Chapter 4
Conclusion: moving forward
4.1
During Part (a) and Part (b) of this inquiry, the committee received
submissions and heard evidence which focused on circumstances surrounding the
contamination at RAAF Base Williamtown, Army Aviation Centre Oakey and issues
around PFOS/PFOA contamination at other Commonwealth, state and territory sites
in Australia. The committee concludes this inquiry with an air of uncertainty
about what the future holds for the residents of Williamtown and Oakey, the
scale of this national contamination issue and the response of authorities
across different political jurisdictions which remains at best a work in
progress.
4.2
The committee heard honest and at times emotional testimony from the
residents of Williamtown and Oakey which highlighted the devastating impact of
contamination on two communities which have little in common except for
Defence's legacy contamination and feeling let down, ignored and abandoned by
the authorities. The committee was moved by the stories people told about their
encounters with a slow-moving contamination crisis, none more so than Mr Nathaniel
Roberts, his wife, Stephanie, and four-day old daughter, Isla, who live in
Oakey. Mr Roberts told the committee: 'My daughter is my whole world, and it
breaks my heart to think that she may be hurt because I bought a house in
Oakey'.[1]
4.3
The committee was struck by the similarities in how people from
different communities were affected physically, emotionally and economically
once the contamination became public and in the weeks and months that followed.
What is clear from the Williamtown and Oakey experience is that Defence's
failure to notify residents sooner; the lack of transparency, accountability
and consistency; and the delay in addressing community concerns fuelled a sense
of crisis and fear among residents about an uncertain future. One expert
witness who has worked with communities on contaminated land for 30 years told
the committee: '...information is much more powerful than lack of information. If
people are not told something, then they can often think the worse or be
concerned about the worse. The more information the better'.[2]
This view is consistent with on the ground observations by the committee in
Williamtown and Oakey.
4.4
The committee
concludes that scientific uncertainty around the human toxicological impact of
PFOS/PFOA and legal uncertainty around environmental regulation when
contamination spreads from land controlled by Defence to non-Commonwealth land
should no longer be viewed by government as obstacles to action. Obtaining scientific
and legal certainty is likely to remain beyond the government's reach for the
indefinite future. It is not acceptable for Defence to hide behind uncertainty as
an excuse for inaction. As the committee noted in its first report,[3]
Defence knew about the likely human health impacts of PFOS/PFOA back in 2003
when a key finding of an internal Defence report on environmental issues
associated with the use of firefighting foams was that 'Both PFOS and PFOA have been
implicated with a variety of cancers and toxic health effects in humans that
have had long term exposure to products containing PFOS/PFOA'.[4]
4.5
The report's
authors also warned that in addition to environmental harm, pollution incidents across
Defence establishments have the potential to seriously damage Defence’s
reputation as an environmental manager and good corporate citizen. These
prophetic words were not lost on the committee as it heard evidence from angry
residents of Williamtown and Oakey who had lost confidence in Defence. Notwithstanding
the evolving science, alarm bells should have been ringing in Defence more than
a decade ago about the potential harmful effects of PFOS and PFOA to both the
environment and humans. Defence must now accept responsibility for its inaction
and engage proactively with communities on the subject of compensation, or risk
damaging its already tarnished reputation and exposing the Commonwealth to unknown
financial risk.
4.6
Defence's stubborn approach to the issue of compensation is highlighted
by evidence from the Defence Special Counsel on 3 December 2015 that the
department had not been advised on liability '...because I do not have evidence
on which to base that assessment', and evidence on 7 April 2016 that the objective
of informal discussions between Defence and some Williamtown residents about
their concerns for the future '...is to put options to government for
consideration as part of the decision they are going to make shortly'. While
Defence argued that a door was open for Williamtown residents who may seek to
recover costs from the department, the evidence received by the committee suggests
otherwise. The committee also notes the less than satisfactory Government
response on the issue of compensation for the commercial fishing industry in
Williamtown as further evidence of policy inertia and failure to address the
concerns of residents about ongoing financial hardship and an uncertain future
for many businesses.
4.7
Should the Government continue with its 'head in the sand' approach to liability
and compensation, it need look no further than existing impacts on Williamtown
and Oakey to see what the future may bring as Defence engages with other
communities affected by contamination. Defence's unsatisfactory responses to
questions by the committee on the issue of responsibility, liability and
compensation, and its failure to adopt a blanket precautionary approach, are the
most disappointing outcomes of this inquiry. The committee is of the view that
Defence should be working with affected communities to prevent expensive and
lengthy class action which may drive those communities to breaking point.
4.8
While Defence needs to move forward in addressing its legacy
contamination, the committee is not confident Defence is capable of managing contamination
of its estate without a whole-of-government response and ongoing parliamentary
oversight. The committee also remains concerned by the lack of response by
state governments to emerging legacy contamination issues when authorities were
aware of the contamination for years and, in some cases, decades but no action
was taken.[5]
Recommendation 8
4.9
The committee recommends that it continue to monitor the Department of
Defence's handling of contamination of its estate and surrounding communities caused
by PFOS/PFOA, and report to the Senate on an interim basis as required.
Recommendation 9
4.10
The committee recommends that it continue to monitor the response of,
coordination between and measures taken by Commonwealth, state and territory
governments to legacy contamination caused by PFOS/PFOA, including the adequacy
of environmental and human health standards and legislation.
Senator Alex
Gallacher
Chair
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page